Dimson vs.

Chua Case Digest

Reyno C. Dimson vs. Gerry T. Chua
G.R. No. 192318. December 5, 2016

Facts
The instant case filed by the petitioner, representing the other 14 complainants,
against the respondent, is an offshoot of the labor case entitled "Reyno Dimson,
et al. v. SEASUMCO, MAC, United Coconut Planters Bank (UPCB), and
Cotabato Sugar Central Co., Inc. (COSUCECO)." On September 22, 2003, the
said labor case for illegal dismissal with monetary claims was decided in favor of
the complainants. Hence, SEASUMCO and MAC, as well as the members of
their board of directors, were ordered to pay jointly and severally the sum of
Three Million Eight Hundred Twenty-Seven Thousand Four Hundred Seventy
Pesos and Fifty-One Centavos (P3,827,470.51).

The LA's decision became final and executory but the judgment remained
unsatisfied. Consequently, the petitioner filed an Ex-parte Motion for the issuance
of an amended alias writ of execution asking for the inclusion of the board of
directors arid corporate officers of SEASUMCO and MAC to hold them liable for
satisfaction of the said decision.

In an Order dated August 16, 2007, the LA granted the motion; hence, an
amended alias writ of execution was issued which now included the respondent.
Aggrieved, the respondent elevated the matter to the NLRC by filing a
Memorandum of Appeal arguing that he was denied due process.

In a Resolution dated January 11, 2008, the NLRC dismissed the appeal for lack
of merit and sustained the findings of the LA. The respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but the NLRC Resolution dated July 31, 2008 denied his
motion.

Hence, he filed a petition for certiorari with application for temporary restraining
order (TRO)/preliminary injunction before the CA. He maintained that the labor
tribunals violated his right to due process when the LA authorized the issuance of
the amended alias writ of execution against him for the corporation's judgment
debt, although he has never been a party to the underlying suit.

Issue
Whether the respondent can be held solidarily liable with the corporation, of
which he was an officer and a stockholder, when he was not served with
summons and was never impleaded as a party to the case.
Ruling
No. Following the explicit language of the NLRC Rules, notices or summons shall
be served on the parties to the case personally. The same rule allows under
special circumstances, that service of summons may be effected in accordance
with the provisions of the Rules of Court. The service of summons in cases
before the LAs shall be served on the parties personally or by registered mail,
provided that in special circumstances, service of summons ,.nay be effected in
accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court.

It is basic that the LA cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent without the latter being served with summons. However, if there is no
valid service of summons, court can still acquire jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant by virtue of the latter's voluntary appearance. In this case, since
the respondent is one of the officers of SEASUMCO, service of summons must
be made to him personally or by registered mail. However, as borne by the
records, it is evident that no service of summons and notices were served on the
respondent and he was not impleaded in NLRC RAB Case No. 12-01-00005-03.
He was hauled to the case after he reacted to the improper execution of his
properties and was actually dragged to court by mere motion of the petitioner
with whom he has no privity of contract and after the decision in the main case
had already become final and executory.

The Court scanned the records but found nothing to indicate that summons with
respect to the said complaints were ever served upon the respondent. The
petitioner in fact does not even dispute· the respondent's claim that no summons
or notices were ever issued and served on him either personally or through
registered mail. True to his claim, the respondent, indeed, was never summoned
by the LA. Besides, even assuming that the respondent has knowledge of a labor
case against SEASUMCO, this will not serve the same purpose as summons to
him.

More so, the respondent did not voluntarily appear before the LA as to submit
himself to its jurisdiction. Contrary to the petitioner's position, the validity of a
judgment or order of a court or quasi-judicial tribunal which has become final and
executory may be attacked when the records show that it lacked jurisdiction to
render the judgment. For a judgment rendered against one in a case where
jurisdiction over his person was not acquired is void, and a void judgment maybe
assailed or impugned at any time either directly or collaterally by means of a
petition filed in the same or separate case, or by resisting such judgment in any
action or proceeding wherein it is invoked.

Guided by the foregoing norms, the CA properly concluded that the proceedings
before the LA deprived the respondent of due process. Considering that the
respondent was never impleaded as a party respondent and was never validly
served with summons, the LA never acquired jurisdiction over his person.
Perforce, the proceedings conducted and the decision rendered are nugatory
and without effect. This utter lack of jurisdiction voids any liability of the
respondent for any monetary award or judgment in favor of the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 13, 2009 and
Resolution dated April 14, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
02575-MIN are AFFIRMED.

tor or officer personally liable for corporate obligations, two requisites must concur: (1) it must be
alleged in the complaint that the director or officer assented to patently unlawful acts of the corporation
or that the officer was guilty of gross negligence or bad faith; and (2) there must be proof that the officer
acted in bad faith.

Based on the records, the petitioner and the private respondents in the NLRC case failed to specifically
allege either in their complaint or position paper that the respondent, as an officer of SEASUMCO,
willfully and knowingly assented to the corporations' patently unlawful act of closing the corporation, or
that the respondent had been guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the
corporation. In fact, there was no evidence at all to show the respondent's participation in the
petitioner's illegal dismissal. Clearly, the twin requisites of allegation and proof of bad faith, necessary to
hold the respondent personally liable for the monetary awards to the petitioner, are lacking.

FACTS:

The instant case filed by the petitioner, representing the other 14 complainants, against the respondent,
is an offshoot of the labor case entitled "Reyno Dimson, et al. v. SEASUMCO, MAC, United Coconut
Planters Bank (UPCB), and Cotabato Sugar Central Co., Inc. (COSUCECO)."

On September 22, 2003, the said labor case for illegal dismissal with monetary claims was decided in
favor of the complainants. Hence, SEASUMCO and MAC, as well as the members of their board of
directors, were ordered to pay jointly and severally the sum of Three Million Eight Hundred
TwentySeven Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos and Fifty-One Centavos (P3,827,470.51).
The respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the NLRC Resolution denied his motion. Hence,
he filed a petition for certiorari with application for temporary restraining order (TRO)/preliminary
injunction before the CA. He maintained that the labor tribunals violated his right to due process when
the LA authorized the issuance of the amended alias writ of execution against him for the corporation's
judgment debt, although he has never been a party to the underlying suit.

Meanwhile, upon the petitioner's motion, a Second Alias Writ of Execution was since the previous writ
has already expired. Pursuant to this, on December 2, 2008, a Certificate of Sale/Award was issued to
the petitioner upon the levy on execution that was made over the shares of stocks belonging to the
respondent at New Frontier Sugar Corporation (NFSC)

On January 30, 2009, the CA denied the respondent's application for a TRO and set the case for hearing
on the propriety of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction (WPI).

In the Resolution dated April 16, 2009, the CA issued a WPI enjoining the NLRC, its sheriff and any
person acting for and its behalf from transferring in the names of the petitioner and other private
respondents in the NLRC case, the respondent shares of stocks with NFSC pending resolution of the

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petition.

the CA rendered the assailed judgment, which nullified and set aside the rulings of the NLRC, and made
the WPI permanent. The CA held that the respondent was indeed denied due process

ISSUE:

Whether respondent can be held solidarily liable with the corporation, of which he was an officer and a
stockholder, when he was not served with summons and was never impleaded as a party to the case.
(NO)
RULING:

Court sustains the CA's ruling that the respondent, as one of SEASUMCO's corporate officer and
stockholder, should not be held solidarily liable with the corporation for its monetary liabilities with the
petitioner.

Here, the LA pierced the veil of corporate fiction of SEASUMCO and held the respondent, in his personal
capacity, jointly and severally liable with the corporation for the enforcement of the monetary awards to
the petitioner. Even assuming that the labor tribunals had jurisdiction over the respondent, it was still
improper to hold him liable for SEASUMCO's obligations to its employees.

In the recent case of Jose Emmanuel P. Guillermo v. Crisanto P. Uson, the Court resolved the twin
doctrines of piercing the veil of corporate fiction and personal liability of company officers in labor cases.
According to the Court:

The common thread running among the aforementioned cases, however, is that the veil of corporate
fiction can be pierced, and responsible corporate directors and officers or even a separate but related
corporation, may be impleaded and held answerable solidarity in a labor case, even after final judgment
and on execution, so long as it is established that such persons have deliberately used the corporate
vehicle to unjustly evade the judgment obligation, or have resorted to fraud, bad faith or malice in doing
so. When the shield of a separate corporate identity is used to commit wrongdoing and opprobriously
elude responsibility, the courts and the legal authorities in a labor case have not hesitated to step in and
shatter the said shield and deny the usual protections to the offending party, even after final judgment.
The key element is the presence of fraud, malice or bad faith. Bad faith, in this instance, does not
connote bad judgment or negligence but imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of wrong; it means breach of a known duty through motive or interest or ill will; it
partakes of the nature of fraud.

As the foregoing implies, there is no hard and fast rule on when corporate fiction may be disregarded;
instead, each case must be evaluated according to its peculiar circumstances. For the case at bar,
applying the above criteria, a finding of personal and solidary liability against a corporate Officer like
Guillermo must be rooted on a satisfactory showing of fraud, bad faith or malice, or the presence of any
of the justifications for disregarding the corporate fiction. x x x. (Citations omitted)
"A corporation is a juridical entity with a legal personality separate and distinct from those acting for and
in its behalf and, in general, from the people comprising it. Thus, as a general rule, an officer may not be
held liable for the corporation's labor obligations unless he acted with evident malice and/or

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bad faith in dismissing an employee." Section 31 of the Corporation Code is the governing law on
personal liability of officers for the debts of the corporation. To hold a director or officer personally
liable for corporate obligations, two requisites must concur: (1) it must be alleged in the complaint that
the director or officer assented to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or that the officer was guilty
of gross negligence or bad faith; and (2) there must be proof that the officer acted in bad faith.

Based on the records, the petitioner and the private respondents in the NLRC case failed to specifically
allege either in their complaint or position paper that the respondent, as an officer of SEASUMCO,
willfully and knowingly assented to the corporations' patently unlawful act of closing the corporation, or
that the respondent had been guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the
corporation. In fact, there was no evidence at all to show the respondent's participation in the
petitioner's illegal dismissal. Clearly, the twin requisites of allegation and proof of bad faith, necessary to
hold the respondent personally liable for the monetary awards to the petitioner, are lacking.

The respondent is merely one of the officers of SEASUMCO and to single him out and require him to
personally answer for the liabilities of SEASUMCO are without basis. In the absence of a finding that he
acted with malice or bad faith, it was error for the labor tribunals to hold him responsible.

The Court had repeatedly emphasized that the piercing of the veil of corporate fiction is frowned upon
and can only be done if it has been clearly established that the separate and distinct personality of the
corporation is used to justify a wrong, protect fraud, or perpetrate a deception. To disregard the
separate juridical personality of a corporation, the wrongdoing must be established clearly and
convincingly. It cannot be presumed.

A. GROUNDS FOR APPLICATION OF DOCT

INTERPORT RESOURCES CORPORATION, Petitioner, -versus – SECURITIES SPECIALIST, INC., AND R.C. LEE
SECURITIES INC., Respondents. G.R. No. 154069, FIRST DIVISION, June 6, 2016, BERSAMIN, J.

The SEC correctly categorized the assignment of the subscription agreements as a form of novation by
substitution of a new debtor which required the consent of or notice to the creditor even without the
knowledge or against the will of the former. The change of debtor took place when R.C. Lee assigned the
Oceanic shares under subscription agreement to SSI such that that the latter became obliged to settle
the 75% unpaid balance on the subscription.

The effect of the assignment was to extinguish the obligation of R.C. Lee to Oceanic, now Interport, to
settle the unpaid balance on the subscription. As a result of the assignment, Interport was no longer
obliged to accept any payment from R.C. Lee because the latter had ceased to be privy to subscription
agreements. On the other hand, Interport was legally bound to accept SSI's tender of payment for the
75% balance on the subscription price because SSI had become the new debtor. As such, the issuance of
the stock certificates in the name of R.C. Lee had no legal basis.

FACTS

Oceanic Oil & Mineral Resources, Inc. (Oceanic) entered into a subscription agreement with R.C. Lee
covering 5,000,000 of its shares with par value of P0.01 per share. Thereupon, R.C. Lee paid 25% of the
subscription. Oceanic then merged with the petitioner, with the latter as the surviving corporation.
Thereafter, R.C. Lee endorsed the subscription agreements to Securities Specialist, Inc. (SSI), a domestic
corporation registered as a dealer in securities.

Subsequently, R.C. Lee requested Interport for a list of subscription agreements and stock certificates
issued in its name and other individuals. Upon finding no record showing any transfer or assignment of
the Oceanic subscription agreements and stock certificates of Interport to SSI, R.C. Lee paid its unpaid
subscriptions and was accordingly issued stock certificates.

Interport eventually issued a call for the full payment of subscription receivables. SSI tendered payment
prior to the deadline through 2 stockbrokers of the Manila Stock Exchange. However, the stockbrokers
reported to SSI that lnterport refused to honor the Oceanic subscriptions. On the date of the deadline,
SSI directly tendered payment to lnterport for the balance covered by the Oceanic subscription
agreements. Interport rejected the same.
SSI learned that Interport had issued the 5,000,000 shares to R.C. Lee, relying on the latter's registration
as the owner of the subscription agreements in the books of the former, thus, SSI wrote R.C. Lee
demanding the delivery of the 5,000,000 shares on the basis of a purported assignment of the
subscription agreements. However, R.C. Lee failed to return the subject shares inasmuch as it had
already sold the same to other parties. SSI, thus, demanded that R.C. Lee pay not only the equivalent of
the 25% it had paid on the subscription but the whole 5,000,000 shares at current market value. SSI also
made demands upon Interport and R.C. Lee for the cancellation of the shares issued to the latter and for
the delivery of the shares to SSl. After its demands were not met, SSI commenced this case in the SEC.
The SEC, in its ruling, stated that it would be inequitable to issue the 5,000,000 shares in favor of SSI
since it only paid 25% thereof. This decision of the SEC was affirmed by the CA.

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lnterport argues that R.C. Lee should be held liable for the delivery of 25% of the shares inasmuch as
R.C. Lee had already received all the 5,000,000 shares upon its payment of the balance on the
subscription price and that it was only proper for R.C. Lee to deliver 25% of the shares under the Oceanic
subscription agreements because it had already received the corresponding payment therefor from SSI
for the assignment of the shares. In any case, it merely relied on its records.

ISSUE

Whether Interport is liable to deliver the Oceanic shares of stock or the value thereof to SSI. (YES)

RULING

Under the Civil Code, obligations may be modified by: (l) changing their object or principal conditions;
(2) substituting the person of the debtor; or (3) subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor. In
this case, the SEC correctly categorized the assignment of the subscription agreements as a form of
novation by substitution of a new debtor which required the consent of or notice to the creditor even
without the knowledge or against the will of the former. The change of debtor took place when R.C. Lee
assigned the Oceanic shares under subscription agreement to SSI such that that the latter became
obliged to settle the 75% unpaid balance on the subscription.

The effect of the assignment was to extinguish the obligation of R.C. Lee to Oceanic, now Interport, to
settle the unpaid balance on the subscription. As a result of the assignment, Interport was no longer
obliged to accept any payment from R.C. Lee because the latter had ceased to be privy to subscription
agreements. On the other hand, Interport was legally bound to accept SSI's tender of payment for the
75% balance on the subscription price because SSI had become the new debtor. As such, the issuance of
the stock certificates in the name of R.C. Lee had no legal basis in the absence of a contractual
agreement between R.C. Lee and Interport.

Under Section 63 of the Corporation Code, no transfer of shares of stock shall be valid, except as
between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in the books of the corporation. This statutory rule
cannot be strictly applied herein because lnterport had unduly refused to recognize the assignment of
the shares between R.C. Lee and SSI.

September 5, 2018

G.R. No. 215280

FRANCISCO C. EIZMENDI JR., JOSE S. TAYAG JR., JOAQUIN L. SAN AGUSTIN, EDUARDO D.
FRANCISCO, EDMIDIO V. RAMOS, JR., ALBERT G. BLANCAFLOR, REY NATHANIEL C.
IFURUNG, MANUEL H. ACOSTA JR., and VALLE VERDE COUNTRY CLUB, INC., Petitioners
vs.
TEODORICO P. FERNANDEZ, Respondent

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify and
set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated June 30, 2014 in CA-G.R. SP No. 134704, the
1

dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us GRANTING

the petition filed in this case. The Order that was issued by Branch 158 of the Regional Trial Court of
the National Capital Judicial Region in Pasig City on January 28, 2014 in Commercial Case No. 13-
202, insofar as it did not allow any evidence to be presented relating to the 23 February 2013
elections of the board of director of VVCCI, and the subsequent resolution of the said court dated
February 3, 2014, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, the public respondent
judge is DIRECTED to allow the presentation of evidence by the petition in connection with the
election of the members of the board of directors of VVCCI that was conducted during its annual
members' meeting on February 23, 2013.
SO ORDERED. 2

The facts are as follows:

On November 28, 2013, respondent Teodorico P. Fernandez filed a Complaint for Invalidation of
3

Corporate Acts and Resolutions with Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the
individual petitioners, namely: Francisco C. Eizmendi Jr., Jose S. Tayag Jr., Joaquin San Agustin,
Eduardo Francisco, Edmidio Ramos, Jr., Albert Blancaflor, Rey Nathaniel Ifmung, Manuel Acosta
Jr., who allegedly constituted themselves as new members of the Board of Directors (BOD) of Valle
Verde Country Club, Inc. (VVCCI), despite lack of quorum during the annual members' meeting on
February 23, 2013. VVCCI is a duly organized non-stock corporation engaged in promoting sports,
recreational and social activities, and the operation and maintenance of a sports and clubhouse,
among other matters.

Fernandez averred that he is a proprietary member in good standing of VVCCI, and that the
individual petitioners held a meeting on October 18, 2013 during which they supposedly acted for
and in behalf of VVCCI, and found him guilty of less serious violations of the by-laws and imposed
on him the penalty of suspension of membership for six (6) months from September 21, 2013, or
until March 21, 2014.

Fernandez asserted that since petitioners were not validly constituted as the new BOD in the place
of the hold-over BOD of VVCCI, they had no legal authority to act as such BOD, to find him guilty
and to suspend him. Fernandez added that he was not accorded due process, as petitioners failed
to give him opportunity to defend himself by notifying him of the charge and the verdict against him.
Not having been notified of his suspension, Fernandez claimed that he had no premonition of what
would happen to him when he went to the VVCCI Complex on October 26, 2013 to avail of its
facilities, and that he suffered deep pain and severe embarrassment because a security guard
directed a waiter not to serve the food he had ordered in the presence of several members on the
ground that his name is in the list of members suspended at the instance of the individual petitioners.

Fernandez prayed that after hearing on the merits, judgment be rendered: (a) making the injunction
permanent; (b) invalidating the claims of the individual petitioners to the office of director of the
VVCCI;

(c) nullifying the annual members' meeting on February 23, 2013, as well as subsequent board
meetings similarly held and conducted by the individual petitioners, including resolutions and
measures approved thereat, particularly those which are related to his suspension from the VVCCI;
(d) ordering the individual petitioners, jointly and severally, to pay him ₱500,000.00 as attorney's
fees and not less than ₱500,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱500,000.00 as moral damages.

In an Urgent Motion or Request for Production/Copying of Documents dated January 10, 2014,
4

Fernandez cited Rule 27 of the Rules of Court and requested the VVCCI, as owner and custodian of
corporate documents, to produce them and allow him to copy the following matters in connection
with the hearing of his application for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction:

1. The original of the Stock and Transfer Book and all cancelled Membership Fee Certificates of the
VVCCI.

2. The original of the Certificate of Incorporation of VVCCI issued by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) on May 30, 1975.
3. The original of the Directors' Certificate To By-laws dated August 24, 1975 of VVCCI, as filed with
the SEC.

4. The original of the By-Laws of VVCCI dated June 30, 1975 as filed with the SEC.

5. The original of the Certificate of Filing of By-Laws of VVCCI issued by the SEC on October 20,
1976, as received by VVCCI from the SEC.

6. The original of the duly-signed "Resolution Increasing the Corporation's Membership Certificates
To Two Thousand (2000)", adopted and approved by the Board of Directors of VVCCI on June 22,
1979, consisting of two (2) pages including the signature page, together with any covering minutes,
under pain of sanctions under Rule 29 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioners opposed the Urgent Motion or Request for Production/Copying of Documents, and
prayed that it be denied for lack of merit, for being unreasonable and for not being in their
possession.

On January 14, 2014, the hearing of Fernandez's application for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction was held before the Hon. Maria Rowena Modesto San Pedro, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 158. During the hearing, Judge San Pedro stressed that
she will not touch on the election contest aspect of the Complaint, but only on the issue of his
suspension from the VVCCI, thus:

COURT:

Before you testify, we are in agreement that the remaining issue ... we will not touch on the election
aspect because that is not proper for the instant case. I have already said it's too late in the day to
file an election contest. So, the only issue before the Court is the suspension.

ATTY. FERNANDEZ:

Yes, your Honor, but with due respect, if your Honor please, our case is not an election contest
because this is a suit precisely questioning the legal authority of the board who suspended me.

COURT:

Yes, even if you do not say that it is an election contest, that will, especially the issue, will still be
whether or not the board of directors' composition is legitimate because, in essence, it was still an
election contest. I will not touch on that, as I had continuously said. The only reason I'm still
entertaining this complaint is with respect to your suspension. So, your suspension, it cannot be
based ... whether or not your suspension is legitimate will not be anchored on the composition of the
board of directors but on issues like due process, if you were duly notified, if the grounds for your
suspension were valid, etcetera.

ATTY. FERNANDEZ

We wish to inform the Honorable Court, your Honor, that the dismissal of the case before Judge
Bonifacio was not based on trial on the merits. That's the reason we cannot ...

COURT:
At any rate, that will not affect me at all, that case. What I am saying is that the election contest
could not have been filed... any disagreement with the composition of that election cannot be raised
as an issue in any other facts fifteen days from election.

ATTY. FERNANDEZ:

But, Your Honor, may we be allowed to present evidence in relation to the fact that. .. I have two
allegations, if your Honor please. No.1, is the fact that they have no legal authority to suspend me
because when they convened as a board, when they elected themselves as board of directors after
the declaration of no quorum, your Honor, they used 1,500 as basis and therefore ...

COURT:

Okay, I will not entertain that. That's still an election contest. That still goes into the validity of the
election. No matter how you phrase it, it will still go into the validity of the election.

ATTY. FERNANDEZ

But that will also deal on the authority ... aside from the other ground, if your Honor please, the
authority of the Board to suspend me because ...

COURT:

Exactly, you cannot question their authority because no election contest was timely filed.

ATTY. FERNANDEZ:

Well, we will just address that in a...

COURT:

You can very well file a petition for certiorari against my refusal to entertain that issue. 5

On January 20, 2014, petitioners filed their Answer with Counterclaim and Grounds for Dismissal. 6

Petitioners specifically denied the material allegations of Fernandez's Complaint, and sought the
dismissal thereof on the following grounds ( 1) he has no cause of action against the individual
petitioners who acted as members of the BOD of VVCCI which is a collegial body; (2) the case is an
election contest filed more than 15 days from the date of election, in violation of Section 3, Rule 6 of
the Rules Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies; (3) non-exhaustion of intra-corporate remedies
and non-compliance with condition precedent under the By-Laws of VVCCI; and ( 4) violation of
rules on notarial practice.

In an Order dated January 28, 2014, the RTC pointed out that the application of a Writ of
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Preliminary Injunction has been rendered moot, upon discussion with counsel and parties present
that, in order to expedite proceedings and to proceed with the trial proper, petitioners have
graciously agreed to provide the relief sought in the Injunction application which is to immediately
reinstate Fernandez. The R TC also reminded the parties that it shall not entertain any issue
respecting the February 23, 2013 elections; otherwise, the mandatory period within which to file an
Election Contest would be rendered nugatory. The trial court stressed that is cannot allow indirectly
what is barred directly by the Rules and, accordingly, the only issue remaining is whether due
process was observed in suspending Fernandez.
In a Resolution dated February 3, 2014, the RTC denied the Urgent Motion or Request for
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Production/Copying of Documents. The trial court reiterated its position that the case is not an
election contest since it was filed way beyond the reglementary period under the Interim Rules of
Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies for election contests to be brought to court,
considering that the only issue that remains to be resolved is with respect to whether due process
was observed in suspending

Fernandez. It also found no meritorious reason to compel VVCCI to produce the original Stock and
Transfer Book and all cancelled Membership Fee Certificates since they do not appear to be
material in the resolution of the remaining issue. It further found no necessity to compel VVCCI to
produce the original items 2 to 6 of the motion, since VVCCI already admitted their existence and the
machine copies thereof were already admitted by the court as documentary exhibits of Fernandez
during the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

Aggrieved by the RTC Order dated January 28, 2014 and Resolution dated February 3, 2014,
Fernandez filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.

The CA summed up the twin issues to be resolved in the petition: first, whether or not the RTC
gravely abused its discretion when it treated the case as an election contest and disregarded the fact
that the real cause of action was Fernandez's purported illegal suspension as member of VVCCI,
and second, whether the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it merely noted and passed upon
the contention of Fernandez's that res judicata does not apply in the case.

In a Decision dated June 30, 2014, the CA granted Fernandez's petition for certiorari, nullified and
9

set aside the assailed Order and Resolution of the RTC insofar as it did not allow any evidence to be
presented relating to the February 23, 2013 elections of the board of directors of VVCCI. The CA
directed the judge to allow presentation of evidence in connection with the election of the members
of the BOD of VVCCI that was conducted during its annual members' meeting on February 23, 2013.
Anent the other matter raised by Fernandez, the CA stated that said issues would be best threshed
out in a full-blown trial of the case, because the other allegations in the petition involved evidentiary
matters which could be passed upon only during trial on the merits of the case.

The CA ruled that in order to fully resolve the issue regarding the legality of the suspension of
Fernandez from VVCCI, it was also necessary for the trial court to admit pieces of evidence which
relate to the composition of the BOD of VVCCI during the time when the penalty of suspension from
club membership was imposed upon petitioner. As explained by the CA, this is especially true
because Fernandez was suspended as member of VVCCI precisely for committing acts that were
purportedly inimical to the interest of the club. The aforesaid acts, in turn, related to the allegation
that Fernandez, along with other members of VVCCI, caused the expulsion of petitioners as
members of VVCCI on the ground that they were "critical of the abuses of the 17-year hold-over
board" of directors of VVCCI. In other words, Fernandez was suspended as member of VVCCI on
the ground that he and other club members had previously caused the expulsion of some of the
members of VVCCI who, according to Fernandez, were illegally constituted as members of the BOD
of VVCCI. Consequently, the issues in the case below, while its primary aim is to declare the
suspension of Fernandez from club membership as illegal, likewise necessarily related to the legality
or illegality of the election of the members of the BOD of VVCCI during the annual members'
meeting that was conducted on February 23, 2013. This especially finds relevance in that it had
been the position of Fernandez from the very beginning that petitioners were illegally constituted as
members of the BOD of VVCCI, thereby refusing to recognize the authority of the acts of the latter.

In support of its ruling, the CA cited the case of Yu v. Court of Appeals where it was held that while
10

trial courts have the discretion to admit or exclude evidence, such power is exercised only when the
evidence had been formally offered. This is because during the early stages of the development of
proof, it is impossible for a trial court judge to know with certainty whether evidence is relevant or not
and, thus, the practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality should be
avoided.

The CA also relied on Prats & Co. v. Phoenix Insurance Co. where it was stressed that in the heat
11

of the battle over which he presides, a judge of first instance may possibly fall into error by judging of
the relevancy of proof where a fair and logical connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is
made and proof is erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds itself
embarrassed and possibly unable to correct the effects of the error without returning the case for a
new trial - a step which this court is always very loath to take. On the other hand, the admission of
proof in a court of first instance, even if the question as to its form, materiality or relevancy is
doubtful, can never result in much harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is supposed to
know the law; and it is its duty, upon final consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant and
material from the irrelevant and immaterial. If this course is followed and the cause is prosecuted to
the Supreme Court upon appeal, this court then has all the materials before it necessary to make a
correct judgment.

In a Resolution dated October 24, 2014, the CA denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari, raising the issue of: Whether the Court
of Appeals gravely erred in allowing respondent in Commercial Case No. 13-190 to present
evidence in connection with the election of the members of the board of directors of VVCCI
conducted on February 23, 2013 to invalidate the claims of petitioners to the office of director in
relation to respondent's suspension as a member thereof by petitioners as a board of directors in
view of the decision of the Honorable Court in G.R. No. 209120 and the 15-day period within which
to file an election contest.
12

Petitioners argue that the CA correctly affirmed the trial court's finding that the cause of action of
Fernandez relates to the legality of his suspension as member of VVCCI, but it gravely erred in
ruling as follows:

xx x Consequently, the issue in the case below, while its primary aim is to declare the suspension of
the petitioner from club membership as illegal, likewise necessarily relates to the legality or illegality
of the election of the members of the board of directors of VVCCI during the annual members'
meeting that was conducted on February 23, 2013. This especially finds relevance in that it had
been the position of the petitioner from the very beginning that herein private respondents were
illegally constituted as members of the board of directors of VVCCI, thereby refusing to recognize
the authority or the acts of the latter.
13

Petitioners contend that Fernandez is attempting to indirectly violate the rules on, and the period for,
filing an election contest as provided in the Interim Rules. They point out that the trial court has read
Fernandez's complaint and readily sensed that the case is partly an election contest; thus, it
immediately prevented Fernandez from raising the issue on the election of petitioners as members
of the BOD, and limited the issue to whether Fernandez was validly suspended by petitioners. They
add that to allow Fernandez to prove the invalidity of petitioners' election is also tantamount to
reopening the first case between the hold-over BOD and the petitioners in G.R. No. 209120, entitled
"Valle Verde Country Club, Inc. v. Eizmendi, Jr.," dated October 14, 2013 (Valle Verde), which
stemmed from a complaint filed by VVCCI, for misrepresentation of corporate office against the
defendants [herein individual petitioners] with respect to the February 23, 2013 annual meeting
where the latter were elected as directors, despite the alleged lack of quorum.
Petitioners submit that the Court Resolution in G.R. No. 20912-where the complaint for
misrepresentation of corporate office was dismissed with finality on two grounds: (1) lack of cause of
action for having been filed by VVCCI instead of the contenders, which include Fernandez, who are
the real parties-in-interest; and (2) for being essentially an election contest which was filed beyond
the 15-day reglementary period under the Interim Rules - is conclusive upon the status of petitioners
as the duly-elected members of the BOD of VVCCI. Considering that Fernandez is a party in G.R.
No. 209120 as an appointee of the old BOD and being a candidate in the February 23, 2013
elections of the members of the BOD, petitioners claim that he should have filed an election contest
within 15 days therefrom or intervened in Commercial Case No. 13-190, which is the RTC case
referred to in G.R. No. 209120.

Petitioners posit that while Fernandez asserts that he is not claiming the office as member of the
BOD, he is, in effect, attempting to unseat them as members thereof, which is in the nature of an
election contest. Besides, petitioners state that their term as members of the BOD of VVCCI already
expired on April 5, 2014, which makes the issue on the validity of their election moot. Finally, they
invoke that the Resolution in G.R. No. 209120 should also be considered as the "law of the case"
under the principle of stare decisis.

For his part, Fernandez counters that his cause of action is his wrongful suspension as member of
the VVCCI, and that he may question petitioners' authority as a board to order his suspension. He
also insists that the case before the R TC is not an election contest as defined by the Interim Rules,
and that his complaint is not barred by res judicata, let alone bound by the Resolution in G.R. No.
209120 under the doctrine of stare decisis.

The petition for review is impressed with merit.

On the issue of whether Fernandez's complaint may be considered as an election contest within the
purview of the Interim Rules, the Court rules in the affirmative.

In Valle Verde Country Club, Inc. v. Eizmendi Jr, et al., the Court ruled that the complaint for
14

misrepresentation of corporate office filed by Valle Verde Country Club, Inc., against the
respondents [herein individual petitioners] falls under the definition of election contest because it
raises the issues of the validation of proxies, and the manner and validity of elections. The Court
noted that a reading of Valle Verde's allegations and prayers in the complaint shows that it is
essentially for the nullification of the election on the ground that the election was unlawfully
conducted due to the adjournment of the February 23, 2013 meeting for lack of quorum.

Here, the allegation in Fernandez's complaint for invalidation of corporate acts and resolutions partly
assails the authority of the BOD to suspend his membership on the ground that despite the lack of
quorum at the same February 23, 2013 meeting, the individual petitioners proceeded to have
themselves constituted as the new members of the BOD of VVCCI. His complaint clearly raises an
15

issue on the validity of the election of the individual petitioners. Contrary to Fernandez's claim that
the case before the lower court does not involve a claim or title to an elective office in VVCCI, and
that his objective is not to unseat the individual petitioners during the term for which they were
allegedly elected, the Court finds that a plain reading of the prayers in his complaint betrays his
cause:

2. After hearing on the merits, to render judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the defendants.

a) Making the injunction permanent;

b) Invalidating the claims of individual defendants [individual petitioners] Francisco C.
Eizmendi Jr., Jose S. Tayag, Jr., Joaquin San Agustin, Eduardo Francisco, Edmidio Ramos,
Jr., Albert Blancaflor, Rey Nathaniel Ifurung and Manuel Acosta, Jr. to the office of director of
VVCCI;

c) Nullifying the so-called annual members' meeting of February 23, 2013, as well as the so-called
board meetings similarly held and conducted by the individual defendants, such as but not limited to
the so-called board meeting of October 18, 2013, including all resolutions and measures approved
thereat, particularly those which related to the suspension of plaintiff [Fernandez] from VVCCI; 16

Fernandez's complaint disputes the election of petitioners as members of the BOD of VVCCI on the
ground of lack of quorum during the February 23, 2013 annual meeting. Verily, his complaint is partly
an "election contest" as defined under Section 2, Rule 6 of the Interim Rules, which refers to "any
controversy or dispute involving title or claim to any elective office in a stock or non-stock
corporation, the validation of proxies, the manner and validity of elections, and the qualifications of
candidates, including proclamation of winners, to the office of director, trustees or other officer
directly elected by the stockholders in a close corporation or by members of a non-stock corporation
where the article of incorporation so provide."

That Fernandez's complaint is partly an election contest is manifest from the decision of the CA,
thus:

x x x [I]n order to fully resolve the issue regarding the legality of the suspension of the
petitioner [Fernandez] from VVCCI, it was also necessary for the trial court to admit pieces of
evidence which relate to the composition of the board of directors of VVCCI during the time
when the penalty of suspension from club membership was imposed upon petitioner. This is
especially true in that petitioner was suspended as a member of VVCCI precisely for committing acts
that were purportedly inimical to the interests of the club. The aforesaid acts, in turn, relate to the
allegation that herein petitioner, along with other members of VVCCI, caused the expulsion of herein
private respondents [individual petitioners] as members of VVCCI on the ground that the latter were
"critical of the abuses of the 17-year hold over board" of directors of VVCCI. In other words, the
petitioner was suspended as a member of VVCCI on the ground that he and other club members
had previously caused the expulsion of some of the members of VVCCI who, according to petitioner,
were illegally constituted as member of the board of directors of VVCCI. x x x 17

On the issue of whether Fernandez may question the authority of the petitioners to act as the BOD
of VVCCI and approve the board resolution suspending his club membership, the Court rules in the
negative.

To allow Fernandez to indirectly question the validity of the February 23, 2013 election would be a
clear violation of the 15-day reglementary period to file an election contest under the Interim Rules.
As aptly pointed out by the RTC, what cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly. This
rule is basic and, to a reasonable mind, does not need explanation; if acts that cannot be legally
done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.18

The Court agrees with Fernandez that the 15-day reglementary period within which to file an election
contest under the Interim Rules is meant to hasten the submission and resolution of corporate
election controversies, so that the state of uncertainty in the corporate leadership is settled; and that
the said period not meant to block suits questioning the unlawful acts of winning directors, including
the legitimacy of their authority. However, if the Court were to entertain one of the causes of action in
Fernandez's complaint, which is partly an election contest raised beyond the said reglementary
period, then the salutary purposes of the said period under the Interim Rules would be rendered
futile; the floodgates to election contests would be opened, to the detriment of the regime of efficient
and stable corporate governance.

The RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion in disallowing Fernandez from presenting
evidence during the hearing of his application for preliminary injunction, relative to the lack of
authority of the individual petitioners to suspend him because it would inevitably question the validity
of the February 23, 2013 election.

The RTC's action of virtually dismissing the first cause of action in Fernandez's complaint for being
an election contest filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period, is indeed consistent with the
following provisions of the Interim Rules: (a) Section 3, Rule 1, because such act promotes the
objective of securing a just, summary, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or
proceeding; and (b) Section 4, Rule 6, which authorizes the court to dismiss outright the complaint if
the allegations thereof is not sufficient in form and substance. The RTC's action is, likewise,
consistent with the inherent power of courts to amend and control its process and orders so as to
make them conformable to law and justice, under Section 5, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court.

The RTC could not, therefore, be faulted with grave abuse of discretion, which is meant such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Neither could it
be blamed for exercising power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, which is so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.

In allowing the presentation of evidence on the validity of the election of the individual petitioners as
members of the BOD of VVCCI, the CA erroneously relied on Yu v. Court of Appeals where it was
19

held that (1) while trial courts have the discretion to admit or exclude evidence, such power is
exercised only when the evidence had been formally offered; and (2) during the early stages of the
development of proof, it is impossible for a trial court to know with certainty whether evidence is
relevant or not and, thus, the practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality
should be avoided.

Here, there is no doubt as to the materiality or relevancy of the evidence sought to be presented by
Fernandez in assailing the validity of the February 23, 2013 election. What the RTC correctly did
was to dismiss of the first cause of action because it is essentially an election contest that was filed
beyond the 15-day reglementary period under the Interim Rules, and to limit the issue of the case to
the second cause of action. To stress, the first cause of action is in effect an election contest,
inasmuch as Fernandez averred that the individual petitioners had no legal authority to act as BOD
of VVCCI, to find him guilty of any violation of the by-laws and to suspend him on the ground of lack
of quorum during the February 23, 2013 election wherein petitioners constituted themselves as
members of the BOD; whereas the second cause of action pertains to his claim for damages for not
having . been notified of his suspension, which led to an embarrassing incident on October 26, 2013
when he was refused services at the VVCCI complex in front of other club members. Since
Fernandez's complaint is partly an election contest, and there being no provision in VVCCI's by-laws
that lay down a procedure for resolution of the controversy from which the 15-day period to file such
contest may be reckoned with, the first cause of action should be dismissed for having been filed
beyond the 15-day reglementary period from the date of the election.

Suffice it to state that Fernandez's reliance on Valley Golf Club, Inc. v. V da. De Caram is 20

misplaced, because no election contest, as defined in the Interim Rules, is involved therein. While
one of the issues in Caram is the lack of due process due to non-service of notice to the member
whose membership share was sold for being delinquent in the payment of his monthly dues, there is
no dispute that the board of directors of the club has authority under the by-laws to expel a member
through forfeiture of such member's club share. In contrast, an election contest is involved in this
case, as Fernandez is also questioning the authority of the BOD of VVCCI to suspend him when he
claimed that the individual petitioners were elected as members thereof despite the supposed lack of
quorum during an annual meeting on February 23, 2013.

On the issue of whether or not the final resolution in Valle Verde Country Club, Inc. v. Eizmendi, et
al., G.R. No. 209120 dated October 14, 2013 bars Fernandez's complaint under the principles of res
judicata, law of the case and stare decisis, the Court rules that only the stare decisis principle
applies to this case.

For res judicata to serve as an absolute to a subsequent action, the following requisites must be
present: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the
merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; and (4) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject
matter, and causes of action. Here, res judicata does not apply because there is no identity of
parties, causes of action and reliefs sought between the complaint subject of Valle Verde and the
complaint subject of this case.

First, while the defendants in the complaints subject of Valle Verde [Commercial Case No. 13-190)
and of this case [Commercial Case No. 13- 202] are the very same individual petitioners, the plaintiff
in the former case is VVCCI, whereas the plaintiff in this case is Fernandez as plaintiff and
proprietary member in good standing of VVCCI. The absence of identity of parties is underscored in
Valle Verde where the Court upheld the dismissal of the complaint because Valle Verde had no
cause of action and was not the real party-in-interest. The Court explained that a corporation does
not have the right to vote and that the reliefs prayed for in the complaint are for the benefit of the
respondents' contenders [like herein respondent Fernandez].

Second, the causes of action of the complaint subject of Valle Verde is distinct from that subject of
this case. In Valle Verde, the cause of action is the individual petitioners' misrepresentation that they
were elected as new members of the BOD and the Officers of VVCCI for 2013 to 2014, due to the
claim that there was no quorum during the February 23, 2013 annual meeting. In this case, the
cause of action is the invalidation of corporate acts of VVCCI on the ground of lack of authority of the
individual petitioners, as members of the BOD, to suspend the club membership of Fernandez, and
the lack of due process which attended his suspension.

Third, there is also a stark contrast between the reliefs sought in the complaint subject of Valle
Verde and that subject of this case. In Valle Verde, VVCCI sought to enjoin the individual petitioners
from misrepresenting themselves to be members of the BOD and Officers of the Club. In this case,
Fernandez seeks to invalidate the claims of said individual petitioners to the office of BOD of VVCCI
and to nullify the annual members' meeting of February 23, 2013, as well as the subsequent board
meetings conducted by the individual petitioners, including all resolutions and measures approved
thereat relative to his suspension.

The doctrine of the "law of the case" is also inapplicable, because it only applies to the same case
involving the same parties. Valle Verde is separate and distinct from this case in terms of parties,
cause of actions and reliefs sought, despite the fact that both intra-corporate controversies arose
from the February 23, 2013 election of the individual petitioners as members of the BOD of VVCCI in
an annual meeting which was supposedly adjourned due to lack of quorum.

Spouses Sy v. Young explains the concept of the "law of the case," thus:
21
Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. It means that
whatever is once irrevocably established the controlling legal rule of decision between the same
parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case whether correct on general principles
or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the
case before the court.

x x x law of the case does not have the finality of res judicata. Law of the case applies only to the
same case, whereas res judicata forecloses parties or privies in one case by what has been done in
another case. In law of the case, the rule made by an appellate court cannot be departed from in
subsequent proceedings in the same case. Furthermore, law of the case relates entirely to questions
of law, while res judicata is applicable to the conclusive determination of issues of fact. Although res
judicata may include questions of law, it is generally concerned with the effect of adjudication in a
wholly independent proceeding.

The rationale behind this rule is to enable an appellate court to perform its duties satisfactorily and
efficiently, which would be impossible if a question, once considered and decided by it, were to be
litigated anew in the same case upon any and every subsequent appeal. Without it, there would be
endless litigation. Litigants would be free to speculate on changes in the personnel of a court, or on
the chance of our rewriting propositions once gravely ruled on solemn argument and handed down
as the law of a given case.

While the doctrines of res judicata and "the law of the case" are not applicable, the principle of stare
decisis et non quieta movere [stand by the decision and disturb not what is settled] applies to this
case, but only to the extent that Valle Verde held that (l) if the allegations and prayers in the
complaint raise the issues of validation of proxies, and the manner and validity of elections, such as
the nullification of election was unlawfully conducted due to lack of quorum, then such complaint falls
under the definition of election contest under the Interim Rules; and (2) the real parties-in-interest in
an election contest are the contenders, and not the corporation.

Abaria, et al. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al. 22

expounds on stare decisis in this wise:

Under the doctrine of stare decisis, once a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a
certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are
substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle
of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided
alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by parties
similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare
decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.

The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances attendant in a
particular case override the great benefits derived by our judicial system from the doctrine of stare
decisis, the Court is justified in setting it aside. For the Court, as the highest court of the land, may
be guided but is not controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is
not obliged to follow blindly a particular decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a
rectification.

Considering that Fernandez's first cause of action seeks to nullify the claim of the individual
petitioners to the office of the BOD of VVCCI due to lack of quorum during the election on February
23, 2013, then the Court must adhere to its ruing in Valle Verde, and hold that his complaint is partly
an election contest. However, Valle Verde cannot be invoked to sustain the position that an election
contest filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period under the Interim Rules is prescribed.
A recap of the facts in Valle Verde is in order. The RTC dismissed the complaint for
1avvphi1

misrepresentation of corporate office filed by VVCCI against the respondents (herein individual
petitioners) for lack of cause of action, as the real parties-in-interest were the respondents'
contenders. The RTC also ruled that the complaint is essentially an election contest, and should
have been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period under the Interim Rules. The CA agreed
with the RTC that respondents had no cause of action and that the complaint was essentially an
election contest because Valle Verde was seeking the respondents' ouster from their position. While
it found no merit in the petition for review on certiorari assailing the rulings of the RTC and the CA,
the Court merely held that "the factual issues raised relate to the rights of the opposing candidates of
the respondents to vote and be voted for; thus, the CA correctly ruled that Valle Verde has no cause
of action." However, the Court did not definitively rule on the effect of the filing of an election contest
beyond the 15-day period under the Interim Rules. It is not amiss to note that a cursory review of the
factual antecedents of Valle Verde and the complaint therein would show that it was filed on March
1, 2013, hence, within the 15- day reglementary period from the date of the election during Valle
Verde's annual meeting on February 23, 2013. Based on the factual antecedents of Valle Verde, it
appears that the RTC erred in citing the violation of the 15-day reglementary period under the
Interim Rules as a ground to dismiss the complaint of VVCCI.

In sum, the CA gravely erred in allowing Fernandez in Commercial Case No. 13-190 to present
evidence in connection with the election of the individual petitioners as members of the BOD of
VVCCI conducted on February 23, 2013 to invalidate their claims to the office of director, because
that is akin to entertaining an election contest filed beyond the 15-day period under the Interim
Rules.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals Decision dated June 30, 2014 and the Resolution dated October 24, 2014 Resolution in
CA-G.R. SP No. 134 704 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 158, on January 28, 2014 in Commercial Case No. 13-202, insofar as it
did not allow any evidence to be presented relating to the February 23, 2013 elections of the Board
of Directors of Valle Verde Country Club, Inc. and the subsequent resolution of the trial court dated
February 3, 2014, are hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR LEONEN

Associate Justice