Junio vs. Grupo, A.C. No.

5020, December 18, 2001 The loan was executed through a promissory note, “undertook to pay Mrs. Junio on or
before January 1997”. Five (5) years had already passed since respondent retained
FACTS: the cash for his own personal use.
Rosario N. Junio alleged that—
1. Sometime in 1995, [she] engaged the services of [respondent], then a
private practitioner, for the redemption of a parcel of land covered by HELD:
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 20394 registered in the name of her parents, It would indeed appear from the records of the case that respondent was allowed to
spouses Rogelio and Rufina Nietes, and located at Concepcion, Loay, borrow the money previously entrusted to him by complainant for the purpose of
Bohol. securing the redemption of the property belonging to complainant’s parents.
2. On 21 August 1995, [complainant] entrusted to [respondent] the amount of Respondent, however, did not give adequate security for the loan and subsequently
P25,000.00 in cash to be used in the redemption of the aforesaid property. failed to settle his obligation. Although complainant denied having loaned the money
3. Notwithstanding the foregoing and for no valid reason, respondent did not to respondent, the fact is that complainant accepted the promissory note given her by
redeem the property; as a result of which the right of redemption was lost respondent on December 12, 1996.
and the property was eventually forfeited.
4. Complainant had demanded [the] return of the money which she entrusted Respondent’s liability is thus not for misappropriation or embezzlement but for
to the former for the above-stated purpose. respondent has continuously violation of Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which forbids
refused to refund the money entrusted to him. lawyers from borrowing money from their clients unless the latter’s interests are
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. In this case,
Atty. Salvador M. Grupo in his answer – respondent’s liability is compounded by the fact that not only did he not give any
1. The subject land for which the money of complainant was initially intended to security for the payment of the amount loaned to him but that he has also refused to
be applied could really not be redeemed anymore . . ; Complainant knew the pay the said amount. His claim that he could not pay the loan “because
mortgage agreement between her parents and the mortgage-owner had circumstances . . . did not allow it” and that, because of the passage of time, “he
already expired, and what respondent was trying to do was a sort of [a] somehow forgot about his obligation” only underscores his, blatant disregard of his
desperate, last-ditch attempt to persuade the said mortgagee to relent and obligation which reflects on his honesty and candor.
give back the land to the mortgagors with the tender of redemption; but at
this point, the mortgagee simply would not budge anymore. Respondent claims that complainant is a close personal friend and that in helping
2. When transaction failed, respondent requested the complainant that he be redeem the property of complainant’s parents, he did not act as a lawyer but as a
allowed, in the meantime, to avail of the money because he had an urgent friend, hence there is no client-attorney relationship between them. This contention
need for some money himself to help defray his children’s educational has no merit. As explained in Hilado v. David,:
expenses. It was really a personal request, a private matter between
respondent and complainant, thus, respondent executed a promissory note To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have
for the amount, a copy of which is probably still in the possession of the employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion . . . It is not necessary that
complainant. any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the
3. Respondent did not ask for any fee. His services were purely gratuitous; his attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was
acts [were] on his own and by his own. It was more than pro bono; it was not had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his
attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or
even for charity; it was simply an act of a friend for a friend.
assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the
Respondent takes further refuge in the intimate and close relationship existing
professional employment must be regarded as established . . .
between himself and the complainant’s family on the basis of which his legal services
were purely gratuitous or “simply an act of a friend for a friend” with “no consideration WHEREFORE, the Court finds petitioner guilty of violation of Rule 16.04 of the Code
involved.” Unfortunately, his efforts to redeem the foreclosed property, as already of Professional Responsibility and orders him suspended from the practice of law for
stated, did not produce the desired result because the mortgagee “would not budge a period of one (1) month and to pay to respondent, within 30 days from notice, the
anymore” and “would not accept the sum offered.” amount of P25,000.00 with interest at the legal rate, computed from December 12,
1996.
Thus, the respondent concluded that there was, strictly speaking, no attorney-client
[relationship] existing between them. Rather, right from the start[,] everything was sort
of personal, he added.
Hilado vs. David et al, G.R. No. L-961, September 21, 1949
 Tiania vs. Ocampo, A.C. No. 2285 August 12, 1991 Ocampo even appeared as counsel for the Angel spouses in a civil case they filed
sometime in 1976. However, in 1978, a Notice to Vacate,12 on the basis of the two
FACTS: (2) documents they signed in 1972, was served on them.

ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 2285

Amando Ocampo has been the “retaining counsel” for Maria Tiania since 1996. In HELD:
1972, one Mrs. Concepcion Blaylock sued Tiania for ejectment from a parcel of land The specific law applicable in both administrative cases is Rule 15.03 of the Code of
described as “Lot 4131, TS- 308.” Ocampo appeared for Tiania and also for Blaylock. Professional Responsibility which provides:
Tiania confronted Ocampo about this but the latter reassured Tiania that he will take A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent of
care of everything and that there was no need for Tiania to hire a new lawyer since he all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
is still Tiania’s lawyer. Ocampo prepared the answer in the said ejectment case,
which Tiania signed. Then Ocampo made Tiania sign a Compromise Agreement We prohibit the representation of conflicting interests not only because the relation of
which the latter signed without reading. Two years from the submission of the attorney and client is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree, but also
Compromise Agreement, Tiania was shocked when she received an order to vacate4 because of the principles of public policy and good taste. An attorney has the duty to
the property in question. To hold off her ejectment for another two years, Ocampo deserve the fullest confidence of his client and represent him with undivided loyalty.
advised Tiania to pay him a certain amount for the sheriff. Once this confidence is abused, the entire profession suffers.

Ocampo then insisted that he appeared on behalf of Mrs. Blaylock, and not as The test of the conflict of interest in disciplinary cases against a lawyer is whether or
counsel of Tiania, in Civil Case No. 1104-0. He never saw or talked to Tiania from the not the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of
time the said civil case was filed up to the pre-trial and as such could not have his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
discussed with her the complaint, the hiring of another lawyer, and more so the unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof.
preparation of the answer in the said case. He admitted that during the pretrial of the
said case, Tiania showed to him a document which supported her claim, over the WHEREFORE, finding the respondent Atty. Amado Ocampo guilty of malpractice and
property in question. Ocampo, after going over the document, expressed his doubts gross misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, we hereby
about it authenticity. This convinced Tiania to sign a Compromise Agreement and to SUSPEND him from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
pay the acquisition cost to Blaylock over a period of six (6) months.

ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 2302

The Angel spouses, complainants in A.C. No. 2302, allege that sometime in 1972,
they sold their house in favor of Blaylock (the same Mrs. Concepcion Blaylock in A.C.
No. 2285) for the amount of seventy thousand pesos, (P70,000.00). Ocampo (the
same respondent Atty. Amado Ocampo), acted as their counsel and prepared the
Deed of Sale of a Residential House and Waiver of Rights Over a Lot.

the Angel spouses bought another parcel of land. Again, Ocampo prepared the Deed
of Sale which was signed by the vendor, a certain Laura Dalanan, and the Angel
spouses, as the vendees. In addition, Ocampo allegedly made the Angel spouses
sign two (2) more documents which, accordingly, were made parts of the sale
transaction.

Those two (2) documents later turned out to be a Real Estate Mortgage of the same
property purchased from Laura Dalanan and a Promissory Note, both in favor of
Blaylock.

The Angel spouses added that Ocampo reassured them that there was no need for
them to engage the services of a new lawyer since he will take care of everything.
 B. R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc vs. CA, G.R. No. L-41862 February 7, 1992 To justify its failure to file the Appellant’s Brief, petitioner relies mainly on the death of
Atty. Crispin Baizas and the supposed confusion it brought to the firm of BAIZAS,
FACTS: ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES.
During the pendency of the appeal, the plaintiff-appellee therein, Eulogio B. Reyes,
thru its counsel, the law firm of Baizas, Alberto and Associates, an action for damages On January 16, 1974, Atty. Crispin D. Baizas died as a result of a brief heart attack. In
with the then RTC against the Director of Public Works, the Republic of the consequence (sic) of his death, the law firm ‘Baizas, Alberto & Associates’ was in a
Philippines and petitioner herein, B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. terribly confused state of affairs. In effect, said law firm was dissolved. Atty. Ruby
Alberto formed her own law office and other associates left the dissolved law firms
On 19 February 1974, petitioner, thru its then counsel of record, received notice to file (sic) joining other offices or putting up their own. Atty. Jose Baizas, son of deceased
Crispin D. Baizas, took over the management of what may have been left of his
Appellant’s Brief within 45 days from receipt thereof. It had, therefore, until 5 April
father’s office, it appearing that some, if not many, cases of the defunct office were
1974 within which to comply. Counsel for petitioner failed to file the Brief; thus, on 9
taken over by the associates who left the firm upon its dissolution.
July 1974, respondent Court issued a Resolution requiring said counsel to show
cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the Appellant’s Brief But, none of the former partners and associates/assistants of the dissolved law firm
within the reglementary period. As the latter failed to comply with the above filed the required appellant’s brief for herein petitioner in its appealed case before the
Resolution, respondent Court, on 9 September 1974, issued another Resolution this respondent Court of Appeals. No notice was served upon petitioner by any of the
time dismissing petitioner’s appeal. surviving associates of the defunct law firm that its appellant’s brief was due for filing
or that the law office had been dissolved and that none of the lawyers therein formerly
connected desired to handle the appealed case of petitioner.
On 28 September 1974, petitioner, this time thru the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE, filed a
motion for reconsideration of the resolution dismissing its appeal alleging that as a
We find no merit in petitioner’s contentions. Petitioner’s counsel was the law firm of
result of the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas, senior partner in the law firm of BAIZAS,
ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES, the affairs of the said firm are still being settled between BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES and not merely Atty. Crispin Baizas. Hence, the
death of the latter did not extinguish the lawyer-client relationship between said firm
Atty. Jose Baizas (son of Crispin Baizas) and Atty. Ruby Alberto, the latter having
established her own law office; furthermore, Atty. Rodolfo Espiritu, the lawyer who and petitioner.
handled this case in the trial court and who is believed to have also attended to the
preparation of the Appellant’s Brief but failed to submit it through oversight and The “confusion” in the office of the law firm following the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas
is not a valid justification for its failure to file the Brief. With Baizas’ death, the
inadvertence, had also left the firm.
responsibility of Atty. Alberto and his Associates to the petitioner as counsel remained
until withdrawal by the former of their appearance in the manner provided by the
In its Resolution of 9 October 1974, respondent Court denied the motion for
reconsideration. Rules of Court. This is so because it was the law firm which handled the case for
petitioner before both the trial and appellate courts. That Atty. Espiritu, an associate
On 6 November 1975, petitioner filed with respondent Court a Motion to Reinstate who was designated to handle the case, later left the office after the death of Atty.
Baizas is of no moment since others in the firm could have replaced him.
Appeal with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Alleging that the
appellant court has the powers to modify and set aside its processes, in the interest of
justice.

ISSUE: whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion
in denying petitioner’s motion to reinstate its appeal, previously dismissed for failure
to file the Appellant’s Brief

HELD:
Negros Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, We said:
“Granting that the power or discretion to reinstate an appeal that had been dismissed
is included in or implied from the power or discretion to dismiss an appeal, still such
power or discretion must be exercised upon a showing of good and sufficient cause, in
like manner as the power or discretion vested in the appellate court to allow
extensions of time for the filing of briefs. There must be such a showing which would
call for, prompt and justify its exercise (sic). Otherwise, it cannot and must not be
upheld.”
 Ducat vs. Villalon, A.C. No. 3910, August 14, 2000
It is basic law, however, that conveyance or transfer of any titled real property must
FACTS: be in writing, signed by the registered owner or at least by his attorney-in-fact by
Before us is a verified letter-complaint1 for disbarment against Attys. Arsenio C. virtue of a proper special power of attorney and duly notarized. Respondent Villalon,
Villalon, Jr.; Andres Canares, Jr. and Crispulo Ducusin for deceit and gross as a lawyer, is presumed to know, or ought to know, this process.
misconduct in violation of the lawyer’s oath. Investigation proceeded only against
respondent Villalon because it was discovered that Andres Canares was not a lawyer All these taken together, coupled with complainant Jose Ducat, Jr.’s strong and
while Atty. Crispulo Ducusin passed away on February 3, 1996. credible denial that he allegedly sold the subject property to respondent Villalon
and/or Andres Canares, Jr. and that he allegedly appeared before respondent notary
Villalon, as counsel for the family of complainant, spoke to the father of complainant public Ducusin, convince us that respondent Villalon’s acts herein complained of
and asked that he be given the title over a property owned by complainant located in which constitute gross misconduct were duly proven.
Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal because he allegedly had to verify the proper measurements
of the subject property. Members of the Bar are expected to always live up to the standards of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility inasmuch as the
In his Comment, respondent Villalon denied that allegations of the complainant and in relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and
turn, he alleged that the property was given voluntarily by Jose Ducat, Sr. to him out demands utmost fidelity and good faith.
of close intimacy and for past legal services rendered. Thereafter, respondent
Villalon, with the knowledge and consent of Jose Ducat, Sr., allowed the subject WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. is hereby found
property to be used by Andres Canares to start a piggery business without any guilty of gross misconduct, and he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
monetary consideration. A Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land was then signed by Jose period of ONE (1) YEAR with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will
Ducat, Sr. to evidence that he has conveyed the subject property to respondent be dealt with more severely. Respondent Villalon is further directed to deliver to the
Villalon with the name of respondent Canares included therein as protection because registered owner, complainant Jose Ducat, Jr., the latter’s TCT No. M-3023 covering
of the improvements to be introduced in the subject property. the subject property within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt of this Decision, at
his sole expense; and that failure on his part to do so will result in his disbarment.
Court summarizes –
FIRST, the registered owner of the subject property is complainant Jose Ducat, Jr.
Accordingly respondent (being a lawyer) knew or ought to know that Jose Ducat, Sr.
could not possibly give to him the said property unless the former is duly authorized
by the complainant through a Special Power of Attorney.

SECOND, being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know that conveyance of a

real property, whether gratuitously or for a consideration, must be in writing.

THIRD, the Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land allegedly executed by Jose Ducat, Sr. in
favor of respondent Atty. Arsenio Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr. covering the
subject parcel of land which respondent prepared allegedly upon instruction of Jose
Ducat, Sr. is of dubious character. As earlier adverted to, Jose Ducat, Sr. is not the
owner of said property. Moreover, said Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land is a falsified
document as admitted by the respondent himself when he said that the signature over
the typewritten name Maria Cabrido (wife of Jose Ducat, Sr.) was affixed by Jose
Ducat

HELD:
The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest
standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law.
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that “a lawyer shall at
all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.”
 Sevilla vs. Salubre, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1336, December 19, 2000
In Fernando Cruz and Amelia Cruz vs. Atty. Ernesto Jacinto,22 we held that—
FACTS: ‘The practice of law is so intimately affected with public interest that it is both a right
Complainant alleges that respondent, prior to his appointment as a Judge, was her and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to promote the public welfare.
legal counsel in Civil Case No. 91-01 entitled “Sps. Petra Sevilla and Sancho Sevilla The Constitution vests this power of control and regulation in this Court. Since the
vs. Sps. Shem J. Alfarero, et al.,” for Repurchase and Damages with Prayer for the practice of law is inseparably connected with the exercise of its judicial power in
Issuance of Preliminary Injunction. On December 26, 1990, upon the advice of administration of justice, the Court cannot be divested of its constitutionally ordained
prerogative which includes the authority to discipline, suspend or disbar any unfit and
respondent, complainant turned-over to the former the amount of P45,000.00 to be
unworthy member of the Bar by a mere execution of affidavits of voluntary desistance
consigned with the trial court as repurchase money. Moreover, instead of consigning
and quitclaim (par [5], Sec. 5, 1987 Constitution).
said amount, the respondent deposited the money in his name with the Family
Savings Bank, Panabo, Davao Province. And without the consent of the complainant, A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his
the said amount was withdrawn from the said bank, misappropriated and used by professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in
respondent for his own purposes and benefit. honesty, in probity and good demeanor, thus rendering unworthy to continue as an
officer of the court (Maligsa vs. Cabanting, 272 SCRA 408 [1997]), and the
This was followed by a series of promises and pleas for extension to pay. On April 14, complainants who called the attention of the Court to the attorney’s alleged
misconduct are in no sense a party, and have generally no interest in the outcome
1994, respondent issued a promissory note promising to pay the amount of
except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice (Rayos-
P45,000.00 in June 1994 or immediately thereafter.2 On July 8, 1994, respondent Ombac vs. Rayos, 285 SCRA 93 [1998]).”
asked for an extension of one month.3 On October 17, 1994, respondent issued
another promissory note promising to pay on or before January 31, 1995. However, We likewise agree with the Office of the Court Administrator that respondent Judge
on January 30, 1995, respondent asked for a fifteen-day extension or up to February Ismael L. Salubre is liable for violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
15, 1995 within which to pay. Responsibility for his failure to return the funds of his client (complainant herein) upon
demand. As noted earlier, respondent finally returned the funds to his client but only
Thereafter, on May 9, 1995, respondent executed yet another promissory note after the latter sued him for estafa.
promising to pay the total amount of P63,000.00 (P45,000.00 as principal plus
P18,000.00 as interest for four [4] years and five [5] months at 10% per annum) on or In Judge Adoracion G. Angeles vs. Atty. Thomas C. Uy, Jr.,23 we stated that—
before June 30, 1995 without necessity of demand. ‘The relationship between a lawyer and a client is highly fiduciary; it requires a high
degree of fidelity and good faith. It is designed ‘to remove all such temptation and to
Subsequently, respondent issued two (2) checks, the first is dated April 30, 1997 for prevent everything of that kind from being done for the protection of the client.’ Thus,
P45,000.00 and the second is dated May 15, 1997 for P31,000.00. However, on Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that ‘a lawyer shall hold
November 4, 1997 both checks were dishonored on the ground “account closed.” in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.’
Finally, complainant, now through her counsel, sent a demand letter dated November Furthermore, Rule 16.01 of the Code also states that ‘a lawyer shall account for all
money or property collected or received for or from the client.’ The Canons of
15, 1997 asking respondent to make good the value of his two (2) checks within five
Professional Ethics is even more explicit:
(5) days from receipt of the letter. ‘The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit
or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by
his client. Money of the client collected for the client or other trust property
HELD: The respondent is hereby ordered to pay a fine in the amount of coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted
P20,000.00 with a STERN WARNING for promptly and should not under any circumstances be commingled with
In like manner, while it may be true that the complaint for Estafa had been dismissed, his own or be used by him.”
the dismissal was on account of the complainant’s voluntary desistance and not upon If while still in active litigation practice lawyers do not know how to uphold this kind of
a finding of innocence of the respondent. It neither confirms nor denies the justice to their clients previous to their appointment as Judges, how then could people
respondent’s non-culpability. It must be emphasized, that the primary object of expect them to render just judgments in the cases before them? This is the price that
administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline the erring judges should pay for the honor bestowed upon those who occupy an exalted position
individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the in the administration of justice. No position exacts a greater demand on the moral
courts and the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary.
profession persons whose utter disregard of their lawyer’s oath have proven them
unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar. Thus,
administrative cases against lawyers can still proceed despite the dismissal of civil
and/or criminal cases against them.
 Angeles vs. Uy, A.C. No. 5019. April 6, 2000 this case, respondent has not done so. Indeed, we agree with the following
observation of the Office of the Bar Confidant:
FACTS: “Keeping the money in his possession without his client’s knowledge only provided Atty. Uy
In open court, accused Norma Trajano manifested that she had alreadv settled in full the tempting opportunity to appropriate for himself the money belonging to his client. This
the civil aspect in Crim. Case No. C-54177 (98) in the total amount of P36,500.00. situation should, at all times, be avoided by members of the bar. Like judges, lawyers must
She further alleged that she paid P20,000.00 directly to the private complainant and not only be clean; they must also appear clean. This way, the people’s faith in the justice
the balance of P16,500.00 was delivered to Atty. Thomas C. Uy, Jr., the lawyer of the system would remain undisturbed.
private complainant and accordingly produced in open court the receipt for such
payment signed by no less than the aforesaid lawyer. Indeed, the civil liability of the
accused had already been satisfied in full.

However, the private complainant, Primitiva Malansing [Del Rosario] manifested that
she did not receive the amount of P16,500.00 which was paid to his lawyer Atty.
Thomas C. Uy, Jr., thereby constraining this court to direct Atty. Thomas C. Uy to turn
over the money to the private complainant which he received in trust for his client.
Atty. Uy however argued that his client did not like to accept the money but the
assertion of the lawyer was belied by his own client, the herein private complainant,
who manifested in open court x x x her willingness to accept the money. The court
directed Atty. Uy to produce the money but the latter argued that he kept it in his
office. Consequently, the Court suspended the proceedings to enable Atty. Uy to get
the money from his law office which is located only at the second floor of the same
building where this court is located. However, he never showed up thereafter.

HELD: Atty. Thomas C. Uy, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED for one month

Administrative Liability of Respondent The relationship between a lawyer and a client

is highly fiduciary; it requires a high degree of fidelity and good faith. It is designed “to
remove all such temptation and to prevent everything of that kind from being done for
the protection of the client.” Thus, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that “a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of
his client that may come into his possession.” Furthermore, Rule 16.01 of the Code
also states that “a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received
for or from the client.”

In the present case, it is clear that respondent failed to promptly report and account
for the P16,500 he had received from Norma Trajano on behalf of his client, Primitiva
Del Rosario. Although the amount had been entrusted to respondent on December 4,
1998, his client revealed during the February 10, 1999 hearing that she had not yet
received it. Worse, she did not even know where it was.

Respondent maintains that on December 15, 1998 he informed Mrs. Del Rosario
about the payment. He further avers that he kept the money upon her instruction, as
she had allegedly wanted “future payments x x x [to] be saved in whole and for them
to avoid spending the same as what had happened to the past installment payments
x x x.”

Verily, the question is not necessarily whether the rights of the clients have been
prejudiced, but whether the lawyer has adhered to the ethical standards of the bar. In
 Santiago vs. Fojas, A.C. No. 4103 September 7, 1995 attributes it to honest mistake and excusable neglect due to his overzealousness to
question the denial order of the trial court.
FACTS:
Complainants Veronica Santiago, Benjamin Hontiveros, Ma. Socorro Manas, and Certainly, “overzealousness” on the one hand and “volume and pressure of legal
Trinidad Nordista were the President, Vice-President, Treasurer, and Auditor, work” on the other are two distinct and separate causes or grounds. The first
respectively, of the FEUFA. They allegedly expelled from the union Paulino Salvador. presupposes the respondent’s full and continuing awareness of his duty to file an
The latter then commenced with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a answer which, nevertheless, he subordinated to his conviction that the trial court had
complaint (NCR-OD-M-90-10-050) to declare illegal his expulsion from the union. committed a reversible error or grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order
reconsidering its previous order of dismissal of Salvador’s complaint and in denying
In his resolution of 22 November 1990, Med-Arbiter Tomas Falconitin declared illegal the motion to reconsider the said order. The second ground is purely based on
Salvador’s expulsion and directed the union and all its officers to reinstate Salvador’s forgetfulness because of his other commitments.
name in the roll of union members with all the rights and privileges appurtenant
thereto. This resolution was affirmed in toto by the Secretary of Labor and Whether it be the first or the second ground, the fact remains that the respondent did
Employment. not comply with his duty to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. His lack of
diligence was compounded by his erroneous belief that the trial court committed such
Subsequently, Paulino Salvador filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of error or grave abuse of discretion and by his continued refusal to file an answer even
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, a complaint against the complainants herein after he received the Court of Appeals’ decision in the certiorari case.
for actual, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees, under Articles 19, 20,
and 21 of the Civil Code. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. The respondent’s negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil Case No. 3526-V-
91 was in fact a “losing cause” is not persuasive because he should have seasonably
As the complainant’s counsel, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the said case informed the complainants thereof. Rule 15.05, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
on grounds of (1) res judicata by virtue of the final decision of the Med-Arbiter in and Responsibility expressly provides:
(2) lack of jurisdiction. A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on
the merits and probable results of the client’s case, neither overstating nor
The trial court, per Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, granted the motion and ordered understating the prospects of the case.
the dismissal of the case. Upon Salvador’s motion for reconsideration, however,
it reconsidered the order of dismissal, reinstated the case, and required the
complainants herein to file their answer within a nonextendible period of fifteen It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every
days from notice. person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment,
subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he
Although that petition and his subsequent motion for reconsideration were both agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and
denied, the respondent still did not file the complainants’ answer in Civil Case No. must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him
3526-V- 91. Hence, upon plaintiff Salvador’s motion, the complainants were declared
in default, and Salvador was authorized to present his evidence ex-parte.

HELD: REPRIMANDED and ADMONISHED

A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his client’s rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning
and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the
rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit
of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he
may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.

In his motion for reconsideration of the default order, the respondent explained his
non- filing of the required answer by impliedly invoking forgetfulness occasioned by a
large volume and pressure of legal work, while in his Comment in this case he
 In Re: De La Rosa, March 21, 1914 consent of both parties. The complainant knew that De la Rosa was acting for and on
behalf of the purchaser because he had conferred with him as her representative.
FACTS: The purchaser knew that he was acting for and on behalf of the seller for pay
The charges presented are threefold: because he had obtained from her express permission to do so. Although it appears
1. That the respondent attorney, in collusion with his client, Juliana Bayubay, from the evidence that the respondent was acting for and on behalf of both parties to
withheld the payment to the petitioner of certain sums of money which the controversy, we do not regard this as constituting malpractice under the law, it
represented, in part, the purchase price of a piece of land sold by appearing undisputed in the record that he acted thus with the knowledge and
complainant to said Juliana by depriving him of money on which he was consent of both parties interested, This being the case, neither party was . deceived
depending, prevented the complainant from redeeming certain jewelry which by respondent, and neither one suffered involuntary damages by reason of his
he had sold with a right to repurchase, thereby causing him serious damage. actions.
2. Respondent maliciously placed obstacles in the way of the petitioner in the
collection of the sum which his client owed to the complainant, thereby
obliging the complainant to pay to said respondent, P350 on one occasion
and P550 on another occasion, a total of P900, which was received by said
respondent as a consideration for his permitting his client to make the
payments which she had agreed to make to the complainant.
3. That the said respondent has refused to pay to the complainant the sum of
P1,330 which his client had placed in his possession for said complainant,
the same being the remainder of the purchase price of the land sold as
above stated.

The complainant, by an instrument in writing, duly acknowledged before Luciano de la

Rosa, a notary public, sold to Juliana Bayubay a parcel of sugar land situated in the
barrio of Canda, municipality of Balayan, Province of Batangas, 90 hectare area, for
P15,500.

It appears from the evidence in the case that, according to the representations of the
vendor and the statements in the conveyance itself, the land sold by Caoibes to
Juliana Bayubay y Garcia was 90 hectares in area. When, however, application was
made by the purchaser to the Court of Land Registration for the registration of the title
thereto, it was found, from the measurement of the Bureau of Lands, that the land
contained only 60 hectares.

It does not appear anywhere in the evidence that the respondent, prior to talking with
the complainant, had advised his client, Juliana Bayubay y Garcia, to reduce the
purchase price, as she had stated to the complainant she was going to do.
Respondent himself says that, with the purchase price of the land in question, he had
had nothing whatever to do until he had been asked by Caoibes to intervene in
connection therewith.

Respondent testified that Caoibes sent him to Juliana Bayubay to intercede on is

behalf to ask Bayubay to pay the total sum of money notwithstanding the reduction in
the area of the land.

HELD: Dismissed.
It should be noted that, although it appears that the respondent was acting as
attorney for both parties, the vendor and the purchaser, whose interests were
diametrically opposed to each other, he was doing so with the knowledge and
 PNB vs. Cedo, A.C. No. 3701 March 28, 1995 since he was in the best position to see the legal weaknesses of his former employer,
a convincing factor for the said clients to seek his professional services. In sum, the
FACTS: IBP saw a deliberate sacrifice by respondent of his ethics in consideration of the
money he expected to earn.
Complainant Philippine National Bank charged respondent Atty. Telesforo S. Cedo,
former Asst. Vice President of the Asset Management Group of complainant bank,
HELD:
with violation of Canon 6, Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by
This Court’s remarks in Hilado vs. David, 84 Phil. 571:
appearing as counsel for individuals who had transactions with complainant bank in
‘Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of
which respondent during his employment with aforesaid bank, had intervened.
litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and
irrelevant, secret and wellknown facts. In the complexity of what is said in the
Complainant averred that while respondent was still in its employ, he participated in
course of dealings between an attorney and client, inquiry of the nature
arranging the sale of steel sheets in favor of Milagros Ong Siy for P200,000.
suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other
matters that might only further prejudice the complainant’s cause.
Moreover, while respondent was still the Asst. Vice President of complainant’s Asset
‘Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of
Management Group, he intervened in the handling of the loan account of the spouses
attorney and client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests.
Ponciano and Eufemia Almeda with complainant bank by writing demand letters to
This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner
the couple. When a civil action ensued between complainant bank and the Almeda
from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from
spouses as a result of this loan account, the latter were represented by the law firm
unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. x x x It is founded on
“Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates” of which respondent is one of the Senior
principles of public policy, of good taste. As has been said in another case,
Partners.
the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to
whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard.
In his Comment on the complaint, respondent admitted that he appeared as counsel
for Mrs. Ong Siy but only with respect to the execution pending appeal of the RTC
Having been an executive of complainant bank, respondent now seeks to litigate as
decision. He alleged that he did not participate in the litigation of the case before the
counsel for the opposite side, a case against his former employer involving a
trial court. With respect to the case of the Almeda spouses, respondent alleged that
transaction which he formerly handled while still an employee of complainant, in
he never appeared as counsel for them. He contended that while the law firm “Cedo,
violation of Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics on adverse influence and
Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates” is designated as counsel of record, the case is actually
conflicting interests, to wit:
handled only by Atty. Pedro Ferrer.
“It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of
Respondent averred that he was not partner with Atty. Ferrer. They are only using the
this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client,
aforesaid name to designate a law firm maintained by lawyers, who although not
it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to
partners, maintain one office as well as one clerical and supporting staff.
oppose.”
Respondent’s averment that the law firm handling the case of the Almeda spouses is
ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to SUSPEND respondent ATTY. TELESFORO
not a partnership deserves scant consideration in the light of the attestation of
S. CEDO from the practice of law for THREE (3) YEARS, effective immediately
complainant’s counsel, Atty. Pedro Singson, that in one of the hearings of the Almeda
spouses’ case, respondent attended the same with his partner Atty. Ferrer, and
although he did not enter his appearance, he was practically dictating to Atty. Ferrer
what to say and argue before the court. Furthermore, during the hearing of the
application for a writ of injunction in the same case, respondent impliedly admitted
being the partner of Atty. Ferrer.

IBP noted that assuming the alleged setup of the firm to be true, it is in itself a
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Rule 15.02) since the client’s
secrets and confidential records and information are exposed to the other lawyers
and staff members at all times.

From the foregoing, the IBP found a deliberate intent on the part of respondent to
devise ways and means to attract as clients former borrowers of complainant bank
 Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc vs. Atty. Paz, A. M. No. 1008 January evidence in the said antigraft case; that notwithstanding repeated requests by Atty.
22, 1980 Brion, the respondent never returned to the former the aforesaid PLACU’s copies of
the record or expediente.
FACTS:
HELD:
Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc. (PLACU), complainant, charged the
There was undoubtedly a relationship of attorney and client between the respondent
respondent, David D.C. Paz, with malpractice, gross misconduct in office, gross
David D.C. Paz and the PARGO. It is also a fact that at the early stages of the
immoral conduct and/or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines
preliminary investigation conducted by the City Fiscal of Pasay of the antigraft case
against exMayor Pablo Cuneta, the respondent appeared as counsel for said Cuneta.
The Solicitor General charged Atty. D.C. Paz with representing clients with conflicting
This is the same antigraft case investigated by the PARGO when the respondent was
interests and gross misconduct in office. Regarding the charge of representing clients
head of the “Charlie Division” thereof. That the respondent later withdrew his
with conflicting interests, the complainant alleged that in 1969, in the course of the
appearances as counsel of Cuneta is of no moment. He had already violated the
investigation then being conducted by the “Charlie Division” of the Presidential
Canons of Legal Ethics and Sec. 20 (e) of Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court which
Agency on Reforms and Government Operations, otherwise known as the PARGO,
provides:
on the complaint of Dr. Irineo P. Sia for antigraft against the then exMayor Pablo
“Sec. 20. Duties of attorneys.—It is the duty of an attorney:
Cuneta of Pasay City, the respondent, David D.C. Paz, was then PARGO’s Legal
xxxx
Officer and Chief Prosecutor, as well as the head of the aforesaid “Charlie Division”.
(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to
preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in
That in the course of the investigation by the PARGO of the aforesaid antigraft
connection with his client’s business except from him or with his knowledge
complaint, but prior to September 10, 1969, the respondent even administered oaths
and approval;
to some persons who had given written statements before the PARGO investigators.
Later on, after respondent had resigned from the PARGO sometime in January 1970
WHEREFORE, the respondent is found guilty of representing clients with conflicting
and on the basis of the investigation conducted by the PARGO on the
interests and he is hereby suspended from the practice of law for two (2) months, with
aforementioned antigraft complaint of Dr. Sia, the PARGO’s successor, the
a warning that a repetition of the same offense will be dealt with more drastically. The
Complaints and Investigation Office (CIO) filed an antigraft charge and another
respondent is exonerated of the charge of gross misconduct in office.
charge for technical malversation both against Pablo Cuneta and others with the
SO ORDERED.
Pasay City Fiscal’s Office.

The respondent entered his appearance, participated and orally argued therein as
one of the counsels of Pablo Cuneta; that while in subsequent hearings thereof, the
respondent no longer appeared as counsel for Cuneta, it was only after his
appearance had been questioned by Atty. Brion; that inasmuch as at least up to
September 10, 1969, the respondent was then PARGO’s Legal Officer and Chief
Prosecutor, as well as head of PARGO’s “Charlie Division”, he had access to, and
necessarily acquired, directly or indirectly, knowledge of the facts of the said antigraft
case, its weak as well as its strong points, and such knowledge is confidential and
should be guarded with great care, lest it jeopardizes PARGO, an agency and
instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines whose interest respondent swore to
serve and protect without any mental reservation, in the ultimate prosecution of the
said case; that there was, therefore, then a relationship of attorney and client between
respondent and the government.

On the charge of gross misconduct in office, the complaint stated that in the course of
the investigation by the PARGO of antigraft complaint against the then exMayor Pablo
Cuneta of Pasay City, but prior to September 10, 1969, the respondent borrowed and
received from Atty. Brion the PLACU’s copies of the record or expediente of Civil
Case No. 72967 of the Court of First Instance of Manila entitled Vicente D. Isip vs.
The Pasay City Government, et al.,” in the presence of Dr. Sia and Atty. Alidio for the
purpose of making xerox copies of such relevant documents therein to be utilized as
 Consolidated Rural Bank (Cagayan Valley), Inc., vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 123810.
January 20, 1999

FACTS:

Private respondent Antonia L. Sanchez was Branch Manager of petitioner’s Ilagan

Branch, Ilagan, Isabela, when she was terminated effective 7 August 1993 for “lack of
diligence, gross negligence, insubordination, and violation of existing bank policies
resulting to loss.”

On 10 January 1994 private respondent sued CONSOLBANK for illegal dismissal with
prayer for reinstatement, back wages and other benefits as well as P500,000.00 in
damages. In his decision dated 22 July 1994 the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of private
respondent thus—
WHEREFORE, x x x we find complainant illegally and unjustly dismissed and she
should be reinstated to her former or substantially equivalent position without loss of
seniority rights with full back wages and other benefits which she could have enjoyed
had she not been illegally dismissed, computed as of July 30, 1994 as follows:
P69,700.00—Basic pay including 13th month pay (August 1992 to July 31, 1994)
P4,380.00—COLA for one year (365 days x 12 mos)
P18,000.00—Gasoline allowance (P1,500 x 12 mos)
P14,400.00—Car allowance (P1,200 x 12 mos)
P12,000.00—Additional representation allowance (P1,000.00 x 12 mos) and
P2,500.00—Clothing allowance for one year
P120,980.00—Total

Respondent is likewise ordered to pay complainant P500,000.00 as moral damages

plus ten percent attorney’s fees of the total monetary award.

In case reinstatement is no longer feasible, complainant is given the option to be paid

separation pay in the total amount of P148,830.00 (P6,765.00 x 22) for her twenty
years of service in addition to her backwages or a total amount of P269,810.00, in lieu
of reinstatement x x x x

Petitioner objects to the award of attorney’s fees on the ground that it was not claimed
by private respondent in her complaint for illegal dismissal.

HELD:
It is settled that in actions for recovery of wages or where an employee was forced to
litigate and thus incur expenses to protect her rights and interests, even if not so
claimed, an award of attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total
award is legally and morally justifiable.
 Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo and Africa vs. Eastern Telecommunications “In any case, whether there is an agreement or not, the courts shall fix a reasonable
Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 104600 July 2, 1999 compensation which lawyers may receive for their professional services.” “A lawyer
has the right to be paid for the legal services he has extended to his client, which
FACTS: compensation must be reasonable.”
A lawyer would be entitled to receive what he merits for his services. Otherwise
Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI) represented by the law firm San
stated, the amount must be determined on a quantum meruit basis.
Juan, Africa, Gonzales and San Agustin (SAGA), filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Makati, a complaint for recovery of revenue shares against Philippine Long Distance
“Quantum meruit, meaning ‘as much as he deserved’ is used as a basis for
Telephone Company (PLDT). Atty. Francisco D. Rilloraza, a partner of the firm,
determining the lawyer’s professional fees in the absence of a contract but
appeared for ETPI.
recoverable by him from his client.” This is authorized when
(1) there is no express contract for payment of attorney’s fees agreed
After ETPI rested its case, it paid SAGA the billed amount of One Hundred Thousand
upon between the lawyer and the client;
Pesos (P100,000.00). On September 18, 1987, the trial court issued a resolution
(2) when although there is a formal contract for attorney’s fees, the
granting ETPI’s application for preliminary restrictive and mandatory injunctions.
fees stipulated are found unconscionable or unreasonable by the
During this period, SAGA was dissolved and four of the junior partners formed the law
court; and
firm Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa (RADA), which took over as counsel in the
(3) when the contract for attorney’s fees is void due to purely formal
case for ETPI.
defects of execution;
(4) when the counsel, for justifiable cause, was not able to finish the
On June 29, 1988, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court a notice of attorney’s
case to its conclusion;
lien, furnishing copies to the plaintiff ETPI, to the signatory of the termination letter
(5) when lawyer and client disregard the contract for attorney’s fees
and PLDT. On the same date, petitioner additionally sent a letter to ETPI attaching its
partial billing statement. In its notice, RADA informed the court that there were
In fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the
negotiations toward a compromise between ETPI and PLDT. Trial court denied due to
basis of quantum meruit, the elements to be considered are generally
lack of basis in fact and in law.
(1) the importance of the subject matter in controversy,
(2) the extent of services rendered, and
Petitioner’s claim for attorney’s fees hinges on two grounds: first, the fact that Atty.
(3) the professional standing of the lawyer.
Rilloraza personally handled the case when he was working for SAGA; and second,
the retainer agreement dated October 1, 1987. Petitioner claims that under the
Charging liens
retainer
We do not agree. A charging lien to be enforceable as security for the payment of
agreement, which provides:
attorney’s fees requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and
“6.2 B. Court Cases:
execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in the main action by the attorney
Should recourse to judicial action be necessary to effect collection or judicial
in favor of his client. A charging lien presupposes that the attorney has secured a
action be taken by adverse party, our attorney’s fees shall be fifteen percent
favorable money judgment for his client. From the facts of the case it would seem that
(15%) of the amounts collected or the value of the property acquired or
petitioner had no hand in the settlement that occurred, nor did it ever obtain a
liability saved.”
favorable
judgment for ETPI.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is entitled to recover attorney’s fees amounting to
P26,350,779.91 for handling the case for its client and for charging liens?

HELD:
Attorney’s fees
However, the retainer agreement has been terminated. True, Attorney Rilloraza
played a vital role during the inception of the case and in the course of the trial. We
cannot also ignore the fact that an attorneyclient relationship between petitioner and
respondent no longer existed during its culmination by amicable agreement. To award
the attorneys’ fees amounting to 15% of the sum of P125,671,886.04 plus
P50,000,000.00 paid by PLDT to ETPI would be too unconscionable.
 Del Rosario vs. CA, G.R. No. 98149 September 26, 1994 Given the nature of the case, the amount of damages involved, and the evident effort
exerted by petitioner’s counsel, the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees for
FACTS: P33,641.50 would appear to us to be just and reasonable
Licudan vs. CA, G.R. No. 91958, January 24, 1991
Petitioner suffered physical injuries, requiring two (2) major operations, when he fell
from, and then was dragged along the asphalted road by, a passenger bus operated FACTS:
by private respondent transportation company. The incident occurred when the bus
driver bolted forward at high speed while petitioner was still clinging on the bus door’s The respondent lawyer was retained as counsel by his brother-in-law and sister, the
handle bar that caused the latter to lose his grip and balance. Respondent refused to now deceased petitioners’ parents, spouses Aurelio and Felicidad Licudan for 2 civil
settle the claim for damages. cases: Civil Case No. Q12254 for partition and Civil Case No. Q28655 for a sum of
money in connection with the redemption of the property. In both cases, the
TC: “WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing defendant De Dios respondent lawyer obtained a judgment in favor of his clients.
Marikina Transportation Co., Inc.’s counterclaim for lack of merit and ordering said
defendant to pay plaintiff Jose V. Del Rosario: (a) the sum of P76,944.41, as actual On August 13, 1979, the respondent lawyer filed a Petition for Attorney’s Lien with
and compensatory damages; (b) the sum of P15,000.00, as moral and exemplary Notification to his Clients which substantially alleged that his clients executed two
damages; and (c) the sum of P33,641.50, as attorney’s fees, as well as to pay the written contracts for professional services in his favor which provided that:
costs of suit; and, as regards the thirdparty complaint herein, ordering thirdparty 1. The undersigned counsel is entitled to own 97.5 square meters of the
defendant First Quezon City Insurance Co., Inc. to indemnify thirdparty plaintiff De plaintiff’s share of the lot in question.
Dios Marikina Transportation Co., Inc. in the sum of P12,000.00, with interest thereon 2. The undersigned counsel shall have a usufructuary right for a period of ten
at the legal rate from date of filing of the thirdparty complaint on August 20, 1985, until (10) years of plaintiffs’ share of the lot in question.
full payment thereof. 3. And that all damages accruing to plaintiffs to be paid by the defendant is for
the undersigned counsel.
Court of Appeals affirmed in toto but it reduced the award for attorney’s fees from On September 6, 1985, the trial court ordered the respondent lawyer to submit a
P33,641.50 to P5,000.00. subdivision plan in conformity with his attorney’s fees contract under which onethird
(1/3) of the property or 90.5 square meters was alloted to him.
ISSUE: Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration questioning the reduction of
attorney’s fees was denied by the appellate court. On October 21, 1985, the trial court issued the second Order being assailed in this
petition finding the claim justified. On August 22, 1986, more than ten (10) months
HELD: In determining the reasonableness of such fees, this Court in a number of after the Orders of September 6, 1985 and October 21, 1985 had become final and
cases has provided various criteria which, for convenient guidance, we might collate executory, the petitioners as substituted heirs of the respondent lawyers’ deceased
thusly: clients filed a motion to set aside orders on the ground that the award of professional
1. the quantity and character of the services rendered; fees covering 121.5 square meters of the 271.5 square meter lot is unconscionable
2. the labor, time and trouble involved; and excessive.
3. the nature and importance of the litigation;
4. the amount of money or the value of the property affected by the On September 16, 1986, the respondent lawyer filed a motion for reconsideration
controversy; stressing the fact that the payment of the professional services was pursuant to a
5. the novelty and difficulty of questions involved; contract which could no longer be disturbed or set aside because it has already been
6. the responsibility imposed on counsel; implemented and had since then become final.
7. the skill and experience called for in the performance of the service;
8. the professional character and social standing of the lawyer; CA ruled with the respondent.
9. the customary charges of the bar for similar services;
10. the character of employment, whether casual or for established client; The petitioners fault the respondent Court for its failure to exercise its inherent power
11. whether the fee is absolute or contingent (it being the rule that an attorney to review and determine the propriety of the stipulated attorney’s fees in favor of the
may properly charge a higher fee when it is contingent than when it is respondent lawyer and accuse the respondent lawyer of having committed an unfair
absolute); and advantage or legal fraud by virtue of the Contract for Professional Services devised
12. the results secured. by him after the trial court awarded him attorney’s fees for P1,000.00 only instead of
respecting the trust and confidence of the highest level reposed on him considering
the close blood and affinal relationship between him and his clients.
The petitioners contend that under the award for professional services, they may
have won the case but would lose the entire property won in litigation to their All that the respondent lawyer handled for his deceased sister and brotherinlaw was a
unclelawyer. They would be totally deprived of their house and lot and the recovered simple case of partition which necessitated no special skill nor any unusual effort in its
damages considering that of the 271.5 square meters of the subject lot, the preparation. The subsequent case for redemption was admittedly but an offshot of the
respondent lawyer is claiming 121.5 square meters and the remaining portion of 150 partition case. Considering the close blood and affinal relationship between the
square meters would also go to attorney’s fees since the said portion pertains to the respondent lawyer and his clients, there is no doubt that Atty. Domalanta took
lawyer’s son by way of usufruct for ten (10) years. advantage of the situation to promote his own personal interests instead of protecting
the legal interests of his clients.
HELD:
There should never be an instance where a lawyer gets as attorney’s fees the entire
It is an equally deeplyrooted rule that contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law. property involved in the litigation. It is unconscionable for the victor in litigation to lose
They are sanctioned by Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics and Canon everything he won to the fees of his own lawyer.
20, Rule 20.01 of the recently promulgated Code of Professional Responsibility.
However, In resolving the issue of reasonableness of the attorney’s fees, we uphold the
as we have held in the case of Tanhueco v. De Dumo (172 SCRA 760 [1989]): timehonoured legal maxim that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
“x x x When it is shown that a contract for a contingent fee was obtained by undue influence dignity of the legal profession so that his basic ideal becomes one of rendering
exercised by the attorney upon his client or by any fraud or imposition, or that the service and securing justice, not moneymaking.
compensation is clearly excessive, the Court must and will protect the aggrieved party.
We find the Contract for Professional Services dated August 30, 1979,
In the case at bar, the respondent lawyer caused the annotation of his attorney’s fees unconscionable and unreasonable. The amount of P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, in
lien in the main action for partition docketed as Civil Case No. Q12254 on the basis of lieu of the 121.5 square meters awarded to the respondent lawyer and the tenyear
a Contract for Professional Services dated August 30, 1979. usufructuary right
over the remaining portion of 150 square meters by the respondent lawyer’s son, is,
On the contrary, we rule that the questioned Orders dated September 19, 1979 and in the opinion of this Court, commensurate to the services rendered by Atty.
October 21, 1985 cannot become final as they pertain to a contract for a contingent Domalanta.
fee which is always subject to the supervision of the Court with regard to its
reasonableness as unequivocally provided in Section 13 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics which reads:
“13. Contingent Fees.—
A contract for a contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under
all the circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the
compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its
reasonableness.”

Although the Contract for Professional Services dated August 30, 1979 was
apparently voluntarily signed by the late Aurelio Licudan for himself and on behalf of
his daughter, petitioner Cristina LicudanCampos and by the petitioner Wilfredo
Licudan who both manifested in open court that they gave their free and willing
consent to the said contract, we cannot allow the said contract to stand as the law
between the parties involved considering that the rule that in the presence of a
contract for professional services duly executed by the parties thereto, the same
becomes the law between the said parties is not absolute but admits an exception—
that the stipulations therein are not contrary to law, good morals, good customs,
public policy or public order.

Under Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall charge

only fair and reasonable fees. In determining whether or not the lawyer’s fees are fair
and reasonable, Rule 20.01 of the same Code enumerates the factors to be
considered in resolving the said issue.
 Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. CA and ARTURO ALAFRIZ and
ASSOCIATES, G.R. No. 86100-03 January 23, 1990 Consequent to such provision, a charging lien, to be enforceable as security for
the payment of attorney’s fees, requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment
FACTS: for money and execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in the main
action by the attorney in favor of his client. A lawyer may enforce his right to fees
A certain Celedonio Javier bought 7 parcels of land owned by Eustaquio Alejandro, et
by filing the necessary petition as an incident in the main action in which his
al., with a total area of about 10 hectares. These properties were thereafter
services were rendered when something s due his client in the action from which
mortgaged by Javier with the petitioner to secure a loan obligation of one Felix Angelo
the fee is to be paid.
Bautista and/or International Hotel Corporation. The obligors having defaulted,
petitioner foreclosed the mortgages after which certificates of sale were issued by the
General rule is that an attorney has no lien on the land of his client,
provincial sheriff in its favor as purchaser thereof. Subsequently, Alejandro, alleging
notwithstanding such attorney has, with respect to the land in question,
deceit, fraud and misrepresentation committed against him by Javier in the sale of the
successfully prosecuted a suit to establish the title of his client thereto, recovered
parcels of land, brought suits against Javier, et al., and included petitioner as
title or possession in a suit prosecuted by such client, or defended successfully
defendant therein.
such client’s right and title against an unjust claim or an unwarranted attack.
These parcels of land were sold by petitioner to its sister corporation, Service Leasing
To repeat, since in our jurisdiction the applicable rule provides that a charging
Corporation on March 23, 1983 for the purported price of P600,000.00. On the same
lien attaches only to judgments for money and executions in pursuance of such
day, the properties were resold by the latter to Herby Commercial and Construction
judgment, then it must be taken in haec verba. The language of the law is clear
Corporation for the purported price of P2,500,000.00. Three months later, or on June
and unequivocal and, therefore, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says,
7, 1983, Herby mortgaged the same properties with Banco de Oro for P9,200,000.00.
barring any necessity for elaborate interpretation.
The lower court found that private respondent, did not have knowledge of these
transfers and transactions.
Further, in Director of Lands vs. Ababa, et al., we held that “(a) charging lien
under Section 37, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited only to
Private respondent, on its part, filed on August 16, 1983 a verified motion to enter in
money judgments and not to judgments for the annulment of a contract or for
the records of the aforesaid civil cases its charging lien, pursuant to Section 37, Rule
delivery of real property as in the instant case.”
138 of the Rules of Court, equivalent to twenty five percent (25%) of the actual and
current market values of the litigated properties as its attorney’s fees.
Indeed, an attorney may acquire a lien for his compensation upon money due his
client from the adverse party in any action or proceeding in which the attorney is
On May 28, 1984, private respondent filed a motion to fix its attorney’s fees, based on
employed, but such lien does not extend to land which is the subject matter of the
quantum meruit, which motion precipitated an exchange of arguments between the
litigation.
parties.
Besides, in fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a
Trial court ordered the petitioner to pay P936,000 to the movant Arturo Alafriz and
lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit, the elements to be considered are
Associates as its proper, just and reasonable attorney’s fees in these cases. CA
generally (1) the importance of the subject matter in controversy, (2) the extent of
affirmed the order of TC.
the services rendered, and (3) the professional standing of the lawyer
ISSUE:
(1) whether private respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien for
payment of its attorney’s fees;
(2) whether a separate civil suit is necessary for the enforcement of such lien; and
(3) whether private respondent is entitled to 25% of the actual and current market values
of the litigated properties on a quantum meruit basis.

HELD: REVERSED and SET ASIDE

On the first issue, petitioner avers that private respondent has no enforceable
attorney’s charging lien in the civil cases before the court below because the
dismissal of the complaints therein were not, in the words of Section 37, Rule 138,
judgments for the payment of money or executions issued in pursuance of such
judgments.
Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc vs. Naldoza, A.C. No. 4017. September administrative liability of respondent, since it found him civilly liable to herein
29, 1999 complainant for $2,555.

FACTS: In his answer:

“I even [went] to the extent of paying him P10,000.00 as my moral obligation only to
The precursor of this Petition was the action of respondent, as counsel for find after accounting that he still owes me P180,000.00 as attorney’s fee [to] which I
complainant, appealing a Decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency am entitled under rule 130 of the rules of court sec. 24, and under sec. 37 of the
(POEA). In relation to the appeal, complainant asserts that respondent should be abovecited rules, I have the right to apply the funds received from Gatchalian in
disbarred for the following acts: satisfaction of my claim for Professional Services, otherwise known as Attorney’s Lien,
(1) Appealing a decision, knowing that the same was already final and as shown in my Service Billings and Statement of Accounts.”
executory
(2) Deceitfully obtaining two thousand, five hundred and fifty five US dollars HELD: DISBARRED
(US$2,555) from complainant, allegedly for “cash bond” in the appealed We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be sanctioned.
case However, the recommended penalty is not commensurate to the gravity of the wrong
(3) Issuing a spurious receipt to conceal his illegal act perpetrated. In a similar case, we have said:

Thus, on December 14, 1992, the respondent filed with the Supreme Court a Petition “x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these
for Review which was docketed as G.R. No. 107984 and that two (2) days thereafter [administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of x x x criminal law.
misrepresented to the complainant corporation that the complainant ha[d] to pay,
Moreover, this Court in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different
which it did, [a] ‘Cash Bond’ in UNITED STATES DOLLAR amounting to TWO capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal cases.”
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY FIVE (U.S. $2,555.00) to the Supreme Court in
order that the said appealed case could be heard or acted upon by the Supreme Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct
Court. The said amount was given to the respondent. from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. The burden of
proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable
“x x x [S]ubsequently the complainant corporation came to know that the fees to be doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, “clearly
paid to the Supreme Court consist[ed] only of nominal filing and docket fees for such preponderant evidence” is all that is required.
kind of appeal but in order to cover up respondent’s misrepresentation, Atty. Naldoza
presented complainant a fake xerox copy of an alleged Supreme Court receipt Contrary to respondent’s claim, the amount of $2,555 was not a part of his attorney’s
representing payment of U.S. $2,555.00. lien. He demanded the money from his client on the pretext that it was needed for the
Petition before the Supreme Court, but he actually converted it to his personal gain.
Meanwhile, a criminal case for estafa based on the same facts was filed against This act clearly constitutes malpractice. The claim that respondent merely applied his
herein respondent before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. Thereafter, lien over the funds of his client is just an afterthought, the accounting being made
respondent filed before the IBP a Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss on July 22, after the fact. It is settled that the conversion by a lawyer of funds entrusted to him is
1996, on the ground that he had already been acquitted in the criminal case for a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal
estafa. profession.

In his Report, Investigating Commissioner Plaridel Jose justified his recommendation Araceli Bayuga of the Supreme Court Cash Collection and Disbursement Division
in this manner: issued a certification that respondent had paid the amount of P622 only, not $2,555.
“x x x [R]espondent fails to rebut the position of the complainant that the signature [on
the receipt for the amount of $2,555.00] was his. Hence, respondent anchors his
position on a mere denial that it is not his signature. Likewise, the respondent denies
the check voucher dated December 15, 1992, and the encircled signature of the
respondent, which x x x according to him is falsified and irregular. No evidence,
however, was presented by the respondent that his signature therein was falsified and
irregular
The commissioner emphasized that the criminal case for estafa was completely
different from the proceedings before him; acquittal in the former did not exonerate
respondent in the latter. He further noted that the RTC Decision itself hinted at the
 Law firm of Armovit vs. Gines, G.R. No. 90983 September 27, 1991 The private respondent alleged that Atty. Armovit had been paid P300,000.00—an
amount approved by the court, and an amount he accepted and for which he is
FACTS: allegedly estopped from claiming a higher amount.
It appears that Atty. Armovit was engaged as counsel for the private respondent in a
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Armovit is entitled to the sum of P252,000?
complaint to have an extrajudicial foreclosure of certain properties by the Government
Service Insurance System declared null and void; that the parties allegedly agreed
HELD:
that the private respondent shall pay P15,000.00 as initial compensation and twenty
The Court is inclined to believe that Atty. Armovit never agreed on the compromise
percent in contingent fees; that after trial, the defunct Court of First Instance rendered
sum of P300,000.00. It is true that he did agree to withdraw his motion to annotate
judgment annulling foreclosure and ordering the Government Service Insurance
attorney's lien, but because the parties were "in the process of amicably settling their
System to restructure the private respondent's loan; that thereafter, the System
differences.
appealed; that on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower
court; and that the Appellate Court's judgment has since attained finality.
There is nothing there that would indicate Atty. Armovit's willingness to accept, in fact,
a lower figure in consideration of his withdrawal of his request to enter attorney's lien.
It also appears that when Atty. Armovit sought execution with the court a quo, he was
informed by Romualdo Bengzon, president of the respondent corporation, that the
The private respondent can not justifiably downplay Atty. Armovit as negligent (for
firm had retained the services of Atty. Pacifico Yadao. He was also informed that the
failing to appeal) or his demand for fees excessive (that he had been paid enough).
company would pay him the agreed compensation and that Atty. Yadao's fees were
Atty. Armovit, after all, succeeded in obtaining a favorable decision for his client, and
covered by a separate agreement. The private respondent, however, later ignored his
although his prayer for various damages were denied, he succeeded in obtaining a
billings and over the phone, directed him allegedly not to take part in the execution
substantial award (P1,900,000.00 in unpaid rentals) for his client.
proceedings. Forthwith, he sought the entry of an attorney's lien in the records of the
case. The lower court allegedly refused.
That the retainer agreement was never approved by the board of the corporation is
also a poor excuse because the fact of the matter is that the private respondent did
Atty. Armovit then moved, apparently for the hearing of his motion to recognize
deliver to Atty. Armovit the sum of P300,000.00 in partial payment, and the private
attorney's lien, trial court issued an order in the tenor as follows:
Atty. Armovit informed the Court that they are withdrawing the petition respondent can not now deny him the balance by alleging lack of authority of the
considering that they are in the process of amicably settling their differences with the Bengson spouses.
plaintiff, which manifestation was confirmed by Atty. Yadao as well as the plaintiffs,
Romualdo Bengson and Brenda Bengson, who are present today. Contingent fees are valid in this jurisdiction. It is true that attorney's fees must at all
In view of this development, the petition to record attorney's charging lien, times be reasonable; however, we do not find Atty. Armovit's claim for "twenty percent
the same being in order and not contrary to law, morals and public policy, as prayed of all recoveries" to be unreasonable. In the case of Aro v. Nañawa, decided in 1969,
for by Attys. Armovit and Aglipay, it is hereby withdrawn. The parties, therefore are this Court awarded the agreed fees amid the efforts of the client to deny him fees by
hereby directed to comply faithfully with their respective obligations.
terminating his services. In parallel vein, we are upholding Atty. Armovit's claim for
SO ORDERED.
P252,000.00 more—pursuant to the contingent fee agreement—amid the private
respondent's own endeavours to evade its obligations.
However, upon the turnover of the money to the private respondent, Mrs. Brenda
Bengson (wife of Romualdo Bengzon) delivered to Atty. Armovit the sum of
We will not however be slow either, in coming to the rescue of aggrieved brother
P300,000.00 only. Atty. Armovit protested and demanded the amount of P552,000.00
lawyers in protecting the integrity of the bar from unscrupulous litigants.
(twenty percent of P2,760,000.00), for which Mrs. Bengzon made assurances that he
will be paid the balance.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The private
respondent is ORDERED to pay the petitioner the sum of P252,000.00. Costs against
The private respondent also alleged that it opposed Atty. Armovit's effort to record his
the private respondent.
attorney's lien on grounds of alleged nullity of the retainer agreement, Atty. Armovit's
IT IS SO ORDERED.
negligence, and because of excessive fees demanded. The private respondent also
insisted that the retainer agreement was signed by only one of seven directors, and it
could not bind the corporation. Atty. Armovit, in any event, had also been allegedly
more than sufficiently compensated.
 Aro vs.Nañawa, G.R. No. L-24163, April 28, 1969

FACTS:
 Miranda v. Carpio, A. C. No. 6281, September 26, 2011

Pitcher vs. Gagate, A.C. No. 9532, October 8, 2013

FACTS:
Complainant claimed to be the legal wife of the late David B. Pitcher who owned 40%
of the shareholdings in Consulting Edge, Inc. In order to settle the affairs of her
deceased husband, complainant engaged the services of respondent.
Complainant and respondent met with Katherine Bantegui, a major stockholder of
Consulting Edge, to discuss the settlement of David’s interest in the company. Prior to
another scheduled meeting, complainant was prevailed upon by respondent to put a
paper seal on the door of the premises. Bantegui expressed disappointment over
these actions then asked them to leave and refused to give them a duplicate key.
Respondent caused the change in the lock of the office door. This prompted Bantegui
to file a complaint for grave coercion. The Prosecutor’s Office issued a Resolution
finding probable cause to charge complainant and respondent. Respondent advised
complainant to go into hiding until he had filed the motions in court. However,
respondent stopped communicating with complainant. Failing to reach respondent,
complainant filed this administrative case before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court found that respondent failed to exercise the
required diligence in handling complainant’s cause since he: first, failed to represent
her competently; and, second, abandoned his client’s cause while the grave coercion
case against them was pending.
Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code states:
CANON 19 – A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.
Rule 19.01 – A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to
present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding.
The Court found Atty. Gagate guilty of violating Canon 17, Rule 18.03 of Canon 18
and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and was
suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years.