01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.

qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina I

2020
Report on Saipem’s
Remuneration Policy
and Paid Compensation
APPROVED BY THE BOARD
OF DIRECTORS
ON MARCH 12, 2020
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina II

Mission
Our mission is to implement challenging, safe and innovative projects, leveraging on the competence of our
people and on the solidity, multiculturalism and integrity of our organisational model. With the ability to face
and overcome the challenges posed by the evolution of the global scenarios, we must seize the opportunities
to create economic and social value for all our stakeholders.

OUR VALUES
Innovation; health, safety and environment; multiculturalism; passion; integrity.

COUNTRIES IN WHICH SAIPEM OPERATES

EUROPE
Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom
AMERICAS
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Mexico, Peru, United States, Venezuela
CIS
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia
AFRICA
Algeria, Angola, Congo, Egypt, Ghana, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal,
South Africa, Tunisia, Uganda
MIDDLE EAST
Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates
ESTREMO ORIENTE E OCEANIA
Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina 1

2020
Report on Saipem’s
Remuneration Policy
and Paid Compensation
Letter from the Chairman of the Compensation and Nomination Committee 2
Introduction 3
Overview 4
2020 Remuneration Policy 4
2019 Remuneration Report - Results of the vote held at Shareholders’ Meeting 5
Executive summary: Saipem remuneration policies 6

Section I - 2020 Remuneration Policy 12

Governance of the remuneration process 12
Bodies and persons involved 12
Saipem Compensation and Nomination Committee 12
2020 Remuneration Policy approval process 15
Aims and general principles of the Remuneration Policy 15
Purposes 15
General principles 16
2020 Remuneration Policy Guidelines 17
Chairman of the Board of Directors and non-executive Directors 18
Chief Executive Officer-CEO 19
Senior Managers with strategic responsibilities 23

Section II - Compensation and other information 26

Report on compensation paid - 2019 26
Overview 26
Implementation of 2019 remuneration policies 28
Fixed compensation 29
Remuneration for service on Board Committees 29
Variable incentives 29
Benefits 30
Accessory remuneration instruments 30
Compensation paid in 2019 31
Table 1 - Compensation paid to Directors, Statutory Auditors 31
and to Senior Managers with strategic responsibilities
Table 3A - Incentive plans based on financial instruments other than stock options, 33
payable to Directors and Senior Managers with strategic responsibilities
Table 3B - Monetary incentive plans for Directors 34
and other Senior Managers with strategic responsibilities
Shares held 35
Table 4 - Shares held by Directors and other Senior Managers with strategic responsibilities 35
Annex pursuant to Article 84-bis of the Consob Issuers’ Regulation 36
- Implementation for 2019 of the Share-based Variable Long-Term Incentive Plan 2019-2021 (LTI)
Table No. 1 of scheme 7 in Annex 3A of Regulation No. 11971/1999 36

The Report is published in the “Governance” section of Saipem’s website (www.saipem.com)

\1
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina 2

SAIPEM 2020 REPORT ON SAIPEM’S REMUNERATION POLICY AND PAID COMPENSATION

Letter from the Chairman

of the Compensation
and Nomination Committee
Paolo Fumagalli

Dear Shareholders, ≥ the accurate indication of the results achieved and

of the incentives paid, illustrated in the Second
in my capacity as Chairman of the Compensation and Section of the Report so as to provide an effective
Nomination Committee and in the name of its other benchmark to compare performances.
members, Federico Ferro-Luzzi and Paul Schapira, I am
delighted to illustrate this Report on the Policy on The summary description of the contribution of our
Remuneration and Compensation paid - 2020, incentive systems to the company’s strategy and of the
approved by the Board of Directors on March 12, key points of the Policy is designed to substantially
2020. This Report is designed to ensure utmost improve transparency and completeness of information.
transparency to Shareholders and Investors with The 2020 Remuneration Policy of Saipem intends to
regard to the quality of our remuneration systems, pursue the sustainable success of business. The link
highlighting their consistency with the Company’s between short- and long-term performance criteria
business strategy, and to pursue the priority objective and the main strategic guidelines, with respect to both
of value creation for Shareholders and stakeholders in business targets and non-financial targets
the medium-long term whilst also attracting, retaining (Environmental Social & Governance - ESG), is a valid
and motivating highly skilled professional and support to our corporate strategy. The attention paid
managerial resources. to the objectives and metrics of environmental
In 2019, the Shareholders’ Meeting confirmed its sustainability and protection of human resources
appreciation for Saipem’s Remuneration Policy, which proves Saipem’s commitment:
obtained a high percentage of favourable votes, thus ≥ to personal health and safety;
confirming the Compensation and Nomination ≥ to the environment;
Committee’s constant commitment to proposing to ≥ to the enhancement of diversity;
the Board of Directors suitable guidelines for the ≥ to the development of skills.
definition and adoption of remuneration policies that
are in line both with national and international best This attention is confirmed by the increased weight
practices and benchmarks, which continue to be used given to these indicators in the 2020 Company
to assess the adequacy of remunerations, and with all objectives for the purposes of the incentive paid to the
our stakeholders’ expectations. Chief Executive Officer-CEO and management. The key
role of Saipem’s commitment in the development of
The key new elements of the 2020 Policy are: new technologies for emerging markets and in
≥ the review of the Variable Short-Term Incentive Plan renewable energy sources, as well as in the reduction of
(STI) for all managerial resources, whose emissions, also through energy efficiency initiatives, is
implementation will be submitted for approval to the proven by the issue of four-year plans that outline the
Shareholders’ Meeting on April 29, 2020. The Plan company’s vision on the efficiency of its activities and
establishes a different incentive percentage in case the ensuing reduction of emissions. Staff safety is a
of over-achievement and introduces a share-based priority and strategic objective for Saipem and is
bonus, subject to a three-year deferral, with the aim constantly monitored, controlled and guaranteed
of rewarding retention and spreading a corporate through an integrated health, safety and environment
culture that gives value to the involvement and management system (HSE).
participation of management in value creation for all This Report also incorporates the additional changes
stakeholders; brought to Article 123-ter of the Consolidated Law on
≥ the introduction of a multiplier to be applied to the Finance by Italian Legislative Decree May 10, 2019, No.
individual performance score in case of particularly 49.
important business developing initiatives, not
included in the Strategic Plan but which are Hoping that these improvements will be appreciated
functional to pursue strategic objectives, identified and that the decisions taken will be positively met and
according to the relevance standard. understood, I wish to thank you, also in the name of the
other members of the Committee, for your approval of
When drafting the document, special attention was the Remuneration Policy suggested for 2020.
paid to the following points in order to pursue an
increasingly clear and comprehensive description of March 12, 2020
the pillars of our remuneration policy:
≥ a transparent and immediate representation of The Chairman of the Compensation
information about the relevant scenario in a detailed and Nomination Committee
Executive Summary;
≥ the alignment of variable incentive systems with the
company’s strategies;

\2
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:27 Pagina 3

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

This Report on Saipem’s Policy on Remuneration and market and investors with an easy-to-read framework
Compensation paid (hereinafter, the “Report”), was for understanding the key elements of the 2020 Policy.
approved by the Board of Directors on March 12, Lastly, the Report also shows, in Section II, the shares
2020, at the proposal of the Compensation and held in the company by the Directors, Statutory
Nomination Committee, whose members are all Auditors and by Senior Managers with strategic
non-executive, independent Directors, and has been responsibilities and contains information regarding the
prepared and defined in accordance with current implementation in 2019 of the 2019-2021 Variable
statutory and regulatory obligations: Article 123-ter of Share-based Long-Term Incentive Plan, in accordance
Italian Legislative Decree No. 58 of February 24, 1998, with provisions in current regulations3.
implemented in the Consolidated Law on Finance; The Report shall be submitted to the Borsa Italiana and
Article 84-quater of the Consob Issuers’ Regulation shall be made available to the public at the Company’s
(Resolution No. 11971 of May 14, 1999 as amended) registered office and posted on Saipem’s website, in
and its Annex 3A, schemes 7-bis and 7-ter; and the “Governance” section, twenty-one days before the
according to the recommendations contained in the Shareholders’ Meeting called to approve the 2019
Corporate Governance Code of listed companies financial statements and to approve Section I of the
promoted by Borsa Italiana (hereinafter “Governance same Report and to pass a non-binding resolution in
Code”), in its last version approved in July 2018 favour or against Section II of the Report, in
endorsed by Saipem1. In keeping with the guidelines accordance with applicable legislation4.
set out in the company’s Strategic Plan, the Information related to financial instrument-based
Remuneration Policy promotes alignment of the compensation plans currently in force is available in
priority objective of value creation for the shareholders the “Governance” section of Saipem’s website5.
in the medium-long term with the interests of This Report, in compliance with current legislative and
management. regulatory obligations6, has been prepared by
This 2020 Report on Saipem’s Remuneration Policy considering analyses and further details regarding the
and Paid Compensation defines and illustrates: results of the Shareholders’ Meeting vote, and the
≥ in Section I, the Policy adopted by Saipem SpA feedback received from the shareholders and the main
(“Saipem” or the “Company”) for 2020 for the Proxy Advisors on the Saipem 2019 Report, their 2020
remuneration of Company Directors, Statutory Policy indications, as well as the results of the
Auditors and Senior Managers with strategic engagement activities with the Proxy Advisors and the
responsibilities2, specifying the general aims market practices of the main listed companies.
pursued, the bodies involved and the procedures In particular, the following points have been
applied for the adoption and implementation of the considered:
Policy. The general principles and the Guidelines ≥ the enhance disclosure of the results achieved;
defined in the first section of this Report also apply ≥ to give greater importance to ESG issues,
to the determination of the compensation policies of introducing further performance criteria within
Saipem’s direct or indirect subsidiaries; incentive systems.
≥ in Section II, the compensation paid in 2019 to the
Directors (with executive and non-executive duties), On March 12, 2020, the Board of Directors of Saipem
Statutory Auditors and Senior Managers with resolved to submit: (i) the Section I of the Report on the
strategic responsibilities of Saipem. Remuneration Policy - 2020 to the binding vote of the
Shareholders’ Meeting; and (ii) the Section II on
The two sections of the Report are both preceded by a compensation paid in 2019 to its consultative vote.
summary of the main information in order to supply the

(1) For further information on the conditions of Saipem’s endorsement of the Governance Code, please refer to the “Governance” section of
Saipem’s website (http://www.saipem.com) and to the “Corporate Governance and Shareholding Structure Report - 2019”.
(2) The term “Senior Managers with strategic responsibilities”, as defined in Article 65, paragraph 1-quater of the Consob Issuers’ Regulation,
refers to persons with direct or indirect planning, coordination and control responsibilities. Saipem Senior Managers with strategic responsibilities,
other than Directors and Statutory Auditors, are those who sit on the Advisory Committee and, in any case, all direct reports of the Chief Executive
Officer-CEO/the Chairman/the Board of Directors of Saipem SpA.
(3) Article 114-bis of the Consolidated Law on Finance and Article 84-bis of the Consob Issuers’ Regulation.
(4) Directive EU 2017/828 and Article 123-ter of Italian Legislative Decree No. 58/1998, paragraph 6, amended by Italian Legislative Decree No.
49/2019.
(5) At: http://www.saipem.com/sites/SAIPEM_it_IT/area/GOVERNANCE-saipem-governance.page.
(6) Article 123-ter of Italian Legislative Decree No. 58/1998 and Article 84-quater of the Consob Issuers’ Regulation (No. 11971 and subsequent
amendments and additions).

\3
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina 4

SAIPEM 2020 REPORT ON SAIPEM’S REMUNERATION POLICY AND PAID COMPENSATION

Overview

2020 Remuneration Policy supporting the development of clean energy

technologies and promoting the implementation of
The Saipem Remuneration Policy is designed: (i) to policies with a low environmental impact, examined by
attract, motivate and retain highly skilled professional the Board of Directors and resulting in the so-called
and managerial resources; (ii) to incentivise the “Dynamic Transition”, and increasing the incidence of
achievement of strategic targets and the company’s sustainability criteria in the short-term incentive system.
sustainable growth; (iii) to promote alignment of the The 2020 Remuneration Policy, illustrated in detail in
interests of management with the priority objective of Section I of this Report, prescribes the following:
value creation for the shareholders in the medium-long ≥ for non-executive Directors, the 2020 Remuneration
term; (iv) to promote the company’s mission and values. Policy Guidelines reflect the decisions resolved by the
The 2020 Remuneration Policy includes, as the key new Shareholders’ Meeting on May 3, 2018 and do not
element compared to 2019, the review of the Variable imply changes to the Policy approved in the previous
Short-Term Incentive Plan, designed to incentivise the year;
achievement of annual targets, increasing the focus on ≥ for the Chairman, the 2020 Remuneration Policy
overperformances and introducing a mechanism for the Guidelines envisage the maintenance of the
deferral of part of the bonus converted into shares, that compensation approved by the Board of Directors on
incentivises and rewards the multi-year retention of June 28, 2018;
management, making the latter become shareholders of ≥ for non-executive Directors who are called upon to sit
the company and thus be more aligned with the on the internal Board Committees, the 2020
interests and expectations of investors. Remuneration Policy Guidelines reflect the decisions
In addition, given that Saipem attributes importance, resolved by the Board of Directors on June 28, 2018,
within the time frame of the Strategic Plan, to the and on July 24, 2018, in addition to a supplementary
execution of operations intended to increase the value compensation to be awarded to the most senior
of the Company and its assets, a multiplier is introduced independent Director called upon to complete the
to be applied to the points achieved on the performance Audit and Risk Committee with regard to the
sheet, provided at least 100 points are achieved on the operations with associated parties, amounting to one-
70-130 performance scale, in case of operations or third of the annual remuneration contemplated for
opportunities not included in the Strategic Plan but each member of the Audit and Risk Committee,
which are functional to pursue the priority objective of without providing for any redefinition of compensation;
value creation for the shareholders, identified according ≥ for Statutory Auditors whose office expires on the day
to the relevance standard, without prejudice to the of the Shareholders’ Meeting called to approve the
maximum limit of 130 points. The introduction of this financial statements as at December 31, 2019, the
element is designed to orient management toward 2020 Guidelines reflect the resolutions passed by the
operations that can increase the value for shareholders Shareholders’ Meeting on April 28, 2017 and thus do
and investors, reward extraordinary commitment and not imply changes to the Policy approved in the
favour the motivation and retention of resources with a previous year;
significant impact on the success of these operations. ≥ for Statutory Auditors who will come into office, their
The Remuneration Policy contributes to the company’s compensation will be set by the Shareholders’
strategy and to the pursuit of long-term interests in Meeting on April 29, 2020;
order to ensure alignment between management and ≥ for the Chief Executive Officer-CEO, the 2020
shareholders. Remuneration Policy Guidelines provide for the
Specifically, incentive plans are developed over a multi- preservation of the fixed remuneration determined by
year time frame through the deferral of short-term the Board of Directors on June 28, 2018, the review of
systems and the presence of a significant number of the maximum short-term incentive percentage with
long-term incentive plans. the aim of rewarding overperformance, consistent
In defining its remuneration policy, Saipem pays with the proposal to review the Short-Term Incentive
attention to given issues that are complementary to the system envisaged for all managerial resources7, and
fixed economic-monetary and variable component, for the introduction of a multiplier to be applied to the
through benefits in kind, mainly of a health and social points achieved on the individual performance sheet,
security nature. provided at least 100 points are achieved on the
70-130 performance scale, in case of operations or
The 2020 Remuneration Policy pays special attention to opportunities not included in the strategic plan but
ESG (Environmental, Social & Governance) objectives which are functional to pursue key objectives,
and, in particular, to the strengthening of climate policies identified according to the relevance standard, without
in accordance with objectives and ambitions defined in prejudice to the maximum limit of 130 points.
the light of the potential energy scenarios and their The 2019-2021 Variable Long-Term Incentive Plan,
implications for the sector which Saipem works in, approved by the Shareholders’ Meeting on April 30,

(7) Subject to its approval by the shareholders at the Meeting convened to approve the financial statements relative to the business year ending
December 31, 2019.

\4
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina 5

OVERVIEW

2019 is also to be applied, as for all managerial regulation of implementation). For further information
resources; on the characteristics of the Plan please refer to the
≥ for Senior Managers with strategic responsibilities, the section “Variable Long-Term Incentives” of this
2020 Guidelines establish the same remuneration Report. Just like for the Chief Executive Officer-CEO, a
instruments defined in 2019, in addition to the multiplier is also introduced to be applied to the points
Variable Short-Term Incentive Plan for 2021-2023 achieved on the individual performance sheet,
relating to the 2020-2022 performance periods for all provided at least 100 points are achieved on the
managerial resources8, and provide for the 70-130 performance scale, in case of operations or
introduction of a review of the maximum incentive opportunities not included in the Strategic Plan but
percentage with the aim of rewarding which are functional to pursue the priority objective of
overperformance, and a mechanism for the deferral of value creation for the shareholders, identified
the share-based bonus that incentivises and rewards according to the relevance standard, without
the multi-year retention of management. For senior prejudice to the maximum limit of 130 points.
managers who achieve the annual performance The table on the following page (“Executive Summary:
targets with at least 100 points on the 70-130 2020 Saipem Remuneration Policy”) shows the main
performance scale and are beneficiaries of the elements of the 2020 Guidelines approved for the
short-term incentive, the Plan establishes the remuneration of the Chief Executive Officer-CEO, as
allocation of an additional bonus, calculated as a well as of Senior Managers with strategic
percentage of their fixed remuneration, deferred for responsibilities (SMSR).
three years. The portion of the incentive varies on the
basis of the individual performance score achieved
annually and is equal to the target value, i.e. where 2019 Remuneration Report
performance is equal to 100 points, of no more than - Results of the vote held
15% of the fixed remuneration, and to the maximum at Shareholders’ Meeting
value, i.e. where performance is equal to 130 points, of
22.5% of the fixed remuneration. The additional bonus The Shareholders’ Meeting of April 30, 2019, in
is converted into Saipem shares to be assigned at the accordance with current legislation (Article 123-ter,
end of the deferral period to those beneficiaries who paragraph 6 of Italian Legislative Decree No. 58/1998),
are still working with the Company. The Plan will be voted on Section I of the 2019 Remuneration Report,
submitted for approval to the shareholders at the with 98% of the votes in favour.
Meeting convened to approve the financial In 2019, the percentage of votes in favour was equal to
statements relative to the business year ending 98% of the total number of voters, and to 94.69% of the
December 31, 2019. The conditions of the Plan are sole institutional investors, with a total average approval
therefore described in detail in the informative rate of roughly 97.90% in the last four years.
document made available to the public on the In order to constantly monitor market developments,
company’s website (www.saipem.com), implementing after the Shareholders’ Meeting Saipem examined the
the current legislation (Article 114-bis of Italian results of that meeting and the feedback received from
Legislative Decree No. 58/1998 and the Consob investors and Proxy Advisors.

RESULTS OF VOTE HELD AT SHAREHOLDERS’ MEETING

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

 97.95%  96.36%  98.60%  98.25%  96.77%  98%

IN FAVOUR

1.35% 0.94% 1.20% 1.55% 2.47% 2%

AGAINST

 0.70%  2.70%  0.20%  0.20% 0.76% 0%

ABSTENTIONS

(8) Subject to its approval by the shareholders at the Meeting convened to approve the financial statements relative to the business year ending
December 31, 2019.

\5
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina 6

SAIPEM 2020 REPORT ON SAIPEM’S REMUNERATION POLICY AND PAID COMPENSATION

Executive summary: 2020 Saipem remuneration policies

VALUES AND MISSION
Principle Description

Our Values: The values and responsibilities that Saipem acknowledges, accepts, endorses and assumes,
≥ To free creative talent building a better future for all, are described in the Code of Ethics approved by the Board of
≥ To take care of people and of the Directors on March 19, 2019.
planet
≥ To build trust in relationships All Saipem People, with no distinctions or exceptions, make sure that their actions and
≥ To give value to different cultural conduct are in accordance with the principles and content of the Code of Ethics.
identities. Relationships among Saipem People, at all levels, shall be characterised by honesty,
fairness, cooperation, loyalty and mutual respect.

Saipem is committed to developing the abilities and skills of management and employees, so
that their energy and creativity can have full expression for the fulfilment of their potential,
and to protecting working conditions as regards both mental and physical health of the
workforce and their dignity. Saipem undertakes to offer, in full compliance with applicable
legal and contractual provisions, equal opportunities to all its employees, making sure that
each of them receives fair statutory and wage treatment exclusively based only on merit
and expertise, without discrimination of any kind.

GOVERNANCE OF THE COMPENSATION PROCESS

Principle Description

The key bodies involved are: The Compensation and Nomination Committee defines the structure and content of the
≥ Shareholders’ Meeting Policy on the remuneration of Directors, the Chief Executive Officer and Senior Managers
≥ Board of Directors with strategic responsibilities regarding the various forms of compensation and pay, as well
≥ Compensation and Nomination as the general criteria for the short- and long-term incentive plans, including any
Committee. share-based plans.
The Compensation and Nomination Committee submits the Policy to the Board of Directors
which approves its content for the presentation to the Shareholders’ Meeting convened to
approve the annual financial statements. When establishing the remuneration of the Chief
Executive Officer-CEO and of Directors assigned with special functions, the Board consults
with the Board of Statutory Auditors.
Where necessary, the Committee may be supported by independent experts in the field.
The Board of Directors, once the Policy has been examined and approved, submits it to the
binding vote of the Shareholders’ Meeting.

Independent
Human Resources experts

Compensation Board Shareholders’

and Nomination of Directors Meeting
Committee

Definition of the structure Analysis and approval Binding vote on the

Ref. page 12 of this Report and contents of the of the Remuneration Policy Remuneration Policy
Remuneration Policy

\6
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina 7

OVERVIEW

OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE REMUNERATION POLICY

Principle Description

To ensure fair remuneration, suited The Saipem Remuneration Policy is defined in accordance with the governance model
to the role and responsibilities adopted by the Company and the recommendations included in the Corporate Governance
assigned, in accordance with the Code, with the aim of attracting and retaining highly skilled professional and managerial
principles of diversity, equal resources, incentivising the achievement of strategic targets and the sustainable growth of
opportunities, the maximisation and the company, and aligning the interests of management with the priority objective of value
leveraging of knowledge and skills creation for the shareholders in the medium-long term, as well as promoting the company’s
of personnel, fairness, and mission and values.
non-discrimination, and with the
provisions of laws, regulations and
company regulations and
consistent with market references
and performance results.

Ref. page 15 of this Report

KEY CHANGES COMPARED TO 2019

Principle Description

New Short-Term The 2020 Remuneration Policy introduces the following main changes to the 2019 Policy:
Incentive Plan ≥ The review of the Variable Short-Term Incentive Plan, focusing on overperformance and
introducing a mechanism for the deferral of part of the bonus converted in shares.
Higher weight
of Environmental, Social ≥ Attention for ESG indicators, weighting 25% in the Saipem Form 2020.
& Governance indicators ≥ The introduction of a multiplier to be applied to the points achieved on the individual
performance sheet, provided at least 100 points are achieved on the 70-130 performance
Multiplier for operations scale, in case of operations or opportunities not included in the Strategic Plan but which
or opportunities are functional to pursue the priority objective of value creation for the shareholders,
of Business development identified according to the relevance standard, without prejudice to the maximum limit of
not included in the Strategic Plan 130 points.
New Executive Summary ≥ The introduction of a new Executive Summary, which gives a more detailed and immediate
indication of the key elements of Section I of this Report.
New overview (Section II) ≥ The introduction of a new overview that introduces and summarises the main content of
Section II of this Report.
Enhanced disclosure of results ≥ Enhanced disclosure on achieved results, shown for the year of accrual of the
Procedural conditions corresponding rights.
in case of derogations ≥ The definition of the procedural conditions to be adopted in case of exceptional
from Remuneration Policy circumstances that require a temporary derogation from given elements of the
remuneration policy.

LINK BETWEEN RESULTS AND REMUNERATION

Principle Description

The variable remuneration of The objectives related to the variable remuneration are predetermined, measurable and
executive roles strongly influencing complementary to each other, in order to represent the priorities for the overall
Company results is characterised performance of the Company and divisions, in line with the Strategic Plan and with the
by a significant incidence of expectations of shareholders and stakeholders, promoting a strong results-based
long-term incentive components, orientation.
through an adequate differentiation
of incentives in a time frame of at The incentives linked with variable compensation are paid following a scrupulous process of
least three years, in accordance checking results actually achieved, assessing performance targets assigned net of the
with the medium- and long-term effects of exogenous variables, with a view to maximising the actual company performance
nature of the business pursued. arising from management action.

\7
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina 8

SAIPEM 2020 REPORT ON SAIPEM’S REMUNERATION POLICY AND PAID COMPENSATION

Executive summary: 2020 Saipem remuneration policies

ELEMENTS OF THE REMUNERATION PACKAGE
Principle Description

The 2020 Remuneration Policy

Guidelines set pay-mixes coherent PAY-MIX CEO
with managerial roles, with a
greater weight given to the variable
component (in particular the
long-term component) for positions
26% 23%
that have a greater influence on 32%
company results, as shown in the 39%
46%
reported pay-mix chart, which was 51%
calculated considering the 23% 31%
monetisation of short and 29%
long-term incentives in the
hypothesis of both minimum and Minimum 2020 Target 2020 Maximum 2020 Fixed
maximum results. Remuneration
PAY-MIX SENIOR MANAGERS WITH STRATEGIC RESPONSIBILITIES
STI Short-Term
Incentive

20% LTI Long-Term

34% Incentive
33%
44% 41%
13%
67%
22% 26%

Minimum 2020 Target 2020 Maximum 2020

FIXED COMPONENT
Principle Description

Values skills, experience and the The fixed remuneration may be adjusted periodically in the framework of the annual salary
contribution demanded by the role review process which is carried out for all managers, after verifying remuneration
assigned. positioning using benchmarks in line with the characteristics of Saipem and of the roles
assigned. This verification is carried out by using a system structured around pay ranges.
The Saipem Remuneration Policy uses merit matrices to make pay rises conditional upon the
analysis of the positioning of resources in terms of internal remuneration equity and having
regard to the relevant market, as well as to the assessment of individual merit and skills.

A fixed remuneration of €1,045,000 a year is established for the Chief Executive Office-CEO.
For SMSR, remuneration is determined on the basis of the role assigned, with possible
adjustments in relation to annual reviews of competitive positioning. Annual adjustments are
Ref. pages 19 and 23 of this Report envisaged as part of the annual salary review.

VARIABLE COMPONENT
Principle Description

The remuneration structure for the The short- and long-term incentive systems are linked to the attainment of a series of
Chief Executive Officer-CEO and for financial/profit, business development, operating and individual targets set with a view to
the Senior Managers with strategic achieving sustainable medium-long term growth in line with the Company’s Strategic Plan
responsibilities is a balanced mix of and with the responsibilities assigned.
a fixed component commensurate Please find below the incentive percentages set out in the variable incentive systems for the
with the powers and/or Chief Executive Officer-CEO:
responsibilities assigned and a
variable component with a
maximum limit designed to link VARIABLE INCENTIVE SYSTEMS 2020 - CEO
remuneration to targets that are
actually achieved.
Min Target Max
STI - Short-Term Incentive 45% 90% 135%

LTI - Long-Term Incentive 40% 100% 160%

\8
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina 9

OVERVIEW

VARIABLE SHORT-TERM INCENTIVE SYSTEM (STI)

Principle Description

The variable short-term component The Short-Term Incentive Plan establishes the payment of a monetary incentive upon
promotes the attainment of annual attainment of performance targets established for the previous year.
budget targets. 2020 CEO objectives:
All managerial resources are ≥ Adjusted Free Cash Flow (35% weight)
included in the Plan. ≥ Adjusted EBITDA (30% weight)
≥ ESG indicators (HSE, Diversity Opportunity, Technological Innovation and Risk
Management) (25% weight)
≥ New contracts (10% weight).
SMSR targets: broken down on the basis of objectives assigned to top management, in
relation to the area of responsibility for the role covered.
Incentives paid based on the results achieved in the previous year and evaluated on a
performance scale of 70÷130 points with minimum threshold to receive the incentive set at
70 points for performance.
The incentive is paid in the year when the annual objectives of the previous year are
conclusively established, based on the level of their attainment.
% incentive for CEO at target value: 90%; Max: 135%
% max incentive for SMSR at target value: 45%; Max: 67.5%

INCENTIVE CURVE

Max. 150%
140%

120%
% incentive

100%
Target 100%
80%

60%
Min. 50%
40%

20%
70% 100% 130%

performance

For managerial resources (excluding the CEO), an additional share-based component is

included in the Variable Short Term Incentive Plan for the 2021-2023 three-year period related
to the 2020-2022 performance years. In particular, for senior managers who achieve the
annual performance targets with at least 100 points on the 70-130 performance scale and are
beneficiaries of the short-term incentive, the Plan establishes the allocation of an additional
bonus, calculated as a percentage of their fixed remuneration, deferred for three years.
The portion of the incentive varies on the basis of the individual performance score achieved
annually and is equal to the target value, i.e. where performance is equal to 100 points, of no
more than 15% of the fixed remuneration, and to the maximum value, i.e. where performance is
equal to 130 points, of 22.5% of the fixed remuneration. The additional bonus is converted into
Saipem shares to be assigned at the end of the deferral period to those beneficiaries who are
still working with the Company. The Plan will be submitted for approval to the shareholders at
the Meeting convened to approve the financial statements relative to the business year ending
December 31, 2019.
For the Chief Executive Officer-CEO and Senior Managers with strategic responsibilities
(SMSR), a multiplier is also introduced to be applied to the points achieved on the individual
performance sheet, provided at least 100 points are achieved on the 70-130 performance
scale, equal to 1.2 with a maximum limit of 130 points on the performance sheet, in case of
operations or opportunities not included in the Strategic Plan but which are functional to pursue
the priority objective of value creation for the shareholders, identified according to the
relevance standard, without prejudice to the maximum limit of 130 points. Application of the
multiplier will be set by the Board of Directors at the proposal of the Compensation and
Nomination Committee. The additional portion of the bonus deriving from the application, if any,
of the multiplier is subject to a 3-year deferral period and to an additional performance
condition that allows for the +/-50% adjustment of the deferred amount, identified by the
average performance on the Saipem sheet in the three-year deferral period. If average
performance in the three-year period is below 70 points, the deferred incentive is not paid.
The introduction of this element is designed to orient management toward operations that can
increase the value for shareholders and investors, reward extraordinary commitment and
favour the motivation and motivation of resources with a significant impact on the success of
Ref. pages 19 and 23 of this Report these operations.

\9
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina 10

SAIPEM 2020 REPORT ON SAIPEM’S REMUNERATION POLICY AND PAID COMPENSATION

Executive summary: 2020 Saipem remuneration policies

VARIABLE LONG-TERM INCENTIVE SYSTEM (LTI)
Principle Description

The variable long-term component Free assignment of ordinary shares of Saipem SpA, differentiated by role on reaching the
fosters the alignment of the following performance conditions, measured at the end of the relevant three-year period:
shareholders’ interests with the Three-year Vesting + Co-investment of 2 years for the Chief Executive Officer-CEO.
management goals and the Three-year Vesting + Retention Premium of 2 years for strategic resources.
sustainability of value creation in
the long term. LTI
All managerial resources are
included in the Plan.
35% 15% 25% 25%
Total Total Adjusted Adjusted ROAIC
Shareholder Shareholder Net (Return on
Return - E&C Return - Drilling Financial Average Invested
Peer Group Peer Group Position Capital)

For the Chief Executive Officer-CEO, the incentive levels are equal to a target value of 100%
of the fixed remuneration and a maximum value of 160% of the fixed remuneration.
In addition to a further 25% of matured shares at the end of the Co-investment period.
For SMSR, the incentive levels are differentiated by role, up to a maximum target value of
65% of the fixed remuneration and a maximum value of 104% of the fixed remuneration.
In addition to a further 25% of matured shares at the end of the Retention Premium period.
The maximum value at the end of the vesting period shall not exceed four times the value of
the shares at the moment they are assigned.
The shares will be allocated annually. The vesting period is three years. The Retention
Ref. pages 20 and 23 of this Report Premium/Co-investment period lasts two years after the vesting period.

BENEFITS
Principle Description

These supplement the compensation ≥ Supplementary social security

package in a logic of total reward ≥ Supplementary healthcare fund
through benefits in kind, mainly of a ≥ Death and disability insurance coverage
health and social security nature. ≥ Company car for business and personal use.
Recipients: all managerial The CEO is also entitled to repayment of Rome-Milan travel expenses once a week if made.
resources. Assignment of a car for business and personal use, subject to periodical review in case of
redefinition of the role assigned.

Ref. pages 22 and 25 of this Report

\ 10
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina 11

OVERVIEW

SUPPLEMENTARY INDEMNITIES
Principle Description

Termination indemnities to protect CEO: all-inclusive indemnity in case of advance termination of the current mandate, except in
the company also from potential case of dismissal for just cause and in case of resignation caused by demotion and change of
competition risks. control, equal to €1,800,000. Non-competition agreement equal to €1,200,000 for the initial
Instruments for the retention and 12 months of duration of the agreement and €600,000 for the six months thereafter.
protection of the Group’s SMSR: termination indemnities (established by the national collective contract and internal
know-how. policies): agreed upon consensual termination of employment; Severance Payment up to a
maximum of two years’ fixed remuneration for a Change of Control resulting in resignation
or termination and/or demotion. Non-competition agreements: activated upon termination of
the employment relationship (12 months salary for each year of the agreement).
Minimum Term Agreements to protect know-how (12 months salary for each year of the
agreement).
These instruments may be implemented during the course of employment or upon
Ref. pages 22 and 24 of this Report termination of employment.

CLAWBACK MECHANISM
Principle Description

Adoption, through a specific The incentives are subject to a clawback regulation that allows for the return of variable
Regulation approved by the Board of components of remuneration in cases of manifestly incorrect or maliciously altered data
Directors, on the proposal of the and violation of laws and regulations, the Code of Ethics or industry regulations.
Compensation and Nomination
Committee, of clawback
mechanisms.

Ref. page 17 of this Report

COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW

Principle Description

The Report on Saipem’s In particular:

Remuneration Policy and Paid ≥ EU Directive 2017/828
Compensation has been prepared ≥ Article 123-ter of Italian Legislative Decree No. 58 of February 24, 1998, implemented in
and defined in accordance with the Consolidated Law on Finance amended by Italian Legislative Decree No. 49/2019
current statutory and regulatory ≥ Article 84-quater of the Consob Issuers’ Regulation (Resolution No. 11971 of May 14, 1999
obligations and with the as amended) and its Annex 3A, schemes 7-bis and 7-ter.
recommendations contained in the
Corporate Governance Code of
listed companies promoted by
Borsa Italiana.

\ 11
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina 12

SAIPEM 2020 REPORT ON SAIPEM’S REMUNERATION POLICY AND PAID COMPENSATION

Section I - 2020 Remuneration Policy

Governance of the remuneration company regulations and the Saipem Governance

process model, which defines the bodies and persons involved
as the following: Shareholders Meeting, Board of
Bodies and persons involved Directors and Compensation and Nomination
Committee.
The Remuneration Policy for the Saipem Board of
Directors is defined in accordance with legislation and

BODIES AND PERSONS INVOLVED

BODY ROLE AND RELEVANT ACTIVITIES

Establishes the compensation of the members of the Board of Directors when they
Shareholders’ Meeting
are appointed and for the whole of their term of office.

1. Establishes the remuneration of Directors assigned with special functions

(Chairman and Chief Executive Officer-CEO) and for service on Board Committees,
having consulted the Statutory Auditors.
2. Defines performance targets and the approval of results for performance plans
used to establish the variable remuneration of the Chief Executive Officer-CEO.
Board of Directors 3. Approves the general criteria for the remuneration of Senior Managers with strate-
gic responsibilities.
4. Defines the remuneration of the Internal Audit Manager in accordance with the
company's Remuneration policy and having consulted the Audit and Risk Commit-
tee and the Board of Statutory Auditors.

Compensation and Provides support to the Board of Directors by proposing and consulting on issues
Nomination Committee regarding compensation issues.

Saipem Compensation
and Nomination Committee COMPENSATION AND NOMINATION COMMITTEE

Composition, appointment and powers NAME ROLE

The Compensation Committee, which as of February
13, 2012, was renamed the “Compensation and
Nomination Committee”, was established by the Board
Paolo Fumagalli Chairman
of Directors in 1999. Committee membership and
appointments, its tasks and its operating procedures
are regulated by a specific set of rules, which were
Federico Ferro-Luzzi Member
approved by the Board of Directors and published on
the Company website.
In accordance with the applicable legislation and the
Paul Schapira Member
recommendations set out in the new version of the
Corporate Governance Code, of three non-executive,
independent Directors. In line with the Corporate 13 meetings in 2019, average length: 2 hour and 19 minutes.
Governance Code (Article 6, paragraph 3), the Average attendance rate: 100%.
Regulation also establishes that at least one member
of the Committee has adequate knowledge and
experience on financial and compensation matters, as
evaluated by the Board at the time of appointment.
The Committee, as of May 3, 2018, has the following
non-executive and independent Directors: Paolo

\ 12
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina 13

SECTION I - 2020 REMUNERATION POLICY

Fumagalli as Chairman; Federico Ferro-Luzzi and Paul Board of Directors, at least twice yearly, and at any
Schapira. rate no later than the term for approval of the
The Corporate Human Resources manager or, financial statements and the half-yearly report.
alternatively, the People Development, Recruitment ≥ through the Committee Chairman or another
and Compensation manager, performs the role of member designated by same, reports on the working
Committee Secretary. procedures of its functions to the Shareholders’
Meeting convened to approve the annual financial
Role of the Committee statements;
The Committee acts in a proposal and advisory role to ≥ on the proposal of the Chief Executive Officer-CEO,
the Board of Directors in line with the examines and evaluates the criteria governing the
recommendations contained in the Corporate succession plan for Senior Managers with strategic
Governance Code (Article 6, paragraph 4 and Article 6, responsibility of the Company.
paragraph 5):
≥ submits for approval to the Board of Directors the Methods of implementation
Report on the Policy on Remuneration and The Committee meets as often as necessary to
Compensation paid and, in particular, the Policy for perform its duties, normally on the dates scheduled on
the remuneration of Directors and Senior Managers the yearly calendar of meetings approved by the
with strategic responsibilities, for its presentation to Committee itself and is quorate when at least the
the Shareholders’ Meeting convened to approve the majority of its members in office are present and
annual financial statements, within the deadlines decides with the absolute majority of those in
established by law, called to approve Section I of the attendance. The Chairman of the Committee convenes
Report and to pass a non-binding resolution in and presides over the meetings.
favour or against Section II of the same Report; To fulfil its duties, the Committee has the right to
≥ makes proposals regarding the various forms of access the necessary Company information and
compensation and pay of the Chairman and departments and to avail of external advisors who do
Executive Directors; not find themselves in situations that could
≥ makes proposals regarding the compensation of the compromise the impartiality of their opinion, within the
Directors appointed to the Committees formed by limits of the budget approved by the Board of
the Board; Directors. On a yearly basis, the Committee drafts a
≥ proposes, after examining the information provided budget that it submits to the Board of Directors for
by the Chief Executive Officer-CEO, the general approval.
criteria for the remuneration of Senior Managers with The Chairman of the Board of Statutory Auditors, or a
strategic responsibilities, the short- and long-term Statutory Auditor designated by the Chairman, may
incentive plans, including any share-based plans; attend Committee meetings. Furthermore, other
≥ proposes general criteria for the definition of the Statutory Auditors may also participate when the
performance objectives and the approval of results Board is dealing with matters for which the Board of
of performance plans used to establish the variable Directors is obliged in its resolution to take account of
remuneration of Directors vested with the opinion of the Board of Statutory Auditors. At the
executive/special powers, taking into account the invitation of the Committee Chairman, other parties
indications provided in this regard by the Chief may attend the meetings to provide information and
Executive Officer-CEO; make assessments within their field of competence in
≥ monitors the implementation of resolutions taken by relation to individual agenda items. No Director can
the Board; take part in Committee meetings where proposals are
≥ periodically checking the adequacy, the overall being made to the Board of Directors concerning
consistency and the implementation of the Policy his/her remuneration.
adopted and formulating proposals in this regard;
≥ suggests candidates for the role of Director to the Annual activities of the Compensation
Board if during the course of the financial year one or and Nomination Committee
more Directorships become vacant (Article 2386, The Compensation and Nomination Committee carries
paragraph 1 of the Italian Civil Code), ensuring out its activities according to an annual programme
compliance with the regulations on the minimum which consists of the following phases:
number of independent Directors and on the quotas ≥ periodically checking the adequacy, the overall
reserved for the least represented gender; consistency and the implementation of the Policy
≥ provides input for the Board regarding the adopted in the previous year in relation to the results
appointment of Senior Managers and of the achieved and the compensation/ benchmarks
members of the Company’s bodies whose supplied by specialised providers;
appointment is the responsibility of the Board; ≥ definition of Policy proposals for the following year
≥ reports to the Board on the tasks performed, at the and of proposals regarding the performance targets
board meeting indicated by the Chairman of the connected with short and long-term incentive plans;

\ 13
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina 14

SAIPEM 2020 REPORT ON SAIPEM’S REMUNERATION POLICY AND PAID COMPENSATION

ANNUAL ACTIVITIES OF THE COMPENSATION AND NOMINATION COMMITTEE

OCTOBER – DECEMBER JANUARY - MARCH

• Implementation • Periodic evaluation of the Policies
of Long-Term Incentive adopted in the previous year
Plan (LTI) • Definition of the Remuneration Policy
OCTOBER – DECEMBER JANUARY - MARCH
• Analysis of results and definition
of objectives for variable incentive
plans
• Preparation of the Report on the
Policy on Remuneration and
Compensation paid

JULY - SEPTEMBER APRIL - JUNE APRIL - JUNE

• Presentation of the Remuneration
JULY - SEPTEMBER Report to the Shareholders’ Meeting
• Analysis of results of voting
• Implementation of the Annual
on the Remuneration Policy
Variable Incentive Plan (STI)
at Shareholders’ Meetings

≥ definition of proposals regarding the implementation implemented in 2019 with a view to defining a
of existing variable short and long-term incentive compensation policy proposal for 2020; (ii) company
plans, after checking the results achieved in relation results in 2019 and the definition of performance
to the performance targets set out in these plans; objectives for 2020 connected to variable incentive
≥ preparation of the Report on Saipem’s Remuneration plans; (iii) the definition of the short-term incentive for
Policy and Paid Compensation, to be submitted the Chief Executive Officer-CEO; (iv) the review of the
every year to the Shareholders’ Meeting subject to 2021-2023 Variable Short-Term Incentive Plan (STI)
the approval of the Board of Directors; which introduces a share-based component and the
≥ examination of the results of voting at the corresponding Consob informative document; (v) the
Shareholders’ Meeting of the Policy approved by the introduction of a rewarding system for operations or
Board; opportunities not included in the Strategic Plan but
≥ monitoring of developments in the regulatory which are functional to pursue the priority objective of
framework and the voting policy of main Proxy value creation for the shareholders, identified
Advisors, as part of the preliminary activities planned according to the relevance standard; (vi) the
to support the Policy proposals for the following appointment of a director by co-optation; (vii) the
year. definition of the number of treasury shares at the
service of short and long-term incentive plans.
Activities carried out and planned During the following meetings, in line with the defined
In 2019, the Committee convened on a total of 13 annual activities, the results of the 2020 AGM season
occasions, with an average member attendance of and the definition of the short-term incentive for
100%. The Chairman of the Board of Statutory Internal Audit Director will be reviewed and the Variable
Auditors or a Statutory Auditor designated by the Long-Term Incentive Plan for the Chief Executive
Chairman, took part in all the meetings which were duly Officer-CEO and managerial resources will be
recorded. implemented.
The Committee, with regard solely to remuneration The Committee reports regularly, through its Chairman,
issues, focused its activities, in particular, on the issues to the Board of Directors and the Shareholders’
outlined in the table called “Main issues discussed in Meeting convened to approve the annual financial
2019” on the following page. statements on the performance of its duties, in
The Committee has scheduled at least nine meetings accordance with its own Regulations, the
in 2020. At the date of approval of this Report, the first recommendations of the Corporate Governance Code
five meetings had already been held. These focused and with the aim of establishing a channel for dialogue
on: (i) an assessment of the compensation policies with its shareholders and investors.

\ 14
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina 15

SECTION I - 2020 REMUNERATION POLICY

Main issues discussed in 2019

Month Issues
1. Proposal of Saipem 2019 indicator sheet
January
2. Proposal of 2019 Policy Guidelines
1. Performance Indicators for the 2019-2021 Long-Term Incentive Plan
February 2. Assessment of the implementation of the 2018 Remuneration Policy
3. Proposed purchase of treasury shares at the service of the share-based long-term incentive plan
1. Final accounting of 2018 results for purposes of the incentive plans
2. Definition of the 2019 Short-Term Incentive for the Chief Executive Officer-CEO
March 3. Definition of the 2019 Short-Term Incentive for the Internal Audit Director
4. Final definition of 2019 performance indicators for incentive plans
5. Remuneration Report (sections I and II)
1. Compensation of the Internal Audit Director
May
2. Renewal of the Long-Term Incentive System of the Chief Executive Officer-CEO’s contract
1. Presentation of post-shareholders’ meeting analysis of the voting results relative to the resolution on 2019
June - remuneration policies
July
2. Regulations of Compensation and Nomination Committee
1. Long-Term Incentive Plan 2019-2021: 2019 allocation and approval of Allocation Regulations for 2019
October - 2. Approval of the Budget of the Compensation and Nomination Committee
December 3. Proposal of 2020 indicators for incentive plans
4. Proposal of a new Short-Term Incentive Plan

2020 Remuneration Policy Nomination Committee and after starting the

approval process Operations with Associated Parties Procedure, where
applicable, with regard solely to the provisions set out
In accordance with its remit, the Committee defined in the paragraphs on the remuneration of the Chief
the structure and contents of the Remuneration Policy Executive Officer-CEO and of Senior Managers with
for the purpose of preparing this Section I of the strategic responsibilities, may temporarily derogate
Report in its meetings of January 13, February 24 and from the remuneration policy, where this derogation is
March 5 and 9, in accordance with the recent consistent with the pursuit of long-term interests and
recommendations contained in the Corporate the Company’s overall sustainability or to ensure its
Governance Code. ability to remain on the market.
In reaching its conclusions, the Committee took Any derogations will be highlighted in Section II of the
account of the results of periodic assessment of Report on the Remuneration Policy of the following
adequacy, overall consistency and concrete year.
application of the 2019 Policy Guidelines, as well as the
resolutions passed in relation to the remunerations by
the Board of Directors and the Shareholders’ Meeting. Aims and general principles
The Saipem 2020 Remuneration Policy for the Chief of the Remuneration Policy
Executive Officer-CEO and Senior Managers with
strategic responsibilities was approved by the Board of Aim
Directors on March 12, 2020 at the proposal of the
Compensation and Nomination Committee, together The Saipem Remuneration Policy is defined in
with this Section I of the Report. accordance with the governance model adopted by
In order to prepare this Report, the Committee availed the Company and the recommendations included in
itself of remuneration benchmarks prepared by the the Corporate Governance Code, with the aim of
independent international consulting company Willis attracting and retaining highly skilled professional and
Towers Watson for the preliminary analysis aimed at managerial resources and aligning the priority
preparing the 2020 Remuneration Policy proposals. objective of value creation for the shareholders in the
Implementation of the compensation policies defined medium-long term with the interests of management.
in accordance with the guidelines provided by the The Saipem Remuneration Policy contributes to the
Board of Directors is done by the Chief Executive achievement of the company mission and strategy by:
Officer-CEO, with the support of the Human Resources ≥ promoting actions and conduct consistent with the
function. company culture and with the principles of diversity,
In case of exceptional circumstances, the Board of equal opportunities, the maximisation and leveraging
Directors, at the proposal of the Compensation and of knowledge and skills of personnel, fairness, and

\ 15
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina 16

SAIPEM 2020 REPORT ON SAIPEM’S REMUNERATION POLICY AND PAID COMPENSATION

non-discrimination as outlined in the Code of Ethics energy sectors and similar positions in the major
and in the “Our people” Policy; European companies comparable to Saipem in terms
≥ recognising and rewarding responsibilities assigned, of turnover and market capitalisation. The verification
the results achieved and the quality of the of compensation is carried out by using a system
professional contribution made, taking into account structured around pay ranges.
the specific context and compensation benchmarks;
≥ defining performance-based incentive systems Variable remuneration
linked to the attainment of a series of financial/profit, Variable remuneration of executive roles strongly
business development and operating targets set influencing Company results, characterised by a
with a view to achieving medium-long term significant incidence of long-term incentive
sustainable growth in line with the Company’s components through an adequate differentiation of
Strategic Plan and with the responsibilities assigned. incentives, also short-term, in a time frame of at least
three years, in accordance with the medium-long term
nature of the business pursued.
General principles
Predetermined, measurable
In line with the above aims, the remuneration paid to and complementary objectives
the Directors and the Senior Managers with strategic Predetermined, measurable and complementary
responsibilities is defined in accordance with the objectives related to the variable remuneration, in
following principles and criteria. order to represent the priorities for the overall
performance of the Company and divisions, in line with
Remuneration of non-executive Directors the Strategic Plan and with the expectations of
The compensation of non-executive Directors is shareholders and stakeholders, promoting a strong
commensurate with the commitment required for results-based orientation. These objectives are defined
participating in Board Committees established in order to ensure: (i) the assessment of annual,
according to the By-laws, with differentiation between Division and individual performance, based on a
the compensation prescribed for the Chairman balanced score card defined according to specific
compared to the members of each committee, in objectives of the area of responsibility and in line with
consideration of the Chairman’s assignments, as the objectives assigned; (ii) a significant incidence of
resolved by the Board of Directors on May 3, 2018. ESG objectives (Environmental, Social & Governance)
Unless otherwise resolved by the Shareholders’ to ensure business sustainability; (iii) the valuation of
Meeting, non-executive Directors are excluded from overperformance; (iv) the definition of a Variable
variable incentive schemes, including share-based Short-Term Incentive Plan in such a way as to focus
incentive plans. management actions on annual targets, whilst attaining
sustainable results over time thanks to the deferral of a
Remuneration of the Chief Executive Officer-CEO portion of the incentive; (v) the orientation of
and of Senior Managers with strategic management toward operations or opportunities not
responsibilities included in the Strategic Plan but which are functional
The remuneration structure for the Chief Executive to pursue the priority objective of value creation for the
Officer-CEO and for Senior Managers with strategic shareholders, identified according to the relevance
responsibilities should be a balanced mix of a fixed standard, thanks to the introduction of a multiplier to
component commensurate with the powers and/or be applied to the points on the individual performance
responsibilities assigned and a variable component sheet; (vi) the definition of a Variable Long-Term
with a maximum limit designed to link remuneration to Incentive Plan in such a way as to assess the
targets that are actually achieved. The Saipem company’s performance both in absolute terms, with
Remuneration Policy uses merit matrices to make pay respect to the ability to pursue economic-financial
rises conditional upon the analysis of the positioning of performance in the medium and long period, and in
resources in terms of internal remuneration equity and relative terms compared to competitors, with respect
having regard to the relevant market, as well as to the to the ability to generate higher levels of stock yield
assessment of individual merit and skills. and of value creation than those of the company’s key
international competitors and to ensure greater
Consistency with market benchmarks alignment with the interests of shareholders in the
Overall consistency of remuneration compared with medium-long term.
the applicable market benchmarks for similar positions
or roles of a similar level of responsibility and Consistency with results achieved
complexity within a panel of companies comparable to Incentives linked with variable compensation paid
Saipem, using specific benchmarks created with the following a scrupulous process of checking results
support of international compensation data providers. actually achieved, assessing performance targets
The Senior Managers with strategic responsibilities assigned net of the effects of exogenous variables,
were compared with similar positions in Italian with a view to maximising the actual company
industrial groups of comparable size to Saipem with a performance arising from management action.
focus in the manufacturing, chemical, engineering and

\ 16
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina 17

SECTION I - 2020 REMUNERATION POLICY

Benefits in line with market practice relevant company bodies and functions must
Benefits, with a preference given to pension and recalculate the incentives, which may lead to the
insurance benefits, in line with market compensation possibility of total or partial recovery in relation to the
benchmarks and compliant with local regulations to results achieved and to the incentives due. Errors that
supplement and enhance the compensation package, do not impact the final determination of the incentive
reflecting roles and/or responsibilities assigned. sum are to be considered of no importance.

Clawback clauses to hedge risks of error Employee termination and non-competition

and for significant violations agreements within pre-set limits
Adoption, through a specific Regulation approved by and for the protection of interests
the Board of Directors, on the proposal of the Additional severance pay and non-competition
Compensation and Nomination Committee, of agreements for executive positions which are subject
clawback mechanisms that make it possible to request to a high risk of competition, defined within a specific
the return of variable components of the amount or for a specific number of years of service or
compensation already paid, or not to proceed with the number of months of salary, in line with level of
final allocation of the Shares at the end of the vesting compensation received.
period or request the return of the corresponding value
of the Shares already paid or to retain the
corresponding value from the compensation due to 2020 Remuneration Policy
the beneficiaries, where the maturation took place Guidelines
based on data that was later proven to be manifestly
incorrect, or return of all incentives (or The 2020 Remuneration Policy Guidelines provide, in
Shares/corresponding value) relating to the year (or the light of the evolution of the market scenario and
years) with reference to which a fraudulent alteration of new business challenges, for concentrating attention
the data used to calculate the results was ascertained on the definition of the 2020 goals in line with the
in order to achieve the right to the incentive and/or the Company’s Strategic Plan and on the review of the
commission of serious and intentional violations of Variable Short-Term Incentive Plan for Senior
laws and/or regulations, of the Code of Ethics or of Managers, with a view to strengthening the alignment
company rules which are relevant to or imply an impact of the shareholders’ and management’s interests and
within the framework of the employment contract, fostering the retention of management. For the
affecting the related fiduciary relationship, in any case Chairman and non-executive Directors, the 2020
without prejudice to any action permitted by the law to Guidelines reflect the decisions resolved by the Board
protect the interests of the Company. of Directors on June 28, 2018, following the renewal of
the company bodies, on the basis of the shareholders’
Conditions, methods and terms of application meeting resolutions of May 3, 2018.
of the clawback principle For the Chief Executive Officer-CEO, the 2020
The Regulation provides for revocation of allocating Guidelines reflect the decisions resolved by the Board
Shares or the recovery of the equivalent monetary of Directors on June 28, 2018 and May 16, 2019, with
value of the shares or of Variable Monetary Incentives the introduction of a new maximum short-term
within a maximum of three years from the date of incentive percentage that best rewards
payment or award of shares, whenever the incentives overperformance.
have been determined on the basis of data relating to For Senior Managers with strategic responsibilities, the
the results and/or performance, which are 2020 Guidelines confirm the structure of the
subsequently revealed to be mistaken. The Regulation compensation package set out in the 2019 Guidelines,
also provides for the application of recovery measures with the introduction of the new Variable Short-Term
within a maximum of five years from the corresponding Incentive Plan, which increases the maximum incentive
issue or assigning for persons who are shown to be percentage and defers a portion of the incentive
responsible for altering, due to misconduct or gross converted into shares, subject to its approval by the
negligence, the data used to report results for Shareholders’ Meeting.
assigned objectives in order to achieve the right to the For the Chief Executive Officer-CEO and for Senior
incentive and/or in violation of laws and/or regulations, Managers with strategic responsibilities, the 2020
the Code of Ethics or company rules which are Guidelines also introduce a multiplier, equal to 1.2, to
relevant to or imply an impact within the framework of be applied to the points achieved on the individual
the employment contract, and are of such significance performance sheet, provided at least 100 points are
as to compromise trust. achieved on the 70-130 performance scale, in case of
In such cases, following the outcome of audits carried operations or opportunities not included in the
out by the relevant company compliance and control Strategic Plan but which are functional to pursue the
functions regarding the existence of errors that impact priority objective of value creation for the shareholders,
the final results, the company must, subject to identified according to the relevance standard, without
rectification of the data, review the results, and the prejudice to the maximum limit of 130 points.

\ 17
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina 18

SAIPEM 2020 REPORT ON SAIPEM’S REMUNERATION POLICY AND PAID COMPENSATION

MARKET REFERENCES
ROLE REMUNERATION DATA PROVIDERS RATIONALE BENCHMARK

Chairman Willis Towers Watson Analogous roles in Italian and Italian companies European companies
European companies Banco BPM Alstom
comparable to Saipem in terms ENEL Balfour Beatty
of turnover, capitalisation and Eni Bilfinger
governance model. Leonardo Colas
Poste Italiane Eiffage
Prysmian Hochtief
Non-executive Salini Impregilo Petrofac
Directors SNAM Subsea 7
Terna Technip FMC
TIM Wood Group
UBI Banca

Chief Executive Willis Towers Watson Similar roles in the main Italian Italian companies European companies
Officer-CEO companies, most of them in Atlantia Alstom
industrial sectors, with particular Fincantieri Balfour Beatty
reference to those pertaining to Leonardo Bilfinger
the MEF perimeter and European Maire Tecnimont Colas
companies comparable to Saipem Prysmian Eiffage
for type of business. Salini Impregilo Hochtief
TIM Petrofac
Subsea 7
Technip FMC
Wood Group

Senior Managers Willis Towers Watson Similar roles in Italian industrial groups comparable in size to Saipem, with a
with strategic focus on the manufacturing, construction, transportation and energy sectors.
responsibilities Similar roles in the main European companies comparable to Saipem, with a
focus on the Oil&Gas, construction and energy sectors.

Chairman of the Board of Directors,

Statutory Auditors SALARY PACKAGE
and non-executive Directors
Remuneration for the Chairman of the Board of FIXED Fixed remuneration
Directors and for non-executive Directors reflects the
resolutions taken by the Board of Directors on June
Variable Short-Term
28, 2018. SHORT-TERM
Incentives (STI) with deferral
VARIABLE of a share-based bonus
Remuneration for the Chairman
of the Board of Directors LONG-TERM Share-based Variable Long-Term
The Policy Guidelines for the Chairman of the Board of VARIABLE Incentives (LTI)
Directors reflect the resolutions passed by the Board
of Directors on June 28, 2018, which defined a fixed
remuneration of €427,500, lower than the reference BENEFITS Non-monetary benefits
market median, inclusive of €60,000 remuneration for
the office of Director resolved by the Shareholders’
Severance Payment;
Meeting of May 3, 2018, to which is added the ANCILLARY Minimum term agreement;
compensation of €28,500 for the role of Chairman of INSTRUMENTS Non-competition agreement
the Corporate Governance Committee and Scenarios.

Remuneration of non-executive Directors on April 29, 2020 to decide on the renewal of the
The Shareholders’ Meeting of May 3, 2018 set the Board of Statutory Auditors and, pursuant to Article
gross annual remuneration for non-executive Directors 2402 of the Italian Civil Code, on the remuneration for
at €60,000. the entire term of its office, the Board of Statutory
Auditors has provided the Company with a document
Remuneration of Statutory Auditors containing guidelines given by the Board of Statutory
The Shareholders’ Meeting of April 28, 2017 set the Auditors of Saipem SpA to Shareholders on the
remuneration of Statutory Auditors, establishing the membership of the new Board of Statutory Auditors,
gross annual remuneration of €70,000 for the which are available in the section of the Company’s
Chairman and €50,000 for each Statutory Auditor. website (www.saipem.com) dedicated to the
The compensation of the Company’s Board of Shareholders’ Meeting and which can also be used by
Statutory Auditors is commensurate with the the Company’s Shareholders to assess the adequacy
commitment required, the importance of its role and of the remuneration granted to the members of the
the Company’s size and sector, consistent with Article Board of Statutory Auditors.
8.C.4 of the Corporate Governance Code. Therefore, on April 29, 2020 the Shareholders’
Since the ordinary Shareholders’ Meeting will be called Meeting will be called, inter alia, to set the

\ 18
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina 19

SECTION I - 2020 REMUNERATION POLICY

remuneration of the members of the Board of Chief Executive Officer-CEO

Statutory Auditors in line with the recommendations
set out in Article 8 of the Corporate Governance Code The Policy Guidelines for the Chief Executive
and the “Guidelines to Shareholders on the Officer-CEO take into account the specific powers
membership of the new Board of Statutory Auditors”, conferred in accordance with the Articles of Association,
prepared by the Board of Statutory Auditors about to the instructions contained in the chapter “Aims and
lose office and available in the section of the general principles of the Remuneration Policy”, as well as
Company’s website (www.saipem.com) dedicated to the remuneration levels and market best practices.
the Shareholders’ Meeting, within the limits laid down
in Article 2402 of the Italian Civil Code. Fixed remuneration
The fixed remuneration reflects the decisions resolved
Supplementary compensation by the Board of Directors on June 28, 2018; with
for service on Board Committees regard to the mandates assigned, it covers both the
An additional annual remuneration will continue to be compensation decided by the Shareholder’ Meeting
paid out to non-executive Directors for service on for the Directors, and any compensation that might be
Board Committees. The fees, resolved by the Board of due for participation on the Boards of Directors of
Directors on June 28, 2018 and July 24, 2018 are subsidiaries or invested companies, and consists of an
determined as follows: annual gross amount of €1,045,000, below the market
≥ €42,500 for the Chairman of the Audit and Risk median. It should also be noted that no forms of
Committee and €33,500 for the other members. extraordinary compensation are envisaged in favour of
Additional compensation is also contemplated for the Chief Executive Officer-CEO.
the most senior independent Director called upon to
complete the Audit and Risk Committee with regard Variable short-term incentives
to operations with associates, amounting to The Variable Short-Term Incentive Plan is associated
one-third of the annual remuneration provided for with achievement of pre-set performance results for
each member of the Audit and Risk Committee; the previous year and each is measured according to a
≥ €28,500 for the Chairman of the Compensation and 70-130 performance scale, in relation to the weight
Nomination Committee and €19,500 for the other assigned to them (a performance below 70 points is
members; considered zero). The total performance threshold
≥ €28,500 for the Chairman of the Corporate level for incentive pay-out purposes is 70 points.
Governance Committee and Scenarios and €19,500 The Plan provides for a compensation determined
for other members. based on results achieved by Saipem in the previous
year, measured on a performance scale consisting of a
Payment in the event of expiry minimum level performance (70 points), a target level
of office or termination performance (100 points) and a maximum level
For the Chairman, Statutory Auditors and performance (130 points), corresponding respectively
non-executive Directors, no payments are provided for to 45%, 90% and 135% of the fixed remuneration.
in the event of expiry of term of office or early The 2020 targets resolved by the Board of Directors
termination. on January 14, 2020 for the 2021 Variable Short-Term
Incentive Plan are in line with the business model and
Benefits strategic guidelines. The structure and weight of
There are no benefits for the Chairman, Statutory different objectives are represented in the table below.
Auditors and non-executive directors.

2020 TARGETS FOR THE SHORT-TERM INCENTIVE PLAN

ECONONIC-FINANCIAL TARGETS SUSTAINABILITY TARGETS STRATEGIC TARGETS

Adjusted Free Cash Flow (1) ESG (Environmental, Social & Governance) New contracts
(weight: 35%) indicators: HSE, Diversity Opportunities, (weight: 10%)
Technological Innovation and Risk
Adjusted EBITDA (1) Management (2)
(weight: 30%) - TRIFR (weight: 10%)
- Environment (weight: 5%)
- Diversity Opportunities (weight: 5%)
- Technological Innovation (weight: 2.5%)
- Risk Management (weight: 2.5%)

(1) The adjustment, for both the EBITDA and the FCF, refers to extraordinary, so-called “non recurring” costs, used in Saipem’s communications to the market, and which
mainly concern the following cases: impairment, redundancy, tax litigation and arbitration
(2) The goal of HSE, Diversity Opportunities, Technological Innovation and Risk Management focuses on issues of safety, environment and sustainability represented by
indicators such as:
- TRIFR (Total Recordable Injury Frequency Rate): Injury Frequency Rate;
- Environment: targeting the reduction of direct and indirect emissions of CO2, performance of studies and energy diagnoses and implementing specific initiatives of
energy efficiency;
- Diversity Opportunities: targeting the recruitment of female new graduates and professional under an indefinite or apprenticeship contract and the identification of
international candidates in SMSR succession plans;
- Technological Innovation: targeting the development of a method to map the technological component in acquired projects, including sustainable business
development;
- Risk Management: implementation of a model of performance assessment serving to mitigate Top Risks.

\ 19
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina 20

SAIPEM 2020 REPORT ON SAIPEM’S REMUNERATION POLICY AND PAID COMPENSATION

performance vs. incentive

EXPECTED TARGET (% FIXED REMUNERATION) TOTAL RECORDABLE INJURY FREQUENCY RATE

Minimum (70) 45% 2.0

Target (100) 90% 1.5

Maximum (130) 135% 1.0

0.54
The 2020 Remuneration Policy pays special attention 0.5
to ESG (Environmental, Social & Governance)
objectives and, in particular, to the strengthening of
climate policies in accordance with objectives and
ambitions defined in the light of the potential energy 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
scenarios and their implications for the sector which
Saipem works in, supporting the development of clean
energy technologies and promoting the Variable long-term incentives
implementation of policies with a low environmental The 2019-2021 share-based Variable Long-Term
impact, examined by the Board of Directors and Incentive Plan (LTI) is intended for all the managerial
resulting in the so-called “Dynamic Transition”. resources with three annual allocations starting in
The Policy also introduces a multiplier to be applied to October 2019. The Plan provides for the free
the points achieved on the individual performance assignment of ordinary Saipem shares (performance
sheet, provided at least 100 points are achieved on the shares) subject to specific performance conditions
70-130 performance scale, equal to 1.2, in case of measured at the end of the three-year reference
operations or opportunities not included in the period, after a thorough audit of the results effectively
Strategic Plan but which are functional to pursue the achieved by the Compensation and Nomination
priority objective of value creation for the shareholders, Committee, in support of the resolutions passed by the
identified according to the relevance standard. Board of Directors in this regard.
Application of the multiplier will be set by the Board of The Plan requires that the performance conditions be
Directors at the proposal of the Compensation and measured on the basis of the following parameters:
Nomination Committee. The maximum score 1. Total Shareholder Return (TSR) of the Saipem share,
achievable on the individual performance sheet is 130, measured on a three-year basis in terms of
for which the Chief Executive Officer-CEO will receive a positioning relative to two reference peer groups
short-term incentive up to 135% of the fixed consisting of major international companies
remuneration. The additional portion of the bonus operating in the same sectors as Saipem (50%
deriving from the application, if any, of the multiplier is weight):
subject to a 3-year deferral period and to an additional ≥ Engineering & Construction Peer Group (35%
performance condition that allows for the +/-50% weight): Petrofac, Tecnicas Reunidas, Technip
adjustment of the deferred amount, identified by the FMC, Subsea 7, Chiyoda, McDermott, Maire
average performance on the Saipem sheet in the Tecnimont, Wood Group, JGC, Oceaneering,
three-year deferral period. If average performance in Sapura Energy, Worley Parson;
the three-year period is below 70 points, the deferred ≥ Drilling Peer Group (15% weight): Helmerich
incentive is not paid. & Payne, Nabors Industries, Seadrill Ltd,

market-based indicator: total shareholder return

RANKING TSR E&C MULTIPLIER VESTING RANKING TSR MULTIPLIER VESTING

(WEIGHT: 35%) PERIOD DRILLING PERIOD
(WEIGHT: 15%)
1st place 160% 56% 1st place 160% 24%

2nd place 145% 51% 2nd place 145% 22%

3rd place 130% 46% 3rd place 130% 20%

th 115% 40% th 115% 17%
4 place 4 place

5th place 100% 35% 5th place 100% 15%

6th place 70% 25% 6th place 70% 11%

7th place 40% 14% 7th place 40% 6%

8th/13th place 0% 0% 8th/13th place 0% 0%

\ 20
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina 21

SECTION I - 2020 REMUNERATION POLICY

BUSINESS-BASED INDICATOR: ADJUSTED NET FINANCIAL POSITION

45% RESULT (R) MULTIPLIER VESTING

PERIOD
40%
R≤
_ TGT NFP
% matured shares

35% 160% 40%

- €400M
30%
TGT NFP - €400M lin. interp. between lin. interp. between
25% ≤ R ≤ TGT NFP 160% and 100% 40% and 25%
20%
R = TGT NFP 100% 25%
15%
10% TGT NFP ≤ R ≤ lin. interp. between lin. interp. between
TGT NFP + €400M 100% and 40% 25% and 10%
5%
R = TGT NFP
+ €400M 40% 10%
TGT NFP TGT TGT NFP NFP
-€400M NFP +€400M R ≥ TGT NFP
+ €400M 0% 0%

Transocean, Valaris, Ensign Energy Services Inc, BUSINESS-BASED INDICATOR:

Diamond, Noble Corp Plc, Patterson-Uti Energy ADJUSTED RETURN ON AVERAGE INVESTED CAPITAL
Inc, Precision Drilling, Odfjell Drilling, Archer Ltd9.
For the purpose of assigning Shares referred to the RESULT (R) MULTIPLIER VESTING
PERIOD
TSR criterion, Saipem must come in at least seventh
(median) in both rankings relating to the two R ≥_ Max ROAIC 160% 40%
individual Peer Groups, as illustrated in the tables
TGT ROAIC ≤ R lin. interp. between lin. interp. between
below. ≤ ROAIC Max 160% and 100% 40% and 25%
2. Predefined economic and financial objectives for
each annual assignment within the Plan. For the R = TGT ROAIC 100% 25%
second assignment these objectives are the: Min TGT ROAIC lin. interp. between lin. interp. between
2.1 Adjusted Net Financial Position (NFP): objective ≤ R ≤ TGT ROAIC 100% and 40% 25% and 10%
that measures Saipem’s medium to long-term
R = Min ROAIC 40% 10%
financial performance at the end of the
three-year performance period (25% weight);
R ≤ Min ROAIC 0% 0%
2.2 Adjusted Return on Average Invested Capital
(ROAIC): objective that measures the yield of
capital invested by the company at the end of PERFORMANCE AT THE END incentive
the three-year performance period (25% of THE THREE-YEAR PERIOD (% FIXED REMUNERATION)
weight).
In particular, the minimum and maximum values Minimum 40%(*)
are set in line with a change in EBITDA of ±10%
in the three-year period 2020-2022 with
respect to the objectives of the Strategic Plan. Target 100%
The performance conditions operate independently of
each other. This means that, in the presence of an
adequate performance in at least one of the
Maximum 160%
objectives, a part of the award will mature regardless of (*) In case of attainment of the minimum performance level for all
the performance achieved in the other objectives. indicators.
For all performance conditions, the attainment of the
maximum level of results implies the assignment of CO-INVESTMENT
160% of the allocated Shares. In the event of
performance that is lower than the minimum level for
Additional shares
each performance condition, no Shares will be (matching shares)
+25%
assigned. For the Chief Executive Officer-CEO, the
incentive levels are equal to a target value of 100% and 25% Unavailable shares 25%
a maximum value of 160% of the fixed remuneration;
the maximum value at the end of the vesting period
may not exceed four times the value of the Shares at
the time of allocation. If the mandate is not renewed, 75% 75%
the shares of Matured Shares Matured at the end of
the 3-year vesting period each allocation are
Shares Shares assigned
conclusively assigned at the end of the corresponding Matured (Co-investment)
Matured at the end Matured at the end
of the 3-year of the 2-year
(9) Integrated competitor as a result of the merger of the companies vesting period co-investment period
Ensco plc and Rowan Companies plc into the new company Valaris
plc. T3 T5

\ 21
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina 22

SAIPEM 2020 REPORT ON SAIPEM’S REMUNERATION POLICY AND PAID COMPENSATION

LONG-TERM INCENTIVE PLAN FOR CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER-CEO - TIMELINE

PERFORMANCE PERIOD CO-INVESTMENT

Year T T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5

VESTING PERIOD
Award of Assignment of 75% Delivery of 25%
Shares of the shares allocated + right to invest of the shares
25% of the shares assigned +25% matching shares

vesting period, at the performance conditions set out communicated to the Board of Directors with 4
in the Plan. months’ notice or, alternatively, the Chief
In a view of alignment with the interests of the Executive Officer-CEO must pay an indemnity of
shareholders in the medium-long term, and of the €350,000.
sustainability of the results achieved, for the Chief b) Non-competition agreement.
Executive Officer-CEO participation in a ≥ Non-competition agreement, to protect the
Co-investment scheme has been envisaged, in which company’s interests, in consideration of the high
25% of the matured Shares cannot be transferred management profile of international standing in
and/or sold for a period of 24 months from the end of the Oil&Gas Services industry and the networks of
the vesting period, at the end of which Saipem will institutional and business relationships built
assign, in addition to the Shares subject to the globally by the Chief Executive Officer-CEO.
additional Co-investment period, one free Saipem The non-competition agreement clause can be
Share for every Share made unavailable. activated on termination of the mandate without
renewal and regardless of the cause of
Clawback clause termination. It provides for payment of a fee in
All variable short- and long-term incentives include a recognition of the commitment undertaken by the
clawback clause enabling the recovery of variable Chief Executive Officer-CEO not to engage, for 18
remuneration components found to have been paid months after termination of the mandate, in any
out in error or as the result of intentional misconduct activity in competition with that carried out by
by beneficiaries, according to the conditions, methods Saipem in relation to its company business and
and terms of application described in the “Aims and on the main reference markets at the international
general principles of the Remuneration Policy” section level. After the first 12 months, the Chief
of this Report (page 15). Executive Officer-CEO may withdraw from the
non-competition agreement, waiving the fee
Accessory remuneration instruments allocated for the residual duration of the
The following payments are envisaged for the Chief agreement (six months). The fee, decided by the
Executive Officer-CEO, in line with the relevant Board of Directors on June 28, 2018 amounts to
practices and the provisions of the Recommendation €1,800,000, of which €1,200,000 for the initial 12
of the European Commission No. 385 of April 30, months of duration of the agreement and
2009, and to protect the company from potential €600,000 for the six months thereafter, in line
competition risks and amounting less than 24 months Italian best practices. Any breach of the
of the global annual remuneration: non-competition agreement will lead to non
a) Indemnities for advance termination of office. payment (or the restitution on the part of the
≥ In case of advance termination of the 2018-2021 payee, where the violation has come to Saipem’s
administrative mandate and in case of resignation knowledge subsequent to payment), as well as the
caused by demotion, and in case of sale, transfer obligation to pay the damages consensually and
either for consideration or free of charge and any conventionally determined in an amount equal to
other disposal of Shares and credit instruments, double the payment agreed, without prejudice to
however called, which changes the majority Saipem’s faculty to request fulfilment of the
shareholders of Saipem under Article 2359 of the agreement in a specific form.
Italian Civil Code (so-called “change of control”),
where this change also causes demotion, an Benefits
all-inclusive indemnity of €1,800,000 is payable, The Chief Executive Officer-CEO will receive the
whose fixed amount is set as a lump sum, benefits reserved for the entire managerial population
pursuant to Article 2383, paragraph 3 of the (supplementary pension fund, healthcare, insurance
Italian Civil Code. It should be noted that, in the coverage, car for business and personal use) plus
event of resignation from the post of Chief repayment of Rome-Milan travel expenses once a
Executive Officer-CEO, when this is not justified week if made.
by demotion, said resignation must be

\ 22
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 22:20 Pagina 23

SECTION I - 2020 REMUNERATION POLICY

Senior Managers Saipem shares to be assigned at the end of the deferral

with strategic responsibilities period to those beneficiaries who are still working with
the Company. The portion of the incentive varies on the
Fixed remuneration basis of the individual performance score achieved
The fixed remuneration of SMSR is set based on roles annually and is equal to the target value, i.e. where
and responsibilities assigned, taking into account performance is equal to 100 points, of no more than
average levels of remuneration at other major Italian 15% of the fixed remuneration, and to the maximum
and international companies for roles of a similar level value, i.e. where performance is equal to 130 points, of
of managerial responsibility and complexity, and may 22.5% of the fixed remuneration. The Plan will be
be adjusted periodically in the framework of the annual submitted for approval to the shareholders at the
salary review process which is carried out for all Meeting convened to approve the financial statements
managers. relative to the business year ending December 31,
Taking into account the relevant context and current 2019. The conditions of the Plan are therefore
market trends, the 2020 Guidelines will employ selective described in detail in the informative document made
criteria designed to ensure adequate levels of available to the public on the Company’s website
competitiveness and motivation: (i) the possibility to (www.saipem.com), implementing the current legislation
adjust the fixed remuneration to pursue the objective of (Article 114-bis of Legislative Decree No. 58/1998 and
alignment with the market median, by using a system the Consob regulation of implementation). For further
structured around pay ranges, for resources who are information on the characteristics of the Plan please
particularly strategic for the attainment of company refer to the section “Variable Short-Term Incentives” of
results, for those who have increased their this Policy document.
responsibilities or the coverage level of their role, for The Plan also introduces a multiplier to be applied to
very critical professional resources with a high impact on the points achieved on the individual performance
business, using the merit matrices to make pay rises sheet, provided at least 100 points are achieved on the
conditional upon the analysis of the positioning of 70-130 performance scale, equal to 1.2, in case of
resources in terms of internal remuneration equity and operations or opportunities not included in the
having regard to the relevant market, as well as to the Strategic Plan but which are functional to pursue the
assessment of individual merit and skills; (ii) the priority objective of value creation for the shareholders,
possibility to make very selective and extraordinary identified according to the relevance standard.
one-off payments (up to 25% of the fixed remuneration) The introduction of this element is designed to orient
in case of excellent quality performances for particularly management toward operations that can increase the
important projects or for retention reasons. value for shareholders and investors, reward
extraordinary commitment and favour the motivation
Variable short-term incentives and retention of resources with a significant impact on
The Variable Short-Term Incentive Plan envisages a the success of these operations. Application of the
remuneration calculated with reference to Saipem and multiplier will be set by the Board of Directors and the
individual performance results of the previous year and beneficiaries will be identified by the Chief Executive
measured according to a 70-130 performance scale Officer-CEO. The maximum score achievable on the
(below 70 points the performance of each target is individual performance sheet is 130, for which the
deemed to be zero), with a minimum individual manager will receive a short-term incentive up to
incentive level of 70 points, below which no bonus is 67.5% of the fixed remuneration. The additional portion
payable. The incentive level differs according to the of the bonus deriving from the application, if any, of the
role covered and is equal (target value, i.e. performance multiplier is subject to a 3-year deferral period and to
= 100) to maximum 45% of the fixed remuneration. an additional performance condition that allows for the
In case of overperformance (performance 126≤130), +/-50% adjustment of the deferred amount, identified
the incentive level is revalued by 150% and is equal to by the average performance on the Saipem sheet in
a maximum value of 67.5% of the fixed remuneration. the three-year deferral period. If average performance
The performance objectives of SMSR are calculated in the three-year period is below 70 points, the
on the basis of the objectives assigned to Top deferred incentive is not paid.
Management and focus on economic-financial
performance, operations, internal efficiency and Variable long-term incentives
sustainability (especially health and safety, Senior Managers with strategic responsibilities, in line
environmental protection, technological and digital with what defined for the Chief Executive Officer-CEO,
innovation, balanced gender diversity opportunities participate in the Variable Long-Term Incentive Plan
and risk management), as well as on individual approved by the Board of Directors on March 11,
objectives assigned in relation to the manager’s area of 2019. The 2019-2021 Variable Long-Term Incentive
responsibility for the role covered, in accordance with Plan (LTI), which includes all managerial resources, with
the Company Performance Plan. three annual awards beginning in October 2019,
For senior managers who achieve the annual encompasses the free allocation of ordinary Saipem
performance targets with at least 100 points on the Shares (performance shares) against the achievement
70-130 performance scale and are beneficiaries of the of performance conditions related to business
short-term incentive, the Plan also establishes the objectives (measured over the three-year vesting
allocation of an additional bonus, calculated as a period) and the performance of the Saipem share
percentage of their fixed remuneration, deferred for measured at the end of the three-year period of
three years. The additional bonus is converted into reference. The Plan, for the 2020 allocation, requires

\ 23
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina 24

SAIPEM 2020 REPORT ON SAIPEM’S REMUNERATION POLICY AND PAID COMPENSATION

LONG-TERM INCENTIVE PLAN FOR SENIOR MANAGERS WITH STRATEGIC RESPONSIBILITIES - TIMELINE

PERFORMANCE PERIOD retention premium

Year T T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5

VESTING PERIOD

Award of Assignment of 75% Delivery of 25%

Shares of the shares allocated of the shares
+25% matching shares

that the performance conditions be measured on the

basis of the following parameters: RETENTION PREMIUM
1. Total Shareholder Return (TSR) of the Saipem share,
measured on a three-year basis in terms of Additional shares +25%
positioning relative to two reference peer groups (matching shares)

consisting of major international companies

operating in the same sectors as Saipem (50% 25% Unavailable shares 25%
weight):
≥ Engineering & Construction Peer Group (35%
weight): Petrofac, Tecnicas Reunidas, Technip 75% 75%
FMC, Subsea 7, Chiyoda, McDermott, Maire
Tecnimont, Wood Group, JGC, Oceaneering,
Sapura Energy, Worley Parson; Shares Shares assigned
≥ Drilling Peer Group (15% weight): Helmerich Matured (Retention Premium)
& Payne, Nabors Industries, Seadrill Ltd, Matured at the end Matured at the end
of the 3-year of the 2-year Retention
Transocean, Valaris, Ensign Energy Services Inc, vesting period Premium period
Diamond, Noble Corp Plc, Patterson-Uti Energy T3 T5
Inc, Precision Drilling, Odfjell Drilling, Archer Ltd10.
2. Predefined economic and financial objectives for
each annual assignment within the Plan, with a
weighting of 50%. For the 2020 allocation, these The Plan further contemplates a Retention Premium of
objectives are the: 25% of the shares allocated, at the end of the
2.1 Adjusted Net Financial Position (NFP): objective three-year vesting period, based on achievement of
that measures Saipem’s medium to long-term the performance conditions mentioned above. For a
financial performance at the end of the period of two years, the beneficiaries may not dispose
three-year period (25% weight); of 25% of the Shares allocated and, at the end of that
2.2 Adjusted Return on Average Invested Capital period, for every Share made unavailable, Saipem will
(ROAIC): objective that measures the yield of assign an additional free share as Retention Premium.
capital invested by the company (25% weight). The Retention Premium aims to strengthen further the
For the purpose of assigning Shares referred to the alignment of interests between management and
TSR criterion, Saipem must come in at least seventh shareholders over the medium and long-term and to
(median) in both rankings relating to the two act as leverage for the retention of management.
individual Peer Groups, as illustrated for the Chief The Plan includes clauses designed to encourage
Executive Officer-CEO. retention of resources whereby, in the event of
The performance conditions operate independently of termination of the employment contract by mutual
each other. This means that, in the presence of an consent or assignment and/or loss of control by
adequate performance in at least one of the Saipem of the company where the beneficiary of the
objectives, a part of the award will mature regardless of plan is employed during the vesting period, the
the performance achieved in the other objectives. beneficiary conserves the right to the incentive, which
For all performance conditions, the attainment of the is reduced on a pro-rata basis in relation to the time
maximum level of results implies the assignment of elapsed between the award of the base incentive and
160% of the allocated Shares. In the event of the occurrence of the event. In the event of unilateral
performance that is lower than the minimum level for termination of employment, no assignment is made.
each performance condition, no Shares will be
assigned. For Senior Managers with strategic Clawback clause
responsibilities, the incentive levels are equal to a The clawback clause is envisaged for Senior Managers
maximum target value of 65% and a maximum value of with strategic responsibilities, and has the conditions,
104% of the fixed remuneration. The maximum value at methods and terms of application described in the
the end of the vesting period may not exceed four “Aims and general principles of the Remuneration
times the value of the shares at the time of allocation. Policy” section of this Report (page 15).

(10) Integrated competitor as a result of the merger of the companies Ensco plc and Rowan Companies plc into the new company Valaris plc.

\ 24
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina 25

SECTION I - 2020 REMUNERATION POLICY

Accessory remuneration instruments protect the know-how with the aim of

a) Indemnities for termination of employment. guaranteeing continuity in achieving the business
≥ SMSR, like all Saipem Senior Managers, receive objectives for a maximum amount corresponding
the termination indemnity established in the to 12 months of the global annual remuneration
National Collective Labour Agreement, as well as per year of the agreement.
any supplementary indemnities that may be c) Non-competition agreements.
agreed on an individual basis upon termination in ≥ Specific remuneration may be envisaged for
accordance with criteria set by Saipem and cases where the need is found to enter into
whose maximum amounts are established taking non-competition agreements for a maximum
into account the entitlements already provided by amount corresponding to 12 months of the global
the National Collective Labour Agreement for annual remuneration per year of the agreement.
Senior Managers in the event of voluntary
redundancy or early retirement. These criteria Benefits
take account of the actual and pensionable age of In continuity with the remuneration policy implemented
the Senior Manager at the time the contract is in 2019 and in accordance with the relevant collective
terminated and his/her annual remuneration. labour agreement established at national level and
In addition, severance payments up to a maximum supplementary agreements reached at company level
of two years’ fixed remuneration for a Change of for Saipem Senior Managers, Senior Managers with
Control resulting in resignation or termination strategic responsibilities are granted membership of
and/or demotion may be established on the basis the supplementary pension fund (FOPDIRE11 or
of individual termination indemnity agreements. PREVINDAI12) and the Supplementary Healthcare Fund
b) Minimum Term Agreements. (FISDE13), death and disability insurance coverage and
≥ Minimum term agreements may be prescribed to a company car for business and personal use.

(11) Closed pension fund operating on a defined contribution, individual account basis, www.fopdire.it.
(12) Pension fund established in the form of an association recognised with a public deed, with contribution defined as individual capitalisation.
www.previndai.it.
(13) Healthcare fund providing reimbursement of medical expenses for working and retired Senior Managers and their family members,
www.fisde-eni.it.

\ 25
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina 26

SAIPEM 2020 REPORT ON SAIPEM’S REMUNERATION POLICY AND PAID COMPENSATION

Section II - Compensation PAID

and other information
Report on compensation paid - 2019 Senior Managers with strategic responsibilities of
Saipem and contains information regarding the
The Report on compensation paid in line with the new implementation in 2019 of the 2019-2021 Variable
regulations is subject for the first year to the Share-based Long-Term Incentive Plan, in accordance
shareholders’ consultative vote. with provisions in current regulations.
This Report illustrates the compensation paid in 2019 In the absence of precise legal guidelines on the
to the Directors (with executive and non-executive content of this document, the Company has voluntarily
duties), Statutory Auditors and Senior Managers with expanded disclosure on the final results of short-term
strategic responsibilities, the shares held in the incentive plans.
Company by the Directors, Statutory Auditors and by

Overview
Component References - Conditions Compensation paid
for implementation - Results
Fixed remuneration Verifies compensation using Caio Francesco - Chairman: €456,000
benchmarks in line with the ≥ Fixed compensation: €427,500, which covers
characteristics of Saipem and of the remuneration for the role of Director, equal to
roles assigned. €60,000.
≥ Remuneration for the role of Chairman of the
Remuneration for the office of Sustainability, Scenarios and Governance
non-executive Director resolved by Committee: €28,500.
the Shareholders’ Meeting of May 3, Cao Stefano - Chief Executive Officer-CEO:
2018. €1,045,000
≥ Fixed remuneration for the 2018-2021 mandate:
Remuneration for the Chairman of the €1,045,000 per year, which covers remuneration for
Board of Directors approved by the the role of Director resolved by the Shareholders’
Board of Directors of June 28, 2018. Meeting, equal to €60,000.
Cappello Maria Elena - Director: €79,500
Remuneration for the office of Chief ≥ Fixed Board meeting fees: €60,000.
Executive Officer-CEO resolved by ≥ Compensation for serving on the Sustainability,
the Board of Directors of June 28, Scenarios and Governance Committee, equal to
2018 and May 16, 2019. €19,500.
Carloni Claudia - Director: €79,500
Remuneration for non-executive ≥ Fixed Board meeting fees: €60,000.
Directors for serving on the ≥ Compensation for serving on the Sustainability,
Committees resolved by the Board of Scenarios and Governance Committee, equal to
Directors of Shareholders’ Meeting of €19,500.
June 28, 2018 and July 24, 2018. Ferro-Luzzi Federico - Director: €99,000
≥ Fixed Board meeting fees: €60,000.
≥ Compensation for serving on the Compensation and
Nomination Committee, equal to €19,500.
≥ Compensation for serving on the Sustainability,
Scenarios and Governance Committee, equal to
€19,500.
Fumagalli Paolo - Director: €99,361
≥ Fixed Board meeting fees: €60,000.
≥ Compensation for the role of Chairman of the
Compensation and Nomination Committee, equal to
€28,500.
≥ Compensation equal to the pro-quota award for
serving on the Associated Parties Committee, equal
to €10,861.
Latini Pierfrancesco - Director: €93,500
≥ Fixed Board meeting fees: €60,000.
≥ Compensation for serving on the Audit and Risk
Committee, equal to €33,500.
Mazzilli Ines - Director: €102,500
≥ Fixed Board meeting fees: €60,000.
≥ Compensation for the role of Chairman of the Audit
and Risk Committee, equal to €42,500.

\ 26
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina 27

SECTION II - COMPENSATION AND OTHER INFORMATION

Component References - Conditions Compensation paid

for implementation - Results
Fixed remuneration Schapira Paul - Director: €113,000
≥ Fixed Board meeting fees: €60,000.
≥ Compensation for serving on the Audit and Risk
Committee, equal to €33,500.
≥ Compensation for serving on the Compensation and
Nomination Committee, equal to €19,500.
Busso Mario - Chairman: Board of Statutory
Auditors:
≥ Fixed Board meeting fees equal to €70,000.
De Martino Giulia - Statutory Auditor:
≥ Fixed Board meeting fees equal to €50,000.
Perotta Riccardo - Statutory Auditor:
≥ Fixed Board meeting fees equal to €50,000.
Senior Managers with strategic responsibilities:
≥ To the gross annual compensation, equal to
€4,597,000, can be added allowances for
assignments in Italy and overseas for a total amount
of €53,900.

STI - Variable 2019 CEO targets: Adjusted Free Cao Stefano - Chief Executive Officer-CEO: the
Short-Term Incentive Cash Flow (35% weight); Adjusted amount of €1,117,500 relates to the 2020 short-term
EBITDA (30% weight); New contracts incentive referred to performance in 2019.
(20% weight); HSE, Risk Management SMSR: €2,164,782 relating to the 2020 short-term
and Sustainability (15% weight). incentive refers to performance in 2019.
Incentives paid based on the results
achieved in the previous year and
evaluated on a performance scale of
70÷130 points with minimum
threshold to receive the incentive set
at 75 points for company
performance.
Final calculation of 2019 CEO
objectives: 118.83 points.

SMSR targets: broken down on the

basis of objectives assigned to top
management, in relation to the area of
responsibility for the role covered.
Incentives paid based on the results
achieved in the previous year and
evaluated on a performance scale of
70÷130 points with minimum
threshold to receive the incentive set
at 70 points for individual
performance.

LTI - Variable Free assignment of ordinary shares of Cao Stefano - Chief Executive Officer-CEO:
Long-Term Incentive Saipem SpA, differentiated by role on 243,900 free Shares subject to allocation in the year.
(2019-2021 Plan) reaching the following performance SMSR: 689,800 free Shares subject to allocation in the
conditions, measured at the end of year.
the relevant three-year period:
Relative TSR measured in terms of
relative positioning with respect to
two peer groups: Engineering
& Construction (35% weight) and
Drilling (15% weight); Adjusted Net
Financial Position (25% weight);
Adjusted ROAIC (25% weight).
Three-year Vesting + Co-investment
of 2 years for the Chief Executive
Officer-CEO.
Three-year Vesting + Retention
Premium of 2 years for strategic
resources.

\ 27
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina 28

SAIPEM 2020 REPORT ON SAIPEM’S REMUNERATION POLICY AND PAID COMPENSATION

Component References - Conditions Compensation paid

for implementation - Results
Benefits CEO: the same benefits reserved for Cao Stefano - Chief Executive Officer-CEO: the
the entire managerial population amount of €18,723 includes the valuation of
(supplementary pension fund, automobile benefits, supplementary health insurance
supplementary healthcare fund, death paid by the company and the taxable amount for
and disability insurance coverage, weekly round trip flights between Milan and Rome.
company car for business and SMSR: the amount of €152,330 includes the valuation
personal use) plus repayment of of automobile benefits and supplementary health
Rome-Milan travel expenses once a insurance and supplementary pension fund paid by the
week if made. company.
SMSR: conditions established in the
relevant collective labour agreement
established at national level and
supplementary agreements reached
at company level for senior managers
(supplementary pension fund,
supplementary healthcare fund, death
and disability insurance coverage,
company car for business and
personal use).

Severance Payment, CEO: all-inclusive indemnity in case of SMSR: the amount of €300,000 refers to the portions
Non-competition advance termination of the current of minimum term agreements in force in 2019; the
Agreement and mandate, except in case of dismissal amount of €658,000 refers to the portions of
Minimum Term for just cause and in case of non-competition agreements in force in 2019.
Agreement resignation caused by demotion and
change of control. Non-competition
agreement.
SMSR: termination indemnities:
agreed upon consensual termination
of employment; Severance Payment
for a Change of Control resulting in
resignation or termination and/or
demotion. Non-competition
agreements: activated upon
termination of the employment
relationship. Minimum term
agreement to protect know-how.

Shares held Shows the shares held in Saipem SpA Cao Stefano - Chief Executive Officer-CEO: 29,000
by Directors by the Directors, Statutory Auditors shares held as of December 31, 2019.
and other and other Senior Managers with Perotta Riccardo - Statutory Auditor: 18,400 shares
Senior Managers strategic responsibilities, as well as by held as of December 31, 2019.
with strategic their spouses, where not legally SMSR: 28,084 shares held as of December 31, 2019.
responsibilities separated, and by their minor children,
either directly or through subsidiary
companies, fiduciaries or third parties,
as per the Shareholders Register,
communications received or other
information received from the
persons concerned.

Implementation of 2019 Compensation and Nomination Committee on the

remuneration policies periodic evaluation envisaged by the Corporate
Governance Code, was found to be in line with the
This section of the Report provides a description of the 2019 Remuneration policy approved by the Board of
remuneration policies implemented in 2019 for the Directors on March 11, 2019, according to the
Chairman of the Board of Directors, non-executive provisions of the resolutions taken by the Board of
Directors, Statutory Auditors, the Chief Executive Directors on May 3, 2018 and June 28, 2018,
Officer-CEO and Senior Managers with strategic regarding the remuneration of non-executive Directors
responsibilities. participating in Board Committees and the definition of
Implementation of the 2019 Remuneration Policy, the remuneration of the Chairman and the Chief
according to what has been verified by the Executive Officer-CEO. Based on the evaluation

\ 28
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina 29

SECTION II - COMPENSATION AND OTHER INFORMATION

expressed by the Committee, the 2019 Policy is in line the relevant item of Table No. 1 of the chapter
with the market benchmarks. “Compensation paid in 2019”.

Fixed compensation Remuneration for service

on Board Committees
Directors
The Chairman was paid compensation for his office in Non-executive Directors were paid the additional
the light of the powers given by the Board of Directors remuneration due for service on Board Committees,
of June 28, 2018. This compensation includes that for according to the resolution of the Board of Directors
the office of Director approved by the Shareholders’ dated June 28, 2018, increased with respect to the
Meeting on May 3, 2018. The Chairman was also paid previous mandate and below the market median,
the compensation for the post of Chairman of the according to the criterion of differentiation between
Corporate Governance Committee and Scenarios. the Chairman and other members.
The non-executive Directors were paid the fixed Remuneration for service on Board Committees is
remuneration resolved by the Shareholders’ Meeting shown in Table No. 1 of the section “Compensation
on May 3, 2018. paid in 2019”.
The Chief Executive Officer-CEO was paid the fee
resolved by the Board of Directors on June 28, 2018.
This compensation paid includes the amount for the Variable incentives
position of Director, approved by the Shareholders’
Meeting of May 3, 2018, in continuity with the previous Variable short-term incentives
mandate. Saipem results for 2019, evaluated in terms of
business continuity and approved by the Board of
Statutory Auditors Directors at the proposal of the Compensation and
The Statutory Auditors were paid the fixed Nomination Committee in the meeting held on March
remuneration resolved by the Shareholders’ Meeting 12, 2020, generated a performance score equal to
on April 28, 2017. 118.83 points on the measurement scale used, which
sets the minimum performance level at 70 points and
Senior Managers with strategic responsibilities the maximum level at 130 points.
For Senior Managers with strategic responsibilities, as The table shows the weights, the economic result and
part of the annual salary review envisaged for all the performance level reached by each target in terms
managers, in 2019 adjustments were made to the fixed of weighted points.
remuneration for positions whose perimeter of In accordance with the 2019 Remuneration Policy
responsibility has increased or are placed below the Guidelines, the performance score achieved allowed
average market benchmarks. for the activation of the annual monetary incentive
In 2019, extraordinary one-off payments were also system for the Chief Executive Officer-CEO. For the
made connected with excellent quality performances purposes of the variable remuneration, as regards
for particularly important projects, for a total amount of Senior Managers with strategic responsibilities, the
€27,000. short-term incentive referred to performance in 2019
The sums for fixed remuneration and, as regards and paid out in 2020, calculated in line with the
employment salaries, for indemnities covered under remuneration Policy, is connected to the company’s
the national contract for senior managers and under results and the individual objectives assigned based on
supplementary company agreements, are specified in the responsibilities of the role, in line with the Saipem

2019 TARGETS FOR THE 2020 INCENTIVE PLAN

Weight Minimum Central Maximum Final results Score

(Mln €)

1. Adjusted Free Cash Flow 35% 760 45.5

2. Adjusted EBITA 30% 1,065 34.33

3. New Contracts 20% 19,747 26

4. HSE, Risk Management 15% Min/Med 86.66

and Sustainability

N.B. I valori economici sono ante IFRS.

\ 29
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina 30

SAIPEM 2020 REPORT ON SAIPEM’S REMUNERATION POLICY AND PAID COMPENSATION

2019 performance plan. For the purposes of the 689,800 as part of the target incentive levels allocated
variable remuneration, the overall performance results by the Plan to the managerial population of Saipem.
in the payment of bonuses to the Senior Managers The number of Saipem shares to be allocated to each
with strategic responsibilities, calculated with regard to beneficiary is determined on the basis of a value equal
the specific performances achieved depending on the to a predefined percentage of the fixed remuneration
levels of incentive applied, differentiated based on the connected to the role covered and with respect to the
position held, up to a maximum of 55.8% of the fixed price of allocation of the Saipem shares.
remuneration, taking account of the target levels of The Shares subject to the allocation to the Chief
incentive (45%) and maximum levels (58.5%) assigned. Executive Officer-CEO and the Senior Managers with
Saipem results for 2018, evaluated in terms of strategic responsibilities are reported in Table No. 1 of
business continuity and approved by the Board of scheme 7 of Annex 3A of Regulation No. 11971/1999,
Directors at the proposal of the Compensation and according to the requirements of Article 84-bis (Annex
Nomination Committee in the meeting held on March 3A, scheme No. 7) of the Consob Issuers Regulation,
11, 2019, generated a performance score equal to 130 with the associated detail in Table No. 3A of the
points on the measurement scale used, which sets the chapter “Compensation paid in 2019”.
minimum performance level at 70 points and the
maximum level at 130 points. In accordance with the
2018 Remuneration Policy Guidelines, the Benefits
performance score achieved allowed for the activation
of the annual monetary incentive system for the Chief Table No. 1 of the chapter “Compensation paid in
Executive Officer-CEO. 2019” shows the taxable value of benefits paid in
For the purposes of the variable remuneration, as 2019, in particular with reference to the following
regards Senior Managers with strategic benefits: (i) annual contribution to the supplementary
responsibilities, the short-term incentive referred to pension fund FOPDIRE or PREVINDAI; (ii) annual
performance in 2018 and paid out in 2019, was contribution to the supplementary healthcare fund
calculated in line with the Remuneration Policy and is FISDE; (iii) company car for business and personal use
connected to the company’s results and the individual (annual value net of the contribution paid by the
objectives assigned based on the responsibilities of assignee); (iv) taxable amount for weekly round trip
the role, in line with the Saipem 2018 performance flights between Milan and Rome (only for the Chief
plan. For the purposes of the variable remuneration, Executive Officer-CEO).
the overall performance resulted in the payment of
bonuses to the Senior Managers with strategic
responsibilities, calculated with regard to the specific Accessory remuneration instruments
performances achieved depending on the levels of
incentive applied, differentiated based on the position Indemnities for termination of office
held, up to a maximum of 58.4% of the fixed or termination or employment
remuneration, taking account of the target levels of During 2019 no indemnities for termination of office
incentive (45%) and maximum levels (58.5%) assigned. were deliberated and/or paid to Directors and other
The incentives awarded to the Senior Managers with Senior Managers with strategic responsibilities.
strategic responsibilities are indicated under the item
“Non-equity variable compensation/bonuses and other Non-competition agreements
incentives” in Table No. 1, and detailed in Table No. 3 of For the Senior Managers with strategic responsibilities,
the section “Compensation paid in 2019”. in line with the 2019 Remuneration Policy Guidelines,
specific remuneration may be envisaged for cases
Share-based Variable Long-Term Incentives where the need is found to enter into non-competition
In line with the 2019 Remuneration Policy Guidelines agreements for a maximum amount corresponding to
and contractual conditions relative to the 2018-2021 12 months of the global annual remuneration per year
mandate connected with the office of Chief Executive of the agreement.
Officer-CEO approved by the Board of Directors on In 2019, the total gross amount of €658,000 was paid
June 28, 2018 and May 16, 2019, with regard to the for portions of non-competition agreements.
2019-2021 Share-based Variable Long-Term Incentive
Plan, according to the criteria and methods defined by Minimum term agreements
the Board of Directors on March 11, 2019 and For the Senior Managers with strategic responsibilities,
approved by the Shareholders’ Meeting on April 30, in line with the 2019 Remuneration Policy Guidelines,
2019, the Board of Directors resolved at its meeting of minimum term agreements may be required to protect
October 23, 2019, the number of Shares subject to the the know-how with the goal of guaranteeing continuity
2019 allocation in favour of the Chief Executive in the achievement of business objectives for a
Officer-CEO to be 243,900 Saipem SpA ordinary maximum amount corresponding to 12 months of the
Shares, equal to 100% of the fixed remuneration. global annual remuneration per year of the agreement.
Senior Managers with strategic responsibilities were In 2019, the total gross amount of €300,000 was paid
allocated for 2019 a number of Shares equal to for portions of minimum term agreements.

\ 30
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina 31

SECTION II - COMPENSATION AND OTHER INFORMATION

Compensation paid in 2019 ≥ the column “Non-equity variable compensation”

shows, under “Bonuses and other incentives”, the
Table 1 - Compensation paid incentives due for the year for accrual of the
to Directors, Statutory Auditors corresponding rights, following verification and
and to Senior Managers approval of the corresponding performance results
with strategic responsibilities by the relevant corporate bodies, as specified in
detail in Table n. 3B “Monetary Incentive Plan for
The following table shows remuneration paid to Directors and other Senior Managers with strategic
Directors and Statutory Auditors, who are listed by responsibilities”; the column “Profit sharing” does not
name, and remuneration paid to Senior Managers with report any amount since no profit sharing schemes
strategic responsibilities14, which is shown on an are envisaged;
aggregated basis. Separate indication is supplied for ≥ the column “Non-monetary benefits” shows the
compensation received from subsidiaries and/or taxable value of fringe benefits assigned;
associated companies, not including those renounced ≥ the column “Other compensation” shows any other
or paid into the Company. All persons who held the compensation paid pertaining to the year and
above-mentioned positions in the year are included in relating to other services performed;
the table, even if they only held such office for a part of ≥ the column “Total” shows the total of the preceding
the year. items;
In particular: ≥ the column “Fair value of equity compensation”
≥ the column “Fixed compensation” shows fixed shows the fair value for the year of stock grant plans
emoluments and remuneration for employed work in place as estimated in accordance with
due for the year. The amounts shown are gross International Financial Reporting Standards which
before deductions for social security and tax payable require costs to be distributed over the vesting
by the employee. They do not include attendance period, as further detailed in Table No. 3A, “Incentive
fees. The footnote provides details of compensation, plans based on financial instruments other than
as well as a separate indication of any allowances stock options payable to Directors and to Senior
and other entitlements related to employment; Managers with strategic responsibilities”;
≥ the column “Compensation for service on board ≥ the column “Indemnities for termination of office or
Committees” shows compensation pertaining to the employment” show indemnities accrued, including
year paid to Directors for participation in indemnities not yet paid, in relation to termination of
Committees created by the Board. The footnote office and/or employment or termination in the
provides a separate indication of remuneration for course of the year.
each Committee on which the Director sits;

(14) There is no current legal requirement for disclosure on an individual basis.

\ 31
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina 32

SAIPEM 2020 REPORT ON SAIPEM’S REMUNERATION POLICY AND PAID COMPENSATION

Table 1. Compensation paid to members of management and control bodies

and Senior Managers with strategic responsibilities
(€ thousand)
Non-equity variable
compensation

Indemnities for termination

of office or employment
of equity compensation
on board Committees

Other compensation
Fixed compensation
Name and Surname

Bonuses and other

Expiry of term (*)
Period of office

Compensation

Non-monetary
Profit sharing
for service

incentives

Fair value
Remarks

benefits

Total
Board of Directors
Caio Francesco Chairman (1) 01.01-31.12 2021 428 (a) 29 (b) 456
Cao Stefano Chief Executive Officer-CEO (2) 01.01-31.12 2021 1,045 (a) 1,118 (b) 19 (c) 2,181 850
Cappello Maria Elena Director (3) 01.01-31.12 2021 60 (a) 20 (b) 80
Schapira Paul Director (4) 01.01-31.12 2021 60 (a) 53 (b) 113
Carloni Claudia Director (5) 01.01-31.12 2021 60 (a) 20 (b) 80
Fumagalli Paolo Director (6) 01.01-31.12 2021 60 (a) 39 (b) 99
Mazzilli Ines Maria Lina Director (7) 01.01-31.12 2021 60 (a) 43 (b) 103
Ferro-Luzzi Federico Director (8) 01.01-31.12 2021 60 (a) 39 (b) 99
Latini Pierfrancesco Director (9) 01.11-31.12 2021 60 (a) 34 (b) 94
Board of Statutory Auditors
Busso Mario Chairman (10) 01.01-31.12 2020 70 (a) 70
De Martino Giulia Statutory Auditor (11) 01.01-31.12 2020 50 (a) 50
Perotta Riccardo Statutory Auditor (12) 01.01-31.12 2020 50 (a) 50
Senior Managers
with strategic responsibilities (**) (13) 4,597 (a) 2,192 (b) 152 (c) 531 (d) 7,472 1,659
6,660 275 3,309 171 531 10,946 2,509
(*) Term of office of Directors appointed by Shareholders’ Meeting on May 3, 2018 expires at Shareholders’ Meeting convened to approve the financial statements at December 31, 2020.
(**) All Senior Managers that are required to serve on the Advisory Committee and in any case all direct reports of the Chief Executive Officer-CEO (thirteen Senior Managers).
(1) Caio Francesco - Chairman
(a) Includes the fixed compensation set by the Board of Directors’ Meeting of June 28, 2018 (€427,500) which includes the compensation for the office of Director set by the
Shareholders’ Meeting of May 3, 2018 (€60,000).
(b) The amount corresponds to compensation as Chairman of the Corporate Governance Committee and Scenarios (€28,500).
(2) Cao Stefano - Chief Executive Officer-CEO
(a) Includes the fixed compensation for the 2018-2021 mandate approved by the Board of Directors’ Meeting of June 28, 2018 (€1,045,000), which includes the compensation for the
office of Chief Executive Officer-CEO set by the Shareholders’ Meeting (€60,000).
(b) The amount, indicated for the year, is resolved by the Board of Directors’ Meeting of March 12, 2020 as the 2020 short-term incentive referred to performance in 2019, to be paid
after this Report is approved. In the course of 2019, the amount of €1,222,500 was paid for the 2019 short-term incentive referred to performance in 2018.
(3) Cappello Maria Elena - Director
(a) The amount corresponds to the fixed Board meeting fees (€60,000).
(b) The amount corresponds to compensation for serving on the Corporate Governance Committee and Scenarios (€19,500), approved by the Board of Directors’ Meeting of June 28,
2018.
(4) Schapira Paul - Director
(a) The amount corresponds to the fixed Board meeting fees (€60,000).
(b) The amount corresponds to compensation for serving on the Compensation and Nomination Committee (€19,500) and the Audit and Risk Committee (€33,500), approved by the Board
of Directors’ Meeting of June 28, 2018.
(5) Carloni Claudia - Director
(a) The amount corresponds to the fixed Board meeting fees (€60,000).
(b) The amount corresponds to compensation for serving on the Corporate Governance Committee and Scenarios (€19,500), approved by the Board of Directors’ Meeting of June 28,
2018.
(6) Fumagalli Paolo - Director
(a) The amount corresponds to the fixed Board meeting fees (€60,000).
(b) The amount corresponds to compensation for the role of Chairman of the Compensation and Nomination Committee (€28,500), approved by the Board of Directors’ Meeting of June
28, 2018, to which is added the pro-quota award of compensation for serving on the Associated Parties Committee (€10,861,000), approved by the Board of Directors’ Meeting of July
24, 2018.
(7) Mazzilli Ines Maria Lina - Director
(a) The amount corresponds to the fixed Board meeting fees (€60,000).
(b) The amount corresponds to compensation for the role of Chairman of the Audit and Risk Committee (€42,500), approved by the Board of Directors’ Meeting of June 28, 2018.
(8) Federico Ferro-Luzzi - Director
(a) The amount corresponds to the fixed Board meeting fees (€60,000).
(b) The amount corresponds to compensation for serving on the Compensation and Nomination Committee (€19,500) and the Corporate Governance Committee and Scenarios (€19,500),
approved by the Board of Directors’ Meeting of June 28, 2018.
(9) Latini Pierfrancesco - Director
(a) The amount corresponds to the fixed Board meeting fees (€60,000).
(b) The amount corresponds to compensation for serving on the Audit and Risk Committee (€33,500), approved by the Board of Directors’ Meeting of June 28, 2018.
(10) Busso Mario - Chairman of the Board of Statutory Auditors
(a) The amount corresponds to the fixed Board meeting fees (€70,000).
(11) De Martino Giulia - Statutory Auditor
(a) The amount corresponds to the fixed Board meeting fees (€50,000).
(12) Perotta Riccardo - Statutory Auditor
(a) The amount corresponds to the fixed Board meeting fees (€50,000).
(13) Senior Managers with strategic responsibilities
(a) To the amount of €4,597,000 for gross annual compensation, allowances for assignments in Italy and overseas can be added that are in line with the national contract for Senior
Managers and with supplementary company agreements, and other compensation included in the employment contract for a total amount of €53,900.
(b) The amount, indicated for the year, includes the estimate of the 2020 short-term incentive referred to performance in 2019, to be paid after this Report is approved, as well as
payment of extraordinary bonuses for €27,000. In the course of 2019, the amount of €1,934,000 was paid for the 2019 short-term incentive referred to performance in 2018.
(c) The amount includes the valuation of automobile benefits and supplementary health insurance and supplementary pension fund paid by the company.
(d) The amount includes paid holidays, minimum term agreements and other allowances included in the employment contract.

\ 32
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina 33

SECTION II - COMPENSATION AND OTHER INFORMATION

Table 3A - Incentive plans based on implementation of the Share-based Long-Term

financial instruments other than Incentive Plans;
stock options, payable to Directors ≥ the column “Fair value at date of assignment” shows
and Senior Managers the total fair value of stock grant plans in place at the
with strategic responsibilities date of the allocation promise;
≥ the column “Vesting period” shows the vesting
The following table shows, on an individual basis, period for long-term monetary incentives awarded
variable long-term monetary incentives based on during the year;
financial instruments other than stock options payable ≥ the column “Fair value pertaining to the year” shows
to the Chief Executive Officer-CEO and, as an the fair value of stock grant plans in place as
aggregated figure, to SMSR. estimated in accordance with International Financial
In particular: Reporting Standards which require costs to be
≥ the column “Number and type of financial distributed over the vesting period.
instruments” indicates the number of free shares The total of the column “Fair value pertaining to the
subject to promised allocation during the year, in year” corresponds with the amount indicated in Table
No. 1.

Table 3A - Incentive plans based on financial instruments other than stock options
payable to Directors and to Senior Managers with strategic responsibilities

Financial
Financial instruments
instruments vested Financial
Financial instruments vested during instruments
assigned in previous years during the year pertaining
(€ thousand) not vested during the year Financial instruments assigned during the year the year to be allocated to the year
Name and Surname

Fair value at date

Number and type

Number and type

Number and type

Number and type

Assignment date

on assignment
Vesting period

Vesting period
of assignment

of maturation
Value at date
Market price
instruments

instruments

instruments

instruments
of financial

of financial

of financial

of financial

Fair value
Office

Plan

Stefano Cao Chief Executive 2019 Long-term

Officer-CEO Incentive Plan
BoD, October 23, 2019 243,900 1,293 three-year (2) Oct. 23, 19 4.029 69
2018 Long-term
Incentive Plan
BoD, March 5, 2018
BoD, July 24, 2018 619,430 three-year (3) 428
2017 Long-term
Incentive Plan
BoD, July 24, 2017 397,500 three-year (3) 353
2016 Long-term
Incentive Plan
BoD, July 27, 2016 365,349 (*) (5)

Senior Managers 2019 Long-term

with strategic Incentive Plan
responsibilities (1) BoD, October 23, 2019 689,800 3,657 three-year (4) Oct. 23, 19 4.029 196
2018 Long-term
Incentive Plan
BoD, July 24, 2018 962,300 three-year (4) 720
2017 Long-term
Incentive Plan
BoD, July 24, 2017 842,500 three-year (4) 743
2016 Long-term
Incentive Plan
BoD, July 27, 2016 564,589 (*) (5)

Total 933,700 4,950 2,509

(*) The number of financial instruments subject to the promised 2016 allocation has been updated by virtue of the resolution passed by the Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting held on April
28, 2017 which established the grouping of the ordinary and savings shares with a ratio of one new ordinary share for every 10 (ten) existing ordinary shares.
(1) All Senior Managers that are required to serve on the Advisory Committee and in any case all direct reports of the Chief Executive Officer-CEO (11 for senior managers for the plan
implemented in 2016, 12 for senior managers for the plan implemented in 2017, 13 for senior managers for the plan implemented in 2018, 14 for senior managers for the plan implemented
in 2019).
(2) At the end of the vesting period the plan establishes that the Chief Executive Officer-CEO cannot dispose of 25% of the matured shares for a further two years (co-investment), at the end
of which the Chief Executive Officer-CEO will receive an addition free share for every share co-invested.
(3) At the end of the vesting period the plan requires that 25% of the matured shares be subject to a lock-up period of two years.
(4) At the end of the vesting period the plan establishes that the strategic resources cannot dispose of 25% of the matured shares for a further two years (retention premium), at the end
of which the beneficiaries will receive an addition free share for every share invested.
(5) The fair value for the year referred to the 2016 assignment is zero since the portion recognised in the course of the year represents the transfer of costs from previous years.

\ 33
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina 34

SAIPEM 2020 REPORT ON SAIPEM’S REMUNERATION POLICY AND PAID COMPENSATION

Table 3B - Monetary incentive plans by the competent company bodies in relation to the
for Directors targets set for the previous year;
and other Senior Managers ≥ the column “Bonus from previous years - to be paid
with strategic responsibilities out/paid out” shows the short-term incentive paid
out in the year, accrued on the basis of the evaluated
The following table shows, on an individual basis, the fulfilment of the performance conditions for the
variable short and long-term monetary incentives previous year;
payable to the Chief Executive Officer-CEO and (as an ≥ the column “Other bonuses” shows incentives paid
aggregated figure) to SMSR. All persons who held the out on an extraordinary one-off basis in relation to
above-mentioned positions during the reporting period the achievement of particularly important results or
are included in the table, even if they only held such projects during the year.
office for a part of the year. The total of the columns “Annual bonus - to be paid
In particular: out/paid out”, “Bonuses from previous years - to be
≥ the column “Annual bonus - to be paid out/paid out” paid out/paid out” and “Other bonuses” corresponds to
shows the variable short-term incentive for the year the figure show in column “Bonuses and other
accrued on the basis of performance, as evaluated incentives” of No. Table 1.

Table 3B. Monetary incentive plan for Directors and Senior Managers with strategic responsibilities
(€ thousand) Annual bonus Bonuses from previous years
Name and Surname

No longer payable
Deferral period
To be paid out/

To be paid out/

Other bonuses
Still deferred
Deferred
paid out

paid out
Office

Plan

Stefano Cao Chief Executive 2020 Short-term Incentive Plan

Officer-CEO BoD, March 12, 2020 1,118
2019 Short-term Incentive Plan
BoD, March 11, 2019 1,223
Senior Managers 2020 Short-term Incentive Plan
with strategic responsibilities (1) BoD, March 12, 2020 2,165
2019 Short-term Incentive Plan
BoD, March 11, 2019 1,934
Total 3,282 3,157 27

(1) All Senior Managers that are required to serve on the Advisory Committee and in any case all direct reports of the Chief Executive Officer-CEO (13 senior managers).

\ 34
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina 35

SECTION II - COMPENSATION AND OTHER INFORMATION

Shares held directly or through subsidiary companies, fiduciaries or

third parties, as per the Shareholders Register,
Table 4 - Shares held by Directors communications received or other information
and other Senior Managers received from the persons concerned.
with strategic responsibilities The table includes all persons that held office for whole
or a part of the year.
Pursuant to Article 84-quater, paragraph 4 of the The number of Shares (all of which are “ordinary”) is
Consob Issuers Regulation, the following table shows indicated on an individual basis for Directors and
shares held in Saipem SpA by the Directors, Statutory Statutory Auditors and on an aggregated basis for
Auditors and other Senior Managers with strategic Senior Managers with strategic responsibilities.
responsibilities, as well as by their spouses, where not All shares are held as personal property.
legally separated, and by their minor children, either

Table 4. Shareholdings of members of management and control bodies

and of other senior managers with strategic responsibilities

at end of previous year

Number of shares held

Number of shares held

Number of shares sold

at end of current year

Name and Surname

Number of shares
purchased
Company
Office

Board of Directors
Stefano Cao Chief Executive Officer-CEO Saipem SpA 29,000 29,000
Riccardo Perotta Statutory Auditor Saipem SpA 18,400 18,400
Other Senior Managers
with strategic responsibilities (1) Saipem SpA 24,484 3,600 28,084
(1) All Senior Managers that are required to serve on the Advisory Committee and in any case all direct reports of the Chief Executive Officer-CEO (thirteen senior
managers). The number of shares held at the end of the previous financial year takes into account those also held by senior managers who became strategic during 2019.

\ 35
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina 36

SAIPEM 2020 REPORT ON SAIPEM’S REMUNERATION POLICY AND PAID COMPENSATION

Annex pursuant to Article 84-bis of the Consob Issuers’ Regulation

- Implementation for 2019 of the Share-based Variable
Long-Term Incentive Plan 2019-2021 (LTI)

With reference to the 2019-2021 Share-based www.saipem.com, the following table provides the
Variable Long-Term Incentive Plan approved by the details of the 2019 allocation for the Plan, pursuant to
Shareholders’ Meeting on April 30, 2019, in conformity Article 84-bis (Annex 3A, scheme No. 7) of the Consob
with the conditions and objectives illustrated in the Issuers’ Regulation.
Information Document available on the internet site

Table No. 1 of scheme 7 in Annex 3A of Regulation No. 11971/1999

Box 1 - Financial instruments other than stock options
Section 2 - Newly allocated instruments based on decisions made by the relevant company body
to implement a resolution of the Shareholders’ Meeting
Name and Surname

Number of financial
Date of resolution

Assignment date
named subjects)

Type of financial
(include only for

Purchase price
of instruments

Vesting period
Market price
instruments

instruments
or category

assignment
Office held

Stefano Cao Chief Executive Officer-CEO April 30, 2019 stock grant 243.900 Oct. 23, 19 4.029 3 years (2)
Senior Managers with
strategic responsibilities (1) April 30, 2019 stock grant 689.800 Oct. 23, 19 4.029 3 years (3)
Other Senior Managers April 30, 2019 stock grant 3.258.800 Oct. 23, 19 4.029 3 years (3)

(1) All Senior Managers that are required to serve on the Advisory Committee and in any case all direct reports of the Chief Executive Officer-CEO (thirteen senior
managers).
(2) At the end of the vesting period the plan establishes that the Chief Executive Officer-CEO cannot dispose of 25% of the matured shares for a further two years
(co-investment), at the end of which the Chief Executive Officer-CEO will receive an addition free share for every share co-invested.
(3) At the end of the vesting period the plan establishes that the strategic resources cannot dispose of 25% of the matured shares for a further two years (retention
premium), at the end of which the beneficiaries will receive an addition free share for every share invested.

\ 36
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina III

Società per Azioni

Share Capital €2,191,384,693 fully paid up
Tax identification number and Milan, Monza-Brianza,
Lodi Companies’ Register No. 00825790157

Headquarters: San Donato Milanese (Milan) - Italy

Via Martiri di Cefalonia, 67
Information for Shareholders
Saipem SpA, Via Martiri di Cefalonia, 67
20097 San Donato Milanese (Milan) - Italy

Relations with institutional investors and financial analysts

Fax +39-0244254295
E-mail: [email protected]

Publications
Relazione finanziaria annuale (in Italian) drawn up
in accordance with Italian Legislative Decree No. 127
of April 9, 1991
Annual Report (in English)

Relazione finanziaria semestrale consolidata

al 30 giugno (in Italian)
Interim Financial Report as of June 30
(in English)

Making change possible - Sustainability Report 2019

(in English)

Also available on Saipem’s website: www.saipem.com

Website: www.saipem.com
Operator: +39-024421

Layout and supervision: Studio Joly Srl - Rome - Italy

Printing:
01-36RelRemSaipem20Ing.qxd 3-04-2020 19:19 Pagina IV

saipem spa
Via Martiri di Cefalonia, 67
20097 San Donato Milanese (MI)

saipem.com