Implementation of Earned Value Management in U.P. Payment Contract.
Implementation of Earned Value Management in U.P. Payment Contract.
Implementation of Earned Value Management in U.P. Payment Contract.
Abstract: The earned value management (EVM) method is internationally considered a standard tool in the project management field,
enabling professionals to plan and control cost and schedule in an integrated manner. However, evidence indicates that EVM is not typically
implemented by contractors when the payment agreement is based on unit-prices. In this payment approach, the owner pays the quantities
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actually executed according to the preagreed rate established in the contract for each unit or task; the income received by the contractor from
the owner (generally named production) is neither proportional to costs nor fixed a priori, as in cost-reimbursable and lump sum contracts,
respectively. Therefore, contractors have to control not only cost but also production. The current formulation of EVM does not allow
controlling production; an additional baseline is needed. In response, this paper presents a proposal for adapting EVM to contractors when
using the unit-prices payment agreement. Using a case study to illustrate, an additional baseline to account for production and profitability, as
well as new indicators, is applied to allow contractors using EVM with this payment approach; this is the contribution of this paper to the body
of knowledge. The proposed EVM formulation provides information not only in terms of cost (as in the traditional EVM approach) but also in
terms of production. DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000500. © 2016 American Society of Civil Engineers.
Author keywords: Contractor; Control; Cost; Earned value; Production; Unit-price.
Introduction tor may not look at cost control as an essential part of management
of the project.
Contract Payment Approaches Lump-sum or fixed-price approaches are those in which the
contractor is paid a preset price by the owner in spite of the actual
In any contract, the party (owner or contractor) taking more risks expenses incurred (PMI 2013). Here, the party that has more at
will be understandably the one more interested in the best ways of stake is the contractor, who will likely be the one more interested
planning and controlling the project; these risks depend highly on in planning and controlling the project (Fleming and Koppelman
the contractual payment approach (Fleming and Koppelman 1997, 2002; Christensen-Day 2010; Hanna 2012). The total price of
2010; Christensen-Day 2010). The most common contract payment the project is fixed and it will not vary from the contractual budget
approaches are cost-reimbursable, lump-sum, and unit-price (Ibbs (unless the contract is modified). Therefore, the contractor will be
et al. 2003; PMI 2013). Cost-reimbursement requires that a contrac- interested in planning the costs as accurately as possible and con-
tor be paid by the owner for all legitimate actual costs incurred plus trolling the deviation of planned costs versus actual costs as much
an additional fee (PMI 2013). In this case, the party who takes more as possible. Any additional cost overrun decreases the profitability
risks is the owner. All actual costs incurred by the contractor are of the contractor because the contractual price (lump sum) is fixed.
paid by the owner. Therefore, the owner needs to control actual The profit is computed easily by the contractor as fixed price minus
costs regarding its planned cost. For the contractor, the profit is actual costs.
going to be the fee, or part of this fee if the overhead is also in- Finally, unit-price is a contract payment agreement where the
cluded in it; therefore, this profit is either proportional to the cost owner pays the contractor periodically according to preset (contrac-
or fixed (or any combination of both), but it is always easy to com- tual) unit rates that are applied to the actual measured quantities. In
pute by the contractor. With this open-book approach, the contrac- addition to the estimated cost of the product/service, these unit rates
include overhead and profit. This is a hybrid payment approach that
encompasses features of lump-sum and cost-reimbursable ap-
1 proaches (PMI 2013). In the unit-price approach, the risk is more
Program Manager, Nommon Solutions and Technologies S.L.,
C/ Cañas 8, 28043 Madrid, Spain. E-mail: [email protected] balanced between both parties; the quantities may vary during de-
2
Associate Professor, School of Civil Engineering, Universitat velopment of the contract depending on the actual work (PMI
Politècnica de València, Camino de Vera s/n, 46022 Valencia, Spain 2013), but the unit price rates are fixed from the start. In this type
(corresponding author). E-mail: [email protected] of contract, both parties bear some risks; therefore, both contractor
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Assistant Professor, School of Civil Engineering, Universitat and owner can benefit from applying planning and control proce-
Politècnica de València, Camino de Vera s/n, 46022 Valencia, Spain. dures (Valderrama and Guadalupe 2010). From the point of view of
E-mail: [email protected] the owner, the contractual budget is the one bid by the contractor
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Associate Professor and Head of Department, Dept. of Construction and awarded by the owner, distributed in periodic payments
Management, Curtin Univ., Kent St., Bentley, WA 6102, Australia. E-mail:
throughout the life of the project. However, this budget is not a
[email protected]
Note. This manuscript was submitted on March 17, 2016; approved on
constant figure, as in the fixed-price agreement, but can vary de-
September 15, 2016; published online on November 18, 2016. Discussion pending on measurement of actual quantities (Missbauer and
period open until April 18, 2017; separate discussions must be submitted Hauber 2006); for the owner, the difference between planned cost
for individual papers. This technical note is part of the Journal of Manage- and actual payment to the contractor will provide the deviation
ment in Engineering, © ASCE, ISSN 0742-597X. in costs.
Scenarios 2 and 3, each with variants (2A, 2B, 3A, and 3B), cover Scenario 3B are described in detail in Fig. 2. It is important that the
the rest of the possible combinations of unit cost and quantities. deviation in quantities in Scenario 3B does not lead to variations in
project duration; this is because both planned and actual project
duration is five months (Figs. 1 and 2), respectively. The project
Results and Discussion is completed on time and, for the reasons stated previously, sched-
This section shows the results obtained by the proposed formu- ule control is not analyzed in this paper.
lation in the case study. Space allows only one of these scenarios Considering traditional EVM indicators (PV, AC, and EV), it
to be described in detail, Scenario 3, which reflects the general can be concluded that Scenario 3B corresponds to good project per-
scenario in which all possible deviations (in terms of both unit cost formance in terms of cost: earned value is higher than actual cost
and quantities) affect project performance. Specifically, Variant 3B (EV > AC in Fig. 3) and cost performance is therefore higher than
(where ACAC is higher than BAC) is analyzed because it is the most planned (CPI > 1 in Fig. 4). With respect to Fig. 3, it is important
unfavorable scenario for the contractor. to realize that PV and EV at the end of the project do not have the
As described in Table 3, Scenario 3B has deviations in both unit same value, as would be expected in a typical application of EVM
costs and quantities. For instance, the actual volume of earth to be in a project like this with no delay. This difference between PV and
removed is 73,500 m3 , which is higher than the originally esti- EV is explained by quantity variations in some work units
mated 70,000 m3 . In terms of cost, the actual cost (€4.73=m3 ) (pq ≠ aq), which is usually the case in unit-price approaches
also exceeds the planned value (€4.50=m3 ). Similar deviations have but not considered in the traditional EVM approach. By relying
been simulated for the other tasks, considering a variance of 10%. solely on traditional EVM indicators, the contractor would thus
In addition to deviations between planned and actual costs and/or conclude that project performance in terms of cost can be consid-
quantities, deviations between planned costs and unit prices may ered “good,” although this is not the case for this project as is ex-
also exist. In this regard, the case study considers units in which plained later.
the contractor’s planned rate (pc in Fig. 1) differs from the unit There is some additional information for the contractor that tra-
rate agreed to with the owner (up in Fig. 2). From the contractor’s ditional EVM does not process. Indeed, although EV is higher than
point of view, these deviations may be both positive (the steel unit AC, the contractor needs to know whether this project is profitable
in Figs. 1 and 2) or negative (the concrete unit in Figs. 1 and 2), or not and whether actual profitability is higher or lower than
reflecting the competitiveness of the company in completing planned profitability. To cover this gap, the proposed EVM formu-
production tasks. In global terms the planned profitability of the lation provides information not only in terms of cost (as the tradi-
project, from the contractor’s point of view, will be determined tional EVM approach does) but also in terms of production and
by the difference between planned production and budget at com- profitability. Indeed, information related to production and profit-
pletion (PPAC and BAC). Similarly, the actual profitability of the ability is the cornerstone for the contractor in dealing with the
project will be provided by the difference between actual cost at project as a business enterprise.
completion and budget at completion (ACAC and BAC). As stated before, traditional EVM does not alert the contractor
Overall, deviations considered in this case study lead to an un- because the project cost performance in Scenario 3B seems to
favorable scenario for the contractor because ACAC is higher than display an optimistic situation (EV > AC in Fig. 3 and CPI > 1
BAC. Contractor planning and actual performance and progress in in Fig. 4). However, this information may be misleading because
in terms of production the project is not profitable to the contractor cost performance identified using traditional EVM does not alert
yet. Indeed, actual cost at completion (ACAC) exceeds planned the contractor (CPI > 1 in Fig. 4), the proposed indicators inform
budget at completion (BAC). This poor performance, which cannot the contractor of a problem with project profitability (PPI < 1 in
be tracked using traditional EVM indicators, has been present Fig. 4). The contractor planned to earn €78,950 at the end of the
during the entire project duration (as AC > AP in Fig. 3). project out of the difference between PP and PV at completion
In fact, actual production is lower than actual cost (AC > AP in (Fig. 5). Nevertheless, because of “poor” project performance in
Fig. 3 and, therefore, PPI < 1 in Fig. 4). Therefore, whereas the terms of profitability, the contractor is not gaining as much as