Doctrine: Bail should be granted before the arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded

from filing a motion to quash.

Topic: Rights of the Accused
Sub-topic: Right to Bail
Alicando, SG

Lavides v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 129670. February 1, 2000

Facts:
1. Lavides was arrested for child abuse. He was arrested on an entrapment operation. The
entrapment was based on the report of a certain San Miguel that his daughter has been recruited
by Lavides for an operation.
2. During the arrest, the police spotted Lavides with San Miguel’s daughter. The child was only
wearing an underwear and t-shirt.
3. Lavides subsequently filed a motion to determine the probable cause, motion for his immediate
release, and motion to be allowed bail.
4. Nine more informations for child abuse were filed against Lavides.
5. The trial court found a probable cause. It also granted Lavides the right to bail. In RTC’s ruling, it
decided that the approval of the bail shall be made only after the arraignment to allow the
Court to immediately acquire jurisdiction over the accused.
6. Lavides filed a motion to quash the information against him and further suspend the arraignment.
He also filed a motion to reduce the bail bonds and that the same be done before the arraignment.
RTC denied all the motions. Accordingly, Lavides was arraigned.
7. Lavides filed a petition for certriorari in CA to review RTC’s decision. Pending the appeal, more
information were filed against him.
8. CA ruled that the condition that arraignment is a prerequisite for the approval of Lavides’ bail bonds
is moot and academic by the fact that he had already posted the bail bonds, had pleaded not guilty
to all the offenses, and he was already released from detention. This was so because the CA
thought it was contrary to Art. III, §14(2) of the Constitution1.
9. Hence, this petition.

Issues:
Whether or not the condition that arraignment is a prerequisite for the approval of bail bonds is
valid.

Ruling:
No, the condition that arraignment is a prerequisite for the approval of bail bonds is invalid.

Bail should be granted before the arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing
a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would then be no
need for the arraignment of the accused. Making arraignment as a prerequisite is to violate the accused’s
right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime
and his right to bail.

In this case, Lavides specifically asked if the bail bonds be released before the arraignment. RTC
did not heed; instead, it provided such invalid condition and even denied his motion to quash the
information. In effect, Lavides was denied provisional release and was even deprived of his right not to be
put on trial for he was arraigned.

1[a]fter arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has
been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 129670. February 1, 2000.]

MANOLET O. LAVIDES, petitioner, vs.

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ROSALINA L. LUNA
PISON, Judge Presiding over Branch 107, RTC, Quezon City;
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Wilfredo M. Guerero, Liberato G. Yambao, George Coronacion, Ben 1. Ibuyan and Benito P.
Fabie for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Several informations were filed against petitioner for child prostitution and other sexual abuse under
Art. III, Sec. 5(b) of R.A. 7610. He filed a motion to grant bail and the trial court allowed the same, but on
the condition that he must always be present at the hearings of the cases or his bail bonds shall be
automatically forfeited, warrant for his arrest immediately issued and trial proceed in absentia. Further,
approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after arraignment. Here in issue is the validity of these
conditions for bail.

The condition that approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after arraignment is void because
it undermines the accused's constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon a valid complaint or
information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail. On the other hand, the condition that
accused must be present at the hearings of his cases is valid as it is in accordance with Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court. At any rate, although the first condition for the grant of bail was invalid, the arraignment and
the subsequent proceedings against petitioner could not be omitted. AScHCD

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; GRANT THEREOF BEFORE

ARRAIGNMENT, DISCUSSED. — The trial court acknowledged, in cases where it is authorized, bail
should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to
quash. For if the information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the
arraignment of the accused. Further, the trial court could ensure the presence of petitioner at the
arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as
arraignment. Under Rule 114, §2(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that
"the accused shall appear before the proper court whenever so required by the court or these Rules," while
under Rule 116, §1(b) the presence of the accused at the arraignment is required.
 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; BAIL CONDITIONED ON ARRAIGNMENT UNDERMINES CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT OF ACCUSED. — To condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place
him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release
on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing
the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These
scenarios certainly undermine the accused's constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid
complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONDITIONS OF THE BAIL; THAT ACCUSED CANNOT WAIVE HIS
APPEARANCE AT THE TRIAL, VALID. — The condition imposed that the accused cannot waive his
appearance at the trial but that he must be present at the hearings of the case is valid and is in accordance
with Rule 114. For another condition of bail under Rule 114, §2(c) is that "The failure of the accused to
appear at the trial without justification despite due notice to him or his bondsman shall be deemed an
express waiver of his right to be present on the date specified in the notice. In such case, trial shall
proceed in absentia." IAEcaH

4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; TRIAL IN ABSENTIA; STAGES OF TRIAL WHEN

ACCUSED CANNOT BE ABSENT. — Art. III, §14(2) of the Constitution authorizing trials in absentia allows
the accused to be absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment
and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt, (b) during trial whenever necessary for identification purposes,
and (c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case the accused may
appear by counsel or representative. At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required and
cannot be waived. As pointed out in Borja v. Mendoza, in an opinion by Justice, later Chief Justice, Enrique
Fernando, there can be no trial in absentia unless the accused has been arraigned.

5. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARRAIGNMENT; NOT INVALIDATED BY

INVALID CONDITION IMPOSED THEREIN. — Although the condition is invalid, it does not follow that the
arraignment was also invalid. Contrary to petitioner's contention, the arraignment did not emanate from the
invalid condition that "approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment." Even without
such a condition, the arraignment of petitioner could not be omitted. In sum, although the condition for the
grant of bail to petitioner is invalid, his arraignment and the subsequent proceedings against him are valid.

6. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; PROPER IN CASE AT BAR. — In Tano v.

Salvador, the Court, while holding that certiorari will not lie from a denial of a motion to quash, nevertheless
recognized that there may be cases where there are special circumstances clearly demonstrating the
inadequacy of an appeal. In such cases, the accused may resort to the appellate court to raise the issue
decided against him. This is such a case. Whether petitioner is liable for just one crime regardless of the
number of sexual acts allegedly committed by him and the number of children with whom he had sexual
intercourse, or whether each act of intercourse constitutes one crime is a question that bears on the
presentation of evidence by either party. It is important to petitioner as well as to the prosecution how many
crimes there are. For instance, if there is only one offense of sexual abuse regardless of the
number of children involved, it will not matter much to the prosecution whether it is able to present only
one of the complainants. On the other hand, if each act of sexual intercourse with a child constitutes a
separate offense, it will matter whether the other children are presented during the trial.
 7. CRIMINAL LAW; R.A. NO. 7160; CHILD PROSTITUTION AND OTHER SEXUAL ABUSE;
ELEMENTS; EACH ACT CONSIDERED SEPARATE AND DISTINCT OFFENSE. — Petitioner is being
prosecuted under Art. 3, Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 7160 which provides for child prostitution and sexual abuse.
The elements of the offense are as follows: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct; (2) that said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse; and (3) the child, whether male or female, is or is deemed under 18 years of age. Exploitation
in prostitution or other sexual abuse occurs when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate, or group. Each incident of sexual intercourse and lascivious act with a child under the
circumstances mentioned in Art. III, §5 of R.A. No. 7160 is thus a separate and distinct offense. The offense
is similar to rape or act of lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code in which each act of rape or
lascivious conduct should be the subject of a separate information. This conclusion is confirmed by Art. III,
§5(b) of R.A. No. 7160. SCADIT

DECISION

MENDOZA, J p:

Petitioner Manolet Lavides was arrested on April 3, 1997 for child abuse under R.A. No. 7610
(AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD
ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR ITS VIOLATION, AND
OTHER PURPOSES). His arrest was made without a warrant as a result of an entrapment conducted by
the police. It appears that on April 3, 1997, the parents of complainant Lorelie San Miguel reported to the
police that their daughter, then 16 years old, had been contacted by petitioner for an assignation that night
at petitioner's room at the Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman, Quezon City. Apparently, this was not the first time
the police received reports of petitioner's activities. An entrapment operation was therefore set in motion.
At around 8:20 in the evening of April 3, 1997, the police knocked at the door of Room 308 of the
Metropolitan Hotel where petitioner was staying. When petitioner opened the door, the police saw him with
Lorelie, who was wearing only a t-shirt and an underwear, whereupon they arrested him. Based on the
sworn statement of complainant and the affidavits of the arresting officers, which were submitted at the
inquest, an information for violation of Art. III, §5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 was filed on April 7, 1997 against
petitioner in the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-97-
70550. dctai

On April 10, 1997, petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause; (2) For the Immediate Release of the Accused Unlawfully Detained on an Unlawful Warrantless
Arrest; and (3) In the Event of Adverse Resolution of the Above Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to
Bail as a Matter of Right under the Law on Which He is Charged." 1

On April 29, 1997, nine more informations for child abuse were filed against petitioner by the same
complainant, Lorelie San Miguel, and by three other minor children, Mary Ann Tardesilla, Jennifer
Catarman, and Annalyn Talinting. The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-97-70866 to Q-97-
70874. In all the cases, it was alleged that, on various dates mentioned in the informations, petitioner had
sexual intercourse with complainants who had been "exploited in prostitution and . . . given money [by
petitioner] as payment for the said [acts of] sexual intercourse."

No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, petitioner filed separate applications for bail in the nine
cases. llcd

On May 16, 1997, the trial court issued an order resolving petitioner's Omnibus Motion, as follows:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,

this Court finds that:

1. In Crim. Case No. Q-97-70550, there is probable cause to

hold the accused under detention, his arrest having been made in
accordance with the Rules. He must therefore remain under detention
until further order of this Court;

2. The accused is entitled to bail in all the above-entitled case.

He is hereby granted the right to post bail in the amount of P80,000.00
for each case or a total of P800,000.00 for all the cases under the
following conditions:

a) The accused shall not be entitled to a

waiver of appearance during the trial of these cases. He shall
and must always be present at the hearings of these cases;

b) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his

bail bonds shall be automatically cancelled and forfeited,
warrants for his arrest shall be immediately issued and the
cases shall proceed to trial in absentia;

c) The hold-departure Order of this Court dated April

10, 1997 stands; and

d) Approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after

the arraignment to enable this Court to immediately acquire
jurisdiction over the accused;

3. Let these cases be set for arraignment on May 23, 1997 at

8:30 o'clock in the morning. 2

On May 20, 1997, petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations against him, except those filed
in Criminal Case No. Q-97-70550 or Q-97-70866. Pending resolution of his motion, he asked the
trial court to suspend the arraignment scheduled on May 23, 1997. 3 Then on May 22, 1997, he filed a
motion in which he prayed that the amounts of bail bonds be reduced to P40,000.00 for each case and that
the same be done prior to his arraignment. 4

On May 23, 1997, the trial court, in separate orders, denied petitioner's motions to reduce bail
bonds, to quash the informations, and to suspend arraignment. Accordingly, petitioner was arraigned during
which he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him and then ordered him released upon posting bail
bonds in the total amount of P800,000.00, subject to the conditions in the May 16, 1997 order and the "hold-
departure" order of April 10, 1997. The pre-trial conference was set on June 7, 1997. LLjur

On June 2, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 44316) in
the Court of Appeals, assailing the trial court's order, dated May 16, 1997, and its two orders, dated May
23, 1997, denying his motion to quash and maintaining the conditions set forth in its order of May 16, 1997,
respectively.

While the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, two more informations were filed against
petitioner, bringing the total number of cases against him to 12, which were all consolidated.

On June 30, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, considering that the conditions imposed

under Nos. 2-a) and 2-b), 5 of the May 23 [should be May 16], 1997
Order, are separable, and would not affect the cash bond which
petitioner posted for his provisional liberty, with the sole modification
that those aforesaid conditions are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE, the May 16, May 23 and May 23, 1997 Orders are
MAINTAINED in all other respects. 6

The appellate court invalidated the first two conditions imposed in the May 16, 1997 order for the
grant of bail to petitioner but ruled that the issue concerning the validity of the condition making arraignment
a prerequisite for the approval of petitioner's bail bonds to be moot and academic. It noted "that petitioner
has posted the cash bonds; that when arraigned, represented by lawyers, he pleaded not guilty to each
offense; and that he has already been released from detention." The Court of Appeals thought that the
aforesaid conditions in the May 16, 1997 order were contrary to Art. III, §14(2) of the Constitution which
provides that "[a]fter arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable."

With respect to the denial of petitioner's motion to quash the informations against him, the
appellate court held that petitioner could not question the same in a petition for certiorari before it, but what
he must do was to go to trial and to reiterate the grounds of his motion to quash on appeal should the
decision be adverse to him. LLjur

Hence this petition. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred 7 —

1. In ruling that the condition imposed by respondent Judge that the

approval of petitioner's bail bonds "shall be made only after
his arraignment" is of no moment and has been rendered
moot and academic by the fact that he had already posted the
bail bonds and had pleaded not guilty to all the offenses;

2. In not resolving the submission that the arraignment was void not
only because it was made under compelling circumstance
 which left petitioner no option to question the respondent
Judge's arbitrary action but also because it emanated from a
void Order;

3. In ruling that the denial of petitioner's motion to quash may not be

impugned in a petition for certiorari; and

4. In not resolving the legal issue of whether or not petitioner may be

validly charged for violation of Section 5(b) of RA No.
7610 under several informations corresponding to the
number of alleged acts of child abuse allegedly committed
against each private complainant by the petitioner.

We will deal with each of these contentions although not in the order in which they are stated by
petitioner.

First. As already stated, the trial court's order, dated May 16, 1997, imposed four conditions for the
grant of bail to petitioner:

a) The accused shall not be entitled to a

waiver of appearance during the trial of these cases. He shall and
must always be present at the hearings of these cases;

b) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds
shall be automatically cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest
shall be immediately issued and the cases shall proceed to trial in
absentia;

c) The hold-departure Order of this Court dated April 10,

1997 stands; and

d) Approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the

arraignment to enable this Court to immediately acquire jurisdiction
over the accused; LLjur

The Court of Appeals declared conditions (a) and (b) invalid but declined to pass
upon the validity of condition (d) on the ground that the issue had become moot
and academic. Petitioner takes issue with the Court of Appeals with respect to its
treatment of condition (d) of the May 16, 1997 order of the trial court which makes
petitioner's arraignment a prerequisite to the approval of his bail bonds. His
contention is that this condition is void and that his arraignment was also invalid
because it was held pursuant to such invalid condition.

We agree with petitioner that the appellate court should have determined the validity of the
conditions imposed in the trial court's order of May 16, 1997 for the grant of bail because petitioner's
contention is that his arraignment was held in pursuance of these conditions for bail. prLL
 In requiring that petitioner be first arraigned before he could be granted bail, the
trial court apprehended that if petitioner were released on bail he could, by being absent, prevent his early
arraignment and thereby delay his trial until the complainants got tired and lost interest in their cases.
Hence, to ensure his presence at the arraignment, approval of petitioner's bail bonds should be deferred
until he could be arraigned. After that, even if petitioner does not appear, trial can proceed as long as he is
notified of the date of hearing and his failure to appear is unjustified, since under Art. III, §14(2) of the
Constitution, trial in absentia is authorized. This seems to be the theory of the trial court in its May 16, 1997
order conditioning the grant of bail to petitioner on his arraignment.

This theory is mistaken. In the first place, as the trial court itself acknowledged, in cases where it is
authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing
a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would then be no
need for the arraignment of the accused. In the second place, the trial court could ensure the
presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at any
stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment. Under Rule 114, §2(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
one of the conditions of bail is that "the accused shall appear before the proper court whenever so required
by the court or these Rules," while under Rule 116, §1(b) the presence of the accused at the arraignment
is required.

On the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place
him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release
on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing
the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These
scenarios certainly undermine the accused's constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid
complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail. 8

It is the condition in the May 16, 1997 order of the trial court that "approval of the bail bonds shall
be made only after arraignment," which the Court of Appeals should instead have declared void. The
condition imposed in the trial court's order of May 16, 1997 that the accused cannot waive his appearance
at the trial but that he must be present at the hearings of the case is valid and is in accordance with Rule
114. For another condition of bail under Rule 114, §2(c) is that "The failure of the accused to appear at the
trial without justification despite due notice to him or his bondsman shall be deemed an express
waiver of his right to be present on the date specified in the notice. In such case, trial shall proceed in
absentia." cdll

Art. III, §14(2) of the Constitution authorizing trials in absentia allows the accused to be absent at
the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea,
whether of innocence or of guilt, 9 (b) during trial whenever necessary for identification purposes, 10 and
(c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case the accused may appear
by counsel or representative. 11 At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required and cannot
be waived. As pointed out in Borja v. Mendoza, 12 in an opinion by Justice, later Chief Justice, Enrique
Fernando, there can be no trial in absentia unless the accused has been arraigned.

Undoubtedly, the trial court knew this. Petitioner could delay the proceedings by absenting himself
from the arraignment. But once he is arraigned, trial could proceed even in his absence. So it thought that
to ensure petitioner's presence at the arraignment, petitioner should be denied bail in the meantime. The
fly in the ointment, however, is that such court strategy violates petitioner's constitutional rights.

Second. Although this condition is invalid, it does not follow that the arraignment of petitioner on
May 23, 1997 was also invalid. Contrary to petitioner's contention, the arraignment did not emanate from
the invalid condition that "approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment." Even without
such a condition, the arraignment of petitioner could not be omitted. In sum, although the condition for the
grant of bail to petitioner is invalid, his arraignment and the subsequent proceedings against him are valid.

Third. Petitioner concedes that the rule is that the remedy of an accused whose motion to quash is
denied is not to file a petition for certiorari but to proceed to trial without prejudice to his right to reiterate the
grounds invoked in his motion to quash during trial on the merits or on appeal if an adverse judgment is
rendered against him. However, he argues that this case should be treated as an exception. He contends
that the Court of Appeals should not have evaded the issue of whether he should be charged under several
informations corresponding to the number of acts of child abuse allegedly committed by him against
each of the complainants. prcd

In Tano v. Salvador, 13 the Court, while holding that certiorari will not lie from a denial of a motion
to quash, nevertheless recognized that there may be cases where there are special circumstances clearly
demonstrating the inadequacy of an appeal. In such cases, the accused may resort to the appellate court to
raise the issue decided against him. This is such a case. Whether petitioner is liable for just one crime
regardless of the number of sexual acts allegedly committed by him and the number of children with whom
he had sexual intercourse, or whether each act of intercourse constitutes one crime is a question that bears
on the presentation of evidence by either party. It is important to petitioner as well as to the prosecution
how many crimes there are. For instance, if there is only one offense of sexual abuse regardless of the
number of children involved, it will not matter much to the prosecution whether it is able to present only
one of the complainants. On the other hand, if each act of sexual intercourse with a child constitutes a
separate offense, it will matter whether the other children are presented during the trial. cdtai

The issue then should have been decided by the Court of Appeals. However, instead of remanding
this case to the appellate court for a determination of this issue, we will decide the issue now so that the
trial in the court below can proceed without further delay.

Petitioner's contention is that the 12 informations filed against him allege only one offense of child
abuse, regardless of the number of alleged victims (four) and the number of acts of sexual intercourse
committed with them (twelve). He argues that the act of sexual intercourse is only a means of committing
the offense so that the acts of sexual intercourse/lasciviousness with minors attributed to him should not
be subject of separate informations. He cites the affidavits of the alleged victims which show that their
involvement with him constitutes an "unbroken chain of events," i.e., the first victim was the one who
introduced the second to petitioner and so on. Petitioner says that child abuse is similar to the
crime of large-scale illegal recruitment where there is only a single offense regardless of the
number of workers illegally recruited on different occasions. In the alternative, he contends that, at the most,
only four informations, corresponding to the number of alleged child victims, can be filed against him.

Art. III, §5 of R.A. No. 7160 under which petitioner is being prosecuted, provides:
 Sec. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. —
Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period

to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or

lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse.

The elements of the offense are as follows: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct; (2) that said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse; and (3) the child, 14 whether male or female, is or is deemed under 18 years of age.
Exploitation in prostitution or other sexual abuse occurs when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate, or group. cdll

Each incident of sexual intercourse and lascivious act with a child under the circumstances
mentioned in Art. III, §5 of R.A. No. 7160 is thus a separate and distinct offense. The offense is similar to
rape or act of lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code in which each act of rape or lascivious conduct
should be the subject of a separate information. This conclusion is confirmed by Art. III, §5(b) of R.A. No.
7160, which provides:

[t]hat when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for
rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal
Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided,
That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium
period; prcd

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and another one is
RENDERED declaring the orders dated May 16, 1997 and May 23, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 107, Quezon City to be valid, with the exception of condition (d) in the second paragraph of the
order of May 16, 1997 (making arraignment a prerequisite to the grant of bail to petitioner), which is hereby
declared void.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

 Footnotes

1.Petition, Appendix F; Rollo, pp. 78-85.

2.Id., Appendix B, pp. 18-19; id., pp. 65-66.

3.Id., Appendix J; id., pp. 115-122.

4.Id., Appendix I; id., pp. 111-114.

5.The conditions declared void were the following:

a) The accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial of these
cases. He shall and must always be present at the hearings of these cases;

b) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be automatically
cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be immediately issued and the
cases shall proceed to trial in absentia;

6.Petition, Appendix A, p. 8; Rollo, p. 47.

7.Id., p. 14; id., p. 16.

8.Under Art. III, §5 of R.A. No. 7610, the offenses with which petitioner is charged are
punishable by reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.

9.Rule 116, §1(b).

10.People v. Avanceña, G.R. No. 37005, Oct. 13, 1933, 32 O.G. 713 (1934); Aquino v.
Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546 (1975); People v. Salas, 143 SCRA 163
(1986).

11.Rule 120, §6.

12.77 SCRA 422 (1977).

13.278 SCRA 154 (1997).

14.Under R.A. No. 7160, Art. I, §3(a):

"Children" refers to persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those but [sic] are unable
to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition;
...

||| (Lavides v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129670, [February 1, 2000], 381 PHIL 331-344)