HAZOP - Procedure

Start Finish
YES
Select a component NO All components analysed?
YES
NO
Select a flow All flows analysed?
YES
Suggest a deviation NO
All guide words considered?
using a guide word

Record as non-hazardous Record as hazard. Make

Investigate and
deviation, with a recommendations for
document causes
justification action if necessary

Investigate and
Does deviation have plausible
document effects
NO causes and hazardous effects? YES
 HAZOP Guidewords
No or Not No part of the intention is achieved
e.g. No flow to the reactor
More Quantitative increase in the intent
e.g. More flow to the reactor
Less Quantitative decrease in the intent
e.g. Less flow to the reactor
As well as All intentions achieved, but with additional
effects e.g. Impurities in flow (air, water)
Part of Only some of the intention is achieved
e.g. Part of the reactants to the reactor
Reverse Exact opposite of the intention
e.g. Reverse flow into the reactor
Other than Complete substitution
e.g. Another material besides reactants
in the reactor
Common HAZOP Parameters
Flow Frequency
Pressure Viscosity
Temperature Voltage
Level Information
Time Mixing
Composition Addition
pH Separation
Speed Reaction
Guide word and process parameter combination

Process No, More Less As Part Reverse Other

parameter None well of than
as
Flow x x x x x x x
Temperature x x
Pressure x x x
Concentration x x x x x x
pH x x
Viscosity x x

x represent valid combination

HAZOP Example – a P&ID
Valve (normally closed during
Manually operated valve Pump
operation of the plant)

Valve (normally open during Automation (level

operation of the plant)
Non-return valve LC controller)

LC
Hydrocarbon PG
from storage

Drain PG

Settling tank

Transfer pumps To reactor

Drain (one working, one spare) Drain
HAZOP Example – output
Guide Deviation Possible Causes Consequences Action Required
Word
No hydrocarbon available Loss of feed to reactor. 1) Ensure good
from storage communication with storage
NO No flow area
2) Install low level alarm on
settling tank
Transfer pump fails (motor
fault, loss of power, impeller As above Covered by 2)

corroded etc.)

Level control valve (LCV) 3) Install high level alarm

fails to open, or LCV Settling tank overfills 4) Check size of overflow
5) Establish locking-off
MORE More flow bypassed in error
procedure for LCV bypass
when not in use

Isolation valve or LCV Line subjected to full 6) Install kickback on pumps

More
closed when pump running pump pressure
pressure
High intermediate storage Higher pressure in 7) Install warning of high
More temperature transfer line and settling temperature at intermediate
temperature storage
tank
 HAZOP Example – Reactor

An exothermic reaction controlled by cooling water

HAZOP study is performed on this unit to improve the safety of the
process. Using study nodes as the cooling coil (process parameter: flow
and temperature) and the stirrer (Process parameter: agitation)
Item Study node Process Deviati- Possible causes Possible Action required
paramet- ons consequences
ers (guide
words)

1. 1A 1. Cooling 1. Flow 1. No 1. Control valve fails 1. Loss of cooling, 1. Select valve to fail open
coils closed possible 2. Install filter with
2. Plugged cooling coils runaway maintenance procedure
3. Cooling water 2. –do- Install cooling water
service failure 3. –do- flow meter and low flow
4. Controller fails and 4. –do- alarm. Install high
closes valve 5. –do- temperature alarm to
5. Air pressure fails, alert operator
closing valve 3. Check and monitor
reliability of water
service
4. Place controller on
critical instrumentation
list
5. See 1A.1

1. 1B 1. High 1. Control valve fails 1. Reactor cools, 1. Instruct operators and

open reactant conc. update procedures
2. Controller fails and builds, possible 2. See 1A-4
opens valve runaway on
heating
2. – do -
1. 1C 1. Low 1. Partially 1. Diminished 1. See 1A.2
plugged cooling, possible 2. See 1A.2
cooling line runaway 3. Place valve on critical
2. Partial water 2. –do- instrumentation list
source failure 3. –do-
3. Control valve
fails to
respond
1D As well 1. Contamination of water 1. Not possible here 1. None
as supply
1E Part of 1. Covered under 1C
1F Reverse 1. Failure on water source 1. Loss of cooling, 1. See1A.2
resulting in backflow possible runaway 2. Install check calve
2. Backflow due to high 2. –do-
backpressure
1G Other 1. Not considered possible
than,
1K Tempera Low 1 Low water supply 1. None; controller 1. None
ture temperature handles
1L High 1. High water supply 1. Cooling system 1. Install high flow
temperature capacity limited alarm and/or cooling
temp. increases water high temp. alarm
2A Stirre Agitatio No 1. Stirrer motor malfunction 1. No mixing, 1. Interlock with feed
r n 2. Power failure possible line
accumulation of 2. Monomer feed valve
unreacted materials must fail closed on
2. Monomer feed power loss
continues, possible
accumulation of
unreacted materials
2B More 1. Stirrer motor controller 1. None
fails, resulting in high motor
speed
Hazard and operability study report

Project title: Sheet of

Project number: Date:

P&ID number: Chairman:

Line number: Study team:

Guide Deviation Cause Conseque Safeguards Action

word nces
Num By Details Reply
ber accepted
HAZOP Action Sheet
Project: Project no: Action no:

P&ID no: Date: Tape ref:

Action no: Date for reply:

Description:

Reply:

Signed: Date:

Issued Returned Complete

Return completed form to:

HAZOP Advantages
Meets regulatory requirements

Plant operates better

Less down time

Product quality improved

Employees are happier

HAZOP Weakness
HAZOP is very time consuming and can be laborious
with a tendency for boredom for analysts.
It tends to be hardware-oriented and process-oriented,
although the technique should be amenable to human
error application.
It tends to generate many failure events with
insignificance consequences and generate many failure
events which have the same consequences.
It stifles brainstorming although this is not required at
the late stage of design when it is normally applied.
HAZOP does not identify all causes of deviations and
therefore omits many scenarios.
HAZOP Weakness
It takes little account of the probabilities of events or
consequences, although quantitative assessment are
sometime added. The group generally let their collective
experiences decide whether deviations are meaningful.
HAZOP is poor where multiple-combination events can
have severe effects.
It tends to assume defects or deterioration of materials of
construction will not arise.
When identifying consequences, HAZOP tends to
encourage listing these as resulting in action by
emergency control measures without considering that
such action might fail. It tends to ignore the contribution
which can be made by operator interventions.
HAZOP Purpose
It emphasizes upon the operating integrity of a system,
thereby leading methodically to most potential and
detectable deviations which could conceivably arise in
the course of normal operating routine
including "start-up " and "shut-down" procedures
as well as steady-state operations.
It is important to remember at all times that HAZOP is
an identifying technique and not intended as a means
of solving problems nor is the method intended to be
used solely as an undisciplined means of searching for
hazardous scenarios.