ADOLF|BEA|CELINE|CHEERLY|CZARINA|DARYL|DON|EASTER|GIGI|GRACE|HAZELLE|JANUSZ|JODELLE|KAYE|LARIELA|MANNY|MARA|MARIA|RYNNAH

MARCOS V. HEIRS OF ANDRES NAVARRO – BRONDIAL

MARCOS V. HEIRS OF NAVARRO (2013)
Sps. Navarro, during their lifetime, acquired several parcels of land, including the one involved in this case. They left behind three
children, Luisa, Lydia, and Andres Jr. Luisa and Lydia found out that Andres' heirs are claiming exclusive ownership of the lot in question,
citing an Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property (donation) allegedly executed by Andres Sr. They sought the examination of PNP
handwriting expert PO2 Mary Grace Alvarez found that Andres, Sr.’s signature on the affidavit and the submitted standard signatures of
Andres, Sr. PO2 Alvarez found that it was a forgery. As a result, plaintiffs- petitioners filed an action for annulment of the deed of
donation.
After the pre-trial, respondents moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a witness. They argued that the RTC did not authorize the
handwriting examination of the affidavit. They added that presenting PO2 Alvarez as a witness will violate their
constitutional right to due process since no notice was given to them before the examination was conducted.

RTC – granted the motion [hearsay as she has no personal knowledge of the alleged handwriting of Andres, Sr. Also, there is no
need for PO2 Alvarez to be presented, if she is to be presented as an expert witness, because her testimony is not yet needed.]
CA – dismissed the petition [the dismissal of the case has mooted the issue of PO2 Alvarez’s disqualification as a witness.]
CA on MR – dismissed the petition [refused to take judicial notice of the decision of another CA Division which reinstated Civil
Case No. 5215. The CA held that a CA Justice cannot take judicial notice of decisions or matters pending before another Division
of the appellate court where he or she is not a member. The CA also held that the sisters were negligent for belatedly informing it
that Civil Case No. 5215 was reinstated.]

Issues/Held:
1. WON the CA should have taken judicial notice of the reinstatement of the case. YES, it should have.
2. WON there was GAD by the RTC in disqualifying PO2 Alvarez as a witness. YES, there was.

Ratio:
The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability other than those mentioned in
the Rules. It is a maxim of recognized utility and merit in the construction of statutes that an express exception, exemption, or
saving clause excludes other exceptions. x x x As a general rule, where there are express exceptions these comprise the only
limitations on the operation of a statute and no other exception will be implied. x x x The Rules should not be interpreted to include
an exception not embodied therein.

As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive and make known her perception to others. We have no doubt that
she is qualified as a witness. She cannot be disqualified as a witness since she possesses none of the disqualifications specified
under the Rules. Respondents’ motion to disqualify her should have been denied by the RTC for it was not based on any of these
grounds for disqualification. The RTC rather confused the qualification of the witness with the credibility and weight of her testimony.
The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon
the assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false
specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer.
Thus, we disagree with the RTC that PO2 Alvarez’s testimony would be hearsay. Under Section 49, Rule 130 of theRules on Evidence,
PO2 Alvarez is allowed to render an expert opinion, as the PNP document examiner was allowed inTamani. But the RTC already ruled at
the outset that PO2 Alvarez’s testimony is hearsay even before her testimony is offered and she is called to the witness stand. Under
the circumstances, the CA should have issued a corrective writ of certiorari and annulled the RTC ruling Petition granted.

PEOPLE V. GOLIMLIM - BRONDIAL

PEOPLE V. GOLIMLIM (2004)
Mental retardate [sic] Evelyn was raped at knifepoint by her aunt's husband Salvador Golimlim. She tried to tell her aunt but the
latter did not believe her. She became pregnant by him, which was discovered and confirmed by her half-sister Lorna much
later. She was examined at Pascual General Hospital in Novaliches and also at the Municipal Health Office of Bulan, Sorsogon
where Evelyn was examined by Dr. Estrella Payoyo. Evelyn, assisted by Lorna, filed a criminal complaint for rape against
appellant before the Municipal Trial Court.

Appellant, on being confronted with the accusation, simply said that it is not true "[b]ecause her mind is not normal,"18 she
having "mentioned many other names of men who ha[d] sexual intercourse with her."1

RTC – found him guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, 50k each in actual and moral damages.

Issue/Held: WON the RTC erred in giving weight to Evelyn's testimony [couldn't remember specific date and time, but general
narration consistent and spontaneous]. NO, it did not.

Ratio:
No cogent reason can be appreciated to warrant a departure from the findings of the trial court with respect to the assessment
of Evelyn’s testimony.

That Evelyn is a mental retardate does not disqualify her as a witness nor render her testimony bereft of truth.
A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness, her mental condition not being a
vitiation of her credibility. It is now universally accepted that intellectual weakness, no matter what form it assumes, is not a
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valid objection to the competency of a witness so long as the latter can still give a fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative
of the matter testified to.
From a meticulous scrutiny of the records of this case, there is no reason to doubt Evelyn’s credibility. To be sure, her
testimony is not without discrepancies, given of course her feeblemindedness.
By the account of Dr. Chona Cuyos-Belmonte, Medical Specialist II at the Psychiatric Department of the Bicol Medical
Center, who examined Evelyn, although Evelyn was suffering from moderate mental retardation with an IQ of 46,30 she is
capable of perceiving and relating events which happened to her. [Interviewed alone several times and used different
questions and was given consistent answers.] Decision affirmed.

ALVAREZ V. RAMIREZ – BRONDIAL

ALVAREZ V. RAMIREZ (2005)
Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN for arson pending before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Malabon City. The accused is Maximo Alvarez, herein petitioner. He is the husband of Esperanza G.
Alvarez, sister of respondent. [Basically: complaining witness is the sister-in-law of the accused.] He tried to burn Susan's house knowing
that his wife was there (they were already separated for 6 months). Her sister Esperanza testified during trial and there was no objection
thereto. However, the proceedings were suspended because of her uncontrollable emotions. Only after such suspension did the counsel
for the defense file a motion to diqualify Esperanza based on 130.22 (marital disqualification).

RTC – granted the motion and disqualified her from testifying. Petition for certiorari filed before the CA
CA – granted the petition! Petition for review on certiorari before SC.

Issue/Held: WON Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN. YES, she can.

Ratio: The reasons given for the rule are:

1) There is identity of interests between husband and wife;
2) If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;
3) The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to
prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and
4) Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other.

But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and in
criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in
the excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule. For instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so
strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based
upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based
on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life, which the law aims at protecting,
will be nothing but ideals, which through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. Decision affirmed.

PEOPLE V. CASTANEDA- BRONDIAL

PEOPLE V. CASTANEDA (1979)
On the basis of the complaint of his wife, Victoria M. Manaloto, herein private respondent Benjamin Manaloto was charged before the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga, with the crime of Falsification of Public Document for forging signature of his spouse Victoria M.
Manaloto in a deed of sale executed by said accused wherein he sold a house and lot belonging to the conjugal partnership of said
spouse in favor of Ponciano Lacsamana notarized by Notary Public Gorospe.

At the trial, the prosecution called the complaint-wife to the witness stand but the defense moved to disqualify her as a witness,
invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130 .

The prosecution opposed said motion to disquality on the ground that the case falls under the exception to the rule, contending that it is a
criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other.

RTC – granted the motion and disqualified her as a witness. Petition for certiorari with a prayer for PI/TRO filed before SC by the fiscal.

Issue/Held: WON the case comes within the exception to the marital disqualification rule. YES, it does.

Ratio:
We sustain petitioner's stand that the case is an exception to the marital disqualification rule, as a criminal case for a crime committed by
the accused-husband against the witness-wife.
The act complained of as constituting the crime of Falsification of Public Document is the forgery by the accused of his wife's
signature in a deed of sale, thereby making it appear therein that said wife consented to the sale of a house and lot belongi ng to
their conjugal partnership when in fact and in truth she did not. It must be noted that had the sale of the said house and lot, and
the signing of the wife's name by her husband in the deed of sale, been made with the consent of the wife, no crime could ha ve
been charged against said husband Clearly, therefore, it is the husband's breach of his wife's confidence which gave rise
to the offense charged. And it is this same breach of trust which prompted the wife to make the necessary complaint with the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal which, accordingly, filed the aforesaid criminal case with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.

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To rule, therefore, that such criminal case is not one for a crime committed by one spouse against the other is to advance a
conclusion which completely disregards the factual antecedents of the instant case.

The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the is too narrow; and the rule that any offense remotely or
indirectly affecting domestic relations within the exception is too broad. The better rule is that, WHEN AN OFFENSE DIRECTLY
ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL RELATION, IT

COMES WITHIN THE EXCEPTION to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal
prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the other.

Finally, overriding considerations of public policy demand that the wife should not be disqualified from testifying against her
husband in the instant case. For, as aptly observed by the Solicitor General," (t)o espouse the contrary view would spawn the
dangerous precedent of a husband committing as many falsifications against his wife as he could conjure, seeking shelter in the
anti-marital privilege as a license to injure and prejudice her in secret

— all with unabashed and complete impunity. Petition granted; order set aside.

RAZON V. CA – BRONDIAL
RAZON V. IAC (1992)
The main issue in these consolidated petitions centers on the ownership of 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. registered under the
name of Juan T. Chuidian in the books of the corporation.

An action was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late Chuidian for the recovery of 1500 shares of stock in E.
Razon Co. which was in Razon's possession.

CFI – The CFI declared that Enrique Razon, the petitioner in G.R. No. 74306 is the owner of the said shares of stock.
IAC – The IAC, however, reversed the trial court's decision and ruled that Juan T. Chuidian, the deceased father of petitioner
Vicente B. Chuidian in G.R. No. 74315 is the owner of the shares of stock. Both parties filed separate motions for reconsideration.

Enrique Razon wanted the appellate court's decision reversed and the trial court's decision affirmed while Vicente Chuidian
asked that all cash and stock dividends and all the pre-emptive rights accruing to the 1,500 shares be ordered delivered to him.

Razon claims that after organizing the E. Razon, Inc., he distributed shares of stock previously placed in the names of the
withdrawing nominal incorporators to some friends including Juan T. Chuidian. The late Chuidian himself delivered the
certificates to him because it was Razon who paid for all the subscription on the shares of stock in the corporation and the
understanding was that he (defendant Razon) was the owner of the said shares of stock and was to have possession thereof
until such time as he was paid therefor by the other nominal incorporators/stockholders. These facts were contained in a
testimony by Razon, which was ultimately excluded by the appellate court for having gone against the Dead Man's
Statute.

Issue: Was the exclusion proper?

Held: NO, it was not.

Ratio: The rule is applicable to a case against the administrator or its representative of an estate upon a claim against the estate
of the deceased person. In this case, the action was brought by the administrator.

Also, even if it were within the prohibition, failure to object thereto constituted a valid waiver of said rule.
As to the ownership of stocks--in order for a transfer of stock certificate to be effective, the certificate must be properly indorsed and that
title to such certificate of stock is vested in the transferee by the delivery of the duly indorsed certificate of stock. (Section 35, Corporation
Code) Since the certificate of stock covering the questioned 1,500 shares of stock registered in the name of the late Juan Chuidian was
never indorsed to the petitioner, the inevitable conclusion is that the questioned shares of stock belong to Chuidian.

a) In G.R. No. 74306, the petition is DISMISSED. The questioned decision and resolution of the then Intermediate Appellate
Court, now the Court of Appeals,
are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
b) In G.R. No. 74315, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned Resolution insofar as it denied the petitioner's motion to clarify the
dispositive portion of the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
decision of the appellate court is MODIFIED in that all cash and stock dividends as, well as all pre-emptive rights that have accrued and
attached to the 1,500 shares in E. Razon, Inc., since 1966 are declared to belong to the estate of Juan T. Chuidian.
SUNGA-CHAN V. CHUA – BRONDIAL
SUNGA-CHAN V. CHUA (2001)
Lamberto T. Chua (hereafter respondent) filed a complaint against Lilibeth Sunga Chan (hereafter petitioner Lilibeth) and Cecilia Sunga
(hereafter petitioner Cecilia), daughter and wife, respectively of the deceased Jacinto L. Sunga (hereafter Jacinto), for Winding Up of
Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Attachment with the
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RTC. He claims that he and Jacinto verbally agreed that they would enter into a partnership (100k contribution each) for the distribution of
Shellane Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) in Manila but they registered it only in Jacinto's name for convenience. The business was
managed by Jacinto and Josephine, Lamberto's sister-in-law (he claims they were understating the income for tax evasion). Upon
Jacintos death in the later part of 1989, his surviving wife, petitioner Cecilia and particularly his daughter, petitioner Lilibeth, took over the
operations, control, custody, disposition and management of Shellite without respondents consent.

Petitioner Lilibeth allegedly informed respondent that the P200,000.00 represented partial payment of the latters share in the partnership,
with a promise that the former would make the complete inventory and winding up of the properties of the business establishment.
Despite such commitment, petitioners allegedly failed to comply with their duty to account.

2 MTDs were filed by respondents. Both were denied for lack of merit. A petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus was filed
with the Court of Appeals. A motion to suspend the PTC was granted.

1. SEC has jurisdiction

2. Action should be dismissed and prosecuted against the estate of deceased Jacinto in a probate or intestate proceeding.

CA – denied the petition.

SC – denied the petition for review on certiorari. The decision became final and entry of judgment was made by the Clerk of Court and the
case was remanded to the trial court.

The proceedings before the RTC were continued. Petitioners were deemed to hav waived their right to present evidence for their
failure to attend the scheduled date for reception of evidence despite notice.

RTC – ruled in favor of the respondent Chua.

CA – dismissed the appeal.

Petitioners question the correctness of the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that a partnership existed between
respondent and Jacinto from 1977 until Jacintos death. In the absence of any written document to show such partnership
between respondent and Jacinto, petitioners argue that these courts were proscribed from hearing the testimonies of
respondent and his witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged partnership three years after Jacintos death. To support this
argument, petitioners invoke the Dead Mans Statute or Survivorship Rule under Section 23, Rule 130.

Issue/Held: WON the Dead Man's Statute applies to this case. NO, it does not.

Ratio: The Dead Mans Statute provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other
mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplai ned account of
the transaction.[9] But before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is necessary that:

1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted.
2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person or a person of unsound mind;
3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against person of
unsound mind;
4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact which occurred before the death of such deceased person or before such person
became of unsound mind.

Two reasons forestall the application of the Dead Mans Statute to this case.

First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim[11] against respondent in their answer before the trial court, and with the filing of their
counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed this case from the ambit of the Dead Mans Statute.[12] Well entrenched is
the rule that when it is the executor or administrator or representatives of the estate that sets up the counterclaim, the
plaintiff, herein respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat the counterclaim.[13]
Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim, respondent is not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death
of the deceased, said action not having been brought against but by the estate or representatives of the deceased.

Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the Dead Mans Statute for the simple reason that she is not a party or
assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted. Records show that respondent offered the testimony
of Josephine to establish the existence of the partnership between respondent and Jacinto. Petitioners insistence that Josephine is the
alter ego of respondent does not make her an assignor because the term assignor of a party means assignor of a cause of action
which has arisen, and not the assignor of a right assigned before any cause of action has arisen.[15] Plainly then,
Josephine is merely a witness of respondent, the latter being the party plaintiff.
Petition denied.

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BORDALBA V. CA – BRONDIAL
BORDALBA V. CA (2002)
The subject lot located in Mandaue City was originally owned by the Sps. Jayme. After their death, and extrajudicial partition was entered
into by the heirs by which the property was divided:

1) 1/3 in favor of - (a) their grandchild Nicanor Jayme, the deceased spouse of private respondent Candida Flores and the father of
private respondents Emmanuel, Dina, Evelia and Gesila, all surnamed Jayme; and (b) their grandchild Asuncion Jayme-Baclay,
whose heirs are private respondents Angelo Baclay, Elnora Baclay and Carmen Jayme-Daclan;
2) 1/3 to their daughter Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, mother of petitioner Teresita P. Bordalba; and
3) 1/3 to an unidentified party.

Petitioner, daughter of Elena, was successfully granted a free patent and a corresponding OCT over the lot. Thereafter, she caused its
subdivision into 6 lots and disposed of 2 (sold to Sps. Cabahug, mortgaged to Rural Bank of Mandaue). As a result, respondents filed an
action for the declaration of nullity of the free patent and the OCT against petitioner, the Sps. Cabahug, and the Bank.

RTC – granted the decision but found that the Sps. Cabahug and the bank were a purchaser and a mortgagee in GF, respectively.
CA – affirmed the decision.

Petitioner contends that the testimonies given by the witnesses for private respondents which touched on matters occurring
prior to the death of her mother should not have been admitted by the trial court, as the same violated the dead mans statute.

Issue/Held: WON the Dead Man's Statute applies. NO, it does not.
Ratio: As to the alleged violation of the dead mans statute,[18] suffice it to state that said rule finds no application in the
present case. The dead mans statute does not operate to close the mouth of a witness as to any matter of fact coming to his
knowledge in any other way than through personal dealings with the deceased person, or communication made by the deceased to the
witness.

CHAN V. CHAN – BRONDIAL

CHAN V. CHAN (2013)
Petitioner Josielene Lara Chan (Josielene) filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 144 a petition for the
declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Johnny Chan (Johnny), the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and
the award of custody of their children to her.

During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim Form1 that Johnny attached to his answer as proof that he
was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. The form carried a physician’s handwritten note that Johnny suffered from
"methamphetamine and alcohol abuse." Following up on this point, on August 22, 2006 Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to Medical City, covering Johnny’s medical records when he was there confined. The
request was accompanied by a motion to "be allowed to submit in evidence" the records sought by subpoena duces tecum. Johnny
opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-patient privilege.

RTC – request denied.

CA – denied petition for certiorari. [if courts were to allow the production of medical records, then patients would be left with no assurance
that whatever relevant disclosures they may have made to their physicians would be kept confidential. The prohibition covers not only
testimonies, but also affidavits, certificates, and pertinent hospital records. The CA added that, although Johnny can waive the
privilege, he did not do so in this case. He attached the Philhealth form to his answer for the limited purpose of showing his alleged forcible
confinement.]

Josielene of course claims that the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged since it is the "testimonial" evidence
of the physician that may be regarded as privileged. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the physician "cannot in a civil case, without
the consent of the patient, be examined" regarding their professional conversation. The privilege, says Josielene, does not cover the
hospital records, but only the examination of the physician at the trial.

Issue/Held: WON the denial of the request for a subpoena was proper. YES, it was.z
Ratio:
1. The objection is premature.
The time to object to the admission of evidence, such as the hospital records, would be at the time they are offered. The offer
could be made part of the physician’s testimony or as independent evidence that he had made entries in those records that
concern the patient’s health problems.
SEC. 36. Objection.— Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the
grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer unless a different period
is allowed by the court.
In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.
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Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielene’s request for subpoena duces tecum is premature. She will
have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital
records. It is when those records are produced for examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just to their
admission in evidence, but more so to their disclosure.

2. Even if treated as a motion for production of evidence prior to trial, it is still not allowed to be produced because it
covers privileged information. The privilege under 130.24 cannot be circumvented by allowing access to records of
facts to which the physician is prevented from testifying.

It is of course possible to treat Josielene’s motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital records as a
motion for production of documents, a discovery procedure available to a litigant prior to trial (Section 1, Rule 27). But the
above right to compel the production of documents has a limitation: the documents to be disclosed are "not privileged."

This argument cannot be gven merit. To allow the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records—the results of
tests that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him—would be to
allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patient’s consent. Physician memorializes all these information
in the patient’s records. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on
privileged matters he gained while dealing with the
patient, without the latter’s prior consent. [You'd be doing indirectly something you're prohibited from doing.]

3. The attachment of the PhilHealth claim form does not constitute a waiver under 132.17 (When part of transaction, writing or
record given in evidence, the remainder admissible).

Trial in the case had not yet begun. Consequently, it cannot be said that Johnny had already presented the Philhealth claim form in
evidence, the act contemplated above which would justify Josielene into requesting an inquiry into the details of his hospital confinement.
Johnny was not yet bound to adduce evidence in the case when he filed his answer. Any request for disclosure of his hospital records
would again be premature.

LACUROM V. JACOBA – BRONDIAL

LACUROM V. JACOBA (2006)
This administrative case arose from a complaint filed by Judge Lacurom against respondent-spouses Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba and Atty. Olivia
Velasco-Jacoba (respondents). Complainant charged respondents with violation of Rules 11.03, 11.04, and 19.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Madaming nangyari. The Sps. Jacoba had a law firm. They represented Veneracion, the plaintiff, in an unlawful detainer case.

1. A very rudely worded Motion for Reconsideration (with Request for Inhibition) was filed by Olivia from a decision reversing the
MTC in an unlawful detainer case – she was found guilty of contempt after hearing and was sentenced to 5d imprisonment (she claims
her husband, then suspended from practice, drafter it ans she merely signed it without reading)
2. Veneracion, assisted by Ellis, filed an affidavit accusing the judge of knowingly rendering unjust judgment through
inexcusablenegligence and ignorance and violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019).
3. The judge issued another order directing Ellis to explain why he should not be held in contempt. Against Velasco-Jacobas statements
implicating him,he invoked the marital privilege rule in evidence. He was found guilty and made to pay a fine of 500.
4. Then this instant action was filed before the IBP.

IBP Commissioner Navarro – recommended 6m suspension.

IBP Board of Governors – adopted the recommendation but reduced the suspension to 3m.
Issue/Held: WON the marital privilege applies. NO, it does not.

Ratio: The privilege may be waived as was done in this case.

We now consider the evidence as regards Jacoba. His name does not appear in the 30 July 2001 motion. He asserts the
inadmissibility of Velasco-Jacobas statement pointing to him as the author of the motion.

The Court cannot easily let Jacoba off the hook. Firstly, his Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition did not contain a denial of
his wifes account. Instead, Jacoba impliedly admitted authorship of the motion by stating that he trained his guns and fired at the
errors which he perceived and believed to be gigantic and monumental.

Secondly, we find Velasco-Jacobas version of the facts more plausible, for two reasons: (1) her reaction to the events was
immediate and spontaneous, unlike Jacobas defense which was raised only after a considerable time had elapsed from
the eruption of the controversy; and (2) Jacoba had been
counsel of record for Veneracion in Civil Case No. 2836, supporting Velasco-Jacobasassertion that she had not actually
participate[d] in the prosecution of the case.

Moreover, Jacoba filed a Manifestation in Civil Case No. 2836, praying that Judge Lacurom await the outcome of the petition for
certiorari before deciding the contempt charge against him. This petition for certiorari anchors some of its arguments on the
premise that the motion was, in fact, Jacobas handiwork.

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The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the claimant to object timely to its presentation or
by any conduct that may be construed as implied consent. This waiver applies to Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of
the 30 July 2001 motion.

SAMALA V. VALENCIA – BRONDIAL

SAMULA V. VALENCIA (2007)
Before us is a complaint1 dated May 2, 2001 filed by Clarita J. Samala (complainant) against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia
(respondent) for Disbarment on the following grounds: (a) serving on two separate occasions as counsel for contending parties;
(b) knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence; (c) initiating numerous cases in exchange for
nonpayment of rental fees; and (d) having a reputation of being immoral by siring illegitimate children.

Records show that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 272, Marikina City, entitled "Leonora M.
Aville v. Editha Valdez" for nonpayment of rentals, herein respondent, while being the counsel for defendant Valdez, also acted as counsel
for the tenants Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante and Bayuga 6 by filing an Explanation and Compliance before the RTC.

In Civil Case No. 98-6804 filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 75, Marikina City, entitled "Editha S. Valdez and Joseph J.
Alba, Jr. v. Salve Bustamante and her husband" for ejectment, respondent represented Valdez against Bustamante - one of the tenants in
the property subject of the controversy. Defendants appealed to the RTC, Branch 272, Marikina City docketed as SCA Case No. 99-341-
MK. In his decision dated May 2, 2000, 8Presiding Judge Reuben P. dela Cruz 9 warned respondent to refrain from repeating the act of
being counsel of record of both parties in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK.

But in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK, filed in the RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, entitled "Editha S. Valdez v. Joseph J. Alba, Jr. and
Register of Deeds of Marikina City," respondent, as counsel for Valdez, filed a Complaint for Rescission of Contract with Damages and
Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 275500 against Alba, respondent's former client in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case
No. 99-341-MK.

Records further reveal that at the hearing of November 14, 2003, respondent admitted that in Civil Case No. 95-105- MK, he was the
lawyer for Lagmay (one of the tenants) but not for Bustamante and Bayuga albeit he filed the Explanation and Compliance for and in
behalf of the tenants. Respondent also admitted that he represented Valdez in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341- MK
against Bustamante and her husband but denied being the counsel for Alba although the case is entitled "Valdez and Alba v.
Bustamante and her husband," because Valdez told him to include Alba as the two were the owners of the property and it was only
Valdez who signed the complaint for ejectment. But, while claiming that respondent did not represent Alba, respondent, however, avers
that he already severed his representation for Alba when the latter charged respondent with estafa.Thus, the filing of Civil Case No.
2000-657-MK against Alba.

Held:
The stern rule against representation of conflicting interests is founded on principles of public policy and good taste. It springs from the
attorney's duty to represent his client with undivided fidelity and to maintain inviolate the client's confidence as well as from the injunction
forbidding the examination of an attorney as to any of the privileged communications of his client. 19

The termination of the relation of attorney and client provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest
adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The reason for the rule is that the client's confidence once reposed
cannot be divested by the expiration of the professional employment. Consequently, a lawyer should not,
even after the severance of the relation with his client, do anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in
which he previously represented him nor should he disclose or use any of the client's confidences acquired in the previous
relation.
In this case, respondent's averment that his relationship with Alba has long been severed by the act of the latter of not turning
over the proceeds collected in Civil Case No. 98-6804, in connivance with the complainant, is unavailing. Termination of the
attorney-client relationship precludes an attorney from representing a new client whose interest is adverse to his former client.
Alba may not be his original client but the fact that he filed a case entitled "Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her
husband," is a clear indication that respondent is protecting the interests of both Valdez and Alba in the said case.
Respondent cannot just claim that the lawyer- client relationship between him and Alba has long been severed without observing
Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court wherein the written consent of his client is required.Guilty; suspended for 3y.

ALMONTE V. VASQUEZ - BRONDIAL

ALMONTE V. VASQUEZ (1995)
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to annul the subpoena duces tecum and orders
issued by respondent Ombudsman, requiring petitioners Nerio Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as chief accountant and record
custodian, respectively, of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce "all documents relating to
Personal Services Funds for the year 1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988"
and to enjoin him from enforcing his orders.

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ADOLF|BEA|CELINE|CHEERLY|CZARINA|DARYL|DON|EASTER|GIGI|GRACE|HAZELLE|JANUSZ|JODELLE|KAYE|LARIELA|MANNY|MARA|MARIA|RYNNAH

Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Villamor C. Perez is Chief of the EIIB's Budget and
Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in connection with his
investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally
disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been written by an employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen, was addressed to the
Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished several government offices, including the Office of the Ombudsman.

[Claim: The EIIB has a syndicate headed by the Chief of Budget Division who is manipulating funds and also the brain of the so
called "ghost agents" or the "Emergency Intelligence Agents" (EIA). ]

To put this case in perspective it should be stated at the outset that it does not concern a demand by a citizen for information
under the freedom of information guarantee of the Constitution. 7 Rather it concerns the power of the Office of the Ombudsman to
obtain evidence in connection with an investigation conducted by it vis-a- vis the claim of privilege of an agency of the Government.

There are several subsidiary issues raised by petitioners, but the principal ones revolve on the question whether petitioners can be
ordered to produce documents relating to personal services and salary vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea that such documents are
classified. Disclosure of the documents in question is resisted on the ground that "knowledge of EIIB's documents relative to its Personal
Services Funds and its plantilla . . . will necessarily [lead to] knowledge of its operations, movements, targets, strategies, and tactics and
the whole of its being" and this could "destroy the EIIB." 9

Petitioners do not question the power of the Ombudsman to issue a subpoena duces tecum nor the relevancy or materiality of the
documents required to be produced, to the pending investigation in the Ombudsman's office. Accordingly, the focus of discussion should
be on the Government's claim of privilege.

Held:
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of records pertaining
to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding
"illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting."
18 Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the case that
there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling production, 19 no similar
excuse can be made for a privilege resting on other considerations.

Nor has our attention been called to any law or regulation which considers personnel records of the EIIB as classified information. To
the contrary, COA Circular No. 88-293, which petitioners invoke to support their contention that there is adequate safeguard against
misuse of public funds, provides that the "only item of expenditure which should be treated strictly confidential" is that which refers to the
"purchase of information and payment of rewards."

The other statutes and regulations invoked by petitioners in support of their contention that the documents sought in the subpoena duces
tecum of the Ombudsman are classified merely indicate the confidential nature of the EIIB's functions, but they do not exempt the
EIIB from the duty to account for its funds to the proper authorities.

The need for the documents thus outweighs the claim of confidentiality of petitioners. What is more, while there might
have been compelling reasons for the claim of privilege in 1988 when it was asserted by petitioners, now, seven years later,
these reasons may have been attenuated, if they have not in fact ceased. The agents whose identities could not then be
revealed may have ceased from the service of the EIIB, while the covert missions to which they might have been deployed
might either have been accomplished or abandoned. On the other hand, the Ombudsman's duty to investigate the complaint
that there were in 1988 unfilled positions in the EIIB for which continued funding was received by its officials and put to illegal
use, remains.

Above all, even if the subpoenaed documents are treated as presumptively privileged, this decision would only justify ordering
their inspection in camera but not their nonproduction. However, as concession to the nature of the functions of the EIIB and just to
be sure no information of a confidential character is disclosed, the examination of records in this case should be made in strict
confidence by the Ombudsman himself. Reference may be made to the documents in any decision or order which the Ombudsman
may render or issue but only to the extent that it will not reveal covert activities of the agency. Above all, there must be a scrupulous
protection of the documents delivered.

DISCUSS EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE UNDER THE DOCTRINES IN

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ERMITA –DARYL

NERI V. SENATE COMMITTEES - DON

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