Preliminary Data Show Downward Trend in Controlled-Flight-Into-Terrain Accidents Among Large Western-Built Commercial Jets
Preliminary Data Show Downward Trend in Controlled-Flight-Into-Terrain Accidents Among Large Western-Built Commercial Jets
Preliminary Data Show Downward Trend in Controlled-Flight-Into-Terrain Accidents Among Large Western-Built Commercial Jets
Preliminary data from The Boeing Co., Airclaims and Don or in categories often related to ALAs (aircraft off end of
Bateman, chief engineer, flight safety systems, Honeywell runway on landing, aircraft off side of runway on landing,
International, show that three accidents involving controlled hard landing, landed short, gear collapse/gear failure/gear up
flight into terrain (CFIT) and nine approach-and-landing and windshear). Thirty accidents in these categories (7.8
accidents (ALAs) have occurred from Jan. 1, 2000, to Oct. 15, percent of total accidents in all categories) occurred among
2000, to Western-built large commercial jets, those heavier first-generation airplanes,1 which had 22.5 accidents per
than 60,000 pounds (27,216 kilograms). million departures. Eighty-seven accidents in these categories
(22.6 percent of total accidents in all categories) occurred
Flight Safety Foundation defines a CFIT accident as one that among second-generation airplanes,2 which had 2.2 accidents
occurs when an airworthy aircraft under the control of the flight per million departures. Eighteen accidents in these categories
crew is flown unintentionally into terrain, obstacles or water, (4.7 percent of total accidents in all categories) occurred among
usually with no prior awareness by the crew. This type of early wide-body airplanes,3 which had 4.1 accidents per million
accident can occur during most phases of flight, but CFIT is departures. Ninety-two accidents in these categories (23.9
more common during the approach-and-landing phases, which percent of total accidents in all categories) occurred among
typically comprise about 16 percent of the average flight current-generation airplanes,4 which had 1.8 accidents per
duration of a large commercial jet. million departures.
Boeing’s definition differs slightly, describing a CFIT accident Figure 2 (page 203) shows that 6,655 fatalities occurred
as “an event where a mechanically normally functioning worldwide in large Western-built commercial jet accidents in
airplane is inadvertently flown into the ground, water or 1990 through 1999 (including 6,464 fatalities aboard
obstacle (not on airport property while attempting to land).” airplanes), and 379 of these fatalities occurred aboard airplanes
The Boeing data include worldwide Western-built large in 1999. CFIT accidents resulted in the largest number of
commercial jet airplanes that are heavier than 60,000 pounds fatalities by category — 2,111, with five in 1999 — and 204
maximum gross weight; the data exclude airplanes fatalities, 37 in 1999, occurred in the landing category.
manufactured in the Commonwealth of Independent States.
Figure 3 (page 204) shows hull-loss accidents, fatal accidents
Boeing defines a hull loss as damage to an airplane that is and fatalities on board Western-built large commercial jets
substantial and beyond economic repair. Boeing also classifies during the last four phases of flight (descent, initial approach,
an airplane as a hull loss if the aircraft is missing, if the final approach and landing). Fifty-nine percent of the accidents
wreckage has not been found and the search has been and 56 percent of the fatalities occurred during these phases
terminated, or if the airplane is substantially damaged and is of flight.
inaccessible.
Figure 4 (page 205) shows the distribution of 18 events
Boeing data (Figure 1, page 202) show that in 1990 through involved in 199 landing accidents among Western-built large
1999, 227 accidents occurred worldwide in the CFIT category commercial jets in 1990 through 1999. The five events reported
Table 2
Hull-loss Accidents
Worldwide Business Jet Airplanes1
Jan. 1, 2000–Oct. 15, 2000
Phase Total
Date Operator Aircraft Location of Flight Fatal
March 26, 2000 Private CitationJet Buda, Texas, U.S. Approach 1
April 5, 2000 Bankair Learjet 35 Marianna, Florida, U.S. Landing 3
May 2, 2000 Northern Executive Aviation Learjet 35 Lyon, France Landing 2
May 10, 2000 Price Aircraft Sabreliner Kaunakaki, Hawaii, U.S. Approach 6
June 13, 2000 Grand Aire Express Falcon 20 Peterborough, Ontario, Canada Landing 0
June 23, 2000 Universal Jet Aviation Learjet 55 Boca Raton, Florida, U.S. Climb 3
Aug. 14, 2000 The Colonel’s Sabreliner Ironwood, Michigan, U.S. Cruise 2
Total 17
Note:
1. Business, corporate or executive jet operations; less than 60,000 pounds (27,216 kilograms) maximum gross weight; excluding the
Commonwealth of Independent States.
Source: Airclaims
Source: Airclaims
Table 4
Controlled Flight Into Terrain1 Hull-loss Accidents
Worldwide Large Commercial Jet Airplanes2
Jan. 1, 2000–Oct. 15, 2000
Phase Total
Date Operator Aircraft Location of Flight Fatal
Feb. 3, 2000 Trans Arabian Air Transport Boeing 707-320 Mwanza, Tanzania Approach 0
April 19, 2000 Air Philippines Boeing 737-200 Davao, Philippines Approach 131
Aug. 23, 2000 Gulf Air Airbus A320 Manama, Bahrain Approach 143
Total 274
Notes:
1. Categorization of accidents for 2000 is preliminary.
2. Heavier than 60,000 pounds (27,216 kilograms) maximum gross weight; excluding the Commonwealth of Independent States.
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Of
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To
Airplane Generation
First 5 7 3 3 4 8 0 30
Second 17 17 20 15 9 8 1 87
Early Widebody 3 3 3 5 1 2 1 18
Current 11 22 11 32 2 13 1 92
Total 36 49 37 55 16 31 3 227
First 22.5
Second 2.2
Current 1.8
0 5 10 15 20 25
Accidents per Million Departures
Airplane Generation
First British Aerospace Comet, Boeing 707/720, McDonnell Douglas DC-8, CV-880/-990, Caravelle
Second Boeing 727, British Aerospace Trident, British Aerospace VC-10, BAC-111, McDonnell Douglas DC-9,
Boeing 737-100/-200, Fokker F28
Early Widebody Boeing 747-100/-200/-300/SP, McDonnell Douglas DC-10, Lockheed L-1011, Airbus A300
Current McDonnell Douglas MD-80, Boeing 767, Boeing 757, Airbus A310, British Aerospace BAe146, Airbus A300-600, Boeing
737-300/-400/-500, Fokker F100, Airbus A320/319/321, Boeing 747-400, McDonnell Douglas MD-11, Airbus A340,
Airbus A330, McDonnell Douglas MD-90, Boeing 777, Boeing 737-NG, Boeing 717
Note:
1. Boeing source data show 385 accidents in 27 categories for this time period.
2. Heavier than 60,000 pounds (27,216 kilograms) maximum gross weight; excluding the Commonwealth of Independent States.
Figure 1
1,500
Fatalities
1,000
223
482
600
506
500
37 80
238 204 140 5
110 100 91 45
6 5 3 3
0
CFIT Loss of In-flight Midair Fuel Landing Takeoff Ice/ Fuel Wind Runway Misc. On RTO Turbulence Unknown
Control Fire Collision Tank Config- Snow Exhaus- Shear Incursion Fatality Ground
in Flight Explosion uration tion
Number
of Fatal 28 29 3 2 2 14 3 3 5 2 4 3 3 1 3 7
Accidents
= 112
Notes:
1. Accidents involving multiple, non-onboard fatalities are included. Accidents involving single, non-onboard fatalities are excluded.
2. Heavier than 60,000 pounds (27,216 kilograms) maximum gross weight; excluding the Commonwealth of Independent States.
Source: Boeing Commercial Airplanes Group
Figure 2
Percentage of Accidents/Fatalities
49%
Initial Final
Descent Approach Approach Landing
Accidents 5% 5% 8% 41%
Fatalities 16% 16% 18% 6%
24%
Initial Final
Approach Approach
Fix Fix
1500
60 1,023
1,145 Fatalities
1,006
1000
40 659
19 500
20 11 11 262
0 0
Descent Initial Final Landing
Approach Approach
Note:
1. Heavier than 60,000 pounds (27,216 kilograms) maximum gross weight; excluding the Commonwealth of Independent States.
2. Exposure = Percentage of flight time based on flight duration of 1.5 hours.
Figure 3
Hard Landing 57
Off Side 56
Off End 51
Wet/Icy Runway 43
Loss of Directional Control 41
Collision With Ground Obstruction 34
Gear Collapse 26
Landed Long 25
Tires 21
High Descent Rate 20
Engine Nacelle 19
Tail Strike 15
Terrain Impact on Final 15
Landed Short 14
Crosswind 13
Wheel/Braking Difficulty 11
Gear Up 10 Landing Accidents = 199 Total Events2
Touchdown Speed 2 10
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Number of Accidents
Notes:
1. Heavier than 60,000 pounds (27,216 kilograms) maximum gross weight; excluding the Commonwealth of Independent States.
2. Each event may involve more than one event descriptor; therefore, the sum of the items may be more than the total accidents
of this type.
Figure 4
7 7
7
6
5
5
4 4
4
3 3 3 3
3
2
2
1
1
0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 20003
Year
Notes:
1. Categorization of accidents for 2000 is preliminary.
2. Heavier than 60,000 pounds (27,216 kilograms) maximum gross weight; excluding the Commonwealth of Independent States.
3. Accidents through Oct. 15, 2000.
Figure 5
20
18
Number of Accidents
16 16
15
15 14
12 12
10 9 9 9
7
0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 20003
Year
Notes:
1. Categorization of accidents for 2000 is preliminary.
2. Heavier than 60,000 pounds (27,216 kilograms) maximum gross weight; excluding the Commonwealth of Independent States.
3. Accidents through Oct. 15, 2000.
Figure 6
1.0
0.5
0.0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 20003
Year
Approach and Landing (ALA) Accident Rate Three-year Moving Average (ALA Accident Rate)
Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) Accident Rate Three-year Moving Average (CFIT Accident Rate)
Notes:
1. Categorization of accidents for 2000 is preliminary.
2. Heavier than 60,000 pounds (27,216 kilograms) maximum gross weight; excluding the Commonwealth of Independent States.
3. Accidents through Oct. 15, 2000.
Figure 7
As required by law, the FAA Civil Aeromedical Institute ***U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO)
(CAMI) monitors the use of alcohol and drugs in aviation. P.O. Box 37050
CAMI collects toxicology data by analyzing specimens from Washington, DC 20013 U.S.
pilots who died in aviation accidents and stores the data in Internet: www.gao.gov
computer databases for future use. This report uses the data to
compare the prevalence of drugs and alcohol in fatal accidents ****National Technical Information Service (NTIS)
in five-year and 10-year periods. Tables show alcohol, drug 5285 Port Royal Road
and medication use by pilot class, drug class and substance Springfield, VA 22161 U.S.
schedule. Internet: www.ntis.org
The following information provides an awareness of problems descent to FL 350, the no. 4 engine had an uncommanded
through which such occurrences may be prevented in the future. shutdown. The flight crew performed the second engine-failure
Accident/incident briefs are based on preliminary information “phase one” items, declared an emergency and received vectors
from government agencies, aviation organizations, press to fly the airplane to the departure airport. As the airplane
information and other sources. This information may not be descended through FL 220, both engines were restarted. They
entirely accurate. operated normally for the remainder of the flight, and the
landing was normal.
Later, the captain observed that “the motion at the rear of the The report said that analysis of the FDR data was the only
flight deck felt different [than] normal,” the report said. The means of identifying the defect before it was experienced by a
crew disengaged the autopilot and engaged a different flight crew. The manufacturer of the PCUs had addressed the
autopilot, but the vertical speed fluctuations continued, now bearing corrosion by changing to stainless steel bearings with
at about plus or minus 300 feet per minute. The pitch better drainage, and issued a product improvement document
oscillations persisted at irregular intervals during the crew’s to inform aircraft operators of the change. The report said,
use of a third autopilot and during a period of hand-flying. however, that because PCUs are dismantled infrequently,
operators have few opportunities to assess their condition. The
“The [captain] reported that, during manual handling, the aircraft manufacturer issued a service letter Aug. 31, 2000,
control column felt very stiff to move in the required direction recommending that operators install the stainless steel bearings
and, after the exertion of considerable pressure, would become at their next opportunity.
free and the aircraft would respond immediately, then requiring
opposite control input,” the report said.
The first officer assisted with flight control pitch inputs during
the landing, and the touchdown was described as “smooth and
accurate.” Shortly after the airplane was taxied clear of the
runway, a flight attendant reported smoke and a burning odor Bird Strike Damages
in the cabin. An external inspection revealed no abnormal
indications, but as the airplane continued to taxi, smoke was
Wing Leading Edge
reported coming from the no. 4 engine. Subsequent inspection
revealed that the burning odor in the cabin was tire smoke that De Havilland DHC-6-300. Substantial damage. No injuries.
resulted from the full autobrake landing and that smoke from
the no. 4 engine came from the oil breather and was not an The airplane was being flown on the downwind portion of the
unusual event. landing approach to an airport in the United States. Night visual
meteorological conditions prevailed.
Information from the flight data recorders (FDRs) confirmed
that the aircraft had experienced periods of pitch oscillations, The airplane was about 1,800 feet above sea level when the
but an examination of the aircraft’s pitch control and trim flight crew observed several birds, then felt an impact. After
system revealed no defects. The problem did not recur during landing, they observed damage to the left wing leading edge
a test flight, but a lack of synchronization of elevator positions and found small portions of a bird on the leading edge.
was observed and was repaired.
Examination of the wing revealed that the leading edge was
The airplane was returned to service and was operated with dented, the upper wing surface was wrinkled and two nose
no apparent problems for five days. Then, an analysis of ribs had been broken.
recorded data confirmed that pitch oscillations similar to those
of the incident flight were continuing during autopilot Crew Fails in Efforts to
operations. The airplane was withdrawn from service for Extend Landing Gear
further inspection, which determined that ball bearings in one
inboard-elevator power-control unit (PCU) were corroded. The Lockheed L382-G. Substantial damage. No injuries.
corrosion was attributed to condensation that penetrated the
PCU dust seals and washed lubricant from the top bearing When the flight crew moved the landing gear switch to the
onto the lower bearing, leading to corrosion of both bearings. down position in preparation for landing at an airport in
The report said that the corrosion probably resulted in reduced Australia, the left-main landing-gear position indicator
movement of the entire pitch-control mechanism for each indicated that the landing-gear position was unsafe. The crew
“The crew then attempted to extend the landing gear manually, They landed the airplane at the destination airport. After
but the emergency engaging handle could not be moved,” the touchdown, the airplane rolled off the departure end of the
report said. “The manual-selection system appeared jammed, runway and struck a localizer antenna array.
and consequently, the selection could not be made. They then
attempted to lower the landing gear by disconnecting the Examination of the airplane revealed that the actuator-extend
universal joints on the vertical-torque shafts of the left-main hose-line connector for the left-main landing gear and the right-
landing gear. However, the castellated nuts on the rear-wheel main landing gear were not torqued to specifications and that
vertical-torque shaft universal joint could not be unwound the left-main landing-gear actuator-extend hose-line connector
without the use of spanners, and after about 30 [minutes], only was leaking hydraulic fluid.
two of the four bolts had been undone.”
By that time, the airplane’s fuel supply was low, and the captain
Controller’s Action Stops Crew
decided that there was insufficient time to remove the From Landing at Wrong Airport
remaining bolts before a landing would be required. The crew
then retracted the nose landing gear and the right-main landing Cessna Citation 550. No damage. No injuries.
gear and landed the airplane.
The flight crew was flying a very-high-frequency
omnidirectional radio (VOR) approach to an airport in Northern
Ireland in early afternoon and had received clearance to land
Corporate on Runway 7. An air traffic controller observed that the air
Business traffic monitor showed that the airplane was south of the typical
approach track at a lower altitude than typical.
Loss of Power Prompts Fatal Forced The crew said that they could see no lights but that they were on
Landing on Basketball Court short final approach. The controller then instructed the crew to go
around and to climb to 3,000 feet. After the climb, the crew told
Piper PA-32-260. Airplane destroyed. Five fatalities. the controller that they could see approach lights on their left, and
they received clearance for a visual approach to Runway 7.
Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the mid-
morning departure from an airport in Ecuador. Witnesses said On several previous occasions, pilots had mistaken the other,
that, during the initial climb, they heard engine power fluctuate private airport (with Runway 8/26 and Runway 3/21) for the
and saw the airplane gliding with its propeller stopped as the larger airport.
pilot maneuvered to avoid buildings in a downtown business
district. “Because of this, the ATIS [automatic terminal information
system] … was advising pilots of the existence of [the private
The airplane struck a telephone post before impacting an airport] and that Runway 7 … would have its approach lights
outdoor basketball court. A postaccident fire destroyed the illuminated,” the report said. “On this occasion, close
airplane. The accident killed the pilot and all four monitoring and effective action by the controller stopped the
passengers. crew … from landing at [the wrong airport].”
Cessna 172R. Airplane destroyed. Four fatalities. The pilot said that, when he applied the right brake, no braking
occurred, and that he shut down both engines in an attempt to
Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the afternoon stop the airplane’s movement. The left propeller was still
flight from an airport in Australia. Photographs taken from turning as the left-main wheel left the tarmac and sank into
the airplane during the flight indicated that the pilot had the ground, and the left propeller struck the edge of the tarmac.
conducted a number of steep turns, and witnesses in several
locations saw the airplane turning. Tests by maintenance personnel revealed that, although the
brakes worked properly when the left pedal and right pedal
Radar information showed that the airplane was flown in a were pressed simultaneously, there was no braking action on
series of left turns between 550 feet and 950 feet above the right-main landing wheel when only the right-brake pedal
ground level. Witnesses said that, during the final turn, the was applied. They said that the braking characteristics indicated
airplane’s angle of bank steepened before the airplane that the right-brake shuttle valve was defective, although no
pitched nose-down. The airplane was destroyed when it wear or damage was found. The right-brake shuttle valve was
struck the ground. replaced, and full braking was restored.
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