ATTY. EDDIE U. TAMONDONG, Petitioner vs. JUDGE EMMANUEL P.

PASAL, Presiding
Judge, Branch 38, Regional Trial Court, Cagayan De Oro City, Respondent

[ A.M. No. RTJ-16-2467. October 18, 2017. ]

DECISION

LEONARDO DE-CASTRO, J.:

This is an administrative complaint for gross ignorance of the law, gross

incompetence, gross inefficiency and/or neglect of duty filed by Atty. Eddie U.
Tamondong (Atty. Tamondong) against Judge Emmanuel P. Pasal (Judge Pasal),
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 38,
relative to Special Civil Action No. 2013-184, entitled Henmar Development Property,
Inc. v. Judge Michelia O. Capadocia, Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Opal,
Misamis Oriental and Heirs of Enrique Abada represented by his wife and children, et
al.

The antecedent facts of the instant administrative complaint are recounted below.

On June 21, 2012, the heirs of Enrique Abada (Abada's heirs), represented by his
wife and children, filed a case for Quieting of Title, Recovery of Possession,
Annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-33060, and Annulment of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale,before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) of Opol, Misamis Oriental, against Atty. Tamondong's client, Henmar
Development Property Inc. (Henmar), docketed as Civil Case No. 2012-06-04.
Subsequently, Henmar, through Atty. Tamondong, filed an Omnibus Motion (Ad
Cautelam) which prayed for, among other reliefs, the dismissal of the complaint
based on the following grounds: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the person of Henmar;
(b) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and/or improper venue; and (c)
prescription and/or laches. In an Order dated March 26, 2013, the MTCC denied the
motion to dismiss of Henmar. Henmar filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was
also denied by the MTCC in an Order dated July 4, 2013.

Aggrieved, Henmar filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Preliminary

Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TR0) before
the RTC, docketed as Special Civil Action No. 2013- 184. The case was raffled to
Branch 38, presided by Judge Pasal.

On December 23, 2013, Judge Pasal issued a Resolution dismissing the Petition for
lack of merit, for the following reasons:

This court holds that the denial of the dismissal by the public respondent falls short
of the foregoing to justify the issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari and
prohibition.

On the first ground, the public respondent acted well within her jurisdiction when she
ruled that summons was validly served and jurisdiction over the person of Henmar
was validly obtained. True, the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure enumerates specific
persons who may validly receive summons for or on behalf of corporations. In the
case of E.B. Villarosa and Partner Co., Limited vs. Herminia I Benito, et al. (G.R. No.
136426, August 6, 1999) the Supreme Court emphasized that the list of persons who
validly receive summons for a corporation is exclusive and should be strictly
followed. However, this is but one side of the jurisprudential spectrum in the
interpretation and application on the rule of service of summons on corporations. On
the other side of the spectrum is the opinion of Justice Regalado (p. 225, Remedial
Law Compendium Volume 1, 6th ed.) that service of summons to a secretary who is
not the official corporate secretary is binding on the corporation when the same is
seasonably received by the corporation. Said opinion became a binding precedent
when the same was integrated by the Supreme Court in its ruling in the case of BPI
vs. Sps. Santiago (G.R. No. 169116, March 28, 2007). It thus appears that the strict
interpretation of the rule on service of summons to corporations espoused by the
earlier E.B. Villarosa case has been modified by the subsequent BPI case where the
Supreme Court went as far as to pronounce that "there is no hard and fast rule
pertaining to the manner of service of summons". The law therefore gives sufficient
latitude for judges to exercise discretion in determining whether there was valid
service of summons.

Whether or not there were sufficient grounds to declare substantial compliance is

irrelevant in a certiorari proceeding as this is not an error of jurisdiction but an error
of law which is a proper subject for appeal. Even assuming that the requirements for
substantial compliance of service of summons were not present, there is no showing
that the public respondent acted arbitrarily or despotically.

On the second ground, petitioner points out that jurisdiction over the case lies
outside of the territorial jurisdiction of respondent court which is limited to the
Municipality of Opol. The property involved in this case is described in the title and
the decree as located in Iponan which is part 6f the city of Cagayan de Oro. This
argument however conveniently ignores the fact, which the public respondent took
judicial notice of, that the title and the decree refer to a cadastral survey conducted
in 1933 when the Municipality of Opol was not yet in existence. It was only in 1950
that Opol came into existence. A trial is therefore necessary to determine the political
boundaries of said new municipality and determine whether the subject property lies
within the court's jurisdictional borders.

Finally, on the issue of prescription, jurisprudence has established that an action for
reconveyance based on fraud is imprescriptible when the plaintiff is in actual
possession of the property (Leyson et. al. vs. Bontuyan, et. al., G.R. No. 156357). In
this case, private respondents alleged that they were in actual possession of the
property until they were ousted from the same in 2008. Prescription therefore
commenced to run only in 2008. Since the present action was filed in 2012, the
action has not yet prescribed.

Henmar filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Resolution, and Abada's
heirs filed their Opposition/Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration.

In an Order dated February 24, 2014, Judge Pasal deemed the Motion for
Reconsideration of Henmar as already submitted for resolution. However, even after
more than six months, Judge Pasal had yet to resolve the said Motion.

Hence, Atty. Tamondong initiated the instant administrative complaint charging

Judge Pasal with gross ignorance of the law and/or gross incompetence.
Atty. Tamondong contends that Judge Pasal's Resolution dated December 23, 2013
in Special Civil Action No. 2013-184 is legally erroneous, insisting that: (a) the MTCC
has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of Henmar as the summons was
improperly served on the clerical/secretarial staff of another corporation, the Radio
Mindanao Network, Inc.; (b) the MTCC does not have jurisdiction over the subject
property because said property is located in Cagayan de Oro City and not in the
Municipality of Opol; and (c) Henmar has been in possession of the subject property,
plus, the document/agreement which Abada's heirs seek to enforce against Henmar
had been executed on April 22, 1968, so the complaint filed by Abada's heirs before
the MTCC only in 2013 is already beyond the 10-year prescriptive period under the
Civil Code for filing an action based on a written contract. Atty. Tamondong asserts
that Judge Pasal, in ruling against Henmar and dismissing its Petition, showed gross
and manifest ignorance and incompetence; and also Judge Pasal, "with all his too
glaring, unfounded and unjustified rejection of the factual and legal grounds" raised
by Henmar in its Petition, was unduly favoring Abada's heirs.

In addition, Atty. Tamondong questions Judge Pasal's failure to seasonably act on

and resolve the Motion for Reconsideration of Henmar and avers that Judge Pasal's
inaction on said Motion for more than six months constituted gross inefficiency
and/or gross neglect of duty.

In his Comment, Judge Pasal invites attention to his Resolution dated December
23,.2013 in Special Civil Action No. 2013-184, which he claims to be self-explanatory
as it amply cites the applicable rule, jurisprudence, and opinion of an eminent
author. Judge Pasal also points out that the act Atty. Tamondong complains of, i.e.,
the dismissal of the Petition in Special Civil Action No. 2013-184, is judicial in nature
and, in fact, Atty. Tamondong has already elevated the same before the Court ·of
Appeals. Judge Pasal lastly reasons that the exercise of one's judicial discretion in
accordance with law, no matter how unfavorable it might be to a party, does not
constitute gross ignorance of the law.

Atty. Tamondong filed a Reply to Comment reiterating the supposed flaws in Judge
Pasal's Resolution dated December 23, 2013 in Special Civil Action No. 2013-184.
According to Atty. Tamondong, there is no dispute as to the authorities cited by
Judge Pasal in said Resolution and the only problem is the absence of facts and/or
evidence for their application. Atty. Tamondong further argues that the appeal of
Judge Pasal's Resolution before the Court of Appeals is not a barrier to the present
administrative complaint against Judge Pasal since these two remedies can proceed
independently and be resolved separately from one another. The administrative
complaint concerns Judge Pasal's fitness to remain in the Judiciary and not the
merits of Special Civil Action No. 2013-184. Atty. Tamondong additionally alleges
that by being completely mum on the matter, Judge Pasal has impliedly admitted his
failure to timely resolve the Motion for Reconsideration of Henmar.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), through Deputy Court Administrator
Raul Bautista Villanueva, submitted a Memorandum dated June 7, 2016,
recommending as follows:

RECOMMENDATION:

It is respectfully recommended for the consideration of the Honorable Court that:

a. The instant administrative complaint against Presiding Judge Emmanuel P. Pasal,
Branch 38, Regional Trial Court, Cagayan de Oro City, be RE-DOCKETED as a regular
administrative matter;

b. Respondent Judge Pasal be found GUILTY of gross inefficiency and/or neglect of

duty arising from undue delay in resolving a motion and be FINED in the amount of
Two Thousand Pesos (PhP2,000.00) with a WARNING to be more punctilious in the
observance of the reglementary periods for resolving pending motions in his court as
a repetition of the same infraction shall be dealt with more severely; and

c. The charge of gross ignorance of the law against respondent Judge Pasal is
DISMISSED for being judicial in nature and for lack of merit.

The Court, in a Resolution dated August 17, 2016, resolves, among other matters, to
re-docket the instant administrative complaint as a regular administrative matter.

In their respective Manifestations, the parties agree to already submit the

administrative complaint for resolution based on the pleadings filed.

The Court fully adopts the findings and recommendations of the OCA.

On the charge of gross ignorance and/or gross incompetence

There is no merit in Atty. Tamondong's charge of gross ignorance of the law and/or
gross incompetence against Judge Pasal.

Atty. Tamondong's sole basis for his charge is Judge Pasal's Resolution dated
December 23, 2013 in Special Civil Action No. 2013-184 dismissing the Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition which Atty. Tamondong filed on behalf of his client,
Henmar. In said Resolution, Judge Pasal determined that there was no grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the MTCC in
denying the motion to dismiss of Henmar in Civil Case No. 2012-06-04. Atty.
Tamondong though is adamant that the MTCC should have dismissed the complaint
of Abada's heirs against Henmar in Civil Case No. 2012-06-04 on the grounds of (a)
lack of jurisdiction over the person of Henmar; (b) lack of territorial jurisdiction over
the subject property; and (c) lack of jurisdiction over a prescribed action.

Judge Pasal issued the Resolution dated December 23, 2013 in Special Civil Action
No. 2013-184 in the exercise of his adjudicative functions, and any errors he might
have committed therein cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings, but
should instead be assailed through judicial remedies. The issues of jurisdiction being
argued by Atty. Tamondong are judicial matters, which again can only be decided
upon through judicial remedies. A party's recourse, if prejudiced by a judge's orders
in the course of a trial, is with the proper reviewing court and not with the OCA,
through an administrative complaint.

The Court declared that an administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy
for every act of a judge deemed aberrant or irregular where a judicial remedy exists
and is available. The acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action. A judge cannot be civilly, criminally, or administratively liable for
his official acts, no matter how erroneous, provided he acts in good faith.

The Court also expounded in Flores v. Abesamis that:

As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or
irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The
ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal
in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in construction or
application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for
reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for new
trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which
may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic
exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil action of
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change
of venue, as the case may be.

Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal
actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for,
these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion
of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding
action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the
persons 6f the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature.
It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate
tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil,
or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed.

In the present administrative complaint, Atty. Tamondong admitted that he already

filed an appeal of Judge Pasal's Resolution dated December 23, 2013 in Special Civil
Action No. 2013-184 before the Court of Appeals. Absent any showing that Atty.
Tamondong has exhausted all available judicial remedies and that there is already an
entry of judgment in the appropriate judicial action or proceeding, the Court cannot
proceed to inquire herein into Judge Pasal's administrative liability in relation to said
Resolution.

Moreover, Atty. Tamondong failed to offer proof that in issuing the Resolution dated
December 23, 2013 in Special Civil Action No. 2013-184, Judge Pasal was acting in
bad faith and unduly favoring Abada's heirs. Mere imputation of bias and partiality
against a judge is insufficient because bias and partiality can never be presumed.
Also, bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because the judgment is adverse
to a party.

On the charge of gross inefficiency and/or gross neglect of duty

As for the other charge of gross inefficiency and/ or gross neglect of duty, the Court
finds Judge Pasal administratively liable for undue delay in resolving the Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated December 23, 2013 filed by Atty.
Tamondong, on behalf of Henmar, in Special Civil Action No. 2013-184.
Canon 6, Section 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciar y
mandates that "[j]udges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of
reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness."

Decision-making is primordial among the many duties of judges. The speedy

disposition of cases is the primary aim of the Judiciary, for only thereby may the
ends of justice not be compromised and the Judiciary may be true to its commitment
of ensuring to all persons the right to a speedy, impartial, and public trial. To pursue
this aim, the Court, through the Rules of Court and other issuances, has fixed
reglementary periods for acting on cases and matters.

Under Rule 37, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, "[a] motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be resolved within thirty (30) days from the time it is submitted
for resolution."

After the filing by Henmar of its Motion for Reconsideration and Abada's Heirs of their
Opposition/Comment to the same, Judge Pasal issued an Order dated February 24,
2014 submitting the said Motion for resolution. The 30-day period for resolution
expired on March 26, 2014. However, Judge Pasal issued the Resolution denying the
Motion for Reconsideration only on June 17, 2014, 113 days or almost four months
after the submission of said Motion for resolution. Notably, Judge Pasal did not offer
any explanation at all for the delay. It is, therefore, undeniable that there was undue
delay on Judge Pasal's part in resolving the Motion for Reconsideration.

As a frontline official of the Judiciary, Judge Pasal should act with efficiency and
probity at all times. Judge Pasal's unexplained delay in resolving the Motion for
Reconsideration is inexcusable, unwarranted, and unreasonable. Judge Pasal failed to
heed the consistent reminder of the Court for judges to decide cases promptly and
expeditiously under the time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied.
Every judge should decide cases with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and
observant in the performance of his functions for delay in the disposition of cases
erodes the faith and confidence of the people in the Judiciary, lowers its standards,
and brings it into disrepute. Judge Pasal's failure to resolve the Motion for
Reconsideration within the 30-day reglementary period is not excusable and
warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions upon him.

If Judge Pasal found himself unable to comply with the mandatory 30- day
reglementary period for resolving the Motion for Reconsideration in Special Civil
Action No. 2013-184, he could have asked the Court for a reasonable extension of
time to do so. The Court is also aware of the heavy case load of trial courts, and has
allowed reasonable extensions of time needed to decide cases or resolve pending
incidents therein, but such extensions must first be requested from the Court. A
judge cannot by himself choose to prolong the period for deciding cases beyond that
authorized by law. Yet, Judge Pasal made no such request for extension of time to
resolve the Motion for Reconsideration of Henmar in Special Civil Action No. 2013-
184.

Pursuant to the latest amendments to Rule 14024 of the Rules of Court, undue delay
in rendering a decision or order is a less serious charge, for which the respondent
judge shall be penalized with either (a) suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or (b) a fine
of more than Ten Thousand Pesos (₱l0,000.00), but not more than Twenty Thousand
Pesos (₱20,000.00).

Taking into account Judge Pasal's seven years of continuous service to the Judiciary
and his subsequent, albeit delayed, resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration, the
Court agrees with the OCA that the imposition of a fine of Two Thousand Pesos
(₱2,000.00) upon Judge Pasal would already suffice.

WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint for gross ignorance of the law and/or
gross incompetence against Judge Emmanuel P. Pasal, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 38, is DISMISSED for being
judicial in nature. However, Judge Emmanuel P. Pasal is found GUILTY for his undue
delay in the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated
December 23, 2013 filed by Henmar Development Property, Inc. in Special Civil
Action No. 2013- 184, for which he is FINED in the amount of Two Thousand Pesos
(₱2,000.00).

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO DE-CASTRO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA

Associate Justice

(On official leave)

NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM

Associate Justice