1

Lecture 1

INTRODUCTION TO SPEECH ACT THEORY

1. Preliminary Remarks

When we speak a language, we

make give ask make make

statements commands questions remarks requests

I. All enumerated actions are performed in accordance with certain rules for the use of
linguistic elements => speech acts are the basic or minimal units of linguistic communication => there
is a connection between the notion of speech acts, what the speaker means, what the sentence (or other
linguistic units) uttered means, what the speaker intends, what the hearer understands, and what the
rules governing the linguistic elements are.
II. A speaker may mean more than what he actually says => the meaning of the sentence does
not in all cases uniquely determine what speech act is performed in a given utterance of that sentence.
III. Speech acts can be viewed from different points of view :
 Psychologists : speech acts may be a prerequisite for the acquisition of language in general
;
 Literary critics : speech acts include illumination of textual subtleties and understanding of
the nature of literary genres ;
 Anthropologists : speech acts comprise some account of the nature of magical spells and
ritual in general ;
 Linguistics : speech acts remain along with presupposition and implicature in particular,
one of the central phenomena that any general pragmatic theory must account for.

2. Philosophical Background

 Speech act studies originate in the philosophy of language (Austin, Searle, Grice, Bierwisch) ;
  Issues of truth and falsity have been of central interest since 1930 when the doctrine
of logical positivism flourished ;
 A British philosopher, J. Austin, launched his theory of speech acts ;
 In his lectures that were published under the title “How to Do Things with Words”
(1962) Austin set about demolishing the view of language that would place truth conditions as
central to language understanding.

He noted that some ordinary declarative sentences, contrary to logical positivist assumption,
are not used just to say things, i.e. describe states of affairs but rather actively to do things (e.g.
I declare war on Zanzibar).

He termed these peculiar and special sentences and the utterances realized in them,
performatives, and contrasted them to statements, assertions, and utterances which he called
constatives.

He suggested that although, unlike constatives, performatives cannot be true or false,

yet they can go wrong.

He set himself the task of cataloguing all the ways in which they can go wrong.

As a result, J. Austin produced a typology of conditions which performatives must meet

if they are to succeed or be « happy ». He called these conditions felicity conditions, and
distinguished three main categories of them:
A. (1) There must be a conventional procedure having a conventional effect.
(2) The circumstances and persons must be appropriate as specified in the procedure.
B. The procedure must be executed (1) correctly and (2) completely.
C. Often (1) the person must have the requisite thoughts, feelings and intentions as
specified in the procedure, and (2) if consequent conduct is specified, then the relevant parties
must do so.

3. Identifying Speech Acts

A speaker’s utterance does not always have a clear indicator of what its function is
=> the illocutionary force of a speech act, that is achieved when the hearer recognizes what the
speaker intended to say or do, is easier to identify in highly conventional contexts (wedding
ceremonies, courts of law and game). It should be noted, however, that the hearer must simply
understand the speaker’s purpose in uttering something and doesn’t have to understand, agree
with or be affected by the utterance.
Types of communicative illocutionary acts :

The type Purpose Examples

The speaker tries to put the hearer into Suggesting, describing,

Constatives
the same knowledge state as himself. informing and predicting.
The speaker wants the hearer to do
Directive speech something and is providing reasons, Advice, prohibitions and
acts information and motivation for the suggestions.
action.
The speaker is agreeing or obligating
Commissives himself to do something for the hearer Promises and offers.
in the future.
The speaker is communicating
Thanking, congratulating,
Acknowledgments emotions or feelings that he or she
apologizing.
wants the hearer to understand.

Searle (1969) extracted what he called 3 constitutive rules for the performance of a
particular speech act :
Hearer has reasons to believe the event will occur and is not in
Preparatory condition
the hearer’s interest.
If it is not obvious to both speaker and hearer that event will
Sincerity condition
occur.
Counts as an undertaking that the event is not in the hearer’s
Essential condition
interest.

4. Locution, Illocution, Perlocution

In accordance with the theory of Austin, there are 3 kinds of acts that are simultaneously
performed :
1) locutionary act: the utterance of a sentence with determinate sense of reference.
2) illocutionary act: the making of a statement, offer, promise, etc. in uttering a
sentence, by virtue of the conventional force associated with it.
3) perlocutionary act: the bringing about of the effects on the audience by means of
uttering the sentence, such effects being special to the circumstances of utterance.
So,
Locution – the actual words uttered (It’s hot in here) ;
Illocution – the force or intention behind the words (I want some fresh air) ;
Perlocution – the effect of the illocution on the hearer (Someone opens the
window).
Austin originally used the term “speech act” to refer to an utterance and the « total
situation in which the utterance is used ». Today the term « speech act » is used to mean the
same as illocutionary act.

5. Illocutionary, Perlocutionary and Propositional Acts

The
illocutionary
act

A
A certain propositinal The
illocutionary centent (p) structure F
force (F) (p)

 Perlocutionary acts (convincing, persuading, annoying, amusing, frightening) have

to do with those effects which our utterances have on hearers and which go beyond the hearer’s
understanding of the utterance.
 Illocutionary acts (stating) are often directed at or done for the purpose of achieving
perlocutionary effects such as convincing or persuading.
 Propositional acts are what is asserted in the act of asserting, what is stated in the
act of stating. When a proposition is expressed, it is always expressed in the performance of an
illocutionary act. Not all illocutionary acts have a propositional content, e.g. an utterance of
“Hurrah” does not, nor does “Ouch”.
 The illocutionary force indicator shows how the proposition is to be taken, or to
put it another way, which illocutionary force the utterance is to have; that is what illocutionary
act the speaker is performing in the utterance of a sentence. Illocutionary force includes word
order, stress, intonation contour, punctuation, the mood of the verb, and the so-called
performative verbs. Often in actual speech situations the context will make it clear what the
illocutionary force of the utterance is

e.g. I promise that I will come.

Illocutionary force The indicator of propositional content
6.
 Performative Utterances

 There are in fact no linguistic features which reliably and unambiguously distinguish
performative from non-performative utterances
 Austin noticed that the concept of the performative utterance, of doing something
by saying something, had a more general application, for in saying I promise, I apologize, I
warn you one actually performs the acts of promising, apologizing and warning.
 The performative utterance may be explicit, e.g. I promise only when I intend to
keep my word. I protest against the verdict.

In the following table the first column contains explicit performatives and the third
column constatives, while the status of those in the middle column is doubtful.

Types of Performative Utterances

Performatives ? Constatives
I thank you I am grateful I feel grateful
I bid you welcome I welcome you –
I apologize I am sorry I repent

Austin suggests four tests for deciding which way utterances in the middle column are
being used :
1. Does the saying of the words constitute the performing of an act ? This can be tested
by asking did he really of particular utterance.
2. Could the action be performed without uttering the words ?
3. Is the action something that can be done deliberately and voluntarily ?
4. Can the utterance be literally false? (Austin sees this as a crucial distinction between
constatives which can be true or false and performatives which can only be happy or unhappy).

7. Reference as a Speech Act

o Any expression which serves to identify any thing, process, event, action, or any
other kind of “individual” or “particular” is a referring expression.
o Referring expressions point to particular things, answering the questions « Who? », «
What? », « Which? »
o Reference is a speech act, and speech acts are performed by speakers in uttering
words, not by wordsь e.g. : « you », « the battle of Waterloo », « our copy of yesterday’s
newspaper », « the constellation of Orion ».
o The utterance serves to pick out or identify one « object » or « entity » or « particular
» apart from other objects, about which the speaker then goes on to say something or ask some
questions.

8. Expressions and Kinds of Speech Acts

1. Sam smokes habitually. (an assertion)

2. Does Sam smoke habitually? (a question)
3. Sam, smoke habitually. (an order)
4. Would that Sam smoked habitually. (a wish or desire)
In the performance of each of these four different acts the speaker performs certain other
acts which are common to all four: in uttering any of these the speaker refers to or mentions, or
designates a certain object Sam, and he predicates the expression “smokes habitually” of the
object referred to. Thus, in the utterance of all four the reference and predication are the same
though in each case the same reference and predication occur as part of a complete speech act
which is different from any of the other three.
Austin baptized these complete speech acts with the name “illocutionary acts”. Some of
the English verbs denoting illocutionary acts are: state, describe, assert, warn, remark, comment,
command, order, request, criticize, apologize, censure, approve, welcome, promise, object,
demand and argue, etc.
Uttering any of the four sentences a speaker is characteristically performing at least three
distinct kinds of acts:
a) uttering words (morphemes, sentences) = performing utterance (locutionary in
Austin’s classification) acts;
b) referring and predicating = performing propositional acts;
c) stating, questioning, commanding, promising, etc. = performing illocutionary acts.

Utterance acts consist simply in uttering strings of words. Illocutionary and

propositional acts consist in uttering words in sentences in certain contexts, under certain
conditions and with certain intentions.
 Lecture 2

CATEGORIES AND TYPES OF PERFORMATIVES

1. Performative Hypothesis

- Performative hypothesis illustrates how and why pragmatics came into being.
- Some utterances have no truth conditions.

1. I drive a white car. (a statement)

2. I apologize.
3. I name this ship The Albatross.
4. I bet you £5 it will rain.

Syntactically, the four sentences are similar: all are in the first person, declarative, indicative,
active and in the simple present tense. Pragmatically, the first sentence is very different from the other
three (verbs in sentences (2) – (4) do not make statements, which can be judged true or false).
One useful (but not infallible) test for a performative verb is to see whether you can meaningfully
insert the adverb hereby between subject and verb:
I hereby apologize
I hereby name this ship The
Albatross I hereby bet you £5
but not:
*I hereby drive a white car

- Austin was convinced that we do not just use language to say things (to make statements), but
to do things (perform actions). It was this conviction which eventually led him to a theory of what he
called illocutionary acts, a theory which examines what kinds of things we do when we speak, how we
do them and how our acts may “succeed” or “fail”, but he began exploring his ideas by way of the (soon
to be abandoned) « performative hypothesis ».

2. Metalinguistic Performatives

Performatives are :
1. Self- referential (the verb refers to what the speaker of the utterance is doing) ;
2. Self-verifying (they contain their own truth conditions) ;
3. Non-falsifiable (they can never be untrue).
Examples :
I say I withdraw (my complaint)
 I protest I declare (the meeting open)
I object I plead (not guilty)
I apologize I note (to abolish vivisection)
I deny I move (the exams to be
abolished) I promise I thank (the audience for their
attention)

I. (1a) I say that John is a liar. (1b) John is a liar.

If, in the real world, it can be shown that John is a liar, then sentence (1b) is true. Sentence (1a) is
self-verifying.
II. (2a) I plead not guilty. (2b) I am innocent.
Sentences (2a) and (2b) are identical to sentences (1a) and (1b) in terms of their truth
conditions.
III. (3a) I move that fox-hunting be abolished. (3b) I believe that fox-hunting should be abolished.
Sentences (3a) and (4a) and (3b) and (4b) are identical in terms of their truth conditions. We would
expect (3b) and (4b) to be produced by speakers who are opposed to fox-hunting, the extension of
licensing hours. All we can say for sure about the speakers of (3a) and (4a) is that they have formally
opposed something.
IV. (4a) I object to the licensing hours being extended. (4b) I do not want the licensing hours to
be extended.
V. (5a) I apologize for deceiving the auditors. (5b) I am sorry I deceived the auditors.
I apologize often sounds like something one says for form’s sake, that it is less sincere than I am
sorry.

3. Ritual Performatives

Austin observed that although performatives are not subject to truth conditions, yet they can go
wrong.
If the felicity conditions are not observed (as in the case of our renaming the ship) the
performative may be infelicitous (or may « fail » or be « unsuccessful »).
Felicity conditions apply particularly to performatives associated with various rituals or very
formal events. Unlike metalinguistic performatives (which seem to operate in broadly the same way in all
languages and cultures and which apparently have no felicity conditions) ritual performatives are highly
culturally dependent. Examples of such ritual performatives are:

(1) I sentence you to ten years.

(2) I absolve you from your sins.
 (3) I baptize you.
(4) I name this ship.

Each of these can only appropriately and successfully be uttered by a specified person in a
specified situation (e.g. by a judge in a court of law, by a priest, etc.)

4. Collaborative Performatives

Some performatives do not have felicity conditions in the sense that a specified person must utter
the words in particular circumstances, but nevertheless their success is not guaranteed.
They require, for their success the « collaboration » or particular uptake of another person :
Mr X, an opposition M.P., had challenged the Minister of Defense using the performative “I bet
you …”. His intervention was reported that evening in the following way :
Mr X offered to bet Mr Z £10 that the N Naval Support base would close within two years, but a
cautious (or perhaps knowledgeable) Mr Z declined to take up the bet.
As the report makes clear, a bet or wager is only successfully made when the other person accepts
it, e.g. :
I bet / wager you five pounds …
I challenge you to pistols at
dawn. I bequeath you my gerbil.

As with a bet, a challenge is only successfully made when the other person accepts the challenge.
And in English law a bequest is only successfully made if the legatee accepts the bequest.

a. Group Performatives

 Some performatives are either commonly or necessarily produced by more than one person (a
communiqué from a summit conference, a report from a committee).
 Group performatives may fall into any of the three preceding categories.
 Examples of a group metalinguistic, ritual and collaborative performatives.
Example 1. “We three Fredricksons … vow to try and put our name in history books because it’s
our own and nobody can say it’s because of our grandfathers.”
Example 2. This example is taken from the findings of the General Medical Council Disciplinary
Committee. “We do not judge you to be guilty of professional misconduct.”

b. Overlap of Categories

Not all the categories are neat and self-contained. E.g. It would be possible to argue that many «
ritual » performatives are also « collaborative » in nature. Performatives such as “I baptize you …” are
arguably only successful if the person concerned (or at least his or her representatives) is willing to accept
the baptism. Similarly, some collaborative performatives also fall within the category of ritual
performatives (bequeathing, e.g.)

c. Explicit and Implicit Performatives

An explicit performative (of the I hereby … kind) is a mechanism which allows the speaker to
remove any possibility of misunderstanding the force behind an utterance.

(1) We remind you that all library books are due to be returned by 9th of June.
(2) This is to remind you that all library books are due to be returned by 9th of June.
(3) You are reminded that all library books are due to be returned by 9th of June.
(4) All library books are due to be returned by 9th of June.

Sentences (1), (2), (3) and (4) all perform the same action – that of reminding borrowers to return
their books by the due date. But whereas utterance (1) uses an explicit performative to perform the act of
reminding (2) – (4) do so using different sorts of non-performative utterances. While it is certainly true to
say, as Austin does, that there are no substantial distinctions in meaning between explicit and implicit
performatives, yet (before we abandon the distinction altogether) it is worth exploring the difference in the
way in which a performative utterance and its non-performative counterpart are used. Some situations
(typically very formal situations) require that a specific form of language be used, while others imply a
stylistic difference (e.g. in the degree of formality conveyed) or imply a difference in emphasis. E.g. :
(1) I apologize.
(2) I am sorry.
Sentence (1) seems more formal than sentence (2).
(3) I assure you, I did send in the application on time.
(4) I did send in the application on time.
Sentence (3) seems more forceful than (4).
(5) I swear I love you.
(6) I love you.

In this case, the performative form would only seem to be necessary in a situation where there
seems to be a degree of doubt in the mind of the loved one. It might also be a second attempt at reassuring
someone – we often find that a speaker will first try implicit performative and move onto an explicit
performative only if the first attempt fails. People often avoid using an explicit performative since in
many circumstances it seems to imply an unequal power relationship or a particular set of rights on the
part of the speaker.
 Lecture 3

TYPES OF ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS AND CONDITIONS OF THEIR

PERFORMING

1. Types of Illocutionary Acts

In using language, we intend to have a specific force in performing speech acts : requests,
authorizations, promises, offers.
Every sentence is « about » something, independent of its syntactic form or intended use. The
sentence « I will be home by noon » is about the speaker’s anticipated presence at his home at midday.
The term propositional content will be used to refer to this notion of what a sentence is about. Part
of sentence meaning and hence what the speaker says often goes beyond the propositional content of the
sentence. The utterance of « I will be home by noon », e.g., can be intended as a promise and when
intended as such commits the speaker to much different attitude towards a future action of home coming,
than when the very same sentence is uttered and intended to be a threat, a warning, or simply a prediction.
There are four major attitudes which can be expressed by the speaker and which partition these
acts into types:

A Belief Speaker expresses belief that proposition is true.

B Desire Speaker expresses a desire concerning the action specified in the
proposition.
C Commitment Speaker expresses an intention to undertake a commitment associated
with the
action specified in the proposition.
D Evaluation Speaker expresses a personal evaluation towards some past action.

We succeed in linguistically communicating when we get the hearer to recognize what we have
said and what attitude we hold towards the propositional content of our utterance. The communicative
effect on the hearer is a recognition of what attitude I hold towards the proposition I have expressed.

 Some, but not all modifications of a basic attitude have labels, associated with them. One that
does, e.g., is in the speaker’s desire that the hearer carry out some action and do so in virtue of the
speaker’s wanting this done: this is a request ;
 Four enumerated speaker attitudes do not exhaust the possible attitudes a speaker might hold
towards what he has said ;

1. The first genus of illocutionary acts is that in which the speaker expresses his belief that the
propositional content of the utterance is true. Fraser calls them representatives (acts of asserting,
predicting, describing, advising, certifying, admitting and agreeing are all instances of the speaker’s
expressing his attitude of belief).
 Representatives. Speaker expresses belief that the propositional content is true and :
A. Indicates the belief is his own opinion
1) without time restrictions (affirm, allege, assert, aver, claim, declare, maintain, say, state)
2) with future time restriction (forecast, predict, prophesy)
3) with past time restriction (report, recount)
B. Indicates the belief rests with some verifiable knowledge (advise, announce, apprise,
disclose, inform, insist, notify, point out, report, reveal, tell, testify)
C. Indicates the belief rests with some truth-seeking procedure (appraise, assess, certify,
conclude, confirm, corroborate, diagnose, find, judge, substantiate, validate, verify)
D. Indicates the belief is contrary to the previous belief (acknowledge, admit, agree, allow,
assent, concede, concur, confer, grant)
E. Indicates the belief is no longer held by him (correct, disavow, disclaim, renounce, retract,
deny)
F. Indicates the belief is that of another person (accept, agree, assent, concur)
G. Indicates the belief is not that of another person (differ, disagree, dissent, reject)
H. Indicates the belief is tentative (conjecture, guess, hypothesize, speculate, suggest)
I. Indicates the belief is worth consideration (assume, hypothesize, postulate, stipulate, suppose,
theorize)
J. Indicates the belief is not shared by all (demur, dispute, object, protest, question)
K. Indicates the belief accurately characterizes some object (appraise, assess, call, categorize,
characterize, classify, date, describe, diagnose, evaluate, grade, identify, rank)

2. The second genus Directives includes those acts in which the speaker expresses an attitude
towards a prospective action by the hearer. Acts such as pleading, requesting, ordering, forbidding and
suggesting all fall within this genus of which again there are a number of species.
Directives: Speaker expresses a desire regarding the action specified in the propositional content,
namely:
A. The hearer is to carry out the action
1) indicating that the hearer is to do so in virtue of the speaker’s desire (ask, beg, beseech,
implore, invite, petition, plead, request, solicit, summon, urge, injure, question)
2) indicating that the hearer is to do so in virtue of the speaker’s authority over the hearer (bid,
charge, command, dictate, direct, enjoin, instruct, order, proscribe, require)
 B. The hearer is not to carry out the action indicating that the hearer is not to do so in virtue of
the authority of the speaker over the hearer (enjoin, forbid, proscribe, restrict)
C. The hearer is to believe that (s)he is now entitled to carry out the action in virtue of the
speaker’s authority over the hearer (agree to, allow, authorize, bless, consent to, dismiss, excuse, exempt,
forgive, grant, license, pardon, release, sanction)
D. The hearer is to consider the merits of taking the action in virtue of the speaker’s belief that
there is sufficient reason for the hearer to act (admonish, advise, caution, counsel, propose, recommend,
suggest, urge, warn)

3. The third genus of illocutionary acts comprise commissives. Commissives are acts in which
the speaker expresses his intentions concerning some future action. There are two main species.
Commissives: Speaker intends that his utterance obligates him to carry out the action specified in
the propositional content:
A. Without any further preconditions (promise, swear, guarantee, vow)
B. Subject to a favourable response by the hearer (offer, propose, bet, volunteer, bid)

4. The fourth group of acts are Evaluatives. They are those acts in which the speaker expresses
his attitude towards some earlier action. The following species are typical.
Evaluatives: Speaker expresses:
A. Regret for a prior action for the hearer feels responsible (apologize)
B. Sympathy for the hearer’s having suffered (condole, commiserate)
C. Gladness for the hearer’s having performed some action (compliment, congratulate)
D. Pleasure at having encountered the hearer (greet)
E. Gratitude for the hearer’s participation in some prior action (thank)
There are some hybrid acts which seem to fall into at least two of the genera just discussed. One of
these is the act of inviting, wherein the speaker is both suggesting the hearer consider the merits of some
action and, at the same time, promising that the speaker will approve of the action should the hearer
perform it. Another is the act of surrendering in which the speaker both admits defeat (a Representative)
and simultaneously, promises to cease fighting (a Commissive).

2. Conditions of Illocutionary Acts

Austin (1962) introduced three categories of conditions which are associated with the successful
and non-defective performance of an illocutionary act.
Success Conditions are necessary and sufficient for the act to have been performed.
Felicity Conditions are required for there to be no defect in the performance. They are not
required for the successful performance of the act, but their failure to be met gives rise to more-or-less
serious defects.
 Considering the act of requesting, again, we might fairly expect the following:
1) the speaker is sincere in his expression of desire that the hearer act, that is, the speaker really
wants the hearer to act ; Insincerity is ordinarily is, nevertheless, sometimes obvious ;
2) that a requester believes that the hearer can, in fact, perform the action ;
3) that the speaker does not believe that the act is going to be performed in the absence of a request.

3. Performing Illocutionary Acts

The utterance meaning (what the speaker says) provides the initial basis on which the hearer
operates and information beyond the intended propositional content.
When the speaker utters a declarative sentence, e.g., « The cat is on the mat », he is saying that this
is the case and hence he is expressing the belief that the cat is on the mat. The declarative syntactic form
entails that the speaker is expressing the attitude of belief towards the propositional content. To utter an
imperative sentence is to say that the hearer is to make it the case that the action specified in the
propositional content is carried out, hence, the speaker expresses the desire that the hearer carry out the
action. To utter a yes / no interrogative sentence, the speaker is expressing his desire that the hearer tell
whether or not it is the case that the proposition is true. If a Wh question (Who was there?) is posed, the
speaker is expressing his desire that the hearer fill in the missing referential term referred to by the Wh-
word in the sentence. Syntactic form does contribute to sentence meaning and therefore to what the
speaker says in uttering a particular sentence. Of course, the use of the simple declarative may only make
it clear that the intention of the speaker is to express the attitude of the belief. Sentence meaning does not
determine intended force but it certainly does limit it.
On the basis of what the speaker says, the hearer can assign an illocutionary act potential to the
utterance. « I was there » has the potential of a claim, but not a prediction due to the tense of the
propositional content, and the potential of a claim but not an order due to its force – indicating properties;
the speaker is expressing belief, not desire.
A most visible force-indicating property is the so-called performative verb. Verbs such as request
and promise when used in sentences such as, “I request that you sit down” and “I promise that I will
arrive on time”, are said to be used performatively because they “announce” to the hearer the intention of
the speaker. In the first sentence, e.g. the “I request” has the force-indicating property of expressing the
speaker’s intention of having the utterance count as a request, while the “you sit down” captures the
propositional content about which the attitude of requesting is held.
The speaker ordinarily intends the hearer to recognize which particular attitude he holds towards
the expressed proposition, either because he has made that intention explicit or provided clues which
enable the hearer to decide. Under such conditions of speaking we say that the speaker has directly
performed an illocutionary act; if the intended act is recognized as such by the hearer then the speaker has
directly communicated. Note that the speaker can directly perform a particular illocutionary act either
literally or figuratively. If I utter, “This room is a pigsty”, and speak literally, saying that this particular
room is a home for pigs, then I have directly claimed that this room is a home for pigs. If I utter the same
sentence but intend it to be taken figuratively, thereby saying that this room is a frightful mess, I have
directly claimed that this room is a frightful mess.
Whether or not I speak literally or figuratively, in both cases I am saying something, and that is
evaluated for its illocutionary force potential. If one of the potential acts is intended, and subsequently
recognized, I have directly performed that act. Mutually shared beliefs aid in using language effectively.
Grice talks about what the speaker says and what the speaker implicates, but does not mention
illocutionary force. However, determining what the speaker says is a preliminary step to determining what
direct illocutionary act has been intended. Analogously what is implicated in Grice’s terms is what is
indirectly said. And it is quite reasonable to talk about what the speaker says and the corresponding direct
illocutionary force (whether performed by speaking literally or figuratively) to what the speaker
implicates and its associated indirect illocutionary force.
Searle (1975) provides a detailed account of how the hearer might proceed logically (although
certainly not necessarily in practice) from what the speaker has said to what he indirectly intended.
Considering a variety of examples, all of which are used to make an indirect request, e.g., “Can you pass
the salt?”, “Could I have the salt?” or, perhaps, “Is there any salt on the table?” he makes the following
assumptions: that the sentence meaning does not involve the imperative force; that such utterances are not
force-ambiguous; that when uttered to make a request, the sentences maintain their literal meaning, and
are uttered with that meaning intended directly. He suggests that a reconstruction of the steps for the
hearer to derive the request interpretation to pass the salt from the question about the hearer’s ability
might run as follows:
1. Speaker requested information about my abilities.
2. I assume he is abiding by the cooperative principle.
3. Context does not indicate any speaker interest in my actual salt-passing ability.
4. Speaker probably already knows the answer to the question.
5. There must, therefore, be some other reason for asking.
6. One condition on a request is the ability of the hearer to perform the act.
7. Thus, the speaker has asked me a question whose affirmative answer would entail that the
preparatory condition for requesting me to pass the salt is satisfied.
8. Context is at dinner where passing the salt is appropriate.
9. Speaker has alluded to satisfaction of a preparatory condition for a request whose fulfilment is
quite reasonable.
10. In absence of any plausible illocutionary point, speaker is probably asking me to pass the salt.
Thus, we can safely assume that not only will an account take into consideration the conditions
defining the intended indirect act, what the speaker has directly done, the manner of speaking and the
context of speaking but also a set of mutually shared beliefs.
 Lecture 4

CONDITIONS OF PROMISES AND GENERAL HYPOTHESES CONCERNING

ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS

1. How to Promise: a Complicated Way

A speaker 1 (S) utters a sentence (T) in the presence of hearer, then in the literal utterance of a
sentence (T), speaker 1 (S) sincerely and non-defectively promises that prepositional content (p) to a
person 1 (H) if and only if the following conditions 1-9 obtain :
1. Normal input (the conditions of understanding) and output (the conditions for intelligible
speaking) conditions obtain ;
2. A speaker 1 expresses the proposition that prepositional content in the utterance of a sentence ;
3. In expressing that prepositional content, the speaker 1 predicates a future act (A) of the
speaker 1 (it cannot be a past act) ;
4. A person 1 would prefer the speaker 1’s doing the future act to his not doing the future act, and
the speaker 1 believes the person 1 would prefer his doing the future act to his not doing it.
5. It is not obvious to both speaker 1 and person 1 that the speaker 1 will do a future act in the
normal course of events (If I make a request to someone to do something which it is obvious that he is
already doing or is about to do quite independently of the request, then my request is pointless and to that
extent defective) ;
6. The speaker 1 intends to do the future act (in the case of sincere promises, the speaker intends
to do the act promised; in the case of insincere promises, he does not intend to do the act. In sincere
promises, the speaker believes it is possible for him to do the act (or to refrain from doing it) ;
7. The speaker 1 intends that the utterance of a sentence will place him under an obligation to do
the future act (this condition distinguishes promises (and other members of the same family such as vows)
from other kinds of illocutionary acts) ;
8. Speaker 1 intends (i-I) to produce in hearer the knowledge that the utterance of the sentence is to
count placing the speaker 1 under an obligation to do the future act. The speaker 1 intends to produce the
knowledge by means of the recognition of i-I and he intends i-I to be recognized in virtue of (by means of)
a person 1’s knowledge of the meaning of a prepositional content.
9. The semantical rules of the dialect spoken by the speaker 1 and the person 1 are such that the
sentence is correctly and sincerely uttered if and only if conditions 1-8 obtain.

This condition is intended to make clear that the sentence uttered is the one which, by the
semantical rules of the language, is used to make a promise. The meaning of a sentence is entirely
determined by the meaning of its elements, both lexical and syntactical.

2. Insincere Promises
 In making an insincere promise the speaker does not have all the intentions he has when
making a sincere promise; in particular he lacks the intention to perform the act promised. However, he
purports to have that intention ;
 A promise involves an expression of intention, whether sincere or insincere.
E.g. to say I promise to do A is to take responsibility for intending to do A and this condition
holds whether the utterance was sincere or insincere.

3. General Hypotheses Concerning Illocutionary Acts

 There are other types of illocutionary acts, e.g. giving an order ;

The preparatory condition

the speaker should be in a position of authority over the hearer ;
the hearer must have some basis for supposing the asserted proposition
is true (for assertiotions).
The sincerity condition
the speaker wants the ordered act done and the essential condition has
to do with the fact that the speaker intends the utterance as an attempt to
get the hearer to do the act ;
the hearer must believe so,ething to be true (for assertations).
The essential condition

 In the utterance of Hello there is no propositional content and no sincerity condition ;

 Certain general hypotheses concerning illocutionary acts :
1. Wherever there is a psychological state specified in the sincerity condition, the performance of
the act counts as an expression of that psychological state. This law holds whether the act is sincere or
insincere. Thus, to affirm, assert, state, counts as an expression of belief (that p). To request, ask, order,
entreat, enjoin, pray, or command (that A be done) counts as an expression of a wish or desire (that A be
done). To promise, vow, threaten or pledge (that A will be done) counts as an expression of intention (to
do A). To thank, welcome or congratulate counts as an expression of gratitude, pleasure (at H's arrival), or
pleasure (at H's good fortune).
2. To converse of the first law is possible only in cases when the act counts as the expression of a
psychological state and that is called insincerity possibility. One cannot, e.g., greet or christen insincerely,
but one can state or promise insincerely.
3. Where the sincerity condition tells us what the speaker expresses in the performance of the act,
the preparatory condition tells us (at least part of) what he implies in the performance of the act. Thus,
e.g., when I make a statement, I imply that I can back it up, when I make a promise, I imply that the thing
promised is in the hearer’s interest. When I thank someone, I imply that the thing I am thanking him for
has benefited me (or was at least intended to benefit me), etc.
4. Whenever the illocutionary force of an utterance is not explicit it can always be made explicit.
This is an instance of the principle of expressibility, stating that whatever can be made, can be said ;
whatever can be implied can be said, though it cannot be said without implying other things.
5. The overlap of conditions shows that certain kinds of illocutionary acts are really special cases
of other kinds; thus asking questions is really a special case of requesting, viz. requesting information
(real question) or requesting that the hearer display knowledge (exam question). This explains that an
utterance of the request form “Tell me the name of the first President of the USA” is equivalent in force to
an utterance of the question form “What’s the name of the first President of the USA?” It also partly
explains why the verb ask covers both requests and questions, e.g., “He asked me to do it” (request) and
“He asked me why” (question).
6. In general the essential condition determines the others. E.g., since the essential rule for
requesting is that the utterance counts as an attempt to get H to do something, then the propositional
content rule has to involve future behaviour of H.
7. The notions of illocutionary force and different illocutionary acts involve several quite different
principles of distinction.
1) there is the point of purpose of the fact (the difference, e.g., between a statement and a question)
;
2) the relative positions of S and H (the difference between a request and an order);
3) the degree of commitment undertaken (the difference between a mere expression of
intention and a promise) ;
4) the difference in propositional content (the difference between predictions and reports) ;
5) the difference in the way the proposition relates to the interest of S and H (the
difference between boasts and laments, warnings and predictions) ;
6) the different possible expressed psychological states (the difference between a
promise, which is an expression of intention, and a statement, which is an expression of belief)
;
7) the different ways in which an utterance relates to the rest of the
conversation (the difference between simply replying to what someone has said and objection
to what he has said).
8. The same utterance act may be performed with a variety of different intentions.
 Lecture 5

A TAXONOMY OF ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS

1. Criteria for Distinguishing Illocutionary Acts

There are several quite different principles of distinction.

There are twelve significant dimensions of variation in which illocutionary acts differ from one
another:
1) Differences in the point (or purpose) of the (type of) act. (an attempt to get the hearer to do
something) ;
2. Differences in the direction of fit between words and the world : difference in direction of fit :
the detective’s list has the word-to-world direction of fit ↓ (as do statements, descriptions, assertions and
explanations); the shopper’s list has the world-to-word direction of fit ↑ (as do requests, commands, vows,
promises) ;
3. Differences in expressed psychological states (in the performance of any illocutionary act
with a propositional content, the speaker expresses some attitudes, state, etc. to that propositional
content) ;
4. Differences in force or strength with which the illocutionary point is presented. (« I suggest
that we go to the movies » and « I insist that we go to the movies » ;
5. Differences in the status or position of the speaker and hearer as these bear on the
illocutionary force of the utterance (if the general asks the private to clean up the room, that is in all
likelihood a command or an order, if the private asks the general to clean up the room, that is likely to be
a suggestion or proposal or request, but not an order of command) ;
6. Differences in the way the utterance relates to the interests of the speaker and the hearer (the
differences between boasts and laments, between congratulations and condolences) ;
7.Differences in relations to the rest of the discourse.
8.Differences in propositional content that are determined by illocutionary force indicating
devices (between a report and a prediction) ;
9. Differences between those acts that must always be speech acts and those that can be, but need
not be performed as speech acts ;
10. Differences between those acts that require extra-linguistic institutions for their performance
and those that do not.
11. Differences between those acts where the corresponding illocutionary verb has a performative
use and those where it does not (most illocutionary verbs have performative uses, e.g., state, promise,
order, conclude. But one cannot perform acts of, e.g., boasting or threatening by saying, “I hereby boast”
or “I hereby threaten”. Not all illocutionary verbs are performative) ;
12. Differences in the style of performance of the illocutionary act (the difference between, e.g.,
announcing and confiding need not involve any difference in illocutionary point or propositional content
but only in the style of performance of the illocutionary act).
2. Basic Categories of Illocutionary Acts

1. Assertives – commit the speaker (in varying degrees) to something’s being the case to the truth
of the expressed proposition.
2. Directives – attempts (of varying degrees) by the speaker to get the hearer to do something.
Verbs denoting members of this class are: ask, order, command, request, beg, plead, pray, entreat,
invite, permit, advise, dare, defy, challenge.
3. Commissives – point to commit the speaker to some future course of action. The propositional
content is always that the speaker does some future action.
4. Expressives – express the psychological state specified in the sincerity condition about a state of
affairs specified in the propositional content.
There is an important class of cases where the state of affairs represented in the proposition is
realized or brought into existence by the illocutionary force indicating device, cases where one brings a
state of affairs into existence by declaring it to exist, cases where, so to speak, « saying makes it s о » (« I
resign », « You are fired », « I excommunicate youс», « I christen this ship the battleship Missouri », « I
appoint you chairman », « War is hereby declared »).
This class is called declarations.
Successful performance guarantees that the propositional content corresponds to the world : if I
successfully perform the act of appointing you chairman.
Declarations bring about some alteration in the status or condition of the object (or objects)
referred to solely in virtue of the fact that the declaration has been successfully performed. This feature of
declarations distinguishes them from other categories.
There must be an extra-linguistic institution and the speaker and hearer must occupy special places
within this institution. It is only given such institutions as the church, the law, private property, the state
and a special position of the speaker and hearer within these institutions that one can excommunicate,
appoint, give and bequeath one’s possessions or declare war.
There are two classes of exceptions to the principle that every declaration requires an
extralinguistic institution : supernatural declarations and the declarations that concern language itself, e.g.,
when one says, “I define, abbreviate, name, call or dub”.
Declarations do attempt to get language to match the world, but they do not attempt to do it either
by describing an existing state of affairs (as do assertives) nor by trying to get someone to bring about a
future state of affairs (as do directives and commissives).
Some institutions require assertive claims to be issued with the force of declarations in order that
the argument over the truth of the claim can come to an end somewhere and the next institutional steps
which wait on the setting of the factual issue can proceed: a prisoner is released, a touchdown is scored.
The existence of this class we may dub « assertive declarations ». Unlike the other declarations, they
share with assertives a sincerity condition. The judge, jury and umpire can, logically speaking, lie, but the
man who declares war or nominates you cannot lie in the performance of his illocutionary act.