Special Proceedings Rule 102

[1] G.R. No. 204528 February 19, 2013 subsequent case be filed—either criminal or civil.
t case be filed—either criminal or civil. Until the full satisfaction of the

judgment, the extraordinary remedy of Amparo allows vigilant judicial monitoring to
SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, DIRECTOR NONNATUS R. ROJAS and ensure the protection of constitutional rights.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR REYNALDO 0. ESMERALDA, Petitioners, Same; Same; Words and Phrases; A writ of Amparo is a special proceeding. It
vs. MAGTANGGOL B. GATDULA, Respondent. is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or particular fact. It
is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the application of the Revised Rule on
Constitutional Law; Writ of Amparo; The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an Summary Procedure is seriously misplaced.—The 1991 Revised Rules of Summary
equitable and extraordinary remedy to safeguard the right of the people to life, Procedure is a special rule that the Court has devised for the following
liberty and security as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.—The remedy of the Writ circumstances: SECTION 1. Scope.—This rule shall govern the summary
of Amparo is an equitable and extraordinary remedy to safeguard the right of the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the
people to life, liberty and security as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. The Rule on Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases
the Writ of Amparo was issued as an exercise of the Supreme Court’s power to falling within their jurisdiction: A. Civil Cases: (1) All cases of forcible entry and
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. unlawful detainer, x x x. (2) All other cases, except probate proceedings, where the
It aims to address concerns such as, among others, extrajudicial killings and enforced total amount of the plaintiff’s claim does not exceed x x x. B. Criminal Cases: (1)
disappearances. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations; (2) Violations of the rental law; (3)
Same; Same; After evaluation, the judge has the option to issue the Writ of Violations of municipal or city ordinances; (4) All other criminal cases where the
Amparo or immediately dismiss the case. Dismissal is proper if the petition and the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged is imprisonment not exceeding six
supporting affidavits do not show that the petitioner’s right to life, liberty or security months, or a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, x x x.
is under threat or the acts complained of are not unlawful. On the other hand, the x x x x It is clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure only applies to
issuance of the writ itself sets in motion presumptive judicial protection for the MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling how this rule could possibly apply to
petitioner.—Due to the delicate and urgent nature of these controversies, the proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the application of
procedure was devised to afford swift but decisive relief. It is initiated through a summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a
petition to be filed in a Regional Trial Court, Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, special proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a
or the Supreme Court. The judge or justice then makes an “immediate” evaluation of right or particular fact. It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the application of
the facts as alleged in the petition and the affidavits submitted “with the attendant the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is seriously misplaced.
circumstances detailed.” After evaluation, the judge has the option to issue the Writ Same; Same; A memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the
of Amparo or immediately dismiss the case. Dismissal is proper if the petition and Writ of Amparo.—The Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the
the supporting affidavits do not show that the petitioner’s right to life, liberty or issues subject to a hearing. Hence, it should be done prior to the hearing, not after. A
security is under threat or the acts complained of are not unlawful. On the other memorandum, on the other hand, is a synthesis of the claims of the party litigants
hand, the issuance of the writ itself sets in motion presumptive judicial protection for and is a final pleading usually required before the case is submitted for decision. One
the petitioner. The court compels the respondents to appear before a court of law to cannot substitute for the other since these submissions have different functions in
show whether the grounds for more permanent protection and interim reliefs are facilitating the suit. More importantly, a memorandum is a prohibited pleading under
necessary. the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
Same; Same; After the measures have served their purpose, the judgment will Same; Same; The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from
be satisfied. In Amparo cases, this is when the threats to the petitioner’s life, liberty the actual order called the Writ of Amparo. The privilege includes availment of the
and security cease to exist as evaluated by the court that renders the judgment .—If entire procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
the allegations are proven with substantial evidence, the court shall grant the —The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual
privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate. The judgment order called the Writ of Amparo. The privilege includes availment of the entire
should contain measures which the judge views as essential for the continued procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. After
protection of the petitioner in the Amparo case. These measures must be detailed examining the petition and its attached affidavits, the Return and the evidence
enough so that the judge may be able to verify and monitor the actions taken by the presented in the summary hearing, the judgment should detail the required acts from
respondents. It is this judgment that could be subject to appeal to the Supreme Court the respondents that will mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the violation of or the
via Rule 45. After the measures have served their purpose, the judgment will be threat to the petitioner’s life, liberty or security. A judgment which simply grants
satisfied. In Amparo cases, this is when the threats to the petitioner’s life, liberty and “the privilege of the writ” cannot be executed. It is tantamount to a failure of the
security cease to exist as evaluated by the court that renders the judgment. judge to intervene and grant judicial succor to the petitioner. Petitions filed to avail
Parenthetically, the case may also be terminated through consolidation should a of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo arise out of very real and concrete
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 101) Page 1 of 123

circumstances. Judicial responses cannot be as tragically symbolic or ritualistic as Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge issued
“granting the privilege of the Writ of Amparo.” summons and ordered De Lima, et al. to file an Answer. 4 He also set the
Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Rules of Court; The Rules of Court can case for hearing on 1 March 2012. The hearing was held allegedly for
be suspended on the following grounds: (1) matters of life, liberty, honor or determining whether a temporary protection order may be issued. During that
property, (2) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (3) the merits of hearing, counsel for De Lima, et al. manifested that a Return, not an Answer,
the case, (4) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party is appropriate for Amparo cases.5
favored by the suspension of the rules, (5) a lack of any showing that the review
sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (6) the other party will not be unjustly In an Order dated 2 March 2012,6 Judge Pampilo insisted that "[s]ince no writ
prejudiced thereby.—In many instances, the Court adopted a policy of liberally has been issued, return is not the required pleading but answer". 7 The judge
construing its rules in order to promote a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of noted that the Rules of Court apply suppletorily in Amparo cases.8 He opined
every action and proceeding. The rules can be suspended on the following grounds: that the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure applied and thus required an
(1) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (2) the existence of special or Answer.9
compelling circumstances, (3) the merits of the case, (4) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the Judge Pampilo proceeded to conduct a hearing on the main case on 7 March
rules, (5) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and 2012.10 Even without a Return nor an Answer, he ordered the parties to file
dilatory, and (6) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. their respective memoranda within five (5) working days after that hearing.
Since the period to file an Answer had not yet lapsed by then, the judge also
RESOLUTION decided that the memorandum of De Lima, et al. would be filed in lieu of their
Answer.11
LEONEN, J.:
On 20 March 2012, the RTC rendered a "Decision" granting the issuance of
Submitted for our resolution is a prayer for the issuance of a temporary the Writ of Amparo. The RTC also granted the interim reliefs prayed for,
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin "the Regional namely: temporary protection, production and inspection orders. The
Trial Court, Branch 26, in Manila from implementing its Decision x x x in Civil production and inspection orders were in relation to the evidence and reports
Case No. 12-127405 granting respondent's application for the issuance of involving an on-going investigation of the attempted assassination of Deputy
inspection and production orders x x x." 1 This is raised through a Petition for Director Esmeralda. It is not clear from the records how these pieces of
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 from the "Decision" rendered by the evidence may be related to the alleged threat to the life, liberty or security of
Regional Trial Court dated 20 March 2012. the respondent Gatdula.
From the records, it appears that on 27 February 2012, respondent In an Order dated 8 October 2012, the RTC denied the Motion for
Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in Reconsideration dated 23 March 2012 filed by De Lima, et al.
the Regional Trial Court of Manila.2 This case was docketed as In the Matter
of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Amparo of Atty. Magtanggol B. Gatdula, Petitioners Sec. De Lima, et al. thus came to this Court assailing the RTC
SP No. 12-127405. It was raffled to the sala of Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 through a Petition for Review on Certiorari
on the same day. (With Very Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction) via Rule 45, as enunciated in Section 19
The Amparo was directed against petitioners Justice Secretary Leila M. De of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9- 12-SC, 25 September
Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. 2007), viz:
Esmeralda of the National Bureau of Investigation (DE LIMA, ET AL. for
brevity). Gatdula wanted De Lima, et al. "to cease and desist from framing up SEC. 19. Appeal. – Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order
Petitioner [Gatdula] for the fake ambush incident by filing bogus charges of to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact
Frustrated Murder against Petitioner [Gatdula] in relation to the alleged or law or both. It is the Court’s view that the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012
ambush incident."3 granting the writ of Amparo is not the judgment or final order contemplated
under this rule. Hence, a Petition for Review under Rule 45 may not yet be
the proper remedy at this time.

The RTC and the Parties must understand the nature of the remedy of There will be a summary hearing26 only after the Return is filed to determine
Amparo to put its procedures in the proper context. the merits of the petition and whether interim reliefs are warranted. If the
Return is not filed, the hearing will be done ex parte.27 After the hearing, the
The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an equitable and extraordinary remedy court will render the judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition
to safeguard the right of the people to life, liberty 12 and security13 as is submitted for decision.28
enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.14 The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was
issued as an exercise of the Supreme Court's power to promulgate rules If the allegations are proven with substantial evidence, the court shall grant
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. 15 It aims to the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate. 29
address concerns such as, among others, extrajudicial killings and enforced The judgment should contain measures which the judge views as essential
disappearances.16 for the continued protection of the petitioner in the Amparo case. These
measures must be detailed enough so that the judge may be able to verify
Due to the delicate and urgent nature of these controversies, the procedure and monitor the actions taken by the respondents. It is this judgment that
was devised to afford swift but decisive relief. 17 It is initiated through a could be subject to appeal to the Supreme Court via Rule 45. 30 After the
petition18 to be filed in a Regional Trial Court, Sandiganbayan, the Court of measures have served their purpose, the judgment will be satisfied. In
Appeals, or the Supreme Court.19 The judge or justice then makes an Amparo cases, this is when the threats to the petitioner’s life, liberty and
"immediate" evaluation20 of the facts as alleged in the petition and the security cease to exist as evaluated by the court that renders the judgment.
affidavits submitted "with the attendant circumstances detailed". 21 After Parenthetically, the case may also be terminated through consolidation
evaluation, the judge has the option to issue the Writ of Amparo22 or should a subsequent case be filed – either criminal or civil. 31 Until the full
immediately dismiss the case. Dismissal is proper if the petition and the satisfaction of the judgment, the extraordinary remedy of Amparo allows
supporting affidavits do not show that the petitioner's right to life, liberty or vigilant judicial monitoring to ensure the protection of constitutional rights.
security is under threat or the acts complained of are not unlawful. On the
other hand, the issuance of the writ itself sets in motion presumptive judicial The "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 assailed by the petitioners could not
protection for the petitioner. The court compels the respondents to appear be the judgment or final order that is appealable under Section 19 of the Rule
before a court of law to show whether the grounds for more permanent on the Writ of Amparo. This is clear from the tenor of the dispositive portion
protection and interim reliefs are necessary. of the "Decision", to wit:
The respondents are required to file a Return23 after the issuance of the writ The Branch Clerk of Court of Court [sic] is hereby DIRECTED to issue the
through the clerk of court. The Return serves as the responsive pleading to Writ of Amparo.
the petition.24 Unlike an Answer, the Return has other purposes aside from
identifying the issues in the case. Respondents are also required to detail the Likewise, the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED to effect the
actions they had taken to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved service of the Writ of Amparo in an expeditious manner upon all concerned,
party. and for this purpose may call upon the assistance of any military or civilian
agency of the government.
If the respondents are public officials or employees, they are also required to
state the actions they had taken to: (i) verify the identity of the aggrieved This "Decision" pertained to the issuance of the writ under Section 6 of the
party; (ii) recover and preserve evidence related to the death or Rule on the Writ of Amparo, not the judgment under Section 18. The
disappearance of the person identified in the petition; (iii) identify witnesses "Decision" is thus an interlocutory order, as suggested by the fact that
and obtain statements concerning the death or disappearance; (iv) determine temporary protection, production and inspection orders were given together
the cause, manner, location, and time of death or disappearance as well as with the decision. The temporary protection, production and inspection orders
any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or are interim reliefs that may be granted by the court upon filing of the petition
disappearance; and (vi) bring the suspected offenders before a competent but before final judgment is rendered.32
court.25 Clearly these matters are important to the judge so that s/he can
calibrate the means and methods that will be required to further the The confusion of the parties arose due to the procedural irregularities in the
protections, if any, that will be due to the petitioner. RTC.

First, the insistence on filing of an Answer was inappropriate. It is the Return (2) Violations of the rental law;
that serves as the responsive pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs
of Amparo. The requirement to file an Answer is contrary to the intention of (3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
the Court to provide a speedy remedy to those whose right to life, liberty and
security are violated or are threatened to be violated. In utter disregard of the (4) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by
Rule on the Writ of Amparo, Judge Pampilo insisted on issuing summons and law for the offense charged is imprisonment not exceeding
requiring an Answer. six months, or a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00), or both, x x x.
Judge Pampilo’s basis for requiring an Answer was mentioned in his Order
dated 2 March 2012: xxxx
Under Section 25 of the same rule [on the Writ of Amparo], the Rules of It is clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure only applies to
Court shall apply suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent with the said MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling how this rule could possibly apply to
rule. proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the application of
summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a
Considering the summary nature of the petition, Section 5 of the Revised special proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
Rules of Summary Procedure shall apply. status, a right or particular fact. 34 It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence,
the application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is seriously
Section 5. Answer – Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the misplaced.
defendant shall file his Answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on
the plaintiff. x x x The second irregularity was the holding of a hearing on the main case prior
to the issuance of the writ and the filing of a Return. Without a Return, the
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the respondents are required to file issues could not have been properly joined.
their Answer ten (days) from receipt of this Order.33
Worse, is the trial court’s third irregularity: it required a memorandum in lieu
The 1991 Revised Rules of Summary Procedure is a special rule that the of a responsive pleading (Answer) of De Lima, et al.
Court has devised for the following circumstances:
The Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the issues
SECTION 1. Scope. – This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the subject to a hearing. Hence, it should be done prior to the hearing, not after.
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal A memorandum, on the other hand, is a synthesis of the claims of the party
Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases litigants and is a final pleading usually required before the case is submitted
falling within their jurisdiction: for decision. One cannot substitute for the other since these submissions
have different functions in facilitating the suit.
A. Civil Cases:
More importantly, a memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on
(1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, x x x. the Writ of Amparo.35
(2) All other cases, except probate proceedings, where the The fourth irregularity was in the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 itself. In the
total amount of the plaintiff’s claim does not exceed x x x. body of its decision, the RTC stated:
B. Criminal Cases: "Accordingly this court GRANTS the privilege of the writ and the interim
reliefs prayed for by the petitioner." (Emphasis supplied).
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;

This gives the impression that the decision was the judgment since the compelling circumstances, (3) the merits of the case, (4) a cause not entirely
phraseology is similar to Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo: attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension
of the rules, (5) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
"SEC. 18. Judgment. — The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days frivolous and dilatory, and (6) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
from the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the thereby.38
petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the
privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice, as a prophylactic to the irregularities
otherwise, the privilege shall be denied." (Emphasis supplied). committed by the trial court judge, and by virtue of its powers under Article
VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution, the Court RESOLVES to:
The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the
actual order called the Writ of Amparo. The privilege includes availment of (1) NULLIFY all orders that are subject of this Resolution issued by
the entire procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the Rule on the Writ of Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. after respondent Gatdula filed the
Amparo. After examining the petition and its attached affidavits, the Return Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo;
and the evidence presented in the summary hearing, the judgment should
detail the required acts from the respondents that will mitigate, if not totally (2) DIRECT Judge Pampilo to determine within forty-eight (48) hours
eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the petitioner's life, liberty or from his receipt of this Resolution whether the issuance of the Writ of
security. Amparo is proper on the basis of the petition and its attached
affidavits.
A judgment which simply grants "the privilege of the writ" cannot be
executed.1âwphi1 It is tantamount to a failure of the judge to intervene and The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to cause the personal service of this
grant judicial succor to the petitioner. Petitions filed to avail of the privilege of Resolution on Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. of Branch 26 of the Regional Trial
the Writ of Amparo arise out of very real and concrete circumstances. Court of Manila for his proper guidance together with a WARNING that
Judicial responses cannot be as tragically symbolic or ritualistic as "granting further deviation or improvisation from the procedure set in A.M. No. 07-9-12-
the privilege of the Writ of Amparo." SC shall be meted with severe consequences.
The procedural irregularities in the RTC affected the mode of appeal that SO ORDERED.
petitioners used in elevating the matter to this Court.
It is the responsibility of counsels for the parties to raise issues using the
proper procedure at the right time. Procedural rules are meant to assist the
parties and courts efficiently deal with the substantive issues pertaining to a
case. When it is the judge himself who disregards the rules of procedure,
delay and confusion result.
The Petition for Review is not the proper remedy to assail the interlocutory
order denominated as "Decision" dated 20 March 2012. A Petition for
Certiorari, on the other hand, is prohibited.36 Simply dismissing the present
petition, however, will cause grave injustice to the parties involved. It
undermines the salutary purposes for which the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
were promulgated.
In many instances, the Court adopted a policy of liberally construing its rules
in order to promote a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action
and proceeding.37 The rules can be suspended on the following grounds: (1)
matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (2) the existence of special or

[2] G.R. No. 193636 July 24, 2012 Same; Writ of Habeas Data; The writ of habeas data is an independent and
summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and
MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA, Petitioner, vs.P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s
his capacity as the PNP-Provincial Director of Ilocos Norte, and P/SUPT. right to the truth and to informational privacy.—The writ of habeas data is an
WILLIAM 0. FANG, in his capacity as Chief, Intelligence Division, PNP independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
Provincial Office, Ilocos Norte, Respondents. information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to
enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a
Constitutional Law; Right to Privacy; Liberty in the constitutional sense must person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in
mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to
privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the
indeed the beginning of all freedom.—The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one
liberty, has long been recognized as a constitutional right. This Court, in Morfe v. hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.
Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1968), thus enunciated: The due process question touching on Same; Private Armies; The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of
an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus resolved goes a long way in disposing of the private armies and other armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted
objections raised by plaintiff that the provision on the periodical submission of a authority.—The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies
sworn statement of assets and liabilities is violative of the constitutional right to and other armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority. It also
privacy. There is much to be said for this view of Justice Douglas: “Liberty in the provides for the establishment of one police force that is national in scope and
constitutional sense must mean more than freedom from unlawful civilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a national police
governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository commission.
of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom.” As a
matter of fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis “the DECISION
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.” The
concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for his SERENO, J.:
personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands
respect. Before this Court is an Appeal by Certiorari (Under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Same; Same; The right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must Court) filed pursuant to Rule 19 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data, 2
be protected from intrusion or constraint.—Clearly, the right to privacy is seeking a review of the 9 September 2010 Decision in Special Proc. No.
considered a fundamental right that must be protected from intrusion or constraint. 14979 of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Laoag City, Branch
However, in Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks, 541 SCRA 13 (RTC Br. 13).3 The questioned Decision denied petitioner the privilege of
456 (2007), this Court underscored that the right to privacy is not absolute, viz.: the writ of habeas data.4
With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated,
suffice it to state that privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true that Section 21, At the time the present Petition was filed, petitioner Marynette R. Gamboa
Article VI of the Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights of persons affected by (Gamboa) was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte. 5 Meanwhile, respondent
the legislative investigation, not every invocation of the right to privacy should be Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSUPT.) Marlou C. Chan was the Officer-in-
allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon, we have Charge, and respondent Police Superintendent (P/SUPT.) William O. Fang
held that the right of the people to access information on matters of public concern was the Chief of the Provincial Investigation and Detective Management
generally prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that Branch, both of the Ilocos Norte Police Provincial Office. 6
case, we declared that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding
compelling state interest. Employing the rational basis relationship test, as laid down
in Morfe v. Mutuc, there is no infringement of the individual’s right to privacy as the On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, in this case, to ensure Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O. 275), "Creating an Independent
that the government agencies involved in regulating banking transactions adequately Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the
protect the public who invest in foreign securities. Suffice it to state that this purpose Country."7 The body, which was later on referred to as the Zeñarosa
constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed with the assailed legislative Commission,8 was formed to investigate the existence of private army groups
investigation. (PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating them before the 10 May 2010

elections and dismantling them permanently in the future. 9 Upon the aware that there is a body monitoring the PAGs movement through the
conclusion of its investigation, the Zeñarosa Commission released and PNP. Commissioner Lieutenant General Edilberto Pardo Adan also clarified
submitted to the Office of the President a confidential report entitled "A that the PAGs are being destabilized so that their ability to threaten and
Journey Towards H.O.P.E.: The Independent Commission Against Private sow fear during the election has been considerably weakened. 19
Armies’ Report to the President" (the Report).10
(e) The Report briefly touched upon the validation system of the
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP– PNP:
Ilocos Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and
her aides,11 and classified her as someone who keeps a PAG. 12 Purportedly Also, in order to provide the Commission with accurate data which is truly
without the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the reflective of the situation in the field, the PNP complied with the
information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission, 13 thereby causing Commission’s recommendation that they revise their validation system to
her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs. 14 include those PAGs previously listed as dormant. In the most recent briefing
More specifically, she pointed out the following items reflected therein: provided by the PNP on April 26, 2010, there are one hundred seven (107)
existing PAGs. Of these groups, the PNP reported that seven (7) PAGs have
(a) The Report cited the PNP as its source for the portion regarding the been reorganized.20
status of PAGs in the Philippines.15
On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program
(b) The Report stated that "the PNP organized one dedicated Special Task the portion of the Report naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to
Group (STG) for each private armed group (PAG) to monitor and be maintaining a PAG.21 Gamboa averred that her association with a PAG
counteract their activities."16 also appeared on print media.22 Thus, she was publicly tagged as someone
who maintains a PAG on the basis of the unverified information that the PNP-
(c) Attached as Appendix "F" of the Report is a tabulation generated by the Ilocos Norte gathered and forwarded to the Zeñarosa Commission. 23 As a
PNP and captioned as "Status of PAGs Monitoring by STGs as of April 19, result, she claimed that her malicious or reckless inclusion in the
2010," which classifies PAGs in the country according to region, indicates enumeration of personalities maintaining a PAG as published in the Report
their identity, and lists the prominent personalities with whom these groups also made her, as well as her supporters and other people identified with her,
are associated.17 The first entry in the table names a PAG, known as the susceptible to harassment and police surveillance operations. 24
Gamboa Group, linked to herein petitioner Gamboa. 18
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned
(d) Statistics on the status of PAGs were based on data from the PNP, to and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of
wit: a writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials of
the PNP-Ilocos Norte.25 In her Petition, she prayed for the following reliefs: (a)
destruction of the unverified reports from the PNP-Ilocos Norte database; (b)
The resolutions were the subject of a national press conference held in
withdrawal of all information forwarded to higher PNP officials; (c) rectification
Malacañang on March 24, 2010 at which time, the Commission was also
of the damage done to her honor; (d) ordering respondents to refrain from
asked to comment on the PNP report that out of 117 partisan armed groups
forwarding unverified reports against her; and (e) restraining respondents
validated, 24 had been dismantled with 67 members apprehended and
from making baseless reports.26
more than 86 firearms confiscated.
The case was docketed as Special Proc. No. 14979 and was raffled to RTC
Commissioner Herman Basbaño qualified that said statistics were based on
Br. 13, which issued the corresponding writ on 14 July 2010 after finding the
PNP data but that the more significant fact from his report is that the PNP
Petition meritorious on its face. 27 Thus, the trial court (a) instructed
has been vigilant in monitoring the activities of these armed groups and this
respondents to submit all information and reports forwarded to and used by
vigilance is largely due to the existence of the Commission which has
the Zeñarosa Commission as basis to include her in the list of persons
continued communicating with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
maintaining PAGs; (b) directed respondents, and any person acting on their
and PNP personnel in the field to constantly provide data on the activities of
behalf, to cease and desist from forwarding to the Zeñarosa Commission, or
the PAGs. Commissioner Basbaño stressed that the Commission’s efforts
to any other government entity, information that they may have gathered
have preempted the formation of the PAGs because now everyone is

against her without the approval of the court; (c) ordered respondents to powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the
make a written return of the writ together with supporting affidavits; and (d) Administrative Code of 1987.
scheduled the summary hearing of the case on 23 July 2010. 28
By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, Gamboa alleged as
In their Return of the Writ, respondents alleged that they had acted within the she accused respondents, who are public officials, of having gathered and
bounds of their mandate in conducting the investigation and surveillance of provided information that made the Zeñarosa Commission to include her in
Gamboa.29 The information stored in their database supposedly pertained to the list. Obviously, it was this gathering and forwarding of information
two criminal cases in which she was implicated, namely: (a) a Complaint for supposedly by respondents that petitioner barks at as unlawful. x x x. 34
murder and frustrated murder docketed as NPS DOC No. 1-04-INQ-091-
00077, and (b) a Complaint for murder, frustrated murder and direct assault Despite the foregoing findings, RTC Br. 13 nevertheless dismissed the
upon a person in authority, as well as indirect assault and multiple attempted Petition on the ground that Gamboa failed to prove through substantial
murder, docketed as NPS DOCKET No. 1-04-INV-10-A-00009. 30 evidence that the subject information originated from respondents, and that
they forwarded this database to the Zeñarosa Commission without the
Respondents likewise asserted that the Petition was incomplete for failing to benefit of prior verification.35 The trial court also ruled that even before
comply with the following requisites under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas respondents assumed their official positions, information on her may have
Data: (a) the manner in which the right to privacy was violated or threatened already been acquired.36 Finally, it held that the Zeñarosa Commission, as
with violation and how it affected the right to life, liberty or security of the body tasked to gather information on PAGs and authorized to disclose
Gamboa; (b) the actions and recourses she took to secure the data or information on her, should have been impleaded as a necessary if not a
information; and (c) the location of the files, registers or databases, the compulsory party to the Petition.37
government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of
the data or information. 31 They also contended that the Petition for Writ of Gamboa then filed the instant Appeal by Certiorari dated 24 September
Habeas Data, being limited to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced 2010,38 raising the following assignment of errors:
disappearances, was not the proper remedy to address the alleged
besmirching of the reputation of Gamboa.32 1. The trial court erred in ruling that the Zeñarosa Commission be
impleaded as either a necessary or indispensable party;
RTC Br. 13, in its assailed Decision dated 9 September 2010, dismissed the
Petition.33 The trial court categorically ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in 2. The trial court erred in declaring that Gamboa failed to present sufficient
the list of persons maintaining PAGs, as published in the Report, constituted proof to link respondents as the informant to the Zeñarosa Commission;
a violation of her right to privacy, to wit:
3. The trial court failed to satisfy the spirit of Habeas Data;
In this light, it cannot also be disputed that by her inclusion in the list of
persons maintaining PAGs, Gamboa’s right to privacy indubitably has been
violated. The violation understandably affects her life, liberty and security 4. The trial court erred in pronouncing that the reliance of the Zeñarosa
enormously. The untold misery that comes with the tag of having a PAG Commission to [sic] the PNP as alleged by Gamboa is an assumption;
could even be insurmountable. As she essentially alleged in her petition, she
fears for her security that at any time of the day the unlimited powers of 5. The trial court erred in making a point that respondents are distinct to
respondents may likely be exercised to further malign and destroy her PNP as an agency.39
reputation and to transgress her right to life.
On the other hand, respondents maintain the following arguments: (a)
By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, it is likewise Gamboa failed to present substantial evidence to show that her right to
undisputed that there was certainly intrusion into Gamboa’s activities. It privacy in life, liberty or security was violated, and (b) the trial court correctly
cannot be denied that information was gathered as basis therefor. After all, dismissed the Petition on the ground that she had failed to present sufficient
under Administrative Order No. 275, the Zeñarosa Commission was tasked proof showing that respondents were the source of the report naming her as
to investigate the existence of private armies in the country, with all the one who maintains a PAG.40

Meanwhile, Gamboa argues that although A.O. 275 was a lawful order, zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his
fulfilling the mandate to dismantle PAGs in the country should be done in detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: ‘The enumeration in the
accordance with due process, such that the gathering and forwarding of Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
unverified information on her must be considered unlawful. 41 She also others retained by the people." After referring to various American Supreme
reiterates that she was able to present sufficient evidence showing that the Court decisions, Justice Douglas continued: "These cases bear witness that
subject information originated from respondents.42 the right of privacy which presses for recognition is a legitimate one."
In determining whether Gamboa should be granted the privilege of the writ of So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded
habeas data, this Court is called upon to, first, unpack the concept of the right recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully
to privacy; second, explain the writ of habeas data as an extraordinary deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is
remedy that seeks to protect the right to informational privacy; and finally, particularly apt: "The concept of limited government has always included the
contextualize the right to privacy vis-à-vis the state interest involved in the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the
case at bar. personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions
between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of
The Right to Privacy the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In
contrast, a system of limited government, safeguards a private sector, which
belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which
The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long been
the state can control. Protection of this private sector — protection, in other
recognized as a constitutional right. This Court, in Morfe v. Mutuc, 43 thus
words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual — has become
enunciated:
increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a
technological age — industrialization, urbanization, and organization —
The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of liberty as operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern
thus resolved goes a long way in disposing of the objections raised by terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks
plaintiff that the provision on the periodical submission of a sworn statement the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society." 44 (Emphases
of assets and liabilities is violative of the constitutional right to privacy. There supplied)
is much to be said for this view of Justice Douglas: "Liberty in the
constitutional sense must mean more than freedom from unlawful
In Ople v. Torres,45 this Court traced the constitutional and statutory bases of
governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a
the right to privacy in Philippine jurisdiction, to wit:
repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all
freedom." As a matter of fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr.
Justice Brandeis "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is
by civilized men." recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. It is
expressly recognized in section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights:
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel
respect for his personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be
interference demands respect. inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or
order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
In the leading case of Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas, speaking for
five members of the Court, stated: "Various guarantees create zones of Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the
privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Bill of Rights, viz:
Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition
against the quartering of soldiers ‘in any house’ in time of peace without the Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
explicitly affirms the ‘right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, laws.
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ The Fifth
Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, of the right to privacy should be allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon, we have held that the right of the people to
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of access information on matters of public concern generally prevails over the
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we declared
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to compelling state interest. Employing the rational basis relationship test, as
be searched and the persons or things to be seized. laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, there is no infringement of the individual’s right
to privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose,
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits in this case, to ensure that the government agencies involved in regulating
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. banking transactions adequately protect the public who invest in foreign
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national securities. Suffice it to state that this purpose constitutes a reason compelling
security, public safety, or public health as may be provided by law. enough to proceed with the assailed legislative investigation. 48
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state
private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not objective, the courts are required to weigh both notions. In these cases,
contrary to law shall not be abridged. although considered a fundamental right, the right to privacy may
nevertheless succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest deemed
legitimate and compelling.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
The Writ of Habeas Data

Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil
Code provides that "every person shall respect the dignity, personality,
privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to
as actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of
privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to
individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of informational privacy.49 It seeks to protect a person’s right to control
another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and unlawful ends.50 It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the
trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on
Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act and the Intellectual the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Section 1 of
Property Code. The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data reads:
recognize the privacy of certain information.
Habeas data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. Clearly, the right to privacy is information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
considered a fundamental right that must be protected from intrusion or aggrieved party.
constraint. However, in Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on
Banks,47 this Court underscored that the right to privacy is not absolute, viz: The notion of informational privacy is still developing in Philippine law and
jurisprudence. Considering that even the Latin American habeas data, on
With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has which our own Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is rooted, finds its origins
violated, suffice it to state that privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true from the European tradition of data protection, 51 this Court can be guided by
that Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, guarantees respect for the cases on the protection of personal data decided by the European Court of
rights of persons affected by the legislative investigation, not every invocation Human Rights (ECHR). Of particular note is Leander v. Sweden, 52 in which

the ECHR balanced the right of citizens to be free from interference in their access to certain sensitive posts within the public service. On the other hand,
private affairs with the right of the state to protect its national security. In this the right of access to public service is not as such enshrined in the
case, Torsten Leander (Leander), a Swedish citizen, worked as a temporary Convention and, apart from those consequences, the interference did not
replacement museum technician at the Naval Museum, which was adjacent constitute an obstacle to his leading a private life of his own choosing.
to a restricted military security zone. 53 He was refused employment when the
requisite personnel control resulted in an unfavorable outcome on the basis In these circumstances, the Court accepts that the margin of appreciation
of information in the secret police register, which was kept in accordance with available to the respondent State in assessing the pressing social need in the
the Personnel Control Ordinance and to which he was prevented access. 54 present case, and in particular in choosing the means for achieving the
He claimed, among others, that this procedure of security control violated legitimate aim of protecting national security, was a wide one.
Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights 55 on the right to
privacy, as nothing in his personal or political background would warrant his 66. The fact that the information released to the military authorities was not
classification in the register as a security risk. 56 communicated to Mr. Leander cannot by itself warrant the conclusion that the
interference was not "necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
The ECHR ruled that the storage in the secret police register of information national security", as it is the very absence of such communication which, at
relating to the private life of Leander, coupled with the refusal to allow him the least partly, ensures the efficacy of the personnel control procedure
opportunity to refute the same, amounted to an interference in his right to
respect for private life.57 However, the ECHR held that the interference was The Court notes, however, that various authorities consulted before the issue
justified on the following grounds: (a) the personnel control system had a of the Ordinance of 1969, including the Chancellor of Justice and the
legitimate aim, which was the protection of national security, 58 and (b) the Parliamentary Ombudsman, considered it desirable that the rule of
Personnel Control Ordinance gave the citizens adequate indication as to the communication to the person concerned, as contained in section 13 of the
scope and the manner of exercising discretion in the collection, recording and Ordinance, should be effectively applied in so far as it did not jeopardise the
release of information by the authorities. 59 The following statements of the purpose of the control. The Court, like the Commission, thus reaches the
ECHR must be emphasized: conclusion that the safeguards contained in the Swedish personnel control
system meet the requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2). Having
58. The notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a regard to the wide margin of appreciation available to it, the respondent State
pressing social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the was entitled to consider that in the present case the interests of national
legitimate aim pursued security prevailed over the individual interests of the applicant .The
interference to which Mr. Leander was subjected cannot therefore be said to
59. However, the Court recognises that the national authorities enjoy a have been disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
margin of appreciation, the scope of which will depend not only on the
nature of the legitimate aim pursued but also on the particular nature of the Leander illustrates how the right to informational privacy, as a specific
interference involved. In the instant case, the interest of the respondent component of the right to privacy, may yield to an overriding legitimate state
State in protecting its national security must be balanced against the interest. In similar fashion, the determination of whether the privilege of the
seriousness of the interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his writ of habeas data, being an extraordinary remedy, may be granted in this
private life. case entails a delicate balancing of the alleged intrusion upon the private life
of Gamboa and the relevant state interest involved.
There can be no doubt as to the necessity, for the purpose of protecting
national security, for the Contracting States to have laws granting the The collection and forwarding of information by the PNP vis-à-vis the interest
competent domestic authorities power, firstly, to collect and store in registers of the state to dismantle private armies.
not accessible to the public information on persons and, secondly, to use this
information when assessing the suitability of candidates for employment in The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and
posts of importance for national security. other armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority. 60 It also
provides for the establishment of one police force that is national in scope
Admittedly, the contested interference adversely affected Mr. Leander’s and civilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a national
legitimate interests through the consequences it had on his possibilities of police commission.61

Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of PNP had a validation system, which was used to update information on
A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the individuals associated with PAGs and to ensure that the data mirrored the
existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them situation on the field.66 Thus, safeguards were put in place to make sure that
permanently. the information collected maintained its integrity and accuracy.
To enable the Zeñarosa Commission to achieve its goals, A.O. 275 clothed it Pending the enactment of legislation on data protection, this Court declines
with the powers of an investigative body, including the power to summon to make any further determination as to the propriety of sharing information
witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the during specific stages of intelligence gathering. To do otherwise would
investigation and use compulsory processes to produce documents, books, supplant the discretion of investigative bodies in the accomplishment of their
and records.62 A.O. 275 likewise authorized the Zeñarosa Commission to functions, resulting in an undue encroachment on their competence.
deputize the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National Bureau of
Investigation, the Department of Justice, the PNP, and any other law However, to accord the right to privacy with the kind of protection established
enforcement agency to assist the commission in the performance of its in existing law and jurisprudence, this Court nonetheless deems it necessary
functions.63 to caution these investigating entities that information-sharing must observe
strict confidentiality. Intelligence gathered must be released exclusively to the
Meanwhile, the PNP, as the national police force, is empowered by law to (a) authorities empowered to receive the relevant information. After all, inherent
enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the protection of lives and to the right to privacy is the freedom from "unwarranted exploitation of one’s
properties; (b) maintain peace and order and take all necessary steps to person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause
ensure public safety; and (c) investigate and prevent crimes. 64 humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities."67
Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but
powers and functions accorded to the Zeñarosa Commission and the PNP, emphasized its confidential nature. That it was leaked to third parties and the
the latter collected information on individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs, media was regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it must be stressed
monitored them and counteracted their activities. 65 One of those individuals is that Gamboa failed to establish that respondents were responsible for this
herein petitioner Gamboa. unintended disclosure. In any event, there are other reliefs available to her to
address the purported damage to her reputation, making a resort to the
This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data unnecessary and improper.
contained in the Report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP.
Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding of information Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial
by the PNP to the Zeñarosa Commission was not an unlawful act that evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made
violated or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security. her and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police
surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently explained that the
The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding investigations conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in
PAGs with the body specifically created for the purpose of investigating the which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of
existence of these notorious groups. Moreover, the Zeñarosa Commission regularity, which she failed to overcome.
was explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the
former’s mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance from the It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling
latter. PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa,
especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information
Following the pronouncements of the ECHR in Leander, the fact that the against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the
PNP released information to the Zeñarosa Commission without prior writ of habeas data must be denied.
communication to Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity to refute
the same cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed
since that act is an inherent and crucial component of intelligence-gathering Decision in Special Proc. No. 14979 dated 9 September 2010 of the Regional
and investigation.1âwphi1 Additionally, Gamboa herself admitted that the

Trial Court, Laoag City, Br. 13, insofar as it denies Gamboa the privilege of specifically the right to informational privacy.—Had the framers of the Rule
the writ of habeas data, is AFFIRMED. intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to cases of extralegal killings or
enforced disappearances, the above underscored portion of Section 2, reflecting a
SO ORDERED. variance of habeas data situations, would not have been made. Habeas data, to
stress, was designed “to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information
age.” As such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances only.
In fact, the annotations to the Rule prepared by the Committee on the Revision
[3] G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014 of the Rules of Court, after explaining that the Writ of Habeas Data complements
the Writ of Amparo, pointed out that: The writ of habeas data, however, can be
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA, availed of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s right to privacy, more
Petitioners, vs.ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies against the violation
ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES, Respondents. of such right can include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the
database or information or files in possession or in control of respondents. (emphasis
Constitutional Law; Habeas Data Rule (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC); Writ of ours) Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data may also be availed of
Habeas Data; The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose in cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful Same; Same; Same; Nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data
act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data.—Nothing in the Rule would
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.—The writ of suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only against abuses of a
habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty person or entity engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data.
or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public As provided under Section 1 of the Rule: Section 1. Habeas Data.—The writ of
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
correspondence of the aggrieved party. It is an independent and summary remedy official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home
information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control Same; Same; Same; Habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or
information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is omissions of public officials and of private individuals or entities engaged in
being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her
Same; Same; Same; The existence of a person’s right to informational privacy correspondences, or about his or her family.—The provision, when taken in its
and a showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea that habeas data is a
of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private
before the privilege of the writ may be extended.—In developing the writ of habeas individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the
data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to informational privacy, aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her family. Such
among others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas data as “a individual or entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data. To
procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information “engage” in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To
age.” The writ, however, will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged “engage” means “to do or take part in something.” It does not necessarily mean that
unauthorized access to information about a person. Availment of the writ requires the the activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the person or
existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about the
life, liberty or security on the other. Thus, the existence of a person’s right to aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of
informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal
threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such
indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be extended. will not prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity.
Same; Same; Same; Informational Privacy; The writ of habeas data can be Same; Same; Same; The Court saw the pressing need to provide for judicial
availed of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s right to privacy, more remedies that would allow a summary hearing of the unlawful use of data or

information and to remedy possible violations of the right to privacy.—The Court the children of petitioners, manifest the intention to keep certain posts private,
saw the pressing need to provide for judicial remedies that would allow a summary through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its
hearing of the unlawful use of data or information and to remedy possible violations visibility. And this intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of
of the right to privacy. In the same vein, the South African High Court, in its the OSN’s privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the
Decision in the landmark case, H v. W, promulgated on January 30, 2013, recognized manifestation, in cyber world, of the user’s invocation of his or her right to
that “[t]he law has to take into account the changing realities not only informational privacy.
technologically but also socially or else it will lose credibility in the eyes of the Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Considering that the default setting for
people. x x x It is imperative that the courts respond appropriately to changing times, Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be surmised that the photographs in question
acting cautiously and with wisdom.” Consistent with this, the Court, by developing were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children
what may be viewed as the Philippine model of the writ of habeas data, in effect, positively limited the disclosure of the photograph.—Considering that the default
recognized that, generally speaking, having an expectation of informational setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be surmised that the photographs in
privacy is not necessarily incompatible with engaging in cyberspace activities, question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’
including those that occur in OSNs. children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case,
Same; Same; Same; Online Social Networks; The purpose of an Online Social they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy. The
Networks (OSN) is precisely to give users the ability to interact and to stay ensuing pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d, is most instructive:
connected to other members of the same or different social media platform through [A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and
the sharing of statuses, photos, videos, among others, depending on the services renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances such as
provided by the site.—Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the here, where the Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices that would
ability to interact and to stay connected to other members of the same or different have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself.
social media platform through the sharing of statuses, photos, videos, among others, Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Messages sent to the public at large in the
depending on the services provided by the site. It is akin to having a room filled with chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses
millions of personal bulletin boards or “walls,” the contents of which are under the any semblance of privacy.—Also, United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, held that
control of each and every user. In his or her bulletin board, a user/owner can post “[t]he more open the method of transmission is, the less privacy one can reasonably
anything –– from text, to pictures, to music and videos –– access to which would expect. Messages sent to the public at large in the chat room or e-mail that is
depend on whether he or she allows one, some or all of the other users to see his or forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy.”
her posts. Since gaining popularity, the OSN phenomenon has paved the way to the Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to
creation of various social networking sites, including the one involved in the case at “Friends” is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is
bar, www.facebook.com (Facebook), which, according to its developers, people use not Facebook friends with the source of the content.—That the photos are viewable
“to stay connected with friends and family, to discover what’s going on in the world, by “friends only” does not necessarily bolster the petitioners’ contention. In this
and to share and express what matters to them.” regard, the cyber community is agreed that the digital images under this setting still
Same; Same; Same; Same; Facebook; Facebook connections are established remain to be outside the confines of the zones of privacy in view of the following:
through the process of “friending” another user.—Facebook connections are (1) Facebook “allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users
established through the process of “friending” another user. By sending a “friend the tools to interact and share in any conceivable way”; (2) A good number of
request,” the user invites another to connect their accounts so that they can view any Facebook users “befriend” other users who are total strangers; (3) The sheer number
and all “Public” and “Friends Only” posts of the other. Once the request is accepted, of “Friends” one user has, usually by the hundreds; and (4) A user’s Facebook friend
the link is established and both users are permitted to view the other user’s “Public” can “share” the former’s post, or “tag” others who are not Facebook friends with the
or “Friends Only” posts, among others. “Friending,” therefore, allows the user to former, despite its being visible only to his or her own Facebook friends. It is well to
form or maintain one-to-one relationships with other users, whereby the user gives emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to “Friends” is
his or her “Facebook friend” access to his or her profile and shares certain no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook
information to the latter. friends with the source of the content. The user’s own Facebook friend can share said
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Informational Privacy; Before one can have content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user
an expectation of privacy in his or her Online Social Networks (OSN) activity, it is tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is
first necessary that said user, in this case the children of petitioners, manifest the shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who
intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which
prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility.—Before one can have an expectation was set at “Friends.”
of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this case

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; There can be no quibbling that the images in settings, such as those of Facebook, especially because Facebook is notorious for
question, or to be more precise, the photos of minor students scantily clad, are changing these settings and the site’s layout often.
personal in nature, likely to affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of
the minors enrolled in a conservative institution.—In sum, there can be no quibbling DECISION
that the images in question, or to be more precise, the photos of minor students
scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely to affect, if indiscriminately circulated, VELASCO, JR., J.:
the reputation of the minors enrolled in a conservative institution. However, the
records are bereft of any evidence, other than bare assertions that they utilized
Facebook’s privacy settings to make the photos visible only to them or to a select The individual's desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in
few. Without proof that they placed the photographs subject of this case within the society is an equally powerful desire. Thus each individual is continually
ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an engaged in a personal adjustment process in which he balances the desire
expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question. for privacy with the desire for disclosure and communication of himself to
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; As a cyberspace community member, one others, in light of the environmental conditions and social norms set by the
has to be proactive in protecting his or her own privacy.—It has been said that “the society in which he lives.
best filter is the one between your children’s ears.” This means that self-
regulation on the part of OSN users and internet consumers in general is the best - Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)
means of avoiding privacy rights violations. As a cyberspace community member,
one has to be proactive in protecting his or her own privacy. It is in this regard that The Case
many OSN users, especially minors, fail. Responsible social networking or
observance of the “netiquettes” on the part of teenagers has been the concern of Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
many due to the widespread notion that teenagers can sometimes go too far since Court, in relation to Section 19 of A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, 1 otherwise known as
they generally lack the people skills or general wisdom to conduct themselves the "Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data." Petitioners herein assail the July 27,
sensibly in a public forum. 2012 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City (RTC) in
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Considering the complexity of the cyber SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB, which dismissed their habeas data petition.
world and its pervasiveness, as well as the dangers that these children are wittingly
or unwittingly exposed to in view of their unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the The Facts
participation of the parents in disciplining and educating their children about being
a good digital citizen is encouraged by these institutions and organizations.—
Considering the complexity of the cyber world and its pervasiveness, as well as the Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both
dangers that these children are wittingly or unwittingly exposed to in view of their minors, were, during the period material, graduating high school students at
unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the participation of the parents in disciplining St. Theresa's College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while
and educating their children about being a good digital citizen is encouraged by these changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend,
institutions and organizations. In fact, it is believed that “to limit such risks, there’s Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of
no substitute for parental involvement and supervision.” themselves clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were then
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her Facebook 3 profile.
exercise due diligence in their online dealings and activities and must not be
negligent in protecting their rights.—It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer
exercise due diligence in their online dealings and activities and must not be teacher at STC’s high school department, learned from her students that
negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves the vigilant. Demanding relief from some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the
the courts, as here, requires that claimants themselves take utmost care in waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if
safeguarding a right which they allege to have been violated. These are they knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia,
indispensable. We cannot afford protection to persons if they themselves did nothing Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes Taboada (Chloe), among others.
to place the matter within the confines of their private zone. OSN users must be
mindful enough to learn the use of privacy tools, to use them if they desire to keep Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective
the information private, and to keep track of changes in the available privacy personal Facebook accounts and showed her photos of the identified
students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and

smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets the photographs in issue as annexes. That same day, the RTC issued a
of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of their temporary restraining order (TRO) allowing the students to attend the
black brassieres. What is more, Escudero’s students claimed that there were graduation ceremony, to which STC filed a motion for reconsideration.
times when access to or the availability of the identified students’ photos was
not confined to the girls’ Facebook friends,4 but were, in fact, viewable by any Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned
Facebook user.5 students from participating in the graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of
the commencement exercises, its adverted motion for reconsideration on the
Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her issuance ofthe TRO remained unresolved.
student’s Facebook page, showed the photosto Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol),
STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate action. Thereafter, following an Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a
investigation, STC found the identified students to have deported themselves Writ of Habeas Data, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB 8 on the basis of
in a manner proscribed by the school’s Student Handbook, to wit: the following considerations:
1. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus; 1. The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were taken
for posterity before they changed into their swimsuits on the occasion of a
2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts; birthday beach party;
3. Smoking and drinking alcoholic beverages in public places; 2. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at
"Friends Only." They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which
4. Apparel that exposes the underwear; must be respected.
5. Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity; contains 3. Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or ought to
sexually suggestive messages, language or symbols; and 6. Posing and have known of laws that safeguard the right to privacy. Corollarily,
uploading pictures on the Internet that entail ample body exposure. respondents knew or ought to have known that the girls, whose privacy has
been invaded, are the victims in this case, and not the offenders. Worse,
after viewing the photos, the minors were called "immoral" and were
On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the
punished outright;
pictures in question, reported, as required, to the office of Sr. Celeste Ma.
Purisima Pe (Sr. Purisima), STC’s high school principal and ICM 6 Directress.
They claimed that during the meeting, they were castigated and verbally 4. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and
abused by the STC officials present in the conference, including Assistant reproduced without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights
Principal Mussolini S. Yap (Yap), Roswinda Jumiller, and Tigol. What is by saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently showing them to
more, Sr. Purisima informed their parents the following day that, as part of STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of petitioners’ children were
their penalty, they are barred from joining the commencement exercises intruded upon;
scheduled on March 30, 2012.
5. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of
A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s mother, Dr. information, data, and digital images happened at STC’s Computer
Armenia M. Tan (Tan), filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages before the Laboratory; and
RTC of Cebu City against STC, et al., docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
38594.7 In it, Tan prayed that defendants therein be enjoined from 6. All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly
implementing the sanction that precluded Angela from joining the broadcasted by respondents through their memorandum submitted to the
commencement exercises. RTC in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594. To petitioners, the
interplay of the foregoing constitutes an invasion of their children’s privacy
On March 25, 2012,petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the mother of and, thus, prayed that: (a) a writ of habeas databe issued; (b) respondents
Julia, joined the fray as an intervenor. On March 28, 2012, defendants inCivil be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed
Case No. CEB-38594 filed their memorandum, containing printed copies of copies of the subjectdata before or at the preliminary hearing; and (c) after

trial, judgment be rendered declaring all information, data, and digital an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or
images accessed, saved or stored, reproduced, spread and used, to have security of the minors involved in this case.
been illegally obtained inviolation of the children’s right to privacy.
Our Ruling
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC, through an
Order dated July 5, 2012, issued the writ of habeas data. Through the same We find no merit in the petition.
Order, herein respondents were directed to file their verified written return,
together with the supporting affidavits, within five (5) working days from Procedural issues concerning the availability of the Writ of Habeas Data
service of the writ.
The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to
In time, respondents complied with the RTC’s directive and filed their verified privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act
written return, laying down the following grounds for the denial of the petition, or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
viz: (a) petitioners are not the proper parties to file the petition; (b) petitioners engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
are engaging in forum shopping; (c) the instant case is not one where a writ regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
of habeas data may issue;and (d) there can be no violation of their right to party.11 It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the
privacy as there is no reasonable expectation of privacy on Facebook. image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an
individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control
information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
habeas data. The dispositive portion of the Decision pertinently states: unlawful ends.12
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition is hereby In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an
DISMISSED. individual’s right to informational privacy, among others. A comparative law
scholar has, in fact, defined habeas dataas "a procedure designed to
The parties and media must observe the aforestated confidentiality. SO safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age." 13 The writ,
ORDERED.9 however, will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized
access to information about a person.Availment of the writ requires the
existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the
To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or
right to life, liberty or security on the other. 14 Thus, the existence of a person’s
threatened violation of the minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions
right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial evidence,
for the issuance of the writ of habeas data. Moreover, the court a quoheld
of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or
that the photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to
security of the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be
who may view them, lost their privacy in some way. Besides, the RTC noted,
extended.15
STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose,
that is, the implementation of the school’s policies and rules on discipline.
Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational
privacy, a habeas datapetition will not prosper. Viewed from the perspective
Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court
of the case at bar,this requisite begs this question: given the nature of an
pursuant to Section 19 of the Rule on Habeas Data. 10
online social network (OSN)––(1) that it facilitates and promotes real-time
interaction among millions, if not billions, of users, sans the spatial barriers, 16
The Issues bridging the gap created by physical space; and (2) that any information
uploaded in OSNs leavesan indelible trace in the provider’s databases, which
The main issue to be threshed out inthis case is whether or not a writ of are outside the control of the end-users––is there a right to informational
habeas datashould be issued given the factual milieu. Crucial in resolving the privacy in OSN activities of its users? Before addressing this point, We must
controversy, however, is the pivotal point of whether or not there was indeed first resolve the procedural issues in this case.

a. The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings Respondents’ contention that the habeas data writ may not issue against
and enforced disappearances STC, it not being an entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence
Contrary to respondents’ submission, the Writ of Habeas Datawas not of the aggrieved party, while valid to a point, is, nonetheless, erroneous.
enacted solely for the purpose of complementing the Writ of Amparoin cases
of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data
protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides: engaged in the businessof gathering, storing, and collecting of data. As
provided under Section 1 of the Rule:
Sec. 2. Who May File. – Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of
habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to
disappearances, the petition may be filed by: any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing
(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party,
of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
namely: the spouse, children and parents; or
correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis Ours)
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved
The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly
party within the fourth civil degreeof consanguinity or affinity, in
conveys the idea that habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or
default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph. (emphasis
omissions of public officials and of private individuals or entities engaged in
supplied)
gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her
correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual or entity need
Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only not be in the business of collecting or storing data.
to cases of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, the above
underscored portion of Section 2, reflecting a variance of habeas data
To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a business
situations, would not have been made.
endeavour. To "engage" means "to do or take part in something." 19 It does
not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business.
Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual freedom from What matters is that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or
abuse in the information age."17 As such, it is erroneous to limit its storing said data or information about the aggrieved party or his or her family.
applicability to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances only. In fact, Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one
the annotations to the Rule preparedby the Committee on the Revision of the pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any
Rules of Court, after explaining that the Writ of Habeas Data complements other reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not
the Writ of Amparo, pointed out that: prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity.
The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent To agree with respondents’ above argument, would mean unduly limiting the
remedy to enforce one’s right to privacy, more specifically the right to reach of the writ to a very small group, i.e., private persons and entities
informational privacy. The remedies against the violation of such right can whose business is data gathering and storage, and in the process decreasing
include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database the effectiveness of the writ asan instrument designed to protect a right which
or information or files in possession or in control of respondents. 18 (emphasis is easily violated in view of rapid advancements in the information and
Ours) Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Datamay also be communications technology––a right which a great majority of the users of
availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced technology themselves are not capable of protecting.
disappearances.
Having resolved the procedural aspect of the case, We now proceed to the
b. Meaning of "engaged" in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or core of the controversy.
information

The right to informational privacy on Facebook b. Facebook’s Privacy Tools: a response to the clamor for privacy in OSN
activities
a. The Right to Informational Privacy
Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to interact
The concept of privacyhas, through time, greatly evolved, with technological and to stay connected to other members of the same or different social
advancements having an influential part therein. This evolution was briefly media platform through the sharing of statuses, photos, videos, among
recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno’s speech, The Common others, depending on the services provided by the site. It is akin to having a
Right to Privacy,20 where he explained the three strands of the right to room filled with millions of personal bulletin boards or "walls," the contents of
privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational privacy; 21 (2) informational privacy; which are under the control of each and every user. In his or her bulletin
and (3) decisional privacy.22 Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar board, a user/owner can post anything––from text, to pictures, to music and
is the right to informational privacy––usually defined as the right of individuals videos––access to which would depend on whether he or she allows one,
to control information about themselves.23 some or all of the other users to see his or her posts. Since gaining
popularity, the OSN phenomenon has paved the way to the creation of
various social networking sites, includingthe one involved in the case at bar,
With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data
www.facebook.com (Facebook), which, according to its developers, people
sharing nowadays, not to mention each system’s inherent vulnerability to
use "to stay connected with friends and family, to discover what’s going on in
attacks and intrusions, there is more reason that every individual’s right to
the world, and to share and express what matters to them." 28
control said flow of information should be protected and that each individual
should have at least a reasonable expectation of privacy in cyberspace.
Several commentators regarding privacy and social networking sites, Facebook connections are established through the process of "friending"
however, all agree that given the millions of OSN users, "[i]n this [Social another user. By sending a "friend request," the user invites another to
Networking] environment, privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable connect their accounts so that they can view any and all "Public" and
expectations, but rather in some theoretical protocol better known as wishful "Friends Only" posts of the other.Once the request is accepted, the link is
thinking."24 established and both users are permitted to view the other user’s "Public" or
"Friends Only" posts, among others. "Friending," therefore, allows the user to
form or maintain one-to-one relationships with other users, whereby the user
It is due to this notion that the Court saw the pressing need to provide for
gives his or her "Facebook friend" access to his or her profile and shares
judicial remedies that would allow a summary hearing of the unlawful use of
certain information to the latter.29
data or information and to remedy possible violations of the right to privacy. 25
In the same vein, the South African High Court, in its Decision in the
landmark case, H v. W,26 promulgated on January30, 2013, recognized that To address concerns about privacy,30 but without defeating its purpose,
"[t]he law has to take into account the changing realities not only Facebook was armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the
technologically but also socially or else it will lose credibility in the eyes of the accessibility of a user’s profile 31 as well as information uploaded by the user.
people. x x x It is imperative that the courts respond appropriately to In H v. W,32 the South Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the users
changing times, acting cautiously and with wisdom." Consistent with this, the to "customize their privacy settings," but did so with this caveat: "Facebook
Court, by developing what may be viewed as the Philippine model of the writ states in its policies that, although it makes every effort to protect a user’s
of habeas data, in effect, recognized that, generally speaking, having an information, these privacy settings are not foolproof." 33
expectation of informational privacy is not necessarily incompatible with
engaging in cyberspace activities, including those that occur in OSNs. For instance, a Facebook user canregulate the visibility and accessibility of
digital images(photos), posted on his or her personal bulletin or "wall," except
The question now though is up to whatextent is the right to privacy protected for the user’sprofile picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy
in OSNs? Bear in mind that informational privacy involves personal setting:
information. At the same time, the very purpose of OSNs is socializing––
sharing a myriad of information, 27 some of which would have otherwise (a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user can view the
remained personal. photo;

(b) Friends of Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends and their informational privacy right which necessarily accompanies said choice. 38
friends can view the photo; Otherwise, using these privacy tools would be a feckless exercise, such that
if, for instance, a user uploads a photo or any personal information to his or
(b) Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo; her Facebook page and sets its privacy level at "Only Me" or a custom list so
that only the user or a chosen few can view it, said photo would still be
deemed public by the courts as if the user never chose to limit the photo’s
(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular friends
visibility and accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will not only strip these
and/or networks of the Facebook user; and
privacy tools of their function but it would also disregard the very intention of
the user to keep said photo or information within the confines of his or her
(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by the user. private space.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set We must now determine the extent that the images in question were visible
up barriers to broaden or limit the visibility of his or her specific profile to other Facebook users and whether the disclosure was confidential in
content, statuses, and photos, among others, from another user’s point of nature. In other words, did the minors limit the disclosure of the photos such
view. In other words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the that the images were kept within their zones of privacy? This determination is
availability of their Facebook activities reflect their choice as to "when and to necessary in resolving the issue of whether the minors carved out a zone of
what extent to disclose facts about [themselves] – and to put others in the privacy when the photos were uploaded to Facebook so that the images will
position of receiving such confidences."34 Ideally, the selected setting will be be protected against unauthorized access and disclosure.
based on one’s desire to interact with others, coupled with the opposing need
to withhold certain information as well as to regulate the spreading of his or
Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their children’s privacy right being
her personal information. Needless to say, as the privacy setting becomes
violated, insist that Escudero intruded upon their children’s Facebook
more limiting, fewer Facebook users can view that user’s particular post.
accounts, downloaded copies ofthe pictures and showed said photos to
Tigol. To them, this was a breach of the minors’ privacy since their Facebook
STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy accounts, allegedly, were under "very private" or "Only Friends" setting
safeguarded with a password.39 Ultimately, they posit that their children’s
Without these privacy settings, respondents’ contention that there is no disclosure was only limited since their profiles were not open to public
reasonable expectation of privacy in Facebook would, in context, be correct. viewing. Therefore, according to them, people who are not their Facebook
However, such is not the case. It is through the availability of said privacy friends, including respondents, are barred from accessing said post without
tools that many OSN users are said to have a subjective expectation that their knowledge and consent. Aspetitioner’s children testified, it was
only those to whomthey grant access to their profile will view the information Angelawho uploaded the subjectphotos which were only viewable by the five
they post or upload thereto.35 of them,40 although who these five are do not appear on the records.
This, however, does not mean thatany Facebook user automatically has a Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit 41 that "my students
protected expectation of privacy inall of his or her Facebook activities. showed me some pictures of girls cladin brassieres. This student [sic] of mine
informed me that these are senior high school [students] of STC, who are
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is their friends in [F]acebook. x x x They then said [that] there are still many
first necessary that said user, in this case the children of petitioners,manifest other photos posted on the Facebook accounts of these girls. At the
the intention to keepcertain posts private, through the employment of computer lab, these students then logged into their Facebook account [sic],
measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. 36 And this intention and accessed from there the various photographs x x x. They even told me
can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSN’s privacy that there had been times when these photos were ‘public’ i.e., not confined
tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation,in to their friends in Facebook."
cyber world, of the user’s invocation of his or her right to informational
privacy.37 In this regard, We cannot give muchweight to the minors’ testimonies for one
key reason: failure to question the students’ act of showing the photos to
Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant Tigol disproves their allegation that the photos were viewable only by the five
or deny access to his or her post orprofile detail should not be denied the of them. Without any evidence to corroborate their statement that the images

were visible only to the five of them, and without their challenging Escudero’s (4) A user’s Facebook friend can "share" 49 the former’s post, or
claim that the other students were able to view the photos, their statements "tag"50 others who are not Facebook friends with the former, despite
are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration. 42 its being visible only tohis or her own Facebook friends.
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s
account that her students, who are the minors’ Facebook "friends," showed privacy to "Friends" is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by
her the photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content. The
that no special means to be able to viewthe allegedly private posts were ever user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own
resorted to by Escudero’s students, 43 and that it is reasonable to assume, Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter
therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or
Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large. when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who
shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is"Public," it can be which was set at "Friends."
surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on
Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has 200. A and B
disclosure of the photograph. If suchwere the case, they cannot invoke the are not Facebook friends. If C, A’s Facebook friend, tags B in A’s post, which
protection attached to the right to informational privacy. The ensuing is set at "Friends," the initial audience of 100 (A’s own Facebook friends) is
pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez44 is most instructive: dramatically increased to 300 (A’s 100 friends plus B’s 200 friends or the
public, depending upon B’s privacy setting). As a result, the audience who
[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to can view the post is effectively expanded––and to a very large extent.
forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under
circumstances suchas here, where the Defendant did not employ protective This, along with its other features and uses, is confirmation of Facebook’s
measures or devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or proclivity towards user interaction and socialization rather than seclusion or
the photograph itself.45 privacy, as it encourages broadcasting of individual user posts. In fact, it has
been said that OSNs have facilitated their users’ self-tribute, thereby resulting
Also, United States v. Maxwell 46 held that "[t]he more open the method of into the "democratization of fame." 51 Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or
transmission is, the less privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent even a post, with visibility set at "Friends Only" cannot easily, more so
to the public at large inthe chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from automatically, be said to be "very private," contrary to petitioners’ argument.
correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy."
As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the
That the photos are viewable by "friends only" does not necessarily bolster sanctioned students’ Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken
the petitioners’ contention. In this regard, the cyber community is agreed that to task for the perceived privacy invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook
the digital images under this setting still remain to be outside the confines of friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients
the zones of privacy in view of the following: of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering
the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had
legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the
(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving
friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the minors nor their
its users the tools to interact and share in any conceivable way;" 47
parents imputed any violation of privacy against the students who showed
the images to Escudero.
(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total
strangers;48
Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that respondents
reproduced and broadcasted the photographs. In fact, what petitioners
(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; attributed to respondents as an act of offensive disclosure was no more than
and the actuality that respondents appended said photographs in their
memorandum submitted to the trial court in connection with Civil Case No.

CEB-38594.52 These are not tantamount to a violation of the minor’s and organizations. In fact, it is believed that "to limit such risks, there’s no
informational privacy rights, contrary to petitioners’ assertion. substitute for parental involvement and supervision."59
In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its
precise, the photos of minor students scantily clad, are personal in nature, students to beresponsible in their dealings and activities in cyberspace,
likely to affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of the minors particularly in OSNs, whenit enforced the disciplinary actions specified in the
enrolled in a conservative institution. However, the records are bereft of any Student Handbook, absenta showing that, in the process, it violated the
evidence, other than bare assertions that they utilized Facebook’s privacy students’ rights.
settings to make the photos visible only to them or to a select few. Without
proof that they placed the photographs subject of this case within the ambit of OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves to
their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an whenever they engage incyberspace activities.1âwphi1 Accordingly, they
expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question. should be cautious enough to control their privacy and to exercise sound
discretion regarding how much information about themselves they are willing
Had it been proved that the access tothe pictures posted were limited to the to give up. Internet consumers ought to be aware that, by entering or
original uploader, through the "Me Only" privacy setting, or that the user’s uploading any kind of data or information online, they are automatically and
contact list has been screened to limit access to a select few, through the inevitably making it permanently available online, the perpetuation of which is
"Custom" setting, the result may have been different, for in such instances, outside the ambit of their control. Furthermore, and more importantly,
the intention to limit access to the particular post, instead of being information, otherwise private, voluntarily surrendered by them can be
broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s friends en masse, opened, read, or copied by third parties who may or may not be allowed
becomes more manifest and palpable. access to such.
On Cyber Responsibility It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their
online dealings and activities and must not be negligent in protecting their
It has been said that "the best filter is the one between your children’s rights. Equity serves the vigilant. Demanding relief from the courts, as here,
ears."53 This means that self-regulation on the part of OSN users and internet requires that claimants themselves take utmost care in safeguarding a right
consumers ingeneral is the best means of avoiding privacy rights violations. 54 which they allege to have been violated. These are indispensable. We cannot
As a cyberspace communitymember, one has to be proactive in protecting afford protection to persons if they themselves did nothing to place the matter
his or her own privacy.55 It is in this regard that many OSN users, especially within the confines of their private zone. OSN users must be mindful enough
minors, fail.Responsible social networking or observance of the to learn the use of privacy tools, to use them if they desire to keep the
"netiquettes"56 on the part of teenagers has been the concern of many due to information private, and to keep track of changes in the available privacy
the widespreadnotion that teenagers can sometimes go too far since they settings, such as those of Facebook, especially because Facebook is
generally lack the people skills or general wisdom to conduct themselves notorious for changing these settings and the site's layout often.
sensibly in a public forum.57
In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors'
Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating lessons on good privacy rights, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and case
cyber citizenship in its curriculum to educate its students on proper online disposition of the court a quo.
conduct may be mosttimely. Too, it is not only STC but a number of schools
and organizations have already deemed it important to include digital literacy In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other assigned
and good cyber citizenshipin their respective programs and curricula in view errors.
of the risks that the children are exposed to every time they participate in
online activities.58 Furthermore, considering the complexity of the cyber world WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
and its pervasiveness,as well as the dangers that these children are wittingly Decision dated July 27, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu
or unwittingly exposed to in view of their unsupervised activities in City in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB is hereby AFFIRMED.
cyberspace, the participation of the parents in disciplining and educating their
children about being a good digital citizen is encouraged by these institutions No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

[4] G.R. No. 232395 cigarettes for a purpose other than that provided for by Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7171.6 The "whereas clause" of House Resolution No. 882 states that the
PEDRO S. AGCAOILI, JR., ENCARNACION A. GAOR, JOSEPHINE P. following purchases by the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte of vehicles
CALAJATE, GENEDINE D. JAMBARO, EDEN C. BATTULAYAN, in three separate transactions from the years 2011 to 2012 in the aggregate
EVANGELINE C. TABULOG, Petitioners amount of ₱66,450,000.00 were in violation of R.A. No. 7171 as well as of
R.A. No. 91847 and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445:8
DECISION
a. Check dated December 1, 2011, "to cash advance the amount needed for
the purchase of 40 units Mini cab for distribution to the different barangays of
TIJAM, J.:
Ilocos Norte as per supporting papers hereto attached to the amount of
EIGHTEEN MILLION SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS 18,000,000.00
Styled as an Omnibus Petition, 1 petitioners Pedro S. Agcaoili, Jr. (Agcaoili,
Jr.), Encarnacion A. Gaor (Gaor), Josephine P. Calajate (Calajate ),
b. Check dated May 25, 2012, "to cash advance the amount needed for the
Genedine D. Jambaro (Jambaro ), Eden C. Battulayan (Battulayan),
purchase of 5 units Buses as per supporting papers hereto attached to the
Evangeline C. Tabulog (Tabulog) - all employees 2 of the Provincial
amount of ... " FIFTEEN MILLION THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
Government of Ilocos Norte and storied as "Ilocos 6" - seek that the Court
(PhP15,300,000.00), which were all second hand units; and
assume jurisdiction over the Habeas Corpus Petition3 earlier filed by
petitioners before the Court of Appeals (CA), 4 and upon assumption, to direct
the CA to forward the records of the case to the Court for proper disposition c. Check dated September 12, 2012, "to cash advance payment of 70 units
and resolution. Foton Mini Truck for distribution to different municipalities of Ilocos Norte as
per supporting papers hereto attached in the amount of THIRTY TWO
MILLION FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS PhP32,550,000.00.
Co-petitioner Maria Imelda Josefa "Imee" Marcos - the incumbent Governor
of the Province of Ilocos Norte - joins the present petition by seeking the
issuance of a writ of prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for Invitation Letters 10 dated April 6, 2017 were individually sent to petitioners for
purposes of declaring the legislative investigation into House Resolution No. them to attend as resource persons the initial hearing on House Resolution
8825 illegal and in excess of jurisdiction, and to enjoin respondents No. 882 scheduled on May 2, 2017. In response, petitioners sent similarly-
Representatives Rodolfo C. Fariñas (Fariñas) and Johnny T. Pimentel and worded Letters11 dated April 21, 2017 asking to be excused from the inquiry
co-respondent Committee on Good Government and Public Accountability pending official instructions from co-petitioner Marcos as head of the agency.
(House Committee) from further proceeding with the same. Co-petitioner
prays for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or issuance of a Because of petitioners' absence at the May 2, 201 7 hearing, a subpoena ad
writ of preliminary injunction, to restrain and enjoin respondents and co- testificandum was issued by co-respondent House Committee on May 3, 201
respondent from conducting any further hearings or proceedings relative to 7 directing petitioners to appear and testify under oath at a hearing set on
the investigation pending resolution of the instant petition. May 16, 2017. 12 Likewise, an invitation was sent to co-petitioner Marcos to
appear on said hearing. 13
In common, petitioners and co-petitioner seek the issuance of a writ of
Amparo to protect them from alleged actual and threatened violations of their Since the subpoena was received by petitioners only one day prior to the
rights to liberty and security of person. scheduled hearing, petitioners requested that their appearance be deferred
to a later date to give them time to prepare. In their letters also, petitioners
The Antecedents requested clarification as to what information co-respondent House
Committee seeks to elicit and its relevance to R.A. No. 7171. 14 Copetitioner
Marcos, on the other hand, submitted a Letter 15 dated May 15, 2017 seeking
On March 14, 2017, House Resolution No. 882 was introduced by
clarification on the legislative objective of House Resolution No. 882 and its
respondent Farinas, along with Representatives Pablo P. Bondoc and Aurelio
discriminatory application to the Province of Ilocos Norte to the exclusion of
D. Gonzales, Jr., directing House Committee to conduct an inquiry, in aid of
other virginia-type tobacco producing provinces.
legislation, pertaining to the use by the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte
of its shares from the excise taxes on locally manufactured virginia-type

Petitioners failed to attend the hearing scheduled on May 16, 201 7. As such, vehicles.27 Allegedly, the same threats and intimidation were employed by
the House Committee issued a Show Cause Order 16 why they should not be Farinas in the questioning of Tabulog who was similarly asked if she
cited in contempt for their refusal without legal excuse to obey summons. remembered the purchase of 70 mini trucks. When Tabulog replied that she
Additionally, petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos were notified of the next could no longer remember such transaction, she was also cited in contempt
scheduled hearing on May 29, 2017.17 and ordered detained. 28
In response to the Show Cause Order, petitioners reiterated that they On the other hand, respondents aver that petitioners were evasive in
received the notice only one day prior to the scheduled hearing date in answering questions and simply claimed not to remember the specifics of the
alleged violation of the three-day notice rule under Section 8 18 of the House subject transactions. According to respondents, petitioners requested to be
Rules Governing Inquiries.19 Co-petitioner Marcos, on the other hand, confronted with the original documents to refresh their memories when they
reiterated the queries she raised in her earlier letter. knew beforehand that the Commission on Audit (COA) to which the original
vouchers were submitted could no longer find the same. 29
Nevertheless, at the scheduled committee hearing on May 29, 2017, all the
petitioners appeared.20 It is at this point of the factual narrative where the Proceedings before the CA
parties' respective interpretations of what transpired during the May 29, 201 7
begin to differ. The next day, or on May 30, 2017, petitioners filed a Petition for Habeas
Corpus against respondent House Sergeant-at-Arms Lieutenant General
Legislative hearing on May 29, 2017and the contempt citation Detabali (Detabali) before the CA. The CA scheduled the petition for hearing
on June 5, 2017 where the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its
On one hand, petitioners allege that at the hearing of May 29, 2017, they special appearance for Detabali, arguing that the latter was not personally
were subjected to threats and intimidation. 21 According to petitioners, they served with a copy of the petition. 30 On June 2, 2017, the CA in its
were asked "leading and misleading questions" and that regardless of their Resolution31 issued a writ of Habeas Corpus ordering Detabali to produce the
answers, the same were similarly treated as evasive.22 bodies of the petitioners before the court on June 5, 2017.
Specifically, Jambaro claims that because she could not recall the On June 5, 2017, Detabali again failed to attend. Instead, the Deputy
transactions Farinas alluded to and requested to see the original copy of a Secretary General of the House of Representatives appeared to explain that
document presented to her for identification, she was cited in contempt and Detabali accompanied several members of the House of Representatives on
ordered detained.23 Allegedly, the same inquisitorial line of questioning was a Northern Luzon trip, thus his inability to attend the scheduled hearing. 32 A
used in the interrogation of Gaor. When Gaor answered that she could no motion to dissolve the writ of Habeas Corpus was also filed on the ground
longer remember if she received a cash advance of ₱18,600,000.00 for the that the CA had no jurisdiction over the petition. 33
purchase of 40 units of minicab, Gaor was likewise cited in contempt and
ordered detained. 24 On June 6, 2017, petitioners filed a Motion for Provisional Release based on
petitioners' constitutional right to bail. Detabali, through the OSG, opposed
The same threats, intimidation and coercion were likewise supposedly the motion.34
employed on Calajate when she was asked by Farinas if she signed a cash
advance voucher in the amount of ₱18,600,000.00 for the purchase of the 40 At the hearing set on June 8, 2017, Detabali again failed to attend. On June
units of minicabs. When Calajate refused to answer, she was also cited in 9, 2017, the CA issued a Resolution 35 denying Detabali's motion to dissolve
contempt and ordered detained. 25 the writ of Habeas Corpus and granting petitioners' Motion for Provisional
Release upon posting of a bond. Accordingly, the CA issued an Order of
Similarly, when Battulayan could no longer recall having signed a cash Release Upon Bond. 36 Attempts to serve said Resolution and Order of
advance voucher for the purchase of minicabs, she was also cited in Release Upon Bond to Detabali were made but to no avail. 37
contempt and ordered detained. 26
On June 20, 2017, the House of Representatives called a special session for
Agcaoili, Jr. was likewise cited in contempt and ordered detained when he the continuation of the legislative inquiry. 38 Thereat, a subpoena ad
failed to answer Fariñas's query regarding the records of the purchase of the

testificandum was issued to compel co-petitioner Marcos to appear at the promulgate rules concerning the pleading, practice and procedure in all
scheduled July 25, 2017 hearing.39 courts and its authority to exercise jurisdiction over all courts as provided
under Sections 148 and 5(5),49 Article VIII of the Constitution.
The tension between the House of Representatives and the CA
Additionally, petitioners stress that the Court exercises administrative
During the June 20, 2017 hearing, House Committee unanimously voted to supervision over all courts as provided under Section 6, 50 Article VIII of the
issue a Show Cause Order against the three Justices of the CA's Special Constitution, and pursuant to its authority as such, the Court has the power to
Fourth Division,40 directing them to explain why they should not be cited in transfer cases from one court to another which power it implements through
contempt by the House of Representatives. 41 The House of Representatives Rule 4, Section 3(c)51 of AM No. 10-4-20-SC. 52
was apparently dismayed over the CA's actions in the Habeas Corpus
Petition, with House Speaker Pantaleon Alvarez quoted as calling the Citing People of the Philippines v. Gutierrez, et al., 53 petitioners likewise
involved CA Justices "mga gago" and threatening to dissolve the CA.42 argue that the administrative power of the Court to transfer cases from one
Disturbed by this turn of events, the involved CA Justices wrote a letter dated court to another is based on its inherent power to protect the judiciary and
July 3, 2017 addressed to the Court En Banc deferring action on certain prevent a miscarriage of justice. 54
pending motions43 and administratively referring the same to the Court for
advice and/or appropriate action. Respondents counter that the Omnibus Petition should be dismissed on the
ground of mootness as petitioners were released from detention.
Meanwhile, in the Habeas Corpus Petition, Detabali moved for the inhibition
of CA Justices Stephen Cruz and Nina Antonio-Valenzuela while CA Justice In any case, respondents argue that petitioners cannot compel the Court to
Edwin Sorongon voluntarily inhibited himself.44 assume jurisdiction over the Habeas Corpus Petition pending before the CA
as assumption of jurisdiction is conferred by law. Respondents also argue
Subsequent Release of Petitioners and Dismissal of the Habeas Corpus that the Omnibus Petition is dismissible on the grounds of misjoinder of
Petition by the CA action and for failure to implead indispensable parties, i.e., the CA in the
petition to assume jurisdiction over the Habeas Corpus Petition and the
On July 13, 2017 and while the Habeas Corpus Petition was still pending Congress in the prohibition and Amparo petitions. Respondents also argue
before the CA, petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos filed the instant Omnibus that petitioners committed forum shopping when they filed the present
Petition. Omnibus Petition at a time when a motion for reconsideration before the CA
was still pending resolution.
During the congressional hearing on July 25, 2017 which petitioners and co-
petitioner Marcos attended, and while the present Omnibus Petition is For the issuance of a Writ of Prohibition
pending final resolution by the Court, respondent House Committee lifted the
contempt order and ordered the release of petitioners. Consequently, Co-petitioner Marcos assails the nature of the legislative inquiry as a fishing
petitioners were released on the same date. 45 Respondent House expedition in violation of petitioners' right to due process and is allegedly
Committee held the continuance of the legislative hearings on August 9, discriminatory to the Province of Ilocos Norte.
2017 and August 23, 2017.46
Respondents counter that a petition for prohibition is not the proper remedy
On August 31, 2017, the CA issued a Resolution in the Habeas Corpus to enjoin legislative actions. House Committee is not a tribunal, corporation,
Petition considering the case as closed and terminated on the ground of board or person exercising judicial or ministerial function but a separate and
mootness.47 independent branch of government. Citing Holy Spirit Homeowners
Association, Inc. v. Defensor,55 and The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee v.
The Arguments For the assumption of jurisdiction over the Habeas Hon. Majaducon,56 respondents argue that prohibition does not lie against
Corpus Petition legislative or quasi-legislative functions.
Petitioners insist that the Habeas Corpus Petition then pending before the CA For the issuance of a Writ of Amparo
can be transferred to the Court on the strength of the latter's power to

Petitioners contend that their rights to liberty and personal security were As to what kind of restraint against which the writ is effective, case law 63
violated as they have been detained, while co-petitioner Marcos is deems any restraint which will preclude freedom of action as sufficient. Thus,
continuously being threatened of arrest.57 as provided in the Rules of Court under Section 1, Rule 102 thereof, a writ of
Habeas Corpus "shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention
In opposition, respondents maintain that the writ of Amparo and writ of by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody
Habeas Corpus are two separate remedies which are incompatible and of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."
therefore cannot co-exist in a single petition. Further, respondents argue that
the issuance of a writ of Amparo is limited only to cases of extrajudicial On the other hand, Section 4, Rule 102 spells the instances when the writ of
killings and enforced disappearances which are not extant in the instant Habeas Corpus is not allowed or when the discharge thereof is authorized:
case.
Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. - If it appears that the
The Issues person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order
1. Whether or not the instant Omnibus Petition which seeks the release of of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
petitioners from detention was rendered moot by their subsequent release process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be
from detention? allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall
not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process,
judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the
2. Whether or not the Court can assume jurisdiction over the Habeas Corpus
discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the
Petition then pending before the CA?
Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
3. Whether or not the subject legislative inquiry on House Resolution No. 882
Accordingly, a Writ of Habeas Corpus may no longer be issued if the person
may be enjoined by a writ of prohibition?
allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained under a lawful process or order of
the court64 because since then, the restraint has become legal. 65 In the
4. Whether or not the instant Omnibus Petition sufficiently states a cause of illustrative case of Ilagan v. Hon. Ponce Enrile, 66 the Court dismissed the
action for the issuance of a writ of Amparo?58 petition for habeas corpus on the ground of mootness considering the filing of
an information before the court. The court pronounced that since the
Ruling of the Court We dismiss the Omnibus Petition. incarceration was now by virtue of a judicial order, the remedy of habeas
corpus no longer lies.
I.The Petition to Assume Jurisdiction over Habeas Corpus Petition
Like so, in Duque v. Capt. Vinarao,67 the Court held that a petition for habeas
The release of persons in whose behalf the application for a Writ of corpus can be dismissed upon voluntary withdrawal of the petitioner. Further,
Habeas Corpus was filed renders the petition for the issuance thereof in Pestano v. Corvista,68 it was pronounced that where the subject person
moot and academic had already been released from the custody complained of, the petition for
habeas corpus then still pending was considered already moot and academic
The writ of Habeas Corpus or the "great writ of liberty" 59 was devised as a and should be dismissed. This pronouncement was carried on in Olaguer v.
"speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and Military Commission No. 34,69 where the Court reiterated that the release of
as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom." 60 The primary the persons in whose behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus was
purpose of the writ "is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as filed is effected, the petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such academic. 70 Thus, with the subsequent release of all the petitioners from
restraint is illegal."61 Under the Constitution, the privilege of the writ of detention, their petition for habeas corpus has been rendered moot. The rule
Habeas Corpus cannot be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion is that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not
when the public safety requires it. 62 consider questions where no actual interests are involved and thus, will not
determine a moot question as the resolution thereof will be of no practical
value. 71

Far compelling than the question of mootness is that the element of illegal it.80 In the absence of all RTC judges in a province or city, special jurisdiction
deprivation of freedom of movement or illegal restraint is jurisdictional in is likewise conferred to any Metropolitan Trial Judge, Municipal Trial Judge or
petitions for habeas corpus. Consequently, in the absence of confinement Municipal Circuit Trial Judge to hear and decide petitions for a writ of Habeas
and custody, the courts lack the power to act on the petition for habeas Corpus.81
corpus and the issuance of a writ thereof must be refused.
These conferment of jurisdiction finds procedural translation in Rule 102,
Any lingering doubt as to the justiciability of the petition to assume jurisdiction Section 2 which provides that an application for a writ of Habeas Corpus may
over the Habeas Corpus Petition before the CA is ultimately precluded by the be made before this Court, or any member thereof, or the Court of Appeals or
CA Resolution considering the petition closed and terminated. With the any member thereof, and if so granted, the same shall be enforceable
termination of the Habeas Corpus Petition before the CA, petitioners' plea anywhere in the Philippines. 82 An application for a writ of Habeas Corpus
that the same be transferred to this Court, or that the Court assume may also be made before the RTCs, or any of its judges, but if so granted, is
jurisdiction thereof must necessarily be denied. enforceable only within the RTC's judicial district. 83 The writ of Habeas
Corpus granted by the Court or by the CA may be made returnable before
Nevertheless, the Court, in exceptional cases, decides moot questions the court or any member thereof, or before the RTC or any judge thereof for
hearing and decision on the merits. 84
Although as above-enunciated, the general rule is that mootness of the issue
warrants a dismissal, the same admits of certain exceptions. It is clear from the foregoing that this Court, the CA and the RTC enjoy
concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus. As the Habeas
Corpus Petition was filed by petitioners with the CA, the latter has acquired
In Prof. David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo, 72 the Court summed up the four
jurisdiction over said petition to the exclusion of all others, including this
exceptions to the rule when Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot, thus:
Court. This must be so considering the basic postulate that jurisdiction once
first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional
acquired by a court is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues
character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third,
until the case is terminated. 85 A departure from this established rule is to run
when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles
the risk of having conflicting decisions from courts of concurrent jurisdiction
to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of
and would unwittingly promote judicial interference and instability.
repetition yet evading review. 73 At the least, the presence of the second and
fourth exceptions to the general rule in the instant case persuades us to
proceed. Rule 102 in fact supports this interpretation. Observe that under Section 6,
Rule 102, the return of the writ of Habeas Corpus may be heard by a court
apart from that which issued the writ. 86 In such case, the lower court to which
The Court's administrative supervision over lower courts does
the writ is made returnable by the issuing court shall proceed to decide the
not equate to the power to usurp jurisdiction already acquired by lower
petition for habeas corpus. In Medina v. Gen. Yan87 and Saulo v. Brig. Gen.
courts
Cruz, etc., 88 the Court held that by virtue of such designation, the lower court
"acquire[s] the power and authority to determine the merits of the [petition for
Jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus and the adjunct authority to habeas corpus.]" Indeed, when a court acquires jurisdiction over the petition
issue the writ are shared by this Court and the lower courts. for habeas corpus, even if merely designated to hear the return of the writ,
such court has the power and the authority to carry the petition to its
The Constitution vests upon this Court original jurisdiction over petitions for conclusion.
.habeas corpus. 74 On the other hand, Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Big. 129, 75 as
amended, gives the CA original jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus Petitioners are without unbridled freedom to choose which between this
whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. 76 The CA's original Court and the CA should decide the habeas corpus petition. Mere
jurisdiction over Habeas Corpus petitions was re-stated in R.A. No. 7902.77 concurrency of jurisdiction does not afford the parties absolute freedom to
Similarly, B.P. Blg. 129 gives the RTCs original jurisdiction in the issuance of choose the court to which the petition shall be filed. After all, the hierarchy of
a writ of Habeas Corpus.78 Family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with this courts "also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
Court and the CA in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors petitions for the extraordinary writs."89
is at issue, 79 with the Family courts having exclusive jurisdiction to issue the
ancillary writ of Habeas Corpus in a petition for custody of minors filed before

Further, there appears to be no basis either in fact or in law for the Court to MR. CONCEPCION: May I refer the question to Commissioner Regalado?
assume or wrest jurisdiction over the Habeas Corpus Petition filed with the
CA. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sarmiento): Commissioner Regalado is
recognized.
Petitioners' fear that the CA will be unable to decide the Habeas Corpus
petition because of the assault 90 it suffered from the House of MR. REGALADO: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
Representatives is unsubstantiated and therefore insufficient to justify their
plea for the Court to over-step into the jurisdiction acquired by the CA. There We did invite Minister Neptali Gonzales, who was the proponent for the
is no showing that the CA will be or has been rendered impotent by the transfer of supervision of the lower courts to the Ministry of Justice. I even
threats it received from the House of Representatives. 91 Neither was there personally called up and sent a letter or a short note inviting him, but the
any compelling reason advanced by petitioners that the non assumption by good Minister unfortunately was enmeshed in a lot of official commitments.
this Court of the habeas corpus petition will result to an iniquitous situation We wanted to hear him because the Solicitor General of his office, Sedfrey
for any of the parties. Ordofiez, appeared before us, and asked for the maintenance of the present
arrangement wherein the supervision over lower courts is with the Supreme
Neither can the Court assume jurisdiction over the then pending Habeas Court. But aside from that, although there were no resource persons, we did
Corpus Petition by invoking Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution and further studies on the feasibility of transferring the supervision over the lower
Section 3(c), Rule 4 of A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC which both refer to the Court's courts to the Ministry of Justice. All those things were taken into
exercise of administrative supervision over all courts. consideration motu proprio.92
Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution provides: Administrative Supervision in Section 38, paragraph 2, Chapter 7, Book IV of
the Administrative Code is defined as follows:
Sec. 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all
courts and the personnel thereof. (2) Administrative Supervision.-(a) Administrative supervision which shall
govern the administrative relationship between a department or its equivalent
This Constitutional provision refers to the administrative supervision that the and regulatory agencies or other agencies as may be provided by law, shall
Department of Justice previously exercised over the courts and their be limited to the authority of the department or its equivalent to generally
personnel. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission enlighten: oversee the operations of such agencies and to insure that they are
managed effectively, efficiently and economically but without interference
MR. GUINGONA: x x x. with day-to-day activities; or require the submission of reports and cause the
conduct of management audit, performance evaluation and inspection to
determine compliance with policies, standards and guidelines of the
The second question has reference to Section 9, about the administrative
department; to take such action as may be necessary for the proper
supervision over all courts to be retained in the Supreme Court. I was
performance of official functions, including rectification of violations, abuses
wondering if the Committee had taken into consideration the proposed
and other forms of maladministration; and to review and pass upon budget
resolution for the transfer of the administrative supervision from the Supreme
proposals of such agencies but may not increase or add to them[.]
Court to the Ministry of Justice. But as far as I know, none of the proponents
had been invited to explain or defend the proposed resolution.
Thus, administrative supervision merely involves overseeing the operations
of agencies to ensure that they are managed effectively, efficiently and
Also, I wonder if the Committee also took into consideration the fact that the
economically, but without interference with day-to-day activities. 93
UP Law Constitution Project in its Volume I, entitled: Annotated Provision
had, in fact, made this an alternative proposal, the transfer of administrative
supervision from the Supreme Court to the Ministry of Justice. Thus, to effectively exercise its power of administrative supervision over all
courts as prescribed by the Constitution, Presidential Decree No. 828, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 842, created the Office of the Court
Thank you.
Administrator. Nowhere in the functions of the several offices in the Office of

the Court Administrator is it provided that the Court can assume jurisdiction On the other hand, the Court's pronouncement in Holy Spirit Homeowners
over a case already pending with another court.94 Association should be taken in its proper context. The principal relief sought
by petitioners therein was the invalidation of the implementing rules issued by
Rule 4, Section 3(c) of A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC, on the other hand provides: the National Government Center Administration Committee pursuant to its
quasi-legislative power. Hence, the Court therein stated that prohibition is not
the proper remedy but an ordinary action for nullification, over which the
Sec. 3. Administrative Functions of the Court. - The administrative functions
Court generally exercises not primary, but appellate jurisdiction. 100
of the Court en bane consist of, but are not limited to, the following:
In any case, the availability of the remedy of prohibition for determining and
(c) the transfer of cases, from one court, administrative area or judicial
correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
region, to another, or the transfer of venue of the trial of cases to avoid
jurisdiction on the part of the Legislative and Executive branches has been
miscarriage of justice[.] (Emphasis ours)
categorically affirmed by the Court in Judge Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar
Council, 101 thus:
Clearly, the administrative function of the Court to transfer cases is a matter
of venue, rather than jurisdiction. As correctly pointed out by respondents,
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition
the import of the Court's pronouncement in Gutierrez95 is the recognition of
are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or
the incidental and inherent power of the Court to transfer the trial of cases
prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only
from one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever the
by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage
ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave
of justice, so demands. 96 Such incidental and inherent power cannot be
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch
interpreted to mean an authority on the part of the Court to determine which
or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise
court should hear specific cases without running afoul with the doctrine of
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is expressly
separation of powers between the Judiciary and the Legislative.
authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra
II. The Petition for Prohibition
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of
Under the Court's expanded jurisdiction, the remedy of prohibition may legislative and executive officials.102 (Citation omitted and emphasis ours)
be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government
The above pronouncement is but an application of the Court's judicial power
which Section 1, 103 Article VIII of the Constitution defines as the duty of the
Respondents principally oppose co-petitioner Marcos' petition for prohibition courts of justice ( 1) to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
on the ground that a writ of prohibition does not lie to enjoin legislative or legally demandable and enforceable, and (2) to determine whether or not
quasi-legislative actions. In support thereof, respondents cite the cases of there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
Holy Spirit Homeowners Association97 and The Senate Blue Ribbon jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Committee. 98 Such innovation under the 1987 Constitution later on became known as the
Court's "traditional jurisdiction" and "expanded jurisdiction," respectively. 104
Contrary to respondents' contention, nowhere in The Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee did the Court finally settle that prohibition does not lie against While the requisites for the court's exercise of either concept of jurisdiction
legislative functions.99 The import of the Court's decision in said case is the remain constant, note that the exercise by the Court of its "expanded
recognition of the Constitutional authority of the Congress to conduct jurisdiction" is not limited to the determination of grave abuse of discretion to
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of quasi-judicial or judicial acts, but extends to any act involving the exercise of
procedure and provided that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by discretion on the part of the government. Indeed, the power of the Court to
such inquiries shall be respected. Thus, if these Constitutionally-prescribed enjoin a legislative act is beyond cavil as what the Court did in Garcillano v.
requirements are met, courts have no authority to prohibit Congressional The House of Representatives Committees on Public Information, et al. 105
committees from requiring the attendance of persons to whom it issues a when it enjoined therein respondent committees from conducting an inquiry
subpoena.

in aid of legislation on the notorious "Hello Garci" tapes for failure to comply Norte's shares from the excise tax on locally manufactured virginia-type
with the requisite publication of the rules of procedure. cigarettes through cash advances which co-petitioner Marcos herself admits
112
to be the "usual practice" and was actually allowed by the Commission on
Co-petitioner Marcos failed to show that the subject legislative inquiry Audit (COA). 113 In fact, the cause of petitioners' detention was not the
violates the Constitution or that the conduct thereof was attended by perceived or gathered illegal use of such shares but the rather unusual
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction inability of petitioners to recall the transactions despite the same having
involved considerable sums of money.
While there is no question that a writ of prohibition lies against legislative
functions, the Court finds no justification for the issuance thereof in the Like so, co-petitioner Marcos' plea for the prevention of the legislative inquiry
instant case. was anchored on her apprehension that she, too, will be arrested and
detained by House Committee. However, such remains to be an
apprehension which does not give cause for the issuance of the
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
extraordinary remedy of prohibition. Consequently, co-petitioner Marcos'
legislation is expressly provided by the Constitution under Section 21, Article
prayer for the ancillary remedy of a preliminary injunction cannot be granted,
VI thereof, which provides:
because her right thereto has not been proven to be clear and unmistakable.
In any event, such injunction would be of no useful purpose given that the
Sec. 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective instant Omnibus Petition has been decided on the merits. 114
committee may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in,
III. The Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo
or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected. (Emphasis ours)
The filing of the petition for the issuance of a writ of Amparo before
Even before the advent of the 1987 Constitution, the Court in Arnault v.
this Court while the Habeas Corpus Petition before the CA was still
Nazareno106 recognized that the power of inquiry is an "essential and
pending is improper
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function." 107 In Senate of the
Philippines v. Exec. Sec. Ermita, 108 the Court categorically pronounced that
the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive Even in civil cases pending before the trial courts, the Court has no authority
branch, as in the instant case. 109 to separately and directly intervene through the writ of Amparo, as elucidated
in Tapuz, et al. v. Hon. Judge Del Rosario, et al., 115 thus:
Although expansive, the power of both houses of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation is not without limitations. Foremost, the inquiry Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with
must be in furtherance of a legitimate task of the Congress, i.e., legislation, the possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment,
and as such, "investigations conducted solely to gather incriminatory we see no point in separately and directly intervening through a writ of
evidence and punish those investigated" should necessarily be struck down. Amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to life,
110
Further, the exercise of the power of inquiry is circumscribed by the liberty or security - the personal concern that the writ is intended to protect -
above-quoted Constitutional provision, such that the investigation must be "in is immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the issuance
and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on
be respected."111 It is jurisprudentially settled that the rights of persons under certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ
the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and with a separately filed criminal case. 116 (Italics in the original)
the right not to be compelled to testify against one's self.
Thus, while there is no procedural and legal obstacle to the joining of a
In this case, co-petitioner Marcos primordially assails the nature of the petition for habeas corpus and a petition for Amparo, 117 the peculiarity of the
legislative inquiry as a fishing expedition in alleged violation of her right to then pendency of the Habeas Corpus Petition before the CA renders the
due process and to be discriminatory to the Province of Ilocos Norte. direct resort to this Court for the issuance of a writ of Amparo inappropriate.
However, a perusal of the minutes of legislative hearings so far conducted
reveals that the same revolved around the use of the Province of Ilocos

The privilege of the writ of Amparo is confined to instances of (b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, or threats thereof acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;
Even if the Court sets aside this procedural/aux pas, petitioners and co- (c) that it be followed by the State or political organization's refusal to
petitioner Marcos failed to show, by prima facie evidence, entitlement to the acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person
issuance of the writ. Much less have they exhibited, by substantial evidence, subject of the Amparo petition; and,
meritorious grounds to the grant of the petition.
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the
Section 1 of the Rule on the writ of Amparo provides: protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. 124
SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy available In Lozada, Jr., et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., 125 the Court
to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened reiterates that the privilege of the writ of Amparo is a remedy available to
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, victims of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a
or of a private individual or entity. similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or
omission is a public official or employee or a private individual. 126
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
Here, petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos readily admit that the instant
In the landmark case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et Omnibus Petition does not cover extralegal killings or enforced
al., 118 the Court categorically pronounced that the Amparo Rule, as it disappearances, or threats thereof. Thus, on this ground alone, their petition
presently stands, is confined to extralegal killings and enforced for the issuance of a writ of Amparo is dismissible.
disappearances, or to threats thereof, and jurisprudentially defined these two
instances, as follows: Despite this, petitioners insist that their rights to liberty and security were
violated because of their unlawful detention. On the other hand, co-petitioner
[T]he Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of Marcos seeks the protective writ of Amparo on the ground that her right to
"extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its liberty and security are being threatened by the conduct of the legislative
present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. inquiry on House Resolution No. 882. But even these claims of actual and
"Extralegal killings" are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., threatened violations of the right to liberty and security fail to impress.
without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced
disappearances are attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, To reiterate, the writ of Amparo is designed to protect and guarantee the (1)
detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security of persons, free from
groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life. In Rev. Fr. Reyes v. Court of
the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts Appeals, et al., 127 the Court had occasion to expound on the rights falling
of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty within the protective mantle of the writ of Amparo, thus:
which places such persons outside the protection of law. 119
The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under
The above definition of "enforced disappearance" appears in the Declaration Section 1 of the Rules thereon are the following: ( 1) right to life; (2) right to
on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances 120 and is as liberty; and (3) right to security.
statutorily defined in Section 3(g)121 of R. A. No. 9851.122 Thus, in Navia, et al.
v. Pardico, 123 the elements constituting "enforced disappearance," are In Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al., the Court explained
enumerated as follows: the concept of right to life in this wise:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially the
liberty; right to be alive- upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is
preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure
quality of this life, viz: "The life to which each person has a right is not a life

lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can
powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the government vary from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their
he established and consented to, will protect the security of his person and imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus,
property. The ideal of security in life and property ... pervades the whole in the Amparo context, it is more correct to say that the "right to security" is
history of man. It touches every aspect of man's existence." In a broad actually the "freedom from threat." Viewed in this light, the "threatened with
sense, the right to security of person "emanates in a person's legal and violation" Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form
uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the
reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while provision.
existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those
things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature, Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and
temperament, and lawful desires of the individual." psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987
Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, ones body cannot be
The right to liberty, on the other hand, was defined in the City of Manila, et al. searched or invaded without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in
v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., in this manner: the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute
more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the
include "the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates.
servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons
restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person.
man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator,
subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare." Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of
Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al., thoroughly expounded ones rights by the government. In the context of the writ of Amparo, this
on the import of the right to security, thus: right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under
Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of
A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological
permutations of the exercise of this right. integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this
third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State guarantees full respect
for human rights under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the
First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its
government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional
"whereas" clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered
enunciates that "a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of
ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially
speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as
when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective
the highest aspiration of the common people." x x x Some scholars postulate
investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection
that "freedom from fear" is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially
to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats
an individual international human right. It is the "right to security of person" as
thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. x x
the word "security" itself means "freedom from fear." Article 3 of the UDHR
x. 128 (Citations omitted and emphasis and italics in the original)
provides, viz:
Nevertheless, and by way of caution, the rule is that a writ of Amparo shall
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
not issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, every petition
for the issuance of a writ of Amparo should be supported by justifying
The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR. allegations of fact, which the Court in Tapuz129 laid down as follows:
In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the "(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the
actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a
cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being

(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It is more than a mere
the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the imputation of wrongdoing or violation that would warrant a finding of liability
respondent may be described by an assumed appellation; against the person charged. 133
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or Here, it appears that petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos even attended and
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, participated in the subsequent hearings on House Resolution No. 882
and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant without any untoward incident. Petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos thus
circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits; failed to establish that their attendance at and participation in the legislative
inquiry as resource persons have seriously violated their right to liberty and
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal security, for which no other legal recourse or remedy is available. Perforce,
circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as the petition for the issuance of a writ of Amparo must be dismissed.
well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;
IV. Congress' Power to Cite in Contempt and to Compel Attendance of
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or Court Justices
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible
for the threat, act or omission; and It has not escaped the attention of the Court that the events surrounding the
filing of the present Omnibus Petition bear the unsavory impression that a
(f) The relief prayed for. display of force between the CA and the Congress is impending. Truth be
told, the letter of the CA Justices to the Court En Banc betrays the struggle
these CA Justices encountered in view of the Congressional power to cite in
The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs."
contempt and consequently, to arrest and detain. These Congressional
powers are indeed awesome. Yet, such could not be used to deprive the
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie Court of its Constitutional duty to supervise judges of lower courts in the
existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits performance of their official duties. The fact remains that the CA Justices are
that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation non-impeachable officers. As such, authority over them primarily belongs to
of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being this Court and to no other.
committed.130 (Citations omitted and italics in the original)
To echo the Court's ruling in Maceda v. Ombudsman Vasquez: 134 [T]he
Even more telling is the rule that the writ of Amparo cannot be issued in Supreme Court [has] administrative supervision over all courts and court
cases where the alleged threat has ceased and is no longer imminent or personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the
continuing.131 lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the
Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's
In this case, the alleged unlawful restraint on petitioners' liberty has compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against
effectively ceased upon their subsequent release from detention. On the them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government
other hand, the apprehension of co-petitioner Marcos that she will be may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
detained is, at best, merely speculative. In other words, co-petitioner Marcos separation of powers.135
has failed to show any clear threat to her right to liberty actionable through a
petition for a writ of Amparo. It is this very principle of the doctrine of separation of powers as enshrined
under the Constitution that urges the Court to carefully tread on areas falling
132
In Mayor William N. Mamba, et al. v. Leomar Bueno, the Court held that: under the sole discretion of the legislative branch of the government. In point
is the power of legislative investigation which the Congress exercises as a
Neither did petitioners and co-petitioner successfully establish the existence Constitutional prerogative.1awp++i1
of a threat to or violation of their right to security. In an Amparo action, the
parties must establish their respective claims by substantial evidence. Concomitantly, the principle of separation of powers also serves as one of
Substantial evidence is that amount of evidence which a reasonable mind the basic postulates for exempting the Justices, officials and employees of

the Judiciary and for excluding the Judiciary's privileged and confidential relating to the commission of crimes or misconduct, or violations of the Code
documents and information from any compulsory processes which very well of Judicial Conduct, or any violation of a law or regulation," and those outside
includes the Congress' power of inquiry in aid of legislation. 136 Such the Justices' adjudicatory functions such as "financial, budgetary, personnel
exemption has been jurisprudentially referred to as judicial privilege as and administrative matters relating to the operations of the Judiciary."
implied from the exercise of judicial power expressly vested in one Supreme
Court and lower courts created by law. 137 As a guiding principle, the purpose of judicial privilege, as a child of judicial
power, is principally for the effective discharge of such judicial power. If the
However, as in all privileges, the exercise thereof is not without limitations. matter upon which Members of the Court, court officials and employees privy
The invocation of the Court's judicial privilege is understood to be limited to to the Court's deliberations, are called to appear and testify do not relate to
matters that are part of the internal deliberations and actions of the Court in and will not impair the Court's deliberative adjudicatory judicial power, then
the exercise of the Members' adjudicatory functions and duties. For the judicial privilege may not be successfully invoked.
guidance of the bench, the Court herein reiterates its Per Curiam
Resolution138 dated February 14, 2012 on the production of court records and The Court had occasion to illustrate the application of the rule on judicial
attendance of court officials and employees as witnesses in the then privilege and its qualifications to impeachment proceedings as follows:
impeachment complaint against former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona,
insofar as it summarized the documents or communications considered as [W]here the ground cited in an impeachment complaint is bribery, a Justice
privileged as follows: may be called as a witness in the impeachment of another Justice, as bribery
is a matter external to or is not connected with the adjudicatory functions and
(1) Court actions such as the result of the raffle of cases and the actions duties of a magistrate. A Justice, however, may not be called to testify on the
taken by the Court on each case included in the agenda of the Court's arguments the accused Justice presented in the internal debates as these
session on acts done material to pending cases, except where a party litigant constitute details of the deliberative process. 139
requests information on the result of the raffle of the case, pursuant to Rule
7, Section 3 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC); Nevertheless, the traditional application of judicial privilege cannot be
invoked to defeat a positive Constitutional duty. Impeachment proceedings,
(2) Court deliberations or the deliberations of the Members in court sessions being sui generis, 140 is a Constitutional process designed to ensure
on cases and matters pending before the Court; accountability of impeachable officers, the seriousness and exceptional
importance of which outweighs the claim of judicial privilege.
(3) Court records which are "predecisional" and "deliberative" in nature, in
particular, documents and other communications which are part of or related To be certain, the Court, in giving utmost importance to impeachment
to the deliberative process, i.e, notes, drafts, research papers, internal proceedings even as against its own Members, recognizes not the superiority
discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal deliberations, and of the power of the House of Representatives to initiate impeachment cases
similar papers; and the power of the Senate to try and decide the same, but the superiority of
the impeachment proceedings as a Constitutional process intended to
(4) Confidential information secured by justices, judges, court officials and safeguard public office from culpable abuses. In the words of Chief Justice
employees in the course of their official functions, mentioned in (2) and (3) Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereneo in her Concurring and Dissenting Opinion to the
above, are privileged even after their term of office. Per Curiam Resolution, the matter of impeachment is of such paramount
societal importance that overrides the generalized claim of judicial privilege
(5) Records of cases that are still pending for decision are privileged and as such, the Court should extend respect to the Senate acting as an
materials that cannot be disclosed, except only for pleadings, orders and Impeachment Court and give it wide latitude in favor of its function of
resolutions that have been made available by the court to the general public. exacting accountability as required by the Constitution.
By way of qualification, judicial privilege is unavailing on matters external to With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the
the Judiciary's deliberative adjudicatory functions and duties. Justice Antonio other issues raised in the Omnibus Petition. WHEREFORE, the Omnibus
T. Carpio discussed in his Separate Opinion to the Per Curiam Resolution, by Petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
way of example, the non-confidential matters as including those "information

[5] G.R. No. 231658 her functions. Thus, it is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation or suspension. It must be emphasized that under Section
REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of
GARY C. ALEJANO, EMMANUEL A. BILLONES, AND TEDDY BRAWNER the President’s exercise of emergency powers. Put differently, if this Court applies
BAGUILAT, JR., Petitioners vs.HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, the standard of review used in a petition for certiorari, the same would emasculate
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; HON. DELFIN N. LORENZANA, SECRETARY its constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII.
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEF'ENSE AND MARTIAL LAW Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Lansang Doctrine; Martial Law; Writ of
ADMINISTRATOR; AND GEN. EDUARDO ANO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF Habeas Corpus; By inserting Section 18 in Article VII which allows judicial review
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MARTIAL LAW of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of
IMPLEMENTOR, Respondents habeas corpus, the framers of the 1987 Constitution in effect constitutionalized and
reverted to the Lansang doctrine.—To recall, the Court held in the 1952 case of
Judicial Review; Locus Standi; One of the requisites for judicial review is Montenegro v. Castañeda, 91 Phil. 882, that the authority to decide whether there is
locus standi, i.e., “the constitutional question is brought before (the Supreme Court a state of rebellion requiring the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
[SC]) by a party having the requisite ‘standing’ to challenge it.”—One of the corpus is lodged with the President and his decision thereon is final and conclusive
requisites for judicial review is locus standi, i.e., “the constitutional question is upon the courts. This ruling was reversed in the 1971 case of Lansang v. Garcia, 42
brought before [the Court] by a party having the requisite ‘standing’ to challenge it.” SCRA 448, where it was held that the factual basis of the declaration of martial law
As a general rule, the challenger must have “a personal and substantial interest in the and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a political
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its question and is within the ambit of judicial review. However, in 1983, or after the
enforcement.” Over the years, there has been a trend towards relaxation of the rule declaration of martial law by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, the Court, in
on legal standing, a prime example of which is found in Section 18 of Article VII Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, 121 SCRA 472, abandoned the ruling in Lansang and
which provides that any citizen may file the appropriate proceeding to assail the reverted to Montenegro. According to the Supreme Court, the constitutional power
sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of of the President to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not subject to
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. “[T]he only requisite for standing to judicial inquiry. Thus, by inserting Section 18 in Article VII which allows judicial
challenge the validity of the suspension is that the challenger be a citizen. He need review of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of
not even be a taxpayer.” habeas corpus, the framers of the 1987 Constitution in effect constitutionalized and
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; It is settled that jurisdiction reverted to the Lansang doctrine.
over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or by the law.—It is Same; Martial Law; Writ of Habeas Corpus; Section 18, Article VII is meant
settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution to provide additional safeguard against possible abuse by the President in the
or by the law. Unless jurisdiction has been specifically conferred by the Constitution exercise of his power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of
or by some legislative act, no body or tribunal has the power to act or pass upon a habeas corpus.—Section 18, Article VII is meant to provide additional safeguard
matter brought before it for resolution. It is likewise settled that in the absence of a against possible abuse by the President in the exercise of his power to declare martial
clear legislative intent, jurisdiction cannot be implied from the language of the law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Reeling from the aftermath
Constitution or a statute. It must appear clearly from the law or it will not be held to of the Marcos martial law, the framers of the Constitution deemed it wise to insert
exist. A plain reading of the aforequoted Section 18, Article VII reveals that it the now third paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII. This is clear from the records
specifically grants authority to the Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual of the Constitutional Commission when its members were deliberating on whether
basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of the President could proclaim martial law even without the concurrence of Congress.
habeas corpus. Same; Judicial Review; Martial Law; Writ of Habeas Corpus; The framers of
Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; The standard of review in a petition the 1987 Constitution not only placed the President’s proclamation of martial law or
for certiorari is whether the respondent has committed any grave abuse of discretion suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus within the ambit of judicial
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the performance of his or her review, it also relaxed the rule on standing by allowing any citizen to question before
functions.—It could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution the Supreme Court (SC) the sufficiency of the factual basis of such proclamation or
that the phrase “in an appropriate proceeding” would refer to a Petition for suspension.—To give more teeth to this additional safeguard, the framers of the 1987
Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII. The standard of review Constitution not only placed the President’s proclamation of martial law or
in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has committed any grave abuse suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus within the ambit of judicial
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the performance of his or review, it also relaxed the rule on standing by allowing any citizen to question before

this Court the sufficiency of the factual basis of such proclamation or suspension. may be exercised only when there is actual invasion or rebellion, and public safety
Moreover, the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII veritably conferred upon requires it.—The extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of
any citizen a demandable right to challenge the sufficiency of the factual basis of habeas corpus and/or declaring martial law may be exercised only when there is
said proclamation or suspension. It further designated this Court as the reviewing actual invasion or rebellion, and public safety requires it. The 1987 Constitution
tribunal to examine, in an appropriate proceeding, the sufficiency of the factual basis imposed the following limits in the exercise of these powers: “(1) a time limit of
and to render its decision thereon within a limited period of 30 days from date of sixty days; (2) review and possible revocation by Congress; [and] (3) review and
filing. possible nullification by the Supreme Court.” The framers of the 1987 Constitution
Same; Presidency; The most important objective of Section 18, Article VII is eliminated insurrection, and the phrase “imminent danger thereof” as grounds for the
the curtailment of the extent of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief.—The most suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law.
important objective of Section 18, Article VII is the curtailment of the extent of the They perceived the phrase “imminent danger” to be “fraught with possibilities of
powers of the Commander-in-Chief. This is the primary reason why the provision abuse”; besides, the calling out power of the President “is sufficient for handling
was not placed in Article VIII or the Judicial Department but remained under Article imminent danger.”
VII or the Executive Department. Same; Same; The declaration of martial law serves as a warning to citizens
Same; Same; Judicial Review; The phrase “in an appropriate proceeding” that the Executive Department has called upon the military to assist in the
appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII refers to any action maintenance of law and order, and while the emergency remains, the citizens must,
initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual under pain of arrest and punishment, not act in a manner that will render it more
basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive’s emergency powers.—A proceeding difficult to restore order and enforce the law.—The powers to declare martial law
“[i]n its general acceptation, [is] the form in which actions are to be brought and and to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus involve curtailment and
defended, the manner of intervening in suits, of conducting them, the mode of suppression of civil rights and individual freedom. Thus, the declaration of martial
deciding them, of opposing judgments, and of executing.” In fine, the phrase “in an law serves as a warning to citizens that the Executive Department has called upon the
appropriate proceeding” appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII military to assist in the maintenance of law and order, and while the emergency
refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the remains, the citizens must, under pain of arrest and punishment, not act in a manner
sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive’s emergency that will render it more difficult to restore order and enforce the law. As such, their
powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a exercise requires more stringent safeguards by the Congress, and review by the
matter to be resolved by the Court. Court.
Same; Same; Martial Law; Writ of Habeas Corpus; Veto Powers; The Same; Same; A state of martial law is peculiar because the President, at such
President’s extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas a time, exercises police power, which is normally a function of the Legislature.—A
corpus and imposing martial law are subject to the veto powers of the Supreme state of martial law is peculiar because the President, at such a time, exercises police
Court (SC) and Congress.—The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated the power, which is normally a function of the Legislature. In particular, the President
scope of the extraordinary powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief and the exercises police power, with the military’s assistance, to ensure public safety and in
review of the said presidential action. In particular, the President’s extraordinary place of government agencies which for the time being are unable to cope with the
powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and imposing condition in a locality, which remains under the control of the State. In David v.
martial law are subject to the veto powers of the Court and Congress. President Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 (2006), the Court, quoting Justice
Same; Same; Calling Out Power; The President may resort to this Vicente V. Mendoza’s (Justice Mendoza’s) Statement before the Senate Committee
extraordinary power (calling out power) whenever it becomes necessary to prevent on Justice on March 13, 2006, stated that under a valid declaration of martial law, the
or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion; the actual use to which the President as Commander-in-Chief may order the “(a) arrests and seizures without
President puts the armed forces is not subject to judicial review.—Among the three judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) [takeover] of news media and
extraordinary powers, the calling out power is the most benign and involves ordinary agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees x x x.”
police action. The President may resort to this extraordinary power whenever it Worthy to note, however, that the above cited acts that the President may perform do
becomes necessary to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. not give him unbridled discretion to infringe on the rights of civilians during martial
“[T]he power to call is fully discretionary to the President”; the only limitations law. This is because martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution,
being that he acts within permissible constitutional boundaries or in a manner not neither does it supplant the operation of civil courts or legislative assemblies.
constituting grave abuse of discretion. In fact, “the actual use to which the President Moreover, the guarantees under the Bill of Rights remain in place during its
puts the armed forces is x x x not subject to judicial review.” pendency. And in such instance where the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
Same; Martial Law; Writ of Habeas Corpus; The extraordinary powers of also suspended, such suspension applies only to those judicially charged with
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and/or declaring martial law rebellion or offenses connected with invasion. Clearly, from the foregoing, while

martial law poses the most severe threat to civil liberties, the Constitution has declaration of martial law and his calling out the Armed Forces necessarily entails
safeguards against the President’s prerogative to declare a state of martial law. separate proceedings instituted for that particular purpose. As explained in
Same; Same; Even the recommendation of, or consultation with, the Secretary Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000), the President’s
of National Defense, or other high-ranking military officials, is not a condition for exercise of his power to call out the Armed Forces to prevent or suppress lawless
the President to declare martial law.—Even the recommendation of, or consultation violence, invasion or rebellion may only be examined by the Court as to whether
with, the Secretary of National Defense, or other high-ranking military officials, is such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or in a manner
not a condition for the President to declare martial law. A plain reading of Section constituting grave abuse of discretion.
18, Article VII of the Constitution shows that the President’s power to declare Political Law; Operative Fact Doctrine; Under the “operative fact doctrine,”
martial law is not subject to any condition except for the requirements of actual the unconstitutional statute is recognized as an “operative fact” before it is declared
invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires it. Besides, it would be contrary unconstitutional.—Neither would the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 result in
to common sense if the decision of the President is made dependent on the the nullification of the acts of the President done pursuant thereto. Under the
recommendation of his mere alter ego. Rightly so, it is only on the President and no “operative fact doctrine,” the unconstitutional statute is recognized as an “operative
other that the exercise of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, fact” before it is declared unconstitutional.
Article VII of the Constitution is bestowed. Same; Doctrine of Contemporaneous Construction; Under the doctrine of
Statutes; Void for Vagueness Doctrine; The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds contemporaneous construction, the framers of the 1987 Constitution are presumed
that a law is facially invalid if “men of common intelligence must necessarily guess to know the prevailing jurisprudence at the time they were drafting the Constitution.
at its meaning and differ as to its application.”—The void-for-vagueness doctrine —Under the doctrine of contemporaneous construction, the framers of the 1987
holds that a law is facially invalid if “men of common intelligence must necessarily Constitution are presumed to know the prevailing jurisprudence at the time they were
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” “[A] statute or act may be said drafting the Constitution. Thus, the phrase “sufficiency of factual basis” in Section
to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence 18, Article VII of the Constitution should be understood as the only test for judicial
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. [In such instance, review of the President’s power to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of
the statute] is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. The
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice Court does not need to satisfy itself that the President’s decision is correct, rather it
of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in only needs to determine whether the President’s decision had sufficient factual bases.
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government Same; Martial Law; Writ of Habeas Corpus; As Commander-in-Chief, the
muscle.” President has the sole discretion to declare martial law and/or to suspend the
Same; Same; The vagueness doctrine is an analytical tool developed for privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, subject to the revocation of Congress and the
testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in review of the Supreme Court (SC).—As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the
American law, First Amendment cases.—The vagueness doctrine is an analytical tool sole discretion to declare martial law and/or to suspend the privilege of the writ of
developed for testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech cases or, as they are habeas corpus, subject to the revocation of Congress and the review of this Court.
called in American law, First Amendment cases. A facial challenge is allowed to be Since the exercise of these powers is a judgment call of the President, the
made to a vague statute and also to one which is overbroad because of possible determination of this Court as to whether there is sufficient factual basis for the
“‘chilling effect’ on protected speech that comes from statutes violating free speech. exercise of such, must be based only on facts or information known by or available
A person who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an to the President at the time he made the declaration or suspension, which facts or
overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from speaking in order to avoid information are found in the proclamation as well as the written Report submitted by
being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him into silence.” him to Congress. These may be based on the situation existing at the time the
It is best to stress that the vagueness doctrine has a special application only to free declaration was made or past events. As to how far the past events should be from
speech cases. They are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes. the present depends on the President. Past events may be considered as justifications
Same; Presidency; Calling Out Power; The President may exercise the power for the declaration and/or suspension as long as these are connected or related to the
to call out the Armed Forces independently of the power to suspend the privilege of current situation existing at the time of the declaration.
the writ of habeas corpus and to declare martial law, although, of course, it may Same; Same; Same; In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
also be a prelude to a possible future exercise of the latter powers, as in this case.— declaration and/or the suspension, the Supreme Court (SC) should look into the full
The President may exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces independently complement or totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or individually.—In
of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to declare determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the
martial law, although, of course, it may also be a prelude to a possible future exercise suspension, the Court should look into the full complement or totality of the factual
of the latter powers, as in this case. Even so, the Court’s review of the President’s basis, and not piecemeal or individually. Neither should the Court expect absolute

correctness of the facts stated in the proclamation and in the written Report as the technical or legal meaning. Since the Constitution did not define the term
President could not be expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of all facts “rebellion,” it must be understood to have the same meaning as the crime of
reported to him due to the urgency of the situation. To require precision in the “rebellion” in the Revised Penal Code (RPC). x x x Thus, rebellion as mentioned in
President’s appreciation of facts would unduly burden him and therefore impede the the Constitution could only refer to rebellion as defined under Article 134 of the
process of his decision-making. Such a requirement will practically necessitate the RPC. To give it a different definition would not only create confusion but would also
President to be on the ground to confirm the correctness of the reports submitted to give the President wide latitude of discretion, which may be abused — a situation
him within a period that only the circumstances obtaining would be able to dictate. that the Constitution seeks to prevent.
Such a scenario, of course, would not only place the President in peril but would also Same; Same; Same; Same; Elements of.—For rebellion to exist, the following
defeat the very purpose of the grant of emergency powers upon him, that is, to elements must be present, to wit: “(1) there is a (a) public uprising and (b) taking
borrow the words of Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 668 arms against the Government; and (2) the purpose of the uprising or movement is
SCRA 504 (2012), to “immediately put an end to the root cause of the emergency.” either (a) to remove from the allegiance to the Government or its laws: (i) the
Possibly, by the time the President is satisfied with the correctness of the facts in his territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or (ii) any body of land, naval, or
possession, it would be too late in the day as the invasion or rebellion could have other armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or
already escalated to a level that is hard, if not impossible, to curtail. partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives.”
Same; Same; Same; Falsities of and/or inaccuracies in some of the facts stated Same; Same; Same; Same; The parameters for determining the sufficiency of
in the proclamation and the written report are not enough reasons for the Supreme factual basis are as follows: 1) actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires
Court (SC) to invalidate the declaration and/or suspension as long as there are it; the first two (2) requirements must concur; and 3) there is probable cause for the
other facts in the proclamation and the written Report that support the conclusion President to believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion.—In determining the
that there is an actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires the existence of rebellion, the President only needs to convince himself that there is
declaration and/or suspension.—The Court’s review is confined to the sufficiency, probable cause or evidence showing that more likely than not a rebellion was
not accuracy, of the information at hand during the declaration or suspension; committed or is being committed. To require him to satisfy a higher standard of
subsequent events do not have any bearing insofar as the Court’s review is proof would restrict the exercise of his emergency powers. Along this line, Justice
concerned. In any event, safeguards under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution Carpio, in his Dissent in Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, 668 SCRA 504
are in place to cover such a situation, e.g., the martial law period is good only for 60 (2012), concluded that the President needs only to satisfy probable cause as the
days; Congress may choose to revoke it even immediately after the proclamation is standard of proof in determining the existence of either invasion or rebellion for
made; and, this Court may investigate the factual background of the declaration. purposes of declaring martial law, and that probable cause is the most reasonable,
Hence, the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus finds no application in this case. most practical and most expedient standard by which the President can fully
Falsities of and/or inaccuracies in some of the facts stated in the proclamation and ascertain the existence or nonexistence of rebellion necessary for a declaration of
the written report are not enough reasons for the Court to invalidate the declaration martial law or suspension of the writ. This is because unlike other standards of proof,
and/or suspension as long as there are other facts in the proclamation and the written which, in order to be met, would require much from the President and therefore
Report that support the conclusion that there is an actual invasion or rebellion and unduly restrain his exercise of emergency powers, the requirement of probable cause
that public safety requires the declaration and/or suspension. is much simpler. It merely necessitates an “average man [to weigh] the facts and
Same; Same; Same; Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters for circumstances without resorting to the calibration of the rules of evidence of which
determining the sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law he has no technical knowledge. He [merely] relies on common sense [and] x x x
and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, “namely (1) needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
actual invasion or rebellion, and (2) public safety requires the exercise of such committed x x x by the accused.” To summarize, the parameters for determining the
power.”—Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: 1) actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public
sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law and/or the safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur; and 3) there is probable
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, “namely (1) actual invasion cause for the President to believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion.
or rebellion, and (2) public safety requires the exercise of such power.” Without the Same; Same; Same; The purpose of judicial review is not the determination of
concurrence of the two conditions, the President’s declaration of martial law and/or accuracy or veracity of the facts upon which the President anchored his declaration
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must be struck down. of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; rather,
Same; Same; Same; Rebellion; Since the Constitution did not define the term only the sufficiency of the factual basis as to convince the President that there is
“rebellion,” it must be understood to have the same meaning as the crime of probable cause that rebellion exists.—It bears to emphasize that the purpose of
“rebellion” in the Revised Penal Code (RPC).—As a general rule, a word used in a judicial review is not the determination of accuracy or veracity of the facts upon
statute which has a technical or legal meaning, is construed to have the same which the President anchored his declaration of martial law or suspension of the

privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; rather, only the sufficiency of the factual basis rather whether what they said are true. Thus, contrary to the view of petitioners, the
as to convince the President that there is probable cause that rebellion exists. It must exception in Bedol finds no application here.
also be reiterated that martial law is a matter of urgency and much leeway and Martial Law; Writ of Habeas Corpus; For a declaration of martial law or
flexibility should be accorded the President. As such, he is not expected to suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to be valid, there must be a
completely validate all the information he received before declaring martial law or concurrence of actual rebellion or invasion and the public safety requirement.—
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Invasion or rebellion alone may justify resort to the calling out power but definitely
Same; Same; Same; The President’s conclusion, that there was an armed not the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was the removal from the allegiance corpus. For a declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
of the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and the deprivation of the habeas corpus to be valid, there must be a concurrence of actual rebellion or
President from performing his powers and prerogatives, was reached after a tactical invasion and the public safety requirement. In his Report, the President noted that the
consideration of the facts.—A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute Group were directed not only
to conclude that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual against government forces or establishments but likewise against civilians and their
bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President’s conclusion, that properties. In addition and in relation to the armed hostilities, bomb threats were
there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was the removal issued; road blockades and checkpoints were set up; schools and churches were
from the allegiance of the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and the burned; civilian hostages were taken and killed; non-Muslims or Christians were
deprivation of the President from performing his powers and prerogatives, was targeted; young male Muslims were forced to join their group; medical services and
reached after a tactical consideration of the facts. In fine, the President satisfactorily delivery of basic services were hampered; reinforcements of government troops and
discharged his burden of proof. civilian movement were hindered; and the security of the entire Mindanao Island was
Same; Judicial Review; The Supreme Court (SC) is not concerned about compromised.
absolute correctness, accuracy, or precision of the facts because to do so would Same; Same; Proclamation No. 216 has sufficient factual basis there being
unduly tie the hands of the President in responding to an urgent situation.—The probable cause to believe that rebellion exists and that public safety requires the
allegation in the Lagman Petition that the facts stated in Proclamation No. 216 and martial law declaration and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
the Report are false, inaccurate, simulated, and/or hyperbolic, does not persuade. As corpus.—These particular scenarios convinced the President that the atrocities had
mentioned, the Court is not concerned about absolute correctness, accuracy, or already escalated to a level that risked public safety and thus impelled him to declare
precision of the facts because to do so would unduly tie the hands of the President in martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In the last
responding to an urgent situation. x x x However, the so-called counter-evidence paragraph of his Report, the President declared: While the government is presently
were derived solely from unverified news articles on the internet, with neither the conducting legitimate operations to address the ongoing rebellion, if not the seeds of
authors nor the sources shown to have affirmed the contents thereof. It was not even invasion, public safety necessitates the continued implementation of martial law and
shown that efforts were made to secure such affirmation albeit the circumstances the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
proved futile. As the Court has consistently ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence, Mindanao until such time that the rebellion is completely quelled. Based on the
twice removed, and are thus without any probative value, unless offered for a foregoing, we hold that the parameters for the declaration of martial law and
purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted. This pronouncement suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus have been properly and fully
applies with equal force to the Cullamat Petition which likewise submitted online complied with. Proclamation No. 216 has sufficient factual basis there being
news articles as basis for their claim of insufficiency of factual basis. probable cause to believe that rebellion exists and that public safety requires the
Remedial Law; Evidence; Hearsay Evidence Rule; Doctrine of Independent martial law declaration and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
Relevant Statement; The Supreme Court (SC) in Bedol v. Commission on Elections, corpus.
606 SCRA 554 (2009), made it clear that the doctrine of independent relevant Same; Same; Martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
statement, which is an exception to the hearsay rule, applies in cases “where only habeas corpus are necessary for the protection of the security of the nation;
the fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is “precautionary, and
immaterial.”—Petitioners, however, insist that in Bedol v. Commission on Elections, although it might [curtail] certain rights of individuals, [it] is for the purpose of
606 SCRA 554 (2009), news reports may be admitted on grounds of relevance, defending and protecting the security of the state or the entire country and our
trustworthiness, and necessity. Petitioners’ reliance on this case is misplaced. The sovereign people.”—Considering the nation’s and its people’s traumatic experience
Court in Bedol made it clear that the doctrine of independent relevant statement, of martial law under the Marcos regime, one would expect the framers of the 1987
which is an exception to the hearsay rule, applies in cases “where only the fact that Constitution to stop at nothing from not resuscitating the law. Yet it would appear
such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial.” that the constitutional writers entertained no doubt about the necessity and
Here, the question is not whether such statements were made by Saber, et al., but practicality of such specie of extraordinary power and thus, once again, bestowed on

the Commander-in-Chief the power to declare martial law albeit in its diluted form. preservation of the nation’s sovereignty and ultimately, the survival of our country. It
Indeed, martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is vital for the protection of the country not only against internal enemies but also
are necessary for the protection of the security of the nation; suspension of the against those enemies lurking from beyond our shores. As such, martial law should
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is “precautionary, and although it might not be cast aside, or its scope and potency limited and diluted, based on bias and
[curtail] certain rights of individuals, [it] is for the purpose of defending and unsubstantiated assumptions. Conscious of these fears and apprehensions, the
protecting the security of the state or the entire country and our sovereign people.” Constitution placed several safeguards which effectively watered down the power to
Commissioner Ople referred to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas declare martial law. The 1987 Constitution “[clipped] the powers of [the]
corpus as a “form of immobilization” or “as a means of immobilizing potential Commander-in-Chief because of [the] experience with the previous regime.” Not
internal enemies” “especially in areas like Mindanao.” Aside from protecting the only were the grounds limited to actual invasion or rebellion, but its duration was
security of the country, martial law also guarantees and promotes public safety. It is likewise fixed at 60 days, unless sooner revoked, nullified, or extended; at the same
worthy of mention that rebellion alone does not justify the declaration of martial law time, it is subject to the veto powers of the Court and Congress.
or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; the public safety Same; Same; Public Safety; Public safety, which is another component
requirement must likewise be present. element for the declaration of martial law, “involves the prevention of and
Same; Same; The determination by the Supreme Court (SC) of the sufficiency protection from events that could endanger the safety of the general public from
of factual basis must be limited only to the facts and information mentioned in the significant danger, injury/harm, or damage, such as crimes or disasters.”—Public
Report and Proclamation.—The Court does not have the same resources available to safety, which is another component element for the declaration of martial law,
the President. However, this should not be considered as a constitutional lapse. On “involves the prevention of and protection from events that could endanger the safety
the contrary, this is in line with the function of the Court, particularly in this instance, of the general public from significant danger, injury/harm, or damage, such as crimes
to determine the sufficiency of factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. As thoroughly or disasters.” Public safety is an abstract term; it does not take any physical form.
discussed in Part VIII, the determination by the Court of the sufficiency of factual Plainly, its range, extent or scope could not be physically measured by metes and
basis must be limited only to the facts and information mentioned in the Report and bounds.
Proclamation. In fact, the Court, in David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 Same; Same; Another reason why the territorial scope of martial law should
SCRA 160 (2006), cautioned not to “undertake an independent investigation beyond not necessarily be limited to the particular vicinity where the armed public uprising
the pleadings.” In this regard, “the Court will have to rely on the fact-finding actually transpired, is because of the unique characteristic of rebellion as a crime.—
capabilities of the [E]xecutive [D]epartment”; in turn, the Executive Department will Perhaps another reason why the territorial scope of martial law should not
have to open its findings to the Court, which it did during the closed door session last necessarily be limited to the particular vicinity where the armed public uprising
June 15, 2017. actually transpired, is because of the unique characteristic of rebellion as a crime.
Same; Same; Presidency; The Constitution grants to the President the “The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast movement of men and a
discretion to determine the territorial coverage of martial law and the suspension of complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion[,]
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.—Section 18, Article VII of the though crimes in themselves[,] are deemed absorbed in one single crime of
Constitution states that “[i]n case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety rebellion.” Rebellion absorbs “other acts committed in its pursuance.” Direct assault,
requires it, [the President] may x x x suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus murder, homicide, arson, robbery, and kidnapping, just to name a few, are absorbed
or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.” Clearly, the in the crime of rebellion if committed in furtherance of rebellion; “[i]t cannot be
Constitution grants to the President the discretion to determine the territorial made a basis of a separate charge.” Jurisprudence also teaches that not only common
coverage of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas crimes may be absorbed in rebellion but also “offenses under special laws [such as
corpus. He may put the entire Philippines or only a part thereof under martial law. Presidential Decree No. 1829] which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political
Same; Same; Not only where the grounds limited to actual invasion or offense.” “All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which
rebellion, but its duration was likewise fixed at sixty (60) days, unless sooner are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become
revoked, nullified, or extended; at the same time, it is subject to the veto powers of absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot be isolated and charged as separate
the Supreme Court (SC) and Congress.—Considering the country’s history, it is crimes in themselves.”
understandable that the resurgence of martial law would engender apprehensions Same; Same; Presidency; The President’s duty to maintain peace and public
among the citizenry. Even the Court as an institution cannot project a stance of safety is not limited only to the place where there is actual rebellion; it extends to
nonchalance. However, the importance of martial law in the context of our society other areas where the present hostilities are in danger of spilling over.—The
should outweigh one’s prejudices and apprehensions against it. The significance of President’s duty to maintain peace and public safety is not limited only to the place
martial law should not be undermined by unjustified fears and past experience. After where there is actual rebellion; it extends to other areas where the present hostilities
all, martial law is critical and crucial to the promotion of public safety, the are in danger of spilling over. It is not intended merely to prevent the escape of

lawless elements from Marawi City, but also to avoid enemy reinforcements and to Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President
cut their supply lines coming from different parts of Mindanao. Thus, limiting the Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial
proclamation and/or suspension to the place where there is actual rebellion would not law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
only defeat the purpose of declaring martial law, it will make the exercise thereof Mindanao.
ineffective and useless.
Same; Same; Same; As a crime without predetermined bounds, the President The full text of Proclamation No. 216 reads as follows:
has reasonable basis to believe that the declaration of martial law, as well as the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao, is WHEREAS, Proclamation No. 55, series of 2016, was issued on 04
most necessary, effective, and called for by the circumstances.—There were also September 2016 declaring a state of national emergency on account of
intelligence reports from the military about offensives committed by the ASG and lawless violence in Mindanao;
other local rebel groups. All these suggest that the rebellion in Marawi has already
spilled over to other parts of Mindanao. Moreover, considering the widespread
atrocities in Mindanao and the linkages established among rebel groups, the armed WHEREAS, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution provides that 'x x x In
uprising that was initially staged in Marawi cannot be justified as confined only to case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he (the
Marawi. The Court therefore will not simply disregard the events that happened President) may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege
during the Davao City bombing, the Mamasapano massacre, the Zamboanga City of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
siege, and the countless bombings in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, and Basilan, martial law x x x';
among others. The Court cannot simply take the battle of Marawi in isolation. As a
crime without predetermined bounds, the President has reasonable basis to believe WHEREAS, Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No.
that the declaration of martial law, as well as the suspension of the privilege of the 6968, provides that 'the crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by
writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao, is most necessary, effective, and rising and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing
called for by the circumstances. from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the
Same; Same; Terrorism; Human Security Act of 2007; As long as the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or
President complies with all the requirements of Section 18, Article VII, the existence other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature,
of terrorism cannot prevent him from exercising his extraordinary power of wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives';
proclaiming martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.—
In any case, even assuming that the insurgency in Marawi City can also be WHEREAS, part of the reasons for the issuance of Proclamation No. 55 was
characterized as terrorism, the same will not in any manner affect Proclamation No. the series of violent acts committed by the Maute terrorist group such as the
216. Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9372, otherwise known as the Human attack on the military outpost in Butig, Lanao del Sur in February 2016, killing
Security Act of 2007 expressly provides that “[n]othing in this Act shall be and wounding several soldiers, and the mass jailbreak in Marawi City in
interpreted as a curtailment, restriction or diminution of constitutionally recognized August 2016, freeing their arrested comrades and other detainees;
powers of the executive branch of the government.” Thus, as long as the President
complies with all the requirements of Section 18, Article VII, the existence of WHEREAS, today 23 May 2017, the same Maute terrorist group has taken
terrorism cannot prevent him from exercising his extraordinary power of proclaiming over a hospital in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur, established several
martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. After all, the checkpoints within the City, burned down certain government and private
extraordinary powers of the President are bestowed on him by the Constitution. No facilities and inflicted casualties on the part of Government forces, and
act of Congress can, therefore, curtail or diminish such powers. Besides, there is started flying the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in several
nothing in Art. 134 of the RPC and RA 9372 which states that rebellion and areas, thereby openly attempting to remove from the allegiance to the
terrorism are mutuality exclusive of each other or that they cannot coexist together. Philippine Government this part of Mindanao and deprive the Chief Executive
RA 9372 does not expressly or impliedly repeal Art. 134 of the RPC. And while of his powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and to
rebellion is one of the predicate crimes of terrorism, one cannot absorb the other as maintain public order and safety in Mindanao, constituting the crime of
they have different elements. rebellion; and
DECISION WHEREAS, this recent attack shows the capability of the Maute group and
other rebel groups to sow terror, and cause death and damage to property
DEL CASTILLO, J.: not only in Lanao del Sur but also in other parts of Mindanao.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE, President of the its paralysis. This sudden taking of control was intended to lay the
Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the groundwork for the eventual establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province in
Constitution and by law, do hereby proclaim as follows: Mindanao.
SECTION 1. There is hereby declared a state of martial law in the Mindanao Based on verified intelligence reports, the Maute Group, as of the end of
group of islands for a period not exceeding sixty days, effective as of the date 2016, consisted of around two hundred sixty-three (263) members, fully
hereof. armed and prepared to wage combat in furtherance of its aims. The group
chiefly operates in the province of Lanao del Sur, but has extensive networks
SECTION 2. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall likewise be and linkages with foreign and local armed groups such as the Jemaah
suspended in the aforesaid area for the duration of the state of martial law. Islamiyah, Mujahidin Indonesia Timur and the ASG. It adheres to the ideals
being espoused by the DAESH, as evidenced by, among others, its
publication of a video footage declaring its allegiance to the DAESH. Reports
DONE in the Russian Federation, this 23rd day of May in the year of our
abound that foreign-based terrorist groups, the ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and
Lord, Two Thousand and Seventeen.
Syria) in particular, as well as illegal drug money, provide financial and
logistical support to the Maute Group.
Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the
President submitted to Congress on May 25, 2017, a written Report on the
The events commencing on 23 May 2017 put on public display the groups'
factual basis of Proclamation No. 216.
clear intention to establish an Islamic State and their capability to deprive the
duly constituted authorities - the President, foremost - of their powers and
The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with prerogatives.2
rebellion and lawless violence which only escalated and worsened with the
passing of time.
In particular, the President chronicled in his Report the events which took
place on May 23, 2017 in Marawi City which impelled him to declare a state
Mindanao has been the hotbed of violent extremism and a brewing rebellion of martial law and suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus, to wit:
for decades. In more recent years, we have witnessed the perpetration of
numerous acts of violence challenging the authority of the duly constituted
• At 1400H members of the Maute Group and ASG, along with their
authorities, i.e., the Zamboanga siege, the Davao bombing, the Mamasapano
sympathizers, commenced their attack on various facilities - government and
carnage, and the bombings in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, and Basilan,
privately owned - in the City of Marawi.
among others. Two armed groups have figured prominently in all these,
namely, the Abu Sayaff Group (ASG) and the ISIS-backed Maute Group. 1
• At 1600H around fifty (50) armed criminals assaulted Marawi City Jail being
manage by the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP).
The President went on to explain that on May 23, 2017, a government
operation to capture the high-ranking officers of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
and the Maute Group was conducted. These groups, which have been • The Maute Group forcibly entered the jail facilities, destroyed its main gate,
unleashing havoc in Mindanao, however, confronted the government and assaulted on-duty personnel. BJMP personnel were disarmed, tied,
operation by intensifying their efforts at sowing violence aimed not only and/or locked inside the cells.
against the government authorities and its facilities but likewise against
civilians and their properties. As narrated in the President's Report: • The group took cellphones, personnel-issued firearms, and vehicles (i.e.,
two [2] prisoner vans and private vehicles).
On 23 May 2017, a government operation to capture Isnilon Hapilon, a senior
leader of the ASG, and Maute Group operational leaders, Abdullah and • By 1630H, the supply of power into Marawi City had been interrupted, and
Omarkhayam Maute, was confronted with armed resistance which escalated sporadic gunfights were heard and felt everywhere. By evening, the power
into open hostility against the government. Through these groups' armed outage had spread citywide. (As of 24 May 2017, Marawi City's electric
siege and acts of violence directed towards civilians and government supply was still cut off, plunging the city into total black-out.)
authorities, institutions and establishments, they were able to take control of
major social, economic, and political foundations of Marawi City which led to

• From 1800H to 1900H, the same members of the Maute Group ambushed • Lawless armed groups likewise ransacked the Landbank of the Philippines
and burned the Marawi Police Station. A patrol car of the Police Station was and commandeered one of its armored vehicles.
also taken.
• Latest information indicates that about seventy-five percent (75%) of
• A member of the Provincial Drug Enforcement Unit was killed during the Marawi City has been infiltrated by lawless armed groups composed of
takeover of the Marawi City Jail. The Maute Group facilitated the escape of at members of the Maute Group and the ASG. As of the time of this Report,
least sixty-eight (68) inmates of the City Jail. eleven (11) members of the Armed Forces and the Philippine National Police
have been killed in action, while thirty-five (35) others have been seriously
• The BJMP directed its personnel at the Marawi City Jail and other affected wounded.
areas to evacuate.
• There are reports that these lawless armed groups are searching for
• By evening of 23 May 2017, at least three (3) bridges in Lanao del Sur, Christian communities in Marawi City to execute Christians. They are also
namely, Lilod, Bangulo, and Sauiaran, fell under the control of these groups. preventing Maranaos from leaving their homes and forcing young male
They threatened to bomb the bridges to pre-empt military reinforcement. Muslims to join their groups.
• As of 2222H, persons connected with the Maute Group had occupied • Based on various verified intelligence reports from the AFP and the PNP,
several areas in Marawi City, including Naga Street, Bangolo Street, there exists a strategic mass action of lawless armed groups in Marawi City,
Mapandi, and Camp Keithly, as well as the following barangays: Basak seizing public and private facilities, perpetrating killings of government
Malutlot, Mapandi, Saduc, Lilod Maday, Bangon, Saber, Bubong, Marantao, personnel, and committing armed uprising against and open defiance of the
Caloocan, Banggolo, Barionaga, and Abubakar. government.3
• These lawless armed groups had likewise set up road blockades and The unfolding of these events, as well as the classified reports he received,
checkpoints at the Iligan City-Marawi City junction. led the President to conclude that -
• Later in the evening, the Maute Group burned Dansalan College These activities constitute not simply a display of force, but a clear attempt to
Foundation, Cathedral of Maria Auxiliadora, the nun's quarters in the church, establish the groups' seat of power in Marawi City for their planned
and the Shia Masjid Moncado Colony. Hostages were taken from the church. establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province covering the entire Mindanao.
• About five (5) faculty members of Dansalan College Foundation had been The cutting of vital lines for transportation and power; the recruitment of
reportedly killed by the lawless groups. young Muslims to further expand their ranks and strengthen their force; the
armed consolidation of their members throughout Marawi City; the
decimation of a segment of the city population who resist; and the brazen
• Other educational institutions were also burned, namely, Senator Ninoy
display of DAESH flags constitute a clear, pronounced, and unmistakable
Aquino College Foundation and the Marawi Central Elementary Pilot School.
intent to remove Marawi City, and eventually the rest of Mindanao, from its
allegiance to the Government.
• The Maute Group also attacked Amai Pakpak Hospital and hoisted the
DAESH flag there, among other several locations. As of 0600H of 24May
There exists no doubt that lawless armed groups are attempting to deprive
2017, members of the Maute Group were seen guarding the entry gates of
the President of his power, authority, and prerogatives within Marawi City as
Amai Pakpak Hospital. They held hostage the employees of the Hospital and
a precedent to spreading their control over the entire Mindanao, in an attempt
took over the PhilHealth office located thereat.
to undermine his control over executive departments, bureaus, and offices in
said area; defeat his mandate to ensure that all laws are faithfully executed;
• The groups likewise laid siege to another hospital, Filipino-Libyan and remove his supervisory powers over local govemments. 4
Friendship Hospital, which they later set ablaze.
According to the Report, the lawless activities of the ASG, Maute Group, and
other criminals, brought about undue constraints and difficulties to the military

and government personnel, particularly in the performance of their duties and In addition to the Report, representatives from the Executive Department, the
functions, and untold hardships to the civilians, viz.: military and police authorities conducted briefings with the Senate and the
House of Representatives relative to the declaration of martial law.
Law enforcement and other government agencies now face pronounced
difficulty sending their reports to the Chief Executive due to the city-wide After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued P.S.
power outages. Personnel from the BJMP have been prevented from Resolution No. 3888 expressing full support to the martial law proclamation
performing their functions. Through the attack and occupation of several and finding Proclamation No. 216 "to be satisfactory, constitutional and in
hospitals, medical services in Marawi City have been adversely affected. The accordance with the law". In the same Resolution, the Senate declared that it
bridge and road blockades set up by the groups effectively deprive the found "no compelling reason to revoke the same". The Senate thus resolved
government of its ability to deliver basic services to its citizens. Troop as follows:
reinforcements have been hampered, preventing the government from
restoring peace and order in the area. Movement by both civilians and NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, by way of
government personnel to and from the city is likewise hindered. the sense of the Senate, that the Senate finds the issuance of Proclamation
No. 216 to be satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance with the law. The
The taking up of arms by lawless armed groups in the area, with support Senate hereby supports fully Proclamation No. 216 and finds no compelling
being provided by foreign-based terrorists and illegal drug money, and their reason to revoke the sarne.9
blatant acts of defiance which embolden other armed groups in Mindanao,
have resulted in the deterioration of public order and safety in Marawi City; The Senate's counterpart in the lower house shared the same sentiments.
they have likewise compromised the security of the entire Island of The House of Representatives likewise issued House Resolution No. 1050 10
Mindanao.5 "EXPRESSING THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES TO PRESIDENT RODRIGO DUTERTE AS IT FINDS
The Report highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City and the crucial NO REASON TO REVOKE PROCLAMATION NO. 216, ENTITLED
and significant role it plays in Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole. In 'DECLARING A STATE OF MARTIAL LAW AND SUSPENDING THE
addition, the Report pointed out the possible tragic repercussions once PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THE WHOLE OF
Marawi City falls under the control of the lawless groups. MINDANAO"'.
The groups' occupation of Marawi City fulfills a strategic objective because of The Petitions
its terrain and the easy access it provides to other parts of Mindanao.
Lawless armed groups have historically used provinces adjoining Marawi A) G.R. No. 231658 (Lagman Petition)
City as escape routes, supply lines, and backdoor passages.
On June 5, 2017, Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, Tomasito s. Villarin,
Considering the network and alliance-building activities among terrorist Gary C. Alejano, Emmanuel A. Billones, and Teddy Brawner Baguilat, Jr.
groups, local criminals, and lawless armed men, the siege of Marawi City is a filed a Petition11 Under the Third Paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII of the
vital cog in attaining their long-standing goal: absolute control over the 1987 Constitution.
entirety of Mindanao. These circumstances demand swift and decisive action
to ensure the safety and security of the Filipino people and preserve our First, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no
national integrity.6 sufficient factual basis because there is no rebellion or invasion in Marawi
City or in any part of Mindanao. It argues that acts of terrorism in Mindanao
The President ended his Report in this wise: do not constitute rebellion12 since there is no proof that its purpose is to
remove Mindanao or any part thereof from allegiance to the Philippines, its
While the government is presently conducting legitimate operations to laws, or its territory.13 It labels the flying of ISIS flag by the Maute Group in
address the on-going rebellion, if not the seeds of invasion, public safety Marawi City and other outlying areas as mere propaganda1 14 and not an
necessitates the continued implementation of martial law and the suspension open attempt to remove such areas from the allegiance to the Philippine
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao until Government and deprive the Chief Executive of the assertion and exercise of
such time that the rebellion is completely quelled.7 his powers and prerogatives therein. It contends that the Maute Group is a

mere private army, citing as basis the alleged interview of Vera Files with Davao market bombing, the Mamasapano carnage and other bombing
Joseph Franco wherein the latter allegedly mentioned that the Maute Group incidents in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, and Basilan, as additional factual
is more of a "clan's private militia latching into the IS brand theatrically to bases for the proclamation of martial law. It contends that these events either
inflate perceived capability". 15 The Lagman Petition insists that during the took place long before the conflict in Marawi City began, had long been
briefing, representatives of the military and defense authorities did not resolved, or with the culprits having already been arrested. 26
categorically admit nor deny the presence of an ISIS threat in the country but
that they merely gave an evasive answer 16 that "there is ISIS in the Fourth, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no
Philippines".17 The Lagman Petition also avers that Lt. Gen. Salvador Mison, sufficient factual basis considering that the President acted alone and did not
Jr. himself admitted that the current armed conflict in Marawi City was consult the military establishment or any ranking official 27 before making the
precipitated or initiated by the government in its bid to capture Hapilon. 18 proclamation.
Based on said statement, it concludes that the objective of the Maute
Group's armed resistance was merely to shield Hapilon and the Maute Finally, the Lagman Petition claims that the President's proclamation of
brothers from the government forces, and not to lay siege on Marawi City and martial law lacks sufficient factual basis owing to the fact that during the
remove its allegiance to the Philippine Republic. 19 It then posits that if at all, presentation before the Committee of the Whole of the House of
there is only a threat of rebellion in Marawi City which is akin to "imminent Representatives, it was shown that the military was even successful in pre-
danger" of rebellion, which is no longer a valid ground for the declaration of empting the ASG and the Maute Group's plan to take over Marawi City and
martial law.20 other parts of Mindanao; there was absence of any hostile plan by the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front; and the number of foreign fighters allied with ISIS
Second, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has was "undetermined"28 which indicates that there are only a meager number of
no sufficient factual basis because the President's Report containef "false, foreign fighters who can lend support to the Maute Group. 29
inaccurate, contrived and hyperbolic accounts".21
Based on the foregoing argumentation, the Lagman Petition asks the Court
It labels as false the claim in the President's Report that the Maute Group to: (1)"exercise its specific and special jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of
attacked Amai Pakpak Medical Center. Citing online reports on the interview the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216"; and (2) render "a Decision voiding
of Dr. Amer Saber (Dr. Saber), the hospital's Chief, the Lagman Petition and nullifying Proclamation No. 216" for lack of sufficient factual basis. 30
insists that the Maute Group merely brought an injured member to the
hospital for treatment but did not overrun the hospital or harass the hospital In a Resolution31 dated June 6, 2017, the Court required respondents to
personnel. 22 The Lagman Petition also refutes the claim in the President's comment on the Lagman Petition and set the case for oral argument on June
Report that a branch of the Landbank of the Philippines was ransacked and 13, 14, and 15, 2017.
its armored vehicle commandeered. It alleges that the bank employees
themselves clarified that the bank was not ransacked while the armored
vehicle was owned by a third party and was empty at the time it was On June 9, 2017, two other similar petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 231771
commandeered.23 It also labels as false the report on the burning of the and 231774 were filed and eventually consolidated with G.R. No. 231658. 32
Senator Ninoy Aquino College Foundation and the Marawi Central
Elementary Pilot School. It avers that the Senator Ninoy Aquino College B) G.R. No. 231771 (Cullamat Petition)
Foundation is intact as of May 24, 2017 and that according to Asst.
Superintendent Ana Alonto, the Marawi Central Elementary Pilot School was The Cullamat Petition, "anchored on Section 18, Article VII" 33 of the
not burned by the terrorists.24 Lastly, it points out as false the report on the Constitution, likewise seeks the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 for
beheading of the police chief of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, and the being unconstitutional because it lacks sufficient factual basis that there is
occupation of the Marawi City Hall and part of the Mindanao State rebellion in Mindanao and that public safety warrants its declaration. 34
University.25
In particular, it avers that the supposed rebellion described in Proclamation
Third, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no No. 216 relates to events happening in Marawi City only an not in the entire
sufficient factual basis since the President's Report mistakenly included the region of Mindanao. It concludes that Proclamation No 216 "failed to show
attack on the military outpost in Butig, Lanao del Sur in February 2016, the any factual basis for the imposition of martial law in the entire Mindanao,"35
mass jail break in Marawi City in August 2016, the Zamboanga siege, the "failed to allege any act of rebellion outside Marawi City, much less x x x

allege that public safety requires the imposition o martial law in the whole of According to the Mohamad Petition, the factual situation in Marawi is not so
Mindanao".36 grave as to require the imposition of martial law. 50 It asserts that the Marawi
incidents "do not equate to the existence of a public necessity brought about
The Cullamat Petition claims that the alleged "capability of the Maute Group by an actual rebellion, which would compel the imposition of martial law or
and other rebel groups to sow terror and cause death and damage to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus".51 It proposes
property"37 does not rise to the level of rebellion sufficient to declare martial that "[m]artial law can only be justified if the rebellion or invasion has reached
law in the whole of Mindanao. 38 It also posits that there is no lawless violence such gravity that [its] imposition x x x is compelled by the needs of public
in other parts of Mindanao similar to that in Marawi City. 39 safety"52 which, it believes, is not yet present in Mindanao.
Moreover, the Cullamat Petition assails the inclusion of the phrase "other Moreover, it alleges that the statements contained in the President's Report
rebel groups" in the last Whereas Clause of Proclamation No. 216 for being to the Congress, to wit: that the Maute Group intended to establish an Islamic
vague as it failed to identify these rebel groups and specify the acts of State; that they have the capability to deprive the duly constituted authorities
rebellion that they were supposedly waging.40 of their powers and prerogatives; and that the Marawi armed hostilities is
merely a prelude to a grander plan of taking over the whole of Mindanao, are
conclusions bereft of substantiation.53
In addition, the Cullamat Petition cites alleged inaccuracies, exaggerations,
and falsities in the Report of the President to Congress, particularly the attack
at the Amai Pakpak Hospital, the ambush and burning of the Marawi Police The Mohamad Petition posits that immediately after the declaration of martial
Station, the killing of five teachers of Dansalan College Foundation, and the law, and without waiting for a congressional action, a suit may already be
attacks on various government facilities.41 brought before the Court to assail the sufficiency of the factual basis of
Proclamation No. 216.
In fine, the Cullamat Petition prays for the Court to declare Proclamation No.
216 as unconstitutional or in the alternative, should the Court find justification Finally, in invoking this Court's power to review the sufficiency ofthe factual
for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of basis for the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of
habeas corpus in Marawi City, to declare the same as unconstitutional the writ of habeas corpus, the Mohamad Petition insists that the Court may
insofar as its inclusion of the other parts of Mindanao. 42 "look into the wisdom of the [President's] actions, [and] not just the presence
of arbitrariness".54 Further, it asserts that since it is making a negative
assertion, then the burden to prove the sufficiency of the factual basis is
C) G.R. No. 231774 (Mohamad Petition)
shifted to and lies on the respondents. 55 It thus asks the Court "to compel the
[r]espondents to divulge relevant information" 56 in order for it to review the
The Mohamad Petition, denominated as a "Petition for Review of the sufficiency of the factual basis.
Sufficiency of [the] Factual Basis of [the] Declaration of Martial Law and [the]
Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus,"43 labels itself as
In closing, the Mohamad Petition prays for the Court to exercise its power to
"a special proceeding"44 or an "appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen" 45
review, "compel respondents to present proof on the factual basis [of] the
authorized under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in Mindanao"57 and declare as unconstitutional Proclamation
The Mohamad Petition posits that martial law is a measure of last resort 46 No. 216 for lack of sufficient factual basis.
and should be invoked by the President only after exhaustion of less severe
remedies.47 It contends that the extraordinary powers of the President should
The Consolidated Comment
be dispensed sequentially, i.e., first, the power to call out the armed forces;
second, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and
finally, the power to declare martial law. 48 It maintains that the President has The respondents' Consolidated Comment 58 was filed on June 12, 2017, as
no discretion to choose which extraordinary power to use; moreover, his required by the Court. Noting that the same coincided with the celebration of
choice must be dictated only by, and commensurate to, the exigencies of the the 119th anniversary of the independence of this Republic, the Office of the
situation.49 Solicitor General (OSG) felt that "defending the constitutionality of
Proclamation No. 216" should serve as "a rallying call for every Filipino to

unite behind one true flag and defend it against all threats from within and factual basis for the proclamation, it would in effect usurp the powers of the
outside our shores".59 Congress to determine whether martial law should be revoked or extended. 72
The OSG acknowledges that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution vests It is also the assertion of the OSG that the President could validly rely on
the Court with the authority or power to review the sufficiency of the factual intelligence reports coming from the Armed Forces of the Philippines; 73 and
basis of the declaration of martial law.60 The OSG, however, posits that that he could not be expected to personally determine the veracity of
although Section 18, Article VII lays the basis for the exercise of such thecontents of the reports.74 Also, since the power to impose martial law is
authority or power, the same constitutional provision failed to specify the vested solely on the President as Commander-in-Chief, the lack of
vehicle, mode or remedy through which the "appropriate proceeding" recommendation from the Defense Secretary, or any official for that matter,
mentioned therein may be resorted to. The OSG suggests that the will not nullify the said declaration, or affect its validity, or compromise the
"appropriate proceeding" referred to in Section 18, Article VII may be availed sufficiency of the factual basis.
of using the vehicle, mode or remedy of a certiorari petition, either under
Section 1 or 5, of Article VIII. 61 Corollarily, the OSG maintains that the review Moreover, the OSG opines that the petitioners miserably failed to validly
power is not mandatory, but discretionary only, on the part of the Court. 62 refute the facts cited by the President in Proclamation No. 216 and in his
The Court has the discretion not to give due course to the petition. 63 Report to the Congress by merely citing news reports that supposedly
contradict the facts asserted therein or by criticizing in piecemeal the
Prescinding from the foregoing, the OSG contends that the sufficiency of the happenings in Marawi. For the OSG, the said news articles are "hearsay
factual basis of Proclamation No. 216 should be reviewed by the Court evidence, twice removed,"75 and thus inadmissible and without probative
"under the lens of grave abuse of discretion" 64 and not the yardstick of value, and could not overcome the "legal presumption bestowed on
correctness of the facts.65 Arbitrariness, not correctness, should be the governmental acts".76
standard in reviewing the sufficiency of factual basis.
Finally, the OSG points out that it has no duty or burden to prove that
The OSG maintains that the burden lies not with the respondents but with the Proclamation No. 216 has sufficient factual basis. It maintains that the burden
petitioners to prove that Proclamation No. 216 is bereft of factual rests with the petitioners. However, the OSG still endeavors to lay out the
basis.1âwphi1 It thus takes issue with petitioners' attempt to shift the burden factual basis relied upon by the President "if only to remove any doubt as to
of proof when they asked the Court "to compel [the] respondents to present the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 216".77
proof on the factual basis" 66 of Proclamation No. 216. For the OSG, "he who
alleges must prove"67 and that governmental actions are presumed to be The facts laid out by the OSG in its Consolidated Comment will be discussed
valid and constitutional.68 in detail in the Court's Ruling.
Likewise, the OSG posits that the sufficiency of the factual basis must be ISSUES
assessed from the trajectory or point of view of the President and base on
the facts available to him at the time the decision was made. 69 It argues that The issues as contained in the revised Advisory 78 are as follows:
the sufficiency of the factual basis should be examined not based on the
facts discovered after the President had made his decision to declare martial
law because to do so would subject the exercise of the President's discretion 1. Whether or not the petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771, and
to an impossible standard.70 It reiterates that the President's decision should 231774 are the "appropriate proceeding" covered by Paragraph 3, Section
be guided only by the information and data available to him at the time he 18, Article VII of the Constitution sufficient to invoke the mode of review
made the determination.71 The OSG thus asserts that facts that were required of this Court when a declaration of martial law or the suspension of
established after the declaration of martial law should not be considered in the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is promulgated;
the review of the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial
law. The OSG suggests that the assessment of after-proclamation facts lies 2. Whether or not the President in declaring martial law and suspending the
with the President and Congress for the purpose of determining the propriety privilege of the writ of habeas corpus:
of revoking or extending the martial law. The OSG fears that if the Court
considers after-proclamation-facts in its review of the sufficiency of the a. is required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his appreciation of
facts;

b. is required to obtain the favorable recommendation thereon of the 8. Whether or not terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism are equivalent to
Secretary of National Defense; actual rebellion and the requirements of public safety sufficient to declare
martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and
c. is required to take into account only the situation at the time of the
proclamation, even if subsequent events prove the situation to have not been 9. Whether or not nullifying Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017 will:
accurately reported;
a. have the effect of recalling Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016; or
3. Whether or not the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis [of] the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the b. also nullify the acts of the President in calling out the armed forces to quell
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is independent of the actual actions that lawless violence in Marawi and other parts of the Mindanao region.
have been taken by Congress jointly or separately;
After the oral argument, the parties submitted their respective memoranda
4. Whether or not there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of and supplemental memoranda.
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus;
OUR RULING
a. What are the parameters for review?
I. Locus standi of petitioners.
b. Who has the burden of proof?
One of the requisites for judicial review is locus standi, i.e., "the constitutional
c. What is the threshold of evidence? question is brought before [the Court] by a party having the requisite
'standing' to challenge it."79 As a general rule, the challenger must have "a
5. Whether the exercise of the power of judicial review by this Court involves personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
the calibration of graduated powers granted the President as Commander-in- will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement." 80 Over the years,
Chief, namely calling out powers, suspension of the privilege of the writ of there has been a trend towards relaxation of the rule on legal standing, a
habeas corpus, and declaration of martial law; prime example of which is found in Section 18 of Article VII which provides
that any citizen may file the appropriate proceeding to assail the sufficiency
6. Whether or not Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017 may be considered, of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the
vague and thus null and void: privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. "[T]he only requisite for standing to
challenge the validity of the suspension is that the challenger be a citizen. He
need not even be a taxpayer."81
a. with its inclusion of "other rebel groups;" or
Petitioners in the Cullamat Petition claim to be "suing in their capacities as

b. since it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters
citizens of the Republic;"82 similarly, petitioners in the Mohamad Petition all
within the entire Mindanao region;
claim to be "Filipino citizens, all women, all of legal [age], and residents of
Marawi City".83 In the Lagman Petition, however, petitioners therein did not
7. Whether or not the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 categorically mention that they are suing's citizens but merely referred to
and in the Report of the President to Congress are sufficient [bases]: themselves as duly elected Representatives. 84 That they are suing in their
official capacities as Members of Congress couLd have elicited a vigorous
a. for the existence of actual rebellion; or discussion considering the issuance by the House of Representatives of
House Resolution No. 1050 expressing full support to President Duterte and
b. for a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ finding no reason to revoke Proclamation No. 216. By such resolution, the
of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao 1 region; House of Representatives is declaring that it finds no reason to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the martial law declaration, which is in direct
contrast to the views and arguments being espoused by the petitioners in the
Lagman Petition. Considering, however, the trend towards relaxation of the

rules on legal standing, as well as the transcendental issues involved in the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege
present Petitions, the Court will exercise judicial self-restraint 85 and will not of the writ of habeas corpus.
venture into this matter. After all, "the Court is not entirely without discretion
to accept a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of a [bona fide] case b) "In an appropriate proceeding" does not refer to a
or of standing. Considerations paramount to [the requirement of legal petition for certiorari filed under Section 1 or 5 of Article VIII
standing] could compel assumption of jurisdiction." 86 In any case, the Court
can take judicial cognizance of the fact that petitioners in the Lagman Petition It could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution that the
are all citizens of the Philippines since Philippine citizenship is a requirement phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" would refer to a Petition for Certiorari
for them to be elected as representatives. We will therefore consider them as pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII. The standard of review in a
suing in their own behalf as citizens of this country. Besides, respondents did petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has committed any grave
not question petitioners' legal standing. abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the
performance of his or her functions. Thus, it is not the proper tool to review
II. Whether or not the petitions are the “appropriate proceeding" covered by the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension. It must
paragraph3, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution sufficient to invoke the be emphasized that under Section 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to
mode of review requiredby the Court. review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's exercise of
emergency powers. Put differently, if this Court applies the standard of
All three petitions beseech the cognizance of this Court based on the third review used in a petition for certiorari, the same would emasculate its
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII.
Constitution which provides:
c) Purpose/significance of Section 18, Article VII is to constitutionalize the
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any pre-Marcos martial law ruling in In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas
citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law Corpus of Lansang.
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and
must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. The third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII was inserted by the framers of
the 1987 Constitution to constitutionalize the pre-Marcos martial law ruling of
During the oral argument, the petitioners theorized that the jurisdiction of this this Court in In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang, 92 to
Court under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII is sui generis.87 It is wit: that the factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension
a special and specific jurisdiction of the Supreme Court different from those of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a political question but
enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. 88 precisely within the ambit of judicial review.
The Court agrees. "In determining the meaning, intent, and purpose of a law or constitutional
provision, the history of the times out of which it grew and to which it may be
a) Jurisdiction must be specifically conferred by the Constitution or by law. rationally supposed to bear some direct relationship, the evils intended to be
remedied, and the good to be accomplished are proper subjects of inquiry." 93
Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. (Fr. Bernas), a member of the Constitutional
It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the
Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution, explained:
Constitution or by the law.89 Unless jurisdiction has been specifically
conferred by the Constitution or by some legislative act, no body or tribunal
has the power to act or pass upon a matter brought before it for resolution. It The Commander-in-Chief provisions of the 1935 Constitution had enabled
is likewise settled that in the absence of a clear legislative intent, jurisdiction President Ferdinand Marcos to impose authoritarian rule on the Philippines
cannot be implied from the language of the Constitution or a statute. 90 It must from 1972 to 1986. Supreme Court decisions during that period upholding
appear clearly from the law or it will not be held to exist. 91 the actions taken by Mr. Marcos made authoritarian rule part of Philippine
constitutional jurisprudence. The members of the Constitutional Commission,
very much aware of these facts, went about reformulating the Commander-
A plain reading of the afore-quoted Section 18, Article VII reveals that it
in-Chief powers with a view to dismantling what had been constructed during
specifically grants authority to the Court to determine the sufficiency of the
the authoritarian years. The new formula included revised grounds for the

activation of emergency powers, the manner of activating them, the scope of MR. MONSOD. This situation arises in cases of invasion or rebellion. And in
the powers, and review of presidential action.94 (Emphasis supplied) previous interpellations regarding this phrase, even during the discussions on
the Bill of Rights, as I understand it, the interpretation is a situation of actual
To recall, the Court held in the 1951 case of Montenegro v. Castaneda95 that invasion or rebellion. In these situations, the President has to act quickly.
the authority to decide whether there is a state of rebellion requiring the Secondly, this declaration has a time fuse. It is only good for a maximum of
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is lodged with the 60 days. At the end of 60 days, it automatically terminates. Thirdly, the right
President and his decision thereon is final and conclusive upon the courts. of the judiciary to inquire into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
This ruling was reversed in the 1971 case of Lansang where it was held that proclamation always exists, even during those first 60 days.
the factual basis of the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a political question and is within MR. SUAREZ. Given our traumatic experience during the past
the ambit of judicial review.96 However, in 1983, or after the declaration of administration, if we give exclusive right to the President to determine these
martial law by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, the Court, in Garcia- factors, especially the existence of an invasion or rebellion and the second
Padilla v. Enrile,97 abandoned the ruling in Lansang and reverted to factor of determining whether the public safety requires it or not, may I call
Montenegro. According to the Supreme Court, the constitutional power of the the attention of the Gentleman to what happened to us during the past
President to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not subject administration. Proclamation No. 1081 was issued by Ferdinand E. Marcos in
to judicial inquiry.98 his capacity as President of the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested
upon him purportedly under Article VII, Section 10 (2) of the Constitution,
Thus, by inserting Section 18 in Article VII which allows judicial review of the wherein he made this predicate under the "Whereas" provision:
declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, the framers of the 1987 Constitution in effect Whereas, the rebellion and armed action undertaken by these lawless
constitutionalized and reverted to the Lansang doctrine. elements of the Communists and other armed aggrupations organized to
overthrow the Republic of the Philippines by armed violence and force have
d) Purpose of Section 18, Article VII is to provide additional assumed the magnitude of an actual state of war against our people and the
safeguard against possible abuse by the President on the exercise of the Republic of the Philippines.
extraordinary powers.
And may I also call the attention of the Gentleman to General Order No. 3,
Section 18, Article VII is meant to provide additional safeguard against also promulgated by Ferdinand E. Marcos, in his capacity as Commander-in-
possible abuse by the President in the exercise of his power to declare Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines and pursuant to Proclamation
martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Reeling No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972 wherein he said, among other things:
from the aftermath of the Marcos martial law, the framers of the Constitution
deemed it wise to insert the now third paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII. 99 Whereas, martial law having been declared because of wanton destruction of
This is clear from the records of the Constitutional Commission when its lives and properties, widespread lawlessness and anarchy and chaos and
members were deliberating on whether the President could proclaim martial disorder now prevailing throughout the country, which condition has been
law even without the concurrence of Congress. Thus: brought about by groups of men who are actively engaged in a criminal
conspiracy to seize political and state power in the Philippines in order to
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. take over the government by force and violence, the extent of which has now
assumed the proportion of an actual war against our people and the
legitimate government ...
The Commissioner is proposing a very substantial amendment because this
means that he is vesting exclusively unto the President the right to determine
the factors which may lead to the declaration of martial law and the And he gave all reasons in order to suspend the privilege of the writ of
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. I suppose he has strong and habeas corpus and declare martial law in our country without justifiable
compelling reasons in seeking to delete this particular, phrase. May we be reason. Would the Gentleman still insist on the deletion of the phrase 'and,
informed of his good and substantial reasons? with the concurrence of at least a majority of all the members of the
Congress'?

MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President, in the case of Mr.Marcos, he is life. While traditional powers inherent in the office of the President are
undoubtedly an aberration in our history and national consciousness. But granted, nonetheless for the first time, there are specific provisions which
given the possibility that there would be another Marcos, our Constitution curtail the extent of such powers. Most significant is the power of the Chief
now has sufficient safeguards. As I said, it is not really true, as the Executive to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or proclaim
Gentleman has mentioned, that there is an exclusive right to determine the martial law.
factual basis because the paragraph beginning on line 9 precisely tells us
that the Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by The flagrant abuse of that power of the Commander-in-Chief by Mr. Marcos
any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial caused the imposition of martial law for more than eight years and the
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof and suspension of the privilege of the writ even after the lifting of martial law in
must promulgate its decision on the same within 30 days from its filing. 1981. The new Constitution now provides that those powers can be
exercised only in two cases, invasion or rebellion when public safety
I believe that there are enough safeguards. The Constitution is supposed to demands it, only for a period not exceeding 60 days, and reserving to
balance the interests of the country. And here we are trying to balance the Congress the power to revoke such suspension or proclamation of martial
public interest in case of invasion or rebellion as against the rights of citizens. law which congressional action may not be revoked by the President. More
And I am saying that there are enough safeguards, unlike in 1972 when Mr. importantly, the action of the President is made subject to judicial review,
Marcos was able to do all those things mentioned.100 thereby again discarding jurisprudence which render[s] the executive action a
political question and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts to adjudicate.
To give more teeth to this additional safeguard, the framers of the 1987
Constitution not only placed the President's proclamation of martial law or For the first time, there is a provision that the state of martial law does not
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus within the ambit of suspend the operation of the Constitution nor abolish civil courts or legislative
judicial review, it also relaxed the rule on standing by allowing any citizen to assemblies, or vest jurisdiction to military tribunals over civilians, or suspend
question before this Court the sufficiency of the factual basis of such the privilege of the writ. Please forgive me if, at this point, I state that this
proclamation or suspension. Moreover, the third paragraph of Section 18, constitutional provision vindicates the dissenting opinions I have written
Article VII veritably conferred upon any citizen a demandable right to during my tenure in the Supreme Court in the martial law cases. 101
challenge the sufficiency of the factual basis of said proclamation or
suspension. It further designated this Court as the reviewing tribunal to f) To interpret "appropriate proceeding" as filed under Section 1
examine, in an appropriate proceeding, the sufficiency of the factual basis of Article VIII would be contrary to the intent of the Constitution.
and to render its decision thereon within a limited period of 30 days from date
of filing. To conclude that the "appropriate proceeding" refers to a Petition for
Certiorari filed under the expanded jurisdiction of this Court would, therefore,
e) Purpose of Section 18, Article VII is to curtail the extent of the powers of contradict the clear intention of the framers of the Constitution to place
the President. additional safeguards against possible martial law abuse for, invariably, the
third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII would be subsumed under Section 1
The most important objective, however, of Section 18, Article VII is the of Article VIII. In other words, the framers of the Constitution added the
curtailment of the extent of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief. This is safeguard under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII on top of the
the primary reason why the provision was not placed in Article VIII or the expanded jurisdiction of this Court.
Judicial Department but remained under Article VII or the Executive
Department. g) Jurisdiction of the Court is not restricted to those enumerated in
Sections I and 5 of Article VIII
During the closing session of the Constitutional Commission's deliberations,
President Cecilia Muñoz Palma expressed her sentiments on the 1987 The jurisdiction of this Court is not restricted to those enumerated in Sections
Constitution. She said: 1 and 5 of Article VIII. For instance, its jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or
The executive power is vested in the President of the Philippines elected by Vice-President can be found in the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII. 102
the people for a six-year term with no reelection for the duration of his/her The power of the Court to review on certiorari the decision, order, or ruling of

the Commission on Elections and Commission on Audit can be found in a) The judicial power to review versus the congressional power to
Section 7, Article IX(A).103 revoke.
h) Unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate
make it sui generis. proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground of lack of sufficient factual
basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or
The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII clearly suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
indicate that it should be treated as sui generis separate and different from
those enumerated in Article VIII. Under the third paragraph of Section 18, In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or
Article VII, a petition filed pursuant therewith will follow a different rule on suspension, the Court considers only the information and data available to
standing as any citizen may file it. Said provision of the Constitution also the President prior to or at the time of the declaration; it is not allowed td
limits the issue to the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise by the "undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings." 106 On the
Chief Executive of his emergency powers. The usual period for filing other hand, Congress may take into consideration not only data available
pleadings in Petition for Certiorari is likewise not applicable under the third prior to, but likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court I
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII considering the limited period within which does not look into the absolute correctness of the factual basis as will
which this Court has to promulgate its decision. be discussed below, Congress could probe deeper and further; it can delve
into the accuracy of the facts presented before it.
A proceeding "[i]n its general acceptation, [is] the form in which actions are to
be brought and defended, the manner of intervening in suits, of conducting In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the filing
them, the mode of deciding them, of opposing judgments, and of of a petition "in an appropriate proceeding" by a citizen. On the other hand,
executing."104 In fine, the phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" appearing on Congress' review mechanism is automatic in the sense that it may be
the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII refers to any action initiated by a activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension
citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of was made.
the exercise of the Chief Executive's emergency powers, as in these cases. It
could be denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress
by the Court. are not only totally different but likewise independent from each other
although concededly, they have the same trajectory, which is, the nullification
III. The power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the Court to
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of review can be exercised independently from the power of revocation of
habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is Congress.
independent of the actions taken by Congress.
b) The framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the judicial
During the oral argument,105 the OSG urged the Court to give! deference to power to review to be exercised independently from the congressional
the actions of the two co-equal branches of the Government: on' the part of power to revoke.
the President as Commander-in-Chief, in resorting to his extraordinary
powers to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas If only to show that the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution was to
corpus; and on the part of Congress, in giving its imprimatur to Proclamation vest the Court and Congress with veto powers independently from each
No. 216 and not revoking the same. other, we quote the following exchange:
The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated the scope of the MS. QUESADA. Yesterday, the understanding of many was that there would
extraordinary powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief and the be safeguards that Congress will be able to revoke such proclamation.
review of the said presidential action. In particular, the President's
extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus MR. RAMA. Yes.
and imposing martial law are subject to the veto powers of the Court and
Congress.

MS. QUESADA. But now, if they cannot meet because they have been IV. The judicial power to review the sufficiency of factual basis of the
arrested or that the Congress has been padlocked, then who is going to declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
declare that such a proclamation was not warranted? habeas corpus does not extend to the calibration of the President's decision
of which among his graduated powers he will avail of in a given
MR. REGALADO. May I also inform Commissioner Quesada that the situation.
judiciary is not exactly just standing by. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
if the Members are detained, can immediately be applied for, and the The President as the Commander-in-Chief wields the extraordinary powers
Supreme Court shall also review the factual basis. x x x107 of: a) calling out the armed forces; b) suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus; and c) declaring martial law.112 These powers may be
c) Re-examination of the Court's pronouncement in Fortun v. President resorted to only under specified conditions.
Macapagal-Arroyo
The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated the powers of the
Considering the above discussion, the Court finds it imperative to re- Commander-in-Chief by revising the "grounds for the activation of emergency
examine, reconsider, and set aside its pronouncement in Fortun v. President powers, the manner of activating them, the scope of the powers, and review
Macapagal-Arroyo108 to the effect that: of presidential action."113
Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the a) Extraordinary powers of the President distinguished.
power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or
suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress Among the three extraordinary powers, the calling out power is the most
to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated. benign and involves ordinary police action. 114 The President may resort to
Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution this extraordinary power whenever it becomes necessary to prevent or
through such review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. "[T]he power to call is fully
The constitutional validity of the President's proclamation of martial law or discretionary to the President;"115 the only limitations being that he acts within
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the permissible constitutional boundaries or in a manner not constituting grave
hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the abuse of discretion.116 In fact, "the actual use to which the President puts the
Court.109 armed forces is x x x not subject to judicial review." 117
If the Congress procrastinates or altogether fails to fulfill its duty respecting The extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
the proclamation or suspension within the short time expected of it, then the corpus and/or declaring martial law may be exercised only when there is
Court can step in, hear the petitions challenging the President's action, and actual invasion or rebellion, and public safety requires it. The 1987
ascertain if it has a factual basis. x x x110 Constitution imposed the following limits in the exercise of these powers: "(1)
a time limit of sixty days; (2) review and possible revocation by Congress;
By the above pronouncement, the Court willingly but unwittingly clipped its [and] (3) review and possible nullification by the Supreme Court." 118
own power and surrendered the same to Congress as well as: abdicated
from its bounden duty to review. Worse, the Court considered' itself just on The framers of the 1987 Constitution eliminated insurrection, and the phrase
stand-by, waiting and willing to act as a substitute in case Congress "imminent danger thereof' as grounds for the suspension of the privilege of
"defaults." It is an aberration, a stray declaration, which must be rectified and the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law. 119 They perceived the
set aside in this proceeding.111 phrase "imminent danger" to be "fraught with possibilities of abuse;" 120
besides, the calling out power of the President "is sufficient for handling
We, therefore, hold that the Court can simultaneously exercise its power of imminent danger."121
review with, and independently from, the power to revoke by Congress.
Corollary, any perceived inaction or default on the part of Congress does not The powers to declare martial law and to suspend the privilege of the writ of
deprive or deny the Court of its power to review. habeas corpus involve curtailment and suppression of civil rights and
individual freedom. Thus, the declaration of martial law serves as a warning
to citizens that the Executive Department has called upon the military to

assist in the maintenance of law and order, and while the emergency is authorized to give jurisdiction even over civilians to military courts precisely
remains, the citizens must, under pain of arrest and punishment, not act in a because the civil courts are closed in that area. But in the general area where
manner that will render it more difficult to restore order and enforce the the civil courts are open then in no case can the military courts be given
law.122 As such, their exercise requires more stringent safeguards by the jurisdiction over civilians. This is in reference to a theater of war where the
Congress, and review by the Court.123 civil courts, in fact, are unable to function.
b) What really happens during martial law? MR. FOZ. It is a state of things brought about by the realities of the situation
in that specified critical area.
During the oral argument, the following questions cropped up: What really
happens during the imposition of martial law? What powers could the FR. BERNAS. That is correct.
President exercise during martial law that he could not exercise if there is no
martial law? Interestingly, these questions were also discussed by the MR. FOZ. And it is not something that is brought about by a declaration of
framers of the 1987 Constitution, viz.: the Commander-in-Chief.
FR. BERNAS. That same question was asked during the meetings of the FR. BERNAS. It is not brought about by a declaration of the Commander-in-
Committee: What precisely does martial law add to the power of the Chief. The understanding here is that the phrase 'nor authorize the
President to call on the armed forces? The first and second lines in this conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians' has
provision state: reference to the practice under the Marcos regime where military courts were
given jurisdiction over civilians. We say here that we will never allow that
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor except in areas where civil courts are, in fact, unable to function and it
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies... becomes necessary for some kind of court to function. 125
The provision is put there, precisely, to reverse the doctrine of the Supreme A state of martial law is peculiar because the President, at such a time,
Court. I think it is the case of Aquino v. COMELEC where the Supreme Court exercises police power, which is normally a function of the Legislature. In
said that in times of martial law, the President automatically has legislative particular, the President exercises police power, with the military’s
power. So these two clauses denied that. A state of martial law does not assistance, to ensure public safety and in place of government agencies
suspend the operation of the Constitution; therefore, it does not suspend the which for the time being are unable to cope with the condition in a locality,
principle of separation of powers. which remains under the control of the State.126
The question now is: During martial law, can the President issue decrees? In David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo,127 the Court, quoting Justice Vicente
The answer we gave to that question in the Committee was: During martial V. Mendoza's (Justice Mendoza) Statement before the Senate Committee on
law, the President may have the powers of a commanding general in a Justice on March 13, 2006, stated that under a valid declaration of martial
theatre of war. In actual war when there is fighting in an area, the President law, the President as Commander-in-Chief may order the "(a) arrests and
as the commanding general has the authority to issue orders which have the seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c)
effect of law but strictly in a theater of war, not in the situation we had during [takeover] of news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d)
the period of martial law. In other words, there is an effort here to return to issuance of Presidential Decrees x x x". 128
the traditional concept of martial law as it was developed especially in
American jurisprudence, where martial law has reference to the theater of Worthy to note, however, that the above-cited acts that the President may
war.124 perform do not give him unbridled discretion to infringe on the rights of
civilians during martial law. This is because martial law does not suspend the
FR. BERNAS. This phrase was precisely put here because we have clarified operation of the Constitution, neither does it supplant the operation of civil
the meaning of martial law; meaning, limiting it to martial law as it has existed courts or legislative assemblies. Moreover, the guarantees under the Bill of
in the jurisprudence in international law, that it is a law for the theater of war. Rights remain in place during its pendency. And in such instance where the
In a theater of war, civil courts are unable to function. If in the actual theater privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is also suspended, such suspension
of war civil courts, in fact, are unable to function, then the military commander

applies only to those judicially charged with rebellion or offenses connected conclusion that judicial review does not include the calibration of the
with invasion.129 President's decision of which of his graduated powers will be availed of in a
given situation. Voting 28 to 12, the framers of the 1987 Constitution
Clearly, from the foregoing, while martial law poses the most severe threat to removed the requirement of congressional concurrence in the first imposition
civil liberties,130 the Constitution has safeguards against the President's of martial law and suspension of the privilege.133
prerogative to declare a state of martial law.
MR. PADILLA.x x x
c) "Graduation" of powers refers to hierarchy based on scope
and effect; it does not refer to a sequence, order, or arrangement by We all agree with the suspension of the writ or the proclamation of martial
which the Commander-in-Chief must adhere to. law should not require beforehand the concurrence of the majority of the
Members of the Congress. However, as provided by the Committee, the
Indeed, the 1987 Constitution gives the "President, as Commander-in- Chief, Congress may revoke, amend, or shorten or even increase the period of
a 'sequence' of 'graduated power[s]'. From the most to the least benign, such suspension.134
these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law."131 It must be MR. NATIVIDAD. First and foremost, we agree with the Commissioner's
stressed, however, that the graduation refers only to hierarchy based on thesis that in the first imposition of martial law there is no need for
scope and effect. It does not in any manner refer to a sequence, concurrence of the Members of Congress because the provision says 'in
arrangement, or order which the Commander-in-Chief must follow. This so- case of actual invasion or rebellion.' If there is actual invasion and rebellion,
called "graduation of powers" does not dictate or restrict the manner by which as Commissioner Crispino de Castro said, there is a need for immediate
the President decides which power to choose. response because there is an attack. Second, the fact of securing a
concurrence may be impractical because the roads might be blocked or
These extraordinary powers are conferred by the Constitution with the barricaded. x x x So the requirement of an initial concurrence of the majority
President as Commander-in-Chief; it therefore necessarily follows that the of all Members of the Congress in case of an invasion or rebellion might be
power and prerogative to determine whether the situation warrants a mere impractical as I can see it.
exercise of the calling out power; or whether the situation demands
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; or whether it calls for Second, Section 15 states that the Congress may revoke the declaration or
the declaration of martial law, also lies, at least initially, with the President. lift the suspension.
The power to choose, initially, which among these extraordinary powers to
wield in a given set of conditions is a judgment call on the part of the And third, the matter of declaring martial law is already a justiciable question
President. As Commander-in-Chief, his powers are broad enough to include and no longer a political one in that it is subject to judicial review at any point
his prerogative to address exigencies or threats that endanger the in time. So on that basis, I agree that there is no need for concurrence as a
government, and the very integrity of the State. 132 prerequisite to declare martial law or to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. x x x135
It is thus beyond doubt that the power of judicial review does not extend to
calibrating the President's decision pertaining to which extraordinary power to MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.
avail given a set of facts or conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an
incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on The Commissioner is suggesting that in connection with Section 15, we
the prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the President. delete the phrase 'and, with the concurrence of at least a majority of all the
Members of the Congress...'
d) The framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the Congress
not to interfere a priori in the decision-making process of the President. MR. PADILLA. That is correct especially for the initial suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or also the declaration of martial law.
The elimination by the framers of the 1987 Constitution of the requirement of
prior concurrence of the Congress in the initial imposition of martial law or MR. SUAREZ. So in both instances, the Commissioner is suggesting that this
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus further supports the would be an exclusive prerogative of the President?

MR. PADILLA. At least initially, for a period of 60 days. But even that period or rebellion, even during the first 60 days when the intention here is to protect
of 60 days may be shortened by the Congress or the Senate because the the country in that situation, it would be unreasonable to ask that there
next sentence says that the Congress or the Senate may even revoke the should be a concurrence on the part of the Congress, which situation is
proclamation.136 automatically terminated at the end of such 60 days.
MR. SUAREZ. x x x MR. SUAREZ. Would the Gentleman not feel more comfortable if we provide
for a legislative check on this awesome power of the Chief Executive acting
The Commissioner is proposing a very substantial amendment because this as Commander-in-Chief?
means that he is vesting exclusively unto the President the right to determine
the factors which may lead to the declaration of martial law and the MR. MONSOD. I would be less comfortable if we have a presidency that
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. I suppose he has strong and cannot act under those conditions.
compelling reasons in seeking to delete this particular phrase. May we be
informed of his good and substantial reasons? MR. SUAREZ. But he can act with the concurrence of the proper or
appropriate authority?
MR. MONSOD. This situation arises in cases of invasion or rebellion. And in
previous interpellations regarding this phrase, even during the discussions on MR. MONSOD. Yes. But when those situations arise, it is very unlikely that
the Bill of Rights, as I understand it, the interpretation is a situation of actual the concurrence of Congress would be available; and, secondly, the
invasion or rebellion. In these situations, the President has to act quickly. President will be able to act quickly in order to deal with the circumstances.
Secondly, this declaration has a time fuse. It is only good for a maximum of
60 days. At the end of 60 days, it automatically terminates. Thirdly, the right MR. SUAREZ. So, we would be subordinating actual circumstances to
of the judiciary to inquire into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the expediency?
proclamation always exists, even during those first 60 days.
MR. MONSOD. I do not believe it is expediency when one is trying to protect
MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President, in the case of Mr. Marcos[,] he is the country in the event of an invasion or a rebellion. 137
undoubtedly an aberration in our history and national consciousness. But
given the possibility that there would be another Marcos, our Constitution
now has sufficient safeguards. As I said, it is not really true, as the The foregoing exchange clearly manifests the intent of the Constitution not to
Gentleman mentioned, that there is an exclusive right to determine the allow Congress to interfere a priori in the President's choice of extraordinary
factual basis because the paragraph being on line 9 precisely tells us that the powers.
Supreme court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen,
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the e) The Court must similarly and necessarily refrain from
suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof and must calibrating the President's decision of which among his extraordinary
promulgate its decision on the same within 30 days from its filing. powers to avail given a certain situation or condition.
I believe that there are enough safeguards. The Constitution is supposed to It cannot be overemphasized that time is paramount in situations
balance the interests of the country. And here we are trying to balance the necessitating the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of
public interest in case of invasion or rebellion as against the rights of citizens. the writ of habeas corpus. It was precisely this time element that prompted
xxx the Constitutional Commission to eliminate the requirement of 1 concurrence
of the Congress in the initial imposition by the President of martial law or
MR. SUAREZ. Will that prevent a future President from doing what Mr. suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Marcos had done?
Considering that the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the
MR. MONSOD. There is nothing absolute in this world, and there may be privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is now anchored on actual invasion or
another Marcos. What we are looking for are safeguards that arereasonable rebellion and when public safety requires it, and is no longer under threat or
and, I believe, adequate at this point. On the other hand, in case of invasion in imminent danger thereof, there is a necessity and urgency for the

President to act quickly to protect the country.138 The Court, as Congress Proclamation No. 216 is being facially challenged on the ground of
does, must thus accord the President the same leeway by not wading into "vagueness" by the insertion of the phrase "other rebel groups" 139 in its
the realm that is reserved exclusively by the Constitution to the Executive Whereas Clause and for lack of available guidelines specifying its actual
Department. operational parameters within the entire Mindanao region, making the
proclamation susceptible to broad interpretation, misinterpretation, or
j) The recommendation of the Defense Secretary is not a condition confusion.
for the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. This argument lacks legal basis.
Even the recommendation of, or consultation with, the Secretary of National a) Void-for-vagueness doctrine.
Defense, or other high-ranking military officials, is not a condition for the
President to declare martial law. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII of The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if "men of
the Constitution shows that the President's power to declare martial law is common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
not subject to any condition except for the requirements of actual invasion or its application."140 "[A] statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
rebellion and that public safety requires it. Besides, it would be contrary to comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily
common sense if the decision of the President is made dependent on the guess at its meaning and differ in its application. [In such instance, the
recommendation of his mere alter ego. Rightly so, it is only on the President statute] is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
and no other that the exercise of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair
under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution is bestowed. notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of
g) In any event, the President initially employed the most benign the Government muscle."141
action - the calling out power - before he declared martial law and
suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. b) Vagueness doctrine applies only in free speech cases.
At this juncture, it must be stressed that prior to Proclamation No. 216 or the The vagueness doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing "on their
declaration of martial law on May 23, 201 7, the President had already issued faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law,
Proclamation No. 55 on September 4, 2016, declaring a state of national First Amendment cases.142 A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a
emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao. This, in fact, is vague statute and also to one which is overbroad because of possible
extant in the first Whereas Clause of Proclamation No. 216. Based on the "'chilling effect' on protected speech that comes from statutes violating free
foregoing presidential actions, it can be gleaned that although there is no speech. A person who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime
obligation or requirement on his part to use his extraordinary powers on a under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from speaking
graduated or sequential basis, still the President made the conscious in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus
anddeliberate effort to first employ the most benign from among his chills him into silence."143
extraordinary powers. As the initial and preliminary step towards suppressing
and preventing the armed hostilities in Mindanao, the President decided to It is best to stress that the vagueness doctrine has a special application only
use his calling out power first. Unfortunately, the situation did not improve; on to free-speech cases. They are not appropriate for testing the validity of
the contrary, it only worsened. Thus, exercising his sole and exclusive penal statutes.144 Justice Mendoza explained the reason as follows:
prerogative, the President decided to impose martial law and suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on the belief that the armed hostilities in
Mindanao already amount to actual rebellion and public safety requires it. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which
is overbroad because of possible 'chilling effect' upon protected speech. The
theory is that ' [w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily
V. Whether or not Proclamation No. 216 may be considered vague and thus apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the
void because of (a) its inclusion of "other rebel groups"; and (b) the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of
absence of any guideline specifying its actual operational parameters within constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on
the entire Mindanao region. overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack

demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn conduct. It is actually a call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
with narrow specificity.' The possible harm to society in permitting some to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Like Proclamation No.
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that 1017, Proclamation No. 216 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free
the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
d) Inclusion of "other rebel groups " does not make Proclamation No.216
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have vague.
general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented The contention that the phrase "other rebel groups" leaves Proclamation No.
from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal 216 open to broad interpretation, misinterpretation, and confusion, cannot be
law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. sustained.
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are In People v. Nazario,150 the Court enunciated that:
analytical tools developed for testing 'on their faces' statutes in free speech
cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. comprehensible standards that men 'of common intelligence must
With respect to such statute, the established rule is that'one to whom necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.' It is
application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for
on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other failure to accord persons, especially the parties targetted by it, fair notice of
persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional.' the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
As has been pointed out, 'vagueness challenges in the First Amendment carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, Government muscle.
while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are
invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant.' x x x 145
But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be
clarified by either a saving clause or by construction. Thus, in Coates v. City
Invalidation of statutes "on its face" should be used sparingly because it of Cincinnati, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that had
results in striking down statutes entirely on the ground that they might made it illegal for 'three or more persons to assemble on any sidewalk and
beapplied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by.'
protected.146 "Such invalidation would constitute a departure from the usual Clearly, the ordinance imposed no standard at all 'because one may never
requirement of 'actual case and controversy' and permit decisions to be know in advance what annoys some people but does not annoy others.'
made in a sterile abstract context having no factual concreteness." 147
Coates highlights what has been referred to as a 'perfectly vague' act whose
c) Proclamation No. 216 cannot be facially challenged using the vagueness obscurity is evident on its face. It is to be distinguished, however, from
doctrine. legislation couched in imprecise language - but which nonetheless specifies
a standard though defectively phrased - in which case, it may be 'saved' by
Clearly, facial review of Proclamation No. 216 on the grounds of vagueness proper construction.151
is unwarranted. Proclamation No. 216 does not regulate speech, religious
freedom, and other fundamental rights that may be facially challenged. 148 The term "other rebel groups" in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague
What it seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech. when viewed in the context of the words that accompany it. Verily, the text of
Proclamation No. 216 refers to "other rebel groups" found in Proclamation
As held by the Court in David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo,149 the facial No. 55, which it cited by way of reference in its Whereas clauses.
review of Proclamation No. 1017, issued by then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo declaring a state of national emergency, on ground o e) Lack of guidelines/ operational parameters does not make Proclamation
vagueness is uncalled for since a plain reading of Proclamation No. 10171 No. 216 vague.
shows that it is not primarily directed at speech or even speech-related1

Neither could Proclamation No. 216 be described as vague, and thus void, President's action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the
on the ground that it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law
parameters within the entire Mindanao region. Besides, operational and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
guidelines will serve only as mere tools for the implementation of the otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together
proclamation. In Part III, we declared that judicial review covers only the the three powers and provided for their revocation and review without any
sufficiency of information or data available to or known to the President prior qualification.153
to, or at the time of, the declaration or suspension. And, as will be discussed
exhaustively in Part VII, the review will be confined to the proclamation itself In other words, the President may exercise the power to call out the Armed
and the Report submitted to Congress. Forces independently of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and to declare martial law, although, of course, it may also be
Clearly, therefore, there is no need for the Court to determine the a prelude to a possible future exercise of the latter powers, as in this case.
constitutionality of the implementing and/or operational guidelines, general
orders, arrest orders and other orders issued after the proclamation for being Even so, the Court's review of the President's declaration of martial law and
irrelevant to its review. Thus, any act committed under the said orders in his calling out the Armed Forces necessarily entails separate proceedings
violation of the Constitution and the laws, such as criminal acts or human instituted for that particular purpose.
rights violations, should be resolved in a separate proceeding. Finally, there
is a risk that if the Court wades into these areas, it would be deemed as As explained in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,154 the President's
trespassing into the sphere that is reserved exclusively for Congress in the exercise of his power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress
exercise of its power to revoke. lawless violence, invasion or rebellion may only be examined by the Court as
to whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits
VI. Whether or not nullifying Proclamation No. 216 will (a) have the effect of or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. 155
recalling Proclamation No. 55; or (b) also nullify the acts
of the President in calling out the armed forces to quell lawless violence in In Zamora, the Court categorically ruled that the Integrated Bar of the '
Marawi and other parts of the Mindanao region. Philippines had failed to sufficiently comply with the requisites of locus
standi, as it was not able to show any specific injury which it had suffered or
a) The calling out power is in a different category from the power to could suffer by virtue of President Joseph Estrada's order deploying the
declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of Philippine Marines to join the PNP in visibility patrols around the
habeas corpus; nullification of Proclamation No. 216 will not affect metropolis.156
Proclamation No. 55.
This locus standi requirement, however, need not be complied with in so far
The Court's ruling in these cases will not, in any way, affect the President's as the Court's jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
declaration of a state of national emergency on account of lawless violence in President's declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege ofthe writ
Mindanao through Proclamation No. 55 dated September 4, 2016, where he of habeas corpus is concerned. In fact, by constitutional design, such review
called upon the Armed Forces and the Philippine National 1 Police (PNP) to may be instituted by any citizen before the Court,157 without the need to
undertake such measures to suppress any and all forms of lawless violence prove that he or she stands to sustain a direct and personal injury as a
in the Mindanao region, and to prevent such lawless violence from spreading consequence of the questioned Presidential act/s.
and escalating elsewhere in the Philippines.
But, even assuming arguendo that the Court finds no sufficient basis for the
In Kulayan v. Tan,152 the Court ruled that the President's calling out power is declaration of martial law in this case, such ruling could not affect the
in a different category from the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of President's exercise of his calling out power through Proclamation No. 55.
habeas corpus and the power to declare martial law:
b) The operative fact doctrine.
x x x Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court
may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no Neither would the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 result in the
such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the nullification of the acts of the President done pursuant thereto. Under the

"operative fact doctrine," the unconstitutional statute is recognized as an a) The scope of the power of review under the 1987 Constitution
"operative fact" before it is declared unconstitutional. 158 refers only to the determination of the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus.
Where the assailed legislative or executive act is found by the judiciary to be
contrary to the Constitution, it is null and void. As the new Civil Code puts it: To recall, the Court, in the case of In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas
'When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the Corpus of Lansang,160 which was decided under the 1935 Constitution, 161
former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive held that it can inquire into, within proper bounds, whether there has been
acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to adherence to or compliance with the constitutionally-imposed limitations on
the laws or the Constitution.' The above provision of the Civil Code reflects the Presidential power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, whether legislative or corpus.162 "Lansang limited the review function of the Court to a very
executive, is not a law, confers no rights, imposes no duties, and affords no prudentially narrow test of arbitrariness." 163 Fr. Bernas described the "proper
protection. This doctrine admits of qualifications, however. As the American bounds" in Lansang as follows:
Supreme Court stated: 'The actual existence of a statute prior to such a
determination [of constitutionality], is an operative fact and may have What, however, are these 'proper bounds' on the power of the courts? The
consequences which cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. Court first gave the general answer that its power was 'merely to check - not
The effect of the subsequent ruling as to the invalidity may have to be to supplant - the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone
considered in various aspects, - with respect to particular regulations, beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power
individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official. vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act. More specifically, the
Court said that its power was not 'even comparable with its power over civil
The orthodox view finds support in the well-settled doctrine that the or criminal cases elevated thereto by appeal...in which cases the appellate
Constitution is supreme and provides the measure for the validity of court has all the powers of the courtof origin,' nor to its power of quasi-judicial
legislative or executive acts. Clearly then, neither the legislative nor the administrative decisions where the Court is limited to asking whether 'there is
executive branch, and for that matter much less, this Court, has power under some evidentiary basis' for the administrative finding. Instead, the Court
the Constitution to act contrary to its terms. Any attempted exercise of power accepted the Solicitor General's suggestion that it 'go no further than to
in violation of its provisions is to that extent unwarranted and null. satisfy [itself] not that the President's decision is correct and that public safety
was endangered by the rebellion and justified the suspension of the writ, but
The growing awareness of the role of the judiciary as the governmental organ that in suspending the writ, the President did not act arbitrarily.' 164
which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure
is valid leads to a more appreciative attitude of theemerging concept that a Lansang, however, was decided under the 1935 Constitution. The 1987
declaration of nullity may have legal consequences which the more orthodox Constitution, by providing only for judicial review based on the determination
view would deny. That for a period of time such a statute, treaty, executive of the sufficiency of the factual bases, has in fact done away with the test of
order, or ordinance was in 'actual existence' appears to be indisputable. arbitrariness as provided in Lansang.
What is more appropriate and logical then than to consider it as 'an operative
fact?' (Emphasis supplied)159 b) The "sufficiency of factual basis test".
However, it must also be stressed that this "operative fact doctrine" is not a Similarly, under the doctrine of contemporaneous construction, the framers of
fool-proof shield that would repulse any challenge to acts performed during the 1987 Constitution are presumed to know the prevailing jurisprudence at
the effectivity of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of the time they were drafting the Constitution. Thus, the phrase "sufficiency of
habeas corpus, purportedly in furtherance of quelling rebellion or invasion, factual basis" in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution should be
and promotion of public safety, when evidence shows otherwise. understood as the only test for judicial review of the President's power to
declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
VII. The Scope of the Power to Review. under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. The Court does not need to
satisfy itself that the President's decision is correct, rather it only needs to
determine whether the President's decision had sufficient factual bases.

We conclude, therefore, that Section 18, Article VII limits the scope of judicial confirm the correctness of the reports submitted to him within a period that
review by the introduction of the "sufficiency of the factual basis" test. only the circumstances obtaining would be able to dictate. Such a scenario,
of course, would not only place the President in peril but would also defeat
As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to declare the very purpose of the grant of emergency powers upon him, that is, to
martial law and/or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, borrow the words of Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Fortun, to "immediately put
subject to the revocation of Congress and the review of this Court. Since the an end to the root cause of the emergency". 166 Possibly, by the time the
exercise of these powers is a judgment call of the President, the President is satisfied with the correctness of the facts in his possession, it
determination of this Court as to whether there is sufficient factual basis for would be too late in the day as the invasion or rebellion could have already
the exercise of such, must be based only on facts or information known by or escalated to a level that is hard, if not impossible, to curtail.
available to the President at the time he made the declaration or suspension,
which facts or information are found in the proclamation as well as the written Besides, the framers of the 1987 Constitution considered intelligence reports
Report submitted by him to Congress. These may be based on the situation of military officers as credible evidence that the President ca appraise and to
existing at the time the declaration was made or past events. As to how far which he can anchor his judgment,167 as appears to be the case here.
the past events should be from the present depends on the President.
At this point, it is wise to quote the pertinent portions of the Dissenting
Past events may be considered as justifications for the declaration and/or Opinion of Justice Presbitero J. Velasco Jr. in Fortun:
suspension as long as these are connected or related to the current situation
existing at the time of the declaration. President Arroyo cannot be blamed for relying upon the information given to
her by the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
As to what facts must be stated in the proclamation and the written Report is Police, considering that the matter of the supposed armed uprising was
up to the President.165 As Commander-in-Chief, he has sole discretion to within their realm of competence, and that a state of emergency has also
determine what to include and what not to include in the proclamation and been declared in Central Mindanao to prevent lawless violence similar to the
the written Report taking into account the urgency of the situation as well as 'Maguindanao massacre,' which may be an indication that there is a threat to
national security. He cannot be forced to divulge intelligence reports and the public safety warranting a declaration of martial law or suspension of the
confidential information that may prejudice the operations and the safety of writ.
the military.
Certainly, the President cannot be expected to risk being too late before
Similarly, events that happened after the issuance of the proclamation, which declaring martial law or suspending the writ of habeas corpus. The
are included in the written report, cannot be considered in determining the Constitution, as couched, does not require precision in establishing the fact
sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law and/or the of rebellion. The President is called to act as public safety requires. 168
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus since these
happened after the President had already issued the proclamation. If at all, Corollary, as the President is expected to decide quickly on whether there is
they may be used only as tools, guides or reference in the Court's a need to proclaim martial law even only on the basis of intelligence reports,
determination of the sufficiency of factual basis, but not as part or component it is irrelevant, for purposes of the Court's review, if subsequent events prove
of the portfolio of the factual basis itself. that the situation had not been accurately reported to him.
In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or After all, the Court's review is confined to the sufficiency, not accuracy, of the
the suspension, the Court should look into the full complement or totality of information at hand during the declaration or suspension; subsequent events
the factual basis, and not piecemeal or individually. Neither should the Court do not have any bearing insofar as the Court's review is concerned. In any
expect absolute correctness of the facts stated in the proclamation and in the event, safeguards under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution are in
written Report as the President could not be expected to verify the accuracy place to cover such a situation, e.g., the martial law period is good only for 60
and veracity of all facts reported to him due to the urgency of the situation. To days; Congress may choose to revoke it even immediately after the
require precision in the President's appreciation of facts would unduly burden proclamation is made; and, this Court may investigate the factual background
him and therefore impede the process of his decision-making. Such a of the declaration.169
requirement will practically necessitate the President to be on the ground to

Hence, the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus finds no application in this MR. DE LOS REYES. As I see it now, the Committee envisions actual
case. Falsities of and/or inaccuracies in some of the facts stated in the rebellion and no longer imminent rebellion. Does the Committee mean that
proclamation and the written report are not enough reasons for the Court to there should be actual shooting or actual attack on the legislature or
invalidate the declaration and/or suspension as long as there are other facts Malacañang, for example? Let us take for example a contemporary event -
in the proclamation and the written Report that support the conclusion that this Manila Hotel incident, everybody knows what happened. Would the
there is an actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires the Committee consider that an actual act of rebellion?
declaration and/or suspension.
MR. REGALADO. If we consider the definition of rebellion under Articles 134
In sum, the Court's power to review is limited to the determination of whether and 135 of the Revised Penal Code, that presupposes an actual assemblage
the President in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of men in an armed public uprising for the purposes mentioned in Article 134
of habeas corpus had sufficient factual basis. Thus, our review would be and by the means employed under Article 135. x x x173
limited to an examination on whether the President acted within the bounds
set by the Constitution, i.e., whether the facts in his possession prior to and Thus, rebellion as mentioned in the Constitution could only refer to rebellion
at the time of the declaration or suspension are sufficient for him to declare as defined under Article 134 of the RPC. To give it a different definition would
martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. not only create confusion but would also give the President wide latitude of
discretion, which may be abused - a situation that the Constitution see k s to
VIII. The parameters for determining the sufficiency of the/actual basis/or the prevent.174
declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. Article 134 of the RPC states:
a) Actual invasion or rebellion, and public safety requirement. Art. 134. Rebellion or insurrection; How committed. - The crime of rebellion or
insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the
Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters for determining the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said
sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law and/or the Government or its laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, "namely (1) actual thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, depriving the Chief
invasion or rebellion, and (2) public safety requires the exercise of such Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or
power."170 Without the concurrence of the two conditions, the President's prerogatives.
declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus must be struck down. Thus, for rebellion to exist, the following elements must be present, to wit: "(l)
there is a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government;
As a general rule, a word used in a statute which has a technical or legal and (2) the purpose of the uprising or movement is either (a) to remove from
meaning, is construed to have the same technical or legal meaning. 171 Since the allegiance to the Government or its laws: (i) the territory of the Philippines
the Constitution did not define the term "rebellion," it must be understood to or any part thereof; or (ii) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or
have the same meaning as the crime of "rebellion" in the Revised Penal (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of
Code (RPC).172 their powers and prerogatives."175
During the July 29, 1986 deliberation of the Constitutional Commission of b) Probable cause is the allowable standard of proof for the President.
1986, then Commissioner Florenz D. Regalado alluded to actual rebellion as
one defined under Article 134 of the RPC: In determining the existence of rebellion, the President only needs to
convince himself that there is probable cause or evidence showing that more
likely than not a rebellion was committed or is being committed. 176 To require
him to satisfy a higher standard of proof would restrict the exercise of his
emergency powers. Along this line, Justice Carpio, in his Dissent in Fortun v.
President Macapagal-Arroyo, concluded that the President needs only to
satisfy probable cause as the standard of proof in determining the existence

of either invasion or rebellion for purposes of declaring martial law, and that deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their
probable cause is the most reasonable, most practical and most expedient powers or prerogatives.178
standard by which the President can fully ascertain the existence or non-
existence of rebellion necessary for a declaration of martial law or Petitioners concede that there is an armed public uprising in Marawi City. 179
suspension of the writ. This is because unlike other standards of proof, However, they insist that the armed hostilities do not constitute rebellion in
which, in order to be met, would require much from the President and the absence of the element of culpable political purpose, i.e., the removal
therefore unduly restrain his exercise of emergency powers, the requirement from the allegiance to the Philippine Government or its laws: (i) the territory of
of probable cause is much simpler. It merely necessitates an "average man the Philippines or any part thereof; or (ii) any body of land, naval, or other
[to weigh] the facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibration of armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or
the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He [merely] partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives.
relies on common sense [and] needs only to rest on evidence showing that,
more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the accused." 177 The contention lacks merit.
To summarize, the parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis a) Facts, events and information upon which the President anchored his
are as follows: l) actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the decision to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of
first two requirements must concur; and 3) there is probable cause for the habeas corpus.
President to believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion.
Since the President supposedly signed Proclamation No. 216 on May 23,
Having laid down the parameters for review, the Court shall nowproceed to 2017 at 10:00 PM,180 the Court will consider only those facts and/or events
the core of the controversy - whether Proclamation No. 216,Declaring a State which were known to or have transpired on or before that time, consistent
of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in with the scope of judicial review. Thus, the following facts and/or events were
the whole of Mindanao, lacks sufficient factual basis. deemed to have been considered by the President in issuing Proclamation
No. 216, as plucked from and extant in Proclamation No. 216 itself:
IX. There is sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law and
the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. 1. Proclamation No. 55 issued on September 4, 2016, declaring a state of
national emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao; 181
At this juncture, it bears to emphasize that the purpose of judicial review is
not the determination of accuracy or veracity of the facts upon which the 2. Series of violent acts182 committed by the Maute terrorist group including:
President anchored his declaration of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; rather, only the sufficiency of the
factual basis as to convince the President that there is probable cause that a) Attack on the military outpost in Butig, Lanao del Sur m February
rebellion exists. It must also be reiterated that martial law is a matter 2016, killing and wounding several soldiers;
ofurgency and much leeway and flexibility should be accorded the President.
As such, he is not expected to completely validate all the information he b) Mass jailbreak in Marawi City in August 2016 of the arrested
received before declaring martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ of comrades of the Maute Group and other detainees;
habeas corpus.
3. On May 23, 2017:183
We restate the elements of rebellion for reference:
a) Takeover of a hospital in Marawi;
1. That there be (a) public uprising, and (b) taking up arms against the
Government; and b) Establishment of several checkpoints within Marawi;
2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either: (a) to remove from c) Burning of certain government and private facilities;
the allegiance to said Government or its laws the territory of the Philippines
or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval or other armed forces or (b) to d) Mounting casualties on the part of the government;

e) Hoisting the flag of ISIS in several areas; and 17. Foreign-based terrorist groups provide financial and logistical support to
the Maute Group;201
f) Capability of the Maute Group and other rebel groups to sow terror, and
cause death and damage to property not only in Lanao del Sur but also in 18. Events on May 23, 2017 in Marawi City, particularly:
other parts of Mindanao; and the Report184 submitted to Congress:
a) at 2:00 PM, members and sympathizers of the Maute Group and ASG
1. Zamboanga siege;185 attacked various government and privately-owned facilities; 202
2. Davao bombing;186 b) at 4:00 PM, around fifty (50) armed criminals forcibly entered the Marawi
City Jail; facilitated the escape of inmates; killed a member of PDEA;
3. Mamasapano carnage;187 assaulted and disarmed on-duty personnel and/or locked them inside the
cells; confiscated cellphones, personnel-issued firearms, and vehicles; 203
4. Cotabato bombings;188
c) by 4:30 PM, intem1ption of power supply; sporadic gunfights; city-wide
189 power outage by evening;204
5. Sultan Kudarat bombings;
d) from 6:00 PM to 7:00 PM, Maute Group ambushed and burned the Marawi
6. Sulu bombings;190
Police Station; commandeered a police car;205
7. Basilan bombings;191
e) BJMP personnel evacuated the Marawi City Jail and other affected
areas;206
8. Attempt to capture Hapilon was confronted with armed resistance by
combined forces of ASG and the Maute Group;192
f) control over three bridges in Lanao del Sur, namely, Lilod, Bangulo, and
Sauiaran, was taken by the rebels;207
9. Escalation of armed hostility against the government troops; 193
g) road blockades and checkpoints set up by lawless armed groups at the
10. Acts of violence directed not only against government authorities and Iligan-Marawi junction;208
establishments but civilians as well;194
h) burning of Dansalan College Foundation, Cathedral of Maria Auxiliadora,
11. Takeover of major social, economic and political foundations which the nuns' quarters in the church, and the Shia Masjid Moncado Colony; 209
paralyzed Marawi City;195
i) taking of hostages from the church;210
12. The object of the armed hostilities was to lay the groundwork for the
establishment of a DAESH/ISIS wilayat or province;196
j) killing of five faculty members of Dansalan College foundation; 211
13. Maute Group has 263 active members, armed and combat-ready; 197
k) burning of Senator Ninoy Aquino College Foundation and Marawi Central
Elementary Pilot School;212
14. Extensive networks or linkages of the Maute Group with foreign and local
armed groups;198
1) overrunning of Amai Pakpak Hospital;213
15. Adherence of the Maute Group to the ideals espoused by ISIS; 199
m) hoisting the ISIS flag in several areas;214
16. Publication of a video showing Maute Group's declaration of allegiance to
n) attacking and burning of the Filipino-Libyan Friendship Hospital; 215
ISIS;200

o) ransacking of a branch of Landbank of the Philippines and 5) "The cutting of vital lines for transportation and power; the recruitment of
commandeering an armored vehicle;216 young Muslims to further expand their ranks and strengthen their force; the
armed consolidation of their members throughout Marawi City; the
p) reports regarding Maute Group's plan to execute Christians; 217 decimation of a segment of the city population who resist; and the brazen
display of DAESH flags constitute a clear, pronounced, and unmistakable
intent to remove Marawi City, and eventually the rest of Mindanao, from its
q) preventing Maranaos from leaving their homes;218
allegiance to the Government."225
r) forcing young Muslims to join their group;219 and
6) "There exists no doubt that lawless armed groups are attempting to
deprive the President of his power, authority, and prerogatives within Marawi
s) intelligence reports regarding the existence of strategic mass action of City as a precedent to spreading their control over the entire Mindanao, in an
lawless armed groups in Marawi City, seizing public and private facilities, attempt to undermine his control over executive departments, bureaus, and
perpetrating killings of government personnel1 , and committing armed offices in said area; defeat his mandate to ensure that all laws are faithfully
uprising against and open defiance of the Government. 220 executed; and remove his supervisory powers over local governments." 226
b) The President's Conclusion 7) "Law enforcement and other government agencies now face pronounced
difficulty sending their reports to the Chief Executive due to the city-wide
After the assessment by the President of the aforementioned facts, he power outages. Personnel from the BJMP have been prevented from
arrived at the following conclusions, as mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 performing their functions. Through the attack and occupation of several
and the Report: hospitals, medical services in Marawi City have been adversely affected. The
bridge and road blockades set up by the groups effectively deprive the
1) The Maute Group is "openly attempting to remove from the allegiance to government of its ability to deliver basic services to its citizens. Troop
the Philippine Government this part of Mindanao and deprive the Chief reinforcements have been hampered, preventing the government from
Executive of his powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and restoring peace and order in the area. Movement by both civilians and
to maintain public order and safety in Mindanao, constituting the crime of government personnel to and from the city is likewise hindered." 227
rebellion."221
8) "The taking up of arms by lawless armed groups in the area, with support
2) "[L]awless armed groups have taken up arms and committed public being provided by foreign-based terrorists and illegal drug money, and their
uprising against the duly constituted government and against the people of blatant acts of defiance which embolden other armed groups in Mindanao,
Mindanao, for the purpose of removing Mindanao - starting with the City of have resulted in the deterioration of public order and safety in Marawi City;
Marawi, Lanao del Sur - from its allegiance to the Government and its laws they have likewise compromised the security of the entire Island of
and depriving the Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives to enforce Mindanao."228
the laws of the land and to maintain public order and safety in Mindanao, to
the great damage, prejudice, and detriment of the people therein and the 9) "Considering the network and alliance-building activities among terrorist
nation as a whole."222 groups, local criminals, and lawless armed men, the siege f Marawi City is a
vital cog in attaining their long-standing goal: absolute control over the
3) The May 23, 2017 events "put on public display the groups' clear intention entirety of Mindanao. These circumstances demand swift and decisive action
to establish an Islamic State and their capability to deprive the duly to ensure the safety and security of the Filipino people and preserve our
constituted authorities - the President, foremost - of their powers and national integrity."229
prerogatives. "223
Thus, the President deduced from the facts available to him that there was
4) "These activities constitute not simply a display of force, but a clear an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was to remove from
attempt to establish the groups' seat of power in Marawi City for their planned the allegiance to the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and to
establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province covering the entire deprive the Chief Executive of any of his powers and prerogatives, leading
Mindanao."224 the President to believe that there was probable cause that the crime of

rebellion was and is being committed and that public safety requires the Similarly, substantial evidence constitutes an unnecessary restriction on the
imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas President's use of her emergency powers. Substantial evidence is the
corpus. amount of proof required in administrative or quasi-judicial cases, or that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to conclude that the adequate to justify a conclusion.
President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases
tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President's conclusion, that I am of the view that probable cause of the existence of either invasion or
there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was the rebellion suffices and satisfies the standard of proof for a valid declaration of
removal from the allegiance of the Philippine Government a portion of its martial law and suspension of the writ.
territory and the deprivation of the President from performing his powers and
prerogatives, was reached after a tactical consideration of the facts. In fine, Probable cause is the same amount of proof required for the filing of a
the President satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof. criminal information by the prosecutor and for the issuance of an arrest
warrant by a judge. Probable cause has been defined as a 'set of facts and
After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
cause for a valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of believe that the offense charged in the Information or any offense included
the writ of habeas corpus. As Justice Carpio decreed in his Dissent in Fortun: therein has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.'
x x x [T]he Constitution does not compel the President to produce such In determining probable cause, the average man weighs the facts and
amount of proof as to unduly burden and effectively incapacitate her from circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of
exercising such powers. which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding
of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely
Definitely, the President need not gather proof beyond reasonable doubt, than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the
which is the standard of proof required for convicting an accused charged accused. Probable cause demands more than suspicion; it requires less than
with a criminal offense.x x x evidence that would justify conviction.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt is the highest quantum of evidence, and to Probable cause, basically premised on common sense, is the most
require the President to establish the existence of rebellion or invasion with reasonable, most practical, and most expedient standard by which the
such amount of proof before declaring martial law or suspending the writ President can fully ascertain the existence or non-existence of rebellion,
amounts to an excessive restriction on 'the President's power to act as to necessary for a declaration of martial law x x x230
practically tie her hands and disable her from effectively protecting the nation
against threats to public safety.' c) Inaccuracies, simulations, falsities, and hyperboles.
Neither clear and convincing evidence, which is employed in either criminal The allegation in the Lagman Petition that the facts stated in Proclamation
or civil cases, is indispensable for a lawful declaration of martial law or No. 216 and the Report are false, inaccurate, simulated, and/or hyperbolic,
suspension of the writ. This amount of proof likewise unduly restrains the does not persuade. As mentioned, the Court is not concerned about absolute
President in exercising her emergency powers, as it requires proof greater correctness, accuracy, or precision of the facts because to do so would
than preponderance of evidence although not beyond reasonable doubt. unduly tie the hands of the President in responding to an urgent situation.
Not even preponderance of evidence, which is the degree of proof necessary Specifically, it alleges that the following facts are not true as shown by its
in civil cases, is demanded for a lawful declaration of martial law. counter-evidence.231
Weighing the superiority of the evidence on hand, from at least two opposing
FACTUAL STATEMENTS COUNTER-EVIDENCE
sides, before she can act and impose martial law or suspend the writ
unreasonably curtails the President's emergency powers.

(1) that the Maute group attacked Amai Statements made by: and the Maute Terror Groups have
Pakpak Hospital and hoisted the (a) Dr. Amer Saber, Chief of the not taken over any government
DAESH flag there, among several Hospital facility in Marawi City.
locations. As of 0600H of 24 May 2017, (b) Health Secretary Paulyn Ubial;
members of the Maute Group were (c) PNP Spokesperson Senior
seen guarding the entry gates of the Supt. Dionardo Carlos; However, the so-called counter-evidence were derived solely from unverified
Amai Pakpak Hospital and that they (d) AFP Public Affairs Office Chief news articles on the internet, with neither the authors nor the sources shown
held hostage the employees of the Co. Edgard Arevalo; and to have affirmed the contents thereof It was not even shown that efforts were
Hospital and took over the PhilHealth (e) Marawi City Mayor Majul made to secure such affirmation albeit the circumstances proved futile. As
office located thereat (Proclamation No. Gandamra denying that the the Court has consistently ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence, twice
216 and Report); hospital was attacked by the Maute removed, and are thus without any probative value, unless offered for a
Group citing online news articles of purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted. 237 This
Philstar, Sunstar, Inquirer, and pronouncement applies with equal force to the Cullamat Petition which
Bombo Radyo.232 likewise submitted online news articles238 as basis for their claim of
insufficiency of factual basis.
2. that the Maute Group ambushed and Statements made by PNP Director
burned the Marawi Police Station General Ronald dela Rosa and Again, it bears to reiterate that the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus
(Proclamation No. 216 and the Report); Marawi City Mayor Majul finds no application in these cases. As long as there are other facts in the
Gandamra in the online news proclamation and the written Report indubitably showing the presence of an
reports of ABS-CBN News and actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires the declaration
CNN Philippines233 denying that the and/or suspension, the finding of sufficiency of factual basis, stands.
Maute group occupied the Marawi
Police Station. d) Ruling in Bedol v. Commission on Elections not Applicable.
3. that lawless armed groups likewise Statement made by the bank
ransacked the Landbank of the officials in the on-line news article Petitioners, however, insist that in Bedol v. Commission on Elections,239 news
Philippines and commandeered one of of Philstar234 that the Marawi City reports may be admitted on grounds of relevance, trustworthiness, and
its armored vehicles (Report); branch was not ransacked but necessity. Petitioners' reliance on this case is misplaced. The Court in Bedol
sustained damages from the made it clear that the doctrine of independent relevant statement, which is an
attacks. ·exception to the hearsay rule, applies in cases "where only the fact that such
statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is
4. that the Marawi Central Elementary Statements in the on-line news immaterial."240 Here, the question is not whether such statements were made
Pilot School was burned (Proclamation article of Philstar235 made by the by Saber, et. al., but rather whether what they said are true. Thus, contrary to
No. 216 and the Report); Marawi City Schools Division the view of petitioners, the exception in Bedol finds no application here.
Assistant Superintendent Ana
Alonto denying that the school was e) There are other independent facts which support the finding that,
burned and Department of more likely than not, rebellion exists and that public safety requires it.
Education Assistant Secretary
Tonisito Umali stating that they Moreover, the alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and
have not received any report of parcels of the Report; along with these alleged false data is an arsenal of
damage. other independent facts showing that more likely than not, actua1 rebellion
5. that the Maute Group attacked Statement in the on-line news exists, and public safety requires the declaration of martial law or suspension
various government facilities article of Inquirer236 made by of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. To be precise, the alleged false
(Proclamation No. 216 and the Report). Marawi City Mayor Majul and/or inaccurate statements are only five out of the severa1 statements
Gandamra stating that the ASG bulleted in the President's Report. Notably, in the interpellation by Justice
Francis H. Jardeleza during the second day of the oral argument, petitioner

Lagman admitted that he was not aware or that he had no personal factual basis there being probable cause to believe that rebellion exists and
knowledge of the other incidents cited.241 As it thus stands, there is no that public safety requires the martial law declaration and the suspension of
question or challenge with respect to the reliability of the other incidents, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
which by themselves are ample to preclude the conclusion that the
President's report is unreliable and that Proclamation No. 216 was without XI. Whole of Mindanao
sufficient factual basis.
a) The overriding and paramount concern of martial law is the protection of
Verily, there is no credence to petitioners' claim that the bases for the the security of the nation and the good and safety of the public.
President's imposition of martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus were mostly inaccurate, simulated, false and/or hyperbolic. Considering the nation's and its people's traumatic experience martial law
under the Marcos regime, one would expect the framers of the 1987
X. Public safety requires the declaration of martial law and the suspension of Constitution to stop at nothing from not resuscitating the law. Yet it would
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. appear that the constitutional writers entertained no doubt about the
necessity and practicality of such specie of extraordinary power and thus,
Invasion or rebellion alone may justify resort to the calling out power but once again, bestowed on the Commander-in-Chief the power to declare
definitely not the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of martial law albeit in its diluted form.
the writ of habeas corpus. For a declaration of martial law or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to be valid, there must be a Indeed, martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
concurrence of actual rebellion or invasion and the public safety requirement. corpus are necessary for the protection of the security of the nation;
In his Report, the President noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is "precautionary ,
ASG and the Maute Group were directed not only against government forces and although it might [curtail] certain rights of individuals, [it] is for the
or establishments but likewise against civilians and their properties. 242 In purpose of defending and protecting the security of the state or the entire
addition and in relation to the armed hostilities, bomb threats were issued; 243 country and our sovereign people". 253 Commissioner Ople referred to the
road blockades and checkpoints were set up; 244 schools and churches were suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as a "form of
burned;245 civilian hostages were taken and killed; 246 non-Muslims or immobilization" or "as a means of immobilizing potential internal enemies"
Christians were targeted;247 young male Muslims were forced to join their "especially in areas like Mindanao."254
group;248 medical services and delivery of basic services were hampered; 249
reinforcements of government troops and civilian movement were Aside from protecting the security of the country, martial law also guarantees
hindered;250 and the security of the entire Mindanao Island was and promotes public safety. It is worthy of mention that rebellion alone does
compromised.251 not justify the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus; the public safety requirement must likewise be
These particular scenarios convinced the President that the atrocities had present.
already escalated to a level that risked public safety and thus impelled him to
declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In b) As Commander-in-Chief, the President receives vital, relevant,
the last paragraph of his Report, the President declared: classified, and live information which equip and assist him in making
decisions.
While the government is presently conducting legitimate operations to
address the on-going rebellion, if not the seeds of invasion, public safety In Parts IX and X, the Court laid down the arsenal of facts and events that
necessitates the continued implementation of martial law and the suspension formed the basis for Proclamation No. 216. For the President, the totality of
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao until facts and events, more likely than not, shows that actual rebellion exists and
such time that the rebellion is completely quelled.252 that public safety requires the declaration of martial law and suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Otherwise stated, the President
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the parameters for the declaration of believes that there is probable cause that actual rebellion exists and public
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ f habeas corpus have safety warrants the issuance of Proclamation No. 216. In turn, the Court
been properly and fully complied with. Proclamation No. 216 has sufficient

notes that the President, in arriving at such a conclusion, relied on the facts findings to the Court,260 which it did during the closed door session last June
and events included in the Report, which we find sufficient. 15, 2017.
To be sure, the facts mentioned in the Proclamation and the Report are far d) The 1987 Constitution grants to the President, as Commander-in-Chief,
from being exhaustive or all-encompassing. At this juncture, it may not be the discretion to determine the territorial coverage or application of martial
amiss to state that as Commander-in-Chief, the President has possession of law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
documents and information classified as "confidential", the contents of which
cannot be included in the Proclamation or Report for reasons of national Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution states that "[i]n case of invasion or
security. These documents may contain information detailing the position of rebellion, when the public safety requires it, [the President] may x x x
government troops and rebels, stock of firearms or ammunitions, ground suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or
commands and operations, names of suspects and sympathizers, etc. , In any part thereof under martial law." Clearly, the Constitution grants to the
fact, during the closed door session held by the Court, some information President the discretion to determine the territorial coverage of martial law
came to light, although not mentioned in the Proclamation or Report. But then and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. He may put
again, the discretion whether to include the same in the Proclamation or the entire Philippines or only a part thereof under martial law.
Report is the judgment call of the President. In fact, petitioners concede to
this. During the oral argument, petitioner Lagman admitted that "the assertion This is both an acknowledgement and a recognition that it is the Executive
of facts [in the Proclamation and Report] is the call of the President." 255 Department, particularly the President as Commander-in-Chief, who is the
repository of vital, classified, and live information necessary for and relevant
It is beyond cavil that the President can rely on intelligence reports and in calibrating the territorial application of martial law and the suspension of
classified documents. "It is for the President as [C]ommander-in[C]hief of the the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It, too, is a concession that the
Armed Forces to appraise these [classified evidence or documents/]reports President has the tactical and military support, and thus has a more informed
and be satisfied that the public safety demands the suspension of the writ." 256 understanding of what is happening on the ground. Thus, the Constitution
Significantly, respect to these so-called classified documents is accorded imposed a limitation on the period of application, which is 60 days, unless
even "when [the] authors of or witnesses to these documents may not be sooner nullified, revoked or extended, but not on the territorial scope or area
revealed."257 of coverage; it merely stated "the Philippines or any part thereof," depending
on the assessment of the President.
In fine, not only does the President have a wide array of information before
him, he also has the right, prerogative, and the means to access vital, e) The Constitution has provided sufficient safeguards against
relevant, and confidential data, concomitant with his position as Commander- possible abuses of Commander-in- Chief's powers; further curtailment of
in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Presidential powers should not only be discouraged but also avoided.
c) The Court has no machinery or tool equal to that of the Considering the country's history, it is understandable that the resurgence of
Commander-in-Chief to ably and properly assess the ground conditions. martial law would engender apprehensions among the citizenry. Even the
Court as an institution cannot project a stance of nonchalance. However, the
In contrast, the Court does not have the same resources available to the importance of martial law in the context of our society should outweigh one's
President. However, this should not be considered as a constitutiona1 lapse. prejudices and apprehensions against it. The significance of martial law
On the contrary, this is in line with the function of the Court, particularly in this should not be undermined by unjustified fears and past experience. After all,
instance, to determine the sufficiency of factual basis of Proclamation No. martial law is critical and crucial to the promotion of public safety, the
216. As thoroughly discussed in Part VIII, the determination by the Court of preservation of the nation's sovereignty and ultimately, the survival of our
the sufficiency of factual basis must be limited only to the facts and country. It is vital for the protection of the country not only against internal
information mentioned in the Report and Proclamation. In fact, the Court, in enemies but also against those enemies lurking from beyond our shores. As
David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo,258 cautioned not to "undertake an such, martial law should not be cast aside, or its scope and potency limited
independent investigation beyond the pleadings." In this regard, "the Court and diluted, based on bias and unsubstantiated assumptions.
will have to rely on the fact-finding capabilities of the [E]xecutive
[D]epartment;"259 in turn, the Executive Department will have to open its

Conscious of these fears and apprehensions, the Constitution placed several one of no ordinary magnitude. But as presented by the Committee, there are
safeguards which effectively watered down the power to declare martial law. many safeguards: 1) it is limited to 60 days; 2) Congress can revoke it; 3) the
The 1987 Constitution "[clipped] the powers of [the] Commander-in-Chief Supreme Court can still review as to the sufficiency of factual basis; and 4) it
because of [the] experience with the previous regime." 261 Not only were the does not suspend the operation of the Constitution. To repeat what I have
grounds limited to actual invasion or rebellion, but its duration was likewise quoted when I interpellated Commissioner Monsod, it is said that the power
fixed at 60 days, unless sooner revoked, nullified, or extended; at the same to impose martial law is dangerous to liberty and may be abused. All powers
time, it is subject to the veto powers of the Court and Congress. may be abused if placed in unworthy hands. But it would be difficult, we think,
to point out any other hands in which this power will be more safe and at the
Commissioner Monsod, who, incidentally, is a counsel for the Mohamad same time equally effectual. When citizens of the State are in arms against
Petition, even exhorted his colleagues in the Constitutional Convention to each other and the constituted authorities are unable to execute the laws, the
look at martial law from a new perspective by elaborating on the sufficiency action of the President must be prompt or it is of little value. x x x 264
of the proposed safeguards:
At this juncture, it bears to stress that it was the collective sentiment of the
MR. MONSOD. x x x framers of the 1987 Constitution that sufficient safeguards against possible
misuse and abuse by the Commander-in-Chief of his extraordinary powers
are already in place and that no further emasculation of the presidential
Second, we have been given a spectre of non sequitur, that the mere
powers is called for in the guise of additional safeguards. The Constitution
declaration of martial law for a fixed period not exceeding 60 days, which is
recognizes that any further curtailment, encumbrance, or emasculation of the
subject to judicial review, is going to result in numerous violations of human
presidential powers would not generate any good among the three co-equal
rights, the predominance of the military forever and in untold sufferings.
branches, and to the country and its citizens as a whole. Thus:
Madam President, we are talking about invasion and rebellion. We may not
have any freedom to speak of after 60 days, if we put as a precondition the
concurrence of Congress. That might prevent the President from acting at MR. OPLE. The reason for my concern, Madam President, is that when we
that time in order to meet the problem. So I would like to suggest that, put all of these encumbrances on the President and Commander-in-Chief
perhaps, we should look at this in its proper perspective. We are only looking during an actual invasion or rebellion, given an intractable Congress that may
at a very specific case. We are only looking at a case of the first 60 days at be dominated by opposition parties, we may be actually impelling the
its maximum. And we are looking at actual invasion and rebellion, and there President to use the sword of Alexander to cut the Gordian knot by just
are other safeguards in those cases.262 declaring a revolutionary government that sets him free to deal with the
invasion or the insurrection.
Even Bishop Bacani was convinced that the 1987 Constitution has enough
safeguards against presidential abuses and commission of human rights f) Rebellion and public safety; nature, scope, and range.
violations. In voting yes for the elimination of the requirement of prior
concurrence of Congress, Bishop Bacani stated, viz.: It has been said that the "gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed
public uprising against the government;"266 and that by nature, "rebellion is x
BISHOP BACANI. Yes, just two sentences. The reason I vote II yes is that x x a crime of masses or multitudes, involving crowd action, that cannot be
despite my concern for human rights, I believe that a good President can also confined a priori, within predetermined bounds."267 We understand this to
safeguard human rights and human lives as well. And I do not want to unduly mean that the precise extent or range of the rebellion could not be measured
emasculate the powers of the President. Xxx263 by exact metes and bounds.
Commissioner Delos Reyes shared the same sentiment, to wit: To illustrate: A contingent armed with high-powered firearms publicly
assembled in Padre Faura, Ermita, Manila where the Court's compound is
situated. They overpowered the guards, entered the Court's premises, and
MR. DE LOS REYES. May I explain my vote, Madam President.
hoisted the ISIS flag. Their motive was political, i.e., they want to remove
from the allegiance to the Philippine government a part of the territory of the
x x x The power of the President to impose martial law is doubtless of a very Philippines, particularly the Court's compound and establish it as an ISIS-
high and delicate nature. A free people are naturally jealous of the exercise territory.
of military power, and the power to impose martial law is certainly felt to be

Based on the foregoing illustration, and vis-a-vis the nature of the crime of Going back to the illustration above, although the President is not required to
rebellion, could we validly say that the rebellion is confined only within the impose martial law only within the Court's compound because it is where the
Court's compound? Definitely not. The possibility that there are other rebels armed public uprising actually transpired, he may do so if he sees fit. At the
positioned in the nearby buildings or compound of the Philippine General same time, however, he is not precluded from expanding the coverage of
Hospital (PGH) or the Manila Science High Schoo1 (MSHS) could not be martial law beyond the Court's compound. After all, rebellion is not confined
discounted. There is no way of knowing that all participants in the rebellion within predetermined bounds.
went and stayed inside the Court's compound.
Public safety, which is another component element for the declaration of
Neither could it be validly argued that the armed contingent positioned in martial law, "involves the prevention of and protection from events that could
PGH or MSHS is not engaged in rebellion because there is no publicity in endanger the safety of the general public from significant danger,
their acts as, in fact, they were merely lurking inside the compound of PGH injury/harm, or damage, such as crimes or disasters." 268 Public safety is an
and MSHS. However, it must be pointed out that for the crime of rebellion to abstract term; it does not take any physical form. Plainly, its range, extent or
be consummated, it is not required that all armed participants should scope could not be physically measured by metes and bounds.
congregate in one place, in this case, the Court's compound, and publicly
rise in arms against the government for the attainment of their culpable Perhaps another reason why the territorial scope of martial law should not
purpose. It suffices that a portion of the contingent gathered and formed a necessarily be limited to the particular vicinity where the armed public
mass or a crowd and engaged in an armed public uprising against the uprising actually transpired, is because of the unique characteristic of
government. Similarly, it cannot be validly concluded that the grounds on rebellion as a crime. "The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast
which the armed public uprising actually to6k place should be the measure of movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts committed
the extent, scope or range, of the actual I rebellion. This is logical since the in furtherance of rebellion[,] though crimes in themselves[,] are deemed
other rebels positioned in PGH, MSHS, I or elsewhere, whose participation absorbed in one single crime of rebellion." 269 Rebellion absorbs "other acts
did not involve the publicity aspect of rebellion, may also be considered as committed in its pursuance".270 Direct assault,271 murder,272 homicide,273
engaging in the crime of rebellion. arson,274 robbery,275 and kidnapping,276 just to name a few, are absorbed in
the crime of rebellion if committed in furtherance of rebellion; "[i]t cannot be
Proceeding from the same illustration, suppose we say that the President, made a basis of a separate charge." 277 Jurisprudence also teaches that not
after finding probable cause that there exists actual rebellion and that public only common crimes may be absorbed in rebellion but also "offenses under
safety requires it, declares martial law and suspends the writ of habeas special laws [such as Presidential Decree No. 1829] 278 which are perpetrated
corpus in the whole of Metro Manila, could we then say that the territorial in furtherance of the political offense".279 "All crimes, whether punishable
coverage of the proclamation is too expansive? under a special law or general law, which are me e components or
ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the
To answer this question, we revert back to the premise that the discretion to crime of rebellion and cannot be isolated and charged as separate crimes in
determine the territorial scope of martial law lies with the President. The themselves.280
Constitution grants him the prerogative whether to put the entire Philippines
or any part thereof under martial law. There is no constitutional edict that Thus, by the theory of absorption, the crime of murder committed in Makati
martial law should be confined only in the particular place where the armed City, if committed in furtherance of the crime of rebellion being hypothetically
public uprising actually transpired. This is not only practical but also logical. staged in Padre Faura, Ermita, Manila, is stripped of its common complexion
Martial law is an urgent measure since at stake is the nation's territorial and is absorbed in the crime of rebellion. This all the more makes it difficult to
sovereignty and survival. As such, the President has to respond quickly. After confine the application of martial law only to the place where the armed
the rebellion in the Court's compound, he need not wait for another rebellion public uprising is actually taking place. In the illustration above, Padre Faura
to be mounted in Quezon City before he could impose martial law thereat. If could only be the nerve center of the rebellion but at the same time rebellion
that is the case, then the President would have to wait until every remote is also happening in Makati City.
corner in the country is infested with rebels before he could declare martial
law in the entire Philippines. For sure, this is not the scenario envisioned by In fine, it is difficult, if not impossible, to fix the territorial scope of martial law
the Constitution. in direct proportion to the "range" of actual rebellion and public safety simply
because rebellion and public safety have no fixed physical dimensions. Their
transitory and abstract nature defies precise measurements; hence, the

determination of the territorial scope of martial law could only be drawn from Thus, considering the current situation, it will not serve any purpose if the
arbitrary, not fixed, variables. The Constitution must have considered these President is goaded into using "the sword of Alexander to cut the Gordian
limitations when it granted the President wide leeway and flexibility in knot"282 by attempting to impose another encumbrance; after all "the
determining the territorial scope of martial law. declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is essentially an executive act."283
Moreover, the President's duty to maintain peace and public safety is not
limited only to the place where there is actual rebellion; it extends to other Some sectors, impelled perhaps by feelings of patriotism, may wish to
areas where the present hostilities are in danger of spilling over. It is not subdue, rein in, or give the President a nudge, so to speak, as some sort of
intended merely to prevent the escape of lawless elements from Marawi City, reminder of the nation's experience under the Marcos-styled martial law.
but also to avoid enemy reinforcements and to cut their supply lines coming However, it is not fair to judge President Duterte based on the ills some of us
from different parts of Mindanao. Thus, limiting the proclamation and/or may have experienced during the Marcos-martial law era. At this point, the
suspension to the place where there is actual rebellion would not only defeat Court quotes the insightful discourse of Commissioner Ople:
the purpose of declaring martial law, it will make the exercise thereof
ineffective and useless. MR. OPLE. x x x
g) The Court must stay within the confines of its power. Madam President, there is a tendency to equate patriotism with rendering the
executive branch of the government impotent, as though by reducing
The Court can only act within the confines of its power.1âwphi1 For the Court drastically the powers of the executive, we are rendering a service to human
to overreach is to infringe upon another's territory. Clearly, the power to welfare. I think it is also important to understand that the extraordinary
determine the scope of territorial application belongs to the President. "The measures contemplated in the Article on the Executive pertain to a practical
Court cannot indulge in judicial legislation without violating the principle of state of war existing in this country when national security will become a
separation of powers, and, hence, undermining the foundation of our common bond of patriotism of all Filipinos, especially if it is an actual invasion
republican system."281 or an actual rebellion, and the President may have to be given a minimum
flexibility to cope with such unprecedented threats to the survival of a nation.
To reiterate, the Court is not equipped with the competence and logistical I think the Commission has done so but at the same time has not, in any
machinery to determine the strategical value of other places in the military's manner, shunned the task of putting these powers under a whole system of
efforts to quell the rebellion and restore peace. It would be engaging in an act checks and balances, including the possible revocation at any time of a
of adventurism if it dares to embark on a mission of deciphering the territorial proclamation of martial law by the Congress, and in any case a definite
metes and bounds of martial law. To be blunt about it, hours after the determination of these extraordinary powers, subject only to another
proclamation of martial law none of the members of this Court could have extension to be determined by Congress in the event that it is necessary to
divined that more than ten thousand souls would be forced to evacuate to do so because the emergency persists.
Iligan and Cagayan de Oro and that the military would have to secure those
places also; none of us could have predicted that Cayamora Maute would be So, I think this Article on the Executive for which I voted is completely
arrested in Davao City or that his wife Ominta Romato Maute would be responsible; it is attuned to the freedom and the rights of the citizenry. It does
apprehended in Masiu, Lanao del Sur; and, none of us had an inkling that the not render the presidency impotent and, at the same time, it allows for a
Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) would launch an attack in vigorous representation of the people through their Congress when an
Cotabato City. The Court has no military background and technical expertise emergency measure is in force and effect.284
to predict that. In the same manner, the Court lacks the technical capability to
determine which part of Mindanao would best serve as forward operating h) Several local armed groups have formed linkages aimed at
base of the military in their present endeavor in Mindanao. Until now the committing rebellion and acts in furtherance thereof in the whole of
Court is in a quandary and can only speculate whether the 60-day lifespan of Mindanao.
Proclamation No. 216 could outlive the present hostilities in Mindanao. It is
on this score that the Court should give the President sufficient leeway to With a predominantly Muslim population, Marawi City is "the only Islamic City
address the peace and order problem in Mindanao. of the South."285 On April 15, 1980, it was conferred the official title of "Islamic
City of Marawi."286 The city's first name, "Dansalan," "was derived from the

word 'dansal', meaning a destination point or rendezvous. Literally, it also h. On April 20, 2017, the ASG kidnapped SSg. Anni Siraji and beheaded him
means arrival or coming."287 Marawi lies in the heart of Mindanao. In fact, the three days later.297
Kilometer Zero marker in Mindanao is found in Marawi City thereby making
Marawi City the point of reference of all roads in Mindanao. There were also intelligence reports from the military about offensives
committed by the ASG and other local rebel groups. All these suggest that
Thus, there is reasonable basis to believe that Marawi is only the staging the rebellion in Marawi has already spilled over to other parts of Mindanao.
point of the rebellion, both for symbolic and strategic reasons. Marawi may
not be the target but the whole of Mindanao. As mentioned in the Report, Moreover, considering the widespread atrocities in Mindanao and the
"[l]awless armed groups have historically used provinces adjoining Marawi linkages established among rebel groups, the armed uprising that was
City as escape routes, supply lines, and backdoor passages;" 288 there is also initially staged in Marawi cannot be justified as confined only to Marawi. The
the plan to establish a wilayat in Mindanao by staging the siege of Marawi. Court therefore will not simply disregard the events that happened during the
The report that prior to May 23, 2017, Abdullah Maute had already Davao City bombing, the Mamasapano massacre, the Zamboanga City
dispatched some of his men to various places in Mindanao, such as Marawi, siege, and the countless bombings in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, and
Iligan, and Cagayan de Oro for bombing operations, carnapping, and the Basilan, among others.298 The Court cannot simply take the battle of Marawi
murder of military and police personnel,289 must also be considered. Indeed, in isolation. As a crime without predetermined bounds, the President has
there is some semblance of truth to the contention that Marawi is only the reasonable basis to believe that the declaration of martial law, as well as the
start, and Mindanao the end. suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
Mindanao, is most necessary, effective, and called for by the circumstances.
Other events also show that the atrocities were not concentrated in Marawi
City. Consider these: i) Terrorism neither negates nor absorbs rebellion.
a. On January 13, 2017, an improvised explosive device (IED) exploded in It is also of judicial notice that the insurgency in Mindanao has been ongoing
Barangay Campo Uno, Lamita City, Basilan. A civilian was killed while for decades. While some groups have sought legal and peaceful means,
another was wounded.290 others have resorted to violent extremism and terrorism. Rebellion may be
subsumed under the crime of terrorism, which has a broader scope covering
b. On January 19, 2017, the ASG kidnapped three Indonesians near a wide range of predicate crimes. In fact, rebellion is only one of the various
Bakungan Island, Taganak, Tawi-Tawi.291 means by which terrorism can be committed. 299 However, while the scope of
terrorism may be comprehensive, its purpose is distinct and well-defined. The
c. On January 29, 2017, the ASG detonated an IED in Barangay Danapah, objective of a "'terrorist" is to sow and create a condition of widespread fear
Albarka, Basilan resulting in the death of two children and the wounding of among the populace in order to coerce the government to give in to an
three others.292 unlawful demand. This condition of widespread fear is traditionally achieved
through bombing, kidnapping, mass killing, and beheading, among others. In
contrast, the purpose of rebellion, as previously discussed, is political, i.e., (a)
d. From March to May 2017, there were eleven (11) separate instances of
to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government or its laws: (i) the
IED explosions by the BIFF in Mindanao. These resulted in the death and
territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; (ii) any body of land, naval, or
wounding of several personalities.293
armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or
partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives.
e. On February 26, 2017, the ASG beheaded its kidnap victim, Juergen
Kantner in Sulu.294
In determining what crime was committed, we have to look into the main
objective of the malefactors. If it is political, such as for the purpose of
f. On April 11, 2017, the ASG infiltrated Inabaga, Bohol resulting in firefights severing the allegiance of Mindanao to the Philippine Government to
between rebels and government troops.295 establish a wilayat therein, the crime is rebellion. If, on the other hand, the
primary objective is to sow and create a condition of widespread and
g. On April 13, 2017, the ASG beheaded Filipino kidnap victim Noel extraordinary fear and panic among the populace in order to coerce the
Besconde.296 government to give in to an unlawful demand, the crime is terrorism. Here,

we have already explained and ruled that the President did not err in WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS sufficient factual bases for the issuance of
believing that what is going on in Marawi City is one contemplated under the Proclamation No. 216 and DECLARES it as CONSTITUTIONAL.
crime of rebellion. Accordingly, the consolidated Petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
In any case, even assuming that the insurgency in Marawi City can also be SO ORDERED.
characterized as terrorism, the same will not in any manner affect
Proclamation No. 216. Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9372, otherwise
known as the Human Security Act of 2007 expressly provides that "[n]othing
in this Act shall be interpreted as a curtailment, restriction or diminution of
constitutionally recognized powers of the executive branch of the
government." Thus, as long as the President complies with all the
requirements of Section 18, Article VII, the existence of terrorism cannot
prevent him from exercising his extraordinary power of proclaiming martial '
law or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. After all, the
extraordinary powers of the President are bestowed on him by the
Constitution. No act of Congress can, therefore, curtail or diminish such
powers.
Besides, there is nothing in Art. 134 of the RPC and RA 9372 which states
that rebellion and terrorism are mutuallty exclusive of each other or that they
cannot co-exist together. RA 9372 does not expressly or impliedly repeal Art.
134 of the RPC. And while rebellion is one of the predicate crimes of
terrorism, one cannot absorb the other as they have different elements. 300
Verily, the Court upholds the validity of the declaration of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire
Mindanao region.
At the end of the day, however ardently and passionately we may believe in
the validity or correctness of the varied and contentious causes or principles
that we espouse, advocate or champion, let us not forget that at this point in
time we, the Filipino people, are confronted with a crisis of such magnitude
and proportion that we all need to summon the spirit of unity and act as one
undivided nation, if we are to overcome and prevail in the struggle at hand.
Let us face up to the fact that the siege in Marawi City has entered the
second month and only God or Allah knows when it would end. Let us take
notice of the fact that the casualties of the war are mounting. To date, 418
have died. Out of that were 303 Maute rebels as against 71 government
troops and 44 civilians.
Can we not sheathe our swords and pause for a while to bury our dead,
including our differences and prejudices?

[6] G.R. No. 167569 September 4, 2009 Jimmy on the ground that he is an alien. Hence, the principal issue that will be
decided on is the propriety of his deportation. To recall, Jimmy claims that he is a
CARLOS T. GO, SR., Petitioner, vs. LUIS T. RAMOS, Respondent. Filipino under Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution because Carlos, his
father, is allegedly a citizen. Since his citizenship hinges on that of his father’s, it
Citizenship; Cases involving issues on citizenship are sui generis—once the becomes necessary to pass upon the citizenship of the latter. However, whatever will
citizenship of an individual is put into question, it necessarily has to be threshed out be the findings as to Carlos’ citizenship will in no way prejudice him.
and decided upon.—Carlos and Jimmy’s claim that the cause of action of the Bureau Same; Judgments; Res Judicata; Citizenship proceedings are a class of its
has prescribed is untenable. Cases involving issues on citizenship are sui generis. own, in that, unlike other cases, res judicata does not obtain as a matter of course;
Once the citizenship of an individual is put into question, it necessarily has to be Requisites for Application of Res Judicata in Citizenship Cases.—Citizenship
threshed out and decided upon. In the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, proceedings, as aforestated, are a class of its own, in that, unlike other cases, res
257 SCRA 727 (1996), we said that decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of judicata does not obtain as a matter of course. In a long line of decisions, this Court
citizenship cannot govern a person’s future status with finality. This is because a said that every time the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a
person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter, lose his citizenship under any judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative
of the modes recognized by law for the purpose. Indeed, if the issue of one’s authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res
citizenship, after it has been passed upon by the courts, leaves it still open to future judicata; hence, it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may
adjudication, then there is more reason why the government should not be precluded demand. Res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship only if the following
from questioning one’s claim to Philippine citizenship, especially so when the same concur: 1. a person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy
has never been threshed out by any tribunal. where said person is a party; 2. the Solicitor General or his authorized representative
Same; Deportation; Prescription; An alien’s deportation may be effected only took active part in the resolution thereof; and 3. the finding or citizenship is affirmed
if his arrest is made within 5 years from the time the cause for deportation arose; It by this Court.
is the legal possibility of bringing the action which determines the starting point for Same; Bureau of Immigration and Deportation; Administrative Law; Doctrine
the computation of the period of prescription.—As shown in the Charge Sheet, of Primary Jurisdiction; There can be no question that the Board of Commissioners
Jimmy was charged for violation of Section 37(a)(9), in relation to Section 45(e) of has the authority to hear and determine the deportation case against a deportee and
Com. Act No. 613. From the foregoing provision, his deportation may be effected in the process determine also the question of citizenship raised by him; Judicial
only if his arrest is made within 5 years from the time the cause for deportation determination is permitted in cases when the courts themselves believe that there is
arose. The court a quo is correct when it ruled that the 5-year period should be substantial evidence supporting the claim of citizenship, so substantial that there are
counted only from July 18, 2000, the time when Luis filed his complaint for reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is correct; When the evidence
deportation. It is the legal possibility of bringing the action which determines the submitted by a deportee is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate
starting point for the computation of the period of prescription. Additionally, Section review should also be recognized and the courts shall promptly enjoin the
2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, entitled “An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription deportation proceedings.—There can be no question that the Board has the authority
for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide to hear and determine the deportation case against a deportee and in the process
When Prescription Shall Begin to Run,” provides: Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to determine also the question of citizenship raised by him. However, this Court,
run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be following American jurisprudence, laid down the exception to the primary
not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial jurisdiction enjoyed by the deportation board in the case of Chua Hiong v.
proceedings for its investigation and punishment. Deportation Board, 96 SCRA 665 (1955), wherein we stressed that judicial
Same; Same; Parties; Indispensable Parties; To be indispensable, a person determination is permitted in cases when the courts themselves believe that there is
must first be a real party in interest, that is, one who stands to be benefited or substantial evidence supporting the claim of citizenship, so substantial that there are
injured by the judgment of the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.—As reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is correct. Moreover, when the
to the issue of whether Carlos is an indispensable party, we reiterate that an evidence submitted by a deportee is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to
indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be immediate review should also be recognized and the courts shall promptly enjoin the
had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiff or defendant. To be deportation proceedings. While we are mindful that resort to the courts may be had,
indispensable, a person must first be a real party in interest, that is, one who stands to the same should be allowed only in the sound discretion of a competent court in
be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or the party entitled to the avails proper proceedings. After all, the Board’s jurisdiction is not divested by the mere
of the suit. Carlos clearly is not an indispensable party as he does not stand to be claim of citizenship. Moreover, a deportee who claims to be a citizen and not
benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit. What is sought is the deportation of therefore subject to deportation has the right to have his citizenship reviewed by the

courts, after the deportation proceedings. The decision of the Board on the question indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding
is, of course, not final but subject to review by the courts. citizenship must be resolved in favor of the state.—It is true that we said that the 3-
Same; Legal Research; The Supreme Court abandoned the principle of jus soli year period for electing Philippine citizenship may be extended as when the person
in the case of Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor, 79 Phil. 249 (1947), and, since then, has always regarded himself as a Filipino. Be that as it may, it is our considered view
said doctrine only benefited those who were individually declared to be citizens of that not a single circumstance was sufficiently shown meriting the extension of the 3-
the Philippines by a final court decision on the mistaken application of jus soli.— year period. The fact that Carlos exercised his right of suffrage in 1952 and 1955
One of the arguments raised to sustain Carlos’ claim to Philippine citizenship is the does not demonstrate such belief, considering that the acts were done after he elected
doctrine of jus soli, or the doctrine or principle of citizenship by place of birth. To Philippine citizenship. On the other hand, the mere fact that he was able to vote does
recall, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled that the doctrine of jus soli not validate his irregular election of Philippine citizenship. At most, his registration
was never extended to the Philippines. We agree. The doctrine of jus soli was for a as a voter indicates his desire to exercise a right appertaining exclusively to Filipino
time the prevailing rule in the acquisition of one’s citizenship. However, the citizens but does not alter his real citizenship, which, in this jurisdiction, is
Supreme Court abandoned the principle of jus soli in the case of Tan Chong v. determined by blood (jus sanguinis). The exercise of the rights and privileges
Secretary of Labor, 79 Phil. 249 (1947). Since then, said doctrine only benefited granted only to Filipinos is not conclusive proof of citizenship, because a person may
those who were individually declared to be citizens of the Philippines by a final court misrepresent himself to be a Filipino and thus enjoy the rights and privileges of
decision on the mistaken application of jus soli. citizens of this country. It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship
Same; Filiation; Paternity; It is a settled rule that only legitimate children to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption
follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under the can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt
parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality.—It is a settled rule that regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the state.
only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate Same; Deportation; Due Process; Deportation proceedings are administrative
children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality. in character, summary in nature, and need not be conducted strictly in accordance
Moreover, we have also ruled that an illegitimate child of a Filipina need not perform with the rules of ordinary court proceedings; The essence of due process is simply
any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself. However, it is our opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the
considered view that absent any evidence proving that Carlos is indeed an action or ruling complained of.—Deportation proceedings are administrative in
illegitimate son of a Filipina, the aforestated established rule could not be applied to character, summary in nature, and need not be conducted strictly in accordance with
him. the rules of ordinary court proceedings. The essence of due process is simply an
Same; Election of Philippine Citizenship; Words and Phrases; The phrase opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity
“reasonable time” has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority.—The 1935 Constitution complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before
and Com. Act No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election of judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met. Although
Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the Jimmy was not furnished with a copy of the subject Resolution and Charge Sheet as
election should be made “upon reaching the age of majority.” The age of majority alleged by him, the trial court found that he was given ample opportunity to explain
then commenced upon reaching 21 years. In the opinions of the then Secretary of his side and present controverting evidence.
Justice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this Same; Same; Habeas Corpus; Certiorari; Appeals; Pleadings and Practice;
dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior The writ of certiorari does not lie where an appeal may be taken or where another
to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for adequate remedy is available for the correction of the error; The 48-hour appeal
electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the period in habeas corpus proceedings demonstrates the adequacy of such remedy in
Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that the election that no unnecessary time will be wasted before the decision will be re-evaluated.—
should be made within a “reasonable time” after attaining the age of majority. The We have held in a litany of cases that the extraordinary remedies of certiorari,
phrase “reasonable time” has been interpreted to mean that the election should be prohibition and mandamus are available only when there is no appeal or any plain,
made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The writ of certiorari
Same; Same; The 3-year period for electing Philippine citizenship may be does not lie where an appeal may be taken or where another adequate remedy is
extended as when the person has always regarded himself as a Filipino; The available for the correction of the error. The petitioners correctly argue that appeal
exercise of the rights and privileges granted only to Filipinos is not conclusive proof should have been the remedy availed of as it is more plain, speedy and adequate. The
of citizenship, because a person may misrepresent himself to be a Filipino and thus 48-hour appeal period demonstrates the adequacy of such remedy in that no
enjoy the rights and privileges of citizens of this country; No presumption can be unnecessary time will be wasted before the decision will be re-evaluated.

Same; Same; Same; Courts; Regional Trial Courts; Bail; Words and Phrases; On the other hand, G.R. No. 171946, also a petition for review on certiorari,
Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his seeks to set aside the December 8, 2005 Decision 6 and March 13, 2006
detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus—his remedy Resolution7 of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 88277.
would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued; The
term “court” in the context of habeas corpus proceedings includes quasi-judicial Considering that the three cases arose from the same factual milieu, the
bodies of governmental agencies authorized to order the person’s confinement, like Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 167570 and 167569 with G.R. No.
the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration; When an alien is detained by 171946 per Resolution8 dated February 26, 2007.
the Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by
the Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit 9 for deportation initiated
alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing by Luis T. Ramos before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now
it.—A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding Bureau of Immigration) against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an
governed by Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to illegal and undesirable alien. Luis alleged that while Jimmy represents
determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmy’s personal circumstances and other
cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person’s detention as records indicate that he is not so. To prove his contention, Luis presented the
of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even birth certificate of Jimmy, issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo
if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening City, which indicated Jimmy’s citizenship as "FChinese." Luis argued that
events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal although it appears from Jimmy’s birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and
at the time of the filing of the application. Once a person detained is duly charged in Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered, because
court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for issuance of a only the citizenship of Carlos appears to be handwritten while all the other
writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the entries were typewritten. He also averred that in September 1989 or
warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after thereabout, Jimmy, through stealth, machination and scheming managed to
the party sought to be released had been charged before any court. The term “court” cover up his true citizenship, and with the use of falsified documents and
in this context includes quasi-judicial bodies of governmental agencies authorized to untruthful declarations, was able to procure a Philippine passport from the
order the person’s confinement, like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Department of Foreign Affairs.
Immigration. Likewise, the cancellation of his bail cannot be assailed via a petition
for habeas corpus. When an alien is detained by the Bureau of Immigration for
Jimmy refuted the allegations in his counter-affidavit, 10 averring that the
deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the Deportation Board, the
complaint for deportation initiated by Luis was merely a harassment case
Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on bail even in habeas
designed to oust him of his rightful share in their business dealings. Jimmy
corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it.
maintained that there is no truth to the allegation that he is an alien, and
insisted that he is a natural-born Filipino. Jimmy alleged that his father
DECISION Carlos, who was the son of a Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected
Philippine citizenship in accordance with Article IV, Section 1, paragraph 4 11
QUISUMBING, J.: of the 1935 Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 625 12 (Com. Act No.
625), as evidenced by his having taken the Oath of Allegiance on July 11,
Before us are three petitions. G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570 are petitions for 1950 and having executed an Affidavit of Election of Philippine citizenship on
review on certiorari to set aside the October 25, 2004 Decision 1 and February July 12, 1950. Although the said oath and affidavit were registered only on
16, 2005 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85143 that September 11, 1956, the reason behind such late registration was sufficiently
affirmed the Decision3 dated January 6, 2004 and Order 4 dated May 3, 2004 explained in an affidavit. Jimmy added that he had even voted in the 1952
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 167 in SCA No. 2218 and 1955 elections.13 He denied that his father arrived in the Philippines as
upholding the preparation and filing of deportation charges against Jimmy T. an undocumented alien, alleging that his father has no record of arrival in this
Go, the corresponding Charge Sheet 5 dated July 3, 2001, and the country as alleged in the complaint-affidavit precisely because his father was
deportation proceedings thereunder conducted. born and raised in the Philippines, and in fact, speaks fluent Ilonggo and
Tagalog.14
With regard to the erroneous entry in his birth certificate that he is

"FChinese," he maintained that such was not of his own doing, but may be

attributed to the employees of the Local Civil Registrar’s Office who might CONTRARY TO LAW.22
have relied on his Chinese-sounding surname when making the said entry.
He asserted that the said office has control over his birth certificate; thus, if On November 9, 2001, Carlos and Jimmy filed a petition for certiorari and
his father’s citizenship appears to be handwritten, it may have been changed prohibition23 with application for injunctive reliefs before the RTC of Pasig
when the employees of that office realized that his father has already taken City, Branch 167, docketed as SCA No. 2218, seeking to annul and set aside
his oath as a Filipino.15 As regards the entry in his siblings’ certificates of the March 8, 2001 Resolution of the Board of Commissioners, the Charge
birth, particularly Juliet Go and Carlos Go, Jr., that their father is Chinese, Sheet, and the proceedings had therein. In essence, they challenged the
Jimmy averred that the entry was erroneous because it was made without jurisdiction of the Board to continue with the deportation proceedings.
prior consultation with his father.16
In the interim, the Board issued a Decision 24 dated April 17, 2002, in BSI-D.C.
In a Resolution17 dated February 14, 2001, Associate Commissioner Linda L. No. ADD-01-117, ordering the apprehension and deportation of Jimmy. The
Malenab-Hornilla dismissed the complaint for deportation against Jimmy. dispositive portion of the decision reads:
Associate Commissioner Hornilla affirmed the findings of the National Bureau
of Investigation tasked to investigate the case that Jimmy’s father elected WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Board of Commissioners hereby
Filipino citizenship in accordance with the provisions of the 1935 Philippine Orders the apprehension of respondent JIMMY T. GO @ JAIME T.
Constitution. By operation of law, therefore, the citizenship of Carlos was GAISANO and that he be then deported to CHINA of which he is a citizen,
transmitted to Jimmy, making him a Filipino as well. without prejudice, however, to the continuation of any and all criminal and
other proceedings that are pending in court or before the prosecution arm of
On March 8, 2001,18 the Board of Commissioners (Board) reversed said the Philippine Government, if any. And that upon expulsion, he is thereby
dismissal, holding that Carlos’ election of Philippine citizenship was made out ordered barred from entry into the Philippines. SO ORDERED. 25
of time. Finding Jimmy’s claim to Philippine citizenship in serious doubt by
reason of his father’s questionable election thereof, the Board directed the In view of the said Decision, Carlos and Jimmy filed on June 13, 2002 a
preparation and filing of the appropriate deportation charges against Jimmy. supplemental petition for certiorari and prohibition 26 before the trial court and
reiterated their application for injunctive reliefs. The trial court issued a writ of
On July 3, 2001, the corresponding Charge Sheet was filed against Jimmy, preliminary prohibitory injunction pending litigation on the main issue,
charging him of violating Section 37(a)(9) 19 in relation to Section 45(c)20 of enjoining the Bureau from enforcing the April 17, 2002 Decision. 27 Later,
Com. Act No. 613, otherwise known as The Philippine Immigration Act of however, the trial court dissolved the writ in a Decision 28 dated January 6,
1940,21 as amended, committed as follows: 2004 as a consequence of the dismissal of the petition.
1. That Respondent was born on October 25, 1952 in Iloilo City, as Carlos and Jimmy moved for reconsideration. But their motion was likewise
evidenced by a copy of his birth certificate wherein his citizenship denied.29
was recorded as "Chinese";
Following the dismissal of the petition in SCA No. 2218, the Board issued a
2. That Respondent through some stealth machinations was able to warrant of deportation30 which led to the apprehension of Jimmy. Jimmy
subsequently cover up his true and actual citizenship as Chinese and commenced a petition for habeas corpus, but the same was eventually
illegally acquired a Philippine Passport under the name JAIME T. dismissed by reason of his provisional release on bail.31
GAISANO, with the use of falsified documents and untruthful
declarations, in violation of the above-cited provisions of the Carlos and Jimmy then questioned the Decision in SCA No. 2218 as well as
Immigration Act[;] the Resolution denying their motion for reconsideration by way of a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
3. That [R]espondent being an alien, has formally and officially 85143. They imputed grave abuse of discretion by the trial court for passing
represent[ed] and introduce[d] himself as a citizen of the Philippines, upon their citizenship, claiming that what they asked for in their petition was
for fraudulent purposes and in order to evade any requirements of merely the nullification of the March 8, 2001 Resolution and the charge
the immigration laws, also in violation of said law. sheet.

The appellate tribunal dismissed the petition. 32 It did not find merit in their No. 11507 assailing his apprehension and detention despite the pendency of
argument that the issue of citizenship should proceed only before the proper his appeal and his release on recognizance.
court in an independent action, and that neither the Bureau nor the Board
has jurisdiction over individuals who were born in the Philippines and have In an Order37 dated December 6, 2004, the trial court dismissed the said
exercised the rights of Filipino citizens. The appellate tribunal also rejected petition ruling that the remedy of habeas corpus cannot be availed of to
their claim that they enjoy the presumption of being Filipino citizens. obtain an order of release once a deportation order has already been issued
by the Bureau. Jimmy moved for reconsideration of the Order, but this was
The Court of Appeals held that the Board has the exclusive authority and also denied by the trial court in an Order38 dated December 28, 2004.
jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged alien, and in the process,
determine their citizenship. Jimmy assailed the Orders of the trial court in a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the appellate court, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 88277. The
The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the principle of jus soli was Court of Appeals granted the petition and enjoined the deportation of Jimmy
never extended to the Philippines; hence, could not be made a ground to until the issue of his citizenship is settled with finality by the court. The Court
one’s claim of Philippine citizenship. Like the trial court, the appellate tribunal of Appeals held as follows:
found that Carlos failed to elect Philippine citizenship within the reasonable
period of three years upon reaching the age of majority. Furthermore, it held …the issuance of a warrant to arrest and deport the petitioner without any
that the belated submission to the local civil registry of the affidavit of election proof whatsoever of his violation of the bail conditions [that he was previously
and oath of allegiance in September 1956 was defective because the granted] is arbitrary, inequitable and unjust, for the policies governing the
affidavit of election was executed after the oath of allegiance, and the delay grant of his bail should likewise apply in the cancellation of the said bail.
of several years before their filing with the proper office was not satisfactorily Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a
explained. criminal action, yet considering that it is such a harsh and extraordinary
administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person who
The course of action taken by the trial court was also approved by the all his life has always lived in the Philippines, where he has established his
appellate tribunal. The Court of Appeals stated that the trial court necessarily family and business interests, one who appears to be not completely devoid
had to rule on the substantial and legal bases warranting the deportation of any claim to Filipino citizenship, being the son of a Filipina, whose father is
proceeding in order to determine whether the Board acted without or in alleged to also have elected to be a Filipino, the constitutional right of such
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Moreover, the person to due process cannot be peremptorily dismissed or ignored
appellate court found that due process was properly observed in the altogether, and indeed should not be denied. If it later turns out that the
proceedings before the Board, contrary to the claim of Jimmy. petitioner is a Filipino after all, then the overly eager Immigration authorities
would have expelled and relegated to statelessness one who might in fact be
Unfazed with the said ruling, they moved for reconsideration. Their motion a Filipino by blood.
having been denied,33 Carlos and Jimmy each filed a petition for review on
certiorari before this Court, respectively docketed as G.R. Nos. 167569 and WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition with reference to the
167570. Warrant of Deportation issued by the BID is hereby GRANTED. The Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation, through Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez,
Meanwhile, in view of the dismissal of CA-G.R. SP. No. 85143, Bureau of Jr., Atty. Faizal Hussin and Ansari Maca Ayan, and any of their deputized
Immigration Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr. issued Warrant of agents, are ENJOINED from deporting petitioner Jimmy T. Go, a.k.a. Jaime
Deportation No. AFF-04-00334 dated November 16, 2004 to carry out the T. Gaisano, until the issue of petitioner’s citizenship is finally settled by the
April 17, 2002 Decision in BSI-D.C. No. ADD-01-117. This resulted in the courts of justice.
apprehension and detention of Jimmy at the Bureau of Immigration Bicutan
Detention Center, pending his deportation to China. 35 SO ORDERED.39
On account of his detention, Jimmy once again filed a petition for habeas Their motion for reconsideration 40 having been denied on March 13, 2006,
corpus36 before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 167, docketed as SP. Proc. Hon. Alipio Fernandez, in his capacity as the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Immigration, and Atty. Faisal Hussin and Ansari M. Macaayan, in their

capacity as Intelligence Officers of the Bureau of Immigration, are before this IV.GIVEN THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE HEREIN
Court as petitioners in G.R. No. 171946. PETITIONER’S FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP, A FULL BLOWN TRIAL UNDER
THE MORE RIGID RULES OF EVIDENCE PRESCRIBED IN COURT
The parties have raised the following grounds for their respective petitions: PROCEEDINGS SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED TO DETERMINE
HIS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AND NOT THROUGH MERE "SUMMARY
PROCEEDINGS" SUCH AS THE ONE HAD BEFORE THE B.I.D.42
G.R. No. 167569
G.R. No. 171946

I.THE PROCEEDINGS HAD BEFORE THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION
AND DEPORTATION (B.I.D.) ARE NULL AND VOID FOR ITS FAILURE TO
IMPLEAD AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY IN THE PERSON OF PETITIONER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN
CARLOS GO, SR. ENJOINING RESPONDENT’S DEPORTATION.43
II.GIVEN THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE HEREIN Succinctly stated, the issues for our resolution are: (a) whether the cause of
PETITIONER CARLOS GO SR.’S FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP, A FULL BLOWN action of the Bureau against Carlos and Jimmy had prescribed; (b) whether
TRIAL UNDER THE MORE RIGID RULES OF EVIDENCE PRESCRIBED IN the deportation proceedings are null and void for failure to implead Carlos as
COURT PROCEEDINGS SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED TO an indispensable party therein; (c) whether the evidence adduced by Carlos
DETERMINE HIS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AND NOT THROUGH MERE and Jimmy to prove their claim to Philippine citizenship is substantial and
"SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS" SUCH AS THE ONE HAD BEFORE THE sufficient to oust the Board of its jurisdiction from continuing with the
B.I.D. AS WELL AS IN THE COURT A QUO. deportation proceedings in order to give way to a formal judicial action to
pass upon the issue of alienage; (d) whether due process was properly
observed in the proceedings before the Board; and (e) whether the petition
III.A FILIPINO CITIZEN IS NOT REQUIRED TO ELECT PHILIPPINE
for habeas corpus should be dismissed.
CITIZENSHIP.
The arguments raised by Carlos and Jimmy in their respective petitions are
IV.ASSUMING CARLOS GO, SR. STILL NEEDS TO ELECT PHILIPPINE
merely a rehash of the arguments they adduced before the appellate tribunal
CITIZENSHIP, HE HAD COMPLIED WITH ALL THE REQUIREMENTS OF
and the trial court. Once again, they raised the same argument of
COM. ACT NO. 625.
prescription. As to Carlos, it is his position that being recognized by the
government to have acquired Philippine citizenship, evidenced by the
V.PETITIONER CARLOS GO, SR. ENJOYS THE "PRESUMPTION OF Certificate of Election issued to him on September 11, 1956, his citizenship
CITIZENSHIP." could no longer be questioned at this late date. As for Jimmy, he contends
that the Board’s cause of action to deport him has prescribed for the simple
VI.RESPONDENT’S "CAUSE OF ACTION" HAD LONG PRESCRIBED.41 reason that his arrest was not made within five (5) years from the time the
cause of action arose, which according to him commenced in 1989 when he
G.R. No. 167570 was alleged to have illegally acquired a Philippine passport.
I.THE PROCEEDINGS HAD BEFORE THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION In any event, they argue that the deportation proceeding should be nullified
AND DEPORTATION (B.I.D.) ARE NULL AND VOID FOR ITS FAILURE TO altogether for failure to implead Carlos as an indispensable party therein.
IMPLEAD AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY IN THE PERSON OF Jimmy posits that the deportation case against him was made to depend
PETITIONER’S FATHER, CARLOS GO, SR. upon the citizenship of his father, Carlos, in that the Board found justification
to order his deportation by declaring that his father is a Chinese citizen even
II.THE DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE B.I.D. ARE NULL though the latter was never made a party in the deportation proceedings.
AND VOID FOR ITS FAILURE TO OBSERVE DUE PROCESS. They argue that the Board could not simply strip Carlos of his citizenship just
so they could question the citizenship of Jimmy. To do so without affording
Carlos the opportunity to adduce evidence to prove his claim to Philippine
III.THE B.I.D.’S CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER
JIMMY T. GO HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.

citizenship would be the height of injustice. For failing to accord him the Even assuming that his father remained as a Chinese, Carlos also claims
requisite due process, the whole proceeding should perforce be stuck down. that he followed the citizenship of his Filipina mother, being an illegitimate
son, and that he even validly elected Philippine citizenship when he complied
While they concede that the Board has jurisdiction to hear cases against an with all the requirements of Com. Act No. 625. He submits that what is being
alleged alien, they insist that judicial intervention may be resorted to when disputed is not whether he complied with Com. Act No. 625, but rather, the
the claim to citizenship is so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to timeliness of his compliance. He stresses that the 3-year compliance period
believe that the claim is correct, like in this case. Their claim to Philippine following the interpretation given by Cuenco v. Secretary of Justice 46 to
citizenship, they said, is clearly shown by the fact that they were born, had Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution and Com. Act No. 625 when
been raised and had lived in this country all their lives; they speak fluent election must be made, is not an inflexible rule. He reasoned that the same
Tagalog and Ilonggo; they engage in businesses reserved solely for Filipinos; decision held that such period may be extended under certain circumstances,
they exercise their right to suffrage; they enjoy the rights and privileges as when the person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino, like
accorded only to citizens; and they have no record of any Alien Certificate of in his case.47
Registration. More importantly, they contend that they were validly issued
Philippine passports. They further posit that the judicial intervention required We deny the appeal of Carlos and Jimmy for lack of merit.
is not merely a judicial review of the proceedings below, but a full-blown,
adversarial, trial-type proceedings where the rules of evidence are strictly Carlos and Jimmy’s claim that the cause of action of the Bureau has
observed. prescribed is untenable. Cases involving issues on citizenship are sui
generis. Once the citizenship of an individual is put into question, it
Considering that his citizenship affects that of his son, Carlos opted to necessarily has to be threshed out and decided upon. In the case of Frivaldo
present controverting arguments to sustain his claim to Philippine citizenship, v. Commission on Elections,48 we said that decisions declaring the
notwithstanding the fact that according to him, he was never impleaded in the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person’s future status with
deportation proceedings. finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that
matter, lose his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the
Carlos takes exception to the ruling of the appellate court that the doctrine of purpose.49 Indeed, if the issue of one’s citizenship, after it has been passed
jus soli failed to accord him Philippine citizenship for the reason that the upon by the courts, leaves it still open to future adjudication, then there is
same was never extended to the Philippines. He insists that if his Philippine more reason why the government should not be precluded from questioning
citizenship is not recognized by said doctrine, it is nonetheless recognized by one’s claim to Philippine citizenship, especially so when the same has never
the laws enforced prior to the 1935 Constitution, particularly the Philippine Bill been threshed out by any tribunal.
of 190244 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916 (Jones Law of
1916).45 Jimmy’s invocation of prescription also does not persuade us. Section 37 (b)
of Com. Act No. 613 states:
According to Carlos, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of 1916
deemed all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands as well as their children born Section 37. …
after the passage of said laws to be citizens of the Philippines. Because his
father, Go Yin An, was a resident of the Philippines at the time of the (b) Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of this
passage of the Jones Law of 1916, he (Carlos) undoubtedly acquired his section at any time after entry, but shall not be effected under any other
father’s citizenship. Article IV, first paragraph, of the 1935 Constitution clause unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five
therefore applies to him. Said constitutional provision reads: years after the cause of deportation arises….
ARTICLE IV. Citizenship As shown in the Charge Sheet, Jimmy was charged for violation of Section
37(a)(9),50 in relation to Section 45(e)51 of Com. Act No. 613. From the
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: foregoing provision, his deportation may be effected only if his arrest is made
within 5 years from the time the cause for deportation arose. The court a quo
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the is correct when it ruled that the 5-year period should be counted only from
adoption of this Constitution. July 18, 2000, the time when Luis filed his complaint for deportation. It is the

legal possibility of bringing the action which determines the starting point for 2. the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in
the computation of the period of prescription. 52 Additionally, Section 2 of Act the resolution thereof; and
No. 3326,53 as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription
for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to 3. the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court. 59
Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run," provides:
In the event that the citizenship of Carlos will be questioned, or his
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the deportation sought, the same has to be ascertained once again as the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the decision which will be rendered hereinafter shall have no preclusive effect
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its upon his citizenship. As neither injury nor benefit will redound upon Carlos,
investigation and punishment. he cannot be said to be an indispensable party in this case.
The counting could not logically start in 1989 when his passport was issued There can be no question that the Board has the authority to hear and
because the government was unaware that he was not a Filipino citizen. Had determine the deportation case against a deportee and in the process
the government been aware at such time that he was not a Filipino citizen or determine also the question of citizenship raised by him. 60 However, this
there were certain anomalies attending his application for such passport, it Court, following American jurisprudence, laid down the exception to the
would have denied his application. primary jurisdiction enjoyed by the deportation board in the case of Chua
Hiong v. Deportation Board61 wherein we stressed that judicial determination
As to the issue of whether Carlos is an indispensable party, we reiterate that is permitted in cases when the courts themselves believe that there is
an indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final substantial evidence supporting the claim of citizenship, so substantial that
determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is correct. 62
plaintiff or defendant.54 To be indispensable, a person must first be a real Moreover, when the evidence submitted by a deportee is conclusive of his
party in interest, that is, one who stands to be benefited or injured by the citizenship, the right to immediate review should also be recognized and the
judgment of the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. 55 Carlos courts shall promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings. 63
clearly is not an indispensable party as he does not stand to be benefited or
injured by the judgment of the suit. What is sought is the deportation of While we are mindful that resort to the courts may be had, the same should
Jimmy on the ground that he is an alien. Hence, the principal issue that will be allowed only in the sound discretion of a competent court in proper
be decided on is the propriety of his deportation. To recall, Jimmy claims that proceedings.64 After all, the Board’s jurisdiction is not divested by the mere
he is a Filipino under Section 1(3),56 Article IV of the 1935 Constitution claim of citizenship.65 Moreover, a deportee who claims to be a citizen and
because Carlos, his father, is allegedly a citizen. 57 Since his citizenship not therefore subject to deportation has the right to have his citizenship
hinges on that of his father’s, it becomes necessary to pass upon the reviewed by the courts, after the deportation proceedings. 66 The decision of
citizenship of the latter. However, whatever will be the findings as to Carlos’ the Board on the question is, of course, not final but subject to review by the
citizenship will in no way prejudice him. courts.
Citizenship proceedings, as aforestated, are a class of its own, in that, unlike After a careful evaluation of the evidence, the appellate court was not
other cases, res judicata does not obtain as a matter of course. In a long line convinced that the same was sufficient to oust the Board of its jurisdiction to
of decisions, this Court said that every time the citizenship of a person is continue with the deportation proceedings considering that what were
material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the presented particularly the birth certificates of Jimmy, as well as those of his
corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such siblings, Juliet Go and Carlos Go, Jr. indicate that they are Chinese citizens.
citizenship is generally not considered as res judicata; hence, it has to be Furthermore, like the Board, it found the election of Carlos of Philippine
threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. 58 Res judicata citizenship, which was offered as additional proof of his claim, irregular as it
may be applied in cases of citizenship only if the following concur: was not made on time.
1. a person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a We find no cogent reason to overturn the above findings of the appellate
controversy where said person is a party; tribunal. The question of whether substantial evidence had been presented to
allow immediate recourse to the regular courts is a question of fact which is

beyond this Court’s power of review for it is not a trier of facts. 68 None of the made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made
exceptions69 in which this Court may resolve factual issues has been shown "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced
to exist in this case. Even if we evaluate their arguments and the evidence upon reaching 21 years. In the opinions of the then Secretary of Justice on
they presented once again, the same conclusion will still be reached. cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma
was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior to
One of the arguments raised to sustain Carlos’ claim to Philippine citizenship the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period
is the doctrine of jus soli, or the doctrine or principle of citizenship by place of for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements
birth. To recall, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled that the of the Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that
doctrine of jus soli was never extended to the Philippines. We agree. The the election should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age
doctrine of jus soli was for a time the prevailing rule in the acquisition of one’s of majority. The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that
citizenship.70 However, the Supreme Court abandoned the principle of jus soli the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of
in the case of Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor. 71 Since then, said doctrine majority.78
only benefited those who were individually declared to be citizens of the
Philippines by a final court decision on the mistaken application of jus soli. 72 It is true that we said that the 3-year period for electing Philippine citizenship
may be extended as when the person has always regarded himself as a
Neither will the Philippine Bill of 190273 nor the Jones Law of 191674 make Filipino. Be that as it may, it is our considered view that not a single
Carlos a citizen of the Philippines. His bare claim that his father, Go Yin An, circumstance was sufficiently shown meriting the extension of the 3-year
was a resident of the Philippines at the time of the passage of the said laws, period. The fact that Carlos exercised his right of suffrage in 1952 and 1955
without any supporting evidence whatsoever will not suffice. does not demonstrate such belief, considering that the acts were done after
he elected Philippine citizenship. On the other hand, the mere fact that he
was able to vote does not validate his irregular election of Philippine
It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the
citizenship. At most, his registration as a voter indicates his desire to exercise
father and that illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the
a right appertaining exclusively to Filipino citizens but does not alter his real
mother and follow her nationality. 75 Moreover, we have also ruled that an
citizenship, which, in this jurisdiction, is determined by blood (jus sanguinis).
illegitimate child of a Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him all
The exercise of the rights and privileges granted only to Filipinos is not
the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines; he
conclusive proof of citizenship, because a person may misrepresent himself
automatically becomes a citizen himself.76 However, it is our considered view
to be a Filipino and thus enjoy the rights and privileges of citizens of this
that absent any evidence proving that Carlos is indeed an illegitimate son of
country.79
a Filipina, the aforestated established rule could not be applied to him.
It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the

As to the question of whether the election of Philippine citizenship conferred
satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be
on Carlos Filipino citizenship, we find that the appellate court correctly found
indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt
that it did not.
regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the state. 80
Com. Act No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of
As Carlos and Jimmy neither showed conclusive proof of their citizenship nor
the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in
presented substantial proof of the same, we have no choice but to sustain
order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1
the Board’s jurisdiction over the deportation proceedings. This is not to say
thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine
that we are ruling that they are not Filipinos, for that is not what we are called
citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and
upon to do. This Court necessarily has to pass upon the issue of citizenship
sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer
only to determine whether the proceedings may be enjoined in order to give
oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall
way to a judicial determination of the same. And we are of the opinion that
accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the
said proceedings should not be enjoined.
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines." 77
In our considered view, the allegation of Jimmy that due process was not
However, the 1935 Constitution and Com. Act No. 625 did not prescribe a
observed in the deportation proceedings must likewise fail.
time period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be

Deportation proceedings are administrative in character, summary in nature, Board, they insist, is the lawful ground that sanctions Jimmy’s apprehension
and need not be conducted strictly in accordance with the rules of ordinary and detention.88
court proceedings.81 The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to
be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to Petitioners in G.R. No. 171946 also argue that Jimmy cannot rely on the bail
explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or on recognizance he was previously granted to question his subsequent
ruling complained of.82 As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be apprehension and detention. Under the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940,
heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are the power to grant bail can only be exercised while the alien is still under
sufficiently met.83 Although Jimmy was not furnished with a copy of the investigation, and not when the order of deportation had already been issued
subject Resolution and Charge Sheet as alleged by him, the trial court found by the Board.89 Hence, the bail granted was irregular as it has no legal basis.
that he was given ample opportunity to explain his side and present Furthermore, they said the petition for habeas corpus necessarily has to be
controverting evidence, thus: dismissed because the same is no longer proper once the applicant thereof
has been charged before the Board, which is the case with Jimmy. 90
x x x It must be stressed that after receiving the Order dated September 11, Nonetheless, they claim that the habeas corpus case is rendered moot and
2001 signed by BSI Chief Ronaldo P. Ledesma on October 4, 2001, academic as Jimmy is no longer being detained.91
petitioner Jimmy T. Go admitted that when his representative went to the
B.I.D. to inquire about the said Order, the latter chanced upon the Resolution On the other hand, Jimmy counters that the instant petition for certiorari and
dated February 14, 2001 and March 8, 2001 as well as the Charge Sheet prohibition is the most appropriate, speedy and adequate remedy in spite of
dated July 3, 2001. Hence on October 5, 2001, he filed a "Motion for the availability of ordinary appeal considering that what is involved in this
Extension of Time to File Memorandum" and as such, was allowed by case is his cherished liberty. Grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Ronaldo P. Ledesma an extension of ten (10) days to submit his required petitioners in ordering his arrest and detention, he argues, all the more
memorandum. x x x84 justifies the avails of the extraordinary writ. 92 Contrary to the petitioners’
stand, Jimmy argues that the April 17, 2002 Decision of the Board has not
This circumstance satisfies the demands of administrative due process. attained finality owing to the availability of various remedies, one of which is
an appeal, and in fact is actually void because it was rendered without due
As regards the petition in G.R. No. 171946, petitioners contend that the process.93 He also insists that the bail issued to him is valid and effective until
appellate tribunal erred in enjoining Jimmy’s deportation. 85 the final determination of his citizenship before the proper courts. 94 Moreover,
he maintains that the petition for habeas corpus was proper since its object is
to inquire into the legality of one’s detention, and if found illegal, to order the
Petitioners question the remedy availed of by Jimmy. They argue that the
release of the detainee.95 As in his petition in G.R. No. 167570, Jimmy also
existence of the remedy of an ordinary appeal proscribes the filing of the
contends that the proceedings before the Board is void for failure to implead
petition for certiorari as was done in this case. They point out that the appeal
therein his father, and that he should have been given a full blown trial before
period in habeas corpus cases is only 48 hours, compared to a special civil
a regular court where he can prove his citizenship. 96
action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which is 60 days. This clearly
shows that an ordinary appeal is the more plain, speedy and adequate
remedy; hence, it must be the one availed of. 86 Since the decision of the trial Considering the arguments and contentions of the parties, we find the
court was not properly appealed, the same may be said to have attained petition in G.R. No. 171946 meritorious.a1f
finality, and may no longer be disturbed.87
We have held in a litany of cases that the extraordinary remedies of
They maintain that the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus by the trial certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are available only when there is no
court was proper. A petition for habeas corpus has for its purpose only the appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
determination of whether or not there is a lawful ground for Jimmy’s law. The writ of certiorari does not lie where an appeal may be taken or
apprehension and continued detention. They urge that the decision of the where another adequate remedy is available for the correction of the error. 97
Board dated April 17, 2002 that ordered Jimmy’s deportation has already
attained finality by reason of the belated appeal taken by Jimmy from the said The petitioners correctly argue that appeal should have been the remedy
decision on April 2, 2004 before the Office of the President, or after almost availed of as it is more plain, speedy and adequate. The 48-hour appeal
two years from the time the decision was rendered. Said decision of the

period demonstrates the adequacy of such remedy in that no unnecessary SO ORDERED.
time will be wasted before the decision will be re-evaluated.
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding

governed by Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court. The objective of the writ
is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is,
the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a
person’s detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ
of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by
reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in
Section 498 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the
application.99
Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question

his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His
remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly
issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party
sought to be released had been charged before any court. The term "court"
in this context includes quasi-judicial bodies of governmental agencies
authorized to order the person’s confinement, like the Deportation Board of
the Bureau of Immigration.100 Likewise, the cancellation of his bail cannot be
assailed via a petition for habeas corpus. When an alien is detained by the
Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by
the Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release
such alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings because there is no
law authorizing it.101
Given that Jimmy has been duly charged before the Board, and in fact
ordered arrested pending his deportation, coupled by this Court’s
pronouncement that the Board was not ousted of its jurisdiction to continue
with the deportation proceedings, the petition for habeas corpus is rendered
moot and academic. This being so, we find it unnecessary to touch on the
other arguments advanced by respondents regarding the same subject.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570 are DENIED.
The Decision dated October 25, 2004 and Resolution dated February 16,
2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85143 are AFFIRMED. The
petition in G.R. No. 171946 is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated
December 8, 2005 and Resolution dated March 13, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88277 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
December 6, 2004 and December 28, 2004 Orders of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 167 are hereby REINSTATED.
No pronouncement as to costs.

[7] UDK No. 14817 January 13, 2014 treating her. She narrated that on September 27, 2011 Shirly instructed
another daughter to give Shang Ko ₱280.00 and take her to the pier to board
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR a boat going to Iloilo City. 5 Shang Ko was told to look for a job there and to
SHANG KO VINGSON YU SHIRLY VINGSON@ SHIRLY VINGSON never come back to Bacolod City. Since she had nowhere to go when she
DEMAISIP, Petitioner, vs. JOVY CABCABAN, Respondent. arrived in Iloilo City, Shang Ko decided to return to Bacolod City with the
money given her. She went to her best friend’s house but was turned away
for fear of Shirly. She called her sister so that she and her boyfriend could get
DECISION
her but they, too, turned her down.6
ABAD, J.:
Respondent Cabcaban also claimed that Shang Ko pleaded with the police
and the social worker not to return her to her mother. As a result, the Bacolod
Petitioner Shirly Vingson (Shirly) alleged that Shang Ko Vingson Yu (Shang City Police filed a complaint7 against petitioner Shirly for violation of Republic
Ko),1 her 14-year-old daughter, ran away from home on September 23, 2011. Act 7610 or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation,
On November 2, 2011 Shirly went to the police station in Bacolod City upon and Discrimination Act. The police sent notice to Shirly inviting her to a
receipt of information that Shang Ko was in the custody of respondent Jovy conference but she refused to receive such notice. Two days later, however,
Cabcaban Cabcaban), a police officer in that station. Since Cabcaban she came and spoke to Cabcaban, pointing out that Shang Ko had been a
refused to release Shang Ko to her, Shirly sought the help of the National difficult child with a tendency to steal. From their conversation, Cabcaban
Bureau of Investigation NBI) to rescue her child. An NBI agent, Arnel Pura surmised that Shirly did not want to take her daughter back, having offered to
Pura), informed Shirly that Shang Ko was no longer with Cabcaban but was pay for her daily expenses at the shelter.
staying with a private organization called Calvary Kids. Pura told her,
however, that the child was fine and had been attending school.
Respondent Cabcaban said that on October 29, 2011 she decided to turn
over Shang Ko to the Calvary Kids, a private organization that gave
This prompted petitioner Shirly to file a petition for habeas corpus against sanctuary and schooling to abandoned and abused children. 8 On November
respondent Cabcaban and the unnamed officers of Calvary Kids before the 2, 2011 petitioner Shirly showed up at the police station asking for her
Court of Appeals (CA) rather than the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City daughter. Cabcaban told her that Shang Ko was in a sanctuary for
citing as reason several threats against her life in that city. abandoned children and that the police officer had to first coordinate with it
before she can disclose where Shang Ko was. But Shirly was adamant and
In a Resolution dated December 18, 2012,2 the CA resolved in CA-G.R. SP threatened her with a lawsuit. Cabcaban claimed that Shang Ko’s father was
07261 to deny the petition for its failure to clearly allege who has custody of a Taiwanese and that Shirly wanted the child back to use her as leverage for
Shang Ko. According to the CA, habeas corpus may not be used as a means getting financial support from him.
of obtaining evidence on the whereabouts of a person or as a means of
finding out who has specifically abducted or caused the disappearance of Respondent Cabcaban further claimed that one year later, NBI agents led by
such person.3 The CA denied petitioner Shirly’s motion for reconsideration on Pura went to the police station to verify Shirly’s complaint that Cabcaban had
January 8, 2013, hence, this petition for review. kidnapped Shang Ko. Cabcaban accompanied the NBI agents to Calvary
Kids to talk to the institution’s social worker, school principal, and director.
In her Comment,4 respondent Cabcaban claimed that on September 28, They provided the NBI agents with the child’s original case study report 9 and
2011 police officers found Shang Ko crying outside a church. When queried, told them that it was not in Shang Ko’s best interest to return her to her
the latter refused to give any information about herself. Thus, they indorsed mother who abused and maltreated her. Shang Ko herself told the NBI that
her case to the Bacolod City Police Women and Children Protection Desk she would rather stay at Calvary Kids because she was afraid of what would
that Cabcaban headed. After the initial interview, Cabcaban referred Shang happen to her if she returned home. 10 As proof, Shang Ko wrote a letter
Ko to Balay Pasilungan , a temporary shelter for abused women and stating that, contrary to her mother’s malicious insinuations, Cabcaban
children. actually helped her when she had nowhere to go after her family refused to
take her back.11
Respondent Cabcaban further claimed that on the next day, a social worker
sat with the minor who said that her mother Shirly had been abusive in

Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus is
available, not only in cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, but also in cases involving the rightful
custody over a minor.12 The general rule is that parents should have custody
over their minor children. But the State has the right to intervene where the
parents, rather than care for such children, treat them cruelly and abusively,
impairing their growth and well-being and leaving them emotional scars that
they carry throughout their lives unless they are liberated from such parents
and properly counseled.
Since this case presents factual issues and since the parties are all residents
of Bacolod City, it would be best that such issues be resolved by a Family
Court in that city. Meantime, considering the presumption that the police
authorities acted regularly in placing Shang Ko in the custody of Calvary Kids
the Court believes that she should remain there pending hearing and
adjudication of this custody case. Besides she herself has expressed
preference to stay in that place.
WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE the Court of Appeals Resolutions in

CA-G.R. SP 07261 dated December 18, 2012 and January 8, 2013 and
ORDERS this custody case forwarded to the Family Court of Bacolod City for
hearing and adjudication as the evidence warrants. Meantime until such court
orders otherwise let the minor Shang Ko Vingson remain in the custody of
Calvary Kids of Bacolod City.
Further the Court ORDERS petitioner Shirly Vingson Shirly Vingson

Demaisip to pay the balance of the docket and other legal fees within 10
days from receipt of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.

[8] G.R. No. 164915 March 10, 2006 On January 11, 2002, Eric Jonathan Yu (petitioner) filed a petition for habeas
corpus before the Court of Appeals alleging that his estranged wife Caroline
ERIC JONATHAN YU, Petitioner, vs. CAROLINE T. YU, Respondent. Tanchay-Yu (respondent) unlawfully withheld from him the custody of their
minor child Bianca. The petition, which included a prayer for the award to him
of the sole custody of Bianca, was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68460.
Civil Law; Litis Pendentia; The Elements of Litis Pendentia.—Since the
ground invoked in the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig
RTC is respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity to perform her essential Subsequently or on March 3, 2002, respondent filed a petition against
marital obligations as provided in Article 36 of the Family Code, the evidence to petitioner before the Pasig Regional Trial Court (RTC) for declaration of
support this cause of action necessarily involves evidence of respondent’s fitness to nullity of marriage and dissolution of the absolute community of property. The
take custody of Bianca. Thus, the elements of litis pendentia, to wit: a) identity of petition included a prayer for the award to her of the sole custody of Bianca
parties, or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; b) identity and for the fixing of schedule of petitioner’s visiting rights "subject only to the
of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; final and executory judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
and c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be 68460."
rendered in the pending case would, regardless of which party is successful, amount
to res judicata in the other, are present. In the meantime, the appellate court, by Resolution of March 21, 2002,
Family Code; Marriages; Annulment; Custody of Children; By petitioner’s awarded petitioner full custody of Bianca during the pendency of the habeas
filing of the case for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC he corpus case, with full visitation rights of respondent.
automatically submitted the issue of the custody of Bianca as an incident thereof.—
By petitioner’s filing of the case for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Petitioner and respondent later filed on April 5, 2002 before the appellate
Pasig RTC he automatically submitted the issue of the custody of Bianca as an court a Joint Motion to Approve Interim Visitation Agreement which was, by
incident thereof. After the appellate court subsequently dismissed the habeas corpus Resolution of April 24, 2002, approved.
case, there was no need for petitioner to replead his prayer for custody for, as above-
quoted provisions of the Family Code provide, the custody issue in a declaration of On April 18, 2002, respondent filed before the appellate court a Motion for
nullity case is deemed pleaded. That that is so gains light from Section 21 of the the Modification of her visiting rights under the Interim Visitation Agreement.
“Rule on Declaration Of Absolute Nullity Of Void Marriages and Annulment of To the Motion, petitioner filed an Opposition with Motion to Cite Respondent
Voidable Marriages” which provides: Sec. 21. Liquidation, partition and for Contempt of Court in light of her filing of the petition for declaration of
distribution, custody, support of common children and delivery of their presumptive nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC which, so he contended, constituted
legitimes.—Upon entry of the judgment granting the petition, or, in case of appeal, forum shopping.
upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the appellate court granting the petition, the
Family Court, on motion of either party, shall proceed with the liquidation,
By Resolution of July 5, 2002, the appellate court ordered respondent and
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, including custody,
her counsel to make the necessary amendment in her petition for declaration
support of common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes pursuant
of nullity of marriage before the Pasig City RTC in so far as the custody
to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless such matters had been adjudicated in
aspect is concerned, under pain of contempt.
previous judicial proceedings. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Since this
immediately-quoted provision directs the court taking jurisdiction over a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage to resolve the custody of common children, by In compliance with the appellate court’s Resolution of July 5, 2002,
mere motion of either party, it could only mean that the filing of a new action is not respondent filed a Motion to Admit Amended Petition before the Pasig RTC.
necessary for the court to consider the issue of custody of a minor. She, however, later filed in December 2002 a Motion to Dismiss her petition,
without prejudice, on the ground that since she started residing and
conducting business at her new address at Pasay City, constraints on
DECISION
resources and her very busy schedule rendered her unable to devote the
necessary time and attention to the petition. The Pasig RTC granted
CARPIO MORALES, J.: respondent’s motion and accordingly dismissed the petition without
prejudice, by Order of March 28, 2003.

On June 12, 2003, petitioner filed his own petition for declaration of nullity of By Omnibus Order of October 30, 2003, the Pasig RTC asserted its
marriage and dissolution of the absolute community of property before the jurisdiction over the custody aspect of the petition filed by petitioner and
Pasig RTC, docketed as JDRC Case No. 6190, with prayer for the award to directed the parties to comply with the provisions of the Interim Visitation
him of the sole custody of Bianca, subject to the final resolution by the Agreement, unless they agreed to a new bilateral agreement bearing the
appellate court of his petition for habeas corpus. approval of the court; and granted custody of Bianca to petitioner for the
duration of the case.
The appellate court eventually dismissed the habeas corpus petition, by
Resolution of July 3, 2003, for having become moot and academic, "the The Pasay RTC in the meantime denied, by Order of November 27, 2003,
restraint on the liberty of the person alleged to be in restraint [having been] petitioner’s motion to dismiss. The court, citing Sombong v. Court of
lifted." Appeals,1 held that in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal
and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the
In the meantime, respondent filed on July 24, 2003 before the Pasay RTC a availability of a writ of habeas corpus as a remedy; rather, a writ of habeas
petition for habeas corpus, which she denominated as "Amended Petition," corpus is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over
praying for, among other things, the award of the sole custody to her of the child.2 And it further held that the filing before it of the habeas corpus
Bianca or, in the alternative, pending the hearing of the petition, the issuance case by respondent, who is a resident of Pasay, is well within the ambit of the
of an order "replicating and reiterating the enforceability of the Interim Visiting provisions of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC.3
Agreement" which was approved by the appellate court. The petition was
docketed as SP Proc. No. 03-0048. On the issue of forum shopping, the Pasay RTC held that it is petitioner, not
respondent, who committed forum shopping, he having filed (on June 12,
Not to be outdone, petitioner filed on July 25, 2003 before the Pasig RTC in 2003) the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC
his petition for declaration of nullity of marriage an urgent motion praying for while his petition for habeas corpus before the Court of Appeals was still
the custody of Bianca for the duration of the case. pending.4
Acting on respondent’s petition, Branch 113 of the Pasay RTC issued a Writ The Pasay RTC held that assuming arguendo that petitioner’s filing before
of Habeas Corpus, a Hold Departure Order and Summons addressed to the Pasig RTC of the declaration of nullity of marriage case did not constitute
petitioner, drawing petitioner to file a motion to dismiss the petition on the forum shopping, it (the Pasay RTC) acquired jurisdiction over the custody
ground of lack of jurisdiction, failure to state a cause of action, forum issue ahead of the Pasig RTC, petitioner not having amended his petition
shopping and litis pendentia, he citing the pending petition for declaration of before the Pasig RTC as soon as the Court of Appeals dismissed his petition
nullity of marriage which he filed before the Pasig RTC. for habeas corpus5 (on July 3, 2003).
The Pasay RTC, in the meantime, issued an Order of August 12, 2003 Finally, the Pasay RTC held that there was no litis pendentia because two
declaring that pending the disposition of respondent’s petition, Bianca should elements thereof are lacking, namely, 1) identity of the rights asserted and
stay with petitioner from Sunday afternoon to Saturday morning and "with the reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and 2) identity
company of her mother from Saturday 1:00 in the afternoon up to Sunday with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases such that any
1:00 in the afternoon." To this Order, petitioner filed a Motion for judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which
Reconsideration, arguing that the Pasay RTC did not have jurisdiction to party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.6
issue the same. He likewise filed a Manifestation of August 14, 2003 stating
that he was constrained to submit to the said court’s order but with the Petitioner thereupon assailed the Pasay RTC’s denial of his Motion to
reservation that he was not submitting the issue of custody and himself to its Dismiss via Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus before the
jurisdiction. appellate court wherein he raised the following issues:
Respondent soon filed her Answer with Counter-Petition on the nullity case A. RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
before the Pasig RTC wherein she also prayed for the award of the sole DISCRETION BY DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO DISMISS
custody to her of Bianca, subject to the final disposition of the habeas corpus DESPITE THE EVIDENT LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE
petition which she filed before the Pasay RTC. SUBJECT MATTER OF CUSTODY, LITIS PENDENTIA, AND

DELIBERATE AND WILLFUL FORUM-SHOPPING ON THE PART II. . . . APPL[YING] THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE BY RULING THAT
OF RESPONDENT CAROLINE T. YU.7 THE PASIG FAMILY COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE
CUSTODY ASPECT OF THE NULLITY CASE ON THE BASIS OF THE
B. RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WHIMSICALLY, JULY 5, 2002 RESOLUTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA GR SP
CAPRICIOUSLY AND ARBITRARILY IN ISSUING THE AUGUST NO. 68460 WHEN THE SAID RESOLUTION CLEARLY APPLIES ONLY TO
12, 2003 ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT CAROLINE T. YU THE NULLITY CASE FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT ON MARCH 7,
OVERNIGHT VISITATION RIGHTS OVER THE MINOR CHILD 2002 DOCKETED AS JDRC CASE NO. 5745 AND NOT TO HEREIN
BIANCA AND DENYING PETITIONER’S URGENT MOTION FOR PETITIONER’S JUNE 12, 2003 PETITION FOR NULLITY DOCKETED AS
RECONSIDERATION OF THE SAID ORDER.8 (Underscoring JDRC CASE NO. 6190.
supplied)
III. . . . DECLARING THAT THE PASIG FAMILY COURT MUST YIELD TO
9
By Decision of August 10, 2004, the appellate court denied petitioner’s THE JURISDICTION OF THE PASAY COURT INSOFAR AS THE ISSUE OF
petition, it holding that the assumption of jurisdiction by the Pasay RTC over CUSTODY IS CONCERNED IN GRAVE VIOLATION OF THE DOCTRINE
the habeas corpus case does not constitute grave abuse of discretion; the OF JUDICIAL STABILITY AND NON-INTERFERENCE.
filing by respondent before the Pasay RTC of a petition for habeas corpus
could not be considered forum shopping in the strictest sense of the word as IV. . . . RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT CAROLINE DID NOT
before she filed it after petitioner’s petition for habeas corpus filed before the COMMIT FORUM-SHOPING IN FILING THE HABEAS CORPUS CASE
appellate court was dismissed; and it was petitioner who committed forum WITH PRAYER FOR CUSTODY BEFORE THE RESPONDENT PASAY
shopping when he filed the declaration of nullity of marriage case while his COURT DESPITE THE FACT THAT AN EARLIER FILED PETITION FOR
habeas corpus petition was still pending before the appellate court. DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE WITH PRAYER FOR
CUSTODY IS STILL PENDING BEFORE THE PASIG FAMILY COURT
In fine, the appellate court held that since respondent filed the petition for WHEN THE FORMER CASE WAS INSTITUTED.
declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC during the pendency
of the habeas corpus case he filed before the appellate court, whereas V. . . . RULING THAT RESPONDENT CAROLINE YU DID NOT SUBMIT TO
respondent filed the habeas corpus petition before the Pasay RTC on July THE JURISDICTION OF THE PASIG FAMILY COURT BASED ON AN
24, 2003 after the dismissal on July 3, 2003 by the appellate court of ERRONEOUS FACTUAL FINDING THAT SHE FILED ON AUGUST 25,
petitioner’s habeas corpus case, jurisdiction over the issue custody of Bianca 2003 AN OMNIBUS OPPOSITION IN PETITIONER’S ACTION FOR
did not attach to the Pasig RTC. NULLITY BEFORE THE PASIG COURT.10 (Underscoring supplied)
As for the questioned order of the Pasay RTC which modified the Interim The petition is impressed with merit.
Visiting Agreement, the appellate court, noting that the proper remedy for the
custody of Bianca was filed with the Pasay RTC, held that said court had the The main issue raised in the present petition is whether the question of
authority to issue the same. custody over Bianca should be litigated before the Pasay RTC or before the
Pasig RTC.
Hence, the present petition filed by petitioner faulting the appellate court for
Judgment on the issue of custody in the nullity of marriage case before the
I. . . . DECLARING THAT PETITIONER ERIC YU COMMITTED FORUM- Pasig RTC, regardless of which party would prevail, would constitute res
SHOPPING IN FILLING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY judicata on the habeas corpus case before the Pasay RTC since the former
OF MARRIAGE WITH PRAYER FOR CUSTODY BEFORE THE PASIG has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter.
FAMILY COURT AND THAT THE LATTER COURT WAS BARRED FROM
ACQUIRING JURISDICTION OVER THE CUSTODY ASPECT OF THE There is identity in the causes of action in Pasig and Pasay because there is
NULLITY CASE IN RECKLESS DISREGARD OF THE PRINCIPLE THAT identity in the facts and evidence essential to the resolution of the identical
THE FILING OF A PETITION FOR NULLITY OF MARRIAGE BEFORE THE issue raised in both actions11 – whether it would serve the best interest of
FAMILY COURTS VESTS THE LATTER WITH EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION Bianca to be in the custody of petitioner rather than respondent or vice versa.
TO DETERMINE THE NECESSARY ISSUE OF CUSTODY.

Since the ground invoked in the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage The final judgment in such cases [for the annulment or declaration of nullity
before the Pasig RTC is respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity to of marriage] shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
perform her essential marital obligations 12 as provided in Article 36 of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
Family Code, the evidence to support this cause of action necessarily children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such other
involves evidence of respondent’s fitness to take custody of Bianca. Thus, matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings."
the elements of litis pendentia, to wit: a) identity of parties, or at least such as (Emphasis and underscoring added)
representing the same interest in both actions; b) identity of rights asserted
and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and c) the By petitioner’s filing of the case for declaration of nullity of marriage before
identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be the Pasig RTC he automatically submitted the issue of the custody of Bianca
rendered in the pending case would, regardless of which party is successful, as an incident thereof. After the appellate court subsequently dismissed the
amount to res judicata in the other,13 are present. habeas corpus case, there was no need for petitioner to replead his prayer
for custody for, as above-quoted provisions of the Family Code provide, the
Respondent argues in her Comment to the petition at bar that the Pasig RTC custody issue in a declaration of nullity case is deemed pleaded. That that is
never acquired jurisdiction over the custody issue raised therein. so gains light from Section 21 of the "Rule on Declaration Of Absolute Nullity
Of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages" 18 which provides:
"[T]he subsequent dismissal of the habeas corpus petition by the Court of
Appeals on 3 July 2003 could not have the effect of conferring jurisdiction Sec. 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common
over the issue on the Pasig court. For the Pasig court to acquire jurisdiction children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes.–Upon entry of the
over the custody issue after the dismissal of the habeas corpus petition judgment granting the petition, or, in case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry
before the Court of Appeals, the rule is that petitioner must furnish the of judgment of the appellate court granting the petition, the Family Court, on
occasion for the acquisition of jurisdiction by repleading his cause of action motion of either party, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and
for custody and invoking said cause anew." 14 (Emphasis and underscoring distribution of the properties of the spouses, including custody,
supplied) support of common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes
pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless such matters had
And respondent cites Caluag v. Pecson,15 wherein this Court held: been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Jurisdiction of the subject matter of a particular case is something more than
the general power conferred by law upon a court to take cognizance of cases Since this immediately-quoted provision directs the court taking jurisdiction
of the general class to which the particular case belongs. It is not enough that over a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage to resolve the custody of
a court has power in abstract to try and decide the class litigations [sic] to common children, by mere motion of either party, it could only mean that the
which a case belongs; it is necessary that said power be properly invoked, or filing of a new action is not necessary for the court to consider the issue of
called into activity, by the filing of a petition, or complaint or other appropriate custody of a minor.19
pleading. (Underscoring supplied by Caroline.)16
The only explicit exception to the earlier-quoted second paragraph of Art. 50
Specific provisions of law govern the case at bar, however. Thus Articles 49 of the Family Code is when "such matters had been adjudicated in previous
and 50 of the Family Code provide: judicial proceedings," which is not the case here.
Art. 49. During the pendency of the action [for annulment or declaration of The elements of litis pendentia having been established, the more
nullity of marriage] and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written appropriate action criterion guides this Court in deciding which of the two
agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of pending actions to abate.20
the spouses and the custody and support of their common children. x x x
It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent. The petition filed by petitioner for the declaration of nullity of marriage before
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)17 the Pasig RTC is the more appropriate action to determine the issue of who
between the parties should have custody over Bianca in view of the express
Art. 50. x x x x

provision of the second paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code. This must
be so in line with the policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits. 21
The appellate court thus erroneously applied the law of the case doctrine
when it ruled that in its July 5, 2002 Resolution that the pendency of the
habeas corpus petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 68460 prevented the Pasig RTC
from acquiring jurisdiction over the custody aspect of petitioner’s petition for
declaration of nullity. The factual circumstances of the case refelected above
do not justify the application of the law of the case doctrine which has been
defined as follows:
Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former
appeal. It is a term applied to an established rule that when an appellate
court passes on a question and remands the case to the lower court for
further proceedings, the question there settled becomes the law of the
case upon subsequent appeal. It means that whatever is once irrevocably
established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties
in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on
general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was
predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court." (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied, italics in the original)22
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The August 10, 2004 decision of

the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE,and another is entered
DISMISSING Pasay City Regional Trial Court Sp. Proc. No. 03-0048-CFM
and ordering Branch 69 of Pasig City Regional Trial Court to continue, with
dispatch, the proceedings in JDRC No. 6190.
SO ORDERED.

[9] G.R. No. 162734 August 29, 2006 Private respondent Loran S.D. Abanilla and petitioner Marie Antonette Abigail
C. Salientes are the parents of the minor Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla.
MARIE ANTONETTE ABIGAIL C. SALIENTES, ORLANDO B. SALIENTES, They lived with Marie Antonette’s parents, petitioners Orlando B. Salientes
and ROSARIO C. SALIENTES, Petitioners, vs.LORAN S.D. ABANILLA, and Rosario C. Salientes. Due to in-laws problems, private respondent
HONORABLE JUDGE PEDRO SABUNDAYO, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL suggested to his wife that they transfer to their own house, but Marie
COURT, BRANCH 203, MUNTINLUPA CITY, Respondents Antonette refused. So, he alone left the house of the Salientes. Thereafter,
he was prevented from seeing his son.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Interlocutory Orders; Under Rule 41,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court, an interlocutory order is not appealable but the Later, Loran S.D. Abanilla in his personal capacity and as the representative
aggrieved party may file an appropriate special action under Rule 65.—Under Rule of his son, filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus and Custody, 3 docketed as
41, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, an interlocutory order is not appealable but the Special Proceedings No. 03-004 before the Regional Trial Court of
aggrieved party may file an appropriate special action under Rule 65. The aggrieved Muntinlupa City. On January 23, 2003, the trial court issued the following
party must show that the court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order:
interlocutory order. In the present case, it is incumbent upon petitioners to show that
the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order. Upon verified Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by Petitioners, the
Respondents Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes, Orlando B. Salientes and
Habeas Corpus; In a petition for habeas corpus, the child’s welfare is the Rosario C. Salientes are hereby directed to produce and bring before this
supreme consideration.—In a petition for habeas corpus, the child’s welfare is the Court the body of minor Lorenzo Emmanuel Salientes Abanilla on January
supreme consideration. The Child and Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provides 31, 2003 at 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon and to show cause why the said
that in all questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child, his child should not be discharged from restraint.
welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
Let this Writ be served by the Sheriff or any authorized representative of this
Same; It bears stressing that the order did not grant custody of the minor to Court, who is directed to immediately make a return.
any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and
explain why private respondent is prevented from seeing his child.—It bears
stressing that the order did not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but SO ORDERED. 4
merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why private
respondent is prevented from seeing his child. This is in line with the directive in Petitioners moved for reconsideration which the court denied.
Section 9 of A.M. 03-04-04-SC that within fifteen days after the filing of the answer
or the expiration of the period to file answer, the court shall issue an order requiring Consequently, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
the respondent (herein petitioners) to present the minor before the court. This was Appeals, but the same was dismissed on November 10, 2003. The appellate
exactly what the court did. court affirmed the February 24, 2003 Order of the trial court holding that its
January 23, 2003 Order did not award the custody of the 2-year-old child to
DECISION any one but was simply the standard order issued for the production of
restrained persons. The appellate court held that the trial court was still about
QUISUMBING, J.: to conduct a full inquiry, in a summary proceeding, on the cause of the
minor’s detention and the matter of his custody. The Court of Appeals ruled
thus:
The instant petition assails the Decision 1dated November 10, 2003 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75680, which dismissed the petition for
certiorari against the orders of the Regional Trial Court in Special WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Proceedings No. 03-004. Likewise assailed is the Court of Appeals’
Resolution 2dated March 19, 2004 denying reconsideration. SO ORDERED. 5
The facts of the case are as follows: Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was denied on March 19, 2004.

Hence, petitioners interposed this appeal by certiorari anchored on the Petitioners posit that even assuming that there were compelling reasons, the
following grounds: proper remedy for private respondent was simply an action for custody, but
not habeas corpus. Petitioners assert that habeas corpus is unavailable
1. The Court of Appeals erred in not pronouncing the respondent judge against the mother who, under the law, has the right of custody of the minor.
gravely abused his discretion, amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in They insist there was no illegal or involuntary restraint of the minor by his
issuing an order for the petitioner-mother to first show cause why her own own mother. There was no need for the mother to show cause and explain
three-year old child in her custody should not be discharged from a so-called the custody of her very own child.
"restraint" despite no evidence at all of restraint and no evidence of
compelling reasons of maternal unfitness to deprive the petitioner-mother of Private respondent counters that petitioners’ argument based on Article 213
her minor son of tender years. The assailed orders, resolutions and decisions of the Family Code applies only to the second part of his petition regarding
of the lower court and the Court of Appeals are clearly void; the custody of his son. It does not address the first part, which pertains to his
right as the father to see his son. He asserts that the writ of habeas corpus is
2. The Court of Appeals erred in not pronouncing that the respondent judge available against any person who restrains the minor’s right to see his father
gravely abused his discretion in issuing a writ of habeas corpus which clearly and vice versa. He avers that the instant petition is merely filed for delay, for
is not warranted considering that there is no unlawful restraint by the mother had petitioners really intended to bring the child before the court in
and considering further that the law presumes the fitness of the mother, accordance with the new rules on custody of minors, they would have done
thereby negating any notion of such mother illegally restraining or confining so on the dates specified in the January 23, 2003 and the February 24, 2003
her very own son of tender years. The petition is not even sufficient in orders of the trial court.
substance to warrant the writ. The assailed orders are clearly void.
Private respondent maintains that, under the law, he and petitioner Marie
3. Contrary to the Court of Appeals decision, the "Sombong vs. CA" case Antonette have shared custody and parental authority over their son. He
supports rather than negates the position of the petitioners. alleges that at times when petitioner Marie Antonette is out of the country as
required of her job as an international flight stewardess, he, the father, should
have custody of their son and not the maternal grandparents.
4. Contrary to the Court of Appeals decision, summary proceeding does
violence to the tender-years-rule
As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the assailed January 23,
2003 Order of the trial court did not grant custody of the minor to any of the
5. The Court of Appeals failed to consider that the private respondent failed
parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and
to present prima facie proof of any compelling reason of the unfitness of the
explain why they are restraining his liberty. The assailed order was an
petitioner-mother;
interlocutory order precedent to the trial court’s full inquiry into the issue of
custody, which was still pending before it.
6. The Court of Appeals failed to see that the New Rules on Custody
SUFFICES AS REMEDY. 6
Under Rule 41, Section 1 8 of the Rules of Court, an interlocutory order is not
appealable but the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special action
Plainly put, the issue is: Did the Court of Appeals err when it dismissed the under Rule 65. The aggrieved party must show that the court gravely abused
petition for certiorari against the trial court’s orders dated January 23, 2003 its discretion in issuing the interlocutory order. In the present case, it is
and February 24, 2003? incumbent upon petitioners to show that the trial court gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the order.
Petitioners contend that the order is contrary to Article 213 7 of the Family
Code, which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld
separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order from a person entitled thereto. 9 Under Article 211 10 of the Family Code,
otherwise. They maintain that herein respondent Loran had the burden of respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have joint parental authority
showing any compelling reason but failed to present even a prima facie proof over their son and consequently joint custody. Further, although the couple is
thereof. separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the
court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both

parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present case,
private respondent’s cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his
child as alleged in his petition. 11 Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is
available to him.
In a petition for habeas corpus, the child’s welfare is the supreme

consideration. The Child and Youth Welfare Code 12 unequivocally provides
that in all questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of the
child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration. 13
Again, it bears stressing that the order did not grant custody of the minor to
any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in
court and explain why private respondent is prevented from seeing his child.
This is in line with the directive in Section 9 14 of A.M. 03-04-04-SC 15 that
within fifteen days after the filing of the answer or the expiration of the period
to file answer, the court shall issue an order requiring the respondent (herein
petitioners) to present the minor before the court. This was exactly what the
court did.
Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication
of custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody by the
court. Petitioners can raise it as a counter argument for private respondent’s
petition for custody. But it is not a basis for preventing the father to see his
own child. Nothing in the said provision disallows a father from seeing or
visiting his child under seven years of age.
In sum, the trial court did not err in issuing the orders dated January 23, 2003
and February 24, 2003. Hence, the Court of Appeals properly dismissed the
petition for certiorari against the said orders of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decisiondated November 10,

2003 and the Resolutiondated March 19, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 75680 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

[10] G.R. No. 159374 July 12, 2007 be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where
the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on
FELIPE N. MADRIÑAN, Petitioner, vs. FRANCISCA R. MADRIÑAN, the merits. From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and
Respondent. Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in habeas
corpus cases where the custody of minors is involved.
Parent and Child; Custody; Habeas Corpus; Courts; Jurisdictions; Family Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; A careful
Courts Act of 1997 (R.A. No. 8369); RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals reading of Section 5(b) of RA 8369 reveals that family courts are vested with
and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the original exclusive jurisdiction in custody cases, not in habeas corpus cases—writs of
custody of minors—the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA No. habeas corpus which may be issued exclusively by family courts under Section 5(b)
7029 and BP 129, i.e., family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of of RA 8369 pertain to the ancillary remedy that may be availed of in conjunction
Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of with a petition for custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.— A careful
minors is at issue.—In Thornton v. Thornton, 436 SCRA 550 (2004), this Court reading of Section 5(b) of RA 8369 reveals that family courts are vested with
resolved the issue of the Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas original exclusive jurisdiction in custody cases, not in habeas corpus cases. Writs of
corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369 habeas corpus which may be issued exclusively by family courts under Section 5(b)
giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions: The Court of of RA 8369 pertain to the ancillary remedy that may be availed of in conjunction
Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 with a petition for custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. In other
that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody words, the issuance of the writ is merely ancillary to the custody case pending before
of minors. x x x x x x x x x We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the the family court. The writ must be issued by the same court to avoid splitting of
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas jurisdiction, conflicting decisions, interference by a co-equal court and judicial
corpus cases involving the custody of minors. x x x x x x x x x The provisions of instability. The rule therefore is: when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or
RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it
and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. into effect may be employed by such court or officer. Once a court acquires
Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 [An Act jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it does so to the exclusion of all other
Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals] and BP 129 [The Judiciary courts, including related incidents and ancillary matters.
Reorganization Act of 1980] are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not
prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas DECISION
corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369
must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129—that family courts have CORONA, J.:
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in
petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue. When a family breaks up, the children are always the victims. The ensuing
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The jurisdiction of the Court of battle for custody of the minor children is not only a thorny issue but also a
Appeals over petitions for habeas corpus was further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03- highly sensitive and heart-rending affair. Such is the case here. Even the
04-SC (22 April 2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus usually technical subject of jurisdiction became emotionally charged.
in Relation to Custody of Minors.—The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over
petitions for habeas corpus was further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April Petitioner Felipe N. Madriñan and respondent Francisca R. Madriñan were
22, 2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation married on July 7, 1993 in Parañaque City. They resided in San Agustin
to Custody of Minors: In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been Village, Brgy. Moonwalk, Parañaque City.
settled with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of
Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20
of the rule provides that: Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.—A verified Their union was blessed with three sons and a daughter: Ronnick, born on
petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with January 30, 1994; Phillip, born on November 19, 1996; Francis Angelo, born
the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which on May 12, 1998 and Krizia Ann, born on December 12, 2000.
the Family Court belongs. x x x x x x x x x The petition may likewise be filed with
the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so After a bitter quarrel on May 18, 2002, petitioner allegedly left their conjugal
granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may abode and took their three sons with him to Ligao City, Albay and

subsequently to Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Respondent sought the help of her eight years old, the court ruled that his custody should be determined by the
parents and parents-in-law to patch things up between her and petitioner to proper family court in a special proceeding on custody of minors under Rule
no avail. She then brought the matter to the Lupong Tagapamayapa in their 99 of the Rules of Court.
barangay but this too proved futile.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but it
Thus respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus of Ronnick, Phillip and was denied. Hence, this recourse.
Francis Angelo in the Court of Appeals, alleging that petitioner’s act of
leaving the conjugal dwelling and going to Albay and then to Laguna Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the petition
disrupted the education of their children and deprived them of their mother’s for habeas corpus and insists that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the
care. She prayed that petitioner be ordered to appear and produce their sons family courts under RA 8369. He invokes Section 5(b) of RA 8369:
before the court and to explain why they should not be returned to her
custody. Section 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. – The Family Courts shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
Petitioner and respondent appeared at the hearing on September 17, 2002.
They initially agreed that petitioner would return the custody of their three x x x x x x x x x
sons to respondent. Petitioner, however, had a change of heart 1 and decided
to file a memorandum.
b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to
the latter;
On September 3, 2002, petitioner filed his memorandum 2 alleging that
respondent was unfit to take custody of their three sons because she was
habitually drunk, frequently went home late at night or in the wee hours of the x x x x x x x x x
morning, spent much of her time at a beer house and neglected her duties as
a mother. He claimed that, after their squabble on May 18, 2002, it was Petitioner is wrong.
respondent who left, taking their daughter with her. It was only then that he
went to Sta. Rosa, Laguna where he worked as a tricycle driver. He In Thornton v. Thornton,7 this Court resolved the issue of the Court of
submitted a certification from the principal of the Dila Elementary School in Appeals’ jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving
Sta. Rosa, Laguna that Ronnick and Phillip were enrolled there. He also custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts
questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that under exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions:
Section 5(b) of RA 8369 (otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of
1997") family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is
the petition for habeas corpus filed by respondent.3 nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas
corpus involving the custody of minors.
For her part, respondent averred that she did not leave their home on May
18, 2002 but was driven out by petitioner. She alleged that it was petitioner x x x x x x x x x
who was an alcoholic, gambler and drug addict. Petitioner’s alcoholism and
drug addiction impaired his mental faculties, causing him to commit acts of
We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and
violence against her and their children. The situation was aggravated by the
the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases
fact that their home was adjacent to that of her in-laws who frequently
involving the custody of minors.
meddled in their personal problems.4
x x x x x x x x x
On October 21, 2002, the Court of Appeals 5 rendered a decision6 asserting
its authority to take cognizance of the petition and ruling that, under Article
213 of the Family Code, respondent was entitled to the custody of Phillip and The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction
Francis Angelo who were at that time aged six and four, respectively, subject of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus
to the visitation rights of petitioner. With respect to Ronnick who was then relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions
of RA 8369, RA 7092 [An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of

Appeals] and BP 129 [The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980] are issue writs of habeas corpus] will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving
absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals individuals like [respondent] without legal recourse in obtaining custody of
and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases their children. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they
involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be are looking for would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family
read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 – that family courts have courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to
Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas
issue.8 (emphases supplied) corpus case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse
could not have been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over petitions for habeas corpus was [RA 8369].10
further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on
Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Moreover, a careful reading of Section 5(b) of RA 8369 reveals that family
Minors: courts are vested with original exclusive jurisdiction in custody cases, not in
habeas corpus cases. Writs of habeas corpus which may be issued
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the exclusively by family courts under Section 5(b) of RA 8369 pertain to the
adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and ancillary remedy that may be availed of in conjunction with a petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. In other words, the
the rule provides that: issuance of the writ is merely ancillary to the custody case pending before
the family court. The writ must be issued by the same court to avoid splitting
of jurisdiction, conflicting decisions, interference by a co-equal court and
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. – A verified petition for a writ of
judicial instability.
habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family
Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the
Family Court belongs. The rule therefore is: when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or
judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to
carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer. 11 Once a court
x x x x x x x x x
acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it does so to the
exclusion of all other courts, including related incidents and ancillary matters.
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be
Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED.
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be made
returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where
the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and Costs against petitioner.
decision on the merits.
SO ORDERED.
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in
habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is involved.9
(emphases supplied)1avvphi1
We note that after petitioner moved out of their Parañaque residence on May
18, 2002, he twice transferred his sons to provinces covered by different
judicial regions. This situation is what the Thornton interpretation of RA
8369’s provision on jurisdiction precisely addressed:
[The reasoning that by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas
corpus cases, the lawmakers intended them to be the sole courts which can

[11] G.R. No. 191416 granting the motion for reconsideration, the party concerned may file an appeal to the
Court via a Rule 45 petition within five working days from notice of the order
MAYOR WILLIAM N. MAMBA, ATTY. FRANCISCO N. MAMBA, JR., pursuant to the fresh period rule.
ARIEL MALANA, NARDING AGGANGAN, JOMARI SAGALON, JUN Same; Words and Phrases; The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed
CINABRE, FREDERICK BALIGOD, ROMMEL ENCOLLADO, JOSEPH at providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and
TUMALIUAN, and RANDY DAYAG, Petitioners vs. LEOMAR BUENO, directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or
Respondent threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security.—The writ
of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the
Writs of Amparo; Motion for Reconsideration; There is nothing in A.M. No. appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in
07-9-12-SC which proscribes the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the final order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights
judgment or order that grants or denies a writ of amparo.—There is nothing in A.M. to life, liberty or security. Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC specifically delimits the
No. 07-9-12-SC which proscribes the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the coverage of the writ of amparo to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances,
final judgment or order that grants or denies a writ of amparo. Section 11 of A.M. viz.: Sec. 1. Petition.—The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any
No. 07-9-12-SC only prohibits the following pleadings and motions: Sec. 11. person whose rights to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
Prohibited Pleadings and Motions.—The following pleadings and motions are violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
prohibited: a. Motion to dismiss; b. Motion for extension of time to file return, private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
opposition, affidavit, position paper and other pleadings; c. Dilatory motion for disappearances or threats thereof. Extralegal killings are killings committed without
postponement; d. Motion for a bill of particulars; e. Counterclaim or cross-claim; f. due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the
Third party complaint; g. Reply; h. Motion to declare respondent in default; i. other hand, enforced disappearance has been defined by the Court as the arrest,
Intervention; j. Memorandum; k. Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State
or interim relief orders; and l. Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or
against any interlocutory order. acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of
Same; Same; What is prohibited under Section 11 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC are liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person,
motions for reconsideration directed against interlocutory orders or interim relief which place such a person outside the protection of the law.
orders, not those assailing the final judgment or order.—What is prohibited under Criminal Law; Denials; To be believed, denial must be buttressed by a strong
Section 11 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC are motions for reconsideration directed against evidence of non-culpability; otherwise, such denial is purely self-serving and without
interlocutory orders or interim relief orders, not those assailing the final judgment or evidentiary value.—It is settled that denial is inherently a weak defense. To be
order. The pleadings and motions enumerated in Section 11 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC believed, it must be buttressed by a strong evidence of non-culpability; otherwise,
would unnecessarily cause delays in the proceedings; they are, thus, proscribed since such denial is purely self-serving and without evidentiary value. Further, even if the
they would run counter to the summary nature of the rule on the writ of amparo. A respondent was indeed guilty of a crime, assuming it to be true, it does not justify his
motion seeking a reconsideration of a final judgment or order in such case, immediate apprehension, in the guise of an invitation, and the subsequent acts of
obviously, no longer affects the proceedings. Moreover, the Rules of Court applies torture inflicted on him.
suppletorily to A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC insofar as it is not inconsistent with the latter. Writs of Amparo; It is undisputed that the respondent, after four (4) days of
Accordingly, there being no express prohibition to the contrary, the rules on motions detention, had been released by the members of the Task Force on June 18, 2009.
for reconsideration under the Rules of Court apply suppletorily to the Rule on the This fact alone, however, does not negate the propriety of the grant of a writ of
Writ of Amparo. amparo.—What is clear is that the respondent was able to prove by substantial
Same; Same; Considering that under Section 19 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a evidence that he was apprehended by the members of the Task Force, illegally
party is only given five (5) working days from the date of notice of the adverse detained, and tortured. It was further established that Maritess would not have seen
judgment within which to appeal to the Supreme Court (SC) through a petition for his son if not for the timely intercession of P/Supt. Buenaobra of the PNP Cagayan
review on certiorari, a motion for reconsideration of a final judgment or order must Regional Office. The members of the Task Force apprehended and detained the
likewise be filed within the same period.—Considering that under Section 19 of A.M. respondent to make him admit to his complicity in the heist the night before sans the
No. 07-9-12-SC a party is only given five working days from the date of notice of benefit of legal and judicial processes. Nevertheless, it is undisputed that the
the adverse judgment within which to appeal to this Court through a petition for respondent, after four days of detention, had been released by the members of the
review on certiorari, a motion for reconsideration of a final judgment or order must Task Force on June 18, 2009. This fact alone, however, does not negate the propriety
likewise be filed within the same period. Thereafter, from the order denying or of the grant of a writ of amparo.

Constitutional Law; Writs of Amparo; Right to Security; The writ of amparo On June 13, 2009, the canteen owned by Emelita N. Mamba (Emelita) in
likewise covers violations of the right to security. At the core of the guarantee of the Tuao, Cagayan was robbed. Emelita is the mother of Mayor Mamba, then
right to security, as embodied in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, is the Mayor of the Municipality of Tuao, Cagayan and Atty. Mamba, then a
immunity of one’s person, including the extensions of his/her person, i.e., houses, Malacafiang official.5 The Task Force Lingkod Bayan (Task Force), an
papers and effects, against unwarranted government intrusion.—Accordingly, a writ agency created by the Sangguniang Bayan of Tuao to help the local police
of amparo may still issue in the respondent’s favor notwithstanding that he has force in maintaining peace and order in the municipality, undertook an
already been released from detention. In such case, the writ of amparo is issued to investigation on the robbery.6
facilitate the punishment of those behind the illegal detention through subsequent
investigation and action. More importantly, the writ of amparo likewise covers On June 14, 2009, several members of the Task Force, Malana, Aggangan
violations of the right to security. At the core of the guarantee of the right to security, and Sagalon, together with barangay officials Cinabre and Encollado, went to
as embodied in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, is the immunity of one’s the. house of the respondent, then still a minor, to invite him for questioning
person, including the extensions of his/her person, i.e., houses, papers and effects, on his supposed involvement in the robbery. The respondent and his mother,
against unwarranted government intrusion. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution Maritess Bueno (Maritess ), acceded to the invitation. Thereupon, the
not only limits the State’s power over a person’s home and possession, but more respondent was brought to the Tuao police station. 7
importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself.
Same; Same; Same; The right to security is separate and distinct from the The parties gave different accounts of what happened after the respondent
right to life.—The right to security is separate and distinct from the right to life. The was brought to the Tuao police station.
right to life guarantees essentially the right to be alive — upon which the enjoyment
of all other rights is preconditioned. On the other hand, the right to security is a
guarantee of the secure quality of life, i.e., the life, to which each person has a right, The petitioners claim that:
is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated
by a powerful ruler. In Manalo, the Court further opined that the right to security of When they reached the Tuao police station, there were no police
person yields various permutations of the exercise of the right, such as freedom from investigators or any representative from the local Social Welfare and
fear or, in the amparo context, freedom from threat; a guarantee of bodily and Development (SWD) office and, hence, the investigation could not proceed.
psychological integrity or security; and a guarantee of protection of one’s rights by At that time, Raymund Rodriguez (Raymund), allegedly an eyewitness to the
the government. robbery, was at the police station. Raymund pointed to the respondent as
among those who robbed the store; the respondent then told Raymund that
he would kill him for ratting him out.8 The petitioners allege that prior to the
DECISION
robbery of the canteen, the respondent approached Raymund and his
brother Robin and proposed to them that they rob the canteen. The latter,
REYES, J.: however, declined the offer. Later that night, Raymund saw the respondent
and Lorenzo Haber (Haber) robbing the canteen. Thereafter, Robin reported
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed in relation to Section 19 of the incident to the Task Force.9
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC,2 seeking to annul and set aside the Decision 3 dated
January 18, 2010 and Resolution4 dated March 2, 2010 of the Court of The petitioners further claim that at the time of the robbery, Mayor Mamba
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 00038, which granted the petition for the and Atty. Mamba were not around since they previously left Tuao, Cagayan
issuance of a writ of amparo filed by Leomar Bueno (respondent) against for Manila on June 10, 2009. Mayor Mamba was on official leave for 10 days,
Mayor William N. Mamba (Mayor Mamba), Atty. Francisco N. Mamba, Jr. from June 10, 2009 until June 20, 2009, while Atty. Mamba had to report for
(Atty. Mamba), Ariel Malana (Malana), Narding Aggangan (Aggangan), work in Malacañang.10
Jomari Sagalon (Sagalon), Jun Cinabre (Cinabre), Frederick Baligod
(Baligod), Rommel Encollado (Encollado ), Joseph Tumaliuan (Tumaliuan),
The respondent's custody was then referred to the Task Force. Haber was
and Randy Dayag (Dayag) (collectively, the petitioners).
later invited to the police station for questioning regarding his involvement in
the robbery. However, his custody was likewise referred to the Task Force
The Facts since there were still no police investigators.11

On June 17, 2009, Atty. Mamba arrived in Tuao, Cagayan. While going out of Malana brought the respondent and Haber, together with Robin and
his residence, Maritess approached Atty. Mamba and asked him about her Raymund, to the office of the Task Force, where they all spent the night. 19
son. Atty. Mamba told her that he does not know her son and that if the
respondent indeed committed a crime, she should not tolerate what her son Meanwhile, Maritess went to the Tuao police station to look for her son; she
was doing.12 was told that the respondent was brought to Mayor Mamba's house.
However, when Maritess went to Mayor Mamba's house, she was not
On June 18, 2009, while the members of the Task Force were on their way to permitted to see her son. Maritess was able to talk to Mayor Mamba who told
bring the respondent and Haber to the police station, they were met by Police her that she should not condone the acts of her son. Maritess then sought
Superintendent Joselito Buenaobra (P/Supt. Buenaobra) of the Philippine the assistance of P/Supt. Buenaobra regarding the respondent's
National Police (PNP) Cagayan Regional Office. Thereafter, the respondent's disappearance from the police station. The PNP Cagayan Regional Office
custody was transferred to the PNP Cagayan Regional Office. 13 was then preparing a case for habeas corpus when the respondent was
released on June 18, 2009 to the local SWD office. 20
Maritess then went to the office of Mayor Mamba, but she was told to come
back at later date since Mayor Mamba was still on official leave. When Mayor Maritess then sought the assistance of the Regional Office of the
Mamba arrived in Tuao on June 20, 2009, a conference was immediately Commission on Human Rights (CHR) in Cagayan as regards the case of the
held. Maritess requested that the members of the Task Force be brought to respondent.21 On August 25, 2009, the respondent, assisted by the CHR,
Mayor Mamba's office. Almost all of the members of the Task Force arrived. filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with the CA.22
However, Maritess was unable to pinpoint who among them took custody of
his son. Mayor Mamba then advised her to file a complaint in court should On September 14, 2009, the CA, gave due course to the petition and
she be able to identify the responsible persons.14 directed the issuance of the writ of amparo. On September 23, 2009, the
petitioners filed their verified return.23
On the other hand, the respondent alleges that:
A summary hearing was thereafter conducted by the CA. The respondent
At around 3:00 p.m. of June 14, 2009, Tumaliuan and Dayag, both members presented in evidence his own testimony and the testimonies of Dr. Odessa
of the Task Force, upon the order of Baligod, then Municipal Administrator of B. Tiangco (Dr. Tiangco) of the Cagayan Valley Medical Center, provindal
Tuao, fetched the respondent from the police station and brought .him to social welfare officer Elvira Layus (Layus), and Maritess. 24 The petitioners, on
Mayor Mamba's house.15 Sometime in the evening of even date, the the other hand, presented the testimony of Cinabre, Encollado, Baligod, and
respondent was made to board a white van driven by Aggangan. Inside the Robin.25
van, he was beaten with a gun by Malana, who later threatened him that he
would be killed. Thereafter, he was brought back to Mayor Mamba's house. 16 The CA further issued subpoena duces tecum ad testificandum to and heard
the testimony of P/Supt. Buenaobra.26
That same evening, Haber, likewise a minor, was invited by the barangay
captain in his place, accompanied by about 10 barangay tanods and two On January 18, 2010, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision, 27 the
police officers, for questioning as regards the robbery of the canteen. Haber decretal portion of which reads:
was brought to the police station where he spent the night. 17
WHEREFORE, the Petition for a Writ of Amparo filed by [the respondent] is
On June 15, 2009, Haber was brought to Mayor Mamba's house. The hereby GRANTED. Accordingly:
respondent and Haber were then tortured to force them to admit to their
involvement in the robbery. They were made to roll on the grass while being 1. [The petitioners] are hereby enjoined from doing any act of physical or
kicked and beaten with a cue stick by Malana; hot wax was poured over their psychological violence that would harm or threaten [the respondent] and his
bodies to force them to admit to the robbery, but they denied any involvement family, including those who assisted him in the preparation of this present
therein. Thereafter, they were blindfolded and were questioned by Atty. petition, especially the [CHR], Regional Office No. 02, Cagayan and his
Mamba regarding the robbery of the canteen. When his blindfold was taken witnesses;
off, the respondent saw Atty. Mamba sitting nearby. 18 On June 16, 2009,

2. The Head of the PNP Regional Office of Cagayan, whoever is the incumbent upon Atty. Mamba, being a public servant, to ensure that the
incumbent, is hereby ordered to continue the investigation on the violation respondent's constitutional rights are not violated. 30
done against [the respondent], and using extraordinary diligence, to furnish
this Court with a report regarding the said investigation. The investigation The CA pointed out that the "invitation" extended to the respondent by the
must be commenced as soon as possible but not more than 30 days from the members of the Task Force was in the nature of an arrest as the real
receipt of this Decision. purpose of the same was to make him answer to the heist committed the
night before. The CA ruled that the same amounted to an invalid warrantless
3. [Mayor Mamba] is hereby ordered to provide assistance to the above PNP arrest since the circumstances of the case do not fall within the purview of
investigation including but not limited to the act of furnishing and/or providing Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.31
the latter a list of the members of the Task Force who had direct involvement
in the violation of [the respondent's] rights to life, liberty and security, Further, the CA ruled that although the respondent was subsequently
including their identities and whereabouts, and to allow the investigation to released and that he failed to establish that there is an impending danger of
run its course unhindered or influenced. He is further ordered to update and physical harm to him or his family, the refusal of the respondent officials of
furnish this Court of the actions he has done or will be doing regarding this the local government of Tuao, especially Mayor Mamba, to admit and
directive. address the irregularities committed by the members of the Task Force is
tantamount to a continuing violation of the respondent's right to security. 32
4. The Head of the PNP Regional Office of Cagayan and [Mayor Mamba] are
ordered to update this Court regarding their reportorial duty under this The petitioners sought a reconsideration 33 of the Decision dated January 18,
Decision within ten (10) days from the commencement of the investigation, 2010, but it was denied by the CA in its Resolution 34 dated March 2, 2010.
and thereafter, to make a quarterly report regarding the said investigation.
The investigation should be completed within one year from the receipt of this Hence, this petition.
Decision;
The petitioners claim that the CA erred in issuing the writ of amparo in favor
5. All findings resulting from the said investigation should be made available of the respondent. They insist that the respondent, who was then the suspect
to [the respondent] and his counsel should they consider the same necessary in the robbery of the canteen, was not illegally detained or tortured; that the
to aid them in the filing of appropriate actions, criminal or otherwise, against members of the Task Force merely invited him for questioning as to his
those who are responsible for the violation of the former's rights. involvement in the robbery.35 They allege that the petition for the issuance of
a writ of amparo is not the proper remedy available to the respondent since
Failure to comply with the above will render the Head of the PNP Regional the present laws provide ample recourse to him for the alleged threats to his
Office of Cagayan and [Mayor Mamba] liable for contempt of this Court. life, liberty and security. They also maintain that the respondent's rights to
life, liberty and security are not under threat since he and his mother stated
The Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to also furnish the Head of the PNP that they are not afraid of the petitioners.36
Regional Office of Cagayan a copy of this Decision.
The petitioners further aver that it was improper for the CA to direct the PNP
SO ORDERED.28 Cagayan Regional Office to conduct further investigation on the incident
since P/Supt. Buenaobra had already testified for the respondent during the
The CA opined that the respondent's rights to liberty and security were summary hearing conducted by the CA.37 They also maintain that Mayor
undeniably undermined when he was invited by the members of the Task Mamba and Atty. Mamba had nothing to do with the alleged violation of the
Force for investigation and was brought to Mayor Mamba's house from the rights of the respondent since they were not in Tuao at the time of the
Tuao police station.29 It further pointed out that notwithstanding that Mayor incident. That when Mayor Mamba returned to Tuao, he immediately met
Mamba was not in Tuao when the incident happened, he is still accountable Maritess to discuss the incident, but the latter failed to identify the persons
since he· failed to show sufficient action to protect the respondent's rights; involved in the incident.38
that Mayor Mamba failed to acknowledge the irregularity of the acts of the
members of the Task Force or to identify those who were responsible for the On the other hand, the respondent claims that this petition was filed beyond
violation of the respondent's rights. The CA further ruled that it was the reglementary period. He claims that under Section 19 of A.M. No. 07-9-

12-SC, an appeal from the final judgment or order must be filed with this Sec. 11. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. - The following pleadings and
Court within five working days from notice of the adverse judgment. The motions are prohibited:
respondent avers that the petitioners, instead of immediately filing a petition
for review on certiorari with this Court, opted to file a motion for a. Motion to dismiss;
reconsideration with the CA, which is a prohibited pleading since it is
dilatory.39 b. Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit, position
paper and other pleadings;
The respondent further maintains that the CA did not err when it directed the
issuance of a writ of amparo in his favor. He claims that the writ of amparo is c. Dilatory motion for postponement;
an appropriate remedy in his case since it covers enforced disappearances;
that his illegal warrantless arrest is covered by the term "enforced
disappearances."40 d. Motion for a bill of particulars;
Issues e. Counterclaim or cross-claim;
Essentially, the issues for the Court's consideration are the following: first, f. Third-party complaint;
whether the petition for review on certiorari before the Court was filed within
the reglementary period; and second, whether the CA erred in granting the g. Reply;
petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo.
h. Motion to declare respondent in default;
Ruling of the Court
i. Intervention;
The petition is devoid of merit.
j. Memorandum;
First Issue: Timeliness of the petition
k. Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders;
The petition for review on certiorari before the Court, which assails the CA's and
grant of the writ of amparo, contrary to the respondent's assertion, was filed
on time. Section 19 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides that: l. Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory
order.
Sec. 19. Appeal. - Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to
the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise question of fact or What is prohibited under Section 11 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC are motions for
law or both. reconsideration directed against interlocutory orders or interim relief orders,
not those assailing the final judgment or order. The pleadings and motions
The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from the date of notice of enumerated in Section 11 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC would unnecessarily
the adverse judgment.1âwphi1 cause delays in the proceedings; they are, thus, proscribed since they would
run counter to the summary nature of the rule on the writ of amparo. A motion
The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus cases. seeking a reconsideration of a final judgment or order in such case,
obviously, no longer affects the proceedings.
There is nothing in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC which proscribes the filing of a
motion for reconsideration of the final judgment or order that grants or denies Moreover, the Rules of Court applies suppletorily to A.M. No. 07-9-12- SC
a writ of amparo. Section 11 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC only prohibits the insofar as it is not inconsistent with the latter. 41 Accordingly, there being no
following pleadings and motions: express prohibition to the contrary, the rules on motions for reconsideration

under the Rules of Court apply suppletorily to the Rule on the Writ of enforced disappearance has been defined by the Court as the arrest,
Amparo. detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of
the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization,
Nevertheless, considering that under Section 19 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge
party is only given five working days from the date of notice of the adverse the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the
judgment within which to appeal to this Court through a petition· for review on disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the
certiorari, a motion for reconsideration of a final judgment or order must law.51
likewise be filed within the same period. Thereafter, from the order denying or
granting the motion for reconsideration, the party concerned may file an In an amparo action, the parties must establish their respective claims by
appeal to the Court via a Rule 45 petition within five working days from notice substantial evidence.52 Substantial evidence is that amount of evidence
of the order pursuant to the fresh period rule. 42 which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
It is more than a mere imputation of wrongdoing or violation that would
The petitioners received a copy of the CA's Decision dated January 18, 2010 warrant a finding of liability against the person charged. 53
on January 20, 2010.43 They, thus, have until January 27, 2010 to either file a
motion for reconsideration with the CA or an appeal to this Court through a After a thorough review of the records of this case, the Court affirms the
Rule 45 petition.44 On January 25, 2010, the petitioners filed a motion for factual findings of the CA, which is largely based on the respondent's
reconsideration with the CA.45 The CA denied the petitioners' motion for evidence. Verily, the totality of the evidence presented by the respondent
reconsideration in its Resolution dated March 2, 2010, a copy of which was meets the requisite evidentiary threshold. To corroborate his allegations, the
received by the petitioners' counsel on March 8, 2010. 46 Thus, the petitioners respondent presented the testimony of Haber who, during the hearing
had until March 15, 2010 within which to appeal to this Court. 47 The conducted by the CA on October 6, 2009, averred that on June 15, 2009, he
petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari on March 12, 2010.48 was brought to Mayor Mamba's house where he and the respondent were
Thus, contrary to the respondent's claim, this petition was filed within the tortured. Haber testified that hot wax was dripped onto their bodies while they
reglementary period. were handcuffed; that they were kicked and beaten with a cue stick and an
alcohol container. Thereafter, Haber testified that he and the respondent
Second Issue: Propriety of the grant were brought to the guardhouse where they were suffocated by placing
plastic bags on their heads. He also testified that a wire was inserted inside
their penises.54
of the writ of amparo
The respondent's claim was further corroborated by Dr. Tiangco who testified
The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief
that on June 18, 2009, she examined the respondent and found that he
consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be
suffered several injuries and multiple second degree bums. Layus also
crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of
attested that she saw the scars incurred by the respondent on his head,
violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security. 49 Section 1 of
arms, and back when she interviewed him on July 26, 2009. 55
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC specifically delimits the coverage of the writ of amparo
to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, viz.:
In contrast, the respective testimonies of the witnesses for the petitioners
merely consisted in denial and the allegation that the respondent was indeed
Sec. 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to
the one who robbed the canteen. 56 Clearly, against the positive testimony of
any person whose rights to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened
the respondent, which was corroborated by his witnesses, the petitioners'
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee,
allegations must fail.
or of a private individual or entity.
It is settled that denial is inherently a weak defense. To be believed, it must

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or
be buttressed by a strong evidence of non-culpability; otherwise, such denial
threats thereof.
is purely self-serving and without evidentiary value. 57 Further, even if the
respondent was indeed guilty of a crime, assuming it to be true, it does not
Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law, i.e.,
without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. 50 On the other hand,

justify his immediate apprehension, in the guise of an invitation, and the In Manalo, the Court further opined that the right to security of person yields
subsequent acts of torture inflicted on him. various permutations of the exercise of the right, such as freedom from fear
or, in the arnparo context, freedom from threat; a guarantee of bodily and
What is clear is that the respondent was able to prove by substantial psychological integrity or security; and a guarantee of protection of one's
evidence that he was apprehended by the members of the Task Force, rights by the government.63 As regards the right to security, in the sense of
illegally detained, and tortured. It was further established that Maritess would the guarantee of protection of one's rights by the government, the Court
not have seen his son if not for the timely intercession of P/Supt. Buenaobra explained:
of the PNP Cagayan Regional Office. The members of the Task Force
apprehended and detained the respondent to make him admit to his In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of
complicity in the heist the night before sans the benefit of legal and judicial the rights to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987
processes. Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat
and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section
Nevertheless, it is undisputed that the respondent, after four days of 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy
detention, had been released by the members of the Task Force on June 18, that the State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II,
2009. This fact alone, however, does not negate the propriety of the grant of Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor
a writ of amparo. of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty
and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford
protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection
In the seminal case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et
includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government
al.,58 the Court emphasized that the writ of amparo serves both preventive
apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced
and curative roles in addressing the problem of extralegal killings and
disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing
enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of
offenders to the bar of justice. x x x. 64 (Citation omitted and emphasis in the
impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates
original)
the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to
subsequent investigation and action.59
In this case, it is incumbent upon the petitioners, who all hold positions in the
local government of Tuao, to conduct, at the very least, an investigation on
Accordingly, a writ of amparo may still issue in the respondent's favor
the alleged illegal arrest, illegal detention and torture of the respondent. The
notwithstanding that he has already been released from detention. In such
petitioners, nevertheless, claim that the Office of the Mayor and the police
case, the writ of amparo is issued to facilitate the punishment of those behind
station of Tuao, unknown to the respondent, are conducting an investigation
the illegal detention through subsequent investigation and action.
on the incident. However, other than their bare assertion, they failed to
present any evidence that would prove the supposed investigation. Mere
More importantly, the writ of amparo likewise covers violations of the right to allegation is not a fact. Absent any evidence that would corroborate the said
security.1âwphi1 At the core of the guarantee of the right to security, as claim, it is a mere allegation that does not have any probative value.
embodied in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, 60 is the immunity of
one's person, including the extensions of his/her person, i.e., houses, papers
Verily, the petitioners failed to point to any specific measures undertaken by
and effects, against unwarranted government intrusion. Section 2, Article III
them to effectively investigate the irregularities alleged by the respondent and
of the Constitution not only limits the State's power over a person's home and
to prosecute those who are responsible therefor. Worse, the illegal detention
possession, but more importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the
and torture suffered by the respondent were perpetrated by the members of
person himself.61
the Task Force themselves.
The right to security is separate and distinct from the right to life. The right to
Instead of effectively addressing the irregularities committed against the
life guarantees essentially the right to be alive - upon which the enjoyment of
respondent, the petitioners seemingly justify the illegal arrest and detention
all other rights is preconditioned. On the other hand, the right to security is a
and infliction of bodily harm upon the respondent by stating that the latter is a
guarantee of the secure quality of life, i.e., the life, to which each person has
habitual delinquent and was the one responsible for the robbery of the
a right, is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be
canteen. As stated earlier, even if the respondent committed a crime, the
unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler.62
petitioners, as local government officials, are not at liberty to disregard the

respondent's constitutionally guaranteed rights to life, liberty and security. It 2. The Regional Director of the Philippine National Police – Cagayan
is quite unfortunate that the petitioners, all local government officials, are the Regional Office, whoever is the incumbent, is hereby directed to
very ones who are infringing on the respondent's fundamental rights to life, conduct an investigation, using extraordinary diligence, on the
liberty and security. violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the respondent
when he was supposedly arrested on June 14, 2009 by the members
Clearly, there is substantial evidence in this case that would warrant the of the Task Force Lingkod Bayan until he was released on June 18,
conclusion that the respondent's right to security, as a guarantee of 2009;
protection by the government, was violated. Accordingly, the CA correctly
issued the writ of amparo in favor of the respondent. 3. The petitioners and the incumbent officials of the local government
of Tuao are hereby ordered to provide genuine and effective
The petitioners' claim that it was improper for the CA to direct the PNP assistance to the investigation to be conducted by the Philippine
Cagayan Regional Office to conduct further investigation on the respondent's National Police - Cagayan Regional Office, including but not limited
allegations deserves scant consideration. There is simply no basis to the to furnishing and/or providing the latter a list of the members of the
petitioners' claim that the PNP Cagayan Regional Office would not be Task Force Lingkod Bayan and all those who had a direct
expected to be objective in their investigation since representatives therefrom involvement in the violation of the respondent's rights to life, liberty
testified during the summary hearing. It bears stressing that P/Supt. and security, including their whereabouts, and to allow the
Buenaobra was not a witness for the respondent; he testified pursuant to the investigation to run its course unhindered;
subpoena duces tecum ad testificandum issued by the CA. Further, as aptly
pointed out by the CA, it would be more reasonable for the PNP Cagayan 4. The investigation shall be completed not later than six (6) months
Regional Office to conduct the said investigation since it has already from receipt of this Decision; and within thirty (30) days after
commenced an initial investigation on the incident. completion of the investigation, the Regional Director of the
Philippine National Police - Cagayan Regional Office shall submit a
Nevertheless, there is a need to modify the reliefs granted by the CA in favor full report on the results of the investigation to the Court of Appeals;
of the respondent. The CA's Decision was promulgated in 2010.1âwphi1
Since then, Mayor Mamba's term of office as Mayor of Tuao had ended and, 5. The Court of Appeals, within thirty (30) days from the submission
presumably, a new individual is now occupying the position of Mayor of Tuao. by the Regional Director of the Philippine National Police - Cagayan
Accordingly, the incumbent Mayor of Tuao should be directed to likewise Regional Office of his full report, is directed to submit to this Court its
provide assistance to the investigation to be conducted by the PNP Cagayan own report and recommendations on the investigation and furnish a
Regional Office. Further, it has not been manifested in this case that the PNP copy thereof to the incumbent Regional Director of the Philippine
Cagayan Regional Office had commenced the investigation on the incident National Police - Cagayan Regional Office, the petitioners, and the
that was ordered by the CA. respondent; and
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is 6. This case is referred back to the Court of Appeals for appropriate
DENIED. The Decision dated January 18, 2010 and Resolution dated March proceedings directed at the monitoring of (a) the investigation to be
2, 2010 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 00038 are hereby conducted by the Philippine National Police - Cagayan Regional
AFFIRMED subject to the following terms: Office, (b) the actions to be undertaken in pursuance of the said
investigation, and (c) the validation of the results.
1. Petitioners Mayor William N. Mamba, Atty. Francisco N. Mamba,
Jr., Ariel Malana, Narding Aggangan, Jomari Sagalon, Jun Cinabre, SO ORDERED.
Frederick Baligod, Rommel Encollado, Joseph Tumaliuan, and
Randy Dayag and the incumbent local government officials of Tuao,
Cagayan are hereby enjoined from doing any act of physical or
psychological violence on respondent Leomar Bueno and his family
including those who assisted him in the filing of the petition for the
issuance of a writ of amparo with the Court of Appeals;

[12] G.R. No. 186050 The present matter arose from a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo
filed by the relatives of James M. Balao (James) before the RTC, alleging
ARTHUR BALAO, WINSTON BALAO, NONETTE BALAO, JONILYN that he was abducted by five (5) unidentified men on September 17, 2008 in
BALAO-STRUGAR, and BEVERLY LONGID, Petitioners, La Trinidad, Benguet because of his activist/political leanings as founding
vs.EDUARDO ERMITA, GILBERTO TEODORO, RON ALDO PUNO, member of the Cordillera People’s Alliance (CPA). 3 The RTC granted the
NORBERTO GONZALES, Gen. ALEXANDER YANO, Gen. JESUS privilege of the writ of amparo, thereby commencing the conduct of several
VERZOSA, Brig. Gen. REYNALDO MAPAGU, Lt. P/Dir. EDGARDO investigations by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
DOROMAL, Maj. Gen. ISA GANI CACHUELA, Commanding Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) to determine the whereabouts and the
AFP-ISU based in Baguio City, PSS EUGENE MARTIN, and several circumstances behind the disappearance of James. 4 In its Formal Report 5
JOHN DOES, Respondents dated November 12, 2014 submitted to the RTC, the PNP stated that they
encountered problems in gathering evidence that would lead to the resolution
of the case, and thus, proposed that their investigation be terminated.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Archiving of Cases; Archiving of cases is
Meanwhile, the AFP overturned the suspicions behind the involvement of an
a procedural measure designed to temporarily defer the hearing of cases in which no
active service officer of the army, i.e., Major Ferdinand Bruce Tokong, in
immediate action is expected, but where no grounds exist for their outright dismissal.
James's abduction, which likewise led to a standstill in its own investigation. 6
—As mentioned in the Court’s June 21, 2016 Resolution, “archiving of cases is a
As a result, the RTC recommended, among others, the archiving of the case,
procedural measure designed to temporarily defer the hearing of cases in which no
considering that the ongoing investigation had reached an impasse. 7
immediate action is expected, but where no grounds exist for their outright
Eventually, the consolidated cases were brought to the Court. 8
dismissal. Under this scheme, an inactive case is kept alive but held in abeyance
until the situation obtains in which action thereon can be taken. To be sure, the
Amparo rule sanctions the archiving of cases, provided, that it is impelled by a valid The Court's Ruling in the June 21, 2016 Resolution
cause, such as when the witnesses fail to appear due to threats on their lives or to
similar analogous causes that would prevent the court from effectively hearing and In a Resolution9 dated June 21, 2016, the Court partially adopted the RTC's
conducting the amparo proceedings x x x.” Section 20 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, recommendations, and accordingly: (a) rejected the recommendation of the
entitled “The Rule on the Writ of Amparo,” reads: Section 20. Archiving and Revival RTC to archive the cases; (b) relieved the AFP and the Commission on
of Cases.—The court shall not dismiss the petition, but shall archive it, if upon its Human Rights from their respective obligations to investigate James's
determination it cannot proceed for a valid cause such as the failure of petitioner or abduction; and (c) directed the PNP to further investigate the angle
witnesses to appear due to threats on their lives. A periodic review of the archived presented by Bryan Gonzales (Gonzales) and to ascertain the identities of
cases shall be made by the amparo court that shall, motu proprio or upon motion by "Uncle John" and "Rene" who are persons of interest in these cases. 10 In light
any party, order their revival when ready for further proceedings. The petition shall of the foregoing, the Court gave the PNP a period of six (6) months to
be dismissed with prejudice upon failure to prosecute the case after the lapse of two complete its investigation on the aforesaid matter, and thereafter, turn over
(2) years from notice to the petitioner of the order archiving the case. The clerks of its results to the RTC. The RTC, in turn, shall then submit its full report and
court shall submit to the Office of the Court Administrator a consolidated list of recommendation to the Court.11
archived cases under this Rule not later than the first week of January of every year.
The Court held that while it may appear that the investigation conducted by
RESOLUTION the AFP had reached an impasse, records disclose that the testimony of
Gonzales, an asset of the Military Intelligence Group 1 and a cousin of
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: James, alluded to the possibility that James could have been abducted by
members of the CPA. In the same testimony, "Uncle John" and "Rene" were
mentioned as CPA members who were James's housemates. Thus, there
Before the Court is the Report1 dated June13, 2017 submitted by the
was still an active lead worth pursuing by the PNP, which means that the
Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 63 (RTC) incompliance
recommendation to archive the case was premature. 12
with the Court's directives contained in the Resolution 2 2dated June 21, 2016
in the above-captioned consolidated cases.
Proceedings after the June 21, 2016 Resolution
The Facts

On June 20, 2017, the RTC submitted its Report 13 dated June 13, 2017 to the Section 20. Archiving and Revival of Cases. - The court shall not dismiss the
Court.1âwphi1 petition, but shall archive it, if upon its determination it cannot proceed for a
valid cause such as the failure of petitioner or witnesses to appear due to
Collating the findings of the PNP in its Compliance Report 14 dated March 14, threats on their lives.
2017, and the attached Investigation Report15 dated March 10, 2017 and
Investigation/Compliance Report16 dated May 18, 2017, the RTC disclosed A periodic review of the archived cases shall be made by the amparo court
that the PNP, through Senior Police Officer 2 Franklin Dulawan, interviewed that shall, motuproprio or upon motion by any party, order their revival when
Gonzales and presented thirty-two (32) photographs of James, most of them ready for further proceedings. The petition shall be dismissed with prejudice
taken between the years 1992 to 2001, in order to allow him to review the upon failure to prosecute the case after the lapse of two (2) years from notice
faces therein and reveal the identities of "Uncle John" and "Rene." to the petitioner of the order archiving the case.
Unfortunately, Gonzales was unable to give any information regarding their
identities due to the lapse of time. Similarly, other witnesses named Florence The clerks of court shall submit to the Office of the Court Administrator a
Luken (Luken) and Danette Balao Fontanilla (Fontanilla) could neither consolidated list of archived cases under this Rule not later than the first
identify the said persons of interest.17 week of January of every year.
As such, the RTC concluded that the investigation has reached another Based on the report submitted by the RTC, it appears that the PNP had
impasse for failure to uncover relevant leads, 18 and once more indeed conducted the required investigation on the angle presented by
recommended to archive the cases, to be revived upon motion by any of the Gonzales and further attempted to ascertain the identities of "Uncle John"
parties should a significant lead arise. Further, the RTC asked the Court to and Rene" who are persons of interest in these cases. This notwithstanding,
relieve the PNP of its mandate to investigate the matter and to submit none of the material witnesses, namely, Gonzales himself, Luken, and
reportorial requirements until new witnesses or relevant evidence appear or Fontanilla, could provide any information on the identities of these persons,
are discovered.19 despite having been presented with various photographs of James and his
companions. As such, the investigation of the PNP on James's case has
The Issue Before the Court once more reached an impasse without, this time, any other active leads left
to further pursue. Given this situation, the Court therefore concludes that the
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not it should adopt the archiving of the case is now appropriate and perforce, adopts and approves
recommendations of the RTC in its Report dated June 13, 2017 relative to the recommendations of the RTC in its June 13, 2017 Report.
these cases.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to ADOPT and APPROVE the
The Court's Ruling recommendations of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet,
Branch 63 in its Report dated June 13, 2017.
The Court adopts and approves the recommendations of the RTC.
Let these cases be ARCHIVED without prejudice to their revival upon due
motion by any of the parties; and the Philippine National Police be
As mentioned in the Court's June 21, 2016 Resolution, "archiving of cases is
RELIEVED from its mandate to investigate the case and to submit reportorial
a procedural measure designed to temporarily defer the hearing of cases in
requirements until new witnesses or relevant evidence appear or are
which no immediate action is expected, but where no grounds exist for
discovered.
their outright dismissal. Under this scheme, an inactive case is kept alive
but held in abeyance until the situation obtains in which action thereon
can be taken. To be sure, the Amparo rule sanctions the archiving of cases, SO ORDERED.
provided that it is impelled by a valid cause, such as when the witnesses fail
to appear due to threats on their lives or to similar analogous causes that
would prevent the court from effectively hearing and conducting the amparo
proceedings x x x."20 Section 20 of A.M. No. 07-9- 12-SC, entitled "The Rule
on the Writ of Amparo,"21 reads:

[13] G.R. No. 230324 concrete statutory definition of “enforced or involuntary disappearance.”—In Navia
v. Pardico, 673 SCRA 618 (2012), this Court clarified that with the enactment of RA
LORIE MARIE TOMAS CALLO, Petitioner vs.COMMISSIONER JAIME H. No. 9851, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo is now a procedural law anchored, not
MORENTE, BUREAUS OF IMMIGRATION, OIC ASSOCIATES only on the constitutional right to life, liberty, and security, but also on a concrete
COMMISSIONERS BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION and BRIAN ALAS, statutory definition of “enforced or involuntary disappearance.” Further, elements
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION , Respondents constituting enforced disappearance as defined under RA No. 9851 were clearly laid
down by this Court, viz.: (a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form
Constitutional Law; Writ of Amparo; Extralegal Killings; Enforced of deprivation of liberty; (b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization,
Disappearances; The protective writ of amparo is a judicial remedy to expeditiously support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization; (c) that it be
provide relief to violations of a person’s constitutional right to life, liberty, and followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give
security, and more specifically, to address the problem of extralegal killings and information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition;
enforced disappearances or threats thereof.—The protective writ of amparo is a and (d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the
judicial remedy to expeditiously provide relief to violations of a person’s protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
constitutional right to life, liberty, and security, and more specifically, to address the Same; Same; Parties; While “any person” may file a petition for the writ of
problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. Section habeas corpus, in a petition for the writ of amparo, the order of priority on who can
1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides: Sec. 1. Petition.—The petition for a writ file the petition should be strictly followed.—While “any person” may file a petition
of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and for the writ of habeas corpus, in a petition for the writ of amparo, the order of
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a priority on who can file the petition should be strictly followed. In this case, there
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall was no allegation nor proof that Parker had no immediate family members or any
cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. ascendant, descendant, or collateral relative within the fourth civil degree of
Same; Same; Same; Same; The writ of amparo covers extralegal killings and consanguinity or affinity. In fact, no allegation was made on any of the familial
enforced disappearances or threats thereof.—The writ of amparo covers extralegal relationship of Parker as only her whereabouts from 2011 were alleged and
killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. Enforced disappearance is discussed. Therefore, based on the order of priority, Callo had no legal standing to
defined under Republic Act (RA) No. 9851, Section 3(g) of which provides: (g) file this petition.
“Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons” means the arrest, detention, or
abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a DECISION
State or a political organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that
deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those CARPIO, Acting C.J.:
persons, with the intention of removing from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time. The Case
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Extralegal Killings” and
“Enforced Disappearances,” Defined.—This Court also had the opportunity to This is a petition for a writ of amparo (with Prayer to Issue Interim Reliefs of
define extralegal killings and enforced disappearance: Extralegal killings are killings Immediate Release of Danielle Tan Parker from Detention) under A.M. No.
committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial 07-9-12-SC (The Rule on the Writ of Amparo). Petitioner Lorie Marie Tomas
proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearance has been defined by the Callo (Callo) seeks the immediate release of Danielle Tan Parker from the
Court as the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty Immigration Detention Facility, Camp Bagong Diwa in Bicutan, Taguig City.
by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts The Facts
of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the
law. Danielle Tan Parker (Parker) is a holder of Philippine Passport No.
Same; Same; Rule on the Writ of Amparo; In Navia v. Pardico, 673 SCRA 618 XX5678508 issued by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on 5 March
(2012), the Supreme Court (SC) clarified that with the enactment of Republic Act 2010 and valid until 4 March 2015.
(RA) No. 9851, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo is now a procedural law anchored,
not only on the constitutional right to life, liberty, and security, but also on a

On 15 January 2013, Parker was charged for deportation for being an On 23 March 2017, Callo filed this petition for a writ of amparo with prayer to
undesirable, undocumented, and overstaying alien, in violation of Section 3 7 issue Interim Reliefs of Immediate Release of Danielle Tan Parker from
(a)(7) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, in relation to Detention. Callo argues that Parker is a natural-born Filipino citizen and thus,
Rule XVI, Office Memorandum No. ADD-01-004. It was alleged that Danielle there is no reason for her to be detained by the Bureau of Immigration.
Nopuente was a fugitive from justice in the United States of America with an
outstanding arrest warrant issued against her. Subsequently, on 24 January The Issue
2013, a Summary Deportation Order (SDO) was issued against Danielle
Nopuente, also known as Isabelita Nopuente and Danielle Tan Parker, upon The only issue in this case is whether or not the right to life, liberty, and
verification that she arrived in the Philippines on 23 March 2011 under the security of Parker is threatened by the respondents to warrant the issuance
Balikbayan Program, with an authorized stay of a period of one year. Parker of the writ of amparo and subsequently the award of the interim reliefs.
was not in the list of approved applications of the DFA for dual citizenship
and her American Passport had been revoked by the United States
Department of State. Thus, she was considered an undocumented, The Ruling of the Court
undesirable, and overstaying alien, in violation of the Philippine Immigration
Act of 1940. The petition has no merit.
On 5 June 2014, pursuant to the SDO issued by the Bureau of Immigration, Callo seeks the issuance of the writ of amparo and the interim reliefs
Parker was arrested in Tagaytay City on the premise that Danielle Nopuente available under A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC for the immediate release of Parker.
and Danielle Tan Parker are one and the same person. She was then taken Callo alleges that Parker is a natural-born Filipino citizen and thus should not
to the Immigration Detention Facility in Bicutan, Taguig City. She is still have been detained by the Bureau of Immigration. Moreover, Callo alleges
currently detained in the Immigration Detention Facility as the deportation that the kife of Parker is endangered in the detention center; and thus a writ
was not carried out due to the fact that Parker is charged with falsification of amparo with the interim reliefs prayed for should be issued by this Court.
and use of falsified documents before Branch 4, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Davao City. We disagree.
On 12 September 2014, Parker, as petitioner, filed a Petition for Habeas The protective writ of amparo is a judicial remedy to expeditiously provide
Corpus before Branch 266, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. The relief to violations of a person's constitutional right to life, liberty, and security,
Bureau of Immigration was able to produce the body of Parker before the and more specifically, to address the problem of extralegal killings and
RTC. The Bureau of Immigration then alleged that as the SDO had become enforced disappearances or threats thereof. Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-
final and executory, it served as the legal authority to detain Parker. The SC provides:
Bureau of Immigration also argued that Parker cannot be released or
deported without the final disposition of her pending criminal case in Davao Sec. 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to
City. any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened
The RTC dismissed the petition, finding that the detention of Parker was or of a private individual or entity.
legal.1 Parker then appealed the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA
affirmed the RTC and found that Parker failed to prove that she was a Filipino The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or
citizen to warrant judicial intervention through habeas corpus. 2 The CA gave threats thereof.
weight to the Certification dated 20 June 2015 issued by the Office of the
Consular Affairs of the DFA that there is "no available data" regarding any
It is clear from the above-quoted provision that the writ of amparo covers
record/information from the year 1990 onwards of Philippine Passport No.
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof 4 Enforced
:XX5678508. Parker no longer appealed the denial of the issuance of the writ
disappearance is defmed under Republic Act (RA) No. 9851, 5 Section 3(g) of
of habeas corpus and the decision of the CA became final and executory on
which provides:
5 January 2016.3

(g) "Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons" means the arrest, information on the whereabouts of Parker because as Callo admits, Parker is
detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or detained in the Immigration Detention Facility of the Bureau of Immigration.
acquiescence of a State or a political organization followed by a refusal to The Bureau of Immigration also does not deny this. In fact, the Bureau of
acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or Immigration had produced the body of Parker before the RTC in the
whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from the proceedings for the writ of habeas corpus previously initiated by Parker
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. herself.9 Similarly, there is no intention to remove Parker from the protection
of the law for a prolonged period of time. As the Bureau of Immigration
This Court also had the opportunity to define extralegal killings and enforced explained, Parker has a pending criminal case against her in Davao City,
disappearance: which prevents the Bureau of Immigration from deporting her from the
country.
Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law, i.e.,
without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced Simply put, we see no enforced or involuntary disappearance, or any threats
disappearance has been defined by the Court as the arrest, detention, thereof, that would warrant the issuance of the writ of amparo. For the
abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or issuance of the writ, it is not sufficient that a person's life is endangered. It is
by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or even not sufficient to allege and prove that a person has disappeared. It has
acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the to be shown by the required quantum of proof that the disappearance was
deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the
disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the government or a political organization, and that there is a refusal to
law.6 acknowledge the same or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of
the missing persons.10 In this case, Parker has not disappeared. Her
detention has been sufficiently justified by the Bureau of Immigration, given
In Navia v. Pardico,7 this Court clarified that with the enactment of RANo.
that there is an SDO and a pending criminal case against her.
9851, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo is now a procedural law anchored, not
only on the constitutional right to life, liberty, and security, but also on a
concrete statutory definition of "enforced or involuntary disappearance." Callo contends that there is no cause to detain Parker because Parker, a
Further, elements constituting enforced disappearance as defined under RA natural-born Filipino citizen, is a different person from Danielle Nopuente, the
No. 9851 were clearly laid down by this Court, viz: person against whom the SDO was issued.
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of We disagree.
liberty; ·
Callo has failed to prove that Danielle Tan Parker and Danielle Nopuente are
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or two different persons. In particular, we give weight to the fact that the DFA
acquiescence of, the State or a political organization; issued a certificate verifying that there is no available data on Passport No.
XX5678508, which was the Philippine passport used by Parker. 11 Moreover,
the Certificate of Live Birth, 12 which purportedly shows that Parker was born
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization's refusal to
in the Philippines on 21 March 1975 of Filipino parents, was only registered
acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person
on 4 January 2010. There was no explanation given as to why Parker's birth
subject of the amparo petition; and,
was registered only after almost 35 years. Moreover, Callo only alleges facts
from the year 2005, allegedly for purposes of brevity. 13 We do not see any
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the reason why facts surrounding the existence of Parker should only be
protection of the law for a prolonged period oftime. 8 presented from 2005. In fact, the only period that is thoroughly discussed
about her is from 2010 to 2011. To prove that Parker and Nopuente are two
It is clear that the elements of enforced disappearance are not attendant in different persons, the life and existence of Parker should have been alleged
this case. There is also no threat of such enforced disappearance.1âwphi1 and proven since birth. In this case, there is no allegation nor any proof as to
While there is indeed a detention carried out by the State through the Bureau who Parker was, or what she had been doing, before 2011. Taking all these
of Immigration, the third and fourth elements are not present. There is no circumstances into perspective, Parker had failed to sufficiently prove that
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of freedom or refusal to give she is a different person from Danielle Nopuente.

Callo contends that Parker's life is endangered in the Immigration I Detention The Court notes that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen also filed the petition
Facility because of the threats against her by her co-detainees and the living for habeas corpus on Merino's behalf. No objection was raised therein for, in
conditions of the facility which pose health problems for Parker. a habeas corpus proceeding, any person may apply for the writ on behalf of
Unfortunately, these allegations - even if proven - will not support the the aggrieved party.
issuance of a writ of amparo. To repeat, the remedy of a writ of amparo is an
extraordinary remedy that is meant to balance the government's awesome It is thus only with respect to the amparo petition that the parents of Sherlyn
power and to curtail human rights abuses. 14 The writ .covers extralegal and Karen are precluded from filing the application on Merino's behalf as
killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereo1 f as specifically they are not authorized parties under the Rule. (Emphasis supplied)
defined under RA No. 9851. The circumstances of Parker, as alleged by
Callo, do not meet the requirements for the issuance of the kit of amparo. Thus, while "any person" may file a petition for the writ of habeas corpus, in a
petition for the writ of amparo, the order of priority on who can file the petition
Finally, we note that the petition for the writ of amparo was filed by Callo. should be strictly followed. In this case, there was no allegation nor proof that
However, there was no allegation of her relationship to Parker. 15 In Boac v. Parker had no immediate family members or any ascendant, descendant, or
Cadapan,16 we emphasized the importance of the exclusive and successive collateral relative within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. In
order of who can file a petition for a writ of amparo. We held: fact, no allegation was made on any of the familial relationship of Parker as
only her whereabouts from 2011 were alleged and discussed. Therefore,
Petitioners finally point out that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen do not have based on the order of priority, Callo had no legal standing to file this petition.
the requisite standing to file the amparo petition on behalf of Merino. They
call attention to the fact that in the amparo petition, the parents of Sherlyn Given that there is no basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo, the interim
and Karen merely indicated that they were "concerned with Manuel Merino" reliefs sought for are also denied. Moreover, we see no need to address the
as basis for filing the petition on his behalf. other issues raised by Callo in this petition, specifically, the condition of the
Immigration Detention Facility and the treatment of Parker in said detention
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides: center. A petition for the writ of amparo is not the proper action to resolve
such issues.
The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any qualified person or
entity in the following order: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
(a) Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse, children and SO ORDERED.
parents of the aggrieved party; (b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral
relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity
or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or
(c) Any concerned citizen, organization, association or institution, if there is

no known member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved
party.1âwphi1
Indeed, the parents of Sherlyn and Karen failed to allege that there were no
known members of the immediate family or relatives of Merino. The exclusive
and successive order mandated by the above-quoted provision must be
followed. The order of priority is not without reason - "to prevent the
indiscriminate and groundless filing of petitions for amparo which may
even prejudice the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved
party."

[14] G.R. No. 181796 CIDG was noncompliant in that regard. To be noted at this juncture is that the CIDG
should have exerted greater effort at complying with both the letter and spirit of the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE Rule on the Writ of Amparo in light of Perez’s sinumpaang salaysay having fully
DIRECTOR/HEAD OF THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION AND DETECTION placed the responsibility for the abduction and disappearance of Pablo right at the
GROUP (CIDG), PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), Petitioner very doorsteps of the CIDG in Camp Crame. It is disheartening for us to see the
vs.REGINA N. CA YANAN AND SPOl ROLANDO V. PASCUA, CIDG’s investigation having been limited to Pascua despite the circumstances
Respondents justifying a broader inquiry. There was also no affirmative showing of any
investigation of the area of the abduction itself despite Regina having presented
Remedial Law; Appeals; Writ of Amparo; Although this mode of appeal is witnesses from the area. Indeed, the CIDG did not seem to have itself investigated
usually limited to the determination of questions of law, Section 19 of the Rule on the Perez on the abduction.
Writ of Amparo explicitly allows the review by the Supreme Court (SC) of questions Same; Despite its being patterned after the rules on the writ of amparo of
of fact or of law or of both.—We have to indicate as a preliminary observation that other countries, particularly those in Latin-American, the Rule on the Writ of
although this mode of appeal is usually limited to the determination of questions of Amparo promulgated by the Supreme Court (SC) should not be wholly dependent on
law, Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo explicitly allows the review by the how those other rules of amparo have operated, or have been implemented.—The
Court of questions of fact or of law or of both. Accordingly, we shall also determine Court clarifies that the application and implementation of the rule of amparo adopted
herein the sufficiency of the evidence presented in support of the petition for the in Mexico or in any other country could only be persuasive at best. Despite its being
issuance of the writ of amparo. patterned after the rules on the writ of amparo of other countries, particularly those
Same; Evidence; Substantial Evidence; Writ of Amparo; Substantial evidence in Latin-American, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo promulgated by the Court should
is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support not be wholly dependent on how those other rules of amparo have operated, or have
a conclusion. This standard was applied in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, been implemented. Such operation and implementation, if worthy of emulation, are
568 SCRA 1 (2008), the first ruling by the Supreme Court (SC) relating to the only best practices to be considered and optionally relied upon, if at all.
remedy of the writ of amparo.—Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo Circumstances and needs peculiar to our country, which the Court has well
requires substantial evidence to establish the allegations of the petition for the writ of considered in crafting the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, dictate different operation and
amparo and to warrant granting the privilege of the writ of amparo, to wit: Section implementation.
18. Judgment.—x x x If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial Same; In proper circumstances, the State or any of its relevant agencies may
evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be be impleaded; otherwise, the rule on the writ of amparo may be rendered ineffective
proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. Substantial evidence or toothless.—Pascua suggests that the State, or any of its agencies or institutions
is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a like the CIDG, cannot be made a respondent in the petition for the writ of amparo.
conclusion. This standard was applied in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, He probably bases his suggestion on the text of Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of
568 SCRA 1 (2008), the first ruling by the Court relating to the remedy of the writ of Amparo, which provides: Section 1. Petition.—The petition for a writ of amparo is a
amparo. remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or
Civil Law; Extraordinary Diligence; The diligence required of the Criminal threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) was extraordinary.—The CIDG posits employee, or of a private individual or entity. x x x The suggestion of Pascua lacks
that it was only required to observe ordinary diligence in conducting its investigation substance. Although Section 1 states that the violation may be committed by the
of the disappearance of Pablo and in determining Pablo’s whereabouts. The CIDG’s persons therein listed (i.e., public official or employee, or a private individual or
position is incorrect. The diligence required of the CIDG was extraordinary. entity), it does not state that only the listed persons can be made respondents. The
Writ of Amparo; Under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the return should rule does not list the State or its agencies as possible violators simply because the
spell out the details of the investigations conducted by the Criminal Investigation State and its agencies may not be presumed to sanction such violations. In proper
and Detection Group (CIDG) and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in a circumstances, the State or any of its relevant agencies may be impleaded; otherwise,
manner that would enable the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to judiciously determine the rule on the writ of amparo may be rendered ineffective or toothless. There may
whether or not the efforts to ascertain Pablo’s whereabouts had been sincere and be occasions when the remedy of the writ of amparo can be made effective only
adequate.—Under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the return should spell out the through the State and its agencies. This is because the State is vested with the
details of the investigations conducted by the CIDG and the NBI in a manner that authority and responsibility for securing every inhabitant’s life, liberty and property.
would enable the RTC to judiciously determine whether or not the efforts to After all, the State controls the legal, moral and material resources by which to fully
ascertain Pablo’s whereabouts had been sincere and adequate. The return by the enforce the Constitution and the laws guaranteeing life, liberty and property.

Same; The proceedings taken under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo are not identifying themselves as operatives of the CIDG, led by Pascua, had forcibly
akin or similar to those in criminal prosecutions. In the former, the guilt or arrested Pablo on Magalang Street, East A venue, Diliman, Quezon City
innocence of the respondents is not determined, and no penal sanctions are meted.— without any warrant of arrest, and had then detained him at the office of the
The proceedings taken under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo are not akin or similar CIDG in Camp Crame, Quezon City; that Pablo had not been found or heard
to those in criminal prosecutions. In the former, the guilt or innocence of the from since then; and that despite repeated demands by her and her relatives,
respondents is not determined, and no penal sanctions are meted. The proceedings the CIDG operatives had not produced the body of Pablo. 4
only endeavor to give the aggrieved parties immediate remedies against imminent or
actual threats to life, liberty or security. The presumption of innocence is never an On August 21, 2007, the CIDG received the petition for habeas corpus
issue. In the latter, the prosecution of the accused with due process of law is the brought in behalf of Pablo. On August 28, 2007, the CIDG filed its return on
object of the proceedings. The presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the writ wherein it denied having the custody of Pablo or having detained
always the starting point. Hence, the need for the State to adduce proof beyond him. It prayed for the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus.5
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.
On September 7, 2007, the R TC directed the parties to submit their
DECISION respective memoranda.6
BERSAMIN, J.: On October 24, 2007, Regina, albeit reiterating the allegations of the petition
for habeas corpus, amended her petition to now seek instead the issuance of
Substantial evidence is sufficient in proceedings involving petitions for the a writ of amparo.7
writ of amparo. The respondent must show in the return on the writ of
amparo the observance of extraordinary diligence. Once an enforced On October 24, 2007, the RTC issued the writ of amparo.8
disappearance is established by substantial evidence, the relevant State
agencies should be tasked to assiduously investigate and determine the On November 5, 2007, the CIDG and Pascua submitted their respective
disappearance, and, if warranted, to bring to the bar of justice whoever may comments vis-a-vis the writ of amparo.9
be responsible for the disappearance.
On November 5, 2007, Regina moved ex parte for the issuance of a
The Case temporary protection order and witness protection order. The RTC granted
her motion on November 6, 2007.10
The Government, represented by the Director/Head of the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the Philippine National Police Pascua did not appear in the proceedings in the RTC. He tendered
(PNP), appeals the resolution issued on December 13, 2007 by the Regional explanations for his non-appearance, specifically: for the initial hearing, he
Trial Court, Branch 91, in Quezon City (RTC) maintaining the writ of amparo; was then suffering acute gastroenteritis; and for the later hearings, he wanted
ordering the CIDG to continue its investigation into the disappearance of to protect his identity as part of his defenses in the criminal case of
Pablo A. Cayanan (Pablo); directing respondent SPO1 Rolando V. Pascua kidnapping brought against him in the Department of Justice. 11
(Pascua) to appear before the proper forum; making the temporary protection
order permanent; and upholding the enrollment of Regina N. Cayanan
(Regina) in the Witness Protection Program of the Department of Justice. 1 On December 13, 2007, the RTC issued the first assailed resolution, 12
disposing thusly:
Also under appeal is the resolution of January 31, 2008, whereby the RTC
denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.2 Foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows, to
wit:
Antecedents
1) The Court hereby maintains the Writ of Amparo earlier issued;
On August 16, 2007, Regina filed a petition for habeas corpus in the R TC
alleging that Pablo, her husband, was being illegally detained by the 2) For respondent CIDG Chief/Director to continue the investigation it earlier
Director/Head of the CIDG;3 that on July 9, 2007 a group of armed men conducted;

3) For SP02 Rolando V. Pascua to appear to the proper forum; I.
4) The Temporary Protection Order is hereby made permanent; Complainant failed to establish by the required burden of proof that
respondent SP02 Pascua, in his personal capacity or as police officer,
5) And the Granting of the Witness Protection Program availed of by the caused the "forced disappearance" of Pablo Cayanan within the ambit
petitioner is hereby retained until the finality of the case/cases related protected by the rule on the writ of amparo.
thereto.
A.
13
It is so ordered.
Following Mexico's Amparo, it is [an] essential requirement for the supposed
The CIDG forthwith moved for reconsideration; 14 however, the RTC denied victim to establish where he is being held. Moreover, Philippine rule on
the motion for reconsideration on January 31, 2008 through the second amparo specifically covers "public official or employee, or of a private
assailed resolution.15 individual or entity'', which evidently precludes a government
institution/instrumentality, such as CIDG-PNP.
Hence, the CIDG has directly appealed to the Court.
B.
Issues
Enforced or forced disappearance means that it must be established that
agents of the state perpetrated its commission.
The CIDG urges the following grounds for review and reversal of the assailed
resolutions, namely:16
II.
I.
Respondent-Accused Pascua is entitled to presumption of innocence, which
cannot be diminished by the rule on writ of amparo.
The trial court gravely erred in granting the writ of amparo, there being no
sufficient evidence to support the same.
The issues for consideration and resolution in this appeal are follows: (1)
whether or not sufficient evidence supported the grant of the writ of amparo
A.
by the RTC; (2) whether or not the CIDG already discharged its duty as
required by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo; (3) whether or not the petition for
The Rule on the writ of amparo did not change the rules on burden of proof. the issuance of the writ of amparo was defective; and (4) whether or not the
issuance of the writ of amparo by the RTC impaired Pascua's right to the
B. presumption of his innocence.
A mere accusation accompanied by inherently hearsay evidence is not Ruling of the Court
sufficient ground for the court to issue a writ of amparo or allow its continued
effectivity. The appeal lacks merit.
II. We have to indicate as a preliminary observation that although this mode of

appeal is usually limited to the determination of questions of law, Section 19
Petitioner discharged its functions as required in its mandate and exhausted of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo explicitly allows the review by the Court of
all remedies available under the law. questions of fact or of law or of both. Accordingly, we shall also determine
herein the sufficiency of the evidence presented in support of the petition for
On his part, Pascua submits in his comment to the petition that: 17 the issuance of the writ of amparo.

I. We see no merit in the petitioners' submitted position that no sufficient
evidence exists to support the conclusion that the Kasim evidence
Substantial evidence existed to warrant the issuance of the writ of unequivocally points to some government complicity in the disappearance x x
amparo x. We painstakingly ruled:
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo defines the nature of the writ of To give full meaning to our Constitution and the rights it protects, we hold
amparo as a remedy against enforced disappearances or threats to life, that, as in Velasquez, we should at least take a close look at the available
liberty and personal security, viz.: evidence to determine the correct import of every piece of evidence - even of
those usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence -
taking into account the surrounding circumstances and the test of reason that
Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to
we can use as basic minimum admissibility requirement x x x.
any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened
or of a private individual or entity. xxxx
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or Likewise, we see no merit in the petitioners' claim that the Kasim evidence
threats thereof. does not amount to substantial evidence required by the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo. This is not a new issue; we extensively and thoroughly considered
and resolved it in our December 3, 2009 Decision. At this point, we need not
Section 17 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo specifies the degree of proof
go into another full discussion of the justifications supporting an evidentiary
required from the petitioner as a respondent named in the petition for the writ
standard specific to the Writ of Amparo. Suffice it to say that we continue to
of amparo, to wit:
adhere to the substantial evidence rule that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
requires, with some adjustments for flexibility in considering the evidence
Section 1 7. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The presented. When we ruled that hearsay evidence (usually considered
parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence. inadmissible under the general rules of evidence) may be admitted as the
circumstances of the case may require, we did not thereby dispense with the
xxxx substantial evidence rule; we merely relaxed the evidentiary rule on the
admissibility of evidence, maintaining all the time the standards of reason
Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires substantial evidence to and relevance that underlie every evidentiary situation. This, we did, by
establish the allegations of the petition for the writ of amparo and to warrant considering the totality of the obtaining situation and the consistency of the
granting the privilege of the writ of amparo, to wit: hearsay evidence with the other available evidence in the case.
Section 18. Judgment. - x x x If the allegations in the petition are proven by Thus viewed, common threads that plainly run in the three cited cases are
substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such applicable to the present case. There is the evidence of ineffective
reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be investigation in Manalo and Velasquez Rodriguez, while in all three was the
denied. recognition that the burden of proof must be lowered or relaxed (either
through the use of circumstantial or indirect evidence or even by logical
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might inference); the requirement for direct evidence to establish that an enforced
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 18 This standard was applied in disappearance occurred -- as the petitioners effectively suggest -- would
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,19 the first ruling by the Court render it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove that an individual has
relating to the remedy of the writ of amparo. been made to disappear. In these lights, we emphasized in our December 3,
2009 Decision that while the need for substantial evidence remains the rule,
flexibility must be observed where appropriate (as the Courts in Velasquez
In Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis,20 a case involving the propriety of the trial court's
Rodriguez and Timurtas did) for the protection of the precious rights to life,
issuance of the writ of amparo, the Court expounded on the need for
liberty and security. This flexibility, we noted, requires that 'we should take a
substantial evidence to support the petition for the writ of amparo, viz.:
close look at the available evidence to determine the correct import of every
piece of evidence - even of those usually considered inadmissible under the

general rules of evidence - taking into account the surrounding S. Noon pong ika-9 ng Hulyo 2007, nag-text si PABLO sa akin, tinatanong
circumstances and the test of reason that we can use as basic minimum kung ok na yung papel ng Transfer of Ownership ng sasakyan, at sabi ko po
admissibility requirement.' From these perspectives, we see no error that we "ok na". Sabi niya "Sige punta ako diyan." Mga alas-tres (3:00) ng hapon
should rectify or reconsider.21 (Emphases supplied) dumating siya sa harap ng opisina naming sa Cres Eden building sa 8A
Magalang St., Pinyahan, Quezon City. Dala ni PABLO yung Isuzu Sportivo
The CIDG contends that Regina did not discharge her burden of proof (Plate ZCW-283) na kulay orange. Hindi na siya bumaba ng sasakyan at
because she did not present substantial evidence to support her petition for tinawag na lang ako para sumakay sa kanya. Pag-sakay ko po ay may
the issuance of the writ of amparo. humarang na dalawang sasakyan, isang Kia 2 door Sedan, puti, na may
plate number YBA 255, at isang Toyota Lite Ace, green, plate number ___-
488. Tinutukan kami ng Calibre .45 pistol ng 2 lalaking tumabi sa amin ni
The contention of the CIDG is without merit.
PABLO. Lumapit si SP02 ROLANDO PASCUA sa amin at pinalipat ako sa
Pajero niya (kulay navy blue). May ibang nag-maneho ng sasakyan ni
We declare that Regina fully discharged her duty to present substantial PABLO na kasama siya doon. Kasama po ni PASCUA yung driver niya.
evidence in support of her petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo.
6. T. Sino si SP02 ROLANDO PASCUA?
Firstly, the sinumpaang salaysay executed on July 30, 2007 before Special
Investigator Cesar S. Rivera of the Anti-Kidnapping, Hijacking and Armed
S: Siya po nagpapagawa din sa akin ng araw na yon ng International Drivers
Robbery Division of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), whereby
License, police po siya, dating naka-destino sa Firearms and Explosives
affiant Ronaldo F. Perez (Perez), an eyewitness no less, detailed the events
Division (FED), Camp Crame.
of the abduction of Pablo in mid-afternoon of July 9, 2007, was consistent
and credible in itself. Perez's statements therein definitely recounted how the
abductors perpetrated the abduction by blocking the path of Pablo's Isuzu xxxx
Sportivo (plate numbered ZCW 283) with their whitecolored Kia 2-door
Sedan bearing plate numbered YBA 255 and their greencolored Toyota Lite 11. T. Saan kayo dinala ni PABLO?
Ace with plate numbered "___-488." Perez identified one of the perpetrators
of the abduction by name ("SP02 Rolando Pascua") and supplied another S. Inikut-ikot kami sa labas ng Crame mga kalahating oras (3:00- 3:30 nh),
identifying circumstance for Pascua ("Siya po nagpapagawa din sa akin ng tapos po ay pumasok kami sa loob ng Crame sa tapat ng CIDG Building,
araw na yon ng International Drivers License, police po siya, dating naka- parking area. Nasa labas lang kami ng CIDG Building nakapark mga isa't
destino sa Firearms and Explosives Division (FED), Camp Crame"). He kalahating oras (3:30-5:00 nh), nasa loob lang ako ng Pajero ni PASCUA. Si
thereby revealed having last seen Pablo on the day of the abduction as being PABLO ay kinakausap nila SP02 ROLANDO PASCUA sa loob ng Sportivo.
inside the Isuzu Sportivo that the abductors parked in front of the main office Pinaalis na po ako mga bandang alas singko (5:00) ng hapon, tumuloy na
of the CIDG in Camp Crame. ako sa upisina sa Pinyahan. Naiwan po doon si PABLO CAYANAN Jr.
bantay siya ng mga dumukot sa kanya, kasama si SP02 ROLANDO
The relevant portions of the sinumpaang salaysay of Perez are quoted for PASCUA.
ready reference as follows:
12. T. Paano mo nasabing nasa CIDG Crame kayo?
4. T. Sino ba si PABLO CAYANAN?
S. Madalas po ako doon, makikita po sa labas ng building na may malaking
S. Kliyente ko po si PABLO, nagpapagawa ng mga rehistro ng mga nakasulat na Criminal Investigation and Detention (sic) Group (CIDG). 22
sasakyan. May pwesto po siya sa Dagupan at namimili at nagbebenta ng
mga second hand car. Mga isang taon mahigit ko na po siyang kilala. Given that no ill-motive was imputed to Perez for firmly identifying Pascua as
the person leading the abduction of Pablo, the credibility of the identification
5. T. Kailan at papano siya nawala o dinukot? [When and how did he of Pascua was unassailable. Indeed, Perez was not likely to falsely
disappear or was abducted] incriminate a police officer like Pascua in the commission of a crime as
serious as abduction unless the incrimination was the truth.

Secondly, Pascua himself expressly admitted the abduction of Pablo, albeit directed by one of the Malefactor not to look back or I would be shot which I
asserting himself as another victim of the same abduction. Pascua's version complied;
on the abduction, as culled from his counter-affidavit, follows:
j) Fearing that what I experienced may be [a] violation of the law, I boarded a
a) On July 9, 2007, I was at the vicinity of Magalang Street near the Land taxi cab and immediately proceeded to the Central Metro Manila Criminal
Transportation Office (LTO) along East Avenue, Quezon City. I was then Investigation and Detection Team located at Camp Karingal, Sikatuna
processing the application for International Driver's License of a relative Village, Quezon City to report the incident. This is the station that I am quite
which was coursed and requested through me; familiar, hence, I decided to proceed to the same station x x x.
b) To facilitate the processing of the said application for International Driver's k) I tried to locate Ronaldo Perez that night but to no avail and so I decided to
License, I met a friend named Ronaldo F. Perez, who incidentally was [a] wait for any news that may come there after;
known "fixer" in the area to help him (sic) facilitate the application;
l) The next day, July 10, 2007 (Tuesday), I was surprised to learn from
c) At around 3:00 in the afternoon and while I am seated in a "turo turo" Ronaldo Perez through telephone call, that he was likewise released and that
(cafeteria) talking to Ronaldo Perez regarding the license detail, a group of he is now ready to process the requested International Driver's License of his
men (referred to herein as "Malefactor" for brevity) more or less ten (10) relative Rizalino Pascua Gani, Jr. x x x.23
brandishing long and short firearms arrived and in a "Gestapo" like manner
hauled several persons including me and Ronaldo Perez. The incident Asserting himself as another victim of the same abduction was Pascua's way
transpired in no less than a minute. The Malefactor seem to be trained and of denying his participation in the abduction of Pablo. Yet, he did not furnish
have prepared for the incident; details of the abduction that would have given to the investigators firm leads
to quickly comer the perpetrators as well as to determine and locate the
d) At that precise moment, [I] could not identify myself as a police officer yet whereabouts of Pablo. His omission as fatal to his credibility. He could not
to the Malefactors for fear that I would be shot at by the Malefactors. At that simply belie his part in the abduction by issuing a blanket denial. He was
time I did not bear with me my service fire arm - caliber 9mm pistol; expected to furnish details because he was a police officer sworn to uphold
and enforce the law. It is significant that his denial was already doubtful in
e) We were ordered to board in a vehicle, which vehicle I cannot identify nor light of Perez's sinumpaang salaysay positively identifying of him as the
their license plate number. There were Seven persons in the vehicle, four (4) leader of the perpetrators of the abduction.
members of the Malefactors and three (3) person who were hauled including
me and Ronaldo Perez; Thirdly, Pascua's version of being a victim of the same abduction deserved
no consideration. For one, he could not even mention the type and the color
f) All three (3) of us who were taken by the malefactors were ordered, at gun of the vehicle that he and Pablo were supposedly ordered to board. Such
point, to bow our head while the vehicle is moving. We were directed not to inability was uncharacteristic of a veteran police officer like him. To justify his
look anywhere; alleged inability to provide details about the abductors in his counter-affidavit,
he stated that he and Pablo were told to "bow their heads and not to look."
The justification was implausible, however, because it was incompatible with
g) Same vehicle, together with two more vehicle apparently taking the lead,
his declaration in the same counter-affidavit to the effect that the "[s]ame
drove all the way to EDSA southbound passing by the street near the
vehicle, together with two or more vehicle apparently taking the lead, drove
building where the Department of Interior and Local Government is located;
all the way to EDSA southbound passing by the street near the building
where the Department of Interior and Local Government is located." 24
h) It was along Kamuning or a few minutes after their (sic) hauling when I had Furthermore, he said that he was released by the abductors only after having
the opportunity to identify myself to one of the Malefactors that I am a introduced himself as a police officer. But he thereby contradicted himself
bonafide member of the police force. I was asked if I am is (sic) sure that I because he also stated in the same counter-affidavit that he feared being
am a police officer, to which I answered "Opo"; shot during the abduction if he identified himself as a police officer. Moreover,
he claimed that although he was released he submissively complied with the
i) A few minutes after and upon learning that I am a police officer, the vehicle order of one of the abductors for him "not to look back or [he] would be
stopped and I was required to get off, which I immediately did. I was however

shot."25 The claim of submissiveness was unnatural for a police officer like Section 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The
him because he was expected - mainly because of his training and parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence.
experience as a police officer, or even because of simple curiosity on his part
- to have at least glanced at the fleeing vehicle of the abductors in order to The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary
get a clue for the follow-up investigation. That he did not give chase or tail the diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed
vehicle, or alert other police officers about the abduction soonest added to in the performance of duty.
the suspiciousness of his denial of participation in the abduction. And, lastly,
his proceeding to a relatively farther police station to report the incident, The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that
instead of to the nearer police station or outpost made his version absolutely extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations
suspicious. was observed in the performance of duty.
Fourthly, Regina presented other witnesses, namely: Ricardo Cayanan 26 and The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption
Leonila R. Francisco,27 to corroborate the allegation on the occurrence of the that official duty has been regularly performed to evade the responsibility or
abduction. Such other witnesses also identified Pascua as the person leading liability.
the abductors of Pablo and Perez.
The CIDG posits that it was only required to observe ordinary diligence in
And, fifthly, Perez's recantation of his sinumpaang salaysay had no conducting its investigation of the disappearance of Pablo and in determining
evidentiary value for being general and bereft of any details. A perusal shows Pablo's whereabouts.
that the recantation did not offer details of what had really occurred if the
abduction of Pablo did not actually happen. Such details were the only
means to directly contradict the details stated in the recanted sinumpaang The CIDG's position is incorrect. The diligence required of the CIDG was
salaysay. extraordinary.
It is relevant to note that the RTC, whose ascertainment of the credibility of Section 9 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo expressly states what a public
conflicting testimonies is generally accorded great respect by the reviewing official or employee impleaded as a respondent in the petition for the writ of
court, easily disbelieved Perez's recantation of his sinumpaang salaysay, amparo should submit with the verified written return, to wit:
observing as follows:
Section 9. Return; Contents. - Within seventy-two (72) hours after service of
Even the recantation of Ronaldo Perez of his Sinumpaang Salaysay as the writ, the respondent shall file a verified written return together with
presented by the respondent SPO2 Rolando Pascua is frowned upon by the supporting affidavits which shall, among other things, contain the following:
Court. Jurisprudence has invariably regarded such affidavit as exceedingly
unreliable, because it can easily be secured from a poor and ignorant (a) The lawful defenses to show that the respondent did not violate or
witness, usually through intimidation or for monetary consideration. threaten with violation the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved
Considering that the respondents herein belong to the police force, the party, through any act or omission;
motive of Ronaldo Perez in executing his Affidavit of Recantation is doubted
by the Court. Moreover, Ronaldo Perez's defiance of the subpoena sent to (b) The steps or actions taken by the respondent to determine the fate or
him by this Court proved all the more the doubt of the Court of the veracity of whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible
his recantation.28 for the threat, act or omission;
II. The CIDG did not observe the required extraordinary diligence (c) All relevant information in the possession of the respondent pertaining to
the threat, act or omission against the aggrieved party; and
Section 17 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo defines the diligence required
of a public official or employee who is named as a respondent in the petition (d) If the respondent is a public official or employee, the return shall further
for the writ of amparo, to wit: state the actions that have or will still be taken:

(i) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party; The CIDG pointed out in its return that the CIDG had undertaken an
administrative investigation against Pascua, and submitted in that regard the
(ii) to recover ·and preserve the evidence related to the death or certification on the pre-charge evaluation and investigation of Pascua. The
disappearance of the person identified in the petition which may aid in the CIDG asserts that its investigation of the disappearance of Pablo was
prosecution of the person or persons responsible; conducted in tandem with that of the NBI; that it had also formed its own
investigating team to conduct a "thorough investigation" of the abduction of
Pablo; and that it had meanwhile verified the vehicle used in the abduction
(iii) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the
from the LT0.30
death or disappearance;
Under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the return should spell out the details
(iv) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or
of the investigations conducted by the CIDG and the NBI in a manner that
disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought
would enable the RTC to judiciously determine whether or not the efforts to
about the death or disappearance;
ascertain Pablo's whereabouts had been sincere and adequate. The return
by the CIDG was non-compliant in that regard. To be noted at this juncture is
(v) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or that the CIDG should have exerted greater effort at complying with both the
disappearance; and letter and spirit of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in light of Perez's
sinumpaang salaysay having fully placed the responsibility for the abduction
(vi) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court. and disappearance of Pablo right at the very doorsteps of the CIDG in Camp
Crame. It is disheartening for us to see the CIDG's investigation having been
The return shall also state other matters relevant to the investigation, its limited to Pascua despite the circumstances justifying a broader inquiry.
resolution and the prosecution of the case. There was also no affirmative showing of any investigation of the area of the
abduction itself despite Regina having presented witnesses from the area.
A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed. Indeed, the CIDG did not seem to have itself investigated Perez on the
abduction.31
In its return, the CIDG only attached passive certificates issued by its
operating divisions to the effect that Pablo was not being detained by any of III. The petition for the writ of amparo was not defective
them.29 Said certifications were severely inadequate. It is almost needless to
characterize the certifications as non-compliant with the requirement for a In his comment, which the CIDG adopted, Pascua reminds that the Rule on
detailed return. As such, the certifications amounted to a general denial on the Writ of Amparo was partly patterned after the rules on the writ of amparo
the part of the CIDG. The quoted rule requires the verified written return of adopted in Mexico. He posits that it has been an essential requirement in
the CIDG to be accompanied by supporting affidavits. Such affidavits, which Mexico for the petition for the writ of amparo to state where the victim of
could be those of the persons tasked by the CIDG and other agencies like involuntary disappearance was being held. He argues that upon the
the NBI and probably the Land Transportation Office (LTO) to collaborate in recantation by Perez of his sinumpaang salaysay, there was no more
the investigation of the abduction of Pablo, would have specified and evidence from which to determine where Pablo was being held.
described the efforts expended in the search for Pablo, if such search was
really conducted, and would have reported the progress of the investigation The argument of Pascua is unfounded.
of the definite leads given in the Perez's sinumpaang salaysay on the
abduction itself. Section 5 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo lists the matters to be alleged in
the petition for the writ of amparo:
The allegation that the CIDG had continuously searched for Pablo among its
various operating divisions similarly constituted a general denial because the Section 5. Contents of the Petition. - The petition shall be signed and verified
CIDG did not thereby indicate who had conducted the search, and how and shall allege the following:
thoroughly the allegedly continuous searches had been conducted.
(a) The personal circumstance of the petitioner;

(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for S: Inikut-ikot kami sa labas ng Crame mga kalahating oras (3:00- 3:30 nh),
the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the tapos po ay pumasok sa loob ng Crame sa tapat ng CIDG Building, parking
respondent may be described by an assumed appellation; area. Nasa labas lang kami ng CIDG Building nakapark, mga isa't kalahating
oras (3:30-5:00 nh), nasa loob lang ako ng Pajero ni PASCUA. Si PABLO ay
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or kinakausap nila SPO2 ROLANDO PASCUA sa loob ng Sportivo. Pinaalis na
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, po ako mga bandang alas singko (5:00) ng hapon; tumuloy na ako sa upisina
and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant sa Pinyahan. Naiwan po doon si PABLO CAYANAN, Jr., bantay siya ng mga
circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits; dumukot sa kanya, kasama si SP02 ROLANDO PASCUA.
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal 12. T: Paano mo nasabing nasa CIDG Crame kayo?
circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as
well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with the report; S: Madalas po ako doon, makikita po sa labas ng building na may malaking
nakasulat na Criminal Investigation and Detention (sic) Group (CIDG). 32
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible Pascua suggests that the State, or any of its agencies or institutions like the
for the threat, act or omission; and CIDG, cannot be made a respondent in the petition for the writ of amparo. He
probably bases his suggestion on the text of Section 1 of the Rule on the
(f) The relief prayed for. Writ of Amparo, which provides:
The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs. Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to
any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened
As Section 5 shows, there is no requirement for the petition to state the
or of a private individual or entity. (Emphasis supplied)
probable whereabouts of the victim. We have no doubt, however, that Regina
was not aware where Pablo had been kept at the time she filed her petition
for the writ of habeas corpus. The suggestion of Pascua lacks substance. Although Section 1 states that
the violation may be committed by the persons therein listed (i.e., public
official or employee, or a private individual or entity), it does not state that
Nonetheless, the Court clarifies that the application and implementation of
only the listed persons can be made respondents. The rule does not list the
the rule of amparo adopted in Mexico or in any other country could only be
State or its agencies as possible violators simply because the State and its
persuasive at best. Despite its being patterned after the rules on the writ of
agencies may not be presumed to sanction such violations.
amparo of other countries, particularly those in Latin-American, the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo promulgated by the Court should not be wholly dependent
on how those other rules of amparo have operated, or have been In proper circumstances, the State or any of its relevant agencies may be
implemented. Such operation and implementation, if worthy of emulation, are impleaded; otherwise, the rule on the writ of amparo may be rendered
only best practices to be considered and optionally relied upon, if at all. ineffective or toothless. There may be occasions when the remedy of the writ
Circumstances and needs peculiar to our country, which the Court has well of amparo can be made effective only through the State and its agencies.
considered in crafting the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, dictate different This is because the State is vested with the authority and responsibility for
operation and implementation. securing every inhabitant's life, liberty and property. After all, the State
controls the legal, moral and material resources by which to fully enforce the
Constitution and the laws guaranteeing life, liberty and property.
It was actually presumptuous for Pascua to argue that there was no evidence
at all that indicated the whereabouts of Pablo following the abduction. There
was such evidence, and it was substantial. Specifically, Perez's sinumpaang IV. The issuance of the writ of amparo did not impair SPO2 Pascua's
salaysay stated the place where Pablo was detained or was last seen, to wit: right to the presumption of innocence
11. T: Saan kayo dinala ni PABLO? Pascua supposes that the issuance of the writ of amparo issued against him
impaired or diminished his right to the presumption of innocence.1âwphi1

Pascua's supposition entirely misses the point. duly held accountable for it. All those conspiring with him in abducting Pablo
should also be held to account to the full extent of the law. The CIDG and the
The proceedings taken under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo are not akin or NBI should not halt in seeing to this, for they bear the primary responsibility in
similar to those in criminal prosecutions. In the former, the guilt or innocence that respect.
of the respondents is not determined, and no penal sanctions are meted. The
proceedings only endeavor to give the aggrieved parties immediate remedies WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and
against imminent or actual threats to life, liberty or security. The presumption AFFIRMS the resolution rendered on December 13, 2007 by the Regional
of innocence is never an issue. In the latter, the prosecution of the accused Trial Court, Branch 91, in Quezon City in all respects subject to the following
with due process of law is the object of the proceedings. The presumption of MODIFICATIONS of the dispositive portion, as follows:
innocence in favor of the accused is always the starting point. Hence, the
need for the State to adduce proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of Foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows, to
the accused. wit:
V. 1. The Court hereby grants the privilege of the Writ of Amparo;
Reliefs to be granted 2. Ordering respondent CIDG Chief/Director and the Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation to cause the speedy conduct of a thorough
We next consider the reliefs to be granted in addition to the grant of the investigation of the disappearance of Pablo A. Cayanan probably caused by
privilege of the writ of amparo. members of the Philippine National Police then assigned in Camp Crame,
presumably with the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group;
According to Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the court hearing
the petition may grant the privilege of the writ of amparo "and such reliefs as 3. Requiring the full investigation of SPO2 Rolando V. Pascua and other
may be proper and appropriate." This means that the amparo court should persons who took part in the abduction of Pablo A. Cayanan; and, if
enable every act or move to prevent any violation of another person's right to warranted, charging them with the appropriate criminal offense or offenses in
life, liberty and security or to defeat any threat of a violation of such right. the Department of Justice in relation to the abduction of Pablo A. Cayanan;
Under Section 9 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the respondent is 4. The Temporary Protection Order is hereby made permanent;
required to also state in the return the actions that have been or will still be
taken: (a) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party; (b) to recover and 5. And the Granting of the Witness Protection Program availed of by the
preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person petitioner is hereby retained until the finality of the case/cases related
identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or thereto.
persons responsible; (c) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from
them concerning the death or disappearance; (d) to determine the cause, It is so ordered.
manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern
or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance; (e) to
identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or The Court REMANDS the case to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 91, in
disappearance; and (f) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent Quezon City for the implementation of and compliance with this decision with
court. utmost dispatch.
With the records of the hearing sufficiently indicating the personal SO ORDERED.
participation of Pascua in the abduction of Pablo, Pascua ostensibly knew
more than he cared to reveal thus far about the abduction. As a start,
Pascua, as the leader of the abduction, knew the identities of the eight or
nine other abductors. He should be assiduously investigated for his
participation in the abduction, and, if warranted, he should be promptly but

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[1] G.R. No. 204528 February 19, 2013 subsequent case be filed—either criminal or civil.

t case be filed—either criminal or civil. Until the full satisfaction of the

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The Writ of Habeas Data

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Petitioners in the Cullamat Petition claim to be "suing in their capacities as

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