RULE 5: UNIFORM PROCEDURE IN TRIAL COURTS It is not true, as the MTC said, that the only questions

raised were questions of law. The petitioner’s answer

135.) Bayubay vs. CA, and Big Mak Burger, Inc. contained a counter-claim for reimbursement of
improvements allegedly made by it on the premises, as
Facts: well as claim for damages for alleged bad faith of private
respondent in bringing the case—questions which
Petition for review of the Decision of the CA. Bayubay obviously required at least the affidavits of witnesses.
filed a petition for ejectment against Big Mak on the
ground of expiration of contract of lease. Private
respondent Big Mak Burger argued in its answer that it 136.) Lucas vs Judge Fabros
had the option to renew the term of the lease contract
“under such conditions as may be agreed upon the Facts:
parties” and set up the defense of estoppel. The MTC
issued summons with notification that the case should In a verified complaint, Lucas charged Judge Fabros of
be heard using the Rules of Summary Procedure. gross ignorance of the law and GAD relative to the case
of Castelo vs Lucas, for ejectment. He alleged that
The trial court rendered a decision holding that the Judge Fabros issued an order granting the MR, which
contract of lease had expired because no extension had dismissed the case for failure of plaintiff and her counsel
been agreed upon by the parties as required by the to appear at the Preliminary Conference. Complainant
agreement. Private respondents appealed the decision averred that it is elementary, under Section 19(c) of the
of the RTC arguing that the MTC violated Sec. 6 of RSP RSP, that a MR is prohibited, but respondent judge, in
by rendering a judgment without ordering the parties to violation of the rule, granted the MR. Judge Fabros in its
submit their respective position papers and affidavits of comment argue that he knows that the MR is a
their witnesses, as a consequence, their right to due prohibited pleading in a RSP, but averred that it was
process was violated. granted in the interest of justice.

The RTC affirmed the MTC’s ruling. On appeal, the CA The Office of Court Administrator after evaluation, report,
reversed the RTC and ordered the remand of the case and recommendation declared that Judge Fabros
back to the MTC. committed GAD in issuing the MR and recommended
that the judge be fined in the amount of P2, 000.
Issue:
Issue:
WON CA erred in its ruling of remanding the case back
to the MTC. WON Judge Fabros committed GAD in the granting the
MR
Decision:
Decision:
No. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs
against the petitioner. No. This rule, however, applies only where the judgment
sought to be reconsidered is one rendered on the merits.
We see nothing wrong with the decision of the As held by the Court in an earlier case involving Sec. 15
(c) of the Rules on Summary Procedure, later Sec. 19(c)
Court of Appeals remanding the case to the Municipal of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure effective
Trial Court for further proceedings. The respondent court November 15, 1991: “The motion prohibited by this
was merely enforcing the mandatory provisions of the Section is that which seeks reconsideration of the
Rule on Summary Procedure. judgment rendered by the court after trial on the merits
of the case.” Here, the order of dismissal issued by
The Section 6 and 7 of RSP require that immediately respondent judge due to failure of a party to appear
after the preliminary conference, the Municipal Trial during the preliminary conference is obviously not a
Court should issue an order clearly and distinctly setting judgment on the merits after trial of the case. Hence, a
forth the issues of the case and the other matters taken motion for the reconsideration of such order is not the
up during the preliminary conference. prohibited pleading contemplated under Section 19 (c) of
the present Rule on Summary Procedure. Thus,
The order is an important part of the summary procedure
respondent judge committed no grave abuse of
because it is its receipt by the parties that begins the
discretion, nor is she guilty of ignorance of the law, in
ten-day period to submit the affidavits and other
giving due course to the motion for reconsideration
evidence mentioned in Sec 7.
subject of the present complaint
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals—
137.) Bongato vs Sps. Severo and Trinidad Malvar
We think that the failure of the MTC to give the petitioner
Facts:
the opportunity to submit its position paper and/or
affidavit of witnesses constituted a denial of due Petition for review on certiorari. This is a petition for
process. True, between August 22, 1989 and December review under Rule 45. Sps Malvar filed a forcible entry
18, 1989, when the MTC rendered its decision was a case against Bongato. The petitioner filed a MOTES to
period of more than three months. But under the Rule on file an answer which was denied by the MTCC; it being
Summary Procedure, the ten-day period for submitting proscribed under the RSP, and likewise containing no
affidavits and position papers did not commence to run notice of hearing. With a new counsel, Atty. Viador C.
until receipt by a party of the order of the court Viajar, petitioner filed an answer which the MTCC
embodying the results of the pre-trial conference. Here, disregarded, the same having been filed beyond the ten-
as already stated, the MTC never issued such an order day regelamentary period. Later, with still another
and so the ten day period never started to run. counsel, Atty. Jesus Chavez of the PAO, petitioner filed
a MD which the MTCC denied as being contrary to the
RSP.
1
The MTCC rendered a decision ordering to vacate the have been tried or are pending in the same court or
land. The RTC affirmed the MTCC’s ruling. Petitioner before the same judge. There are exceptions to this rule.
filed an MR. the MR was granted only insofar as to Ordinarily, an appellate court cannot refer to the record
determine the location for the houses involved in this in another case to ascertain a fact not shown in the
civil case so that the Court will know whether they are record of the case before it, yet, it has been held that it
located on one and the same lot or a lot different from may consult decisions in other proceedings, in order to
that involved in the criminal case for Anti-Squatting, filed look for the law that is determinative of or applicable to
by Malvar against Bongato.. In the same order, the case under review. In some instances, courts have
respondent judge disallowed any extension and warned also taken judicial notice of proceedings in other cases
that if the survey is not made, the court might consider that are closely connected to the matter in controversy.
the case abandoned and the writ of execution would be These cases “may be so closely interwoven, or so
dismissed. Petitioner filed a MOTEX. Petitioner filed a clearly interdependent, as to invoke” a rule of judicial
MOTEX fir the submission of the relocation survey, as notice.
the engineer concerned could not conduct his survey
during Holy Week, being a lay minister and parish Factual findings of trial courts, especially when affirmed
council member. There being no survey report, the case by the Court of Appeals, are binding on the Supreme
was returned to the court of origin for disposal. Court. Indeed, the review of such findings is not a
function that this Court normally undertakes. However,
The RTC ruled that the writ of execution can now be this Rule is not absolute; it admits of exceptions, such as
served to the defendant. (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when a lower
On appeal the CA affirmed that RTC. The CA held that court’s inference from its factual findings is manifestly
the lot referred to in the present controversy as different mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave
from the involved in the anti-squatting case. It further abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when
ruled that the MTCC had jurisdiction, and that it did not the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues
err in rejecting petitioners MD. The appellate court of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties
reasoned that the MTCC had passed upon the issue of to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which
ownership of the property merely to determine —if properly considered—will justify a different
possession—an action that did not oust the latter of its conclusion; (5) when there is a misappreciation of facts;
jurisdiction. (6) when the findings of fact are conclusions without
mention of the specific evidence on which they are
Issue: based, are premised on the absence of evidence, or are
contradicted by evidence on record.
WON the CA erred in its ruling that the MTCC had
jurisdiction over the case Pursuant to Section 36 of B.P. 129, the Court on June
16, 1983, promulgated the Rule on Summary Procedure
Decision: in Special Cases. Under this Rule, a motion to dismiss or
quash is a prohibited pleading. Under the 1991 Revised
Yes. Before tackling the issue directly, it is worthwhile to
Rule on Summary Procedure, however, a motion to
restate three basic legal principles. In forcible entry, one
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
employs force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth to
subject matter is an exception to the rule on prohibited
deprive another of physical possession of land or
pleadings.
building. Thus, the plaintiff must allege and prove prior
physical possession of the property in litigation until A court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
deprived thereof by the defendant. This requirement cannot be waived by the parties or cured by their
implies that the possession of the disputed land by the silence, acquiescence or even express consent. A party
latter was unlawful from the beginning. The sole may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at
question for resolution hinges on the physical or material any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal. That
possession (possession de facto) of the property. the MTCC can take cognizance of a motion to dismiss
Neither a claim of juridical possession (possession de on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, even if an answer
jure) nor an averment of ownership by the defendant can has been belatedly filed.
outrightly prevent the court from taking cognizance of the
case. Ejectment cases proceed independently of any 138.) Pascual vs Judge Jovellanos
claim of ownership, and the plaintiff needs merely to
prove prior possession de facto and undue deprivation Facts: Pascual charged Judge Jovellanos with gross
thereof. ignorance of the law, bias and impartiality, abuse of
discretion and neglect of duty. Complainant alleged the
It is wise to be reminded that forcible entry is a quieting he filed a forcible entry against Manaois which was
process, and that the restrictive time bar is prescribed to dismissed for ebing insufficient in some material
complement the summary nature of such process. allegations. Complainant corrected the complaint.
Indeed, the one-year period within which to bring an Instead of filing an answer, Manaois filed a motion to
action for forcible entry is generally counted from the strike out new allegations for being false. He accuse
date of actual entry to the land. However, when entry is Atty. Peregrino, of having a penchant for filing
made through stealth, then the one-year period is administrative cases against him instead of appealing
counted from the time the plaintiff learned about it. After the decision before the proper court.
the lapse of the one-year period, the party dispossessed
of a parcel of land may file either an accion publiciana, The OCA fined Judge Jovellanos with P10,000 and a
which is a plenary action to recover the right of warning that a similar infraction will be dealt with more
possession; or an accion reivindicatoria, which is an severely.
action to recover ownership as well as possession.
Issue: WON Judge Jovellanos is guilty of gross
As a general rule, courts do not take judicial notice of the ignorance of the law
evidence presented in other proceedings, even if these

2
Decision: 2003 were non-working holiday (per presidential
proclamation in connection with the Independence Day
YES. We agree with the findings of the OCA, but celebration)
increase the penalty, taking note that this is respondent’s
second infraction. The OCA ordered Judge Mirafuente a fine of P11, 000
with a stern warning that a repetition of the similar act
In particular, municipal judges are frontline officers in the shall be dealt with more severely.
administration of justice. It is therefore essential that they
live up to the high standards demanded by the Code of Issue: WON Judge Mirafuente is guilty of gross
Judicial Conduct. To be able to render substantial justice ignorance of the law
and to maintain public confidence in the legal system,
they are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory Decision:
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. They
are likewise expected to keep abreast of all laws and Yes. Delay in the disposition of cases undermines the
prevailing jurisprudence. Judicial competence requires people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary. Hence,
no less. judges are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Such
a requirement is especially demanded in forcible entry
The Rule on Summary Procedure was promulgated and unlawful detainer cases.
precisely to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases. Failure to observe the period For forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases involve
within which to render a judgment subjects the defaulting perturbation of social order, which must be restored as
judge to administrative sanctions. For this reason, the promptly as possible, such that technicalities or details of
Rule frowns upon delays and expressly prohibits, procedure which may cause unnecessary delays should
altogether, the filing of motions for extension. carefully be avoided. That explains why the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure which governs ejectment,
Lack of knowledge of the Rules on Summary Procedure among other cases, lays down procedural safeguards to
reflects a serious degree of incompetence. When the law guarantee expediency and speedy resolution.
is so elementary, as in this case, not to be aware of it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. A member of the The word “shall” in the above-quoted sections of the
bench must be constantly abreast of legal and 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure underscores
jurisprudential developments, bearing in mind that this their mandatory character. Giving the provisions a
learning process never ceases. It is indispensable to the directory application would subvert the nature of the
correct dispensation of justice. Rule and defeat its objective of expediting the
adjudication of the suits covered thereby. To admit a late
Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Canons on Judicial Ethics answer is to put a premium on dilatory maneuvers—the
mandates that a judge should dispose of the court’s very mischief that the Rule seeks to redress
business promptly and decide each case within the
period prescribed therefor. We have held in numerous In the present case, respondent gave a liberal
cases that failure to decide within the reglementary interpretation of the above-said Rule. Liberal
period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the interpretation or construction of the law or rules,
imposition of administrative sanctions. however, is not a free commodity that may be availed of
in all instances under the cloak of rendering justice.
WHEREFORE, Judge Eduardo Jovellanos is hereby Liberality in the interpretation and application of Rules
found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and is applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes
FINED in the amount of fifteen thousand pesos and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a
(P15,000). He is further warned that a repetition of this game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case
or similar offenses will be dealt with even more severely. must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
SO ORDERED. procedure to insure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice
139.) Luna vs Judge Mirafuente
Respecting respondent’s admission of the unverified
Facts: Dr. Luna filed a complaint for unlawful detainer answer of the defendants, while paragraph (B) of
against Florencio and Alex Sadiwa. Defendant filed an Section 3 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
unverified answer to the complaint 7 days beyond the requires that “all pleadings shall be verified,” the
regelementary period of 10 days from the services of requirement is formal, not jurisdictional. The court may
summons on them. Dr. Luna filed a motion for judgment, order the correction of the pleading if the verification is
invoking Sec. 6 of RSP, to which Florence and Alex lacking or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if
Sadiwa did not file any opposition. The said motion was the attending circumstances are such that strict
denied. compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in
order that the end of justice may thereby be served.
Hence, Dr. Luna charged Judge Mirafuent with Grave
misconduct and Conduct prejudicial to the best interest Respondent’s act, albeit a disregard of procedural rules,
of the service, violation of the rules on RSP in special does not, however, constitute grave misconduct. Neither
cases and gross ignorance of the law arising from his act does it constitute gross ignorance of the law. Gross
of giving due course to the belatedly filed an unverified ignorance transcends a simple error in the application of
answer. He asserts that Judge Mirafuente have motu legal provisions. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or
propio or on the motion of the plaintiffs rendered corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are
judgement as warranted by the fatcs alleged in the generally not subject to disciplinary action, even though
complaint, following Sec. 6 of RSP. Respondent judge in such acts are erroneous
his comment argued that his admission of the answer
was premised on the spirit of justice and fair play; that 140.) Azucena Go And Regena Gloria Siong Vs.
the admission was proper because the delay was Court Of Appeals
negligible, it involving only 4 days as June 13 to 15, G.R. No. 128954 October 8, 1998
Petition for review on certiorari 
3
 We find that the respondent RTC did not abuse its
FACTS: discretion in taking cognizance of the appeal. Neither did
it act without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
Star Group Resources filed with MTCC of Iloilo (Branch
1) an ejectment case against petitioners. Upon motion of First, it must be stated that the purpose of the Rule[s] on
petitioners, said court issued an Order holding in Summary Procedure is "to achieve an expeditious and
abeyance the preliminary conference in said case until inexpensive determination of cases without regard to
after the case for specific performance involving the technical rules." (Section 36, Chapter III, B.P. Blg. 129).
same parties shall have been finally decided by the RTC
of Iloilo City (Branch 37). Apparently, the prohibition against petitions
for certiorari involving interlocutory orders was included
Star Group filed an appeal which was assigned to RTC to forestall useless petitions and avoid undue
of Iloilo (Branch 34). Thereafter, petitioners filed a inconvenience and delays. In effect, a party is prevented
motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the from having to assail orders on incidental matters as
appealed order is interlocutory and therefore not they are issued by the court. Instead, a party is obliged
appealable. Said motion was denied. Their motion for to contest all such expeditious resolution of the case.
reconsideration was likewise denied.
However, in the case at bench, what the private
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the respondent sought to be reviewed by way of appeal was
Supreme Court (SP 37306) alleging that RTC Branch 34 a suspension order. An order which to all intents and
should not deny their motion to dismiss appeal. purposes runs counter to the summary nature of
ejectment proceedings. Thus, the private respondent as
Private respondent then filed with respondent RTC a plaintiff in the ejectment proceeding should be given a
"Motion to Resume Proceedings". RTC granted said remedy to question said order which the respondent
motion and directed the remand of the records of the court had judiciously  provided for.
case to the MTCC (Branch 1) for further proceedings.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and All told, inaction on the MTCC's order of suspension due
clarification but the same was denied. to the procedural void created by Section 19 of the
Rule[s] on Summary Procedure and Section 2, Rule 41
Petitioners then filed with CA a petition for "review" (SP of the Rules of Court will defeat rather than promote the
394403) alleging that RTC should not order the thrust of the summary rules which is the speedy
resumption of proceedings in MTCC Branch 1. disposition of cases.

The CA issued a TRO enjoining the respondent RTC ISSUE:

from further proceeding. ometime after the restraining
order lapsed, respondent court remanded the records to Whether CA erred in allowing the appeal of an
the MTCC. interlocutory order.

Petitioners filed with the MTCC a motion to hold in RULING:

abeyance further proceedings. MTCC denied the motion
and set the case for preliminary conference. The petition is devoid of merit.

Subsequently, petitioners filed their supplemental In affirming the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
petition for review impleading the presiding Judge of the of Iloilo City, the Court of Appeals noted that there was a
MTCC, raising the issue of whether or not the "procedural void" in the summary proceedings before the
respondent MTCC erred in resuming the proceedings in MTCC. The undisputed facts illustrate that existing
view of the timely filing of the petition for "review", procedural rules do not provide an adequate remedy to
docketed as SP No. 39403. herein private respondent.

CA granted petitioners' motion for a writ of preliminary It may be recalled that the MTCC, acting on petitioners'
injunction and ordered herein private and public motion, held in abeyance the preliminary conference in
respondents to refrain from continuing with the the ejectment suit, until the termination of a pending
proceedings before the MTCC until the herein above- case for specific performance involving the same parties.
entitled petitions are resolved. In challenging the order of the MTCC, herein private
respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court.
he Court of Appeals sustained the propriety of appeal as Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the
a remedy to challenge the suspension of the ejectment assailed order was interlocutory and, therefore, not
suit by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo subject to appeal.
City:
Indisputably, the appealed order is interlocutory, for "it
Verity, the respondent RTC was cognizant of the does not dispose of the case but leaves something else
impropriety of an appeal from an interlocutory order. to be done by the trial court on the merits of the case." 5 It
However, in denying the motion to dismiss the appeal it is axiomatic that an interlocutory order cannot be
considered the following circumstances: 1) the challenged by an appeal.6 Thus, it has been held that
procedural void where the aggrieved party (herein "the proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal
private respondent) will have no remedy for the from an adverse judgment  on the merits, incorporating in
ventilation of his rights; and 2) the fact that herein said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory
petitioners as plaintiffs in the case for specific order. Allowing appeals from interlocutory orders would
performance (Civil Case No. 21142) also filed a motion result in the 'sorry spectacle' of a case being subject of a
to hold in abeyance the pre-trial of said case. counterproductive ping-pong to and from the appellate
4
court as often as a trial court is perceived to have made Private respondent herein filed an appeal to question the
an error in any of its interlocutory rulings. However, interlocutory order. This recourse was upheld by the
where the assailed interlocutory order is patently RTC and the CA in order to fill a "procedural void." We
erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford affirm the ruling of both the trial and the Court of
adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may Appeals. We hold, however, that the appeal should
allow  certiorari as a mode of redress."7 instead be treated as a petition for certiorari under Rule
65. An appeal ordinarily entails a longer process which
Clearly, private respondent cannot appeal the order, negates an expeditious resolution.
being interlocutory. But neither can it file a petition
forcertiorari, because ejectment suits fall under the Petitioners posit that if such "procedural void" exists, no
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, Section 19 (g) of remedy is sanctioned by law, and the courts thus have
which considers petitions for certiorari prohibited no power to provide one. Petitioners aver that the defect
pleadings: lies in the law and can only be remedied by the
legislature.
Sec. 19: Prohibited pleadings and
motions. — The following pleadings, This argument is unacceptable.  First, at issue in this
motions, or petitions shall not be case is not a law passed by the legislature, but
allowed in the cases covered by this procedural rules promulgated by the Supreme Court.
Rule: Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, categorically
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or allows the Court to lay down rules concerning, among
to quash the complaint or information others, procedure in all courts. Second, court are
except on the ground of lack of "empowered, even obligated, to suspend the operation
jurisdiction over the subject matter, or of the rules," when a rule "deserts its proper office as an
failure to comply with the preceding aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief
section; enemy such that rigid application thereof frustrates
(b) Motion for a bill of particulars; rather than promotes substantial justice."8 Thus, it has
(c) Motion for new trial, or for been held that "the power of this Court to suspend its
reconsideration of a judgment, or for own rules or to except a particular case from [their]
reopening of trial; operations whenever the purposes of justice require it,
(d) Petition for relief from judgment; cannot be questioned."
(e) Motion for extension of time to file
pleadings, any other pager; 141.) Republic of the Philippines and National Power
(f) Memoranda; Corporation vs. Sunvar Realty Development
(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, Corporation
or prohibition against any interlocutory G.R. NO. 194880; June 30, 2012
order issued by the court;
(h) Motion to declare the defendant in FACTS:
default;
(i) Dilatory motions for postponement;
(j) Reply; Petitioners Republic and NAPOCOR are registered co-
(k) Third party complaints; owners of a parcel of land which they leased to the
(l) Interventions. Technology Resource Center Foundation, Inc., (TRCFI)
for a period of 25 years ending on December 31, 2002.
Based on the foregoing, private respondent was literally The TRCFI was given the right to sublease this land,
caught "between Scylla and Charybdis" in the procedural which it did, to Sunvar, through sublease agreements
void observed by the Court of Appeals and the RTC. with the common provision that their sublease
Under these extraordinary circumstances, the Court is agreements were going to expire on December 31,
constrained to provide it with a remedy consistent with 2002, the date that the TRCFI’s lease agreements with
the objective of speedy resolution of cases. the petitioners would expire.

As correctly held by Respondent Court of Appeals, "the In 1987, when the government was reorganized, the
purpose of the Rules on Summary Procedure is "to TCFRI was replaced with the Philippine Development
achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of Alternatives Foundation (PDAF). Before the expiration
cases without regard to technical rules." (Section 36, date, Sunvar wrote to PDAF and expressed its desire to
Chapter III, BP Blg. 129)" Pursuant to this objective, the renew the sublease over the subject property and
Ruler prohibit petitions for certiorari, like a number of proposed an increased rental rate and a renewal period
other pleadings, in order to prevent unnecessary delays of another 25 years. PDAF forwarded the letter to
and to expedite the disposition of cases. In this case, petitioners. By June 25, 2002, PDAF had informed
however, private respondent challenged the MTCC Sunvar of petitioners’ decisions not to renew the lease.
order delaying the ejectment suit, precisely to avoid the
mischief envisioned by the Rules. When the lease contract and the sublease agreements
expired, petitioners recovered all the rights over the
subject property. Nevertheless, respondent Sunvar
Thus, this Court holds that situations wherein a summary continued to occupy the property.
proceeding is suspended indefinitely, a petition
for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion may be Six years after the expiry date, petitioner Republic,
allowed. Because of the extraordinary circumstances in through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
this case, a petition for  certiorari, in fact, gives spirit and advised respondent Sunvar to vacate the subject
life to the Rules on Summary Procedure. A contrary property. Although Sunvar duly received the Notice, it
ruling would unduly delay the disposition of the case and did not vacate the property. Almost a year after the first
negate the rationale of the said Rules. notice, respondent Sunvar received from respondent
OSG a final notice to vacate within 15 days. When the

5
period lapsed, respondent Sunvar again refused to bogus charges of Frustrated Murder against Gatdula in
vacate the property. relation to the alleged ambush incident.

Petitioners then filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer RTC JUDGE PAMPILO: Instead of deciding on whether
with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City. Sunvar to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge issued summons
moved to dismiss the complaint, questioning the and ordered De Lima, et al. to file an Answer. He also
jurisdiction of the MeTC as the action was supposed to set the case for hearing to determine whether a
an accion publiciana rather than one for unlawful temporary protection order may be issued.
detainer. The MeTC denied respondent’s Motion to
Dismiss and subsequent Motion for Reconsideration and During that hearing, counsel for De Lima, et al.
required Sunvar to submit their Answer. manifested that a Return, not an Answer, is appropriate
for Amparo cases
Despite filing an Answer, Sunvar still filed a Rule 65
Petition for Certiorari with the RTC of Makati City to RTC ORDER: Judge said that since no writ has been
assail the denial by the MeTC of respondent’s Motion to issued, return is not the required pleading but answer.
Dismiss. To answer this petition, petitioner’s questioned The judge noted that the Rules of Court apply
the RTC’s jurisdiction and prayed for the outright suppletorily in Amparo cases. He opined that the
dismissal of the petition. The RTC denied the motion for Revised Rules of Summary Procedure applied and thus
dismissal and granted the Rule 65 Petition, directing the required an Answer.
MeTC to dismiss the Complaint for unlawful detainer for
lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the instant petition. Judge Pampilo proceeded to conduct a hearing on the
main case. Even without a Return nor an Answer, he
ISSUE: ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda
within five (5) working days
Whether RTC violated the Rules on Summary Procedure
when it took cognizance and granted the certiorari RTC DECISION: granting the issuance of the Writ of
petition filed by Sunvar Amparo. The RTC also granted the interim reliefs prayed
for, namely: temporary protection, production and
RULING: inspection orders in relation to the evidence and reports
involving an on-going investigation of the attempted
Yes. The RTC should have dismissed Sunvar’s petition assassination of Deputy Director Esmeralda.
outright for being a prohibited pleading. Under the Rules
on Summary Procedure, a certiorari petition under Rule RTC denied herein petitioners’ MR.
65 against an interlocutory order issued by the court in a
summary proceeding is a prohibited pleading. According Petitioners thus came to the SC assailing the RTC
to former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban, the proper "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 through a Petition for
remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an Review on Certiorari (With Very Urgent Application for
adverse judgment on the merits incorporating in said the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of
appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order. Preliminary Injunction) via Rule 45.
Allowing appeals from interlocutory orders would result
in the ‘sorry spectacle’ of a case being subject of a ISSUE:
counterproductive ping pong to and from the appellate
court as often as a trial court is perceived to have made Whether a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
an error in any of its interlocutory rulings. The Court 45 is the proper remedy in the present case
mentioned only two cases in which they allowed
RULING:
exceptions to this rule and since Sunvar could not
substantiate its claims of extraordinary circumstances No. the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 granting the writ
that would allow those same exceptions to apply to his of Amparo is not the judgment or final order
case, the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 remains, contemplated under Rule 45. Hence, a Petition for
for him, a prohibited pleading. If the Court were to relax Review under Rule 45 may not yet be the proper remedy
the interpretation of the prohibition against the filing of at this time.
certiorari petitions under the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure, the RTCs may be inundated with similar The "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 assailed by the
prayers from adversely affected parties questioning petitioners could not be the judgment or final order that
every order of the lower court and completely dispensing is appealable under Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of
with the goal of summary proceedings in forcible entry or Amparo. This is clear from the tenor of the dispositive
unlawful detainer suits. portion of the "Decision" which merely directs the
issuance and service of the Writ of Amparo.
142.) SECRETARY DE LIMA VS. GATDULA
GR NO. 204528; FEB 19, 2013 The "Decision" is thus an interlocutory order, as
suggested by the fact that temporary protection,
FACTS: production and inspection orders were given together
with the decision. The temporary protection, production
and inspection orders are interim reliefs that may be
granted by the court upon filing of the petition but before
February 2012, respondent Atty. Magtanggol B. Gatdula
final judgment is rendered.
filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in
the RTC Manila against petitioners Justice Secretary The confusion of the parties arose due to the procedural
Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and irregularities in the RTC
Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of the National
Bureau of Investigation. First, the insistence on filing of an Answer was
inappropriate. It is the Return that serves as the
Respondent wanted petitioners to cease and desist from responsive pleading for petitions for the issuance of
framing up Gatdula for the fake ambush incident by filing
6
Writs of Amparo. The requirement to file an Answer is not properly served to him. Moreover, he also argued
contrary to the intention of the Court to provide a speedy that  he had been continuously exercising acts of
remedy ownership over the subject property, including payment
of real estate taxes. Magdamit, Sr. further argued that
Under Section 25 of the same rule [on the Writ of amendment of the Complaint in order to implead him is
Amparo], the Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily improper. According to Magdamit, Sr., amendment
insofar as it is not inconsistent with the said rule. It is cannot be allowed so as to confer jurisdiction upon a
clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure court that never acquired it in the first place, and the
only applies to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling ejectment case cannot be instituted against Magdamit,
how this rule could possibly apply to proceedings in an Jr. because an action to recover possession cannot be
RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the application of maintained against one who is not in actual or legal
summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A possession thereof.9
writ of Amparo is a special proceeding.
Pending litigation of the case, Magdamit, Jr., who was
Second was the holding of a hearing on the main case
made an original defendant in the MeTC, substituted his
prior to the issuance of the writ and the filing of a Return.
deceased father, Magdamit, Sr.
Without a Return, the issues could not have been
properly joined.
MeTC ruled in favor of the petitioner saying that the fact
Third, it required a memorandum in lieu of a responsive that the person who received the summons was a 13-
pleading (Answer) of De Lima, et al. year old girl does not make the service of summons
invalid. That she was of sufficient age and discretion is
The fourth irregularity was in the "Decision" dated 20 shown by the fact that she was intelligent enough to
March 2012 itself. "Accordingly this court GRANTS the immediately bring to the attention of defendant Atty.
privilege of the writ and the interim reliefs prayed for by Amador Magdamit, Jr. the summons and copy of the
the petitioner." complaint she received."10 The MeTC went on further,
stating that Magdamit Sr.’s claim of ownership is beyond
Court directed Judge Pampilo to determine within forty- its jurisdiction because the onlyissue in an ejectment
eight (48) hours from his receipt of this Resolution case is "possession de facto".
whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is proper on
the basis of the petition and its attached affidavits. On appeal, the RTC set aside the decision of the MeTC
and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over the
143.) Prudential Bank (now BPI) vs. Amador A. person of the respondents.12 According to the RTC,
Magdamit amending the original complaint to implead Magdamit,
GR No. 183795; November 12, 2014 Sr. to cure a defect in the complaint and introduce a non-
 Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of existing cause of action, which petitioner did not possess
Civil Procedure at the outset, and to confer jurisdiction upon the court
that never acquired jurisdiction in the first place renders
FACTS: the complaint dismissible. The RTC further stated that
because the Return did not clearly indicate the
In its capacity as administrator of the Estate of Juliana impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable
Vda. De Gabriel, Prudential Bank filed a case of unlawful time upon the respondents, the process server’s resort
detainer against Amador Magdamit. Magdmait failed to to substituted service of summons was unjustified.
pay rentals and refused to vacate the property located in
Paco, Manila. Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal via a petition for
review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court before the
Instead of filing an answer, Magdamit filed a Notice of CA. The CA denied the petition and affirmed the
Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss. He argued decision of the RTC. According to the CA, the Return,
that petitioner was not duly authorized by a resolution to with only a general statement and without specifying the
institute the complaint and MeTC did not acquire details of the attendant circumstances or of the efforts
jurisdiction over his person because the summons was exerted to serve the summons, will notsuffice for
served at his former address. He also said that he was purposes of complying with the rules of substituted
not an occupant of said property but instead, his parents, service of summons. The CA also rejected petitioner’s
were grantees or awardees of Juliana Diez Vda. De contention that respondents’ voluntary submission to the
Gabriel. jurisdiction of the court cured any defect in the
substituted service of summons when as early as during
On 30 April 2003, petitioner filed a Motion to Strike Out the infancy of the proceedings in the MeTC, Magdamit,
this pleading on the ground that it is prohibited. Jr. seasonably raised the ground of lack of jurisdiction
Petitioner then filed an Amended Complaint, this time, over his person by filing a Notice of Appearance with
impleading both Magdamit, Jr. and Amador Magdamit, Motion to Dismiss, which the respondents incessantly
Sr. (Magdamit, Sr.). reiterated in their pleadings even when the case was
elevated to the RTC, then to the CA. 
MeTc granted the motion to strike out Magdamit Jr.’s
motion and ordered him to file an answer. MeTC denied The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.
Magdamit’s contention that he was not properly served
summons. ISSUE:

Both Magdamit Jr. and Magdamit Sr. filed their answers Whether MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of
separately. Magdmait Jr. filed an answer with the respondents.
counterclaim and on the other hand, Magdamit Sr.
argued in his answer that MeTC did not acquire RULING:
jurisdiction ver his persob because the summons was
7
The petition is bereft of merit. Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the
service of summons with due care, utmost diligence, and
Fundamental is the rule that jurisdiction over a defendant reasonable promptness and speed so as not to prejudice
in a civil case is acquired either through service of the expeditious dispensation of justice. Thus, they are
summons or through voluntary appearance in court and enjoined to try their best efforts to accomplish personal
submission to its authority. In the absence or when the service on defendant. On the other hand, since the
service of summons upon the person of the defendant defendant is expected to try to avoid and evade service
isdefective, the court acquires no jurisdiction over his of summons, the sheriff must be resourceful,
person, and a judgment rendered against him is null and persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the process
void. on the defendant. For substituted service of summons to
be available, there must be several attempts by the
sheriff to personally serve the summons within a
In actionsin personamsuch as ejectment, the court
reasonable period [of one month] which eventually
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt
through personal or substituted service of summons.
service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3)
However, because substituted service is in derogation of
tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In
the usual method of service and personal service of
addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were
summons is preferred over substituted service, parties
unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service
do not have unbridled right to resort to substituted
can be confirmed or accepted.
service of summons. Before substituted service of
summons is resorted to, the parties must: (a) indicate
the impossibility of personal service of summons within a (2) Specific Details in the Return
reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate
the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the
served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted
who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the personal service. The efforts made to find the defendant
office or regular place of business of the defendant. and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly
narrated in detail in the Return.The date and time of the
In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, 22 we have succinctly attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to
discussed a valid resort to substituted service of locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the
summons: alleged residence or house of defendant and all other
acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on
defendant must be specified in the Return to justify
We can break down this section into the following
substituted service. The form on Sheriff’s Return of
requirements to effect a valid substituted service:
Summons on Substituted Service prescribed in the
Handbook for Sheriffs published by the Philippine
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service Judicial Academy requires a narration of the efforts
made to find the defendant personally and the fact of
The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff failure. Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 5
must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or dated November 9, 1989 requires that "impossibility of
there is impossibility of prompt service. Section 8, Rule prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts
14 provides that the plaintiff or the sheriff is given a made to find the defendant personallyand the failure of
"reasonable time" to serve the summons to the such efforts," which should be made in the proof of
defendant in person, but no specific time frame is service.
mentioned. "Reasonable time" is defined as "so much
time as is necessary under the circumstances for a (3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion
reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently,
what the contract or duty requires that should be done,
If the substituted service will be effected at defendant’s
having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if
house or residence, it should be left with a person of
any, to the other party." Under the Rules, the service of
"suitable age and discretion then residing therein." A
summons has no set period.
person of suitable age and discretion is one who has
attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and
However, when the court, clerk of court,or the plaintiff is considered to have enough discernment to understand
asks the sheriff to make the return of the summons and the importance of a summons. "Discretion" isdefined as
the latter submits the return of summons, then the "the ability to make decisions which represent a
validity of the summons lapses. The plaintiff may then responsible choice and for which an understanding of
ask for an alias summons if the service of summons has what is lawful, right or wise may be presupposed". Thus,
failed. What then is a reasonable time for the sheriff to to be of sufficient discretion, suchperson must know how
effect a personal service in order to demonstrate to read and understand English to comprehend the
impossibility of prompt service? To the plaintiff, import of the summons, and fully realize the need to
"reasonable time" means no more than seven (7) days deliver the summonsand complaint to the defendant at
since an expeditious processing of a complaint is what a the earliest possible time for the person to take
plaintiff wants. To the sheriff, "reasonable time" means appropriate action. Thus, the person must have the
15 to 30 days because at the end of the month, it is a "relation of confidence" to the defendant, ensuring that
practice for the branch clerk of court to require the sheriff the latter would receive orat least be notified of the
to submit a return of the summons assigned to the receipt of the summons. The sheriff must therefore
sheriff for service. The Sheriff’s Return provides data to determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or
the Clerk of Court, which the clerk uses in the Monthly residence of defendant is of legal age, what the
Report of Cases to be submitted to the Office of the recipient’s relationship with the defendant is, and
Court Administrator within the first ten (10) days of the whether said person comprehends the significance of
succeeding month. Thus, one month from the issuance the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately
of summons can be considered "reasonable time" with deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant
regard to personal service on the defendant.
8
of said receipt of summons. These matters must be Worse, the Return did not make mention of any attempt
clearly and specifically described in the Return of to serve the summons at the actual residence of
Summons. Magdamit, Jr. The Return merely expressed a general
statement that the sheriff exerted efforts to serve the
(4) A Competent Person in Charge summons and that the same was futile, "[t]hat on several
occasions despite deligent (sic) efforts exerted to serve
the said processes personally to defendant/s herein the
If the substituted service will be done at defendant’s
same proved futile," without any statement on the
office or regular place of business, then it should be
impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable
served on a competent person in charge of the place.
time. Further, the summons was served on a certain
Thus, the person on whom the substituted service will be
DaraCabug, a person not of suitable age and discretion,
made must be the one managing the office or business
who is unauthorized to receive the same.
of defendant, such as the president or manager; and
such individual must have sufficient knowledge
tounderstand the obligation of the defendant in the Notably, the requirement additionally is that
summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects
arising from inaction on the summons. Again, these Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, such person must
details must be contained in the Return. 23(Emphasis and know how to read and understand English to
underscoring supplied; citations omitted) comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize
the need to deliver the summons and complaint to the
The service of summons on Magdamit, Sr. failed to defendant at the earliest possible timefor the person to
comply with the rule laid down in Manotoc. The resort to take appropriate action. Thus, the person must have the
substituted service after just two (2) attempts to "relation of confidence" to the defendant, ensuring that
personally serve the summons on Magdamit, Sr., is the latter would receive or at least be notified of the
premature under our pronouncement that: receipt of the summons. The sheriff must therefore
determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or
residence of defendant is of legal age, what the
What then is a reasonable time for the sheriff to effect a
recipient’s relationship with the defendant is, and
personal service in order to demonstrate impossibility of
whether said person comprehends the significance of
prompt service? To the plaintiff, "reasonable time"means
the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately
no more than seven (7) days since an expeditious
deliver it tothe defendant or at least notify the defendant
processing of a complaint is what a plaintiff wants. To
of said receipt of summons. These matters must be
the sheriff, "reasonable time" means 15 to 30 days
clearly and specifically described in the Return of
because at the end of the month, it is a practice for the
Summons.27
branch clerk of court to require the sheriff to submit a
return of the summons assigned to the sheriff for
service. The Sheriff’s Return provides data to the Clerk The readily acceptable conclusion inthis case is that the
of Court, which the clerk uses in the Monthly Report of process server at once resorted to substituted service of
Cases to be submitted to the Office of the Court summons without exerting enough effort to personally
Administrator within the first ten (10) days of the serve summons on respondents. In Sps. Jose v. Sps.
succeeding month. Thus, one month from the issuance Boyon,28 we discussed the effect of failure to specify the
of summons can be considered "reasonable time" with details of the effort exerted by the process serverto
regard to personal service on the defendant.24 personally serve summons upon the defendants:

Then too, the proof of service failed to specify the details The Return of Summons shows no effort was actually
of the attendant circumstances. The Return merely exerted and no positive step taken by either the process
expressed a general statement that because the Sheriff server or petitioners to locate and serve the summons
failed to reachMagdamit, Sr., he elected substituted personally on respondents. At best, the Return merely
service of summons. The Return failed to state the states the alleged whereabouts of respondents without
impossibility to serve summons within a reasonable time. indicating that such information was verified from a
And the further defect in the service was that the person who had knowledge thereof. Certainly, without
summons was served on a person not of sufficient specifying the details of the attendant circumstances or
discretion, an incompetent person, Madel Magalona, a of the efforts exerted to serve the summons, a general
housemaid of Magdamit Sr.’s daughter, Arleen Marie statement that such efforts were made will not suffice for
Cabug. purposes of complying withthe rules of substituted
service of summons.29 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Similar to the case of Magdamit, Sr., the service of
summons on Magdamit, Jr. also failed to complywith the
rules laid down in Manotoc. The summons was served at In the case at bar, the Returns contained mere general
1163 Int., J. Nakpil St., Paco, Manila, Magdamit, Jr.’s statements that efforts at personal service were made.
former residence when at the time, Magdamit, Jr. was Not having specified the details of the attendant
residing at 0369 Jupiter St., Progressive Village 20 and circumstances or of the efforts exerted to serve the
21, Molino I, Bacoor, Cavite. In Keister v. Navarro, 25 we summons,30 there was a failure to comply strictly with all
have defined "dwelling house" or "residence" to refer to the requirements of substituted service, and as a result
a place where the person named in the summons is the service of summons is rendered ineffective.31
living at the time when the service is made, even though
he may be temporarily out of the country at the time to Filing an Answer does not amount to voluntary
the time of service. Therefore, it is not sufficient for the appearance
Sheriff "to leave the copy at defendant's former dwelling
house, residence, or place ofabode, as the case may be, The petitioner asserted that assuming arguendo that the
after his removal therefrom".26 service of summons was defective, respondents’ filing of
their respective Answers and participation in the
proceedings in the MeTC, such as attending the pre-trial
9
and presenting evidence, amount to voluntary special appearance to challenge, among others, the
appearance which vested the MeTC jurisdiction over court’s jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered
their persons. to have submitted to its authority.

Indeed, despite lack of valid service of summons, the Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:
court can still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant by virtue of the latter’s voluntary appearance. (1) Special appearance operates as an
Section 20, Rule14 of the Rules of Court clearly states: exception to the general rule on voluntary
appearance;
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. – The defendant’s
voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to (2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of
service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to the court over the person of the defendantmust
dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an
over the person shall not be deemed a voluntary unequivocal manner; and
appearance.
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary
However, such is not the case atbar. Contrary to submission to the jurisdiction of the court,
petitioner’s contention, respondents are not deemed to especially in instanceswhere a pleading or
have voluntarily submitted to the court’s jurisdiction by motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and
virtue of filing an Answer or other appropriate responsive submitted to the court for resolution. 34 (Emphasis
pleadings and by participating in the case. supplied and underscoring supplied)

The mandate under the Rules on Summary Proceedings Parallel to our ruling in Philippine Commercial
that govern ejectment cases, is expeditious International Bank, the respondents’ act of filing their
administration of justice such that the filing of an Answer respective Answers with express reservation should not
is mandatory. To give effect to the mandatory character be construed as a waiver of the lack of jurisdiction of the
and speedy disposition of cases, the defendant is MeTC over their person because of non-
required to file an answer within ten (10) days from service/defective/improper service of summons and for
service of summons, otherwise, the court, motu proprio, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Hence, sans
or upon motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction, filing an
may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint, answer in compliance with the rules on summary
limited to the relief prayed for by the procedure in lieu of obtaining an adverse summary
petitioner.32 Through this rule, the parties are precluded judgment does not amount to voluntary submission. As
from resorting to dilatory maneuvers. we already held, a party who makes a special
appearance in court, challenging the jurisdiction of said
Compliantly, respondents filed their respective Answers. court, is not deemed to have submitted himself to the
In the MeTC, at first, Magdamit, Jr. filed a Notice of jurisdiction of the court.35 It should not be construed as
Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss, where he voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
seasonably raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction, which
the MeTC later ordered to be stricken out. In lieu thereof, 144.) FAIRLAND KNITCRAFT CORPORATION Vs.
Magdamit, Jr. filed an Answer with Counterclaim (In a ARTURO LOO PO
Special Appearance Capacity). Again, Magdamit, Jr. G.R. No. 217694; GR No. 217694; Jan 27, 2016
reiterated the lack of jurisdiction over his person and the
subject matter. On the other hand, Magdamit, Sr. filed an FACTS:
Answer with an allegation by special defense that the
original complaint
Fairland was the owner of a Condominium Unit in Pasig
City. The said unit was leased by Fairland to Po by
should be dismissed outright because the MeTC did not
verbal agreement, with a rental fee of P20,000.00 a
acquire jurisdiction over his person and the subject
month, to be paid by Po at the beginning of each month.
matter.1âwphi1In sum, both respondents filed their
From March 2011, Po had continuously failed to pay
Answers via special appearance.
rent. On January 30, 2012, Fairland sent a formal
letter to Po demanding that he pay the amount of
In Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses P220,000.00, representing the rental arrears, and that
Wilson Dy Hong Pi and Lolita Dy, 33 we held that filing of he vacate the leased premises within fifteen (15) days
an answer in a special appearance cannot be construed from the receipt of the letter. Despite receipt of the
as voluntary appearance or submission to the court’s demand letter and the lapse of the said 15-day period to
jurisdiction: comply, Po neither tendered payment for the unpaid rent
nor vacated the premises. Thus, on December 12, 2012,
Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil Fairland filed a complaint for unlawful detainer before the
case is acquired either by the coercive power of legal MeTC. Po had until January 7, 2013 to file his answer
processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary but he failed to do so. Hence, on February 6, 2013,
appearance in court. As a general proposition, one who Fairland filed a motion to render judgment.
seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted
to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule On March 1, 2013, Po’s counsel filed his Entry of
that we have had occasion to declare that the filing of Appearance with Motion for Leave of Court to file
motions to admit answer, for additional time to file Comment/Opposition to Motion to Render Judgment. He
answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to denied the allegations against him and commented that
lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is there was no supporting document that would show that
considered voluntary submission to the court’s Fairland owned the property; that there was no lease
jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of contract between them; that there were no documents
conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a
10
attached to the complaint which would show that Affirmative and negative defenses not pleaded therein
previous demands had been made and received by him; shall be deemed waived, except for lack of jurisdiction
that the alleged unpaid rental was P220,000.00, but the over the subject matter. Cross-claims and compulsory
amount of damages being prayed for was P440,000.00; counterclaims not asserted in the answer shall be
that the issue in the case was one of ownership; and that considered barred. The answer to counterclaims or
it was the RTC which had jurisdiction over the case. cross-claims shall be filed and served within ten (10)
days from service of the answer in which they are
The MeTC treated the comment/opposition as Po’s pleaded.
answer to the complaint. Considering, however, that the
case fell under the Rules of Summary Procedure, the Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. – Should the
same was deemed filed out of time. Hence, the motion defendant fail to answer the complaint within the period
was denied. above provided, the court, motu proprio or on motion of
the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be
In its March 21, 2013 Decision, the MeTC dismissed the warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and
complaint for lack of merit due to Fairland’s failure to limited to what is prayed for therein. The court may in
prove its claim by preponderance of evidence. The its discretion reduce the amount of damages and
MeTC explained that although the complaint sufficiently attorney’s fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise
alleged a cause of action, Fairland failed to prove that it unconscionable, without prejudice to the applicability of
was entitled to the possession of the subject property. Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, if there are two
There was no evidence presented to support its claim or more defendants.
against Po either.
Section 6 is clear that in case the defendant failed to file
Fairland filed its appeal before the RTC under Rule 40 his answer, the court shall render judgment, either motu
and argued that an unlawful detainer case was a special proprio or upon plaintiff’s motion, based solely on the
civil action governed by summary procedure. In cases facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is
where a defendant failed to file his answer, there was no prayed for. The failure of the defendant to timely file his
need for a declaration of default. Fairland claimed that
answer and to controvert the claim against him
the Rules stated that in such cases, judgment should be
based on the “facts alleged in the complaint,” and that constitutes his acquiescence to every allegation stated in
there was no requirement that judgment must be based the complaint. Logically, there is nothing to be done in
on facts proved by preponderance of evidence. On this situation except to render judgment as may be
September 16, 2013, the RTC affirmed the MeTC ruling warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint.
and agreed that Fairland failed to establish its case by
preponderance of evidence. Similarly, under Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court,
which governs the rules for forcible entry and unlawful
Fairland appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA detainer, if the defendant fails to answer the complaint
dismissed the petition and ruled that an action for within the period provided, the court has no authority to
unlawful detainer would not lie against Po. declare the defendant in default. Instead, the court, motu
Notwithstanding the abbreviated proceeding it ordained proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render
and the limited pleadings it allowed, the Rules on judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in
Summary Procedure did not relax the rules on evidence. the complaint and limited to what is prayed for.
In order for an action for recovery of possession to
prosper, it was indispensable that he who brought the In this case, Po failed to file his answer to the complaint
action should prove not only his ownership but also the despite proper service of summons. He also failed to
identity of the property claimed. The CA concluded, provide a sufficient justification to excuse his lapses.
Thus, as no answer was filed, judgment must be
however, that Fairland failed to discharge such bounden
rendered by the court as may be warranted by the facts
duty. alleged in the complaint.
ISSUE: The lower courts erroneously dismissed the complaint of
Fairland simply on the ground that it failed to establish
Whether the ejectment case was correctly dismissed for by preponderance of evidence its ownership over the
lack of preponderance of evidence subject property. As can be gleaned above, the rules do
not compel the plaintiff to attach his evidence to the
RULING: complaint because, at this inception stage, he only has
to file his complaint to establish his cause of action.
NO. The Court agrees with Fairland’s position. Here, the court was only tasked to determine whether
the complaint of Fairland alleged a sufficient cause of
action and to render judgment thereon.
The summons, together with the complaint and its
annexes, was served upon Po on December 28, 2012. These specific provisions under the Rules of Summary
This presupposes that the MeTC found no ground to Procedure which are also reflected in Rule 70 of the
dismiss the action for unlawful detainer. Nevertheless, Rules of Court, serve their purpose to immediately settle
Po failed to file his answer on time and the MeTC had ejectment proceedings. “Forcible entry and unlawful
the option to render judgment motu proprio  or on motion detainer cases are summary proceedings designed to
of the plaintiff. In relation thereto, Sections 5 and 6 of the provide for an expeditious means of protecting actual
Rules on Summary Procedure provide: possession or the right to possession of the property
involved. It does not admit of a delay in the
Sec. 5. Answer. – Within ten (10) days from service of determination thereof. It is a ‘time procedure’ designed
summons, the defendant shall file his answer to the to remedy the situation. Thus, as a consequence of the
complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. defendant’s failure to file an answer, the court is simply
11
tasked to render judgment as may be warranted by the provide the measure of recovery is to prevent surprise to
facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is the defendant.
prayed for therein.
It would be unfair to the adverse party who would have
145.) Chinatrust (Phils.) Commercial Bank vs. Turner no opportunity to present further evidence material to the
G.R. No. 191458. July 3, 2017 new theory, which it could have done had it been aware
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and of it at the time of the hearing before the trial court.
resolution of the Court of Appeals
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED “The purpose of an action...and the law to govern it...is
to be determined...by the complaint itself, its allegations
FACTS: and the prayer for relief.” The complaint states, “the
Turner, herein respondent initiated via Chinatrust, herein theory of a cause of action which forms the bases of the
petitioner, a money wire transfer amounting to $438 plaintiff’s claim of liability". A review of the Complaint
going to his travel agency, MIN TRAVEL/ESMAT AZMY, filed before the MTC reveals that respondent originally
based in Cairo Egypt. This amount represented partial sued upon a breach of contract consisting in the alleged
payment for his and his spouse’s tour in Egypt. The failure of petitioner to remit the funds to his travel
funds were transmitted by Chinatrust thru Unionbank of agency’s account in Cairo, Egypt.
California, its paying bank, to Citibank New York, which
will credit to the Citibank Cairo account of MIN TRAVEL. The bank’s supposed negligence in the handling of
However, Chinatrust received notice from Citibank Cairo respondent’s concerns was not among respondent’s
that it was unable to credit the amount to the said causes of action and was never raised in the MTC.
account because the beneficiary account name did not While the RTC affirmed the MTC's ruling that indeed the
match their books, also known as “discrepancy notice”. funds were credited to the intended beneficiary’s
Said discrepancy notice was relayed to Turner but account, it went further and touched upon an issue that
Turner said he got in contact with MIN TRAVEL which was beyond the cause of action framed by the
confirmed receipt of the funds. respondent. It adjudged petitioner liable not because it
failed to perform its obligation to remit the funds but
However, Turner wanted to obtain refund of the fund due because it purportedly did not exercise due diligence in
to the cancellation of their travel, as his spouse fell ill. attending to respondent’s queries and demands with
Chinatrust, after several weeks, received official regard to the fund transfer.
confirmation from Citibank Cairo that the funds were
already transmitted successfully. Said official notice was Courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide
relayed to Turner but he still insisted on the refund. a question not in issue and that a judgment going
outside the issues and purporting to adjudicate
Turner filed a complaint in the MTC against Chinatrust. something upon which the parties were not heard is not
The complaint is anchored on the cause of action that merely irregular, but extrajudicial and invalid.
Chinatrust failed to transmit the funds to MIN TRAVEL.
MTC ruled in favor of Chinatrust as it found that it Another reason is that the determination of issues at the
complied with the obligation to transmit the funds to the preliminary conference bars the consideration of other
intended beneficiary. Turner filed an appeal with the questions on appeal. This is because under Section 9,
RTC. the parties are required to submit their affidavits and
other evidence on the factual issues as defined in the
RTC ruled that while Chinatrust transmitted the funds to preliminary conference order. Thus, either of the parties
MIN TRAVEL, the same did not absolve it of cannot raise a new factual issue on appeal, otherwise it
responsibility. RTC motu proprio, in ruling in favor of would be unfair to the adverse party, who had no
Turner, found that Chinatrust was negligent for its failure opportunity to present evidence against it.
to render services in a manner that could have mitigated,
if not prevented, the monetary loss, emotional stress, RULE 6: KINDS OF PLEADING
and mental anguish that Turner suffered for 6 weeks
waiting for the confirmation of receipt of his payment. 146.) Victorina Lazaro vs. Brewmaster International,
Inc.
Chinatrust appealed before the CA, which affirmed CA in G.R. No. 182779. August 23, 2010
toto. Hence, this petition. PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of
Appeals Decision and Resolution are hereby
Whether an appellate court may grant a relief not prayed AFFIRMED.
for in the pleadings. Whether arguments or issues not
raised in the lower court may be raised for the first time FACTS:
on appeal.
Respondent Brewmaster filed a complaint for sum of
RULING: money in the MTC under Rules on Summary Procedure,
against petitioner Victorina Lazaro and her spouse.
No. The judgment must be secundum allegata et Attached to the complaint were copies of sales invoices
probata. which indicated that said merchandise were sold to
“Total (Gas)”. In her answer, Victorina denied said
Issues that were not alleged or proved before the lower transactions.
court cannot be decided for the first time on appeal. This
rule ensures fairness in proceedings.

It is an established principle that “courts cannot grant a

relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what
is being sought by the party. The fundamental purpose
of the requirement that allegations of a complaint must
12
In the preliminary conference, both the petitioner and her respondent’s action for sum of money but were attached
spouse did not appear. Basing its finding on the sales to the Complaint only to provide details on the alleged
invoices attached, MTC dismissed the complaint as transactions. They were evidentiary in nature and not
Brewmaster failed to establish its claim against Victorina. even necessary to be stated or cited in the Complaint. At
RTC affirmed MTC. The CA ruled in favor of any rate, consideration of the attached sales invoices
Brewmaster. would not change our conclusion. The sales invoices,
naming Total as the purchaser of the goods, do not
CA found that since Victorina and her spouse failed to absolutely foreclose the probability of petitioner being
appear during the preliminary conference, judgment liable for the amounts reflected thereon. An invoice is
should have been rendered as may be warranted by the nothing more than a detailed statement of the nature,
facts alleged in the complaint. CA found that MTC’s and quantity, and cost of the thing sold and has been
RTC’s reliance on the sales invoices were improper as considered not a bill of sale.
the same were not actionable documents.
147.) Mongao vs. Pryce Properties Corporation
Petitioner insisted that assuming judgment should be G.R. No. 156474. August 16, 2005
confined to the allegations in the complaint, no relief PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
must be awarded as the complaint failed to state cause resolution of the Court of Appeals.
of action. Hence, this petition. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is
GRANTED.
ISSUE:

Whether the allegations in the complaint was sufficient to FACTS:

state cause of action
Petitioner Mongao and respondent Pryce Properties
RULING: entered into a memorandum of agreement whereby
petitioner agreed to sell to Pryce a parcel of land with a
At the outset, it must be noted that this case falls under consideration of 5M. Pryce gave 550k representing
Rules on Summary Procedure. Since defendant (herein earnest money. The controversy arose when Pryce
petitioner) failed to appear in the preliminary conference, offered to pay the balance by issuing a check payable to
the court is compelled to render judgment as may be petitioner Mongao, and another person named Animas.
warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint. It appears that Animas is related to Mongao and claimed
co-ownership of the land. Pryce refused to pay the
Yes. The basic requirement under the rules of procedure
balance solely to Mongao despite repeated demands.
is that a complaint must make a plain, concise, and
direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the In the action for rescission and damages filed by the
plaintiff relies for his claim. Ultimate facts mean the petitioner, she also filed a motion for judgement on the
important and substantial facts which either directly form pleadings on the ground that the answer failed to tender
the basis of the plaintiff’s primary right and duty or an issue. RTC granted the motion. Pryce elevated the
directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the case to the CA, which reversed the RTC ruling and
defendant. They refer to the principal, determinative, remanded the case. The CA ruled that there were actual
constitutive facts upon the existence of which the cause issues tendered by the respondent’s answer. Hence, the
of action rests. The term does not refer to details of present petition.
probative matter or particulars of evidence which
establish the material elements. ISSUE:
The test of sufficiency of the facts alleged in a complaint Whether judgment on the pleadings was proper on the
to constitute a cause of action is whether, admitting the ground that the answer failed to tender an issue.
facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment
upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the RULING:
petition or complaint. To determine whether the
complaint states a cause of action, all documents Yes. Judgment on the pleadings is governed by Section
attached thereto may, in fact, be considered, particularly 1, Rule 34, essentially it provides that where an answer
when referred to in the complaint. We emphasize, “fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
however, that the inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, the court
veracity of the material allegations in the complaint. may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such
Thus, consideration of the annexed documents should pleading.” The answer would fail to tender an issue, of
only be taken in the context of ascertaining the course, if it does not comply with the requirements for a
sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint. specific denial; and it would admit the material
allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings not only
Contrary to petitioner’s stance, we find that the where it expressly confesses the truthfulness thereof but
Complaint sufficiently states a cause of action. The also if it omits to deal with them at all.
following allegations in the complaint adequately make
up a cause of action for collection of sum of money Thus, there is joinder of issues when the answer makes
against petitioner: a specific denial of the material allegations in the
complaint or asserts affirmative defenses which would
(1) that petitioner and her husband obtained beer and bar recovery by the plaintiff. Where there is proper
other products worth a total of P138,502.92 on credit joinder of issues, the trial court is barred from rendering
from respondent; and judgment based only on the pleadings filed by the
parties and must conduct proceedings for the reception
(2) that they refused to pay the said amount despite of evidence.
demand.
An answer may allege affirmative defenses which may
As correctly held by the CA, the sales invoices are not strike down the plaintiff’s cause of action. An affirmative
actionable documents. They were not the bases of defense is one which is not a denial of an essential
13
ingredient in the plaintiff’s cause of action, but one included the parcels of land already granted to DSierto.
which, if established, will be a good defense—i.e. an DENR denied the foreshore application of DSierto as the
“avoidance” of the claim. Affirmative defenses include properties were either under the title of Ilocandia or were
fraud, statute of limitations, release payment, illegality, subject of Ilocandia’s foreshore lease application.
statute of frauds, estoppel, former recovery, discharge in
bankruptcy, and any other matter by way of confession A settlement meeting between DSierto members and
and avoidance. When the answer asserts affirmative Ilocandia was convened whereby each of the members
defenses, there is proper joinder of issues which must of DSierto agreed to receive 400k in exchange of waiver
be ventilated in a full-blown trial on the merits and of their claims and vacate the properties. The petitioner
cannot be resolved by a mere judgment on the Buncayao Sr did not attend the meeting but instead sent
pleadings. Allegations presented in the answer as his son in his place. The son of petitioner was the one
affirmative defenses are not automatically characterized who accepted the 400k.
as such. Before an allegation qualifies as an affirmative
defense, it must be of such nature as to bar the plaintiff Petitioner now filed an action to declare the settlement
from claiming on his cause of action. void. Respondent filed a counterclaim for the return of
the 400k and for the petitioner to vacate the property,
Petitioners’ action for rescission is mainly based on the including damages caused by the delay to Ilocandia’s
alleged breach by respondent of its contractual projects. No payment of docket fees for the counterclaim
obligation under the MOA when respondent refused to was made. In the trial court, the parties agreed to cancel
effect payment of the purchase price solely to petitioner the quitclaim and the return of 400k. The trial court ruled
Mongao. On the other hand, nothing from the allegations in favor of respondent, and found that the property
in respondent's answer makes out a proper joinder of occupied by petitioner was within the titled property of
issues. Petitioners’ cause of action for rescission is respondent.
founded mainly on a perfected contract of sale allegedly
entered into between petitioners and respondent as CA affirmed the decision in toto. The CA also held that
embodied in the MOA attached to the complaint. First, the counterclaim was compulsory therefore it did not
the allegations in respondent's answer do not make out require payment of docket fees.
a specific denial that a contract of sale was perfected
between the parties. Second, respondent does not Petitioner maintained that the court did not acquire
contest the due execution and/or genuineness of said jurisdiction over the counterclaim due to nonpayment of
MOA. docket fees. Hence, this petition.

Respondent offered the affirmative defense that the ISSUE

separate demands of petitioner Mongao and the Animas
Whether the counterclaim was compulsory so as to be
family compelled it to issue the check payable to both
exempted from payment of docket fees.
petitioner Mongao and her Animas. Effectively, the
affirmative defense offered imply an admission by RULING
respondent that it effected payment contrary to the
express terms of the contract of sale. Nowhere in the No. A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money
terms of the MOA does it state that the payment of the or any relief, which a defending party may have against
purchase price be tendered to any person other than an opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out of,
petitioner Mongao. The averment virtually admits or is necessarily connected with, the same transaction or
petitioners’ allegation that respondent corporation occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff’s
committed a breach of its contractual obligation to complaint.13 It is compulsory in the sense that it is within
petitioners and supports their cause of action for the jurisdiction of the court, does not require for its
rescission. adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and will be barred in
In essence, respondent corporation justifies its refusal to the future if not set up in the answer to the complaint in
tender payment of the purchase price solely to petitioner the same case. Any other counterclaim is permissive.
Mongao by alleging that the latter was a mere trustee
and not the beneficial owner of the property subject of The Court has ruled that the compelling test of
the sale and therefore not the proper party to receive compulsoriness characterizes a counterclaim as
payment. Such defense cannot prevent petitioners from compulsory if there should exist a logical relationship
seeking the rescission of the contract of sale. The between the main claim and the counterclaim.
express terms of the MOA, the genuineness and due
execution of which are not denied, clearly show that the The criteria to determine whether the counterclaim is
contract of sale was executed only between petitioner compulsory or permissive are as follows:
Mongao and respondent.
(a) Are issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by
148.) Bungcayao, Sr. vs. Fort Ilocandia Property the counterclaim largely the same?
Holdings and Development Corporation
G.R. No. 170483. April 19, 2010 (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the defendant’s claim, absent the compulsory rule?
Court of Appeals.
(c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute
plaintiff’s claim as well as defendant’s counterclaim?
FACTS:
(d) Is there any logical relations between the claim and
Petitioner was part of a group that called themselves the counterclaim?
“DSierto”. This group applied for foreshore lease
covering parcels of land along Calayab Beach. The The only counterclaim that remained was for the
group was granted provisional permit. Fort Ilocandia recovery of possession of the subject property. While
Property Holdings also filed a foreshore lease which this counterclaim was an offshoot of the same basic

14
controversy between the parties, it is very clear that it No. The criteria to determine whether the counterclaim is
will not be barred if not set up in the answer to the compulsory or permissive are as follows:
complaint in the same case. Respondent’s second
counterclaim, contrary to the findings of the trial court (a) Are issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by
and the Court of Appeals, is only a permissive the counterclaim largely the same?
counterclaim. It is not a compulsory counterclaim. It is
capable of proceeding independently of the main case. (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on
defendant’s claim, absent the compulsory rule?
The rule in permissive counterclaim is that for the trial
court to acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute
bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. Any decision plaintiff’s claim as well as defendant’s counterclaim?
rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be
struck down at any time, even on appeal before this (d) Is there any logical relations between the claim and
Court. In this case, respondent did not dispute the non- the counterclaim?
payment of docket fees. Respondent only insisted that
Tested against the above-mentioned criteria, this Court
its claims were all compulsory counterclaims. As such,
agrees with the CA’s view that petitioner’s counterclaim
the judgment by the trial court in relation to the second
for the recovery of the amount representing rentals
counterclaim is considered null and void without
collected by Fernando from the CMTC is permissive.
prejudice to a separate action which respondent may file
The evidence needed by Fernando to cause the
against petitioner.
annulment of the bid award, deed of absolute sale and
149.) Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TCT is different from that required to establish
vs. Heirs of Fernando F. Caballero petitioner’s claim for the recovery of rentals.
G.R. No. 158090. October 4, 2010
The issue in the main action, i.e., the nullity or validity of
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
the bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT in favor of
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
CMTC, is entirely different from the issue in the
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
counterclaim, i.e., whether petitioner is entitled to receive
FACTS: the CMTC’s rent payments over the subject property
when petitioner became the owner of the subject
Fernando, the father of the heirs, herein respondent, property by virtue of the consolidation of ownership of
secured a loan from GSIS and executed a real estate the property in its favor.
mortgage subjecting his land as security. Fernando
defaulted in his payment which resulted in the The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial
foreclosure of the REM. Fernando did not redeem the court to acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is
property so GSIS sent a notice of consolidation of title. In bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. This, petitioner
view of continued occupancy of Fernando of the did not do, because it asserted that its claim for the
property, GSIS demanded for rental payments. collection of rental payments was a compulsory
Fernando on the other hand requested that he be counterclaim. Since petitioner failed to pay the docket
allowed to repurchase the land thru partial payments. fees, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over its
Negotiation as to the repurchase went on for years but permissive counterclaim. The judgment rendered by the
no agreement was concluded. RTC, insofar as it ordered Fernando to pay petitioner the
rentals which he collected from CMTC, is considered null
GSIS then conducted a public bidding for the subject and void. Any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a
property out of which Carmelita Mercantile Trading Corp total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on
(CMTC) emerged as the highest bidder. Meanwhile, appeal before this Court.
Fernando passed away. Jocelyn, daughter of Fernando,
filed a complaint for the annulment of the sale for the Petitioner further argues that assuming that its
reasons that Carmelita Ang Hao had no authority from counterclaim is permissive, the trial court has jurisdiction
the board to participate in the bidding, CMTC was not to try and decide the same, considering petitioner’s
authorized to acquire real property, and GSIS allowed exemption from all kinds of fees.
CMTC to bid despite knowledge that CMTC has no
In In Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the
authority to do so. Petitioner GSIS specifically denied all
Government Service Insurance System from Payment of
the allegations, and filed a counterclaim for the collection
Legal Fees, the Court ruled that the provision in the
of 130k representing unpaid rentals, and additional 250k
Charter of the GSIS, i.e., Section 39 of Republic Act No.
for the rentals Fernando allegedly collected from
8291, which exempts it from “all taxes, assessments,
Carmelita.
fees, charges or duties of all kinds,” cannot operate to
RTC ruled in favor of GSIS. The CA affirmed the ruling exempt it from the payment of legal fees. This was
of RTC, HOWEVER, deleted the award for counterclaim, because, unlike the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which
there being no payment of docket fees made. empowered Congress to repeal, alter or supplement the
rules of the Supreme Court concerning pleading,
Petitioner GSIS maintained that its counterclaim was practice and procedure, the 1987 Constitution removed
compulsory in nature, hence exempted from payment of this power from Congress. Hence, the Supreme Court
docket fees. Hence, this petition. now has the sole authority to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
ISSUE: courts.

Whether the counterclaim was compulsory so as to be 150.) Consuelo V. Calo Vs. Ajax International,
exempt from payment of docket fees. Incorporated
G.R. No. L-22485, March 13, 1968
RULING:
FACTS:

15
Calo ordered from Ajax International, Inc. a John Shaw action for the remaining balance of his counterclaim, the
wire rope with the length of 1,200 feet. However, when it previous litigation did not really settle all related
was delivered it was found out that it was short of 300 ft. controversies.
It then wrote a demand letter to Ajax asking for the
completion of delivery or account adjustment of the 151.) INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL
alleged undelivered 300 ft rope. SERVICES, INC. Vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL
Adolfo Benavides filed a complaint with MTC of Manila Rule 65 Was Filed Before SC.
against Calo. It alleged that it acquired the outstanding
credit of Calo from Ajax through assignment of credit.
FACTS:
A judgment by default was entered, and a writ of
execution issued, against plaintiff Calo. The latter Sharp, Inc., the herein private respondent filed a
resorted to this Court on a petition for certiorari, complaint for prohibition with prayer for preliminary
prohibition and mandamus. Judgment of default and writ injunction against the Secretary of Transportation and
of execution were set aside and remanded the case for Communications, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA),
further proceedings. E. Razon, Inc., and the International Container Terminal
Services Inc., the herein petitioner.
Calo assisted by her husband, Marcos Calo, filed in the
Court of First Instance of Agusan a complaint against The trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction
defendant asking (1) that the latter either effect complete upon the posting by Sharp of a bond by the Integrated
delivery or that she be relieved from paying the balance Bonding and Insurance Co.
and (2) that the latter indemnify her for P12,000 as
attorney's fees, damages and expenses of litigation. On that same day, the petitioner filed an answer with a
compulsory counterclaim against Sharp for its
Instead of filing an answer, defendant moved for the "unfounded and frivolous action." The petitioner claimed
dismissal of Civil Case 860 on the ground, inter alia, that that as a consequence of the complaint and the writ of
the subject thereof was involved and intimately related to preliminary injunction, it had suffered injuries which "if
that case initially filed in MTC of Manila. The court a quo monetized (would) amount to more than
sustained the motion and dismissed the case. P100,000,000.00."

Calo moved for reconsideration and new trial. When this The writ of preliminary injunction was nullified by this
failed, she instituted the present appeal. Court in G.R. No. 82218. SC held that Sharp was not a
proper party to stop the negotiation and awarding of the
ISSUE: contract for the development, management and
operation of the Container Terminal at the Port of
Whether or not Calo should have filed a counterclaim in Manila. Moreover, the petition was premature because
the case filed before the MTC Manila by reason that her Sharp had not exhausted the administrative remedies
claim is a compulsory counterclaim. open to it from "the PPA, the Bidding Committee, and
the Office of the President."
RULING:
the PPA, taking its cue from this decision, filed a motion
NO. Calo’s claim is not a compulsory counterclaim to dismiss Sharp’s complaint on the above-stated
hence need not to filed in MTC Manila. grounds. This motion was adopted by petitioner CCTSI
in a manifestation.
Notwithstanding that there is no question that it arises
out of the same transaction which is the basis of the Judge Edilberto G. Sandoval dismissed the complaint as
complaint and does not require the presence of third well as the counterclaim.
parties over whom the municipal court of Manila could
not acquire jurisdiction. However, Calo’s claim is not a ICTSI filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
compulsory counterclaim for the simple reason that the insofar as it dismissed its counterclaim. Meanwhile, it
amount thereof exceeds the jurisdiction of the municipal gave notice to the First Integrated Bonding and
court. The rule that a compulsory counterclaim not set Insurance Co., Inc. that it was claiming damages against
up is barred, when applied to the municipal court, Sharp for the revoked injunction.
presupposes that the amount involved is within the said
court's jurisdiction. Otherwise, as this Court had already The motion for reconsideration was denied. CA affirmed
noted in Yu Lay v. Galmes , we would come to the the decision of trial court.
absurd situation where a claim must be filed with the
CCTSI has filed the present petition for review alleging
municipal court which it is prohibited from taking
that the order of the trial court dismissing the
cognizance of, being beyond its jurisdiction.
counterclaim was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
Specifically, the petitioner contends that the respondent
Besides, the reason underlying the rule, which is to court erred.
settle all related controversies in one sitting only, does
not obtain. For, even if the counterclaim in excess of the ISSUE:
amount cognizable by the inferior court is set up, the
defendant cannot obtain positive relief. The Rules allow 1. Whether or not the dismissal of the complaint
this only for the defendant to prevent plaintiff from will result to the dismissal of the compulsory
recovering from him.4 This means that should the court counterclaim.
find both plaintiff's complaint and defendant's 2. Whether a claim for damages can be made in
counterclaim (for an amount exceeding said court's the form of a counterclaim.
jurisdiction) meritorious, it will simply dismiss the
complaint on the ground that defendant has a bigger RULING:
credit. Since defendant still has to institute a separate
16
 a. Yes, dismissal of the complaint results dismissal and the parties having offered their evidence on the
of compulsory counterclaim unless reserve the subject, the trial court could dispose of it along with the
right to prosecute it by the defendant. principal action. It is not necessary that the defendant
wait until it is determined by a final decision in the main
A counterclaim is compulsory where: (1) it arises out of, action that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover in order
or is necessarily connected with, the transaction or to present the question of his right to damages. All
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing questions which are material to the main action or which
party’s claim; (2) it does not require for its adjudication are incidental thereto but depending thereon should be
the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot presented and litigated at the same time with the main
acquire jurisdiction; and (3) the court has jurisdiction to action, so as to avoid the necessity of subsequent
entertain the claim. litigation and consequent loss of time and money.
Tested by these requirements, the petitioner’s 152.) LUALHATI A. COJUANGCO
counterclaim was clearly compulsory. The petitioner Vs. PURIFICACION VILLEGAS
itself so denominated it. There is no doubt that the same G.R. No. 76838               April 17, 1990
evidence needed to sustain it would also refute the
cause of action alleged in the private respondent’s The instant petition for certiorari and prohibition. Rule 65.
complaint; in other words, the counterclaim would
succeed only if the complaint did not. It is obvious from FACTS:
the very nature of the counterclaim that it could not
remain pending for independent adjudication, that is, Lualhati Aldaba Cojuangco is the widow of Don Juan
without adjudication by the court of the complaint itself Cojuangco, the registered owner of the disputed parcel
on which the counterclaim was based. of residential land situated at San Agustin, Malolos,
Bulacan.
The Court notes that, to begin with, the petitioner itself
joined the PPA in moving for the dismissal of the Many years back (about sixty years, according to the
complaint; or put passively, it did not object to the municipal trial court) the parents of private respondent
dismissal of the private respondent’s complaint. Purificacion Villegas, with the acquiescence of Don Juan
Secondly, the compulsory counterclaim was so Cojuangco, constructed a residential house and later a
interwined with the complaint that it could not remain structure housing a bakery on the aforesaid lot. It was
pending for independent adjudication by the court after understood that they could remain on the land with his
the dismissal of the complaint which had provoked the blessings and without paying rentals on condition that
counterclaim in the first place. As a consequence, the they would vacate the premises when needed by the
dismissal of the complaint (on the petitioner’s own owner.
motion) operated to also dismiss the counterclaim
questioning that complaint. After her parent's death, Villegas remained in the
property, renovating the same and spending
If it wanted the counterclaim to subsist, it should have P300,000.00 in the process. She also leased out a
objected to the dismissal of the complaint or at least portion of the land to Siapno Appliances at P600.00 a
reserved its right to prosecute it, assuming this would month without the knowledge and consent of Don Juan
still be possible. It did neither of these. The petitioner Cojuangco This latter act apparently destroyed her
now claims that there is no law requiring that congenial relations with the landowner because soon
reservation, but there is no law presuming it either. The thereafter, Don Juan Cojuangco, through his attorney in
petitioner cannot simply say now that it intended all the fact, demanded that she leave the property. Despite his
time to preserve its counterclaim when it knew that repeated written demands for her to surrender
under Rule 17, Sec. 2 "if a counterclaim has been possession of the property, Villegas refused, prompting
pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of Cojuangco to institute ejectment proceedings against her
a motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed before MTC.
against the defendant’s objection unless the
counterclaim can remain pending for independent Don Juan Cojuangco died intestate. His wife Lualhati,
adjudication by the Court." herein petitioner, together with nephews and nieces,
were sub-constituted as parties-plaintiffs by the order of
The counterclaim was not permissive. A counterclaim is the court.
permissive if it does not arise out of nor is it necessarily
connected with the subject matter of the opposing The inferior court dismissed the action for ejectment for
party’s claim. It is not barred even if not set up in the lack of jurisdiction. It cited the unassailable fact that
action. 3 The petitioner’s counterclaim was within the Villegas and her predecessors-in-interest had been in
jurisdiction of the trial court. Most importantly, it had no actual possession of the subject land for no less than
independent existence, being merely ancillary to the sixty years and that in addition, Villegas asserted an
main action. 4 The petitioner knew all this and did not adverse claim of ownership, thus transforming the suit
object to the dismissal of the complaint. On the contrary, into an accion publiciana which is properly cognizable by
it actually moved to dismiss that main action, and in so courts of first instance (now regional trial courts).
doing also moved, in effect, for the dismissal of its
counterclaim. CFI reversed the decision of MTC. The trial court then
ordered Villegas to vacate the premises and to surrender
1. Yes, a claim for damages can be made a possession thereof to herein petitioner Cojuangco.
subject of a counterclaim in the main case.
The case was elevated to the appellate court and to the
It would seem that the proper practice to be followed in Supreme Court and in both instances, herein petitioner
cases where it is desired to obtain damages by reason Cojuangco's right of possession over the land was
of the wrongful issuance of an attachment in favor of upheld.
plaintiff that an issue would be tendered on the subject
by the defendant in his answer in the main case. Such a
tender would present the question squarely in that court,
17
Petitioner went to the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, declarations on the part of Villegas completely negate
Branch XV, where she filed a motion for execution of the her absurd claim that the factual basis for her
judgment, which the court granted. subsequent action arose after the ejectment suit became
final.1âwphi1
A writ of demolition was issued against Villegas, who did
not oppose the ordered demolition but instead asked the Villegas should have set forth, simultaneously with the
lower court to give her more time. assertion that she was entitled to the parcel of land by
right of inheritance, the alternative claim that assuming
Before the lapse of the grace period, Villegas filed a
she was not legally entitled to the disputed lot, at least
separate civil action against petitioner Cojuangco and
as a builder in good faith, she has the right to the value
the provincial sheriff "for specific performance with
of the buildings and improvements which she and her
urgent prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining
parents had introduced on the land. 11 And while it may
order and preliminary injunction."
be argued that the defense of being a builder in good
This case, instead of being referred to Branch XV which faith would have been inconsistent with her claim of
had earlier issued the writ of demolition, was raffled to ownership, in the case of Castle Bros., Wolf and Sons v.
another Malolos branch of the Bulacan Trial Court, Go-Juno 12 the Court held that a party may set forth as
specifically Branch XVII which issued on the same day, many defenses and counterclaims as he may have,
a temporary restraining order enjoining Cojuangco and whatever be their nature. These may even be
particularly the sheriff "from enforcing or implementing inconsistent with each other because what is sufficient is
the Order of Demolition. This was followed by another that each is consistent with itself.
order granting a writ of preliminary injunction.
Since Villegas failed to set up such alternative defense
ISSUE: (i.e. a builder in good faith is entitled to recover the value
of improvements) and instead relied on the sole defense
1. Whether Villegas can still legally institute a that she inherited the land from her parents, the rejection
separate independent action against the thereof was a complete resolution of the controversy
adjudged owner of the disputed lot on the between the parties which bars a later case based upon
ground that Villegas and her predecessors-in- the unpleaded defense. The adjudication of the issue
interest are builders in good faith and are joined by the parties in the earlier case constitutes res
therefore entitled to recover the value of the judicata, the theory being that what is barred by prior
improvements they had introduced on the lot. judgment are not only the matters actually raised and
litigated upon, but also such other matters as could have
been raised but were not.
2. Whether or not the execution of a final judgment 2. NO, it will be violation of doctrine of non-
in an ejectment case may be stayed by a co- interference. "no court has power to interfere by
equal court in order that the light of injunction with the judgments or decrees of a
indemnification and retention of an alleged court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction
builder in good faith may not be rendered having power to grant the relief sought by
meaningless or illusory in an independent civil injunction." The various branches of the court of
action for specific performance. first instance of a province or city, having as they
RULING: have the same or equal authority and exercising
as they do concurrent and coordinate
jurisdiction, should not, cannot and are not
1. NO. Villegas should have made it an alternative
permitted to interfere with their respective cases,
claim or defense. Villegas' claim to recover
much less with their orders or judgments. A
compensation for improvements made on the
contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion
land is essentially in the nature of a counterclaim
and seriously hamper the administration of
since it is inter-woven with the fact of
justice.
possession. Said claim for compensation should
have been presented as a counterclaim in the 153.) Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. Vs.
ejectment suit. It is deemed barred if not raised Felix Paras And Inland Trailways, Inc., And Hon.
on time and the party in error is precluded from Court Of Appeals
setting it up in a subsequent litigation. G.R. No. 161909; April 25, 2012

According to Villegas, the reason why the counterclaim FACTS:

for indemnification was not made in the original action
was because it became a "ripe issue" only after the Felix Paras (Paras for brevity), who hails from Cainta,
ejectment proceedings. Villegas contended that the Rizal is engaged in the buy and sell of fish products.
estoppel of judgment could only extend to those facts Sometime on 08 February 1987, on his way home to
and conditions existing at the time the judgment was Manila from Bicol Region, he boarded a bus, owned and
rendered and not to those which supervened before the operated by Inland Trailways, Inc. (Inland for brevity)
second suit. and driven by its driver Calvin Coner.

The said bus was travelling along Maharlika Highway,

The argument is untenable. In her pleadings, Villegas
Tiaong, Quezon, it was bumped at the rear by another
repeatedly stressed that the residential house which her
bus with Plate No. EVB 259, owned and operated by
parents had constructed was already there on the
Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc.
questioned lot for as long as she could remember, that
she herself has lived there all her life and that in the The said accident bought considerable damage to the
honest belief that the land had been "donated" to her vehicles involved and caused physical injuries to the
parents by her "Aunt Tecla", she made various passengers and crew of the two buses, including the
improvements and renovation thereon. Obviously, such
18
death of Coner who was the driver of the Inland Bus at negligence. To be precise, Philtranco and its driver were
the time of the incident. brought into the action on the theory of liability that the
proximate cause of the collision between Inland’s bus
Paras sustained injuries. and Philtranco’s bus had been "the negligent, reckless
and imprudent manner defendant Apolinar Miralles
Paras filed a complaint for damages based on breach of drove and operated his driven unit, the Philtranco Bus.
contract of carriage against Inland.

In its answer, defendant Inland denied responsibility, by The apparent objective of Inland was not to merely
alleging, among others, that its driver Coner had subrogate the third-party defendants for itself, as
observed an utmost and extraordinary care and Philtranco appears to suggest, but, rather, to obtain a
diligence to ensure the safety of its passengers. In different relief whereby the third-party defendants would
support of its disclaimer of responsibility, Inland invoked be held directly, fully and solely liable to Paras and
the Police Investigation Report which established the Inland for whatever damages each had suffered from the
fact that the Philtranco bus driver of [sic] Apolinar negligence committed by Philtranco and its driver. In
Miralles was the one which violently bumped the rear other words, Philtranco and its driver were charged
portion of the Inland bus, and therefore, the direct and here as joint tortfeasors who would be jointly and
proximate cause of Paras’ injuries. severally be liable to Paras and Inland.

Upon leave of court, Inland filed a third-party complaint Impleading Philtranco and its driver through the third-
against Philtranco and Apolinar Miralles (Third Party party complaint filed on March 2, 1990 was correct. The
defendants). In this third-party complaint, Inland, sought device of the third-party action, also known as
for exoneration of its liabilities to Paras, asserting that impleader, was in accord with Section 12, Rule 6 of the
the latter’s cause of action should be directed against Revised Rules of Court, the rule then applicable, viz:
Philtranco considering that the accident was caused by
Miralles’ lack of care, negligence and reckless Section 12. Third-party complaint. – A third-party
imprudence. complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with
leave of court, file against a person not a party to the
RTC ordered that Philtranco and Apolinar Miralles are action, called the third-party defendant, for contribution,
hereby ordered to pay plaintiff jointly and severally. indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of
his opponent’s claim.
All the parties appealed to the CA on different grounds.

CA affirmed RTC with modification. Aside from paying Accordingly, the requisites for a third-party action are,
Paras, it ordered Philitranco and Miralles to pay Inland firstly, that the party to be impleaded must not yet be a
as a way of temperate damages. party to the action; secondly, that the claim against the
third-party defendant must belong to the original
Philtranco moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied defendant; thirdly, the claim of the original defendant
its motion for reconsideration. against the third-party defendant must be based upon
the plaintiff’s claim against the original defendant; and,
ISSUE: fourthly, the defendant is attempting to transfer to the
third-party defendant the liability asserted against him by
Whether or not CA committed grave abuse of discretion the original plaintiff.
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in awarding moral
damages to Paras despite the fact that the complaint As the foregoing indicates, the claim that the third-party
had been anchored on breach of contract of carriage. complaint asserts against the third-party defendant must
be predicated on substantive law. Here, the substantive
RULING:
law on which the right of Inland to seek such other relief
NO. CA correctly ruled that Paras can recover moral through its third-party complaint rested were Article 2176
damages against Philtranco when its cause of action is and Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
based on breach of contract against Inland.
Paras’ cause of action against Inland (breach of contract
As a general rule, indeed, moral damages are not of carriage) did not need to be the same as the cause of
recoverable in an action predicated on a breach of action of Inland against Philtranco and its driver (tort or
contract. This is because such action is not included in quasi-delict) in the impleader. It is settled that a
Article 2219 of the Civil Code5 as one of the actions in defendant in a contract action may join as third-party
which moral damages may be recovered. By way of defendants those who may be liable to him in tort for the
exception, moral damages are recoverable in an action plaintiff’s claim against him, or even directly to the
predicated on a breach of contract: (a) where the mishap plaintiff. Indeed, Prof. Wright, et al., commenting on the
results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Article provision of the Federal Rules of Procedure of the
1764,6 in relation to Article 2206, (3),7 of the Civil Code; United States from which Section 12, supra, was
and (b) where the common carrier has been guilty of derived, observed so, to wit:16
fraud or bad faith,8 as provided in Article 22209 of the
Civil Code. The third-party claim need not be based on the same
theory as the main claim. For example, there are cases
Although this action does not fall under either of the in which the third-party claim is based on an express
exceptions, the award of moral damages to Paras was indemnity contract and the original complaint is framed
nonetheless proper and valid. There is no question that in terms of negligence. Similarly, there need not be any
Inland filed its third-party complaint against Philtranco legal relationship between the third-party defendant and
and its driver in order to establish in this action that they, any of the other parties to the action. Impleader also is
instead of Inland, should be directly liable to Paras for proper even though the third party’s liability is
the physical injuries he had sustained because of their contingent, and technically does not come into existence
until the original defendant’s liability has been
19
established. In addition, the words ‘is or may be liable’ in defendant and judgment is rendered adjudicating
Rule 14(a) make it clear that impleader is proper even plaintiff's right to recover against defendant and
though the third-party defendant’s liability is not defendant’s rights to recover against third party, he is
automatically established once the third-party plaintiff’s bound by both adjudications.That part of the sentence
liability to the original plaintiff has been determined. refers to the second subject. If third party is brought in as
liable to plaintiff, then third party is bound by the
Nor was it a pre-requisite for attachment of the liability to adjudication as between him and plaintiff. That refers to
Philtranco and its driver that Inland be first declared and the first subject. If third party is brought in as liable to
found liable to Paras for the breach of its contract of plaintiff and also over to defendant, then third party is
carriage with him. As the Court has cogently discoursed bound by both adjudications. xxx
in Samala v. Judge Victor:
Under this Rule, a person not a party to an action may
Appellants argue that since plaintiffs filed a complaint for be impleaded by the defendant either (a) on an
damages against the defendants on a breach of contract allegation of liability to the latter; (b) on the ground of
of carriage, they cannot recover from the third-party direct liability to the plaintiff-; or, (c) both (a) and (b). The
defendants on a cause of action based on quasi-delict. situation in (a) is covered by the phrase "for contribution,
The third party defendants, they allege, are never parties indemnity or subrogation;" while (b) and (c) are
liable with respect to plaintiff s claim although they are subsumed under the catch all "or any other relief, in
with respect to the defendants for indemnification, respect of his opponent’s claim."
subrogation, contribution or other reliefs. Consequently,
they are not directly liable to the plaintiffs. Their liability The case at bar is one in which the third party
commences only when the defendants are adjudged defendants are brought into the action as directly liable
liable and not when they are absolved from liability as in to the plaintiffs upon the allegation that "the primary and
the case at bar. immediate cause as shown by the police investigation of
said vehicular collision between (sic) the above-
Quite apparent from these arguments is the mentioned three vehicles was the recklessness and
misconception entertained by appellants with respect to negligence and lack of imprudence (sic) of the third-party
the nature and office of a third party complaint. defendant Virgilio (should be Leonardo) Esguerra y
Ledesma then driver of the passenger bus." The effects
are that "plaintiff and third party are at issue as to their
Section 16, Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of Court defines
rights respecting the claim" and "the third party is bound
a third party complaint as a "claim that a defending party
by the adjudication as between him and plaintiff." It is not
may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party
indispensable in the premises that the defendant be first
to the action, called the third-party defendant, for
adjudged liable to plaintiff before the third-party
contribution, indemnification, subrogation, or any other
defendant may be held liable to the plaintiff, as precisely,
relief, in respect of his opponent’s claim." In the case of
the theory of defendant is that it is the third party
Viluan vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 16 SCRA 742 [1966],
defendant, and not he, who is directly liable to plaintiff.
this Court had occasion to elucidate on the subjects
The situation contemplated by appellants would properly
covered by this Rule, thus:
pertain to situation (a) above wherein the third party
defendant is being sued for contribution, indemnity or
... As explained in the Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. vs. U.S. subrogation, or simply stated, for a defendant's "remedy
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 52 F. Supp. 177 (1943:) over".19

‘From the sources of Rule 14 and the decisions herein It is worth adding that allowing the recovery of damages
cited, it is clear that this rule, like the admiralty rule, by Paras based on quasi-delict, despite his complaint
‘covers two distinct subjects, the addition of parties being upon contractual breach, served the judicial policy
defendant to the main cause of action, and the bringing of avoiding multiplicity of suits and circuity of actions by
in of a third party for a defendant’s remedy over’. xxx disposing of the entire subject matter in a single
litigation.
‘If the third party complaint alleges facts showing a third
party’s direct liability to plaintiff on the claim set out in 154.) SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED Vs.
plaintiff’s petition, then third party ‘shall’ make his THE COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE
defenses as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims AIRLINES
against plaintiff as provided in Rule 13. In the case of G.R. No. 107356 March 31, 1995
alleged direct liability, no amendment (to the complaint)
is necessary or required. The subject-matter of the claim WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of
is contained in plaintiff's complaint, the ground of third Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 20488 dated September 21,
party’s liability on that claim is alleged in third party 1992, is hereby REVERSED and a new one is entered
complaint, and third party’s defense to set up in his ordering private respondent Philippine Airlines to pay, by
answer to plaintiff's complaint. At that point and without way of contribution, petitioner Singapore Airlines one-
amendment, the plaintiff and third party are at issue as half (1/2) of the amount it actually paid to Sancho and
to their rights respecting the claim. Beatriz Rayos in satisfaction of the judgment in Civil
Case No. 142252, dated September 9, 1988.
The provision in the rule that, ‘The third-party defendant
may assert any defense which the third-party plaintiff FACTS:
may assert to the plaintiffs claim,’ applies to the other
Sancho Rayos was an overseas contract worker who
subject, namely, the alleged liability of third party
had a renewed contract with the Arabian American Oil
defendant. The next sentence in the rule, ‘The third-party
Company (Aramco) for the period covering April 16,
defendant is bound by the adjudication of the third party
1980, to April 15, 1981. As part of Aramco's policy, its
plaintiffs liability to the plaintiff, as well as of his own to
employees returning to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia from
the plaintiff or to the third-party plaintiff applies to both
Manila are allowed to claim reimbursement for amounts
subjects. If third party is brought in as liable only to
20
paid for excess baggage of up to 50 kilograms, as long ISSUE:
as it is properly supported by receipt.
Whether or not appellate court should have restricted its
Rayos took a Singapore Airlines (SIA) flight to report for ruling on the right of SIA to seek reimbursement from
his new assignment, with a 50-kilogram excess baggage PAL, as this was the only issue raised by SIA in its third-
for which he paid P4,147.50. Aramco reimbursed said party complaint against PAL.
amount upon presentation of the excess baggage ticket.
RULING:
Rayos learned that he was one of several employees
being investigated by Aramco for fraudulent claims. He Yes, CA erred.
immediately asked his wife Beatriz in Manila to seek a
written confirmation from SIA that he indeed paid for an It must be noted that in the proceedings below, PAL
excess baggage of 50 kilograms. disclaimed any liability to the Rayoses and imputed the
alleged tampering to SIA's personnel. On appeal,
SIA's manager, Johnny Khoo, notified Beatriz of their however, PAL changed its theory and averred that the
inability to issue the certification requested because their spouses Rayos had no valid claim against SIA on the
records showed that only three kilograms were entered around that the non-renewal of Sancho's contract with
as excess and accordingly charged. SIA issued the Aramco was his unsatisfactory performance rather than
certification requested by the spouses Rayos only after the alleged tampering of his excess baggage ticket. In
its investigation of the anomaly and after Beatriz, response to PAL's appeal, SIA argued that it was
assisted by a lawyer, threatened it with a lawsuit. improper for PAL to question SIA's liability to the plaintiff,
Aramco gave Rayos his travel documents without a since this was no longer an issue on account of the
return visa. His employment contract was not renewed. finality and, in fact, satisfaction of the judgment.

The spouses Rayos, convinced that SIA was responsible There is no question that a third-party defendant is
for the non-renewal of Rayos' employment contract with allowed to set up in his answer the defenses which the
Aramco, sued it for damages. SIA claimed that it was not third-party plaintiff (original defendant) has or may have
liable to the Rayoses because the tampering was to the plaintiff's claim. There are, however, special
committed by its handling agent, Philippine Airlines circumstances present in this case which preclude third-
(PAL). It then filed a third-party complaint against PAL. party defendant PAL from benefiting from the said
PAL, in turn, countered that its personnel did not collect principle.
any charges for excess baggage; that it had no
participation in the tampering of any excess baggage One of the defenses available to SIA was that the
ticket; and that if any tampering was made, it was done plaintiffs had no cause of action, that is, it had no valid
by SIA's personnel. claim against SIA. SIA investigated the matter and
discovered that tampering was, indeed, committed, not
RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. It made SIA liable for by its personnel but by PAL's. This became its defense
damages to Rayoses. as well as its main cause of action in the third-party
complaint it filed against PAL. For its part, PAL could
ON THE THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT, the third-party have used the defense that the plaintiffs had no valid
defendant PAL is ordered to pay defendant and third- claim against it or against SIA. This could be done
party plaintiff SIA whatever the latter has paid the indirectly by adopting such a defense in its answer to the
plaintiffs. third-party complaint if only SIA had raised the same in
its answer to the main complaint, or directly by so stating
All parties filed an appeal before the CA. PAL claimed in unequivocal terms in its answer to SIA's complaint that
that the spouses Rayos had no valid claim against SIA SIA and PAL were both blameless. Yet, PAL opted to
because it was the inefficiency of Rayos which led to the deny any liability which it imputed to SIA's personnel. It
non-renewal of his contract with Aramco, and not the was only on appeal — in a complete turn around of
alleged tampering of his excess bagged ticket On the theory — that PAL raised the issue of no valid claim by
other hand, SIA argued that the only issue in the said the plaintiff against SIA. This simply cannot be allowed.
appeal is whether or not it was entitled to reimbursement
from PAL While the third-party defendant; would benefit from a
victory by the third-party plaintiff against the plaintiff, this
The appellate court disagreed with SIA's contention that is true only when the third-party plaintiff and third-party
PAL could no longer raise the issue of SIA's liability to defendant have non-contradictory defenses. Here, the
the Rayoses and opined "that SIA's answer to the defendant and third-party defendant had no common
complaint should inure to the benefit of PAL, and the defense against the plaintiffs' complaint, and they were
latter may challenge the lower court's findings against even blaming each other for the fiasco.
SIA in favor of plaintiffs-appellees (the Rayos spouses)
for the purpose of defeating SIA's claim against it, and Fear of collusion between the third-party plaintiff and the
not for the purpose of altering in any way the executed plaintiffs aired by the appellate court is misplaced if not
judgment against SIA." In its answer to the main totally unfounded. The stand of SIA as against the
complaint, SIA set up the defense that the excess plaintiffs' claim was transparent from the beginning. PAL
baggage ticket was indeed tampered with but it was was aware of SIA's defense, and if it was convinced that
committed by PAL's personnel. SIA should have raised the defense of no valid claim by
the plaintiffs, it should have so stated in its answer as
CA absolved PAL from liability.
one of its defenses, instead of waiting for an adverse
Hence, this petition for review. SIA contended that PAL judgment and raising it for the first time on appeal.
cannot validly assail for the first time on appeal the trial The judgment, therefore, as far as the Rayoses and SIA
court's decision sustaining the validity of plaintiff's are concerned, has already gained finality. What
complaint against SIA if PAL did not raise this issue in remains to be resolved, as correctly pointed out by
the lower court. petitioner, is whether it is entitled to reimbursement from
PAL, considering that PAL appealed that part of the
21
decision to the appellate court. This is where the rule laid aggrieved by some allegations in the main
down in Firestone becomes applicable. complaint should, aside from answering the third-
party complaint, also answer the main complaint.
the Court stated in Firestone case:
The non-renewal of Rayos employment contract was
The third-party complaint is, therefore, a procedural the natural and probable consequence of the separate
device whereby a "third party" who is neither a party nor tortious acts of SIA and PAL. Under mandate of Article
privy to the act or deed complained of by the plaintiff, 2176 of the Civil Code, Rayos is entitled to be
may be brought into the case with leave of court, by the
defendant, who acts as third-party plaintiff to enforce
compensated for such damages. Inasmuch as the
against such third-party defendant a right for responsibility of two or more persons, or tort-feasors,
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in liable for a quasi-delict is joint and several, 3 and the
respect of the plaintiff's claim. The third-party complaint sharing as between such solidary debtors is pro-rata, 4
is actually independent of and separate and distinct from it is but logical, fair, and equitable to require PAL to
the plaintiff's complaint. . . . When leave to file the third- contribute to the amount awarded to the Rayos
party complaint is properly granted, the Court renders in
effect two judgments in the same case, one on the
spouses and already paid by SIA, instead of totally
plaintiff's complaint and the other on the third-party indemnifying the latter.
complaint. When he finds favorably on both complaints,
as in this case, he renders judgment on the principal 155.) VIRGINIA S. DIO and H.S. EQUITIES, LTD. Vs.
complaint in favor of plaintiff against defendant and SUBIC BAY MARINE EXPLORATORIUM, INC.,
renders another judgment on the third-party complaint in Officer, TIMOTHY DESMOND
favor of defendant as third-party plaintiff, ordering the G.R. No. 189532; June 11, 2014
third-party defendant to reimburse the defendant This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari pursuant to
whatever amount said defendant is ordered to pay Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, assailing the
plaintiff in the case. Failure of any of said parties in such Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balanga City,
a case to appeal the judgment as against him makes Bataan, on pure question of law.
such judgment final and executory. By the same token,
an appeal by one party from such judgment does not FACTS:
inure to the benefit of the other party who has not
appealed nor can it be deemed to be an appeal of Petitioner H.S. Equities, Ltd., (HSE) is a foreign
such other party from the judgment against him. corporation duly organized and existing under the laws
of the British Virgin Islands. It entered into an isolated
The trial court's decision, although adverse to SIA as transaction subject of the instant case. It is represented
defendant, made PAL ultimately answerable for the in this action by petitioner Virginia S. Dio (Dio).
judgment by ordering the latter to reimburse the former
for the entire monetary award. On appeal, PAL tried to
Respondent Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, Inc.
exonerate itself by arguing that the Rayoses had no valid
(SBME) is a domestic corporation, duly organized and
claim against SIA. From PAL's viewpoint, this seemed to
existing under the Philippine laws and is represented in
be the only way to extricate itself from a mess which the
this action by its Chief Executive Officer, respondent
court a quo ascribed to it. This cannot, however, be
Timothy Desmond (Desmond).
allowed because it was neither raised by SIA in its
answer to the main complaint nor by PAL in its answer to
the third-party complaint. The prudent thing that PAL In 2002, SBME decided to expand its business by
should have done was to state in its answer to the operating a beach resort. For the business venture to
third-party complaint filed by SIA against it take off, SBME needed to solicit investors. HSE thru its
everything that it may conceivably interpose by way authorized director, Dio, agreed to invest the amount of
of its defense, including specific denials of US$2,500,000.00 with SBME by purchasing common
allegations in the main complaint which implicated it shares. The agreement was reduced into writing wherein
along with SIA. HSE, in order to protect its interest in the company, was
afforded the right to appoint a member of the board of
The appellate court was in error when it opined that directors and the right to veto certain board resolutions.
SIA's answer inured to the benefit of PAL for the After HSE initially paid US$200,000.00 for its
subscription, it refused to further lay out money for the
simple reason that the complaint and the third-party expansion project of the SBME due to the alleged
complaint are actually two separate cases involving mismanagement in the handling of corporate funds.
the same set of facts which is allowed by the court
to be resolved in a single proceeding only to avoid Consequently, SBME initiated an intra-corporate dispute
a multiplicity of actions. Such a proceeding obviates before the RTC of Balanga City, Bataan against
the need of trying two cases, receiving the same or petitioners HSE and Dio. SBME essentially alleged that
similar evidence for both, and enforcing separate HSE unjustly refused to pay the balance of its unpaid
judgments therefor. This situation is not, as claimed subscription effectively jeopardizing the company’s
by the appellate court, analogous to a case where expansion project. Apart from their refusal to honor their
there are several defendants against whom a obligation under the subscription contract, it was further
complaint is filed stating a common cause of action, alleged by SBME that Dio tried to dissuade local
where the answer of some of the defendants inures investors and financial institutions from putting in capital
to SBME by imputing defamatory acts against Desmond.
to the benefit of those who did not file an answer.
To protect the interest of the corporation and its
While such a complaint speaks of a single suit, a stockholders, SBME sought that petitioners be enjoined
third-party complaint involves an action separate from committing acts inimical to the interest of the
and distinct from, although related to the main company.
complaint. A third-party defendant who feels
22
To refute the claims of respondents, petitioners No. In the significant case of Pinga v. Heirs of German
maintained in their Answer with Compulsory Santiago, this Court speaking through Justice Dante
Counterclaim that it would be highly preposterous for Tinga, resolved the nagging question as to whether or
them to dissuade investors and banks from putting in not the dismissal of the complaint carries with it the
money to SBME considering that HSE and Dio are dismissal of the counterclaim. Putting to rest the
stakeholders of the company with substantial remaining confusion occasioned by Metals Engineering
investments therein. In turn, petitioners countered that Resources Corp. v. Court of Appeals24 and BA Finance
their reputation and good name in the business Corporation v. Co,25 the Court articulated that, in light of
community were tarnished as a result of the filing of the the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
instant complaint, and thus prayed that they be correct and prevailing doctrine is as follows:
indemnified for moral damages and litigation expenses.
Petitioners likewise sought to recover their investment of To be certain, when the Court promulgated the 1997
US$1,500,000.00 since they were purportedly inveigled Rules of Civil Procedure, including the amended Rule17,
by Desmond into putting in money to SBME under the those previous jural doctrines that were inconsistent with
pretext that they will be accorded with minority protection the new rules incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil
rights. Procedure were implicitly abandoned insofar as
incidents arising after the effectivity of the new
After petitioners filed their Answer with Compulsory procedural rules on 1 July 1997. BA Finance, or even
Counterclaim, the RTC, instead of setting the case for the doctrine that a counterclaim may be necessarily
pre-trial, motu proprio dismissed the case. The dismissal dismissed along with the complaint, clearly conflicts with
was grounded on the defective certificate of non-forum the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The abandonment of
shopping which was signed by Desmond without specific BA Finance as doctrine extends as far back as 1997,
authority from the Board of Directors of SBME. when the Court adopted the new Rules of Civil
Procedure. If, since then, such abandonment has not
Armed with a board resolution specifically authorizing been affirmed in jurisprudence, it is only because no
Desmond to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping proper case has arisen that would warrant express
on behalf of SBME, respondents moved that the case be confirmation of the new rule. That opportunity is here
reinstated. For lack of merit, RTC denied respondents’ and now, and we thus rule that the dismissal of a
motion and affirmed the dismissal. complaint due to fault of the plaintiff is without prejudice
to the right of the defendant to prosecute any pending
counterclaims of whatever nature in the same or
Aggrieved, respondents elevated the matter before the
separate action. We confirm that BA Finance and all
Court of Appeals. For failure of the respondents to file
previous rulings of the Court that are inconsistent with
their appellants’ brief, the appellate court proceeded to
this present holding are now abandoned.
dismiss the case and considered it closed and
terminated.
As the rule now stands, the nature of the counterclaim
notwithstanding, the dismissal of the complaint does not
After respondents failed to seasonably move for the
ipso jure result in the dismissal of the counterclaim, and
reconsideration of the aforementioned Resolution, the
the latter may remain for independent adjudication of the
dismissal became final and executory.
court, provided that such counterclaim, states a sufficient
cause of action and does not labor under any infirmity
The procedural incidents before the appellate court that may warrant its outright dismissal. Stated differently,
having been resolved with finality, petitioners went back the jurisdiction of the court over the counterclaim that
to the RTC to file a motion to set their counterclaims for appears to be valid on its face, including the grant of any
hearing which was opposed by the respondents on the relief thereunder, is not abated by the dismissal of the
ground that the filing of the compulsory counterclaims main action. The court’s authority to proceed with the
was not accompanied by payment of the required docket disposition of the counterclaim independent of the main
fees precluding the court from acquiring jurisdiction over action is premised on the fact that the counterclaim, on
the case. its own, raises a novel question which may be aptly
adjudicated by the court based on its own merits and
Acting on the motions filed by the opposing parties, the evidentiary support.
RTC granted the motion to dismiss but not on the ground
of non-payment of docket fees. In disallowing petitioners’ In Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd. v. Dakila Trading
counterclaims to proceed independently of respondents’ Corporartion,29 a case on all fours with the present one,
complaint, the lower court pointed out that in view of the we expounded our ruling in Pinga and pointed out that
dismissal of the main case, which has already been the dismissal of the counterclaim due to the fault of the
affirmed with finality by the appellate court, it has already plaintiff is without prejudice to the right of the defendant
lost its jurisdiction to act on petitioners’ counterclaim, the to prosecute any pending counterclaims of whatever
compulsory counterclaim being merely ancillary to the nature in the same or separate action, thus: Based on
principal controversy. the aforequoted ruling of the Court, if the dismissal of the
complaint somehow eliminates the cause of the
Thus, petitioners filed this instant Petition for Review on counterclaim, then the counterclaim cannot survive.
Certiorari on pure question of law seeking the reversal of Conversely, if the counterclaim itself states sufficient
the RTC Orders. cause of action then it should stand independently of
and survive the dismissal of the complaint. Now, having
ISSUE: been directly confronted with the problem of whether the
compulsory counterclaim by reason of the unfounded
Whether or not the dismissal of the complaint carries suit may prosper even if the main complaint had been
with it the dismissal of the counterclaim dismissed, we rule in the affirmative.

RULING:
23
It bears to emphasize that petitioner's counterclaim The Pasay City RTC denied defendants’ motion to
against respondent is for damages and attorney's fees dismiss.
arising from the unfounded suit. While respondent's
Complaint against petitioner is already dismissed, Meanwhile, in their Complaint filed against Judge Pedro
petitioner may have very well already incurred damages De Leon Gutierrez and Aida Padilla (both sued in their
and litigation expenses such as attorney's fees since it personal capacity), respondents claimed that Globe
was forced to engage legal representation in the Asiatique and Filmal are well-known and successful real
Philippines to protect its rights and to assert lack of estate developers whose projects were "being
jurisdiction of the courts over its person by virtue of the continuously supported by various banks and other
improper service of summons upon it. Hence, the cause financial institutions prior to the malicious and
of action of petitioner's counterclaim is not eliminated by devastating unfounded civil action" filed by AidaPadilla
the mere dismissal of respondent's complaint. (petitioner) which wrought havoc to their businesses and
lives. Respondents sought to hold Judge Gutierrez
Once more, we allow the counterclaim of the petitioners personally liable for issuing the writ of preliminary
to proceed independently of the complaint of the attachment in favor of PNB.
respondents.
Respondents thus prayed for a judgment ordering
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is petitioner and Judge Gutierrez to pay moral damages,
GRANTED. The assailed R TC Orders dated 3 April exemplary damages, litigation expenses, attorney’s fees
2009 and 26 August 2009 are hereby REVERSED and and cost of suit.
SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Regional
Trial Court of Balanga City, Bataan for further Judge Gutierrez moved to dismiss the complaint against
proceedings, on the matter of petitioners Virginia S. Dio him while petitioner filed her Answer With Compulsory
and H.S. Equities, Ltd.'s counterclaims. No Counterclaims, praying for the dismissal of respondents’
pronouncement as to costs. complaint on the following grounds: (1) submission of a
false certification of non-forum shopping by respondents;
156.) AIDA PADILLA Vs. GLOBE ASIATIQUE REALTY (2) litis pendentia; (3) respondents’ failure to attach the
HOLDINGS CORPORATION, FILMAL REALTY alleged actionable document, i.e.the supposed "new
CORPORATION, DELFIN S. LEE and DEXTER L. LEE term loan", inviolation of Section 7, Rule 8 of the Rules
G.R. No. 207376; August 6, 2014 of Court; (4) failure to state a cause of action against
Petition: Petition for review under Rule 45 petitioner; and (5) petitioner cannot be held personally
liable for her official acts done for and in behalf of PNB.
FACTS:
The RTC of Pasig City dismissed the case of
Philippine National Bank (PNB) entered into several respondents claiming damages from petitioner for lack of
Contracts to Sell (CTS) Facility Agreements with jurisdiction. A motion for reconsideration was filed but it
respondents Globe Asiatique Realty Holdings was denied. Petitioner on the other hand, filed a Motion
Corporation (Globe Asiatique) and Filmal Realty to Set Counterclaims for Pre-Trial Conference. However,
Corporation (Filmal) represented by Delfin S. Lee and it was denied. Hence, the petitioner came directly to this
Dexter L. Lee, President and Vice-President, Court.
respectively, of the two corporations. Pursuant to and as
a condition for the CTS Facility availments, respondents ISSUE:
executed in favor of PNB several Deeds of Assignment.
Whether or not a court can take cognizance of a
Respondents defaulted in the payment of their compulsory counterclaim despite the fact that the
outstanding balance, for which PNB made a formal and corresponding complaint was dismissed for lack of
final demand upon respondents to pay/settle their jurisdiction.
outstanding obligation. In the course of credit monitoring
and verification, PNB claimed it discovered 231 out of RULING:
240 Contracts to Sell to have either inexistent addresses
of buyers or the names of the buyers are non-existent or
both. Thereafter, PNB instituted Civil Case for recovery Yes. SEC. 7. Compulsory counterclaim.– A compulsory
of sum of money and damages with prayer for writ of counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the
preliminary attachment before the RTC of Pasay City. regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected
with the transaction or occurrence constituting the
subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does
In their complaint, PNB alleged that respondents falsely not require for its adjudication the presence of third
represented that they have valid and subsisting parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
contracts to sell, which evidently showed they had no Such a counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of the
intention to pay their loan obligations. court both as to the amount and the nature thereof,
except that in an original action before the Regional Trial
Defendants Globe Asiatique and Filmal also filed their Court, the counterclaim may be considered compulsory
Answer with Counterclaim denying PNB’s allegations of regardless of the amount.
fraud and misrepresentation particularly after PNB had
accepted payments from the corporations. They further Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it is now
assailed the affidavit executed by Aida Padilla who they explicitly provided that the dismissal of the complaint due
claimed has no personal knowledge of the subject to failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his case is "without
transactions and there being no allegation of threat or prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his
possibility that defendant corporations will dispose of counterclaim in the same or in a separate action."
their properties in fraud of their creditors.

24
To be certain, when the Court promulgated the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, including the amended Rule
17, those previous jural doctrines that were inconsistent
with the new rules incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil 157.) ELIZA ZUNIGA-SANTOS Vs. MARIA DIVINA
Procedure were implicitly abandoned insofar as GRACIA SANTOS-GRAN** and REGISTER OF
incidents arising after the effectivity of the new DEEDS OF MARIKINA CITY
procedural rules on 1 July 1997. Subsequently, in Perkin G.R. No. 197380; October 8, 2014
Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd. v. Dakila Trading Petition: Before the Court is a petition for review on
Corporation37 this Court held that while the declaration in certiorari
Pinga refers to instances covered by Section 3, Rule 17
on dismissal of complaints due to the fault of plaintiff, it FACTS:
does not preclude the application of the same rule when
the dismissal was upon the instance of defendant who Petitioner Eliza Zuñiga-Santos (petitioner), filed a
correctly argued lack of jurisdiction over its person. Complaint for annulment of sale and revocation of title
Further, in stark departure from Metals Engineering, we against respondents Maria Divina Gracia Santos-Gran
declared that the court’s jurisdiction over respondent’s (Gran) and the Register of Deeds of Marikina City before
complaint is not to be confused with jurisdiction over the RTC. The said complaint was later
petitioner’s counterclaim, amended (Amended Complaint).

Still anchored on the pronouncement in Pinga, we then In her Amended Complaint, petitioner alleged, among
categorically ruled that a counterclaim arising from the others, that: (a) she was the registered owner of three
unfounded suit may proceed despite the dismissal of the (3) parcels of land located in the province of Rizal
complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the person of (subject properties) prior to their transfer in the name of
defendant-counterclaimant. private respondent Gran; (b) she has a second husband
by the name of Lamberto C. Santos (Lamberto), with
It bears to emphasize that petitioner’s counterclaim whom she did not have any children; (c) she was forced
against respondent is for damages and attorney’s fees to take care of Lamberto’s alleged daughter, Gran,
arising from the unfounded suit. While respondent’s whose birth certificate was forged to make it appear that
Complaint against petitioner is already dismissed, the latter was petitioner’s daughter; (d) pursuant to void
petitioner may have very well already incurred damages and voidable documents, i.e., a Deed of Sale, Lamberto
and litigation expenses such as attorney’s fees since it succeeded in transferring the subject properties in favor
was forced to engage legal representation in the of and in the name of Gran; (e) despite diligent efforts,
Philippines to protect its rights and to assert lack of said Deed of Sale could not be located; and (f) she
jurisdiction of the courts over its person by virtue of the discovered that the subject properties were transferred
improper service of summons upon it. Hence, the cause to Gran sometime in November 2005. Accordingly,
of action of petitioner’s counterclaim is not eliminated by petitioner prayed, inter alia, that Gran surrender to her
the mere dismissal of respondent’s complaint. the subject properties and pay damages, including costs
of suit.
In the present case, the RTC of Pasig City should have
allowed petitioner’s counterclaim to proceed For her part, Gran filed a Motion to Dismiss, contending,
notwithstanding the dismissal of respondents’ complaint, inter alia, that (a) the action filed by petitioner had
the same being compulsory in nature and with its cause prescribed since an action upon a written contract must
not eliminated by such dismissal. The Pasig City RTC be brought within ten (10) years from the time the cause
clearly erred in refusing to hear the counterclaims upon of action accrues, or in this case, from the time of
the same ground for dismissal of the complaint, i.e., lack registration of the questioned documents before the
of jurisdiction in strict observance of the policy against Registry of Deeds;14 and (b) the Amended Complaint
interference with the proceedings of a co-equal court. failed to state a cause of action as the void and voidable
documents sought to be nullified were not properly
Ironically, while it is the respondents who erroneously identified nor the substance thereof set forth, thus,
and maliciously asked the Pasig City RTC to pass upon precluding the RTC from rendering a valid judgment in
these issues still pending in a co-equal court, for which accordance with the prayer to surrender the subject
reason the said court dismissed their complaint, properties.
petitioner was not allowed to prove her counterclaim by
reason of the unfounded suit in the same case as The RTC granted Gran’s motion and dismissed the
purportedly it will entail verifying respondents’ claim that Amended Complaint for its failure to state a cause of
they were prejudiced by the orders and processes in the action, considering that the deed of sale sought to be
Pasay City RTC. This situation exemplifies the rationale nullified was not attached. It likewise held that the
in Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd.42 on requiring the certificates of title covering the subject properties cannot
petitioner to make the counterclaim in the present action, be collaterally attacked and that the action had already
under threat of losing such right to claim the same ever prescribed under Article 1144 of the Civil Code.
again any other court, yet make such right of the
petitioner totally dependent on the fate of the Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA.
respondents’ complaint.
The CA sustained the dismissal of petitioner’s Amended
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders Complaint but on the ground of insufficiency of factual
dated November 12, 2012 and May 8, 2013 of the basis. The CA likewise ruled that the action has not yet
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 155 in Civil prescribed since an action for nullity of void deeds of
Case No. 73132 are hereby REVERSED and SET conveyance is imprescriptible. Nonetheless, it held that
ASIDE. Said court is hereby directed to proceed with the since the Deed of Sale sought to be annulled was not
presentation of evidence in support of the compulsory attached to the Amended Complaint, it was impossible
counterclaim of petitioner Aida Padilla. for the court to determine whether petitioner’s signature
25
therein was a forgery and thus, would have no basis to through statements/documents tracing the root of
order the surrender or reconveyance of the subject petitioner’s title or copies of previous certificates of title
properties. registered in her name. Instead, the certificates of title
covering the said properties that were attached to the
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration and Amended Complaint are in the name of Gran. At best,
attached, for the first time, a copy of the questioned the attached copies of TCT Nos. N-5500 and N-4234
Deed of Sale which she claimed to have recently only mention petitioner as the representative of Gran at
recovered, praying that the order of dismissal be set the time of the covered property’s registration when she
aside and the case be remanded to the RTC for further was a minor. Nothing in the pleading, however, indicates
proceedings. that the former had become any of the properties’ owner.
This leads to the logical conclusion that her right to the
properties in question – at least through the manner in
The CA denied petitioner’s motion and held that the
which it was alleged in the Amended Complaint –
admission of the contested Deed of Sale at this late
remains ostensibly unfounded.
stage would be contrary to Gran’s right to due process.

Aside from the insufficiency of petitioner’s allegations

Hence, the instant petition.
with respect to her right to the subject properties sought
to be recovered, the ultimate facts supposedly justifying
ISSUE: the "annulment of sale," by which the reconveyance of
the subject properties is sought, were also insufficiently
Whether or not the dismissal of petitioner’s Amended pleaded.
Complaint should be sustained
Hence, by merely stating a legal conclusion, the
RULING: Amended Complaint presented no sufficient allegation
upon which the Court could grant the relief petitioner
Yes. A complaint states a cause of action if it sufficiently prayed for. Thus, said pleading should be dismissed on
avers the existence of the three (3) essential elements of the ground of failure to state cause of action, as correctly
a cause of action, namely: (a) a right in favor of the held by the RTC.
plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it
arises or is created; (b) an obligation on the part of the That a copy of the Deed of Sale adverted to in the
named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; Amended Complaint was subsequently submitted by
and (c) an act or omission on the part of the named petitioner does not warrant a different course of
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or action. The submission of that document was made, as it
constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the was purportedly "recently recovered," only on
plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for reconsideration before the CA which, nonetheless, ruled
recovery of damages. If the allegations of the complaint against the remand of the case. An examination of the
do not state the concurrence of these elements, the present petition, however, reveals no counter-argument
complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on against the foregoing actions; hence, the Court
the ground of failure to state a cause of action. considers any objection thereto as waived.

It is well to point out that the plaintiff’s cause of action In any event, the Court finds the Amended Complaint’s
should not merely be "stated" but, importantly, the dismissal to be in order considering that petitioner’s
statement thereof should be "sufficient." This is why the cause of action had already prescribed.
elementary test in a motion to dismiss on such ground is
whether or not the complaint alleges facts which if true To determine when the prescriptive period commenced
would justify the relief demanded. As a corollary, it has in an action for reconveyance, the plaintiff’s possession
been held that only ultimate facts and not legal of the disputed property is material. If there is an actual
conclusions or evidentiary facts are considered for need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not
purposes of applying the test. This is consistent with in possession, the action for reconveyance based on
Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court which states that implied trust prescribes in ten (10) years, the reference
the complaint need only allege the ultimate facts or the point being the date of registration of the deed or the
essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action. issuance of the title. On the other hand, if the real owner
A fact is essential if they cannot be stricken out without of the property remains in possession of the property,
leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate. the prescriptive period to recover titleand possession of
Since the inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, the property does not run against him and in such
of the material allegations, it follows that the analysis case,the action for reconveyance would be in the nature
should be confined to the four corners of the complaint, of a suit for quieting of title which is imprescriptible. 41
and no other.
In the case at bar, a reading of the allegations of the
A judicious examination of petitioner’s Amended Amended Complaint failed to show that petitioner
Complaint readily shows its failure to sufficiently remained in possession of the subject properties in
state a cause of action. Contrary to the findings of the dispute. On the contrary, it can be reasonably deduced
CA, the allegations therein do not proffer ultimate facts that it was Gran who was in possession of the subject
which would warrant an action for nullification of the sale properties.
and recovery of the properties in controversy, hence,
rendering the same dismissible.

While the Amended Complaint does allege that

petitioner was the registered owner of the subject
properties in dispute, nothing in the said pleading or its
annexes would show the basis of that assertion, either
26
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision On 29 October 2009, the Castros filed a motion to
dated January 10, 2011 and the Resolution dated June include the PPSBI as an indispensable party-defendant.
22, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. The RTC thereafter denied the motion, reasoning that
87849 are hereby AFFIRMEDwith MODIFICATION in Paramount's Complaint could be fully resolved without
that the Amended Complaint be dismissed on the the PPSBI's participation. 
grounds of (a) failure to state a cause of action, and (b)
prescription as herein discussed. Consequently, the Castro’s filed a Motion for Leave to
File a Third Party-Complaint and to Admit Attached
Third-Party Complaint. This motion was likewise
denied. The Castro’s Motion for Reconsideration was
158.) PARAMOUNT LIFE & GENERAL INSURANCE again denied in a Resolution.
CORPORATION VS. CHERRY T. CASTRO and
GLENN ANTHONY T. CASTRO Aggrieved, the Castro’s assailed the RTC Resolutions
G.R. No. 195728 April 19, 2016 through a Petition for Certiorari filed with the CA. They
Petition: Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule likewise subsequently filed a Motion for Leave of Court
45 of the Rules of Court to File and to Admit Attached Supplemental Petition for
Review.
FACTS:
In its Decision, the CA partially granted the Petition by
In 2004, the PPSBI applied for and obtained insurance allowing a third-party complaint to be filed against the
from Paramount, which accordingly issued Group Master PPSBI. It ruled that the Castro’s were freed from the
Policy effective 1 September 2004. Under Section 20, obligation to pay the bank by virtue of subrogation, as
Article IV of the said policy, "all death benefits shall be the latter would collect the loan amount pursuant to the
payable to the creditor, PPSBI, as its interest may MRI issued by Paramount in Virgilio's favor. Paramount
appeal." moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion
through a Resolution.
Meanwhile, Virgilio J. Castro (Virgilio) - Cherry's
husband and Glenn's father - obtained a housing loan Paramount filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45,
from the PPSBI. PPSBI required Virgilio to apply for a arguing that the case could be fully appreciated and
mortgage redemption insurance (MRI) from Paramount resolved without involving the PPSBI as a third-party
to cover the loan. In his application for the said defendant.
insurance policy, Virgilio named Cherry and Glenn as
beneficiaries. 16 Paramount issued a certificate in his ISSUES:
favor, subject to the terms and conditions of Group
Master Policy. Whether the CA erred in remanding the case to the R
TC for the admission of the Third-Party Complaint
On 26 February 2009, Virgilio died of septic against PPSBI
shock. Consequently, a claim was filed for death benefits
under the individual insurance coverage issued under RULING:
the group policy. Paramount however denied the claim,
on the ground of the failure of Virgilio to disclose material
information, or material concealment or Yes. The Castro’s sought to implead the PPSBI as a
misrepresentation. It said that when Virgilio submitted third-party defendant in the nullification case instituted by
his insurance application, he made some material Paramount. They theorized that by virtue of the death of
misrepresentations by answering "no" to questions on Virgilio and the mandate of the group insurance policy in
whether he had any adverse health history and whether relation to his individual insurance policy, the PPSBI
he had sought medical advice or consultation concerning stepped into the shoes of Cherry and Glenn. According
it. Because of the alleged material concealment or to the Castro’s, upon Virgilio's death, the obligation to
misrepresentation, it declared Virgilio's individual pay the third-party defendant (PPSBI) passed on to
insurance certificate (No. 041913) rescinded, null, and Paramount by virtue of the Mortgage Redemption
absolutely void from the very beginning.22 Insurance, and not to them as Virgilio's heirs.

Paramount filed a Complaint with the RTC. It prayed that In this case, the PPSBI, as the mortgagee-bank,
Application and Insurance Certificate covering the required Virgilio to obtain an MRI from Paramount to
individual insurance of Virgilio be declared null and void cover his housing loan. Paramount undertook to pay the
by reason of material concealment and PPSBI. Paramount, in opposing the PPSBI's inclusion as
misrepresentation. It also prayed for attorney's fees and a third-party defendant, reasons that it is only seeking
exemplary damages. the nullification of Virgilio's individual insurance
certificate, and not the group insurance policy forged
between it and the PPSBI. It concludes that the
In their Answer with Counterclaim, the Castro’s argued nullification action it filed has nothing to do with the
that Virgilio had not made any material PPSBI.
misrepresentation. They further argued that by
approving Virgilio's application, Paramount was
estopped from raising the supposed We disagree. Should Paramount succeed in having the
misrepresentations. The Castro’s made a counterclaim individual insurance certificate nullified, the PPSBI shall
for actual and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's then proceed against the Castro’s. This would contradict
fees, for the alleged breach of contract by Paramount the provisions of the group insurance policy that ensure
arising from its refusal to honor its obligation as insurer. the direct payment by the insurer to the bank:

G.R. No. 195728 Notwithstanding the provision on Section 22 "No

Assignment" of Article IV Benefit Provisions, and in
27
accordance with provisions of Section 6 "Amendment of FACTS:
this Policy" under Article II General Provisions of the
Group Policy, it is hereby agreed that all death benefits Plaintiffs-respondents filed a complaint against
shall be payable to the Creditor, Philippine Postal defendant-petitioner with the CFI of Davao for quieting of
Savings Bank as its interest may appeal.47 (Emphasis title and recovery of possession with damages. Plaintiffs-
supplied.) respondents filed another case against defendant-
petitioner with the City Court of Davao City for forcible
In allowing the inclusion of the PPSBI as a third-party entry over the same parcel of land. In a motion to
defendant, the Court recognizes the inseparable interest dismiss, defendant-petitioner sought the dismissal of the
of the bank (as policyholder of the group policy) in the complaint for forcible entry alleging the pendency of
validity of the individual insurance certificates issued by quieting of title case; but the City Court, in its order,
Paramount. The PPSBI need not institute a separate denied the said motion "for the reason that there is no
case, considering that its cause of action is intimately identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for and for
related to that of Paramount as against the Castro’s. The the further reason that it does not appear that any
soundness of admitting a third-party complaint judgment which would be rendered on the other action
hinges on causal connection between the claim of will amount to res adjudicate in the herein case."
the plaintiff in his complaint and a claim for Defendant-petitioner appealed to the Court of First
contribution, indemnity or other relief of the Instance reiterating his arguments for the dismissal of
defendant against the third-party defendant.  In this the complaint for forcible entry as stated in his earlier
case, the Castro’s stand to incur a bad debt to the motion in the City Court. His appeal benig dismissed,
PPSBI - the exact event that is insured against by Group defendant filed the herein petition.
Master Policy No. G-086 - in the event that Paramount
succeeds in nullifying Virgilio's Individual Insurance ISSUE:
Certificate.
Whether the verification in the complaint for forcible
Paramount further argues that the propriety of a third- entry does not comply with Section 6, Rule 7, of the
party complaint rests on whether the possible third-party Revised Rules of Court, hence, the complaint is void
defendant (in this case PPSBI) can raise the same
defenses that the third-party plaintiffs (the Castro’s) have HELD:
against the plaintiff. However, the Rules do not limit the
third-party defendant's options to such a condition. Thus:
NO. Catalino dela Victoria, one of the plaintiffs (now
respondents) clearly referred to the allegations in the
Section 13. Answer to third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint as having been read by him. However, while
complaint. – A third (fourth, etc.)-party defendant may he stated that "they are true and correct," he omitted to
allege in his answer his defenses, counterclaims or state that said conclusion was reached of his own
cross-claims, including such defenses that the third knowledge. The latter detail, however, is logically
(fourth, etc.)-party plaintiff may have against the original inferable since affiant was a party and it does not appear
plaintiffs claim. In proper cases, he may also assert a that he was verifying upon information and belief. If
counterclaim against the original plaintiff in respect of the petitioner entertained doubt about the true character of
latter's claim against the third-party plaintiff. 49 the verification, he should have asked that it be made
more definite. Moreover, even if We should find the
As seen above, the same defenses the third-party verification insufficient, that insufficiency would not
plaintiff has against the original plaintiff are just some of render the complaint for forcible entry, or the whole
the allegations a third-party defendant may raise in its proceedings in the court below, void. This Court already
answer. Section 13 even gives the third-party defendant held in several decisions that the requirement regarding
the prerogative to raise a counterclaim against the verification is not jurisdictional, but merely formal. Thus,
original plaintiff in respect of the latter's original claim while it is true that Section 1, Rule 70, of the Revised
against the defendant/third-party plaintiff. Rules of Court requires the verification of the complaint
for forcible entry, the insufficiency of the same, or its
The CA correctly ruled that to admit the Castro’s Third- being defective, is not fatal to the jurisdiction of the City
Party Complaint, in which they can assert against the Court or that of the court a quo to which the case was
PPSBI an independent claim they would otherwise later appealed. With respect to the second assignment
assert in another action, would prevent multiplicity of of error, one the grounds for a motion to dismiss under
suits. Considering also that the original case from which Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court is the pendency of
these. Present Petitions arose has not yet been another action between the same parties for the same
resolved, the Court deems it proper to have all the cause. In order that this ground may be availed of there
parties air all their possible grievances in the original must be, between the action under consideration and the
case still pending with the RTC. other action, (1) identity of parties, or at least such as
representing the same interest in both actions; (2)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petitions in identity rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
G.R. Nos. 195728 and 211329 are DENIED. being founded on the same facts; and (3) the identity on
the two preceeding particulars should be such that any
judgment which may be rendered on the other action will
RULE 7: PARTS OF A PLEADING
regardless which party is successful amount to res
adjudicata in the action under consideration. While there
159.) JOSE SALCEDO QUIMPO, petitioner, vs. may be identity of parties and subject matter in the
CATALINO DELA VICTORIA and FRANCISCA O. forcible entry case and Civil Case No. 6005, for quieting
DELA VICTORIA, respondents. of title, the rights asserted and the relief prayed for in the
G.R. No. L-31822 July 31, 1972 said cases are not the same. In the former case, to the
This is a Petition to Review the Decisions of the CFI of legal right claimed is possession, while in the latter case,
Davao the legal right asserted is ownership.

28
  
160.) SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY An unsigned pleading produces no legal
VS SANTOS effect. However, the court ay, in its discretion, allow such
G.R. 152579. AUGUST 4, 2009 deficiency to be remedied if it shall appear that the same
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for
the Rules of Court delay. Counsel who deliberately files an unsigned
pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or
FACTS: alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails to
promptly report to the court a change of his address,
Private respondents Santos, et al. were recruited by shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action.
petitioner Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. (Emphasis supplied.)
(Sameer) as aluminum products manufacturer operators  
for Ensure Company Ltd. of Taiwan (Ensure), under a  Obviously, the rule allows the pleadings to be signed by
one-year employment contract with a basic monthly either the party to the case or the counsel representing
salary of NT$14,800.00. that party. In this case, ASBT, as petitioner, opted to
  sign its petition and its motion for reconsideration in its
Santos, et al. were deployed and were able to work for own behalf, through its corporate president, Mildred R.
Ensure. However, they were repatriated even prior to the Santos, who was duly authorized by ASBTs Board of
expiration of their contracts. Santos, et al. filed Directors to represent the company in prosecuting this
complaints against Sameer before the National Labor case. Therefore, the said pleadings cannot be
Relations Commission (NLRC) for illegal dismissal, considered unsigned and without any legal effect.
underpayment of salaries, and unauthorized salary
deductions. 161.) ANDERSON VS HO
  G.R. NO. 17259. JANUARY 7, 2013
Sameer filed a third party complaint against private
respondent ASBT International Management Service, Anderson filed a Complaint for Ejectment against
Inc. (ASBT). It claimed that the latter should be liable for respondent Enrique Ho (Ho) before the Metropolitan
all the contractual obligations of Ensure since Sameers Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City. She alleged that
accreditation was transferred to ASBT on June 9, 1997. through her mere tolerance, Ho is in possession of her
parcel of land at Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. As she
The Labor arbiter ruled that SAMEER should pay Santos was already in need of the said property, Anderson
et.al. served upon Ho a Demand Letter to Vacate but despite
receipt thereof, Ho refused. Because of this, Anderson
However upon appeal to the NLRC, it absolved prayed that the MeTC order Ho to vacate the Roosevelt
SAMEER and order ASBT to pay Santos et.al. property and pay her damages and attorneys fees. Ho
averred that he possesses the property not through
ASBT elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a mere tolerance but as part of his compensation for
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of services rendered to Anderson. Hence, he is entitled to
Court.  The CA at first denied the appeal on the ground the continued possession thereof until such time that the
that the attached Verification and Certification of Non- property is sold and he is paid the 10% of the proceeds
Forum Shopping was signed by Mildred R. Santos as of its sale.
President of ASBT without any proof of authority to sign
for and bind ASBT in the proceedings. ASBT filed a MeTC rendered a Decision dismissed the case for lack
motion for reconsideration of the Resolution, submitting of cause of action.
therewith the necessary board resolution authorizing
corporate president Mildred R. Santos to represent The case was appealed to the RTC which also
ASBT before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the same without prejudice. Anderson filed an
granted the motion and reinstated the petition. MR but the same was denied by the RTC.
 Sameer now appeals raising the issue below.
Intending to file with the CA a Petition for Review under
ISSUE: Rule 42of the Rules of Court, Anderson’s counsel, Atty.
Rommel V. Oliva (Atty. Oliva), filed a Motion for
Whether or not the Petition and the Motion for Extension of Time of 15 days within which to file a
Reconsideration, signed by Mildred Santos as corporate petition allegedly due to the revisions required in the
president and who is not a member of the Bar, should be initial draft and on account of heavy pressure of work.
considered unsigned pleadings which produce no legal This was granted by the CA.
effect.
Subsequently, said counsel sought another extension of
RULING: 15 days, this time claiming that the petition had already
been finalized and sent to Anderson in Hawaii, U.S.A. for
NO WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of her to read as well as sign the certification and
merit. verification portion thereof. However, as of the last day
  of the extended period, the petition has not yet been
SEC. 3. Signature and address.Every pleading sent back, hence, the additional extension being sought.
must be signed by the party or counsel
representing him, stating in either case his In the interest of justice, the CA once again granted the
address which should not be a post office box. said motion for extension. On June 20, 2005, Atty. Oliva
  was finally able to file the Petition for Review but the
The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him certification against forum shopping attached thereto
that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his was signed by him on Anderson’s behalf without any
knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground accompanying authority to do so. Hence, the CA
to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. dismissed the case as the certification of forum shopping

29
was signed not by the petitioner herself but by her defective certification is generally not curable by its
counsel without authority to do so. A motion for subsequent correction. And while it is true that in some
reconsideration was filed which was also denied by the cases the Court considered such a belated submission
CA. Thus, petitioner now invokes before the SC the as substantial compliance, it "did so only on sufficient
liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure. and justifiable grounds that compelled a liberal approach
while avoiding the effective negation of the intent of the
ISSUE: Whether or not the rules on certification against rule on non-forum shopping.
forum shopping may be relaxed in this case

HELD:

NO. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on

Certiorari is DENIED.

The need to abide by the Rules of Court and the

procedural requirements it imposes has been constantly 162.) BUAN VS LOPEZ
underscored by this Court. One of these procedural G.R. NO. 75349. OCTOBER 13, 1986
requirements is the certificate of non-forum shopping
which, time and again, has been declared as basic, FACTS:
necessary and mandatory for procedural orderliness.
On August 5, 1986, a Special Civil Action was instituted
by the Quiapo Church Vendors against Respondent
In Vda. De Formoso v. Philippine National Bank, the
Gemiliano Lopez who was the then Acting Mayor of
Court reiterated the guidelines respecting non-
Manila.
compliance with or submission of a defective certificate
of non-forum shopping, the relevant portions of which The case prayed for that the Lopez be prohibited from
are as follows:cralawlibrary arbitrarily, whimsically and capriciously revoking or
cancelling their licenses or permit as well as from
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non- threatening the physical demolition of their business
compliance therewith or a defect therein, x x x, is stalls.There was also a prayer for issuance of TRO
generally not curable by its subsequent submission or which was granted on the same day.
correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the
Rule on the ground of substantial compliance or On July 7, 1986, another Special Civil Action of
presence of special circumstances or compelling prohibition with preliminary injunction was filed by
reasons.x x x Samahang Kapatiran Sa Hanap Buhay ng Bagong
Lipunan against Lopez in Regional Trial Court of Manila,
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must docketed as Civil Case No. 8636563.
be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If,
however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party- The president of the said organization was Rosalina
pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Buan and its press relations officer was Liza Ocampo.
Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to The two individuals are also the petitioners in the case at
sign on his behalf. (Emphasis supplied) bar. It must be noted that the petitions is grounded on
the same facts.
The requirement that it is the petitioner, not her counsel, There was also identity of parties or at least such parties
who should sign the certificate of non-forum shopping is represent the same interests in both actions as well as
due to the fact that a "certification is a peculiar personal the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for. 
representation on the part of the principal party, an
assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there ISSUE:
are no other pending cases involving basically the same
parties, issues and causes of action." "Obviously, it is Whether there exist forum shopping.
the petitioner, and not always the counsel whose
professional services have been retained for a particular HELD:
case, who is in the best position to know whether she
actually filed or caused the filing of a petition in that YES. WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of
case." Per the above guidelines, however, if a petitioner merit
is unable to sign a certification for reasonable or
justifiable reasons, she must execute an SPA The petition in Case No. 86-36563 is grounded on the
designating her counsel of record to sign on her behalf. same facts as those in the case at bar: the members of
"A certification which had been signed by counsel the Samahan had been legitimately engaged "in their
without the proper authorization is defective and respective business of selling sundry merchandise, more
constitutes a valid cause for the dismissal of the particularly religious articles, flowers and ornamental
petition." plants, and medicinal herbs;" they had been religiously
paying "the corresponding license and permit fees
In this light, the Court finds that the CA correctly imposed by prevailing ordinances of the City of Manila,"
dismissed Andersons Petition for Review on the ground but this notwithstanding they had been given written
that the certificate of non-forum shopping attached notice dated May 3, 1986 emanating from the Mayor's
thereto was signed by Atty. Oliva on her behalf sans any Office, advising of the cancellation of their permits and
authority to do so. While the Court notes that Anderson their possible relocation to another site; and these acts
tried to correct this error by later submitting an SPA and "are unjust, illegal arbitrary, oppressive and constitute
by explaining her failure to execute one prior to the filing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent.
of the petition, this does not automatically denote
substantial compliance. It must be remembered that a

30
There thus exists between the action before this Court
and RTC Case No. 86-36563 Identity of parties, or at Petitioners Efren Loquias and Antonio Din, Jr. are the
least such parties as represent the same interests in Mayor and Vice-Mayor, respectively, of San Miguel,
both actions, as well as Identity of rights asserted and Zamboanga del Sur while petitioners Angelito Martinez
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same II, Lovelyn Biador and Gregorio Faciol, Jr. are members
facts, and the Identity on the two preceding particulars is of the Sangguniang Bayan of the said municipality.
such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res Public respondent Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto
adjudicata  in the action under consideration: all the approved the Resolution of Graft Investigation Officer II
requisites, in fine, of auter action pendant.  Jovito A. Coresis, Jr. of the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao finding "probable cause to conclude that the
Indeed, the petitioners in both actions, described in their crime of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 has been
petitions as vendors of religious articles, herbs and committed by respondents Mayor, Vice-Mayor, members
plants, and sundry merchandise around the Quiapo of the Sangguniang Bayan and Budget Officer of San
Church or its "periphery," have incurred not only the Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur" and that accordingly, the
sanction of dismissal of their case before this Court in appropriate Information be filed with the Sandiganbayan.
accordance with Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, but also
the punitive measure of dismissal of both their actions, Petitioners filed a Motion for Reinvestigation with prayer
that in this Court and that in the Regional Trial Court as to defer arraignment and pre-trial alleging that they
well Quite recently, upon substantially Identical factual recognize the salary increases of the health personnel
premises, the Court en banc had occasion to condemn as a mandatory statutory obligation but the salary
and penalize the act of litigants of hearing the same suit increases could not be implemented because of lack of
in different courts, aptly described as "forum-shopping," funds and the municipality had incurred overdrafts. They
viz: further argue that the failure to give salary increases and
other Magna Carta benefits were due to circumstances
beyond their control and not due to any manifest
The acts of petitioners constitute a clear case of forum
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
shopping, an act of malpractice that is proscribed and
negligence on their part.
condemned as trifling with the courts and abusing their
processes. It is improper conduct that tends to degrade
Special Prosecution Officer I Jacqueline J. Ongpauco-
the administration of justice. The rule has been
Cortel recommended the dismissal of the case which
formalized in Section 17 of the Interim Rules and
recommendation was approved by Deputy Special
Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11, 1983 in
Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos and concurred in by Special
connection with the implementation of the Judiciary
Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo. This recommendation
Reorganization Act, specifically with the grant in
was, however, disapproved by Ombudsman Desierto on
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129 of equal original jurisdiction
June 18, 1999 stating in his handwriting that "(T)he
to the Intermediate Appellate Court to issue writs of
crime had obviously been committed, per OMB
mandamus, prohibition, etc., and auxiliary writs or
Mindanao findings, long before the payment granting
processes, whether or not in aid Of its appellate
that the accused latters claim/allegation is true."
jurisdiction. Thus, the cited Rule provides that no such
petition may be filed in the Intermediate Appellate Court
'if another similar petition has been filed or is still Meanwhile, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration
pending in the Supreme Court' and vice-versa. The \alleging that there is no probable cause in holding that
Rule orders that "A violation of the rule shall constitute they violated Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
contempt of court and shall be a cause for the summary Practices Act. Alleging that the order disapproving the
dismissal of both petitions, without prejudice to the dismissal of the case constituted denial of the motion for
taking of appropriate action against the counsel or party reconsideration, petitioners filed the present petition.
concerned." The rule applies with equal force where the
party having filed an action in the Supreme Court shops The Office of the Ombudsman, through the Solicitor
for the same remedy of prohibition and a restraining General, alleges that the petition does not comply with
order or injunction in the regional trial court (or vice- Section 5, Rule 7 as the Verification and the Certification
versa). on Non-Forum Shopping were signed only by petitioner
Antonio Din and not by all the petitioners and there is no
showing that petitioner Din was authorized by his co-
163.) LOQUIAS VS OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
petitioners to represent them in this case.
G.R.139396. AUGUST 15, 2000
Petition for certiorari under Rule 65
Petitioners contend that there was substantial
compliance with Section 5, Rule 7 notwithstanding the
FACTS
fact that only one of the petitioners signed the
verification and certification on forum shopping
In a sworn complaint filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao, private respondents against
petitioners with violation of Republic Act No. 3019 for
ISSUE: WON substantial compliance is enough to
their alleged failure to give the salary increases and
comply with Section 5, Rule 7.
benefits provided in Section 20 of the Magna Carta of
Public Health Workers (R.A. 7305) and Local Budget
HELD: NO.
Circulars Nos. 54, 54-A, 56, 60 and 64 for the health
personnel of the local government of San Miguel,
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby
Zamboanga del Sur.
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Herein private respondents were officers of the
Association of Municipal Health Office Personnel of At the outset, it is noted that the Verification and
Zamboanga del Sur who instituted the said complaint in Certification was signed by Antonio Din, Jr., one of the
behalf of the 490 members of the said Association.
31
petitioners in the instant case. We agree with the
Solicitor General that the petition is defective. Section 5, ISSUE: Whether or not the petition be dismissed for
Rule 7 expressly provides that it is the plaintiff or the certificate of non-forum shopping was signed by
principal party who shall certify under oath that he only one of the petitioners?
has not commenced any action involving the same
issues in any court, etc. HELD: NO.

Only petitioner Din, the Vice-Mayor of San Miguel, WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
Zamboanga del Sur, signed the certification. There is no hereby GRANTED.
showing that he was authorized by his co-petitioners to
represent the latter and to sign the certification. It cannot
likewise be presumed that petitioner Din knew, to the In the case at bar, however, we hold that the subject
best of his knowledge, whether his co-petitioners had the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping signed by the
same or similar actions or claims filed or pending. petitioner Antonio Docena alone should be deemed to
constitute substantial compliance with the rules. There
We find that substantial compliance will not suffice are only two petitioners in this case and they are
in a matter involving strict observance by the rules. husband and wife. Their residence is the subject
The attestation contained in the certification on non- property alleged to be conjugal in the instant verified
forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the petition. The Verification/Certification on Non-Forum
party who executed the same. Petitioners must show Shopping attached to the Petition for Certiorari and
reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the Prohibition was signed only by the husband who
certification. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be certified, inter alia, that he and his wife have not
rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal commenced any other action or proceeding involving the
construction. same issues raised in the petition in any court, tribunal
or quasi-judicial agency; that to the best of their
164.) DOCENA VS LAPESURA knowledge no such action is pending therein; and that
G.R. No. 140153. March 28, 2001 he and his wife undertake to inform the Court within five
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of (5) days from notice of any similar action or proceeding
the Rules of Court seeking the nullification of the Court which may have been filed.
of Appeal
The property subject of the original action for recovery is
FACTS: conjugal. Whether it is conjugal under the New Civil
Code or the Family Code, a fact that cannot be
Casiano Hombria filed a Complaint for the recovery of a determined from the records before us, it is believed that
parcel of land against his lessees, petitioner-spouses the certificate on non-forum shopping filed in the Court of
Antonio and Alfreda Docena. The petitioners claimed Appeals constitutes sufficient compliance with the rules
ownership of the land based on occupation since time on forum-shopping.
immemorial. A certain Guillermo Abuda intervened in the Under the New Civil Code, the husband is the
case. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners and administrator of the conjugal partnership.In fact, he is the
the intervenor Abuda. sole administrator, and the wife is not entitled as a
matter of right to join him in this endeavour. The
The CA reversed the judgment of the trial court and husband may defend the conjugal partnership in a suit or
ordered the petitioners to vacate the land they have action without being joined by the wife. Corollarily, the
leased from Casiano. The Complaint in Intervention of husband alone may execute the necessary certificate of
Abuda was dismissed. CA ordered the petitioners to non-forum shopping to accompany the pleading. The
vacate the land they have leased from the plaintiff- husband as the statutory administrator of the conjugal
appellant [private respondent Casiano Hombria], property could have filed the petition for certiorari and
excluding the portion which the petitioners reclaimed prohibition alone, without the concurrence of the wife. If
from the sea and forms part of the shore, as shown in suits to defend an interest in the conjugal properties may
the Commissioners Report, and to pay the plaintiff- be filed by the husband alone, with more reason, he may
appellant the agreed rental of  P1.00 per year from the sign the certificate of non-forum shopping to be attached
date of the filing of the Complaint until they shall have to the petition.
actually vacated the premises. The Complaint in
Intervention of Abuda was dismissed. Under the Family Code, the administration of the
conjugal property belongs to the husband and the wife
 Hombria filed a Motion for Execution of the above jointly. However, unlike an act of alienation or
decision which has already become final and executor. encumbrance where the consent of both spouses is
Pursuant to the Resolution, the public respondent sheriff required, joint management or administration does not
issued an alias Writ of Demolition.  require that the husband and wife always act together.
Each spouse may validly exercise full power of
A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by the management alone, subject to the intervention of the
petitioners with the Court of Appeals, alleging grave court in proper cases as provided under Article 124 of
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge in the Family Code. It is believed that even under the
issuing the Orders and of the sheriff in issuing the Writ of provisions of the Family Code, the husband alone could
Demolition.  have filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition to
contest the writs of demolition issued against the
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the conjugal property with the Court of Appeals without
grounds that the petition was filed beyond the 60-day being joined by his wife. The signing of the attached
period provided under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 certificate of non-forum shopping only by the husband is
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure as amended by Bar not a fatal defect.
Matter No. 803 effective September 1, 1998, and that
More important, the signing petitioner here made the
the certification of non-forum shopping attached
certification in his behalf and that of his wife. The
thereto was signed by only one of the petitioners
32
husband may reasonably be presumed to have personal The trial court issued an order denying the motion to
knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his wife of any dismiss. Petitioners filed with the CA a petition for
action or claim similar to the petition for certiorari and certiorari. The petition, however, was dismissed.
prohibition given the notices and legal processes
involved in a legal proceeding involving real A perusal of the records discloses that the verification
property. We also see no justifiable reason why he may and the certification against forum shopping was signed
not lawfully undertake together with his wife to inform the by a certain Lourdes Pomperada without any showing or
court of any similar action or proceeding which may be indication that she is duly authorized by the petitioners to
filed. If anybody may repudiate the certification or sign for and in their behalf. Petitioners submitted a
undertaking for having been incorrectly made, it is the Secretary’s Certificate showing the authorization of Mrs.
wife who may conceivably do so. Lourdes Pomperada to represent the petitioner
corporation. However, there is still no showing that the
In view of the circumstances of this case, namely, the said Mrs. Lourdes Pomperada is duly authorized to act
property involved is a conjugal property, the petition for and in behalf of petitioner. Hence, this petition.
questioning the writ of demolition thereof originated from
an action for recovery brought against the spouses, and
is clearly intended for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership, and the wife, as pointed out in the Motion ISSUE:
for Reconsideration in respondent court, was in the
province of Guian, Samar, whereas the petition was Whether the complaint should have been dismissed due
prepared in Metro Manila, a rigid application of the rules to false certification
on forum shopping that would disauthorize a husbands
signing the certification in his behalf and that of his wife HELD:
is too harsh and is clearly uncalled for.
YES. It is obligatory that the one signing the verification
165.) ART FUENTEBELLA, Park-in-Charge, and and certification against forum shopping on behalf of the
ROLLING HILLS MEMORIAL PARK, INC., vs. principal party or the other petitioners has the authority
DARLICA CASTRO to do the same.
G.R. No. 150865 June 30, 2006 | AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review seeking the nullification of Hence, a certification which had been signed without the
the resolutions of the CA. proper authorization is defective and constitutes a valid
cause for the dismissal of the petition.

FACTS: Respondent Darlica Castro engaged the funeral This holds true in the present case where the Court of
services of petitioner Rolling Hills Memorial Park, Inc. in Appeals accordingly dismissed the petition for lack of
Bacolod City for the interment of the remains of her proper authorization of the one signing it on behalf of
husband. petitioners.Lourdes Pomperada, the Administrative
Manager of petitioner corporation, who signed the
During the burial, it was discovered that the dimensions verification and certificate on non-forum shopping,
of the vault did not correspond to the measurements of initially failed to submit a secretary’s certificate or a
the casket. As a result, the casket was lifted and placed board resolution confirming her authority to sign for the
under the heat of the sun for about one hour in front of corporation, and a special power of attorney to sign on
all the mourners while the vault was being prepared. To behalf of co-petitioner Art Fuentebella, who was sued
make matters worse, the employees of petitioner- jointly and solidarily with the corporation in his capacity
corporation measured the casket by using a as officer of the latter.
spade/shovel.
Hence, in any event, the trial court correctly held that the
Insulted by the events that transpired at the funeral, submission of a false certification shall constitute indirect
respondent wrote to the management of petitioner contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding
corporation demanding an explanation for its negligence, administrative and criminal sanctions. This is in
but the latter did not respond nor attempt to apologize to accordance with Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
the former.
166.) SANTO TOMAS UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL,
Respondent filed a complaint for damages against the Vs. CESAR ANTONIO Y. SURLA and EVANGELINE
corporation and its Park-in-Charge Art Fuentebella, SURLA
jointly and solidarily, before the MTCC of Bacolod City G.R. No. 129718 August 17, 1998 | VITUG, J.:
asking for damages.
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
the MTCC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Respondent spouses filed a complaint for damages
case because the amount of damages exceeds its against petitioner Santo Tomas University Hospital with
jurisdiction. Respondent subsequently filed a motion to the RTC of Quezon City predicated on an allegation by
withdraw the complaint, which was granted by the the spouses that their son, Emmanuel Cesar Surla, while
MTCC. confined at the said hospital for having been born
prematurely, had accidentally fallen from his incubator
Respondent filed a similar complaint with the RTC of possibly causing serious harm on the child.
Negros Occidental. Attached in the complaint was the Petitioner hospital filed its Answer with Compulsory
Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping Counterclaim asserting that respondents still owed to it
required. the amount of P82,632.10 representing hospital bills for
Emmanuels confinement at the hospital and making a
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that claim for moral and exemplary damages by reason of
the certification is false because respondent had the supposed unfounded and malicious suit filed against
previously filed an identical complaint with the MTCC. it.

33
Petitioner received a copy of respondents Reply to to as not being initiatory in character and thereby not
Counterclaim that sought for the dismissal of petitioners covered by the provisions of Administrative Circular No.
counterclaim for its non-compliance with Administrative 04-94.
Circular No. 04-94 requiring that a complaint and other
initiatory pleadings, such as a counterclaim, cross-claim, 167.) CAGAYAN VALLEY DRUG CORPORATION Vs.
third (fourt, etc.) party complaint, be accompanied with a COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
certificate of non-forum shopping. G.R. No. 151413 February 13, 2008
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
In its Rejoinder to respondents Reply to Counterclaim, Court seeks to recall the Resolution of CA.
petitioner contended that the subject circular should be
held to refer only to a permissive counterclaim, an FACTS:
initiatory pleading not arising out of, nor necessarily
connected with, the subject matter of the plaintiffs claim Petitioner corporation, a duly licensed retailer of
but not to a compulsory counterclaim spawned by the medicine and other pharmaceutical products operating
filing of a complaint and so intertwined therewith and under the name and style of Mercury Drug alleged that
logically related thereto that it verily could not stand for in 1995, it granted 20% sales discounts to qualified
independent adjudication. senior citizens on purchases of medicine pursuant to
Republic Act No. (RA) 7432 “Senior Citizens Act”
The trial court dismissed petitioners counterclaim holding Petitioner filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
that the counterclaim referred to in said Circular covers a claim for tax refund/tax credit of the full amount of the
both kinds. 20% sales discount it granted to senior citizens for the
year 1995, allegedly totaling to PhP 123,083 in
Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to the CA which accordance with Sec. 4 of RA 7432.
dismissed the petition opining that a counterclaim
partakes of the nature of a complaint and/or a cause of The BIRs inaction on petitioners claim for refund/tax
action against the plaintiff in a case x x x, only this time it credit compelled petitioner to file on March 18, 1998 a
is the original defendant who becomes the plaintiff. It petition for review before the CTA in order to forestall the
stands on the same footing and is tested by the same two-year prescriptive period under the Tax Code
rules as if it were an independent action.
The CTA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for
ISSUE: Whether a compulsory counterclaim pleaded in review for lack of merit.
an Answer be dismissed on the ground of a failure to
accompany it with a certificate of non-forum shopping Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter before the CA.
The CA issued the assailed Resolution dismissing the
HELD: Partly meritorious. The complaint and other petition on procedural grounds. The CA held that the
initiatory pleadings referred to and subject of the Circular person who signed the verification and certification of
are the original civil complaint, counterclaim, cross- absence of forum shopping, a certain Jacinto J.
claim, third (fourth, etc.) party complaint or complaint-in- Concepcion, President of petitioner, failed to adduce
intervention, petition, or application wherein a party proof that he was duly authorized by the board of
asserts his claim for relief. directors to do so.

It bears stressing that the real office of Administrative Hence, we have this petition.
Circular No. 04-94 is to curb the malpractice commonly
referred to also as forum-shopping. The language of the ISSUE:
circular distinctly suggests that it is primarily intended to
cover an initiatory pleading or an incipient application of Whether or not the verification and certification of non-
a party asserting a claim for relief. forum shopping signed by the President of petitioner is
sufficient compliance with Secs. 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the
The circular in question has not been contemplated to 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
include a kind of claim which, by its very nature as being
auxiliary to the proceedings in the suit and as deriving its HELD:
substantive and jurisdictional support therefrom, can
only be appropriately pleaded in the answer and not It must be borne in mind that Sec. 23, in relation to Sec.
remain outstanding for independent resolution except by 25 of the Corporation Code, clearly enunciates that all
the court where the main case pends. Prescinding from corporate powers are exercised, all business conducted,
the foregoing, the proviso in the second paragraph of and all properties controlled by the board of directors. A
Section 5, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules on Civil corporation has a separate and distinct personality from
Procedure, i.e., that the violation of the anti-forum its directors and officers and can only exercise its
shopping rule shall not be curable by mere amendment x corporate powers through the board of directors. Thus, it
x x but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case is clear that an individual corporate officer cannot solely
without prejudice, being predicated on the applicability exercise any corporate power pertaining to the
of the need for a certification against forum shopping, corporation without authority from the board of
obviously does not include a claim which cannot be directors. This has been our constant holding in cases
independently set up. instituted by a corporation.

Petitioner, nevertheless, is entitled to a mere In a slew of cases, however, we have recognized the
partial relief. The so called counterclaim of petitioner authority of some corporate officers to sign the
really consists of two segregative parts: (1) for unpaid verification and certification against forum shopping.
hospital bills of respondents son, Emmanuel Surla, in the
total amount of P82,632.10; and (2) for damages, moral In Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. CA, we
and exemplary, plus attorney’s fees by reason of the recognized the authority of a general manager or acting
alleged malicious and unfounded suit filed against it. It is general manager to sign the verification and certificate
the second, not the first, claim that the Court here refers against forum shopping; in Pfizer v. Galan, we upheld
the validity of a verification signed by an employment
34
specialist who had not even presented any proof of her HELD:
authority to represent the company; in Novelty
Philippines, Inc., v. CA, we ruled that a personnel officer YES. Forum shopping exists when a party repeatedly
who signed the petition but did not attach the authority avails himself of several judicial remedies in different
from the company is authorized to sign the verification courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially
and non-forum shopping certificate; and in Lepanto founded on the same transactions and the same
Consolidated Mining Company v. WMC Resources essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
International Pty. Ltd. (Lepanto), we ruled that the substantially the same issues either pending in or
Chairperson of the Board and President of the Company already resolved adversely by some other court.
can sign the verification and certificate against non-
forum shopping even without the submission of the Ultimately, what is truly important in determining whether
boards authorization. forum shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the
courts and party-litigant by a party who asks different
In sum, we have held that the following officials or courts to rule on the same or related causes and/or to
employees of the company can sign the verification and grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the
certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions
Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President being rendered by the different fora upon the same
of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting issue.
General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an
Employment Specialist in a labor case. Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1)
filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action
While the above cases do not provide a complete listing and with the same prayer, the previous case not having
of authorized signatories to the verification and been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis
certification required by the rules, the determination of pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same
the sufficiency of the authority was done on a case to cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case
case basis. The rationale applied in the foregoing cases having been finally resolved (where the ground for
is to justify the authority of corporate officers or dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases
representatives of the corporation to sign the verification based on the same cause of action, but with different
or certificate against forum shopping, being in a position prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground
to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).
allegations in the petition.
In the present case, there is no dispute that petitioners
In the case at bar, we so hold that petitioner substantially failed to state in the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping,
complied with Secs. 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Revised attached to their Verified Complaint in Civil Case No.
Rules on Civil Procedure. First, the requisite board CV-05-0402 before RTC-Branch 195, the existence of
resolution has been submitted albeit belatedly by Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 pending before RTC-Branch
petitioner. Second, we apply our ruling in Lepanto with 258.
the rationale that the President of petitioner is in a
position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the Petitioners committed forum shopping by filing multiple
allegations in the petition. Third, the President of cases based on the same cause of action, although with
petitioner has signed the complaint before the CTA at different prayers.
the inception of this judicial claim for refund or tax credit.
Forum shopping occurs although the actions seem to be
Consequently, the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 59778 different, when it can be seen that there is a splitting of a
ought to be reinstated. cause of action. 

168.) FIDEL O. CHUA and FILIDEN REALTY AND Petitioners would like to make it appear that Civil Case
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. No. CV-01-0207 was solely concerned with the
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, ATTY. nullification of the auction sale and certification of sale,
ROMUALDO CELESTRA, ATTY. ANTONIO V. VIRAY, while Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 was a totally separate
ATTY. RAMON MIRANDA and ATTY. POMPEYO claim for damages. Yet, a review of the records reveals
MAYNIGO that petitioners also included an explicit claim for
G.R. No. 182311 August 19, 2009 damages in their Amended Complaint
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
assailing the Decision of CA. Petitioners committed forum shopping by filing multiple
cases based on the same cause of action, although with
FACTS: different prayers.
Petitioner Chua is the president of co-petitioner Filiden
The Court observes that the damages being claimed by
Realty Development Corporation. Petitioners obtained
petitioners in their Complaint in Civil Case No. CV-05-
from respondent Metrobank a loan of P4, 000, 000,
0402 were also occasioned by the supposedly fictitious
which was secured by a real estate mortgage (REM) on
foreclosure sale.
parcels of land registered in petitioner Chuas name.
The lawyers of respondent Metrobank demanded that If the forum shopping is not considered willful and
petitioners fully pay and settle their liabilities. When deliberate, the subsequent case shall be
petitioners still failed to pay their loans, respondent dismissed without prejudice, on the ground of either litis
Metrobank sought to extra-judicially foreclose the REM pendentia or res judicata. However, if the forum
constituted on the subject properties. shopping is willful and deliberate, both (or all, if there are
more than two) actions shall be dismissed with
ISSUE:
prejudice. In this case, petitioners did not deliberately
Whether or not successively filing Civil Case No. CV-01- file Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 for the purpose
0207 and Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 amounts to forum of seeking a favorable decision in another
shopping forum. Otherwise, they would not have moved for the
consolidation of both cases. Thus, only Civil Case No.
35
CV-05-0402 is dismissed and the hearing of Civil Case To determine whether a party violated the rule against
No. CV-01-0207 before RTC-Branch 258 will be forum shopping, the most important factor to ask is
continued. whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or
whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res
169.) ABOITIZ EQUITY VENTURES, INC.  Vs. VICTOR judicata in another; otherwise stated, the test for
S. CHIONGBIAN, BENJAMIN D. GOTHONG, and determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or
CARLOS A. GOTHONG LINES, INC. (CAGLI) more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or
G.R. No.197530 July 9, 2014 causes of action, and reliefs sought.
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
decision of RTC. First, between the first and second complaints, there is
identity of parties. The first complaint was brought by
FACTS: CAGLI as the sole plaintiff against Victor S. Chiongbian,
Aboitiz Shipping Corporation ("ASC"), principally owned ATSC, and AEV as defendants. In the second complaint,
by the Aboitiz family, CAGLI, principally owned by the CAGLI was joined by Benjamin D. Gothong as
Gothong family, and William Lines, Inc. ("WLI"), (co-)plaintiff. As to the defendants, ATSC was deleted
principally owned by the Chiongbian family, entered into while Chiongbian and AEV were retained.
an agreement (the "Agreement"), whereby ASC and
CAGLI would transfer their shipping assets to WLI in While it is true that the parties to the first and second
exchange for WLI’s shares of stock. WLI, in turn, would complaints are not absolutely identical, this court has
run their merged shipping businesses and, henceforth, clarified that, for purposes of forum shopping, "[a]bsolute
be known as WG&A, Inc. ("WG&A"). identity of parties is not required [and that it] is enough
The Agreement required all disputes arising out of or in that there is substantial identity of parties."
connection with the Agreement to be settled by
arbitration. Second, there is identity in subject matter and cause of
action. There is identity in subject matter as both
CAGLI gave more than what was stipulated, but the complaints are applications for the same relief. There is
excess was returned. Later on, claimed that the excess identity in cause of action as both complaints are
was not yet returned. grounded on the right to be paid for or to receive the
value of excess inventories (and the supposed
AEV acquired the shares of ASC and WLI and renamed corresponding breach thereof) as spelled out in Annex
the business to ATSC. SL-V.

CAGLI filed applications for arbitration ("first The first and second complaints are both applications for
complaint") against respondent Chiongbian, ATSC, ASC, arbitration and are founded on the same instrument —
and petitioner AEV, before the Cebu City RTC for the Annex SL-V. Moreover, the intended arbitrations in both
return of the excess inventories. complaints cater to the same ultimate purpose, i.e., that
CAGLI may recover the value of its supposedly
AEV filed a motion to dismiss arguing that CAGLI failed unreturned inventories earlier delivered to
to state a cause of action as there was no agreement to WLI/WG&A/ATSC.
arbitrate between CAGLI and AEV. AEV pointed out it
AEV was never a party to the Agreement. Third, the order dated December 4, 2009 of the Cebu
City Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, which dismissed
The Cebu City RTC issued an order dismissing the first the first complaint with respect to AEV, attained finality
complaint with respect to AEV. It sustained AEV’s when CAGLI did not file a motion for reconsideration,
assertion that there was no agreement binding AEV and appealed, or, in any other manner, questioned the order.
CAGLI to arbitrate CAGLI’s claim.
Fourth, the parties did not dispute that the December 4,
The Cebu City RTC issued an order directing the parties 2009 order was issued by a court having jurisdiction over
remaining in the first complaint (after the discharge of the subject matter and the parties. Specifically as to
AEV) to proceed with arbitration. jurisdiction over the parties, jurisdiction was acquired
over CAGLI as plaintiff when it filed the first complaint
CAGLI filed a notice of dismissal withdrawing the first and sought relief from the Cebu City Regional Trial
complaint which the RTC allowed. Court, Branch 20; jurisdiction over defendants AEV,
ATSC, and Victor S. Chiongbian was acquired with the
CAGLI, now joined by respondent Benjamin D. Gothong, service of summons upon them. Fifth, the dismissal of
filed a second application for arbitration ("second the first complaint with respect to AEV was a judgment
complaint") before the Cebu City RTC. on the merits. As explained in Cabreza, Jr. v. Cabreza: A
judgment may be considered as one rendered on the
AEV filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint on
merits "when it determines the rights and liabilities of the
the following grounds: (1) forum shopping; (2) failure to
parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of
state a cause of action; (3) res judicata; and (4) litis
formal, technical or dilatory objections"; or when the
pendentia. Cebu City Regional Trial Court denied AEV's
judgment is rendered "after a determination of which
motion to dismiss.
party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered
Aggrieved, AEV filed the present petition. upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical
point."
ISSUE: Whether the complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-
37004 constitutes forum shopping and/or is barred by In sum, the requisites for res judicata have been
res judicata and/or litis pendentia satisfied and the second complaint should, thus, have
been dismissed. From this, it follows that CAGLI
HELD: YES. The complaint in Civil Case committed an act of forum shopping in filing the second
No. CEB-37004 constitutes forum shopping and is complaint. CAGLI instituted two suits in two regional trial
barred by res judicata. court branches, albeit successively and not
simultaneously. It asked both branches to rule on the

36
exact same cause and to grant the exact same relief. The Philhealth Arbiter gave more evidentiary weight to
CAGLI did so after it had obtained an unfavorable the signature of Alestre in the school’s attendance
decision (at least with respect to AEV) from the Cebu logbook which established the fact that she reported for
City Regional Trial Court, Branch 20. These work on 12 August 2003.
circumstances afford the reasonable inference that the
second complaint was filed in the hopes of a more ZMC was found liable for the charge of "Extending
favorable ruling. Period of Confinement" in violation of R.A. No. 7875 and
was meted the penalty of suspension from participating
Notwithstanding our pronouncements sustaining AEV’s in the NHIP for a period of three (3) months and a fine of
allegations that CAGLI engaged in forum shopping and ₱10,000.00.
that the second complaint was barred by res judicata, we
find that at the time of the filing of the second complaint,
ZMC appealed but the Philhealth Board of Directors (the
AEV had already been discharged from the proceedings
Board) dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Decision
relating to the first complaint. Thus, as between AEV and
of the Philhealth Arbiter.
CAGLI, the first complaint was no longer pending at the
time of the filing of the second complaint. Accordingly,
the second complaint could not have been barred by litis The Board noted that Alestre could not possibly be in
pendentia. ZMC and in the school at the same time on 12 August
2003 while her son was still confined at the hospital.
170.) ZARSONA MEDICAL CLINIC Vs.
PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION ZMC filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 191225; October 13, 2014 putting in the forefront of its arguments Alestre’s Affidavit
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of Explanation. ZMC admitted to Alestre’s recantation
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, questioning the but in its defense, ZMC emphasized that the Affidavit,
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals. being notarized and executed under oath, should weigh
more than the Salaysay, which was not so.
FACTS:
Acting on the petition, the Court of Appeals directed the
A complaint was filed against petitioner Zarsona Medical petitioner to RECTIFY within five (5) days from notice,
Clinic (ZMC) for violation of Section 149 of the Republic the following deficiencies in its petition: (1) failure to
Act No. 7875 or the National Health Insurance Act of attach the Special Power of Attorney executed by the
1995. Section 149 penalizes any health care provider petitioner Zarsona Medical Clinicin favor of Ma. Irene M.
that increases the period of actual confinement of any Hao, authorizing the latter to execute the verification and
patient with revocation of accreditation. certification of nonforum shopping; (2) failure of the
petitioner to attach the certified true copy of the assailed
ZMC filed a claim with the Philippine Health Insurance decision of the Board of Directors of the Philippine
Corporation (Philhealth) on the confinement of National Health Insurance Corporation as required under Rule 43,
Health Insurance Program (NHIP) member Lorna M. Section 6(c) of the Revised Rules of Court; (3) failure of
Alestre (Alestre) on 10-12 August 2003. Said claim was the petitioner’s counsel, Atty. John Tracy F. Cagas, to
denied on the ground of "extended confinement." It was indicate the dates and places of issuance of his IBP and
stated on the claim form that Alestre was admitted to PTR Receipts as well as his Roll of Attorneys Number.
ZMC on 6 August 2003 and was discharged on 12
August 2003. It was also revealed in her Further action on the petition is held in abeyance
Salaysay3 dated 12 January 2004 that Alestre’s actual pending the petitioner’s compliance on these matters. 8
confinement at ZMC was on 10-11 August 2003. Alestre,
who is a teacher at Rizal Elementary School, was found ZMC filed its Compliance, but the he Court of Appeals
to have reported for work on 12 August 2003. dismissed the petition for failure on the part of ZMC to
attach a valid SPA. The appellate court found the SPA
In defense of ZMC, Dr. Sylvia Bragat (Dr. Bragat), its defective on the ground that it does not explicitly
Medical Director, stated that ZMC’s Midwife/Clerk authorize Dr. Bragat to sign and execute the required
Jennifer R. Acuram (Acuram) committed an honest verification and certification of nonforum shopping in this
mistake when she wrote 6-12 August 2003 as the case.
confinement period in the claim form. Dr. Bragat
asserted that the hospital had in fact claimed only for two ZMC moved for reconsideration but it was denied for
(2) days. Acuram acknowledged her mistake in her lack of merit. Hence, this petition for review.
Affidavit of Explanation.4
ISSUE:
ZMC also presented an Affidavit of Explanation from
Alestre recanting her previous Salaysay. Alestre Whether the SPA is sufficient to authorize Dr. Bragat to
explained that the previous statement she gave does not sign the verification and certification of non-forum
reflect the truth because she was protecting herself shopping in the petition filed before the Court of Appeals.
when she logged-in at the school’s time record on 12
August 2003 when she was supposedly still confined at RULING:
ZMC. Alestre narrated that she and her son were
admitted at ZMC on 10 August 2003 and was Yes. As to certification against forum shopping, non-
discharged on 12 August 2003. And that on 12 August compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in
2003, she managed to slip out of the hospital and report verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent
for work. She then went back to ZMC to attend to her submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need
child and process her discharge papers. Dr. Ariel dela to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial
Cruz, attending physician of Alestre, confirmed that the compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or
ordered Alestre’s discharge on 12 August 2003.6 compelling reasons." Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of

37
the Court, requires that the certification should be signed De Koning failed redeem the property. Thus, Metrobank
by the "petitioner or principal party" himself. The demanded that he turn over possession of the
rationale behind this is "because only the petitioner condominium unit. When De Koning refused, Metrobank
himself has actual knowledge of whether or not he has filed with the RTC Makati, Branch 65, an ex
initiated similar actions or proceedings indifferent courts parte petition for a writ of possession over the foreclosed
or agencies."13 property.

In this case, Philhealth found the SPA defective. The The lower court issued an order setting the ex
defects in the SPA notwithstanding, we rule in favor of parte hearing of Metrobanks petition and directing that a
ZMC. Time and again, we had espoused the doctrine copy of the order be given to De Koning to inform him of
that provisions of the Rules of Court should be liberally the existence of the proceedings.
construed in order to promote their objective of securing
a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every  During the scheduled ex parte hearing, De Koning’s
action and proceeding. Otherwise put, the rule requiring counsel appeared and manifested that he filed a motion
a certification of forum shopping to accompany every to dismiss on the ground that Metrobanks petition
initiatory pleading, or the verification for that matter violated Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court
"should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness (Rules) which requires the attachment of a certification
as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or against forum shopping to a complaint or other initiatory
the goal of all rules of procedure – which is to achieve pleading. 
substantial justice as expeditiously as possible." 17 While
it is true that the rules of procedure are intended to  The RTC agreed with De Koning and dismissed
promote rather than frustrate the ends of justice, and the Metrobanks. The lower court denied Metrobanks motion
swift unclogging of court docket is a laudable objective, it
for reconsideration. Metrobank thus elevated the matter
nevertheless must not be met at the expense of
to the CA on a petition for certiorari.
substantial justice. This Court has time and again
reiterated the doctrine that the rules of procedure are
 The CA affirmed the dismissal of Metrobanks ptition. It
mere tools aimed at facilitating the attainment of justice,
explained that Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules is not
rather than its frustration. A strict and rigid application of
limited to actions, but covers any initiatory pleading that
the rules must always be eschewed when it would
subvert the primary objective of the rules, that is, to asserts a claim for relief. Since Metrobanks petition for
enhance fair trials and expedite justice. Technicalities writ of possession is an initiatory pleading, it must
should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of perforce be covered by this rule. Thus, Metrobanks
the other party. Every party-litigant must be affordedthe failure to disclose in the verification and certification the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination existence of the two cases filed by De Koning, involving
of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. 18 the issue of Metrobanks right to foreclose on the
property, rendered the petition dismissible.
We choose to apply liberality becauseof the substantial
merit of the petition. Based on the foregoing, we reverse  The CA denied Metrobanks subsequent motion for
the finding of Philhealth and hold that ZMC is not guilty reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review
of extending the period of confinement. on certiorari.

ISSUE:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Resolution of the Court or Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. Whether or not a petition for a writ of possession
02489-MIN dismissing the petition is REVERSED and
requires a certificate against non-forum shopping
SET ASIDE. Philhcalth Board Resolution No. 1151,
Series or 2008 is SET ASIDE. RULING:

171.) METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY No. In Sps. Arquiza v. CA, where we said:
Vs. HON. SALVADOR ABAD SANTOS RTC, Br. 65
G.R. No. 157867; December 15, 2009  The certification against forum shopping is required
This petition for review on certiorari, seeks to reverse only in a complaint or other initiatory
and set aside the decision and subsequent ruling on pleading. The ex parte petition for the issuance of a
motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals writ of possession filed by the respondent is not an
initiatory pleading.  Although the private respondent
FACTS: denominated its pleading as a petition, it is, nonetheless,
a motion.  What distinguishes a motion from a petition or
 Respondent Manfred Jacob De Koning (De Koning)
other pleading is not its form or the title given by the
obtained a loan from Metrobank. To secure the payment
party executing it, but rather its purpose. The office of a
of this loan, De Koning executed a real estate mortgage
motion is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a
(REM) in favor of Metrobank over a condominium unit
material but incidental matter arising in the progress of
and all its improvements. 
the case in which the motion is filed. A motion is not an
When De Koning failed to pay his loan despite demand, independent right or remedy, but is confined to incidental
Metrobank instituted extrajudicial foreclosure matters in the progress of a cause. It relates to some
proceedings against the REM. Metrobank was the question that is collateral to the main object of the action
highest bidder at the public auction of the condominium and is connected with and dependent upon the principal
unit and a Certificate of Sale was issued in the bank's remedy. An application for a writ of possession is a mere
favor. Metrobank duly registered this Certificate of Sale incident in the registration proceeding. Hence, although
with the Registry of Deeds for Makati City. it was denominated as a petition, it was in substance
merely a motion. Thus, the CA correctly made the
following observations:

38
Such petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is
filed in the form of an ex parte motion, inter alia, in the
registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is
registered. Apropos, as an incident or consequence of
the original registration or cadastral proceedings, the
motion or petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession, not being an initiatory pleading, dispels the
requirement of a forum-shopping certification. Axiomatic
is that the petitioner need not file a certification of
non-forum shopping since his claims are not
initiatory in character (Ponciano vs. Parentela, Jr., 331
SCRA 605 [2000]) 

  Since a petition for a writ of possession under Section 7

of Act No. 3135, as amended, is neither a complaint nor
an initiatory pleading, a certificate against non-forum
shopping is not required. The certificate that Metrobank
attached to its petition is thus a superfluity that the lower
court should have disregarded.

 WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the

petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 62325 dated November 21, 2002, as well
as the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 65 in LRC Case No. M-4068 dated September
18, 2000 and October 23, 2000, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. LRC Case No. M-4068 is ordered remanded to
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 65, for
further proceedings and proper disposition. Costs
against respondent Manfred Jacob De Koning.

39