The Fight Against Hooliganism in England: Insights For Other Jurisdictions?

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The Fight Against Hooliganism In England: Insights For Other Jurisdictions?
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THE FIGHT AGAINST HOOLIGANISM IN ENGLAND:
INSIGHTS FOR OTHER JURISDICTIONS?
The Fight Against Hooliganism in England
ALEXANDRA VEUTHEY AND LLOYD FREEBURN *
Violence amongst spectators of sporting events has a long history. Beginning in the 1960s and
originating in England, a new type of organised, group violence began to be experienced,
particularly amongst football spectators. This ‘hooliganism’ led to such infamous incidents as
the 1985 Heysel disaster in Belgium, in which 39 spectators died as a consequence of violence
between fans of English and Italian football clubs. Hooliganism led to a series of regulatory
responses in England, including various legislative initiatives. This article analyses those
regulatory responses, which have collectively become known as the English model for tackling
hooliganism. It notes the apparent overall domestic success of these regulatory initiatives, while
observing some analytical gaps that make definitive conclusions difficult. The influence of the
English system abroad and its use in other countries as a model of good practice — in particular
France, Belgium, Italy, Germany and Switzerland — is then critically examined. This article
concludes with a summary of the situation in a non-European nation, Australia.
CONTENTS
I Introduction........................................................................................................... 204
II The Situation in England ...................................................................................... 207
A The Reports Established in Relation to the Safety and Security of
Spectators and Violence in Stadiums ....................................................... 207
B The Legal Framework .............................................................................. 210
1 State Measures Relating to Supporters......................................... 210
2 State Measures Aimed at Organisers of Sports Events ................ 222
3 State Measures Aimed at Third Parties ........................................ 223
4 Main Criticisms ............................................................................ 224
5 Legal Framework Tested in the Courts ........................................ 226
C Measures Managed by the Clubs/the League ........................................... 229
1 General ......................................................................................... 229
2 Main Criticisms ............................................................................ 231
D Efficiency of the Current Tools ................................................................ 232
E Final Remarks on the English System ...................................................... 234
III The Application of the English System Abroad ................................................... 236
A The Situation in Europe ............................................................................ 236
1 The Legislative Framework ......................................................... 237
2 The Measures Managed by the Clubs/the League........................ 244
3 Analysis ........................................................................................ 245
B The Situation in Australia ......................................................................... 248
* This article develops ideas first presented by Alexandra Veuthey in a paper written for the
Melbourne Law Masters subject ‘Event Management Law’, originally submitted in August
2012. Our thanks go to Olivier Cousi (attorney at Gide Loyrette Nouel/Paris) and his
associates, Alessandro Visentin (CEO of Mechvis SRL), Alberto Zamboni (Deputy
Licensing Manager, Federazione Italiana Giuco Calcio), Anastassia Tsoukala (Associate
Professor at the University of Paris XI), Leander Monbaliu (Legal Counsel for the Belgian
Pro League), Wouter Lambrecht (Legal Manager at the European Club Association) and
Loïc Trégourès (PhD candidate, University of Lille II) for their many helpful suggestions
and clarifications with regard to the comparative law chapters. Our gratitude also goes to
Geoff Pearson (Senior Lecturer in sports law, University of Liverpool) and Mark James
(Professor of Laws, University of Northumbria) for their invaluable advice. Omissions or
errors are the responsibility of the authors.
203
204 Melbourne Journal of International Law [Vol 16
1 The Legislative Framework ......................................................... 249

2 The Measures Managed by the Clubs/the League........................ 251
3 Analysis ........................................................................................ 252
C Final Remarks ........................................................................................... 253
IV Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 254
I INTRODUCTION
Sporting events have been marred by fights and clashes between spectators, if
not since the inception of organised sport, then at least since the end of the 19th
century. However, spectator misbehaviour escalated to a new dimension in
Britain in the 1960s with the emergence of a new form of violence: ‘organised,
premeditated and more often than not, group based’ violence. 1 This phenomenon
became known as ‘hooliganism’ and gradually extended throughout continental
Europe and, to a lesser degree, the rest of the world. 2 While hooliganism is a
term used to describe, in a broader sense, violence or disorder that may occur
amongst spectators at any sport, the term is primarily associated with football. 3
England is the focus of this essay for several reasons. Hooliganism reached its
zenith in 1985, when, during the European Cup final between Juventus (Turin)
and Liverpool at Heysel Stadium in Brussels, 39 spectators died. 4 This tragedy
led to a five-year blanket ban on English football teams at European
competitions. 5
1 Dominique Bodin, Le Hooliganisme (Presses Universitaires de France, 2003). See also

Anastassia Tsoukala, Hooliganisme en Europe: Sécurité et libertés publiques (Athéna,
2010) 11.
2 Steve Frosdick and Peter Marsh, Football Hooliganism (Willan Publishing, 2005) 2.
3 Note that the term ‘football’ will be used throughout this paper to refer to the ‘world sport’
that is sometimes called ‘soccer’ in Anglo-Saxon countries. For more details about this
paragraph, see generally Steve Frosdick and Robert Newton, ‘The Nature and Extent of
Football Hooliganism in England and Wales’ (2006) 7 Soccer and Society 403, 403–4;
Clifford Stott and Geoff Pearson, Football ‘Hooliganism’, Policing and the War on the
‘English Disease’ (Pennant Books, 2007) 55. See also Mike Morgan and Luca Egitto,
‘Crowd Disorder: European Anti-Hooliganism Measures: Developments’ (2007) 5(5) World
Sports Law Report 5, 5.
4 Bodin, Le Hooliganisme, above n 1, 13. More specifically, regarding the emergence of
hooliganism in Europe: at 17–43. See also Geoff Beckham, ‘The Price of Passion: The
Banishment of English Hooligans from Football Matches in Violation of Fundamental
Freedoms’ (2001) 25 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 41, 41–2.
However, Beckham refers to 38 deaths. For additional background, see Frosdick and Marsh,
Football Hooliganism, above n 2, 160; Stott and Pearson, Football ‘Hooliganism’, Policing
and the War on the ‘English Disease’, above n 3, xix, 25; Ian Warren, Football, Crowds and
Cultures: Comparing English and Australian Law and Enforcement Trends (Australian
Society for Sports History, 2003) 46. Ian Warren reports 38 deaths. Wolfgang Wohlers,
‘Hooliganismus-Bekämpfung: kann die Schweiz von England lernen?’ (2011) 2 Causa
Sport 176, 178. For a detailed analysis about this tragedy, see, eg, Françoise Tulkens, ‘La
tragédie du Heysel: les responsabilités — Le débat sur le plan juridique’ [1988] Revue
interdisciplinaire d'études juridiques 71. It should also be noted that many other incidents
have marred modern sports competitions and football in particular. In the 20th century, for
football alone, the magazine L’Equipe listed over 1300 deaths throughout the world
following acts of hooliganism: Bodin, Le Hooliganisme, above n 1, 16. For a historical
presentation of disorder in Europe, see also Frosdick and Marsh, Football Hooliganism,
above n 2, 16–22.
5 Beckham, above n 4, 42; Frosdick and Marsh, Football Hooliganism, above n 2, 43, 153;
Stott and Pearson, Football ‘Hooliganism’, Policing and the War on the ‘English Disease’,
above n 3, 26–7.
2015] The Fight against Hooliganism in England 205
The effects of English hooliganism in the 1970s and 1980s also led to the
introduction of widespread reforms by both the Government and the football
authorities to combat the problem. 6 These reforms have often been referred to as
a model framework for managing crowd violence. 7 While the problem has not
been completely resolved and it is not possible to be absolutely definitive, it does
appear that greater regulation and control from the relevant authorities and
entities has contributed to a decline in the level of hooliganism. 8
The topic of violence in football has also attracted frequent academic
comment, 9 in particular contributions confined to specific aspects of the issue.
Crowd violence (or more generally, crowd and safety management) is also the
subject of numerous practice-oriented and generalist literature aimed at sports
managers or the general public. 10 Yet few authors have examined the legal
aspects of hooliganism comparatively across national jurisdictions. 11
6 See below 17 and accompanying text. See also Frosdick and Marsh, Football Hooliganism,
above n 2, 153; Morgan and Egitto, above n 3, 5. For more details about English rioting, see
above n 3; Warren, Football, Crowds and Cultures, above n 4, 7.
7 See, eg, Stefano Blin, ‘Football: England the Example Italy Should Follow in Hooliganism
Fight’, Agence France-Presse (Paris), 10 February 2007; Tony Fonteneau, ‘Les limites du
modèle anglais’, L’Express (online), 5 March 2010 <http://www.lexpress.fr/
actualite/sport/les-limites-du-modele-anglais_853306.html>. See also Conférence des
directrices et directeurs de départements cantonaux de justice et police, ‘Concept pour une
politique de prévention de la violence dans le sport — Projet’ (Report, 29 October 2009) 3
(‘Prevention of Violence in Sport Report’). This document sums up the conclusions of a
Swiss delegation which visited several European countries and studied the way they fight
against hooliganism in order to find a model of ‘good practice’ for Switzerland.
8 See, eg, Nick Coward, ‘Tackling Hooliganism’ (2003) 59 Magistrate 232, 232; Morgan and
Egitto, above n 3, 5.
9 Frosdick and Newton, ‘Hooliganism in England and Wales’, above n 3, 403; Frosdick and
Marsh, Football Hooliganism, above n 2, 7–8; Megan O’Neill, Policing Football: Social
Interaction and Negotiated Disorder (Palgrave McMillan, 2005) 16; Stott and Pearson,
Football ‘Hooliganism’, Policing and the War on the ‘English Disease’, above n 3, 37;
Warren, Football, Crowds and Cultures, above n 4, 5. See, for example, the many
contributions dedicated to the study of specific gangs or, in the legal area, the operation and
the legality of the banning orders system.
10 Frosdick and Marsh, Football Hooliganism, above n 2, 7–8. About the issue of safety and
management in sport, see, eg, Steve Frosdick and Lynne Walley, Sport & Safety
Management (Butterworth-Heinemann, 1997); Steve Greenfield and Guy Osborn, ‘Sport
and the Law: Considerations for Sport Managers’ in Linda Trenberth and David Hassan
(eds), Managing Sport Business: An Introduction (Routledge, 2012) 285, 285–98. About
Australia, see, eg, Tracy Taylor and Kristine Toohey, ‘Ensuring Safety at Australian Sport
Event Precincts: Creating Securitised, Sanitised and Stifling Spaces?’ (2011) 48 Urban
Studies 3259, 3259–75.
11 Stott and Pearson, Football ‘Hooliganism’, Policing and the War on the ‘English Disease’,
above n 3, 37; Warren, Football, Crowds and Cultures, above n 4, 5; Roy Hay and Ian
Warren, ‘Order and Disorder at Sporting Venues’ in Dennis Hemphill (ed), All Part of the
Game: Violence and Australian Sport (Walla Walla Press, 1998) 63, 63.
This article examines the legal and policy measures introduced to respond to
football hooliganism in England (and Wales). 12 These measures include an
enhanced legal framework as well as policy-based initiatives such as the use of
surveillance and monitoring technologies and other strict police enforcement
(based mainly on segregation) and increased ticket prices. 13 Particular attention
is devoted to the legal measures implemented by the Government to combat
hooliganism. Some other measures, relating to the improvement of sports
infrastructure, will also be briefly discussed as they have made stadiums safer
and reduced crowd disorder. 14
On the basis of the commentary and assumptions drawn from statistics which
show a decline in hooliganism, the conclusion can reasonably be drawn that the
reforms that have been introduced in England to combat hooliganism have been
effective and good policy in the English (football) context. 15 The few
shortcomings of these reforms are not sufficient to refute this. It is more
problematic, however, to identify the particular effects of any specific measure in
reducing hooliganism within the overall model, or indeed, the precise or
cumulative effects of the overall model. Accordingly, the conception of the
reforms as a ‘model’ should be used in a prudent manner by other jurisdictions
faced with hooliganism problems. Careful consideration needs to be given to the
potential benefits that could be expected from the adoption of some or all of the
English reforms and how to implement those reforms in different circumstances.
Noting this gap in the analysis, the influence of the English model in some
other countries will then be examined to illustrate the need to adapt reforms in
light of the local circumstances and culture.
This paper proceeds in three main parts. Part II will critically describe the
English system, including the measures employed by the state to manage
supporters, organisers of sports events and third parties, together with the
measures implemented by the clubs and the league. Part III will examine the
12 The other countries of the United Kingdom (Scotland and Northern Ireland) will not be
examined because they have not experienced the same degree of hooliganism. About
Scotland, see Richard Giulianotti, ‘Sport Mega Events, Urban Football Carnivals and
Securitised Commodification: The Case of the English Premier League’ (2011) 48 Urban
Studies 3293, 3300; Niall Hamilton-Smith et al, ‘An Evaluation of Football Banning Orders
in Scotland’ (Research Report, Scottish Government Social Research, 2011); O’Neill, above
n 9, 52–3; Stott and Pearson, Football ‘Hooliganism’, Policing and the War on the ‘English
Disease’, above n 3, 122–30. In Northern Ireland, supporters fall very much along Catholic
Republican and Protestant Loyalist lines, which sometimes creates dangerous situations. For
more details about the latter point, see Mike Cronin, ‘Catholics and Sport in Northern
Ireland: Exclusiveness or Inclusiveness?’ (2000) 22(1) International Sports Studies 25.
13 Frosdick and Marsh, Football Hooliganism, above n 2, 153; Giulianotti, ‘Sport Mega
Events’, above n 12, 3299; Ian Warren and Roy Hay, ‘“Fencing them in”: The A-League,
Policing and the Dilemma of Public Order’ (2009) 10 Soccer & Society 124, 125. See also
Fonteneau, above n 7; Julie Zaugg, ‘Comment le Royaume-Uni a
taclé les hooligans’, L’Hebdo (online), 4 April 2012 <http://www.hebdo.ch/
comment_le_royaumeuni_a_tacle_les_hooligans_156559_.html>.
14 On the contribution of stadium design and condition to spectator safety in relation to the
Hillsborough disaster, see Lord Justice Taylor, The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster, Cm 765
(1989); The Hillsborough Independent Panel, ‘The Report of the Hillsborough Independent
Panel’ (Report, 12 September 2012) (‘Hillsborough Panel Report’). See also Frosdick and
Marsh, Football Hooliganism, above n 2, 8, 172–3.
15 See, eg, Morgan and Egitto, above n 3, 5. They note that ‘[t]he UK’s anti-hooliganism
measures now in place can quite justifiably be viewed as some of the most efficient on the
planet’.
influence of the English system abroad and its use in other countries as a model
of good practice — in particular France, Belgium, Italy, Germany and
Switzerland. Part IV will conclude with a summary of the situation in a
non-European nation, Australia. Finally, a number of concluding observations
will be made.
II THE SITUATION IN ENGLAND

This Part will be devoted to the description and the critical analysis of the
legal and regulatory measures introduced by England and English clubs in order
to combat hooliganism. In this context, the attempt will be made to demonstrate
that even if the current system is not perfect, it has reached a satisfactory
threshold as the result of a long process spanning several decades. 16 The
anti-hooliganism regime introduced in England has also required many
adjustments, often conditioned by the tragedies and other riots that have marred
football matches. These are discussed in the context of the various reports
produced by inquiries established by the Government in response to specific
incidents.
A The Reports Established in Relation to the Safety and Security of

Spectators and Violence in Stadiums
Several United Kingdom government reports concerning the safety and
security of spectators and violence in stadiums were written after various
incidents which occurred during the 20th century. 17 While most of the fatalities
that occurred in these incidents were the result of inadequate safety measures, the
issues of spectator safety and hooliganism were often conflated.
The first report was the Shortt Report (1924), which ‘followed a near-disaster
at Wembley in 1923, and included recommendations about responsibility,
licensing, stewarding and fire safety’. 18 The Moelwyn Hughes Report (1946),
commissioned to investigate the collapse of two barriers at Bolton Wanderers’
Burnden Park Ground which resulted in the death of 33 people, 19 dealt with
licensing and crowd management. The Lang Report (1969) specifically
concerned the behaviour of spectators 20 and the Wheatley Report (1971), written
following the disaster at Ibrox Park (Glasgow) which involved the death of 66
16 See Warren, Football, Crowds and Cultures, above n 4, 57–79. Warren notes the
importance of historical developments in British soccer.
17 Aude Bichovsky, Prévention de la Violence Commise par les Spectateurs lors de
Manifestations Sportives (Thesis, Université de Lausanne, 2009) 119; Warren, Football,
Crowds and Cultures, above n 4, 5.
18 Frosdick and Marsh, Football Hooliganism, above n 2, 174; Edward Shortt, Report of the
Departmental Committee on Crowds, Cmd 2088 (1924). The evidence heard by the inquiry
is held at the National Archives: HO 73/114 and 115. See also
‘Amazing Scenes at the Cup Final’, The Guardian (online), 30 April 1923
<http://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/from-the-archive-blog/2011/may/23/
guardian190-fa-cup-1923>.
19 Ronw Moelwyn Hughes, Enquiry into the Disaster at Bolton Wanderers’ Football Ground
on the 9th March, 1946, Cmd 6846 (1946) 12. See also Steve Greenfield and Guy Osborn,
Regulating Football: Commodification, Consumption and the Law (Pluto, 2001) 8; Mark
James, Sports Law (Palgrave Macmillan, 2nd ed, 2013) 187–8.
20 Bichovsky, above n 17, 119.
spectators in a stampede, 21 led to the Safety of Sports Ground Act 1975 (UK)
(which implemented the recommendations initially made in the Moelwyn
Hughes Report, but which had not been acted upon). 22 Other reports also
addressed, inter alia, the issue of alcohol in connection with matches. 23
The Popplewell Report (1986) investigated the fire of the Bradford stadium,
the Heysel events that occurred two weeks later and a hooligan-related death at
Birmingham. 24 The Bradford tragedy, which claimed the lives of 58 people, was
not due to the violent behaviour of spectators but to the poor infrastructure of the
stadium. Illustrating connections between safety and hooliganism, the fire
extinguishers were removed from the stadium for fear that they would be used by
hooligans as missiles. In addition, the parliamentary debate on the disaster and
the Popplewell Report was ‘dominated by a discussion of violence rather than
safety’. 25
Recommendations flowing from these reports included requiring clubs to
have licences in order to host football matches at their stadiums and the
introduction of video surveillance systems. Greater seating capacity in stadiums,
the creation of a membership scheme for all spectators and penalties for clubs
not complying with their obligations were also recommended. 26
Until the Heysel disaster in 1985, the various reports struggled to produce
substantial legislative reform, with matters of security in stadiums remaining in
the purview of sporting clubs in accordance with a policy of self-regulation and
the traditional exclusion of sport from legislative regulation. 27
21 Simon Gardiner et al, Sports Law (Routledge, 4th ed, 2012) 30–1, 548; James, above n 19,
189–90; Warren, Football, Crowds and Cultures, above n 4, 46.
22 For the whole paragraph, see Bichovsky, above n 17, 119; Hillsborough Panel Report,
above n 14, 30 [1.28]–[1.31]; Gardiner et al, above n 21, 544–52; Greenfield and Osborn,
Regulating Football, above n 19, 7–9; James, above n 19, 183–91; O’Neill, above n 9, 45–7.
23 See J A Harrington, ‘Soccer Hooliganism: A Preliminary Report’ (Report, Birmingham
Research Group, 1968); Frank McElhone, ‘Report of the Working Group on Football Crowd
Behaviour’ (Report, Scottish Education Department, 1977). For some comments, see
Bichovsky, above n 17, 119; Frosdick and Marsh, Football Hooliganism, above n 2, 39,
87–8, 125–37, 174; Gardiner et al, above n 21, 548; Greenfield and Osborn, Regulating
Football, above n 19, 9–11; O’Neill, above n 9, 47–8.
24 Bichovsky, above n 17, 119; Gardiner et al, above n 21, 548–9; Greenfield and Osborn,
Regulating Football, above n 19, 11–12; O’Neill, above n 9, 48–9; Stott and Pearson,
Football ‘Hooliganism’, Policing and the War on the ‘English Disease’, above n 3, 26–7.
25 Martin Johnes, ‘“Heads in the Sand”: Football, Politics and Crowd Disasters in
Twentieth-Century Britain’ in Paul Darby, Martin Johnes and Gavin Mellor (eds), Soccer
and Disaster: International Perspectives (Routledge, 2005) 10, 13, 19. See also Justice
Popplewell, Committee of Inquiry into Crowd Safety and Control at Sports Grounds: Final
Report, Cmd 9710 (1986). The Bradford stadium fire occurred on 11 May 1985, when a
flash fire consumed one side of the Bradford City stadium (England). As a result of the
panicked crowds, the incident claimed the lives of 58 spectators and resulted in injuries to a
further 200 people. It was established that the spectators were not able to escape from the
stand in the event of fire because of the barriers and fences that were present in the stadium.
For more details, see Bichovsky, above n 17, 119. Note that some authors report other
figures. See, eg, Ian Blackshaw, ‘The “English Disease” — Tackling Football Hooliganism
in England’ [2005] (1–2) International Sports Law Journal 90, 90. Ian Blackshaw reports 54
deaths. See also James, above n 19, 191–4; Warren, Football, Crowds and Cultures, above
n 4, 1, 46; Gardiner et al, above n 21, 545. Mark James, Simon Warren and Gardiner et al all
report 56 deaths. See O’Neill, above n 9, 48. Megan O’Neill mentions 57 deaths.
26 See, eg, Bichovsky, above n 17, 120.
27 Ibid 119–20; Johnes, above n 25, 4, 10, 16.
In 1989, at the Hillsborough stadium in Sheffield, England during an FA Cup

semifinal match between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest football clubs,
uncontrolled spectator movements resulted in spectators being crushed, causing
the deaths of 96 people and nearly 800 injuries. In the Taylor Report (1990),
made following the Hillsborough stadium incident, 28 the central issues were
stadium infrastructure and crowd management improvement. 29 However, the
prevalence of hooliganism at the time led to some attempts to direct blame
towards the behaviour of spectators, in particular towards the Liverpool fans.
Ultimately, in 2012, the Report of the Hillsborough Independent Panel
conclusively established that fans were not responsible for the deaths and that, in
fact, authorities had attempted to conceal what had happened. This report led to
apologies from the UK Prime Minister and others. 30
Following the Taylor Report in 1990, an important building and stadium
improvement program was established in England, which led to the construction
of more than 20 stadiums and over 200 new stands. 31 Fences within stadiums
were removed and all-seated accommodation was introduced. The Hillsborough
disaster is credited with bringing a radically different approach to safety in
football. Reform was forced upon reluctant clubs
by a government which saw football as an embarrassment and irritant. … [The
then English Prime Minister Margaret] Thatcher’s personal position, the Heysel
tragedy and the continuing problem of hooliganism meant that the government
was no longer content for football to govern its own affairs. The government’s
insistence on all-seater stadiums was as much due to their potential to reduce
hooliganism as to the safety factor. Hooliganism, not safety, had brought football
into the arena of high politics. 32
The next section addresses the legal measures introduced by the Government
in order to combat hooliganism.
28 For an incident that was not caused by hooliganism, see Lord Justice Taylor, The
Hillsborough Stadium Disaster, Cm 765 (1989); Hillsborough Panel Report, above n 14.
29 Lord Justice Taylor, The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster, Cm 765 (1989). See also
Hillsborough Panel Report, above n 14. Again illustrating the connection between safety
and hooliganism, the fences at Hillsborough that exacerbated the effects of the crowd crush
were designed to cage in hooligans: Johnes, above n 25, 19. For more details, see, eg,
Giulianotti, ‘Sport Mega Events’, above n 12, 3299.
30 Hillsborough Panel Report, above n 14, 1, 22–6; Owen Gibson, David Conn and Haroon
Siddique, ‘Hillsborough Disaster: David Cameron Apologises for “Double Injustice”’, The
Guardian (London), 13 September 2012. See also Phil Scraton, Hillsborough: The Truth
(Mainstream, 1999); Hazel J Hartley, Exploring Sport and Leisure Disasters: A Socio-Legal
Perspective (Cavendish, 2001).
31 Coward, above n 8, 232. See also Giulianotti, ‘Sport Mega Events’, above n 12, 3302–3;
Frosdick and Marsh, Football Hooliganism, above n 2, 8, 172–3. A significant proportion of
the cost of the stadium redevelopment program was financed by the Football Trust (now the
Football Stadia Improvement Fund). See The Football Stadia Improvement Fund, About the
Football Stadia Improvement Fund <http://www.fsif.co.uk/about-fsif>. Part of the proceeds
of the government levy on football pools was made available by the government for
distribution by the Football Trust. The Football Trust distributed £150 million (of a total
£500 million cost) to clubs in England, Scotland and Wales between 1990–97: Football
Trust, ‘Annual Report’ (Annual Report, 1997) 1.
32 Johnes, above n 25, 20. See also Coward, above n 8, 232.
B The Legal Framework

Spectators are subject to a general body of law. Offences aimed at protecting
against violence or damage to property apply in the normal way. 33 In addition, a
whole raft of legislation is solely sport- or, more specifically, football-related. 34
The current principal legislation relevant in this context in England (and
Wales) can be found in a number of different Acts:
• Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (UK);
• Football (Disorder) Act 2000 (UK);
• Football (Disorder) (Amendment) Act 2002 (UK);
• Football (Offences and Disorder) Act 1999 (UK);
• Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK);
• Public Order Act 1986 (UK);
• Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975 (UK);
• Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol etc) Act 1985 (UK);
• Sports Ground Safety Authority Act 2011 (UK); and
• Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006 (UK) 35
As will be seen, certain provisions concern supporters while others are aimed
at the organisers of sporting events. 36 In addition, there are specific provisions
concerning third parties. 37
In addition to the above Acts there are international laws, most notably the
European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events
and in Particular at Football Matches. 38
1 State Measures Relating to Supporters

The state measures aimed at supporters include the creation and use of a
database, specific (sports- and football-related) offences, banning orders, the
obligation to report to a police station, the prohibition to leave the territory and
detention in police custody.
33 Frosdick and Marsh, Football Hooliganism, above n 2, 169.

34 Ibid.
35 See, eg, Bichovsky, above n 17, 121; Giulianotti, ‘Sport Mega Events’, above n 12, 3300;
Greenfield and Osborn, Regulating Football, above n 19, 18–38; O’Neill, above n 9, 51–2.
Some other general Acts might be relevant such as: Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (UK) c
37; Antisocial Behaviour Act 2003 (UK) c 38. Though they are not directly relevant to
football banning orders, some of the arguments about the legality of these measures were
revisited in several antisocial behaviour order cases. See, eg, R v Manchester Crown Court;
Ex parte McCann [2001] EWCA Civ 281 (1 March 2001).
37 Ibid 188.
38 European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events and in
Particular at Football Matches, opened for signature 19 August 1985, 1496 UNTS 125
(entered into force 1 November 1985) (‘European Convention on Spectator Violence’). It is
to be noted that the European Convention on Spectator Violence includes provision for
measures found in the ‘English model’, such as the following: domestic
governmental/agency cooperation: at arts 2, 3.1(b); legislative offences for violence or
misbehaviour by spectators: at art 3.1(c); coordination/supervision of travel arrangements: at
arts 3.1(a), 3.3; stadia design: at arts 3.4(a), 3.4(e); spectator management (segregation): at
art 3.4(b); banning orders: at art 3.4(d); and alcohol restrictions: at art 3.4(f). This legislation
is beyond the scope of this essay and will not be discussed further. For more details, see
Bichovsky, above n 17, 87–113.
(a) The Use of a Database

A database has been set up to counter hooliganism in England. This database,
which has undergone various organisational changes, has now been in existence
for several decades. It is now managed by the United Kingdom Football Policing
Unit, 39 which houses the Football Banning Orders Authority. 40
This database contains the details of people involved (or suspected of being
involved) in football-related disorders. 41 These individuals are divided into three
categories (A, B and C), according to their degree of dangerousness. 42 The
information stored in the database is considered to be very useful for English
authorities and the Football Association’s (‘FA’) official member clubs.43
Furthermore, information can be passed onto foreign police forces on the basis of
European Union agreements. 44 This exchange of information is particularly
important in preventing violence during international matches. 45 There are also a
number of bilateral agreements, signed on the basis of the Football Spectators
Act 1989 (UK), which allow banning from English and Welsh stadiums anyone
who has participated in violent behaviour abroad. 46
Next, the specific offences introduced by the British Government in order to
fight hooliganism are considered.
(b) Creation of Specific Offences

The Government has introduced several sports- or football-related legislative
measures to combat hooliganism. 47 This includes the creation of offences such as
entering a stadium when drunk or in possession of alcohol, throwing any objects
39 Some other entities have effectively preceded the United Kingdom Football Policing Unit
(‘UKFPU’) in the monitoring of hooligans. In 1989, an independent body known as the
Football Intelligence Unit was created and became a part of the National Crime Intelligence
Service (‘NCIS’) when it was formed in 1992. It is only in 2006 that the Football
Intelligence Unit was replaced by the UKFPU, which was removed from the ambit of the
NCIS to be overseen by the Home Office and the Association of Chief Police Officers. This
organisational arrangement is seemingly constructive, as it allows the UKFPU to take on a
wider role in the effective management of hooliganism amongst English fans abroad. The
UKFPU is in charge of the planning and intelligence coordination at major sporting events.
It provides intelligence on hooligans to agencies at home and abroad. It can also apply
directly to courts for an imposition of domestic or international banning orders. For more
details, see Frosdick and Newton, ‘Hooliganism in England and Wales’, above n 3, 405–6;
Frosdick and Marsh, Football Hooliganism, above n 2, 166; Giulianotti, ‘Sport Mega
Events’, above n 12, 3300–1; Stott and Pearson, Football ‘Hooliganism’, Policing and the
War on the ‘English Disease’, above n 3, xxi; Anastassia Tsoukala, ‘La gestion policière du
hooliganisme en Angleterre, en Italie et aux Pays-Bas’ in Jean-Charles Basson (ed), Sport et
ordre public (La documentation Française, 2001) 159, 164.
40 For more details, see Home Office, Football-Related Arrests and Banning Orders
(9 October 2013) Gov.UK <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/
football-banning-orders>.
42 Ibid.
43 James Rowlands, Policing European Football Hooliganism — Conclusion
(2001) Policing European Football Hooliganism <http://people.exeter.ac.uk/
watupman/undergrad/rowlands/conclusions.htm>.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 See, eg, Stott and Pearson, Football ‘Hooliganism’, Policing and the War on the ‘English
Disease’, above n 3, 173.
47 Bichovsky, above n 17, 131; Coward, above n 8, 232.
at or towards the pitch, possessing fireworks, indecent or racist chanting and

entering the pitch without lawful excuse. 48
(c) Alcohol
Under the Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol etc) Act 1985 (UK), any
person who is drunk at a sporting venue, brings alcohol inside or possesses
alcohol during a match is guilty of an offence. 49 Furthermore, the Act grants
uniformed police constables the authority to search (and even arrest) individuals
suspected of infringing these rules. 50
The term ‘drunk’ is not defined in the Act. Therefore, some legal
commentators consider that these provisions may catch not only highly
intoxicated supporters, but also those who may be less intoxicated. 51
Further to these restrictions, the intoxication of supporters on public transport
is also forbidden, as is the possession of alcohol in public transport vehicles. 52
Here, police constables can legally undertake a search of public transportation
for the purposes of targeting drunkenness at sporting events. 53 One consequence
of these restrictions is that tour operators may be found guilty of the offence of
permitting alcoholic beverages in vehicles used by them to transport patrons to
and from football matches. 54
Finally, a constable in uniform may require the closure of a bar if it appears to
him or her that the sale or supply of intoxicating liquor ‘is detrimental to the
orderly conduct or safety of spectators’. 55
(d) Pyrotechnics in Stadiums

Under the Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol etc) Act 1985 (UK), 56 any
person who enters (or tries to enter) a football ground with fireworks, or
possesses fireworks during a sports event, is guilty of an offence. 57
This Act defines the term ‘firework’ as ‘any article or substance whose main
purpose is the emission of a flare for purposes of illuminating or signalling (as
opposed to igniting or heating) or the emission of smoke or a visible gas’. 58
48 Bichovsky, above n 17, 131–8; Frosdick and Marsh, Football Hooliganism, above n 2, 170.
49 Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol etc) Act 1985 (UK) c 57, s 2; Bichovsky, above n 17,
131. See also Frosdick and Marsh, Football Hooliganism, above n 2, 170; Stott and Pearson,
Football ‘Hooliganism’, Policing and the War on the ‘English Disease’, above n 3, 27.
50 Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol etc) Act 1985 (UK) c 57, ss 1(2), 7(2); Bichovsky,
above n 17, 131. Note that the Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006 (UK) also empowers the
police to ‘move on’ anybody (including football fans) if an alcohol-related offence might
occur: Giulianotti, ‘Sport Mega Events’, above n 12, 3300.
52 Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol etc) Act 1985 (UK) c 57, s 1. See also ibid, 132;
Gardiner et al, above n 21, 546; Warren, Football, Crowds and Cultures, above n 4, 58.
53 Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol etc) Act 1985 (UK) c 57, s 7(3).
55 Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol etc) Act 1985 (UK) c 57, s 6(1). See also ibid; Warren,
Football, Crowds and Cultures, above n 4, 69–70.
56 Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol etc) Act 1985 (UK) c 57, s 2A, as amended by Public
Order Act 1986 (UK) c 64, sch 1 para 3.
58 Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol etc) Act 1985 (UK) c 57, s 2A(3).
Included in this definition are ‘distress flares, fog signals, and pellets and
capsules intended to be used as fumigators or for testing pipes’. In contrast,
matches, cigarette lighters or heaters are permitted. 59
(e) Throwing Missiles onto the Pitch

The Football Offences Act 1991 (UK) prohibits spectators throwing missiles
onto the pitch or to any areas where spectators or any other people are or may be
present. 60
(f) Indecent or Racist Chanting

By the late 1970s and ’80s, football hooligans started to consist of racist and
right-wing groups, 61 who abused black players who were then beginning to
appear in national English teams. 62 Some black players were also victims of
monkey noises, showers of bananas or verbal insults. 63 But this kind of
provocation was not always linked to skin colour. 64 For example, the actions of
the French football player Eric Cantona in 1995 in launching a ‘kung-fu’ style
kick into a supporter, is explained by many as being a response to a racial slur
directed at the player. 65
In reaction to these incidents, campaigns against racism were launched by
private entities. 66 For its part, the Government, after other general legislative
changes, finally opted for the creation of a specific football offence to fight
against this curse, though this was not the end of the issue in terms of general
legislation. 67 This response is embodied in s 3 of the Football Offences Act 1991
59 Ibid.
60 Football Offences Act 1991 (UK) c 19, s 2. See also Bichovsky, above n 17, 134; Steve
Greenfield and Guy Osborn, ‘When the Whites Go Marching In? Racism and Resistance in
English Football’ (1996) 6 Marquette Sports Law Review 315, 326; Warren, Football,
Crowds and Cultures, above n 4, 60.
61 Warren, Football, Crowds and Cultures, above n 4, 45.
62 Frosdick and Marsh, Football Hooliganism, above n 2, 139; Greenfield and Osborn,
Regulating Football, above n 19, 143.
63 Frosdick and Marsh, Football Hooliganism, above n 2, 139; Greenfield and Osborn,
Regulating Football, above n 19, 138.
64 Gardiner et al, above n 21, 581–2; Greenfield and Osborn, ‘Racism and Resistance in
English Football’, above n 60, 320.
65 Gardiner et al, above n 21, 582; Greenfield and Osborn, Regulating Football, above n 19,
148–50; Greenfield and Osborn, ‘Racism and Resistance in English Football’, above n 60,
318.
66 Frosdick and Marsh, Football Hooliganism, above n 2, 142–6; Greenfield and Osborn,
Regulating Football, above n 19, 150–4. See also Gardiner et al, above n 21, 585;
Greenfield and Osborn, ‘Racism and Resistance in English Football’, above n 60, 329–32.
67 Greenfield and Osborn, Regulating Football, above n 19, 154–8. When the Criminal Justice
and Public Order Bill 1994 (UK) was passing through Parliament, an amendment was
introduced. This resulted in a new s 4A of the Public Order Act 1986 (UK), which
established a new offence of intentional harassment, alarm or distress:
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if, with intent to cause a person harassment,
alarm or distress, he … (a) uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour,
or disorderly behaviour, or (b) displays any writing, sign or other visible
representation which is threatening, abusive or insulting, thereby causing that or
another person harassment, alarm or distress.
(UK), which currently punishes those who ‘engage 68 or take part in chanting of
an indecent or racialist nature’. 69
According to the section, ‘of a racialist nature’ means ‘consisting of or
including matter which is threatening, abusive or insulting to a person by reason
of his colour, race, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or national
origins’. 70 Surprisingly, religion is not included in this list.71
Subsequent to its introduction, this legislation had to be amended to ensure
that it covered solitary actions. 72 The original law defined chanting as ‘repeated
uttering of any words or sounds in concert with one or more others’. 73 This gap
allowed ‘several offenders to escape conviction’ at football matches. 74 Now, the
law states that the offence is committed ‘whether alone or in concert with one
[or] more others’. 75
(g) Encroachment onto the Playing Area

According to s 4 of the Football Offences Act 1991 (UK):
It is an offence for a person at a designated football match to go onto the playing
area, or any area adjacent to the playing area to which spectators are not generally
The element of racial motivation that was part of the original amendment was excluded
from the final section of the Public Order Act 1986 (UK). Similarly, the offence requires not
only intent but also proof that the victim suffered harassment, alarm or distress. This is a
more serious offence, by virtue of the potential penalties, than s 5 of the Public Order Act
1986 (UK). Given the exclusion of the racial motivation element, it adds little to the existing
public order legislation: Greenfield and Osborn, ‘Racism and Resistance in English
Football’, above n 60, 326–7. Finally, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (UK) was adopted
in 1998. Section 33 provides for an aggravation of public order offence in cases relating to
racial or religious abuse.
68 Term added by s 8 of the Football (Offences and Disorder) Act 1999 (UK).
69 Bichovsky, above n 17, 135; Frosdick and Marsh, Football Hooliganism, above n 2, 139;
Greenfield and Osborn, Regulating Football, above n 19, 158; Greenfield and Osborn,
‘Racism and Resistance in English Football’, above n 60, 326. See also Warren, Football,
Crowds and Cultures, above n 4, 60. Note in this regard that the Crown Prosecution Service
and the Football Association (‘FA’) have recently declared that the singing of ‘yid’
(apparently perpetrated mainly by Spurs fans) was to be deemed racial, but subsequent
convictions have collapsed. For more details, see, eg, James Lyons, ‘Spurs “Yid” Row:
David Cameron Says Tottenham Fans Should Not Face Criminal Charges over Chants’, The
Daily Mirror (online), 17 September 2013, <http://www.mirror.co.uk/sport/football/news/
spurs-yid-row-david-cameron-2279807#ixzz3D75QYBAu>. For a detailed and general
overview about racism issues in the English Premier League, see Alexandra Veuthey,
‘Racism in English Premier League: Is Football Operating in a Cocoon?’ [2013]
International Sports Law Review 76.
70 Bichovsky, above n 17, 135; Frosdick and Marsh, Football Hooliganism, above n 2, 140;
Greenfield and Osborn, Regulating Football, above n 19, 158–9; Greenfield and Osborn,
‘Racism and Resistance in English Football’, above n 60, 326.
71 Bichovsky, above n 17, 135. Nevertheless, religious discriminations are punished, for other
matters. See Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (UK) c 37, s 29.
72 Frosdick and Marsh, Football Hooliganism, above n 2, 139–40.
73 Ibid 139; Gardiner et al, above n 21, 583.
74 Frosdick and Marsh, Football Hooliganism, above n 2, 140. See also Gardiner et al, above
n 21, 583. Gardiner et al refer to the Cantona case.
75 See Football Offences Act 1991 (UK) c 19, s 3(2)(a). For more details about this reform,
see, eg, Frosdick and Marsh, Football Hooliganism, above n 2, 139–40.
admitted, without lawful authority or lawful excuse (which shall be for him to
prove). 76
In addition to these specific measures, legislation provides for the banning of
individuals who are regarded as dangerous from stadiums.
(h) Removal Orders from Stadiums

Removal orders from stadiums that exist in public law under state legislation
coexist alongside the private law stadium bans imposed by the clubs. 77 These
measures are primarily intended to reduce violence at matches by preventing
troublemakers from entering or approaching football grounds. 78
The exclusion measures are dealt with in four principal acts: the Public Order
Act 1986 (UK), the Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK), the Football (Offences
and Disorder) Act 1999 (UK) and the Football (Disorder) Act 2000 (UK).
(i) Public Order Act 1986 (UK)

The first of the legislative orders designed to regulate entry to football
stadiums was introduced by the Public Order Act 1986 (UK). 79 This legislation
introduced ‘exclusion orders’, preventing convicted fans from attending specific
matches in England and Wales. 80
In spite of its potential to be a powerful tool in regulating misbehaviour at
football matches, it appeared quickly that the exclusion orders were inefficient
with regards to disorder occurring abroad. 81 This deficiency led to the adoption
of additional measures. 82
(ii) Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK)

The Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK) was adopted in order to govern
disciplinary and criminal proceedings brought against hooligans. 83 Its purpose
was to prevent violence and disorder related to football matches. 84
This Act sought to control ‘the admission of spectators at designated football
matches in England and Wales through a national membership scheme’. 85 It also
76 Bichovsky, above n 17, 136; Greenfield and Osborn, ‘Racism and Resistance in English
Football’, above n 60, 326. See also Warren, Football, Crowds and Cultures, above n 4, 60.
77 Bichovsky, above n 17, 121, 138–9. Note in this regard that when a state order is refused, it
is increasingly common practice that the police will forward their evidence to the club in
question and encourage them to impose a stadium ban of their own.
78 Ibid 138–9.
79 Geoff Pearson and Mark James, ‘The Legality and Effectiveness of Using Football Banning
Orders in the Fight against Racism and Violence at Sports Events’ in Simon Gardiner,
Richard Parrish and Robert C R Siekmann (eds), EU, Sport, Law and Policy — Regulation,
Re-Regulation and Representation (TMC Asser, 2009) 535, 536–7.
80 Public Order Act 1986 (UK) c 64, pt IV, as repealed by Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK)
c 37, s 27(5). See Giulianotti, ‘Sport Mega Events’, above n 12, 3300; Hamilton-Smith et al,
above n 12, 5; Pearson and James, ‘The Legality and Effectiveness of Using Football
Banning Orders’, above n 79, 536–7; Warren, Football, Crowds and Cultures, above n 4,
59.
81 Pearson and James, ‘The Legality and Effectiveness of Using Football Banning Orders’,
above n 79, 537.
82 Ibid.
83 Beckham, above n 4, 43.
84 Ibid.
created a Football Licensing Authority (‘FLA’), in charge of issuing licenses to

stadiums that accommodated spectators during football matches. 86
However, above all, this statute introduced ‘restriction orders’, which
prevented attendance at games abroad for persons convicted of relevant (ie
football-related) offences, including reporting duties to police stations. 87 A court
could only impose such an order if it was satisfied that the restriction was
necessary to prevent football disorder or violence at football matches. 88 The
length of these orders was between two to five years, with the possibility for the
person subject to an order to seek earlier termination, depending upon whether a
prison sentence had been imposed. 89 The relevant period of time in which an
offence could be considered as football-related ran from two hours before the
match to one hour after the match was complete. 90
If the individual served with the order failed to report as required to a police
station without reasonable excuse, they could be imprisoned for one month. 91
Subsequently, amendments introduced by more general legislation, such as
the Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006 (UK), modified the Football Spectators
Act 1989 (UK) to increase the length of time an individual could be banned after
85 See the introductory text to the Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK). Section 1(5) provides
for the restriction of spectators. As Geoff Beckham explains:
The national membership scheme licensed spectators, creating a database that
allowed the police to regulate attendance at sporting events. Full implementation of
the membership scheme stalled as a result of the staggering expense required to
maintain the extensive network.
The notion of a national membership scheme survived, in part, through the
discretionary power of the courts to photograph the recipients of exclusion orders.
However, the reactive nature of the membership scheme proved futile in combating
the increasingly violent activity of football supporters both inside and outside
stadiums.
Ibid 43–4. See also Giulianotti, ‘Sport Mega Events’, above n 12, 3300; Stott and Pearson,
Football ‘Hooliganism’, Policing and the War on the ‘English Disease’, above n 3, 170;
Warren, Football, Crowds and Cultures, above n 4, 59.
86 Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK) c 37, ss 3, 8. For more details, see Stott and Pearson,
Football ‘Hooliganism’, Policing and the War on the ‘English Disease’, above n 3, 170. See
also Sports Grounds Safety Authority, Our History (18 December 2012)
<http://www.safetyatsportsgrounds.org.uk/about-us/our-history>.
87 Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK) c 37, ss 15–16, as amended by Football (Disorder) Act
2000 (UK) c 25, sch 2 para 2; Michael J Beloff, ‘Editorial’ [2006] International Sports Law
Review 55, 55; Pearson and James, ‘The Legality and Effectiveness of Using Football
Banning Orders’, above n 79, 537; Christopher Stoner, ‘Controlling the Hooligans’ (1998)
5(4) Sports Law Administration and Practice 11, 11; Stott and Pearson, Football
‘Hooliganism’, Policing and the War on the ‘English Disease’, above n 3, 171; Giulianotti,
‘Sport Mega Events’, above n 12, 3300.
88 Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK) c 37, s 15, as amended by Football (Disorder) Act 2000
(UK) c 25, s 1(1), sch 2 item 2; Beloff, above n 87, 55; Stott and Pearson, Football
‘Hooliganism’, Policing and the War on the ‘English Disease’, above n 3, 171; Stoner,
above n 87, 12.
89 Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK) c 37, ss 16–17, as amended by Football (Disorder) Act
2000 (UK) c 25, sch 2 para 2; Beloff, above n 87, 55; Stoner, above n 87, 12; Stott and
Pearson, Football ‘Hooliganism’, Policing and the War on the ‘English Disease’, above n 3,
171.
above n 3, 172.
91 Ibid 171.
receiving a banning order. 92 The two principal football-related amendments

which revised and reinforced the legislation were the Football (Offences and
Disorder) Act 1999 (UK) and the Football (Disorder) Act 2000 (UK). 93
(iii) Football (Offences and Disorder) Act 1999 (UK)

The Football (Offences and Disorder) Act 1999 (UK) led to significant
legislative changes and was an important step taken by the Government to ‘get
tough’ on hooliganism. First, restriction orders were renamed ‘international
football banning orders’. 94 Secondly, the people served with international
banning orders were liable to have their passports confiscated for a ‘control
period’ (starting five days before an international match). 95 Thirdly, the Act
extended the maximum duration of banning orders (10 years in case of a
custodial sentence and five years in other cases) and introduced a minimum
duration for these orders (respectively six and three years). 96 Fourthly, it
extended both the definition of the ‘relevant period’ to determine whether an
offence should be considered football-related (from two hours before a match to
24 hours before or after) and the period for which an international banning order
must have been in place prior to the fan being able to apply for termination.97
Finally, magistrates who did not want to impose an order were obliged to explain
in open court why they did not think this would help reduce disorder in the
future. 98
92 See Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK) c 37, s 14F. About the Violent Crime Reduction Act
2006 (UK) in particular, see Giulianotti, ‘Sport Mega Events’, above n 12, 3300.
93 Beckham, above n 4, 44.
94 Football (Offences and Disorder) Act 1999 (UK) c 21, s 1, as repealed by Football
(Disorder) Act 2000 (UK) c 25, s 1; ibid; Beloff, above n 87, 55; Stott and Pearson, Football
‘Hooliganism’, Policing and the War on the ‘English Disease’, above n 3, 177. These
authors also indicate that the ‘international’ aspect was removed by the Football (Disorder)
Act 2000 (UK), which merged international and domestic orders.
95 Beckham, above n 4, 44; Stott and Pearson, Football ‘Hooliganism’, Policing and the War
on the ‘English Disease’, above n 3, 177.
96 Football (Offences and Disorder) Act 1999 (UK) c 21, s 4(1); Andrew Mimmack, ‘The
Magistrates’ Court and the Football Hooligan’ (2003) 59 Magistrate 251, 251; Stott and
177.
97 Beloff, above n 87, 55; Stott and Pearson, Football ‘Hooliganism’, Policing and the War on
the ‘English Disease’, above n 3, 177.
above n 3, 177.
(iv) Football (Disorder) Act 2000 (UK)

The entry into force of the Football (Disorder) Act 2000 (UK) followed the
famous incidents involving English fans in Belgium during the 2000 UEFA
European Football Championship. 99
This Act repealed (with minor exceptions) the Football (Offences and
Disorder) Act 1999 (UK) and replaced pt II of the Football Spectators Act 1989
(UK). The distinction between matches in England/Wales and abroad was
abolished. 100 Consequently, the more global Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK)
became more repressive. A banning order is now automatically in effect for both
domestic and international matches, 101 meaning that a person subject to a
banning order cannot go to any stadium in England or abroad. 102
The Football (Disorder) Act 2000 (UK) also broadened the scope for the
making of banning orders. 103 Orders now can be made not only in relation to the
individuals convicted of an offence in relation to a football game, 104 but can also
be imposed on a troublemaker without a prior criminal conviction at the request
of a chief officer of police (‘banning orders made on a complaint’). 105
In the first case, the court must be ‘satisfied that there are reasonable grounds
to believe that making a banning order would help to prevent violence or
disorder at or in connection with any regulated football matches’. 106 In the
second case, the same test is applied, with the additional requirement that the
respondent must also have ‘at any time caused or contributed to any violence or
99 For the record, several thousand English supporters arrived in Charleroi and Brussels
without tickets and provoked significant riots. This event served as a reminder to all
concerned that the issue of hooliganism had not completely disappeared: Beloff, above n 87,
55; Bichovsky, above n 17, 139; Hamilton-Smith et al, above n 12, 5; Warren, Football,
Crowds and Cultures, above n 4, 46. For more details about these events and the Dutch
approach to policing English fans at the 2000 UEFA European Football Championship, see
above n 3, 146–67. The English team was even threatened by the Union of European
Football Associations (‘UEFA’) to be banned from the competition. See, eg, ‘Hooliganism
Could Result in England’s Elimination’, Los Angeles Times (online), 19 June 2000
<http://articles.latimes.com/2000/jun/19/sports/sp-42523>; ‘England Faces Expulsion if
Hooliganism Continues’, Sun-Sentinel (Fort Lauderdale), 19 June 2000.
100 Football (Disorder) Act 2000 (UK) c 25, s 1(a). See Beloff, above n 87, 55; Bichovsky,
above n 17, 139; Stott and Pearson, Football ‘Hooliganism’, Policing and the War on the
‘English Disease’, above n 3, 178–9.
101 Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK) c 37, s 14(4); Beckham, above n 4, 45; Bichovsky,
103 Ibid 139.
104 Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK) c 37, s 14A. See also Beloff, above n 87, 55; Bichovsky,
above n 17, 139–40; Coward, above n 8, 232. For the full list of the relevant offences, see
Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK) c 37, sch 1, as amended by Football (Disorder) Act 2000
(UK) c 25, sch 1 para 5.
105 Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK) c 37, s 14B. See also Beckham, above n 4, 46; Beloff,
above n 87, 55–6; Bichovsky, above n 17, 139–40; Hamilton-Smith et al, above n 12, 4–5;
Pearson and James, ‘The Legality and Effectiveness of Using Football Banning Orders’,
106 Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK) c 37, s 14A(2). Beloff, above n 87, 55; Bichovsky,
above n 17, 140; Coward, above n 8, 232. See also Hamilton-Smith et al, above n 12, 4–5;
Mimmack, above n 96, 251; Stott and Pearson, Football ‘Hooliganism’, Policing and the
War on the ‘English Disease’, above n 3, 180.
disorder in the United Kingdom or elsewhere’. 107 In the latter case, the new
statute gave the court the ‘additional power to impose a banning order of
between two and three years’ (the maximum duration is currently five years,
according to the Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006 (UK)). 108
Similarly, the Football (Disorder) Act 2000 (UK) increased the array of
‘relevant offences’ for which exclusion applies. This includes conduct not
immediately related to football, such as transit to and from the game. 109 In
addition, under amendments introduced by the Football (Disorder) Act (UK), the
courts are now required, unless ‘exceptional circumstances’ are present, to order
the confiscation of an individual’s passport if subject to a banning order. 110
Under the former legislation this was merely discretionary. 111 Furthermore, a
person who does not respect the current legislation is now ‘liable on summary
conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or a fine not
exceeding level 5 [£5000] on the standard scale, or both’. 112
Finally, the Football (Disorder) Act 2000 (UK) was itself amended slightly by
the Football (Disorder) (Amendment) Act 2002 (UK). 113 In addition to the
banning orders described above, the complementary or supporting measures of
the obligation to report to a police station and the prohibition on leaving the
territory should be noted. 114 To conclude this description of the legal measures
aimed at supporters, provisions relating to detention in the police custody are
described. The role of the police will also be briefly examined.
(i) Obligation to Report at a Police Station

The obligation to report to a police station requires potential troublemakers to
go to the police station specified in the order: ‘a banning order must require the
person subject to the order to report initially at a police station in England and
107 Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK) c 37, s 14B(2). See Bichovsky, above n 17, 140;
Hamilton-Smith et al, above n 12, 4–5; Mimmack, above n 96, 251; Stott and Pearson,
Football ‘Hooliganism’, Policing and the War on the ‘English Disease’, above n 3, 179–80.
108 Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK) c 37, s 14F(5); Beloff, above n 87, 56; Bichovsky, above
n 17, 140; Mimmack, above n 96, 251. See also Stott and Pearson, Football ‘Hooliganism’,
Policing and the War on the ‘English Disease’, above n 3, 180. About the Violent Crime
Reduction Act 2006 (UK) in particular, see Giulianotti, ‘Sport Mega Events’, above n 12,
3300.
109 Beckham, above n 4, 45–6; Hamilton-Smith et al, above n 12, 4.
110 Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK) c 37, s 14E(3).
112 Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK) c 37, s 14J. While failure to comply with the terms of a
banning order can give rise to criminal sanctions under this section, a banning order is
essentially a civil order that has the effect of prohibiting certain conduct and requiring a
person to report to a police station: at s 14(4). See also Beloff, above n 87, 55; Bichovsky,
above n 17, 141; Mimmack, above n 96, 251; Pearson and James, ‘The Legality and
Effectiveness of Using Football Banning Orders’, above n 79, 539.
113 In particular, s 1 of the the Football (Disorder) (Amendment) Act 2002 (UK) (now repealed
by ss 52(1) and 66(2) of the Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006 (UK)) amended s 5 of the
Football (Disorder) Act 2000 (UK). Section 1 of the the Football (Disorder) (Amendment)
Act 2002 (UK) pertained to the commencement and duration of the legislation and its effect.
It changed the ‘initial period’ from one year to five years (the initial period being the
duration in which an application could be made in relation to a banning order or a power
exercised by a constable). The new legislation also scrapped the ‘sunset’ clause in the
Football Disorder Act 2000 (UK), meaning that banning orders will remain law until they
are repealed by parliament.
114 Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK) c 37, ss 14 E(2)–(3).
Wales specified in the order within the period of five days beginning with the
day on which the order is made’. 115 Additional reporting requirements can be
made when the person reports to the police station. 116 The main objective is to
prevent individuals from attending stadiums during a match to engage in acts of
violence in and around them, or in other places. 117
(j) Prohibition on Leaving the Territory

As mentioned above, the banned individual cannot attend a match in the
United Kingdom or abroad. 118 To enable enforcement of this prohibition, the
Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK) originally gave authority to the courts to
order, if necessary, the confiscation of passports of the people identified. 119 The
amendments introduced by the Football (Disorder) Act 2000 (UK) required
stadium banning orders to also impose a requirement for passports to be
surrendered, unless ‘extraordinary circumstances’ are present. If it appears to the
court that there are such circumstances, the court is required to state those
reasons in open court. 120
(k) Police Custody

Police custody constitutes the ‘ultima ratio’ in order to deal with particularly
recalcitrant troublemakers. This measure consists of holding an individual in
police premises in order to prevent him or her from participating in violence
during sports events. 121
Detention in custody for periods up to six hours is provided for in s 21A of
the Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK), which allows a constable in uniform to
detain a British citizen if he or she has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the
person will cause violence or that they have engaged in violent acts. 122 In
addition, the constable must believe that this measure ‘would help to prevent
violence or disorder at or in connection with any regulated football matches’. 123
Thus, the implementation of these measures aimed at supporters falls to the
police forces.
(l) Role of the Police

The success of the fight against hooliganism in the United Kingdom is largely
attributed to the smooth operation of its police forces. In the 1990s, the British
police did not hesitate to take extreme measures — such as telephone tapping,
115 Ibid s 14E(2); Bichovsky, above n 17, 154.

116 Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK) c 37, s 19(2B).
117 Bichovsky, above n 17, 154; Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK) c 37, s 16(2)(b).
118 Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK), s 14(4); Bichovsky, above n 17, 139, 160.
120 Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK) c 37, ss 14E(3)–(4). See also ibid.
122 Section 20A(3) of the Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK) limits the custodial period to four
hours but allows custody to extend to six hours where authorised by a senior police officer
(rank of inspector or above).
123 Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK) c 37, s 21A(1)(b); Stott and Pearson, Football
‘Hooliganism’, Policing and the War on the ‘English Disease’, above n 3, 181–2.
shadowing and infiltration — to conduct criminal investigations against some

groups of suspected hooligans. 124
Various police groups interact between and/or during football matches. 125 In
particular, uniformed police constables generally take a proactive approach and
concentrate on troublesome supporters. 126
Mobile officers 127 patrol the streets around the stadium and the city where
football matches are being held. 128 They also transport people who have been
arrested to a police station. 129 Frequently, they help police constables escort
spectators and separate them according to the teams they support. 130 This
segregation practice occurs both inside and outside British football grounds, and
extends to the train stations in the vicinity of football stadiums. 131 In the
stadiums, each football team’s set of fans is separated from the other by a
physical barrier or a large cloth tarpaulin that runs down a column of empty
seats, next to which is a column of stewards and police officers. 132
British Transport Police officers regularly escort trains carrying groups of
football fans across the country and on the London Underground system. 133
In addition, plain-clothes detectives indirectly contribute to the maintenance
of order. 134 They intervene during match day, but also during the preceding
week, by collating and processing the intelligence. 135 They then pass the relevant
information to the football spotters (ie officers engaged in surveilling the crowd)
to help them in their actions on game days. If necessary, they also radio the
information to the mobile officers. 136
Moreover, senior officers (including sergeants) set out procedures to be
followed on match day and supervise the football policing efforts. 137
Furthermore, CCTV (closed-circuit television) operators monitor the
supporters via cameras in the city centre and the stadium. 138 They constantly
work in conjunction with police officers by mutually sharing information.139
New technologies, such as facial recognition systems, could also potentially be
124 Fonteneau, above n 7.

125 O’Neill, above n 9, 59.
126 Ibid 63.
127 For more details, see ibid 96–131.
128 Ibid 96.
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid 75–6, 85.
131 For more details, see ibid; Ian Woolsey, ‘Train Stations and Trainers: Observations of
Simulated Football Hooliganism in England’ (2010) 11 Soccer & Society 588, 589–92.
132 For more details, see O’Neill, above n 9, 75–6, 85.
133 British Transport Police, Football Policing <http://www.btp.police.uk/advice_and_info/
how_we_tackle_crime/football_policing.aspx>.
134 O’Neill, above n 9, 97.
135 The intelligence is the information about the hooligans and their planned activities. For
more details, see O’Neill, above n 9, 97.
136 Ibid 96–131.
137 Ibid 133. For more details, see at 132–53.
138 Frosdick and Marsh, Football Hooliganism, above n 2, 159–60; O’Neill, above n 9, 169.
139 Frosdick and Marsh, Football Hooliganism, above n 2, 159–60. Frosdick and Marsh
mention notably the use of the ‘photophone’ system, which allows police to exchange
pictures of hooligans from CCTV via telephone and computer links and the ‘hooligan’,
which enables radio contacts between police forces: at 160. See also Giulianotti, ‘Sport
Mega Events’, above n 12, 3301; O’Neill, above n 9, 169–86.
deployed to monitor football spectators, though cost and potential privacy issues
constitute an obstacle to their widespread use in England and elsewhere. 140
Finally, more stewards are being employed at football matches to ensure the
efficient running of games, as per a recommendation from the Taylor Report. 141
In addition to these measures directed at spectators, there are a range of state
measures aimed at the organisers of sports events and third parties.
2 State Measures Aimed at Organisers of Sports Events

In parallel to the spectator-related measures outlined above, specific
provisions also exist which relate to the organisers of sports events. 142
It should be noted that in England, clubs usually own stadiums, unlike
Australia, France, Italy and Switzerland, where the sports clubs are generally
tenants. 143 Therefore, as stadium owners, it is the clubs’ responsibility to take the
necessary measures relating to the construction and security of stadiums. 144
(a) Acquisition of a Licence Allowing Spectators

The Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK) created the FLA, which was
responsible for issuing licences to stadiums that accommodate spectators during
matches. 145 This entity was founded by the British Department of Culture, Media
and Sports but was independent from the Government. 146 It had an important
role to play in the management or regulation of crowds. 147
In October 2010, the Government announced proposals to reform 481 public
bodies through the Public Bodies Bill 2011 (UK). In this context, it identified the
FLA as one of the organisations to be abolished. Its expertise and functions were
then transferred to another body, the Sports Ground Safety Authority. 148
140 Alexandra Veuthey, ‘Mettre un terme au hooliganisme endémique’, Le Temps

(online), 30 September 2011 <http://www.letemps.ch/Page/Uuid/c568b42c-eabf-11e0-ae81
-260a19b1d518/Mettre_un_terme_au_hooliganisme_endémique>.
141 Frosdick and Marsh, Football Hooliganism, above n 2, 159, 164–5; O’Neill, above n 9,
169–86. Note that this description is intended as general. The exact policing methods may
vary according to which part of England or the United Kingdom it applies to: at 97. O’Neill
presents the situation from a general perspective, but also with a special focus on Scottish
football.
142 Bichovsky, above n 17, 121, 172.
143 For European countries, see Bichovsky, above n 17, 172–3; Luca Ferrari, ‘Stadiums: Italian
Measures to Combat Stadium Violence & Disorder’ (2012) 10(6) World Sports Law Report.
About Australia, see, eg, Melbourne Cricket Club, Tenant Clubs
<http://www.mcg.org.au/About-Us/Tenant-Clubs>; Etihad Stadium, Tenant Clubs
<http://www.etihadstadium.com.au/about/tenant-clubs>.
144 Bichovsky, above n 17, 172–3.
145 Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK) c 37, s 8; ibid 173; Gardiner et al, above n 21, 555.
147 Ibid.
148 The change to the name of the Football Licensing Authority (‘FLA’) was effected by the
Sports Ground Safety Authority Act 2011 (UK). That Act also provided the FLA with
additional powers to provide advice to government ministers, local authorities and others in
relation to safety at sports grounds. For more details, see Sports Ground Safety Authority,
About Us (1 February 2013) <http://www.safetyatsportsgrounds.org.uk/about/aboutus.php>;
Sports Ground Safety Authority, Our History (18 December 2012)
<http://www.safetyatsportsgrounds.org.uk/about-us/our-history>.
(b) The Acquisition of a Safety Certificate

Under the Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975 (UK), each football club that
owns a stadium of a significant capacity must possess a safety certificate
indicating that the stadium is safe. 149 Local authorities are responsible for issuing
this certificate. 150 In order to obtain a certificate, clubs must appoint a safety
officer and establish a system of stewards, electronic tickets, video surveillance
and a checkpoint in the stadium connected directly to the police forces and leader
stewards. 151
The Act also provides an emergency procedure to prohibit or restrict the
admission of spectators to the whole or a specific part of the ground, if they may
be exposed to serious risk. 152 This measure can remain until steps have been
taken to reduce the risk to a ‘reasonable level’. 153
(c) Provision of Seating

In accordance with s 11 of the Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK), the clubs
belonging to the first two divisions of the championship must ensure all
spectators are seated. 154
This measure, introduced in 1994 to primarily deal with the risk of crowd
crushing, also helped to reduce crowd disorder in grounds by breaking up groups
which might have congregated together. 155
Similarly, internal fences around spectator areas were removed. This initiative
has not led to an increase of disturbance at matches, but seems, on the contrary,
to have ‘calmed spirits’ by making individuals aware of their responsibilities
rather than ‘caging’ them. 156
3 State Measures Aimed at Third Parties

A prohibition on the unauthorised sale of tickets ensures that rival supporters
are not in the same bleachers in a stadium. 157 It also prevents the tickets being
sold on the black market to any group of supporters. 158
The prohibition is effected by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994
(UK), 159 which provides for the imposition of a fine for the sale of tickets by
unauthorised people. 160
149 Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975 (UK) c 52, s 1. See also Bichovsky, above n 17, 173;
Gardiner et al, above n 21, 554.
151 Ibid; Coward, above n 8, 232. About the video surveillance in particular, see Tsoukala, ‘La
gestion policière du hooliganisme en Angleterre, en Italie et aux Pays-Bas’, above n 39, 159,
161–4.
152 Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975 (UK) c 52, s 10. See also Bichovsky, above n 17, 173;
154 Ibid. See also Frosdick and Marsh, Football Hooliganism, above n 2, 172.
156 Ibid 172. See also Basile Barbey, ‘Hooliganisme, territoire et sécurité: analyse spatiale d’un
risque complexe’ in Thomas Busset et al (eds), Le football à l’épreuve de la violence et de
l’extrémisme (Antipodes, 2008) 253, 259.
158 Ibid.
159 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (UK) c 33, s 166, as amended by Football
(Offences and Disorder) Act 1999 (UK) c 21.
This concludes the description of the principal state measures introduced to

fight against hooliganism. These reforms have been the subject of some
criticisms and have received some judicial consideration, which are described
below.
4 Main Criticisms
According to some commentators, some of the measures outlined above
pursue hooligans to a degree that violates civil liberties and human rights.161
Most of this criticism focuses on banning orders. 162 Banning orders, it is argued,
may infringe provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights
(‘ECHR’) and various European Union treaties. 163 This argument is particularly
focused on banning orders on complaint, which do not require any previous
criminal conviction. 164 The principle of proportionality is also often raised in
opposition to the measures, 165 and, when balanced with the effectiveness of the
measures, is questioned by some commentators. 166
These arguments have not found favour with the Court of Appeal 167 of
England and Wales, which has completely rejected these criticisms in a
160 Ibid.
161 See, eg, Beckham, above n 4, 43; Giulianotti, ‘Sport Mega Events’, above n 12, 3300; Stott
and Pearson, Football ‘Hooliganism’, Policing and the War on the ‘English Disease’, above
n 3, 28, 174–6, 182–201, 339. See also Frosdick and Marsh, Football Hooliganism, above
n 2, 170–2; ‘Hooligans and the Law’, The Economist (London), 8 July 2000, 22.
162 Note that some other aspects of the system (eg database, video surveillance, criminal
investigations etc) might also, to a lesser degree, be discussed in relation to the right to
privacy.
163 For more details, see, eg, Beckham, above n 4, 43–54; Pearson and James, ‘The Legality
and Effectiveness of Using Football Banning Orders’, above n 79, 539–48; Stott and
174–6, 182–201, 339. See also ‘Hooligans and the Law’, above n 161. Contra Ricky
Cannon, ‘Sensible Soccer: The Creation of the Unconvicted Football Hooligan Order’
(2000) 6 European Public Law 573. Ricky Cannon considers that these measures (in
particular the banning orders on complaint) are lawful. According to him, they fall out of the
scope of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) and within the parameters of
the European Union law: at 574.
164 For more details, see, eg, Beckham, above n 4, 46–7; Blackshaw, above n 25, 90; Pearson
and James, ‘The Legality and Effectiveness of Using Football Banning Orders’, above n 79,
540–1; Stott and Pearson, Football ‘Hooliganism’, Policing and the War on the ‘English
Disease’, above n 3, 174–6, 182–201, 339. See also Giulianotti, ‘Sport Mega Events’, above
n 12, 3300; ‘Hooligans and the Law’, above n 161.
165 Some authors think that these measures go far beyond what is necessary to prevent disorder.
See, eg, Beckham, above n 4, 46–7; Stott and Pearson, Football ‘Hooliganism’, Policing
and the War on the ‘English Disease’, above n 3, 174–6, 182–201, 339. See also Cannon,
above n 163, 583–4; Pearson and James, ‘The Legality and Effectiveness of Using Football
Banning Orders’, above n 79, 548; ‘Hooligans and the Law’, above n 161.
166 Indeed, Christopher Stoner, Clifford Stott and Geoff Pearson, and Steve Frosdick and Peter
Marsh note that it is not typically the ‘known’ hooligans that are involved in the rioting:
Stoner, above n 87, 12; Stott and Pearson, Football ‘Hooliganism’, Policing and the War on
the ‘English Disease’, above n 3, 339; Frosdick and Marsh, Football Hooliganism, above
n 2, 172. For their part, Niall Hamilton-Smith et al consider that banning orders (without
conditions) are not effective against individuals who have no interest in attending the match,
but only want to use match days as a way of accessing opportunities for recreational
violence well away from the stadiums: Hamilton-Smith et al, above n 12, 18. See also
above n 79, 548–54.
167 The Court of Appeal is the second highest court of England and Wales.
well-known 2002 judgment. 168 Similarly, some commentators argue that this
system relies overwhelmingly upon the use of force and that over-repressive
policing may be counterproductive and lead hooligans to behave more
aggressively. 169
Another example of potentially counterproductive effects raised by critics of
the reforms relates to the use of video surveillance. This, it is argued, has led to
incidents being effectively moved out of stadiums where video surveillance is
particularly effective. Incidents now take place around the stadiums, and occur
before or after matches. This has meant that hooligans’ actions are better
planned. 170 Some problems with the identification of suspected wrong-doers
using video technology have also been reported, with the ‘axe’ sometimes falling
on innocent parties. 171
Similarly, some commentators criticise the power and effectiveness of the
police’s ability to close bars, leading some supporters to go to duty-free shops to
purchase alcohol and, therefore, to drink spirits instead of beer. 172
Other critics argue that hooliganism has not been completely defeated because
it is not properly understood. They argue that the Government focuses too much
on gangs travelling to cause trouble, to the detriment of general risks associated
with crowd management. 173
Yet others note that hooligans are now significantly in the minority and less
apparent, which makes them more dangerous and committed than before. 174
Finally, the legislation is sometimes described as being implemented to
answer populist will rather than to answer a real need. 175 It has also been
criticised as being too rigid, and therefore an unwarranted interference with
judicial discretion, 176 or inversely, incomplete. Thus, banning orders do not, for
168 Gough v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [2002] EWCA Civ 351 (20 March 2002) (‘Gough’).
above n 3, 54, 333; Pearson and James, ‘The Legality and Effectiveness of Using Football
Banning Orders’, above n 79, 552. See also Giulianotti, ‘Sport Mega Events’, above n 12,
3306; Frosdick and Marsh, Football Hooliganism, above n 2, 153, 156, 158, 174. Frosdick
and Marsh also criticise other aspects of the police management, such as the lack of respect
of the police towards hooligans and its inconsistent organisation: at 156, 158. See also
Warren, Football, Crowds and Cultures, above n 4, 172.
170 Tsoukala, ‘La gestion policière du hooliganisme en Angleterre, en Italie et aux Pays-Bas’,
above n 39, 163–4. From a more general perspective, see also Barbey, above n 156, 263.
See also Warren and Hay, ‘The A-League, Policing and the Dilemma of Public Order’,
above n 13, 125.
171 See, eg, Zaugg, above n 13. About the particular issue of racism, see also Gardiner et al,
above n 21, 583; Greenfield and Osborn, Regulating Football, above n 19, 164–5;
Greenfield and Osborn, ‘Racism and Resistance in English Football’, above n 60, 328–9.
172 Warren, Football, Crowds and Cultures, above n 4, 69–70.
173 Barbey, above n 156, 263; Stott and Pearson, Football ‘Hooliganism’, Policing and the War
on the ‘English Disease’, above n 3, 328.
174 See, eg, Martin King and Martin Knight, The Naughty Nineties — Football’s Coming
Home? (Mainstream Publishing, 1999).
175 See, eg, Frosdick and Marsh, Football Hooliganism, above n 2, 125–37, 170–2. Frosdick
and Marsh mention in support the prohibition of alcohol in stadiums (whose negative effect
is exaggerated), the creation of specific football offences (already covered by the general
legislation) and the banning orders (most of the disorder being due to ‘unknown’ hooligans).
See Gardiner et al, above n 21, 576; Warren, Football, Crowds and Cultures, above n 4, 73;
Wohlers, above n 4, 199. See also Stoner, above n 87, 12; Stott and Pearson, Football
‘Hooliganism’, Policing and the War on the ‘English Disease’, above n 3, 339.
176 Hamilton-Smith et al, above n 12, 51–2.
instance, control what happens in pubs and clubs when matches are shown on
televisions. 177 Moreover, the current legislation is silent regarding the power of
referees in relation to calling a halt to a match in case of misbehaviour by
supporters. 178
5 Legal Framework Tested in the Courts

The anti-hooligan legal framework has been tested in the courts on several
occasions. The most famous case, Gough v Chief Constable of Derbyshire
(‘Gough’), 179 concerned the imposition of banning orders in relation to hooligan
behaviour. Carl Gough and Gary Smith, two British hooligans, were sentenced
on appeal 180 and banned from stadiums for two years in 2002 under s 14B of the
Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK). 181 Gough and Smith had been convicted of
violence offences (common assault and assault with intent to resist arrest) in
1990 and 1998. 182 Each was also the subject of a ‘profile’ prepared by the police,
which indicated repeated involvement in incidents of violence at or around
football stadiums. 183 They challenged the legislation that authorised their bans
on attending stadiums as being incompatible with their fundamental rights under
European Union treaties and the ECHR. 184
The appellants argued, in particular, that the banning orders derogated from
their positive rights on freedom of movement and freedom to leave their home
country. 185 In addition, it was asserted that the Football Spectators Act 1989
(UK) infringed the principle of proportionality by banning an individual from
travelling anywhere within the community even if the relevant match was not
taking place there. 186
177 Mimmack, above n 96, 251.

178 Darren Bailey, ‘Crowd Control’ (2004) 11(6) Sports Law Administration and Practice 5,
6–7. Note that according to some commentators, the legislation should also be strengthened
at the European Union level. For more details, see Cannon, above n 163, 590–4; Pearson
and James, ‘The Legality and Effectiveness of Using Football Banning Orders’, above n 79,
553–4. See also Stott and Pearson, Football ‘Hooliganism’, Policing and the War on the
179 Gough [2002] EWCA Civ 351.
180 Their arguments were rejected at first instance: Gough v Chief Constable of Derbyshire
[2001] EWHC Admin 554 (13 July 2001).
181 Gough [2002] EWCA Civ 351, 1008 [103] (Lord Phillips MR). See also Bichovsky, above
n 17, 141; Gardiner et al, above n 21, 578; Stott and Pearson, Football ‘Hooliganism’,
Policing and the War on the ‘English Disease’, above n 3, 183.
182 Gough [2002] EWCA Civ 351, 991–2 [28] (Lord Phillips MR). See also Gardiner et al,
above n 21, 578.
183 Gough [2002] EWCA Civ 351, 992–3 [30]–[33] (Lord Phillips MR). See also Elspeth
Deards, ‘Human Rights for Football Hooligans?’ (2002) 27 European Law Review 765, 765;
184 Gough [2002] EWCA Civ 351, 994 [38] et seq (Lord Phillips MR). See also Beloff, above
n 87, 56; Bichovsky, above n 17, 141; Gardiner et al, above n 21, 578.
185 Council Directive 73/148/EEC of 21 May 1973 on the Abolition of Restrictions on
Movement and Residence within the Community for Nationals of Member States with
Regard to Establishment and Provision of Services [1993] OJ L 172/14, arts 1–2. Gough
[2002] EWCA Civ 351, 998 [57] et seq (Lord Phillips MR). See also Bichovsky, above
n 17, 141; Deards, above n 183, 765–6; Gardiner et al, above n 21, 578.
186 Gough [2002] EWCA Civ 351, 998 [56], 1000 [63] et seq (Lord Phillips MR). See also
The appellants further invoked the argument that this legislation infringed arts
6 and 8 of the ECHR (a right to a fair trial and freedom of movement,
respectively). 187 They also made claims under the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK),
which is responsible for embodying and ensuring the respect of the ECHR in
England. 188 They contended, in particular, that ‘banning orders should only be
imposed following a criminal procedure’. 189 In this context, they argued that the
principle of the presumption of innocence and their right to a defence were not
respected. Furthermore, the evidence gathered against them was said to be
insufficient to justify the bans, since no criminal conviction was required. 190
Finally, on the basis of the ECHR, they raised issues about the restrictions
imposed on their freedom of movement. 191
The Court of Appeal (‘the Court’) rejected all of these arguments. 192 The
Court noted that there was no absolute right to leave one’s country under the
ECHR. Restrictions on the right could be imposed in some circumstances, such
as to protect order and public safety. 193 The Court found that these measures
respected the principle of proportionality as long as there were strong grounds
for concluding that the individual had a propensity for taking part in football
hooliganism. 194 It was also proportionate to require these persons to obtain
authorisation to travel abroad during periods when international matches are
held, since they would then have the opportunity to prove that the purpose of
187 Gough [2002] EWCA Civ 351, 1007 [98] et seq (Lord Phillips MR). Note that the
respondents did not invoke the right to respect for their private and family life, which is
associated with art 8 of the ECHR.
188 Gough [2002] EWCA Civ 351, 994–5 [41] (Lord Phillips MR). See also Bichovsky, above
n 17, 141; Gardiner et al, above n 21, 578; Stott and Pearson, Football ‘Hooliganism’,
Policing and the War on the ‘English Disease’, above n 3, 182–3. About the Human Rights
Act 1998 (UK) (‘HRA’), see David Pannick and Jane Mulcahy, ‘The Human Rights Act
1998 and Sport’ in Adam Lewis and Jonathan Taylor (eds), Sport: Law and Practice (Tottel
Publishing, 2nd ed, 2008) 511, 511–36.
189 Gough [2002] EWCA Civ 351, 1001 [69] (Lord Phillips MR). See also Gardiner et al, above
n 21, 578; Stott and Pearson, Football ‘Hooliganism’, Policing and the War on the ‘English
Disease’, above n 3, 183.
190 Gough [2002] EWCA Civ 351, 994–5 [41] (Lord Phillips MR). See also Bichovsky, above
n 17, 141–2.
191 Note that this claim should have been made under art 2 of Protocol 4 instead had it been
ratified by the United Kingdom. For more details, see Pearson and James, ‘The Legality and
Effectiveness of Using Football Banning Orders’, above n 79, 541.
192 Gough [2002] EWCA Civ 351, 1003 [78], 1007–8 [100]–[103] (Lord Phillips MR). See also
Bichovsky, above n 17, 142.
193 Gough [2002] EWCA Civ 351, 998 [52] (Lord Phillips MR). See also Beloff, above n 87,
56; Bichovsky, above n 17, 142; Deards, above n 183, 766; Gardiner et al, above n 21, 578;
above n 3, 184.
n 87, 56–7; Bichovsky, above n 17, 142; Deards, above n 183, 768; Gardiner et al, above
n 21, 578.
their trip was not related to such matches. 195 The Court found that it would not
be possible to achieve the same result with less restrictive measures. 196
Examining the issue from the perspective of art 6 of the ECHR, the Court
considered that banning orders were not criminal but civil, since their purpose
was preventative and not punitive. 197 Although the civil standard of proof had to
be applied, the Court noted that, given the serious restrictions on freedom of
movement, it was appropriate to apply an exacting standard of proof, being in
practice ‘hard to distinguish from the criminal’. 198
The Court also determined that if a banning order was properly made (and no
defects in the making of the orders were made out), any interference with an
individual’s rights under art 8(1) of the ECHR would be justified under art 8(2),
since the interference was necessary for the prevention of disorder. 199
On a broader level, the Court noted that the legislation fulfilled the
requirements of European states. The European member states requested that the
British Government take measures to prevent acts of violence of its citizens
abroad, 200 as any new violent acts would likely lead to further exclusion of
English clubs from European competitions, producing significant financial
consequences. 201 Finally, hooliganism tarnished the reputation of the United
Kingdom abroad. 202
While the test applied by the Court, in conducting a balancing of relevant
interests, may not always have been applied strictly correctly in subsequent
cases, 203 and despite later criticism by commentators, 204 this judgment must be
credited with providing a number of significant clarifications in the operation of
the laws.
195 Gough [2002] EWCA Civ 351, 1002 [75] et seq (Lord Phillips MR). Beloff, above n 87, 57;
Bichovsky, above n 17, 142; Deards, above n 183, 768–9.
n 87, 57; Bichovsky, above n 17, 142; Deards, above n 183, 768–9. About the issue of
proportionality, see also Pearson and James, ‘The Legality and Effectiveness of Using
Football Banning Orders’, above n 79, 547–8, 551–3; Stott and Pearson, Football
n 17, 142; Deards, above n 183, 769; Gardiner et al, above n 21, 578. For a critical comment
about this conclusion, see Stott and Pearson, Football ‘Hooliganism’, Policing and the War
on the ‘English Disease’, above n 3, 183–4.
n 17, 143; Deards, above n 183, 769; Gardiner et al, above n 21, 578; Stott and Pearson,
Football ‘Hooliganism’, Policing and the War on the ‘English Disease’, above n 3, 190.
199 Beloff, above n 87, 57; Bichovsky, above n 17, 142–3; Deards, above n 183, 770.
n 17, 143; Deards, above n 183, 767.
201 Deards, above n 183, 767.
202 Ibid. For a legal analysis of subsequent case laws, see Stott and Pearson, Football
203 For more details, see Stott and Pearson, Football ‘Hooliganism’, Policing and the War on
the ‘English Disease’, above n 3, 182–201.
204 See, eg, Blackshaw, above n 25, 91; Pearson and James, ‘The Legality and Effectiveness of
Using Football Banning Orders’, above n 79, 547–8, 551–3; Stott and Pearson, Football
‘Hooliganism’, Policing and the War on the ‘English Disease’, above n 3, 183–8, 339. See
also, Deards, above n 183, 770.
It established that, if applied correctly, 205 banning orders 206 are lawful as a
matter of community law and the ECHR. 207 The public order benefits of the
legislation, in contributing to the reduction of hooliganism in recent years,
arguably provides reciprocal support for the banning orders regime. 208
The decision in Gough also confirmed that public policy restrictions on a
member states’ own citizens may only be justified by reference to its own
interests. 209
It is now appropriate to describe the main measures implemented by the clubs
and the League in the fight against hooliganism.
C Measures Managed by the Clubs/the League
1 General
To the extent that it can be assumed that the legislation passed by the British
Government was effective in reducing hooliganism, 210 measures implemented by
the clubs may similarly be assumed to have contributed (either in combination or
in isolation) to this decrease. 211 One important measure that clubs have
205 The legislation is open to interpretation and might lead to disproportionate results. However,
the Court of Appeal concluded that the question ‘was not whether the statutory provisions
could give rise to a disproportionate effect but whether they could give rise to a
proportionate effect’: Deards, above n 183, 768.
206 Made under: Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK) c 37 s 14B, as amended by the Football
(Disorder) Act 2000 (UK) c 25, sch 1 para 2.
207 Deards, above n 183, 770; Gardiner et al, above n 21, 578. Note that other arguments based
on the ECHR (such as art 7, which establishes the principle of non-retroactivity) were also
rejected in the first instance. For more details, see Sylvia Elwes, ‘Football Hooliganism’
(2002) 23 Business Law Review 37, 37–41. See also Pearson and James, ‘The Legality and
Effectiveness of Using Football Banning Orders’, above n 79, 540–54. They describe all the
potential challenges that could be made towards banning orders. Pearson and James
mention, for instance, art 8 of the ECHR (private and family life aspects): at 541. These
aspects were not raised in this procedure. They also note that art 7 of the ECHR ‘was only
argued before the High Court, although the Court of Appeal specifically approved Laws
LJ’s judgment on the issue’: at 542.
208 The efficiency of the English system is discussed further. See below Parts II(D), II(E).
209 Deards, above n 183, 770. Note that while the Gough precedent is presently still relevant in
England, it seems that banning orders applications are increasingly being successfully
challenged. Judges appear to be less accepting of the police version of events, and instead
are examining more closely whether or not the respondent is a genuine risk to public order.
For a recent analysis of this case (in light of the evolution previously mentioned), see Geoff
Pearson, ‘Football and Crowds: Gough and Smith v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [2002]
QB 1213’ in Jack Anderson (ed), Leading Cases in Sports Law (TMC Asser, 2013) 307.
210 Contra Warren and Hay, ‘The A-League, Policing and the Dilemma of Public Order’, above
n 13, 133.
211 See below Bodin et al, ‘Le hooliganisme entre genèse et modernité’, below n 242. See also
Bichovsky, above n 17, 121.
implemented is a significant increase in ticket prices. 212 This changed the

demographic of spectators at football matches by excluding from stadiums
certain categories of spectators whilst attracting others. 213 Currently, spectators
include more middle class people and fewer young, white men from the lower
income social groups. 214 A recent survey of the Premier League has also shown
that 23 per cent of fans are now women and 11 per cent belong to ethnic
minorities. 215
This phenomenon, combined with a large number of regular season ticket
holders who have allocated seats (and who can therefore be more easily
identified if they misbehave), contributed to make the environment in stadiums
more predictable and orderly. 216 Similarly, as already mentioned, clubs have
power to impose stadium bans, sometimes for life. 217 However, most English
clubs seem reluctant to introduce schemes that require greater contact between
fans and club officials, or to develop socio-preventive projects (known as ‘fan
coaching’ in mainland Europe). 218
For its part, the FA imposes certain obligations on clubs and organisers of
sporting events, some of which are modelled on state laws. 219 The FA has also
212 Thus, to see a match in England, one must now pay ten times more than twenty years ago.
See Bichovsky, above n 17, 121. See also Fonteneau, above n 7; Zaugg, above n 13. While
it is the most expensive club to watch, tickets to see an Arsenal match in the Premier League
in 2012–13 ranged from £25.50 for the cheapest tickets to £126 for the most expensive
tickets: ‘Arsenal’s Most Expensive Premier League Ticket for 2012–13 to Cost £126’, The
Guardian (online), 14 July 2012 <http://www.theguardian.com/football/2012/jul/14/
arsenal-premier-league-ticket-126>. Ticket prices have led to protests from fans. See Sam
Weaver and Ami Sedghi, ‘Premier League Ticket Prices: Which Clubs Charge the Most’,
The Guardian (online), 20 June 2013 <http://www.theguardian.com/
news/datablog/2013/jun/19/premier-league-ticket-prices-club-charge-the-most>. Ticket
prices have increased at three times the rate of inflation: Adam Shergold, ‘Premier League
and Football League Ticket Prices Rise at Three Times the Rate of Inflation as the
Staggering Cost of Following Your Team is Revealed’, The Daily Mail (online),
15 October 2014 <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/article-2792703/
the-staggering-cost-following-team-premier-league-football-league-ticket-prices-rise-three
-times-rate-inflation.html#ixzz3RUW6ekPk>.
213 Bichovsky, above n 17, 121. See also Giulianotti, ‘Sport Mega Events’, above n 12, 3302;
Zaugg, above n 13.
214 Zaugg, above n 13. See also Giulianotti, ‘Sport Mega Events’, above n 12, 3302.
215 Zaugg, above n 13.
216 Frosdick and Marsh, Football Hooliganism, above n 2, 173; Hamilton-Smith et al, above
n 12, 7.
217 Bichovsky, above n 17, 121, 138. See also Coward, above n 8, 233.
219 For instance, according to the FA, each affiliated association, competition and club is
responsible for ensuring:
(a) that its directors, players, officials, employees, servants, representatives,
spectators, and all persons purporting to be its supporters or followers, conduct
themselves in an orderly fashion and refrain from any one or combination of the
following: improper, violent, threatening, abusive, indecent, insulting or provocative
words or behaviour, (including, without limitation, where any such conduct, words or
behaviour includes a reference, whether express or implied, to any one or more of
ethnic origin, colour, race, nationality, religion or belief, gender, gender
reassignment, sexual orientation or disability) whilst attending at or taking part in a
Match in which it is involved, whether on its own ground or elsewhere; and
(b) that no spectators or unauthorised persons are permitted to encroach onto the
pitch area, save for reasons of crowd safety, or to throw missiles, bottles or other
potentially harmful or dangerous objects at or on to the pitch.
introduced an official supporters’ club, where applicants give permission for

background checks for criminal records and other football-related misbehaviour
in exchange for being given priority when buying tickets for England matches
overseas. 220 Furthermore, the FA sometimes accommodates ad hoc measures,
such as campaigns for good behaviour and fair play and appeals for the public
and media to identify troublemakers. 221
As with the State’s reforms, the measures taken by the clubs and the League
to fight hooliganism have not been spared from criticism.
2 Main Criticisms
The increase in ticket prices, which had the effect of excluding certain
categories of people and, according to some observers, tarnishing the atmosphere
in the stadiums, is often seen negatively. 222
It is also argued that, using the example of Germany, alternatives exist to
measures such as higher ticket prices and all-seated stadiums. Germany, although
less affected by hooliganism, has managed (through large standing areas and
controlled seat prices) to attract on average 7000 more supporters per game,
including a higher proportion of women and young fans, than the English
Premier League games. 223
The English clubs’ poor investment in fan coaching measures is also
criticised. 224
Finally, it is noted that the criticisms about the state banning orders based on
civil liberties and human rights grounds are not relevant in relation to the bans
implemented by the clubs. These bans are strictly a matter of contract (paying to
watch a football match) and property law. Bans imposed by a club do not
compromise the individual’s liberty to move about in public or to leave the
country. It is therefore not a human rights issue. 225
The Football Association, Rules of the Association 2014–15, pt E s 20

<http://www.thefa.com/football-rules-governance/more/rules-of-the-association>.
220 Coward, above n 8, 232–3.
221 Ibid 233.
222 Barbey, above n 156, 262–3; Richard Giulianotti, ‘Supporters, Followers, Fans, and
Flâneurs: A Taxonomy of Spectator Identities in Football’ (2002) 26 Journal of Sport and
Social Issues 25, 25. See also Fonteneau, above n 7.
223 Giulianotti, ‘Sport Mega Events’, above n 12, 3306.
225 Furthermore, assuming that a court accepts one day the fact that it is a human rights matter
(which appears unlikely), the application of the ECHR and the HRA to private entities is
controversial. For more details about the HRA, see Pannick and Mulcahy, above n 188,
511–36. These authors note that:
So far, no sporting body has been found to be a public authority for the purposes of
the HRA 1998, and several have been found not to be. But that has not stopped courts
taking [occasionally] human rights points into account, since the courts themselves
are public authorities, and hence are obliged to consider the human rights of the
parties, whether public or private.
It is now necessary to examine the efficiency of the current anti-hooligan

tools.
D Efficiency of the Current Tools

Regardless of the outcomes that have followed the measures described above,
it is clear that English hooliganism has not completely disappeared. 226 During
the last 10 years, various major incidents concerning English fans have occurred
in England 227 and abroad. 228
Nevertheless, the total number of people arrested in connection with all
international and domestic football matches involving teams from, or
representing, England and Wales has steadily been declining since the early
At 511. The majority of the commentators now also seem to be of this opinion. About the
issue of human rights in the context of doping, see, eg, Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Giorgio
Malinverni and Antonio Rigozzi, ‘Legal Opinion on the Conformity of Certain Provisions of
the Draft World Anti-Doping Code with Commonly Accepted Principles of International
Law’ (Legal Opinion, World Anti-Doping Agency, 26 February 2003) [1], [73]
<https://wada-main-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/resources/files/kaufmann-kohler-full.pdf>.
About the ECHR, see Béatrice Moutel, L’effet horizontal de la Convention européenne des
droits de l’homme en droit privé français: Essai sur la diffusion de la CEDH dans les
rapports entre personnes privées (PhD Thesis, Université de Limoges, 2006)
<http://epublications.unilim.fr/theses/2006/moutel-beatrice/moutel-beatrice.pdf>. Contra
Raheel Saleem, ‘The Olympic Meddle: The International Olympic Committee’s Intrusion of
Athletes’ Privacy through the Discriminatory Practice of Gender Verification Testing’
(2010) 28 John Marshall Journal of Computer & Information Law 49, 77. However,
according to the prevailing contemporary judicial practice, human rights are not applicable
in sports matters: Kaufmann-Kohler, Malinverni and Rigozzi, above n 225, [66]–[72]. Note
that the European Court of Human Rights has never determined this issue: at [66].
226 Fonteneau, above n 7.
227 In the fifth round of the FA Cup in 2005, angry supporters threw coins, a mobile phone and
a bottle to protest against Wayne Rooney’s return to Everton in Manchester United colours.
This resulted in an injury to the Mancunian goalkeeper and 33 arrests outside the ground.
Another example is the pitch invasion that occurred during the match between Burnley and
Blackburn Rovers during the same competition: Frosdick and Marsh, Football Hooliganism,
above n 2, 6. The English Premier League is not spared. Notable examples are the East
London derby West Ham-Millwall (August 2009) and Aston Villa-Birmingham (December
2010), to name only the most famous and recent cases of hooligan behaviour. For more
details about these incidents, see, eg, Fonteneau, above n 7; ‘London Calling Hooliganism:
Soccer Fans in Flare-up’, The Advertiser (Adelaide), 3 December 2010, 4. Note that apart
from these reported instances of serious disorder, there have also been many others that
were not widely publicised, namely the matches between Manchester United and AS Roma
(home match in 2007), Birmingham and Manchester United (2010) and Barnsley and United
(2009). See also the disorder that occurred during the match between Chelsea and Cardiff
(2010). About older incidents, see also Warren, Football, Crowds and Cultures, above n 4,
47. See also Emma Clark, ‘Pictured Drinking on the Night He Launched Sickening Attack
on Goalkeeper: Shameless Yob Who Is Meant to Be Banned from Football Grounds for
Hooliganism’, The Daily Mail (online), 21 October 2012 <http://www.dailymail.co.uk
/news/article-2220902/Chris-Kirkland-attacked-Leeds-United-yob-attacked-goalkeeper
-pitch-banned-football-grounds-previous-acts-hooliganism.html#ixzz3BSnjCtRQ>.
228 Examples include the riots that occurred during the 2004 UEFA European Football
Championship and the 2006 FIFA World Cup. The unruly behaviour of Manchester United
fans in Rome for the quarterfinals of the 2007 Champions League and the incidents
involving Liverpool fans in Athens for the final of the same competition are also noted. See
above n 3, xi, 1–10.
1990s, from 6378 cases for the 1991–92 season, to 4400 in 1996–97, 3089 in
2010–11 and to 2456 in 2012–13. 229
For the 2012–13 season, the Home Office statistics show that the total
attendance is in excess of 39 million at football matches. 230 The total number of
arrests represents therefore less than 0.01 per cent of all spectators or one arrest
for every 14 000 spectators. 231
Furthermore, the average number of arrests (inside and outside of stadiums) is
less than one per match, and 58 per cent of all matches had no police
presence. 232
In addition, ‘[m]ore than 100 000 English and Welsh club fans travelled to
Champions League and Europa League matches outside of England and
Wales’ 233 and ‘[t]hese 44 matches resulted in only 20 arrests of away fans’. 234
The number of football banning orders has also decreased (by 11 per cent
from 2750 on 9 November 2012 to 2451 on 20 September 2013 and down 22.9
per cent from 3180 for the 2008-09 season to 10 November 2009). 235 This
represents 471 new banning orders imposed during the period. 236
Finally, 92 per cent of the individuals whose orders have expired since 2000
are considered to be no longer a risk to football disorder. 237
Even if ‘[s]tatistics … tell only part of the story and need to be placed in
context’, 238 this data has been referred to by several experts to show that British
stadiums are now among the safest in the world. 239
229 This covers all arrests designated in law under sch 1 of the Football Spectators Act 1989
(UK) reported by police to the Football Banning Orders Authority. This includes soccer
specific offences and a wide range of generic criminal offences committed in connection
with a soccer match. This covers such arrests at any place within a period of 24 hours either
side of a match. For more details, see Home Office, Statistics on Football-Related Arrests
and Banning Orders, Season 2012 to 2013 (9 October 2013) Gov.UK, 2
<https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/football-related-arrests-and-banning-orders
-season-2012-to-2013>. For the previous years, see Home Office, Statistics on
Football-Related Arrests and Banning Orders, Season 2011 to 2012 (14 November 2012)
Gov.UK <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/football-banning-orders>. The lowest
recorded total of arrests occurred in the 2011–12 season (2363 arrests). The 2012–13 season
therefore recorded a four per cent increase of 93 arrests on the previous season.
230 Home Office, Statistics on Football-Related Arrests and Banning Orders, Season 2012 to
2013, above n 229, 2.
231 Ibid.
232 Ibid. The average number of arrests per match declines proportionately from the Premier
League (1.90 arrests per match) to League Two (0.29 arrests per match).
233 Ibid.
234 Ibid.
235 Ibid. See also Home Office, Football Banning Orders 2008 to 2009 (1 September 2010)
Gov.UK <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/football-banning-orders-2008-to
-2009>. Note, however, that the number of banning orders have generally increased if
compared to earlier statistics (looking at the figures for 2003–04, they have increased from
1794 on 14 August 2003 to 2596 on 18 October 2004). This increase can however be
explained, at least partially, by the more restrictive policing approach being applied. See
Frosdick and Newton, ‘Hooliganism in England and Wales’, above n 3, 406–7; Frosdick and
Marsh, Football Hooliganism, above n 2, 36.
236 Home Office, Statistics on Football-Related Arrests and Banning Orders, Season 2012 to
2013, above n 229, 2.
237 Home Office, Statistics on Football-Related Arrests & Banning Orders,
Season 2010 to 2011 (21 December 2011) Gov.UK <https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/118119/fbo-2010-11.pdf>.
238 Frosdick and Newton, ‘Hooliganism in England and Wales’, above n 3, 406.
E Final Remarks on the English System

In light of the above analysis, the argument can be advanced that the English
reforms have had an extremely positive impact in the fight against hooliganism
and were good policy in the English (football) context. However, a few points
need to be made regarding such an argument.
First, the reforms remain open to some criticism. At the state level, the issue
of human rights appears to be the most problematic. Even if this system has
survived judicial challenge, both the courts and the police must ensure that their
actions remain fair and proportionate in each case. Otherwise this may lead to
unfair situations and result in a counterproductive effect. 240 Similarly, the clubs
could intensify their efforts in the matter of fan coaching; a measure that, while
having some limitations, can have positive effects.
Secondly, some caution may be required before being too definitive about the
effects of the reforms themselves. At a high level, the results appear to be
demonstrable. English football stadiums — which were the scenes of bloody
catastrophes a few years ago as noted above — are now considered to be among
the safest stadiums in the world. 241 The conclusion that appears to naturally
follow is that the reforms that England has imposed in response to hooliganism
have been very effective.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that other factors, including socio-economic
factors, might have contributed to the decline of hooliganism in England. For
example, many sociologists argue that the implementation of violence and
hooliganism in England was favoured by the socio-economic collapse that
occurred in the 1970s to 1980s. 242 It would therefore not be surprising that the
improvement of the economic climate that gradually followed fostered, in turn, a
decline in general criminality and hooliganism.
239 Zaugg, above n 13. See Coward, above n 8, 232; Morgan and Egitto, above n 3, 5. Morgan
and Egitto note that ‘[t]he UK’s anti-hooliganism measures now in place can quite
justifiably be viewed as some of the most efficient on the planet’. For a more critical
opinion, see Warren and Hay, ‘The A-League, Policing and the Dilemma of Public Order’,
above n 13, 125, 133.
240 As we have seen, some authors argue that the English system relies overwhelmingly upon
the use of force, in that over-repressive policing may even play a counterproductive role and
result in hooligans behaving more aggressively. For more details, see Stott and Pearson,
Football ‘Hooliganism’, Policing and the War on the ‘English Disease’, above n 3, 54, 333;
above n 79, 552. See also Giulianotti, ‘Sport Mega Events’, above n 12, 3306–7; Frosdick
and Marsh, Football Hooliganism, above n 2, 153, 156, 158, 174, 187. Frosdick and Marsh
also criticise other aspects of the police management, such as the lack of respect of the
police towards supporters and its inconsistent organisation: at 156, 158. See also Warren,
Football, Crowds and Cultures, above n 4, 172. Besides, the legislation is open to
interpretation, and might lead to disproportionate results. However, the Court of Appeal
concluded that the question ‘was not whether the statutory provisions could give rise to a
disproportionate effect but whether they could give rise to a proportionate effect’: Deards,
above n 183, 768.
241 Zaugg, above n 13. See Coward, above n 8, 232; Morgan and Egitto, above n 3, 5. Morgan
and Egitto note that ‘[t]he UK’s anti-hooliganism measures now in place can quite
justifiably be viewed as some of the most efficient on the planet’. For a more critical
opinion, see Warren and Hay, ‘The A-League, Policing and the Dilemma of Public Order’,
above n 13, 125, 133.
242 See, eg, Dominique Bodin et al, ‘Le hooliganisme entre genèse et modernité’ [2005] (1)
Vingtième Siècle: Revue d'histoire 61, 72.
To illustrate this point, it is noted that general crime rates in England and
Wales have declined to their current historically low levels, 243 and that this
decline has coincided with a decline in levels of hooliganism. However, an
assumption that these declines are related does not necessarily follow. In any
case, it would be simplistic to minimise unduly the positive influence of the
measures to fight against hooliganism that were set up for this reason alone.
This statement is also corroborated by the fact that the curve of hooliganism
in England has not significantly been modified despite the European economic
crisis of 2008, or even the domestic violent riots that occurred in 2011 after the
death of a 29 year old man in a shootout with police in the district of Tottenham.
In addition, an absence of automatic correlation between general criminality
and hooliganism seems to be confirmed by international experience. For
instance, various countries that have experienced similar declines in general
criminality have at the same time been exposed to increased levels of
hooliganism. 244 While one should be cautious when making inter-jurisdictional
comparisons, this would appear to support the hypothesis that the English
reforms have been effective.
However, it remains true that the English system includes a large range of
measures which cannot completely be taken out of their context. Some of the
components of the system are the responsibility of, and implemented by, the
State, and include both legislative and non-legislative (eg policing practices)
initiatives. The clubs and the League have implemented other components of the
system. All of the system’s components have been developed and modified over
time in an unsettled and changing socio-economic environment.
This means that the effect, or otherwise, that any specific measure involved in
the ‘English response’ to hooliganism has had on reducing hooliganism, either in
isolation or in combination, is not clear. Questions arise as to what has been the
contribution of particular measures such as banning orders. How effective have
measures such as ticket price increases and stadium infrastructure improvements
been? What has exactly been the relative contribution of social and economic
changes in English society over time to reductions in the incidence of
hooliganism? To what extent have factors such as unemployment rates
influenced the prevalence of hooliganism incidents? Has the rate of decline in
hooliganism in England been uniform and consistent or have there been
statistically discernible impacts that can be associated with the introduction of a
particular initiative?
Further research, including, for example, cross-jurisdictional comparisons of
trends over time, would be required to posit an informed response to any of these
queries. Answers to such questions are likely to be relevant in the consideration
243 For crime statistics in England and Wales, see Office for National Statistics, ‘Crime in
England and Wales, Year Ending June 2014’ (Statistical Bulletin, 16 October 2014)
<http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_380538.pdf>. These estimates are the lowest since
the survey began in 1981.
244 One example is the case of Switzerland, which has experienced a decline in general
criminality but a converse increase in hooliganism related crime. See Office fédéral de la
statistique, ‘Statistique policière de la criminalité 2013: Baisse des infractions au Code
pénal’ (Press Release, No 0353-1402-50, 24 March 2014) <http://www.bfs.admin.ch/
bfs/portal/fr/index/themen/19/22/press.html?pressID=9349>.
of the transposition of initiatives derived from the English model to new

jurisdictions.
Finally, even if some commentators 245 argue that it is not typically the
‘known’ hooligans that are involved in the rioting, and that hooliganism is now
more hidden (and thereby potentially not being counted in official statistics), the
number of individuals who can potentially be associated with football disorder is
not unlimited. Furthermore, these commentators do not clearly show which other
factors might have led to the decline in hooliganism in the past decades.
Similarly, the dissuasive role of the reforms should not be underestimated.
It is timely then, to now turn to a consideration of the influence that the
English system has already had elsewhere. The situation in a number of
European countries and in Australia are examined.
In this context, a related conceptual issue needs to be borne in mind in
considering the potential for cross-jurisdictional application of the English
reforms: while the reforms are collectively described as a ‘model’, this term is
apt to mislead. They are not a model in the sense of being a single, coherent,
integrated system. Instead, as has been described, the reforms are a collection of
different measures implemented by different parties, at different times, over an
extended number of years. This factor, when combined with the impossibility of
exactly determining the positive impact of the measures that have been
implemented in England, either in isolation or in combination, means that it is
not an easy task to determine how to usefully deploy the ‘model’ in other
jurisdictions.
III THE APPLICATION OF THE ENGLISH SYSTEM ABROAD
A The Situation in Europe

Whilst football-related violence continues its decline in England, it has sadly
played a high profile role on Europe’s mainland. 246 Legal commentators suggest
‘[t]he irony is that the UK model for crowd control offers something of a
blueprint for those member states which now find themselves in a position with
which English lawmakers became all too familiar in past decades’. 247
245 See above nn 166, 175.

246 Morgan and Egitto, above n 3, 5; Warren, Football, Crowds and Cultures, above n 4, 17.
247 Morgan and Egitto, above n 3, 5.
The situations in France, Belgium, Italy and Germany, which are the countries
traditionally most affected by hooliganism, will be examined. 248 The case of
Switzerland will also be discussed; where, while historically less severely
impacted, hoolganism is increasingly becoming an issue. 249 Influenced by the
hooliganism and the legislation of its neighbours, but with a time delay, the
Swiss situation assists to illustrate certain limits to the application of the English
model abroad.
1 The Legislative Framework

The following section briefly describes the legal measures introduced by
governments to combat hooliganism that parallel the changes in England. The
measures managed by the clubs and the leagues will then be considered.
(a) France
In France, serious incidents occurred in 2006, including one in which a
policeman killed a Paris Saint-Germain supporter. 250 The situation was gradually
regulated by various special laws, then introduced in arts L332–1 et seq of the
Code du sport. 251 This legal system is supplemented by various decrees, as well
248 See ibid; Frosdick and Marsh, Football Hooliganism, above n 2, 3, 26, 48. These authors
also report the case of the Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, of a few other countries. For
more details about the Netherlands, see Peter T M Coenen, ‘At Last, a Football Law in the
Netherlands?’ [2009] (3–4) International Sports Law Journal 59; Ramón Spaaij, ‘Football
Hooliganism in the Netherlands: Patterns of Continuity and Change’ (2007) 8 Soccer &
Society 316. It is to be noted that the countries mentioned in this chapter are not the only
countries affected by hooliganism in Europe. For example, the Balkan region (in particular
Serbia) has been fighting against hooliganism for more than 20 years. For more details, see
Loïc Trégourès, ‘Le supportérisme serbe et l’Europe: entre indifférence et rejet’ [2012] (1)
Politique Européenne 126. See also Loïc Trégourès, ‘Aspects politiques et identitaires du
football en ex-Yougoslavie’ (Thesis) (forthcoming); Loïc Trégourès, Le hooliganisme
comme étalon-mesure de l’Etat de droit en Serbie (17 February 2014) Regard sur l’est
<http://www.regard-est.com/home/breve_contenu.php?id=1480&PHPSESSID=af586d2
6b055457cf4215ff94b0ef17c>; Robert C R Siekmann, ‘Legal Aspects of Combating
Transnational Football Hooliganism in Europe’ in Robert C R Siekmann (ed), Introduction
to International and European Sports Law: Capita Selecta (TMC Asser, 2012) 335;
Anastassia Tsoukala, Geoff Pearson and Peter Coenen, Legal Responses to Football
Hooliganism in Europe (TMC Asser, 2015) (forthcoming).
249 For statistics, see Denis Oswald and Alexandra Veuthey, ‘Les mesures juridiques de lutte
contre le hooliganisme en Suisse’ in Pascal Mahon and Minh Son Nguyen (eds), L’activité
et l’espace: Droit du sport et aménagement du territoire (Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2011) 85,
100–2. See also Federal Office of Police, ‘Measures against Violence at Sporting Events’
(Press Release, 8 February 2012) <http://www.fedpol.admin.ch/fedpol/en/home/
sicherheit/hooliganismus.html>.
250 For the record, the policeman, who maintained that he was trying to protect a young Israeli
Hapoël Tel-Aviv supporter who was a victim of a racist assault, was discharged after four
years of investigation. For more details, see Charles Amson, ‘Sport et sécurité. Une
approche juridique’ (2010) 11 Cahiers de la sécurité intérieure 43, 44. See also ‘Jeune
supporteur du PSG tué en 2006: non-lieu pour le policier’, Le Huffington Post (online), 16
February 2011 <http://archives-lepost.huffingtonpost.fr/article/2011/02/16/2407565_jeune
-supporteur-du-psg-tue-en-2006-non-lieu-pour-le-policier.html>.
251 Code du sport (version consolidée au 1 avril 2015) [The Sports Code (version last revised 1
April 2015)] (France).
as the general legislative framework. 252 The effects of these laws appear limited,
given that violent riots and other incidents continue to occur. 253
French law provides many sport specific offences. 254 In addition, two types of
stadium bans exist: stadium bans as a criminal sanction 255 and as an
administrative ban. 256 An obligation to report to a police station can be made
only if a stadium ban has been imposed previously. 257 However, there are no
specific measures regarding police custody or a ban on travel abroad. 258
Banned individuals are likely to feature in two different databases: Le fichier
des personnes recherchées [the file of wanted persons] and Le fichier national
des interdits de stade [the national register of banned people]. 259 One of the
peculiarities of the French legislation is the possibility for associations of
supporters to be dissolved for acts of violence or incitement of hatred or
discrimination. 260 Finally, measures aimed at organisers are also well-developed,
both in terms of infrastructure and operation. 261
(b) Belgium
Belgium, which experienced the Heysel tragedy, has very well-developed
legislation. 262 The basic text is the Loi sur le football 263 of 1998. 264 This strict
252 See Code pénal [The Criminal Code] (France).

253 Fonteneau, above n 7. For an example of a recent event, see ‘Nice-Bastia: “débordements
inadmissibles”’, Le Figaro (online), 20 October 2014 <http://www.lefigaro.fr>.
254 These offences are related to the introduction of alcohol and pyrotechnics in stadiums,
throwing missiles on the pitch and the incitement to hatred or violence. The encroachment
onto the playing area, or the display of symbols of racism and xenophobia, are also
punishable. For more details, see Bichovsky, above n 17, 132–7; Amson, above n 250, 45.
255 This ban requires the commission of an offence described in arts L332–3 to L332–10 and
L332–19 of the Code du Sport [The Sports Code]. For more details, see Bichovsky, above
n 17, 148–50.
256 This prohibition presupposes a threat to the public order. For more details, see Bichovsky,
above n 17, 150–3; Amson, above n 250, 45.
258 Ibid 159–65. Note that custody is generally governed by the particular provisions of arts 63,
77, 154, 706–88 and 803 et seq of the Code de procédure pénale [Code of Criminal
Procedure]. For a report of a recent incident regarding the arrest of 80, mainly French fans,
in Holland on 17 September 2014. See ‘Plus de 80 hooligans ont été interpellés aux
Pays-Bas’, Le Matin (online), 18 September 2014 <http://www.lematin.ch/sports/football/80
-hooligans-interpelles-paysbas/story/14332181>.
259 For more details about these files, see Bichovsky, above n 17, 170–1.
260 For more details, see Amson, above n 250, 45; Bichovsky, above n 17, 189–93. See also
Colin Miège, ‘La décision de dissoudre une association de supporters violents est conforme
à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales’ (2011) 24
Les Cahiers de droit du sport 46.
261 These measures include the establishment of a security and surveillance service and the
requirement to obtain approval for stadiums. This obligation applies to the few clubs that are
stadium owners. In most cases stadiums are the responsibility of municipal authorities which
are the bodies then affected by this requirement. For more details, see Bichovsky, above
n 17, 183–8.
263 Loi relative à la sécurité lors des matches de football [Author’s trans, Act Related to
Security at Football Matches] (Belgium) 1998-12-21/40.
264 Bichovsky, above n 17, 123; Marc Cools, Nico De Pauw and André Lemaître, ‘Une
interprétation de la sécurité privée et des événements footballistiques en Belgique’ (2010)
11 Cahiers de la sécurité intérieure 140, 141; Bertrand Fincoeur, ‘Football et sécurité en
Belgique: formes et transformations’ in Thomas Busset et al (eds), Le football à l’épreuve
de la violence et de l’extrémisme (Antipodes, 2008) 127, 129.
framework is supplemented by the Code pénal 265 and various decrees and
circulars. 266
The Belgian legislation lists various specific offences. 267 It also provides for
three types of stadium bans (judicial, administrative and as an immediate security
measure). 268 A prohibited perimeter can be ordered. 269 An obligation to report to
the police is also provided in various cases. 270
In addition, a prohibition on leaving the country after a judicial or
administrative stadium ban was introduced in 2005. 271 Similarly, an individual
who is violent during a sporting event may be subject to an administrative or
judicial arrest. 272
Relevant databases are first, Le fichier relatif aux interdictions de stade [the
file relating to stadium bans], and secondly, Le fichier relatif aux sanctions
administratives [the file relating to administrative sanctions]. 273 Numerous and
detailed obligations are imposed on match organisers. 274
(c) Italy
Italy significantly reinforced its legislative framework following the death of
a police officer in February 2007 by implementing Legge 41/2007. 275 The
265 Code pénal [Penal Code] (Belgium).

267 The introduction of pyrotechnics in a stadium, throwing a projectile on the pitch, the
incitement to hatred or violence, the encroachment into a field or not to comply with the
directions given in a stadium are to be noted. For more details, see Bichovsky, above n 17,
133–7; Fincoeur, ‘Football et sécurité en Belgique: formes et transformations’, above n 264,
129.
268 For more details, see Bichovsky, above n 17, 144–7.
269 Ibid 147–8.
270 For more details, see ibid 156–7.
271 Ibid 162.
272 Ibid 164.
273 For more details about these files, see Bichovsky, above n 17, 167–9.
274 These include, for example, the obligations directly related to infrastructure and security in
stadiums, the operational aspects and the conclusion of conventions. For more details, see
Bichovsky, above n 17, 174–83; Cools, De Pauw and Lemaître, above n 264, 142.
275 Recante misure urgenti per la prevenzione e la repressione di fenomeni di violenza connessi
a competizioni calcistiche [Urgent Measures for the Prevention and Repression of
Phenomena of Violence Connected with Football Matches] (Italy) Law No 41, 4 April 2007
(‘Prevention and Repression of Violence Law’). For more details, see Ferrari, above n 143.
adoption of this new law has been considered to have had a positive effect. 276
However, hooliganism continues to be a problem in Italy. 277
Higher punishments were introduced for violent crimes committed in and
around stadiums or in connection with a sports event. 278 Provisions related to
stadium bans, which have existed since 1989, 279 were expanded by several
subsequent reforms (including those of 2007). 280 The judicial procedures and
rules of execution were also overhauled. 281 Stadium bans, which may be applied
to events held in Italy or abroad, 282 can be complemented by a summons to
appear at a police station. 283 This applies automatically in case of
non-compliance with a previous ban. 284
Some ‘stadium safety’ measures were also introduced, as Italy is perhaps the
country — among the leading football nations — with the worst
infrastructure. 285 Legge 41/2007 obliged clubs and the municipalities to upgrade
276 See, eg, Ferrari, above n 143. See, however, the criticism of Alberto Testa: Alberto Testa,
‘Normalization of the Exception: Issues and Controversies of the Italian
Counter-Hooliganism Legislation’ (2013) 16 Sports in Society: Culture, Commerce, Media,
Politics 151.
277 See, for example, the reports on the shooting of three Napoli fans in Rome: ‘Napoli
Supporters Shot in Rome ahead of Italian Cup Final at Olympic Stadium with Serie A
Rivals Fiorentina’, The Telegraph (online), 3 May 2014 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/
football/european/10806888/Napoli-supporters-shot-in-Rome-ahead-of-Italian-Cup-final-at
-Olympic-Stadium-with-Serie-A-rivals-Fiorentina.html>; John Hooper, ‘Napoli Fan Fights
for Life in Hospital after Rome Football Violence’, The Guardian (online), 4 May 2014
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/04/napoli-fan-hospital-rome-football
-violence-coppa-italia>. These incidents cost the life of one supporter:
Terry Daley, ‘Napoli Fan Shot in Cup Final Violence Dies’, Reuters
(Online), 25 June 2014 <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/06/25/uk-soccer-italy-death
-idUKKBN0F00QF20140625>. See also ‘Le Stade olympique a encore été le théatre
d’émeutes’, Le Matin (online), 18 September 2014 <http://www.lematin.ch/
sports/football/stade-olympique-encore-theatre-emeutes/story/20065979>.
278 For instance, punishment for bodily harm would range between four and 10 years of
imprisonment (and up to eight and 16 in cases of grievous bodily harm). Furthermore,
verbal or physical aggression from a distance towards police forces are now falling within
the notion of ‘injury or violence against a public officer’: Ferrari, above n 143. In addition,
many other sports-related offences are listed in the legislation and may lead to the ban of a
supporter. Examples include: the illegal carrying of weapons: Norme integrative della
disciplina vigente per il controllo delle armi, delle munizioni e degli esposivi
[Supplementary Rules of Law for the Control of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives] (Italy)
Law No 110, 18 April 1975, art 4; the illegal use of helmets: Disposizioni a tutela
dell’ordine pubblico [Provisions for the Protection of Public Order] (Italy) Law No 152, 22
May 1975, art 5; entering stadiums with racist or discriminatory emblems/symbols: Recante
misure urgenti in materia di discriminazione razziale, etnica e religiosa [Urgent Measures
Concerning Racial, Ethnic and Religious Discrimination] (Italy) Law No 205, 25 June 1993,
art 2(2); throwing dangerous items and invasion of the pitch: Interventi nel settore del
giuoco e delle scommesse clandestini e tutela della correttezza nello svolgimento di
(manifestazioni sportive) [Interventions in the Field of Illegal Betting and Gaming and
Ensuring the Proper Conduct of Sporting Events] (Italy) Law No 401, 13 December 1989,
art 6-bis (‘Proper Conduct of Sporting Events Law’); the use or possession of fireworks: at
art 6-ter; and the participation/incitation to acts of violence/devastation: at art 6. Note that
these Acts have been amended several times.
279 See Proper Conduct of Sporting Events Law.
280 Ferrari, above n 143.
281 Ibid.
282 See Proper Conduct of Sporting Events Law art 6(1).
284 Ibid.
285 Ibid.
facilities in order to increase safety. 286 Money was therefore spent on

improvement to access, creation of fences separating the visiting supporters’ area
and emergency escapes. 287 Furthermore, additional admittance restrictions were
implemented. Thus, entrance tickets are now issued under the holder’s name.288
A ‘fan card’ is issued by clubs after the police authority have checked the
criminal history of the individual. 289 Furthermore, ticket touting is forbidden. 290
In addition, the new legislation increased the responsibilities of the hosting
club and, more specifically, introduced a mandatory standing official 291 for each
stadium with more than 10 000 seats, who is competent in deciding all matters
concerning spectator security. 292 Finally, the consequences of an arrest made
upon the detection of the commission of an alleged offence are also described in
the legislation. 293
(d) Germany
In Germany, several major incidents occurred during the 2012 Bundesliga, the
peak German league competition, notably clashes after a promotion/relegation
match between Karlsruhe (second division) and Regensburg (third division). 294
In this federal state, there is no specific legislation on violence committed by
spectators at sporting events. 295 The standards in this area are therefore, in
principle, in various pieces of the general German law. 296 Consequently, the
types of prohibited conduct and responsibilities of supporters are far less detailed
than in the other countries discussed above. 297 Recent developments in Germany
286 Ibid.
287 Ibid.
288 Ibid. Note, however, that Italy does not have a specific database for hooligans.
289 The police authority will check if a banning order is in progress and/or if the supporter was
previously convicted of a sports-related infraction in the past five years.
291 Gruppo Operativo Sicurezza [Operational Group Security]. Another important institution
concerned with stadium security is the Osservatorio Nazionale sulle Manifestazioni Sportive
[National Centre for the Monitoring of Sports Events]. This entity includes the Comitato di
Analisi sulle Manifestazioni Sportive [the Committee for the Analysis of Sports Events]. It
can, for instance, prohibit admission to visiting supporters. One of its most significant
initiatives was ‘the introduction of a mandatory registration for supporters willing to buy a
season ticket or a ticket to their team’s away matches’: Ferrari, above n 143.
292 Note that under the 2007 regulations, if a stadium lacks safety configurations, the match
must be played without spectators: Ferrari, above n 143. For more details about the
obligations of the event organiser, see also Recante disposizioni urgenti per contrastare I
fenomeni di violenza in occasione di copmetizioni sportive [Urgent Measures to Combat the
Phenomena of Violence at Sports Competitions] (Italy) Law No 88, 24 April 2003.
293 See especially Proper Conduct of Sporting Events Law art 8(1); Prevention and Repression
of Violence Law art 4. In addition to this, the general criminal law (in particular the Codice
Penale [Criminal Code]) applies to police custody.
294 This led the clubs and the German federation to strengthen the penalties towards violent
individuals. For more details, see ‘Les hooligans interdits de stade pendant
dix ans’, Le Matin (online), 17 July 2012 <http://www.lematin.ch/sports/football/
hooligans-interdits-stade-dix-ans/story/29775415>.
296 Ibid. See especially Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [Civil Code] (Germany); Strafgesetzbuch
[Criminal Code] (Germany); Paßgesetz [Passport Act] (Germany) 19 April 1986, BGB1 I,
537 (‘PassG’); Personalausweisgesetz [Law on Identity Cards] (Germany) 18 June 2009,
BGB1 I, 1346 (‘PersAusw’).
involving the politicisation and organisation of hooligan groups by far right

groups introduce new challenges and complications for the development of an
appropriate legal response. 298
The German legal framework in the matter of hooliganism is thus based on a
few measures, such as Aufenthaltsverbot [the prohibition on residence] 299 and
the checking of identity documents. 300 The obligation to report to a police station
can, for its part, only be imposed in case of emergency. 301 If concrete evidence
suggests that the person concerned, despite an obligation to report to the police
or a prohibition on residence, will go to the match venue, the police may also
detain them in custody. 302
German law also provides for a form of ‘yellow card’ to be issued to
supporters considered to be potentially dangerous. 303 The police will issue a
form of warning to the spectator informing them about the consequences of
misbehaviour. 304 The Zentrale Informationsstelle Sporteinsätze [‘information
office’ for sporting events] is responsible for administering a national
database. 305 Finally, Germany does not have specific provisions requiring safety
measures to be taken by the organiser. 306
(e) Switzerland
Switzerland has recently adopted anti-hooliganism legislation. 307 In
combination with a proliferation of violent outbursts over the past 20 years, the
trigger for legislation was provided by the organisation of the 2008 UEFA
European Football Championship and of the Ice Hockey World Championships
2009. 308
298 See Sabrina Pabst, ‘United against Salafism, Right-Wing Scene Surges
in Germany’, Deutsche Welle (online), 18 October 2014 <http://www.dw.de/
united-against-salafism-right-wing-scene-surges-in-germany/a-18005284>.
299 This measure seeks to prohibit certain people’s access to risky places at certain times. It is
usually based on the laws of the different Länder [cantons].
300 For more details, see Bichovsky, above n 17, 143–4, 160–1. See also PassG § 13; PersAusw
§ 2(2).
301 This measure — Meldeauflage — based on the laws of the different Länder, is, however,
not considered as a priority. For more details, see Bichovsky, above n 17, 155–6.
302 This measure — Präventivgewahrsam — based on the laws of the different Länder, requires
in principle a court order. For more details, see Bichovsky, above n 17, 163–4.
304 Ibid 193.
305 The database is known as Datei Gewalttäter Sport [Violent Hooligan Database] which was
created in 1994. For more details, see North Rhine-Westphalia Police, Häufig gestellte
Fragen zur Datei Gewalttäter Sport <http://www.polizei-nrw.de/artikel__4596.html>;
Bichovsky, above n 17, 165–7.
307 Oswald and Veuthey, ‘Les mesures juridiques de lutte contre le hooliganisme en Suisse’,
above n 249, 86–7. See also Veuthey, ‘Mettre un terme au hooliganisme endémique’, above
n 140.
308 See also Veuthey, ‘Mettre un terme au hooliganisme endémique’, above n 140.
Rather than adopting a hooliganism-specific law, the Parliament chose to

amend the pre-existing legislation aimed at maintaining internal security.309
These amendments, which came into force on 1 January 2007, consisted
primarily of the creation of a database on hooligans, provided for bans on
entering a defined perimeter and from travelling in a given country, imposed an
obligation to report to a police station and provided for detention in police
custody. 310 In 2010, an inter-cantonal convention, the Concordat instituant des
mesures contre la violence lors des manifestations sportives (‘CVMS’)311
substantially reproduced these measures with a few adjustments. 312 The law on
internal security, meanwhile, kept a few basic provisions. 313 This legislation is
supplemented by the general criminal framework, in particular the Code
pénal. 314 While Swiss hooliganism-related criminal offences do not exist, their
introduction is, however, encouraged by some academic commentators. 315
309 Loi fédérale instituant des mesures visant au maintien de la sûreté intérieure (LMSI) du 21
mars 1997 [Federal Act on Measures to Safeguard Internal Security of 21 March 1997]
(Switzerland). For more details, see Oswald and Veuthey, ‘Les mesures juridiques de lutte
contre le hooliganisme en Suisse’, above n 249, 86–7. See also Veuthey, ‘Mettre un terme
au hooliganisme endémique’, above n 140.
310 For more details, see Oswald and Veuthey, ‘Les mesures juridiques de lutte contre le
hooliganisme en Suisse’, above n 249, 91–5. See also Veuthey, ‘Mettre un terme au
hooliganisme endémique’, above n 140.
311 Concordat instituant des mesures contre la violence lors des manifestations sportives
(CVMS) [Convention on Measures to Prevent Violence at Sports Events] (Geneva)
(‘CVMS’).
314 Code pénal [Criminal Code] (Switzerland).
315 Veuthey, ‘Mettre un terme au hooliganisme endémique’, above n 140.
Despite the adoption of this legislation, incidents of hooliganism have

continued to grow in Switzerland. 316 In response to the growth in these incidents,
the cantons have decided to react. A review process of the CVMS is currently in
progress, 317 accompanied by various cantonal initiatives. 318 Similarly, proposals
are increasing at the political level. 319
2 The Measures Managed by the Clubs/the League

From a general point of view, the football associations of all the countries
discussed above are familiar with stadium bans and the practice of the
segregation of fans. 320 Similarly, they all provide rules regarding the
construction of stadiums and impose (to varying degrees) the establishment of a
security presence. 321 As in England, these measures are not within the sole
responsibility of the football associations but also require action from state
agencies.
However, one point of distinction between the anti-hooliganism activities of
the football associations in continental Europe is that, unlike England, ‘fan
316 For recent instances of hooliganism in football, see, eg, ‘Les débordements des hooligans
jugés “intolérables” à Berne’, Le Matin (online), 28 April 2014
<http://www.lematin.ch/suisse/Les-debordements-des-hooligans-juges-intolerables-a
-Berne/story/10408960>; Christiane Imsand, ‘Les CFF ne feront pas payer les clubs’,
L’Express (online), 19 September 2014 <http://www.arcinfo.ch/fr/
en-continu/articles/index.php?idContent=1348341>; ‘Enquête ouverte après les incidents
lors du match Baden — Xamax FCS’, Arcinfo (online), 11 May 2014
<http://www.arcinfo.ch/fr/sports/football/enquete-ouverte-apres-les-incidents-lors-du
-match-baden-xamax-fcs-568-1293104>; ‘FC Bâle champion: des hooligans perturbent la
fête’, Arcinfo (online), 16 May 2014 <http://www.arcinfo.ch/fr/sports/football/
fc-bale-champion-des-hooligans-perturbent-la-fete-568-1295461>; ‘Des hooligans blessent
cinq policiers’, 20 Minutes (online), 18 August 2014 <http://www.20min.ch/ro/news/
suisse/story/Des-hooligans-blessent-cinq-policiers-14238982>. See also Veuthey, ‘Mettre
un terme au hooliganisme endémique’, above n 140. For statistics, see Oswald and Veuthey,
‘Les mesures juridiques de lutte contre le hooliganisme en Suisse’, above n 249, 100–2;
Office fédérale de la police, ‘Chiffres actuels du système d’information HOOGAN’ (30
January 2015) <https://www.fedpol.admin.ch/fedpol/fr/home/aktuell/news/2015/2015-01
-30.html>. Apart from a rise in violence, these reports show that recent hooliganism
instances occur at both the amateur and professional level, going from small clubs from the
Première Ligue Promotion (third-tier of the Swiss Championship) up to prestigious clubs
like Basel, which has won the latest Swiss Super League Championship. The Swiss Cup is
not spared. As a consequence, the canton of Bern, where the Swiss Cup was traditionally
held each year, has recently announced that it did not want to host this event anymore (and
the same thing for the national team matches), due to high costs related to hooligans and
security. Similarly, the Chemins de Fer Fédéraux [the Swiss Federal Railways] are currently
questioning their obligation to accept all passengers without exception.
317 The key measure of this review is the introduction of the obligation for the clubs to ask the
police for an authorisation in order to organise sports events (in particular, football and
hockey matches in the upper leagues). For more details, see Thorsten Siegel, ‘Hooligans im
Verwaltungsrecht: Stadionverbote und andere polizeirechtlishe Maßnahmen zur
Eindämmung von Gewalt in Fußballstadien’ (2013) 66 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift
1035. It is anticipated that the CVMS will be accepted by all cantons (with the exception of
Basel) by mid-2015.
318 The canton of Neuchâtel is a good example of this.
319 For more details, see Veuthey, ‘Mettre un terme au hooliganisme endémique’, above n 140.
See also ‘Deux motions pour serrer la vis aux hooligans’, Le Matin (online), 21 February
2012 <http://www.lematin.ch/suisse/Deux-motions-pour-serrer-la-vis-aux-hooligans
-/story/10494397>.
320 Bichovsky, above n 17, 117 n 292.
321 Ibid.
coaching’ is also well established. This is particularly the case in Germany — the
first country to have introduced such measures 322 — but also in Belgium 323 and
Switzerland. 324
3 Analysis
In light of the comparative discussion, at least some elements of the English
model appear to have been influential in relation to measures adopted in
continental Europe. 325
Measures modelled on aspects of the English approach have recently been
introduced in Italy. These measures are considered to have had a positive effect.
And this is so notwithstanding the care that needs to be taken when comparing
the statistics of different countries, and despite the legislative and regulatory
differences specific to each country — which may influence the effectiveness of
each system. However, results are more qualified in other countries, like France
and Switzerland.
It is probably an obvious conclusion that the English model cannot be
reproduced automatically abroad, but must adapt to local circumstances. From
the legal point of view, four main types of limitations to the universal
implementation of the English model can be identified.
First, hooligans are not the same everywhere. For example, where some
countries are distinguished by racial and/or political incidents, others are devoid

323 For more details about fan coaching in Belgium, see Bertrand Fincoeur, ‘Le fan coaching
belge: défis et avatars d’une alternative régulatrice avant-gardiste’ in Thomas Busset, Roger
Besson and Christophe Jaccoud (eds) L’autre visage du supportérisme — Autorégulations,
mobilisations collectives et mouvements sociaux (Peter Lang, 2014) 59, 59–73.
325 The influence of the ‘English system’ on other countries is sometimes assumed from the
circumstances by certain commentators. However, it is not uncommon that some
governments expressly refer to the ‘English system’ as a model to follow in their
explanatory memoranda and other relevant documents before adopting new measures. This
was, for instance, the case in Switzerland. For more details, see Prevention of VIOlence in
Sport Report, above n 7. The same is true for France, where several explanatory memoranda
of the French General Assembly and the Senate expressly refer to the ‘English system’. See,
eg, Assemblée nationale, Compte rendu intégral, Première séance du mardi 11 avril 2006,
195e séance de la session ordinaire 2005–2006 [National Assembly, First Session Tuesday
11 April 2006, 195th Sitting of the 2005–6 Ordinary Session] <http://www.assemblee
-nationale.fr/12/cri/2005-2006/20060195.asp>; Sénat, Proposition de loi relative à la
prevention des violences lors des manifestations sportives [Senate, Proposed Law on the
Prevention of Violence at Sporting Events] (4 June 2015) <http://www.senat.fr/rap/l05
-338/l05-3385.html>; Assemblée nationale, Rapport n°3011 [General Assembly, Report No
3011] <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/rapports/r3011.asp>. For Belgium, see, eg,
Sénat, Projet de loi relative à la sécurité lors des matches de football, Rapport No
1–1060/3, Session du 24 novembre 1998 [Senate, Draft Law on Security at Football
Matches, Report No 1–1060/3, Session of 24 November 1998] [2]–[3]
<http://www.senate.be/www/webdriver?MItabObj=pdf&MIcolObj=pdf&MInamObj=pdfid
&MItypeObj=application/pdf&MIvalObj=16780628>; Chambre des représentants, Rapport
No 1572/5–97/98, Session ordinaire du 3 juillet 1998 [House of Representatives, Report No
1572/5–97/98, Ordinary Session of 3 July 1998] 6 <http://www.lachambre.be/
FLWB/PDF/49/1572/49K1572005.pdf>.
of them. 326 Various political and social factors, such as ethnic conflicts or
financial poverty, also influence the behaviour of fans. 327
Secondly, the extent and severity of hooliganism is not the same everywhere.
For instance, in continental Europe, football-related violence is known to be
mainly, though not only, domestic. 328 Similarly, the degree of hooliganism is not
the same in France or Switzerland as it was in England 20 or 30 years earlier.
Solutions can thus appear proportionate in a given country, but inappropriate in
326 For more details about European fan profiles and behaviour, see Frosdick and Marsh,
Football Hooliganism, above n 2, 57–70, 102–12. About the issue of racism, see ibid
146–51. About Belgium in particular, see Fincoeur, ‘Football et sécurité en Belgique:
formes et transformations’, above n 264, 130–44. About the Balkans, see Trégourès, ‘Le
supportérisme serbe et l’Europe: entre indifférence et rejet’, above n 248, 126–48. See also
CBS Sports, Serbia Fans Chant Mladic Slogans at France Match (31 May 2012)
<http://www.cbssports.com/general/story/19217360/serbia-fans-chant-mladic-slogans-at
-france-match>; Telegraph Sport, ‘Serbia v Albania Abandoned Following Mass Brawl after
Drone Flies over Stadium Carrying Albanian Flag’, The Telegraph (online),
15 October 2014 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/euro-2016/11163216/
Serbia-v-Albania-abandoned-following-mass-brawl-after-drone-flies-over-stadium
-carrying-Albanian-flag.html>. About Italy, see, eg, ‘Two New Arrests in Italy in
Neo-Fascist Beating Death: Agency’, Agence France-Presse (Paris), 6 May 2008.
327 For more details about European fan profiles and behaviour, see Frosdick and Marsh,
Football Hooliganism, above n 2, 57–70, 102–12. About the issue of political and social
factors, see, in particular, the situation in Germany: David M Keithly, ‘Shadows of
Germany’s Authoritarian Past’ (1994) 38 Orbis 207; Gunter A Pilz, ‘Social Factors
Influencing Sport and Violence: On the “Problem” of Football Hooliganism in Germany’
(1996) 31 International Review for the Sociology of Sport 49. See also the case of the
Balkans: Trégourès, ‘Le supportérisme serbe et l’Europe: entre indifférence et rejet’, above
n 248; ‘Serbia Fans Chant Mladic Slogans at France Match’, above n 326; ‘Serbia v Albania
Abandoned Following Mass Brawl after Drone Flies over Stadium Carrying Albanian Flag’,
above n 326. About Belgium, see Fincoeur, ‘Football et sécurité en Belgique: formes et
transformations’, above n 264, 132–4. About France, see Nicolas Hourcade and Antoine
Lech, ‘Les supportérismes français: entre modèles européens et spécificités nationales’ in
Guillaume Robin (ed), Football, Europe et régulations (Septentrion, 2011) 23. For an
analysis about England, see Warren, Football, Crowds and Cultures, above n 4, 23–6.
328 Frosdick and Marsh, Football Hooliganism, above n 2, 70. UEFA international matches
have also experienced racism/hooliganism-related incidents. See, eg, above Part I; above n
326 and accompanying text.
another one (with a risk, as noted, of perverse effects), 329 notably with regard to
human rights. 330
Thirdly, the structure of government may also have an influence over the
adoption of initiatives inspired by the English experience. For instance, the
federal structure of Switzerland and Germany has sometimes indirectly
329 Along the same strand (with a special focus on security measures), see Taylor and Toohey,
above n 10. Tracy Taylor and Kristine Toohey indicate that:
It is a matter of judgement whether the security is excessive or the control measures
are out of proportion to the risk. The verdict on such questions is certainly influenced
by the geo-political environment within which each event is located. Put simply, the
level and type of security practices are likely to be mediated by local circumstances
and traditions.
At 3263. More specifically about Italy, see Ferrari, above n 143. About Switzerland, see
Oswald and Veuthey, ‘Les mesures juridiques de lutte contre le hooliganisme en Suisse’,
above n 249, 96–100.
330 Note that like in England, the legislative frameworks of mainland Europe aimed at fighting
against hooliganism have been tested in the courts. In France, several judgments about
banning orders have been issued by administrative courts. See Anastassia Tsoukala,
‘Controlling Football-Related Violence in France: Law and Order vs the Rule of Law’
(2013) 16 Sport in Society: Cultures, Commerce, Media, Politics 140. See also the
judgments made by the French State Council and Constitutional Council concerning
banning orders and decrees prohibiting movements of supporters: see, eg, Conseil
constitutionnel [French Constitutional Court], decision n° 2011–625 DC, 10 March 2011;
Conseil d'État [French Administrative Court], decision n° 373129, 8 November 2013;
Conseil d'État [French Administrative Court], decision n° 367274, 29 March 2013; Conseil
d'État [French Administrative Court], decision n° 347359, 9 November 2011; Conseil d'État
[French Administrative Court], decision n° 340849, 1 June 2011; Conseil d'État [French
Administrative Court], decision n° 340849, 8 October 2010 reported in [2010] Rec Lebon;
Conseil d'État [French Administrative Court], decision n° 339257, 13 July 2010 reported in
[2010] Rec Lebon; Conseil d'État [French Administrative Court], decision n° 339293, 13
July 2010; Conseil d'État [French Administrative Court], decision n° 315723, 25 July 2008.
For judgments concerning the lawfulness of the dissolution of an association of supporters,
see Association Nouvelle des Boulogne Boys v France (European Court of Human Rights,
Application No 6468/09, 22 February 2011). Finally, note that the Commission nationale de
l’informatique et des libertés [National Commission on IT and Liberties] has recently
sanctioned the Paris Saint-Germain FC for the illegal filing of information on 2000 of its
supporters: Adrien Pécout, ‘La CNIL interdit au PSG le “fichage illégal” de ses
supporteurs’, Le Monde (online), 5 August 2014 <http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/
2014/08/05/la-cnil-interdit-au-psg-le-fichage-illegal-de-ses-supporteurs_4466907_3224
.html>. For Belgium, in relation to banning orders, see, eg, Cour d’arbitrage [Belgium Court
of Arbitration], decision n° 175/2002, 5 December 2002. In Italy, many aspects of the
legislation to fight against hooliganism have come under the scrutiny of the Constitutional
Court. See Ferrari, above n 143. Regarding Germany and the operation of art 5 of the ECHR
on the lawfulness of the arrest of a supporter, see Ostendorf v Germany (Judgment)
(European Court of Human Rights, Application No 15598/08, 7 March 2013). Finally, in
Switzerland, several appeals have been filed against the legislation itself, giving rise to
various abstract constitutionality reviews. See Bundesgericht [Federal Supreme Court of
Switzerland], 1C_158/2007, 31 March 2008; Bundesgericht [Federal Supreme Court of
Switzerland], 1C_428/2009, 13 October 2010; Bundesgericht [Federal Supreme Court of
Switzerland], 1C_16/2010, 16 November 2010; Bundesgericht [Federal Supreme Court of
Switzerland], 1C_176/2013 and 1C_684/2013, 7 January 2014. About the whole topic, see
Anastassia Tsoukala, ‘Security Policies & Human Rights in European Football Stadia’
(Research Paper No 5, Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2007). It is observed that
while the relevant legislation in mainland Europe has raised substantial controversy,
constitutional challenges have rarely resulted in the abrogation of the substantive legislative
provisions.
hampered the progress of the fight against hooliganism. 331 Another example is
the difficulties experienced in Switzerland in the implementation of the
legislative framework. It is unable, for cultural, political and economic reasons,
to implement its new legislation. 332 These reasons include the lack of political
will (namely the withdrawal of the State in recent years as it no longer wishes to
support security or legal costs). 333 Another factor in Switzerland is its strong
commitment to the protection of privacy, which is likely to weaken the fight
against hooliganism. 334
Fourthly, initiatives from the English model, such as increases in ticket prices,
also lack universal application. In small countries like Switzerland, the measure
would risk decreasing crowd attendance numbers and gate receipts, which are
crucial in the absence of substantial sponsorship revenues. 335
Next, it is of interest to examine a country outside Europe. The majority of
non-European countries have a much lower degree of hooliganism. 336 Australia
is one country that perfectly illustrates this tendency.
B The Situation in Australia

Australia has experienced relatively little hooliganism 337 and the term
‘hooliganism’ is not widely used. Most published works focus on broader issues,
such as ‘crowd management’ or ‘security at sports events’ (including terrorist
risks). 338
In football, the establishment of an elite national league in 2005 was
accompanied by an unprecedented growth in popularity for the game in several
Australian cities. 339 This growth presents challenges for maintaining public
order. 340 Most incidents that have taken place have been linked to externally
sourced ethnic conflicts, 341 even though the recent doctrine tends to relativise the
331 About Switzerland, some commentators have, in particular noticed, that the State and the
cantons keep passing the buck with regards to their responsibility: Veuthey, ‘Mettre un
terme au hooliganisme endémique’, above n 140. About Germany, the long delay to adhere
to the European Convention on Spectator Violence can be explained by the fact that all the
Länder [cantons] had to accept it: Bichovsky, above n 17, 121.
332 Veuthey, ‘Mettre un terme au hooliganisme endémique’, above n 140. Not to mention, for
some other countries, like Bosnia, corruption problems are likely to weaken the
effectiveness of the fight against hooliganism: Trégourès, ‘Le supportérisme serbe et
l’Europe: entre indifférence et rejet’, above n 248, 132.
333 Veuthey, ‘Mettre un terme au hooliganisme endémique’, above n 140.
334 Ibid.
335 For more details about the financial health of the Swiss football clubs, see
Ignace Jeannerat, ‘Tous ces clubs de football dans le rouge’, Le Temps (online), 5 March
2012 <http://www.letemps.ch/Page/Uuid/218c80ac-6640-11e1-a3b9-3de4c710e72f/
Tous_ces_clubs_de_football_dans_le_rouge>.
336 Morgan and Egitto, above n 3, 5.
337 Warren, Football, Crowds and Cultures, above n 4, 37, 79. For specific details about
Australian rules football, see at 6, 79. See also Warren and Hay, ‘The A-League, Policing
and the Dilemma of Public Order’, above n 13, 125, 132.
338 Taylor and Toohey, above n 10, 3260, 3264, 3266; Warren, Football, Crowds and Cultures,
above n 4, 158.
339 Warren and Hay, ‘The A-League, Policing and the Dilemma of Public Order’, above n 13,
124.
340 Ibid.
341 Warren, Football, Crowds and Cultures, above n 4, 130–3, 140–1; ibid 125–6.
concrete influence of this factor. 342 One of the clubs most affected by
hooliganism is Melbourne Victory, which has recently entered into a supporters’
charter in order to combat crowd disorder. 343
Similarly, lower leagues are not spared by this scourge. Violent events have
occurred recently in the New South Wales Premier League 344 between fans of
Sydney United and the Bonnyrigg White Eagles football clubs. 345
Another feature of Australia is that the problem of hooliganism is not, as in
most other countries examined, entirely confined to football. It has been
experienced in sports as diverse as tennis, 346 cricket and the domestic game,
Australian rules football. 347 Arguably, however, football has a disproportionate
history of hooliganism in Australia. 348 Association football (soccer) is only one
of four codes of football played in Australia; the others being rugby league,
rugby union and Australian rules football. These other codes are more popular
than football — Australian rules football and rugby league substantially so. Yet
none of these codes have any tradition of, or requirement for, measures such as
the segregation of groups of supporters, 349 a practice that has been required in
relation to a number of football clubs in Australia.
1 The Legislative Framework

Unlike the legislation of many countries in Europe, which is directly modelled
on the English framework, the Australian system is more minimalist. The areas
of criminal law and the regulation of the staging of sporting events are typically
the responsibility of state legislatures under the Australian federal model. The
342 Warren, Football, Crowds and Cultures, above n 4, 131–2, 140; Warren and Hay, ‘The
A-League, Policing and the Dilemma of Public Order’, above n 13, 125–6, 128.
343 Melbourne Victory Football Club, Charter for Football Supporter Management (Charter,
September 2011) <https://www.gomvfc.com.au/site/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/
v2-Charter_Football-Supporter-Management_Sept12_FINAL.pdf>.
344 The New South Wales Premier League is a state-based league, one level below the elite
national A-League competition.
345 For more details, see Warren and Hay, ‘The A-League, Policing and the Dilemma of Public
Order’, above n 13, 126–7. For a description of other incidents of spectator disorder in
soccer, see at 128; Warren, Football, Crowds and Cultures, above n 4, 132; Warren and
Hay, ‘Order and Disorder at Sporting Venues’, above n 11, 64.
346 Taylor and Toohey, above n 10, 3270. See also ‘Tennis Fans Ejected from Australian
Open’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 18 January 2010
<http://www.smh.com.au/sport/tennis/tennis-fans-ejected-from-australian-open-20100118
-mfwo.html>.
347 Warren, Football, Crowds and Cultures, above n 4, 78. For specific details about spectator
disorder at Australian rules football, see at 79–103. See also Warren and Hay, ‘The
A-League, Policing and the Dilemma of Public Order’, above n 13, 124–5.
348 For recent examples of hooliganism afflicting football in Australia, see Caroline Zielinski,
‘Two Charged over Soccer Riots’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 29 December 2013
<http://www.smh.com.au/sport/soccer/two-charged-over-soccer-riots-20131229
-301hf.html>; Madame H, ‘A-League Violence Slammed’, Triple M (online), 26 March
2013 <http://www.triplem.com.au/melbourne/sport/other-sports/news/football-federation
-australia-condemns-soccer-violence-after-hooligans-terrorise-patrons-at-sydney-fc-western
-wanderers-a-league-derby>; Rachel Olding, ‘Football Crowd Violence Draws Advice from
League Expert’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 24 August 2012, 7.
349 Warren, Football, Crowds and Cultures, above n 4, Preface, 7, 116. The reasons for the
relative differences in spectator behaviours at football as compared with other forms of
football and other sports, both in Australia and in other jurisdictions, are not obvious and
this is an area that would benefit from further research.
existence of relevant laws, therefore, is also dependent on each state’s legislative

agenda. The states of Victoria and New South Wales have the most developed
event legislation.
Part 4 of the Major Sporting Events Act 2009 (Vic), which concerns crowd
management issues, contains some specific offences known in English law. 350
An authorised officer is entitled to inspect bags, baskets or other receptacles if
deemed necessary. 351 In this context, inappropriate behaviour can lead to the
direction to leave the event venue or area, 352 or even to a banning order for a
period of up to five years. 353 Nevertheless, there is no real ticketing policy (ie
identification card or database with supporter profiles) in this, or in any other,
state. 354
Division 5 of the Major Events Act 2009 (NSW) — which, as its name
suggests, is not limited to sports events — follows the same model. 355 The
prohibited conduct is described more generally as more specific provisions can
350 The following offences are to be noted: to possess prohibited items: Major Sporting Events
Act 2009 (Vic) s 62; to possess or throw fireworks: at ss 63–5; to throw or kick projectiles:
at s 68; and to climb on a fence: at s 72. For dealing with prohibited items, see at ss 79–82.
Furthermore, unless expressly authorised by the manager or the coming event organiser, ‘a
person in an event venue or an event area must not have in his or her possession any alcohol
that has not been purchased at the event venue or event area in accordance with the Liquor
Control Reform Act 1998’: Major Sporting Events Act 2009 (Vic) s 66(1).
351 See Major Sporting Events Act 2009 (Vic) s 90.
352 Ibid ss 83–4.
353 Ibid s 87. For more details about the Major Sporting Events Act 2009 (Vic), in particular
regarding the issue of human rights. See Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities 2006
(Vic) s 28 (‘Charter’); Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 26 February
2009, 488–502 (James Merino, Minister for Sport, Recreation and Youth Affairs); Scrutiny
of Acts and Regulations Committee, Alert Digest, No 3 of 2009, 10 March 2009, 1–6;
Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission, ‘Register of Compatibility
Statements 2009’ (Register of Statements) 27–8; John So and Charlotte Beeny, ‘Victorian
Charter of Rights Developments’ (2009) 37 Human Rights Law Resource Centre Bulletin 5,
5–6. See also the discussions in relation to the application of ss 25(2)(k) and s 24(1) of the
Charter in respect of ss 144 and 172 of the Major Sporting Events Act 2009 (Vic) and the
abrogation of the common law privilege against self-discrimination following the decision
of Warren CJ in Re an Application under the Major Crime (Investigative Powers) Act 2004.
On the notion of ‘public authority’ for the purposes of the Charter, see Metro West v Sudi
(Residential Tenancies) [2009] VCAT 2025; Jennifer Ring and Malcolm Cooke,
‘Application of the Victorian Charter of Human Rights: New Obligations for Private
Companies when Carrying out Public Functions’ (Media Release, 24 December 2009)
<http://web.archive.org/web/20110227015726/http://www.freehills.com.au/5680.aspx>.
354 Thomas Cieslak, Game Day Security and Football Hooliganism: A
Discussion of New Methods to Solve this Long-Standing and Deep-Rooted
Problem, European Association for Sport Management
<http://easm.net/download/2007/ac74d0b6a6950bd25689c8bd41f7ed7f.pdf>.
355 See also Major Events Act 2009 (NSW) s 3.
be found in other laws. 356 The obligations of event organisers are not described
in detail in Australian legislation. 357
Legislation in other states, such as the Major Events Act 2014 (ACT), is more
concise. 358 Some specific laws exist in other states, though with limited
application in relation to the regulation of violent conduct at sporting events,
which is largely left to the general criminal law. 359 For example, in Queensland,
the Major Sports Facilities Act 2001 (Qld) regulates major sports facilities360
applying to events held at those facilities. This Act provides, inter alia,
restrictions on the purchase and resale of tickets to a major sports facility. 361
In addition, some laws may be adopted for a limited time in connection with
specific events. 362
2 The Measures Managed by the Clubs/the League

In addition to the legislation described above, some sports venue management
organisations have the power to pass venue regulations under the authority of an
Act of Parliament. 363 Similarly, private actors can establish an arrangement
together, or with the police, in order to provide event security. 364
Finally, sports federations, with a tendency to self-regulate, have their own
regulations in this matter. This is the case of Football Federation Australia,
356 See especially Sporting Venues (Invasions) Act 2003 (NSW); Sporting Venues (Offenders
Banning Orders) Act 2005 (NSW).
357 Note that even though this is not expressed explicitly as a legal obligation for the organiser
(like in England or other countries in Europe), surveillance technology is commonly used in
Australian stadiums. For more details, see Taylor and Toohey, above n 10, 3260, 3267–9,
3271–3. These authors, however, mention the Occupational Health and Safety Act
Guidelines 2004 (Vic) and associated documents such as WorkSafe Victoria’s Crowd
Control Guide 2006, which indicates that ‘consideration should be given to providing crowd
controllers with wearable, personal video and recording services’: WorkSafe Victoria,
‘Crowd Control at Venues and Events — A Practical Occupational Health and Safety
Guide’ (Information Guide, WorkSafe Victoria, January 2007) 16
<https://www.worksafe.vic.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0013/10354/crowd_control.pdf>.
See also Warren, Football, Crowds and Cultures, above n 4, 2, 137. See also the provisions
related to occupiers’ liability such as the ones contained in pt IIA of the Wrongs Act 1958
(Vic). Besides, other more general differences exist between the Major Sporting Events Act
2009 (Vic) and the Major Events Act 2009 (NSW), notably in relation to the declaration of
major events and the constitution of advisory committees and major events authorities.
358 For specific powers and offences relating to crowd management, see Major Events Act 2014
(ACT) pt 3.
359 For example, see Major Events Act 2014 (Qld); Major Events Act 2013 (SA). For examples
of general criminal laws, see Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) pt III. See also Police Act 1990 (NSW)
s 208; Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld). See also Warren, Football,
Crowds and Cultures, above n 4, 107–9. Warren mentions, in addition, the Summary
Offences Act 1953 (SA) and the Summary Offences Act 1966 (Vic).
360 See Major Sports Facilities Act 2001 (Qld) s 4.
361 Ibid ss 30C(1)–(2).
362 See Commonwealth Games Arrangements Act 2001 (Vic). In the matter of broadcasting and
the challenges posed by new media technologies, which were adopted for the Olympic
Games in Sydney, see also Olympic Arrangements Act 2000 (NSW). For more details about
the legislation in Australia, see, eg, Taylor and Toohey, above n 10, 3264, 3266, 3268, 3270;
Warren, Football, Crowds and Cultures, above n 4, 107–9.
363 See Melbourne Cricket Ground Act 2009 (Vic) s 33. See also Warren, Football, Crowds and
Cultures, above n 4, 110.
364 See, eg, Melbourne Victory Football Club, Charter for Football Supporter Management
(September 2011) <https://www.gomvfc.com.au/site/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/
v2-Charter_Football-Supporter-Management_Sept12_FINAL.pdf>.
which has adopted a Spectator Code of Behaviour. 365 This Code indicates the
conduct that spectators should adopt at football matches. 366 Any person who
does not comply with it may be evicted from a venue and banned from attending
future matches. 367
In relation to the issue of racial, and other types of vilification, many
Australian sports have now adopted anti-vilification policies to address problems
such as racial and homophobic vilification. 368 Notwithstanding the difficulties in
extending the scope of these policies to spectators who are not members of sports
clubs, spectators who have engaged in racial vilification have been ejected from
stadiums; where the spectators responsible have been members of clubs, their
club memberships have been revoked. 369
3 Analysis
The influence of the English model on Australian legislation does not appear
as significant as in some European countries. This is not surprising, given that
the problems of hooliganism in Australia are not commensurate with those
experienced by England and Europe’s mainland. 370 The relevance of the English
system in Australia, as a model of good practice, is therefore not as prominent.
365 Football Federation of Australia, Spectator Code of Behaviour (1 January 2007)

<http://www.footballaustralia.com.au>.
366 Ibid.
367 Ibid. See also Dominic Bossi, ‘A-League: Clubs to Pay for Fans’ Bad Behaviour under FFA
Plan’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 31 December 2013 <http://www.smh.com.au/
sport/soccer/aleague-clubs-to-pay-for-fans-bad-behaviour-under-ffa-plan-20131230
-3032o.html>.
368 See Australian Football League, National Vilification and Discrimination Policy (June
2013) <http://www.afl.com.au/staticfile/AFL%20Tenant/AFL/Files/Respect%20and%
20Responsibility/National-Vilification-Discrimination-Policy.pdf>. This policy prohibits
‘conduct which may reasonably be considered to incite hatred towards, contempt for,
ridicule of or discrimination against a person or group of persons’ on grounds that include
race, religion, gender, colour, sexual orientation or disability: at art 4.1. It also proscribes
‘harassment’ which is defined as:
[C]onduct which may reasonably be considered to be offensive, abusive, belittling or
threatening, or which is otherwise unwelcome and a reasonable person would
recognise it as being unwelcome and likely to cause the recipient to feel offended,
humiliated or intimidated.
At art 4.2. A process to resolve disputes is established by the policy, with the possibility of
disciplinary sanctions being issued: at art 10.4. See also National Rugby League, Code of
Conduct (2003) cl 15(2)(c) <http://www.rugbyleague.com.au/nrl/nrl_code_of_conduct.pdf>;
Cricket Australia, Cricket Australia: Anti-Racism Code for Players and
Player Support Personnel (2014) <http://www.cricketaustralia.com.au>; Tennis Australia,
Member Protection Policy (2014) 11–14 <http://www.tennis.com.au/wp
-content/uploads/2014/06/TA_Member_Protection_Policy-LR.pdf>; Football Federation
Australia, Spectator Code of Behaviour (1 January 2007) cls (c), (e)
<http://www.footballaustralia.com.au>.
369 See Adam Baldwin and Malcolm Conn, ‘Adam Goodes Racially Abused by Essendon Fan
in Friday Night Clash at Etihad Stadium, Western Bulldogs Apologise to Demon Neville
Jetta’, The Herald Sun (Melbourne), 21 May 2014. See also Mark Robinson and Tom
Minear, ‘Hawthorn Fan Kicked out of Aurora Stadium after Majak Daw Racist Slur’, The
Herald Sun (Melbourne), 22 February 2014.
370 Warren, Football, Crowds and Cultures, above n 4, 37, 79. About Australian rules football
in particular, see at 6, 79. See also Warren and Hay, ‘The A-League, Policing and the
Dilemma of Public Order’, above n 13, 125, 132.
A recent report by an Independent Football Inquiry, following the incident in

the NSW Premier League mentioned above, addressed this issue. 371 Effectively,
several recommendations were made by the Panel, which recommended more
sweeping legislative reforms based on the English legislation. 372 According to
this report, the new laws should sit alongside tighter bans and enforcement
procedures; they should target violence and the display of inflammatory national
or political flags and be implemented by Football NSW. 373 Furthermore, the
legislation should introduce enhanced police search and confiscation powers in
and around sports venues, along with mandatory 12 month exclusion orders and
potential lifetime bans for the most troublesome supporters. 374
On this basis, the two clubs involved were instructed to help with the
implementation of several initiatives in order to improve public order. 375 Despite
these measures, the disorder leading to the inquiry continued. 376
This example shows that while the English legal system may provide a source
of inspiration for governments in Australia and for measures that are introduced,
they will not necessarily amount to a panacea to totally cure the ills created by
hooliganism. It also illustrates the difficulty of implementing initiatives derived
from the English model in isolation from other aspects of that model.
Further, the restrictions discussed in the context of the application of the
English system across jurisdictions to countries in Europe’s mainland may be
equally or more powerful in the Australian context. Some commentators
emphasise the possible counterproductive effects that may be produced by the
introduction of inappropriate regulation and the potential implementation
problems. 377 They have even advocated that governments should favour internal
good practices models in preference to adoption of the English model. 378
C Final Remarks
If the influence of the English system is relatively persuasive in continental
Europe, its relevance is more limited in Australia.
Furthermore, several restrictions to the universal application of the English
system can be identified. Critical analysis demonstrates that if the English model
is to be an effective source of inspiration for other countries, it must be adapted
to local circumstances.
In particular, its full application remains a problematic issue in countries that
only experience a moderate degree of hooliganism, such as Switzerland or
126.
372 Ibid.
373 Ibid 126–7.
374 Ibid.
375 Ibid 133.
376 Ibid. See also Sebastian Hassett, ‘A-League: Wanderers Hit Back at Victory as Blame Game
Continues’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 1 January 2014 <http://www.smh.com.au/
sport/soccer/aleague-wanderers-hit-back-at-victory-as-blame-game-continues-20131231
-304nr.html>.
377 See, eg, Warren and Hay, ‘The A-League, Policing and the Dilemma of Public Order’,
above n 13, 127, 132. For more details about the Major Sporting Events Act 2009 (Vic) and
the issue of human rights, see above n 353 and accompanying text.
124, 132–7.
Australia. The case of Australia, however, with its four codes of football,
highlights the issue of differences in the extent of hooliganism between sports as
an area of potentially fruitful, further research. Such an inter-sport comparison
would also be of relevance in other jurisdictions.
IV CONCLUSION
The English system against hooliganism is the result of a long process and it
is relatively comprehensive, both on public and private levels. It is, however,
open to criticism in some respects, notably in the matter of human rights. Thus,
both courts and the police must ensure that their actions remain fair and
proportionate in each case to avoid unfair situations and producing
counterproductive effects. 379 Similarly, the English clubs could productively
intensify their efforts in the matter of fan coaching. 380
Despite these shortcomings, this framework appears to have been an
appropriate response in the context of the English (football) hooliganism. It
appears, if not totally eradicated hooliganism, to have at least significantly
contributed to its reduction.
It is therefore not surprising, as the comparative approach has shown, that this
model, to differing degrees, has been appropriated by other countries in Europe
and, to a lesser degree, in Australia. Nonetheless, the main cross-jurisdictional
weakness of the model is its lack of universality. Even where it is possible to
transpose the model, it cannot be transposed without adaptation to the specific
nature of each country.
In this context, its application remains particularly problematic in countries
with low levels of hooliganism, which benefit from more moderate solutions or
even internal models developed from good practices. 381
Finally, it is to be observed that there is no system that could be constructed to
prevent every individual case of disorder. The solution to violence amongst
sports spectators does not entirely lie in the law or in regulations. 382 Violence in
the context of sport, as in other contexts, is reflective of wider societal issues,383
and any solution also rests with a change of mentality of the people who attend
sporting fixtures. 384
379 See above nn 169, 240 and accompanying text.

380 Frosdick and Marsh, Football Hooliganism, above n 2, 154, 182–8.
381 About Australia, see Warren and Hay, ‘The A-League, Policing and the Dilemma of Public
Order’, above n 13, 124, 132–7.
382 Cannon, above n 163, 594.
383 Stoner, above n 87, 12.
384 Cannon, above n 163, 594.
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The Fight Against Hooliganism In England: Insights For Other Jurisdictions?

Article · January 2015

Lloyd Freeburn Alexandra Veuthey

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1 The Legislative Framework ......................................................... 249

1 Dominique Bodin, Le Hooliganisme (Presses Universitaires de France, 2003). See also

II THE SITUATION IN ENGLAND

A The Reports Established in Relation to the Safety and Security of

In 1989, at the Hillsborough stadium in Sheffield, England during an FA Cup

B The Legal Framework

1 State Measures Relating to Supporters

33 Frosdick and Marsh, Football Hooliganism, above n 2, 169.

(a) The Use of a Database

(b) Creation of Specific Offences

at or towards the pitch, possessing fireworks, indecent or racist chanting and

(d) Pyrotechnics in Stadiums

(e) Throwing Missiles onto the Pitch

(f) Indecent or Racist Chanting

(g) Encroachment onto the Playing Area

(h) Removal Orders from Stadiums

(i) Public Order Act 1986 (UK)

(ii) Football Spectators Act 1989 (UK)

created a Football Licensing Authority (‘FLA’), in charge of issuing licenses to

receiving a banning order. 92 The two principal football-related amendments

(iii) Football (Offences and Disorder) Act 1999 (UK)

(iv) Football (Disorder) Act 2000 (UK)

(i) Obligation to Report at a Police Station

(j) Prohibition on Leaving the Territory

(k) Police Custody

(l) Role of the Police

115 Ibid s 14E(2); Bichovsky, above n 17, 154.

shadowing and infiltration — to conduct criminal investigations against some

124 Fonteneau, above n 7.

2 State Measures Aimed at Organisers of Sports Events

(a) Acquisition of a Licence Allowing Spectators

140 Alexandra Veuthey, ‘Mettre un terme au hooliganisme endémique’, Le Temps

(b) The Acquisition of a Safety Certificate

(c) Provision of Seating

3 State Measures Aimed at Third Parties

This concludes the description of the principal state measures introduced to

5 Legal Framework Tested in the Courts

177 Mimmack, above n 96, 251.

C Measures Managed by the Clubs/the League

implemented is a significant increase in ticket prices. 212 This changed the

introduced an official supporters’ club, where applicants give permission for

The Football Association, Rules of the Association 2014–15, pt E s 20

It is now necessary to examine the efficiency of the current anti-hooligan

D Efficiency of the Current Tools

E Final Remarks on the English System

of the transposition of initiatives derived from the English model to new

III THE APPLICATION OF THE ENGLISH SYSTEM ABROAD

A The Situation in Europe

245 See above nn 166, 175.

1 The Legislative Framework

252 See Code pénal [The Criminal Code] (France).

265 Code pénal [Penal Code] (Belgium).

facilities in order to increase safety. 286 Money was therefore spent on

involving the politicisation and organisation of hooligan groups by far right