Gonzales V Pe Bulilis V Nuez

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26596///39*

Gonzales vs. Pe (Payment of Docket Fees)

Facts: Respondent Quirico Pe was engaged in the business of construction materials and had been in the business with
petitioner Spouses Rodriguez. Petitioners were then awarded by DPWH two contracts and availed of DPWH’s pre-payment
program for cement requirement regarding the projects, wherein the DPWH would give an advance payment even before
project completion. Petitioner then gave the blank LBP check (amount and date blank) to respondent to guarantee
payment of 15,698 bags of Portland cement. However a year later respondent filled up the blank LBP Check by placing
P2,062,000.00 and June 30,1999. The petitioners then filed a case against the respondent. The RTC ruled in favour of the
plaintiffs but this was set aside by the CA and ordered the trial court to assess the appellate docket fees and allow the
petitioner to pay such fees and give due course to the petitioners to pay such fees and give dues course to its appeal.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in reversing the decision of the RTC and allowing the respondent to belatedly pay the
required appellate docket and other legal fees.

Held: The ruling in Yambao is not applicable to the present case as herein respondent never made any payment of the
docket and other lawful fees, not even an attempt to do so, simultaneous with his filing of the Notice of Appeal. Although
respondent was able to file a timely Notice of Appeal, however, he failed to pay the docket and other legal fees, claiming
that the Branch Clerk of Court did not issue any assessment. This procedural lapse on the part of the respondent rendered
his appeal with the CA to be dismissible and, therefore, the RTC Decision, dated June 28, 2002, to be final and executory.

To recapitulate, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must strictly comply with the requirements of the rules, and
failure to do so leads to the loss of the right to appeal. 30 The rules require that from the date of receipt of the assailed RTC
order denying one’s motion for reconsideration, an appellant may take an appeal to the CA by filing a notice of appeal
with the RTC and paying the required docket and other lawful fees with the RTC Branch Clerk of Court, within the 15-day
reglementary period for the perfection of an appeal. Otherwise, the appellant's appeal is not perfected, and the CA may
dismiss the appeal on the ground of non-payment of docket and other lawful fees. As a consequence, the assailed RTC
decision shall become final and executory and, therefore, the prevailing parties can move for the issuance of a writ of
execution.
Doctrine: In cases of ordinary appeal, Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that the appeal to the CA in cases
decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the RTC (the
court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from) and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
Section 3 thereof states that the appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order
appealed from. Concomitant with the filing of a notice of appeal is the payment of the required appeal fees within the 15-
day reglementary period set forth in Section 4 of the said Rule. Thus,
SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. – Within the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to
the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court
docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the
original record or the record on appeal.

Bulilis vs. Nuez (Jurisdiction)

Facts: Petitioner Bulilis and respondent Nuez were contenders for the position of punong barangay. Bulilis was proclaimed
to be the winner of the elections for the said position. Nuez then filed an Election Protest for judicial recount and
annulment of proclamation with the MCTC. Bulilis through his counsel denied the allegation in the protest and prayed for
the dismissal on the ground that MCTC had no jurisdiction since the protest failed to implead the people who were
purposely indispensable parties. In the preliminary conference, counsel for Nuez moved in open court to be allowed to
present evidence ex-parte. The counsel for Bulilis then filed a motion for reconsideration asserting lack of proper notice to
him of the preliminary conference. MCTC denied the motion. Bulilis then filed a petitione ofr certiorari under Rule 65,
however this was denied by the RTC, on the ground that COMELEC has the exclusive jurisdiction over petitions in election
cases. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether the COMELEC has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction in election cases.
Held: There is no merit in petitioner’s argument that Rule 28, Section 1 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure limits the
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari in election cases to issues related to elections, returns and
qualifications of elective municipal and barangay officials. Said provision, taken together with the succeeding
section,14 undeniably shows that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari with the COMELEC whenever a judge
hearing an election case has acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be filed
exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. (Emphases supplied.)
Plainly, from the foregoing, this Court recognizes the COMELEC’s appellate jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari against
all acts or omissions of courts in election cases. Indeed, in the recent case of Galang v. Geronimo, 16 the Court had the
opportunity to rule that a petition for certiorari questioning an interlocutory order of a trial court in an electoral protest
was within the appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
Doctrine: The question then is, would taking cognizance of a petition for certiorari questioning an interlocutory order of
the regional trial court in an electoral protest case be considered in aid of the appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC? The
Court finds in the affirmative.
Interpreting the phrase "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction," the Court held in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al. that
if a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has
jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This was reiterated in De Jesus v.
Court of Appeals, where the Court stated that a court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said
court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court. 1avvphi1

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