SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 124491. June 1, 1999.]

ROQUE VICARIO Y MENDEZ, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

ROQUE VICARIO Y MENDEZ was charged with libel by the Provincial Prosecutor of
Catarman, Northern Samar, with Judge Proceso Sidro of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Mondragon San Roque, Northern Samar, as complaining witness. According to
the Information, the crime was committed when Vicario allegedly distributed and
circulated in the vicinity of the Northern Samar Provincial Hospital in Catarman
photocopies of page 7 of the 20 March 1992 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer which
contained the following article 1 —

SAMAR JUDGE WHO POCKETED BOND CHARGED WITH GRAFT

OMBUDSMAN Conrado Vasquez yesterday filed with the Sandiganbayan graft charges
against a Northern Samar judge who pocketed the P1,000.00 cash bond posted by a
respondent in one of several cases pending in his sala.

Charged was Judge Proceso Sidro of the Northern Samar municipal circuit trial court in
Mondragon.

Investigation showed that Sidro failed to deposit the cash bond with his clerk-of-court,
and refused to return the money even after the accused who filed the bond was already
acquitted in the case.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

Private complainant Sidro alleged that petitioner’s act greatly prejudiced his reputation
as a member of the bench and caused him great distress. Petitioner Vicario on the
other hand disclaimed responsibility for the distribution of the alleged libelous article, at
the same time asserting that the libel suit against him was ill-motivated for he had filed
a criminal charge for graft and corruption against Judge Sidro before the Ombudsman
and an administrative complaint for dishonesty with the Supreme Court, both due to
the latter’s unjustified refusal and failure to return petitioner’s cash bond of P1,000.00.

After trial, the court a quo found petitioner Vicario guilty of libel and sentenced him to
pay a fine of P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. 2 The trial
court justified its decision by declaring that while no evidence was presented to show
that Vicario distributed copies of the news article to several persons, at least he gave
one photocopy to prosecution witness Amador Montes which amounted to publication,
and that this act was tainted with malice as it stemmed from Vicario’s hatred, as
evident from the manner his testimony was delivered, towards complaining witness
Sidro. 3

On 28 February 1996 respondent Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the
trial court. 4 Hence, this petition for review on certiorari predicated on the following
propositions 5 —

First. The news item in question is a privileged matter and since it was published in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer, a nationally circulated newspaper, without any intervention of
petitioner, his act of giving a copy to a person named Amador Montes is not a libelous
act;

Second. Respondent court gravely erred in concluding that Amador Montes saw
petitioner distributing copy of the aforesaid issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer; chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

Third. Respondent court gravely erred in considering the affidavit-complaint petitioner

filed with the Ombudsman which was completely immaterial and impertinent to the
issue of whether or not the act of petitioner in giving a copy of the Philippine Daily
Inquirer to Amador Montes where the news item was published, constitutes the crime of
libel;

Fourth. Respondent court seriously erred in citing authorities which are not applicable in
deciding whether petitioner’s act of giving a copy of the Philippine Daily Inquirer to
Amador Montes constituted the crime of libel;

Fifth. Respondent court gravely erred in adopting the conclusion of the trial court that
petitioner’s act of giving a copy of the Philippine Daily Inquirer to Amador Montes was
motivated by his intense hatred against Judge Sidro, it being clear that such act was an
insufficient and inadequate evidence of the alleged intense hatred of petitioner; and,

Sixth. Respondent court gravely erred, in the final analysis, in not acquitting petitioner
on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Two (2) main issues are laid before us: (a) whether the act of merely distributing a
photocopy of an article in a newspaper reporting that graft charges had been filed
against a judge named therein constitutes libel, and (b) whether Vicario’s act was
proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect,

real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to
discredit or cause the dishonor or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to
blacken the memory of one who is dead. 6 Thus, the elements of libel are: (a)
imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another; (b) publication of the
imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and, (d) existence of malice. 7
The evidence on record clearly shows that the elements above enumerated have not
been satisfactorily established as to conclude that libel was committed by petitioner.
Thus, we rule in his favor. For an in congruency exists between the evidence on one
hand, and the findings of fact and of law by the trial court and the appellate court on
the other, which we must reconcile, if not rectify.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

As found by the trial court, there was no evidence at all to show that petitioner was the
source of the statements contained in the news item published by the Philippine Daily
Inquirer. Indeed, for not only was the news item by itself bereft of this information, the
records also confirmed its absence. This is why it was incorrect for the appellate court
to find that "the news item was patently culled from the Affidavit-Complaint of the
appellant imputing a criminal act on Judge Sidro filed with the Ombudsman (Emphasis
ours)" when no basis, factual or legal, exists for so ruling. To be sure, the Affidavit-
Complaint was merely a narration of the facts constituting the cause of action of
petitioner. Its contents never appeared in the news article which spoke only of the filing
by the Ombudsman with the Sandiganbayan of graft charges against Judge Sidro after
its, investigation of a complaint that the judge refused to return the cash bond of an
accused after the latter’s acquittal in a criminal case. There is no specific reference
therein to petitioner nor to his Affidavit-Complaint. Since it has not been established
that he caused the publication of the subject article nor was the source thereof, it would
be inappropriate to conclude that through the disputed news item he ascribed a
criminal act to Judge Proceso Sidro. Parenthetically, it would have been more accurate
for the appellate court to state that the news article was culled from the resolution of
the Ombudsman directing the filing of a criminal charge based on the results of his
investigation of a complaint leveled against the named judge. But then, if it did, it
would have been left with no basis at all to hold, as in fact it did, that Vicario
maliciously imputed a discreditable act to respondent judge, and there would be no
more justification for the finding that the first element of libel was established. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The trial court also opined that no suit arising from the publication was filed against the
newspaper because what appears settled is that the item was merely a fair and true
report, with no comments or remarks, of official or judicial proceedings which are not
classified as confidential. Again, a perusal of the subject news item confirms this fact.
Then the trial court proceeded to state that the accused (petitioner) however publicized
the newspaper item because "shown by competent and relevant evidence was the
giving (by Vicario) of a xerox copy of the publicized item to Amador Montes." But was
petitioner indeed guilty of republication of a libelous article? chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In his appeal, petitioner disputes the existence of the elements of publication and
malice, 8 arguing that inasmuch as he was not the author or originator of the subject
article in the Philippine Daily Inquirer he could not be liable for its publication. The
Court of Appeals brushed aside this proposition, declaring in the main that by having
the news item machine copied and furnishing prosecution witness Montes a copy
thereof, Accused-appellant thereby endorsed and adopted the news item and hence
was answerable therefor. We note the American citations relied upon by the appellate
court to support its conclusions. However, we deem these as not authoritative, much
less persuasive upon the Court, considering further that there are dissimilarities in the
facts between the cited cases and this case before us.

Contrary to the perception of the appellate court, there was no evidence at all offered
to show that petitioner himself photocopied the article. Nor was evidence sufficiently
adduced to prove that he himself distributed photocopies of the news item to so many
people, prompting the trial court to rule as hearsay the testimony on the matter by
Judge Sidro and his protégé Amador Montes. This puts to doubt whether petitioner
himself gave a copy of the publication to Montes. Notably, Montes was not even named
by the judge as one of the original witnesses listed in the complaint he filed for
preliminary investigation. The witness named therein was a certain Hermito
Pahimnayan who was never presented in court despite his having executed an affidavit
which was attached to Sidro’s criminal complaint in the Municipal Trial Court. This
affidavit described not the incident of 22 May 1992 on which the charge for libel was
based but one which occurred sometime in 1991 or a year earlier during which Vicario
was said to have shown Pahimnayan a copy of his administrative complaint against
Judge Sidro. Moreover, in the affidavit executed by Judge Sidro which he also attached
to his complaint, he declared that it was Romeo Pinangay, his court messenger, who
gave him a copy of Philippine Daily Inquirer and informed him that Roque Vicario
distributed clippings of the news item to everyone in the premises of the hospital.
Amador Montes was never mentioned in this affidavit; much less was he made to
execute any affidavit to support the criminal complaint of Judge Sidro. This much he
admitted on the witness stand. 9 Other than the testimony of Montes himself, an
acknowledged subaltern of the judge, no one else was presented to establish the fact of
distribution by petitioner of copies of the alleged offensive news article. The prosecution
could have offered other witnesses with more objective dispositions than Montes, but it
did not do so. With these doubts subsisting, it was therefore reversible error of the
courts below to conclude that petitioner was liable for the republication of the news
article alleged to be libelous.

A person’s liability for libel need not, admittedly, stem from the fact that he was the
original publisher of the discreditable act. The maker of a libelous republication or
repetition, although not liable for the results of the primary publication, is liable for the
consequence of a subsequent publication which he makes or participates in making. It
is no justification that the defamatory matter is previously published by a third person,
10 provided malice is present. Granting arguendo the correctness of the finding by the
lower courts that petitioner did at least distribute a machine copy of the article to one
Amador Montes, an acknowledged "batos" 11 of Judge Sidro, was there sufficient basis
to ascribe malice in his act?chanrobles.com : virtual law library

The trial court rationalized that "the accused has all the motivations to do so (i.e.,
distribute a copy to Montes) because of his intense hatred against complainant,
manifested even by the very manner he gave testimony, who would not return to him
an amount that he had to borrow from a loan shark (there is nothing to show that the
same was returned to the accused). . . . Even so, such actuation . . . in disseminating
through Montes is removed from the protection accorded to a privileged communication
under the foregoing circumstances." This is flawed reasoning, a veritable non sequitur.
It is established doctrine that the malice that attends the dissemination of the article
alleged to be libelous must attend the distribution itself. It cannot be merely a
resentment against a person, manifested unconnectedly several months earlier or one
displayed at a much later date, as what happened in this case. A fine-tooth comb
dissection of the testimony of prosecution witness Amador Montes reveals none that
would indicate, much less hint at, the attitude and mental frame of Vicario at the time
he allegedly handed over the photocopy of the news item in question to Montes. If at
all, as can be gathered from the testimonial narration, Vicario’s attitude could only be
described as noncommittal.

In order to constitute malice, ill will must be personal. So if the ill will is engendered by
one’s sense of justice or other legitimate or plausible motive, such feeling negatives
actual malice. 12 The anger observed by trial court to have been shown by the
petitioner towards private complainant at the time the former offered his testimony in
defense of libel cannot be properly considered as malice, either in fact or in law, that
accompanied the dissemination of an alleged libelous publication. For the anger
discerned of petitioner on the witness stand could also mean anger not only borne out
of a sense of justice frustrated by the continued refusal of Judge Sidro to return to him
his cash bond, but also at being criminally sued in court for an act which he stoutly
believed was not imputable to him. This state of mind cannot be appropriately
considered malice and applied retroactively to the time of the distribution of the alleged
libelous article unless clear and convincing evidence shows otherwise; and, there is no
such contrary evidence in the case at bar. Since there is no indication about the cause
of such display of "intense hatred" by the petitioner for Judge Sidro, the Court will grant
him the benefit of the doubt under the "equipoise doctrine." 13

There was nothing defamatory in the news item. This much was found by the trial court
itself, noting that the published article was merely a factual report about the filing by
the Ombudsman of the charge of corruption against the judge with the Sandiganbayan.
Of course, it does not necessarily mean that if the news article complained of is not
libelous because it is a privileged matter, he who repeats the publication is likewise free
from accountability for the re-utterance. We recognize that a person’s liability for libel
does not necessarily proceed from the fact that he was the original publisher of the
discreditable act. The maker of a libelous republication or repetition, although not liable
for the results of the primary publication, is liable for the consequences of a subsequent
publication which he makes or participates in making so long as the elements of libel
are satisfied. But in every case malice must be present, something which has not been
shown in the case at bar. chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

The law presumes that malice is present in every defamatory imputation. However, on
this score, Art. 354 of the Revised Penal Code provides an exemption —

ARTICLE 354. Requirement for publicity. — Every defamatory imputation is presumed

to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making
it is shown, except in the following cases . . . . 2. A fair and true report, made in good
faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official
proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech
delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the
exercise of their functions (Emphasis supplied).

Paragraph 2 aforequoted refers to a qualifiedly privileged communication, the character

of which is a matter of defense that may be lost by positive proof of express malice on
the part of the accused. Once it is established that the article is of a privileged
character, the onus of proving actual malice rests on the plaintiff who must then
convince the court that the offender was prompted by malice or ill will. When this is
accomplished the defense of privilege becomes unavailing. 14 Since the prosecution
failed to establish express malice on the part of petitioner by positive proof, its cause
perforce must fail.

WHEREFORE, this petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Catarman, Northern Samar, dated 11 March 1993 finding petitioner guilty of libel, and
that of the Court of Appeals dated 28 February 1996 affirming his conviction are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner ROQUE VICARIO Y MENDEZ is ACQUITTED of the
crime charged. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

SO ORDERED. chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

Puno, Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1. Exhs. "A" and "A-1," Records, p. 8.

2. Decision penned by Judge Cesar R. Cinco, RTC-Br. 20, Catarman, Northern Samar.

3. Id., pp. 48-53.

4. Rollo, pp. 40-47.

5. Petition, p. 16, Rollo, p. 23.

6. Art. 353, Revised Penal Code.

7. Daez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 47971, 31 October 1990, 191 SCRA 61, 67.

8. Petition, p. 19, Rollo, p. 32.

9. TSN, 4 August 1993, p. 18.

10. Reyes, Leonardo P., Fundamentals of Libel Law, 1986, pp. 14-15, citing Sourbier v.
Brown, 123 N.E. 802, 188 Ind. 544; Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., D.C. Mo. 8 F
Supp. 889; Wayne Works v. Hicks Body Co., 55 N.E. 2d 382, 115 Ind.

11. "Batos" is the local Waray term for "factotum." cralaw virtua1aw library

12. Aquino, Ramon C., The Revised Penal Code, Vol. III, Bk. II, 1997 Ed., citing People
v. de los Reyes, Jr., 47 OG 3569.

13. The "equipoise doctrine" is the rule which states that when the evidence of the
prosecution and the defense are so evenly balanced the appreciation of such evidence
calls for tilting of the scales in favor of the accused. Thus, the evidence for the
prosecution must be heavier to overcome the presumption of innocence of the accused.
The constitutional basis of the rule is Bill of Rights which finds expressions in Sec. 1,
par. (a) , Rule 115 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended (see People v.
Argawamon, 215 SCRA 652; People v. Ramilla, G.R. No. 101435, 8 November 1993;
People v. De la Iglesia, G.R. No. 110991-92, 24 Feb. 1995).

14. Santos v. Court of Appeals, No. L-45031, 21 October 1991,