Autonomous Objects

Graham Harman
Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: a political ecology of things, Durham, North
Carolina, Duke University Press, 2010; 200pp, £14.99 paperback.

Jane Bennett’s Vibrant Matter is an admirable book for at least three reasons.
First, it is wonderfully written in a comfortable personal style, which is rare
enough for academic books. Second, Bennett makes an explicit break with
the timeworn dogmas of postmodernist academia. She bids farewell to the
continental platitudes of recent decades: the social construction of the real,
and a dominant human subject cloaked in the alibi of language. In place
of these tattered garments she gives us ‘thing-power’, and from this new
autonomy of things much follows. Better yet, Bennett repeatedly avoids the
half-measure of saying that things ‘resist us with their recalcitrance’, that
disappointing manoeuvre which leaves humans in command while merely
haunting them with a vague letter X beyond their grasp. The third point
that makes this book admirable is Bennett’s professional position: Chair of
Political Science at Johns Hopkins University. That someone in a Political
Science department at an important university could write as candid a work
of metaphysics as Vibrant Matter is an encouraging sign. Perhaps philosophical
speculation on fundamental topics is poised for a comeback throughout the
humanities.
Bennett’s twelve-page preface has a certain freshness to it, and serves as a
fine overture to the chapters that follow. What she seeks is a ‘vital materiality’
or ‘material vitalism’ sharing more in common with childhood naiveté than
with the aloof critique that one normally adopts as a basic intellectual stance.
This leads her to oppose a Hegel-Marx-Adorno axis of ‘historical materialism’
that tends to ‘follow the trail of power to expose social hegemonies’ (pxiii).
Instead, Bennett empowers the non-human world, dropping the tedious
opposition between active humans and inanimate things. This leads her
to endorse an alternate materialist axis of Democritus-Epicurus-Spinoza-
Diderot-Deleuze. This may seem too close for comfort to Deleuze’s own
pantheon of favoured thinkers (I will return to this issue later). Nonetheless,
Bennett’s preface contains a flurry of insights. The usual tool of the intellectual
is demystification, and for Bennett it must be used with caution, since
‘demystification assumes that at the heart of any event or process lies a human
agency that has illicitly been projected into things’ (pxiv). Things do not just
obstruct human action, but have an inherent liveliness that allows them to act
in the world at large, not just on us. And finally, in a stirring declaration: ‘I
will emphasize, even overemphasize, the agentic contributions of nonhuman
forces.... in an attempt to counter the narcissistic reflex of human language

DOI:10.3898/NEWF.71.REV01/2011 Reviews 125

and thought’ (pxvi). The usual charge against those who describe inanimate
things as actors is ‘anthropomorphism’, yet Bennett answers convincingly that
anthropomorphism may be needed in order to counter anthropocentrism.
Chapter One, ‘The Force of Things,’ develops another key insight as
Bennett defines her concept of ‘vibrant matter’. It is meant to replace the
half-hearted realism that views the world as ‘recalcitrance’ or ‘resistance’. For
if it is conceded that even cultural constructions such as gender or nationality
can resist our attempts to reshape them, this does not go far enough. The role
of reality is not just to obstruct and perplex the human cogito, since objects
affect one another even when humans are not watching. This step alone
is enough to give value to Bennett’s book, since it shatters the dominant
human-world couplet that Quentin Meillassoux’s 2006 book After Finitude
described as ‘correlationism’. This divides Bennett from her Johns Hopkins
colleague Hent de Vries, who proposes a recalcitrant absolute beyond human
knowledge (p3) and even from Theodor Adorno, whose Negative Dialectics
does bow before the unmasterable reality beyond concepts, but who is ‘quick
—too quick from the point of view of the vital materialist— to remind the
reader that objects are always “entwined” with human subjectivity’ (p16).
Bennett’s ‘vibrant matter’ marks a step beyond such a humanized absolute-
for-us. For things are ‘never exhausted by their semiotics’ (p5), and matter
is not just ‘intractable’ but also includes ‘the ability to make things happen,
to produce effects’ (p5).
The title of Chapter Two, ‘The Agency of Assemblages’, can be read as
a nod to Manuel DeLanda, one of Bennett’s rare fellow travellers on the
path of continental realism. The ultimate sources of the term ‘assemblage’,
of course, are Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, who along with Spinoza are
the major historical referents of this chapter. The concept is used to provide
an interesting account of the American electrical blackout of 2003. Whereas
the term ‘thing’ sounds fixed and stable (p20), ‘assemblage’ evokes Spinoza,
for whom any specific thing is a mode of the one substance called ‘God or
Nature’ (pp21-22). This nature is not a global organic unity but a vibrant
amalgam of parts (p23). In one sense the assemblage is more than its pieces,
since ‘the effects generated by an assemblage are ... emergent properties,
emergent in that their ability to make something happen ... is distinct from
the sum of vital force of each materiality considered alone’ (p24). Yet at the
same time, ‘precisely because each member-actant has a pulse slightly “off ”
from that of the assemblage, [it] is never a stolid block but an open-ended
collective, a “non-totalizable sum”’ (p24). The model of assemblages also leads
Bennett to question the usual model of causation as a matter of individual
agents in isolation from all else (p32). The assemblage allows Bennett to
distance herself still further from the paralyzing human-world dyad that she
finds again (correctly) in Maurice Merleau-Ponty and his advocate Diana
Coole (p30), since for them as for Adorno the world remains entwined with
the human and never gains full independence. But this very polemic makes

126 New Formations

it all the more puzzling when Bennett praises Jacques Derrida’s ‘messianicity’
for its turn toward the outside (p32), especially given her earlier critique of
de Vries’s similar notion of the absolute. At the close of the chapter, Bennett
raises the intriguing ethical question of what follows from the assemblage. For
it seems to imply a distributive concept of agency spread over a vast multitude
of actors (p38), and this calls into question any moralistic ascription of right
and wrong to individuals.
Chapter Three, ‘Edible Matter’, takes a remarkably concrete turn toward
questions of diet. Bennett’s material vitalism is no ivory tower philosophy. Like
a wise friend concerned for our welfare, she cautions us against the memory-
stunting effects of hydrogenated fats (p41) and scorns the industrialized
berries found in Pop-Tarts (p47). Bennett’s ontology is also perhaps the
first to make room for potato chips: ‘In the case of ... potato chips, it seems
appropriate to regard the hand’s actions as only quasi- or semi-intentional,
for the chips themselves seem to call forth, or provoke and stoke, the manual
labor’. And further: ‘To eat chips is to enter into an assemblage in which the I is
not necessarily the most decisive operator’ (p40). At the same time, she praises
the omega-3 fatty acids found in wild fish as mood enhancers, using national
depression statistics to bolster her views. Bennett’s point is that eating does
not mean conquering raw material and assimilating it to ourselves, as Leon
Kass holds (p47). Instead, the food-actors with which we engage constitute
our individuality, as endorsed by the two contrasting models of Nietzsche
with his ‘warrior food’ (p44) and Thoreau with his view of meat as unclean
(p46). This entire chapter shows Bennett’s talent for spinning philosophical
gold out of everyday wool. After reading this chapter, you will find yourself
wanting to eat more healthily: but for ontological reasons rather than the
usual medical ones.
Chapter Four, ‘A Life of Metal,’ is perhaps the least developed in the book.
Bennett’s main point seems to be that a metal is what it can do, not what it is
(p60). But despite the chapter’s title, metal is discussed for only three of its
ten pages. Another problem here is that Bennett’s normally strong authorial
voice is drowned out by that of Deleuze, and we hear Bennett speak in such
non-Bennettian language as this: ‘a vibratory effluescence that persists before
and after any arrangement in space: the peculiar “motility” of an intensity’
(p57). Or this: ‘an interstitial field of non-personal, ahuman forces, flows,
tendencies, and trajectories’ (p61). At other moments Bennett negotiates
the Deleuzian influence with greater success: ‘a life is not only a negative
recalcitrance but a positive, active virtuality: a quivering protoblob of creative
élan’ (p61). And at still other times her own voice returns in force: ‘The line
of travel of these cracks [in metal] is not deterministic but expressive of an
emergent causality, whereby grains respond on the spot and in real time to
the idiosyncratic movements of their neighbors’. (p59)
Chapter Five, ‘Neither Vitalism Nor Mechanism’, delivers on its promising
title with fresh ideas likely to stick in the reader’s mind. Repeating her

Reviews 127
powerful claim that the inhuman has a life of its own and does not exist only
to obstruct human will (p62), Bennett turns to the vitalist theories of Henri
Bergson and Hans Driesch (p63). It is not a matter of naively collecting
false allies: Bennett openly notes that Bergson and Driesch both agree that
matter is lifeless and mechanistic (p69), while she does not agree at all:
‘[This] association of matter with passivity still haunts us today ... weakening
our discernment of the force of things’ (p65). Bennett’s boldness in walking
alone is displayed further in her willingness to challenge Kant, that giant of
modern philosophy. For Kant the vital principle in the Critique of Judgment is
merely regulative and can never be directly encountered (p66); for Bennett,
however, mechanism is no less inscrutable (p67). For Kant there is a quantum
leap in reality from nature to humans; for Bennett, the world is made up
of fine gradations of experience (p68), a claim linking her with Whitehead.
Here, a Latourian sensitivity to the emptiness of the human-world duality
is combined with a Heideggerian vision of reality withdrawing from human
grasp. This should only be celebrated. But Bennett proceeds to a further
deduction that I find less compelling. Namely, she approvingly cites Bergson’s
view that ‘a world of fixed entities’ is a ‘distortion.... necessary and useful
because humans must use the world instrumentally if they are to survive in it’,
and laments that we ‘view the world as if it consisted not of an ever-changing
flow of time but of a calculable set of things’ (p77). In a related point, Bennett
celebrates the Bergsonian élan vital for being a source of surprise beneath
all the specific bodies it organizes. Now as before, this is aimed against the
notion of individual things as having causal agency: ‘the means available
to élan vital do not preexist.... the moment of their deployment, but rather
emerge in tandem with their effects’ (p78). And further: ‘as self-dispensing,
élan vital is profoundly at odds with itself ’ (pp79-80). In short, Bennett’s initial
enemies are (a) the robotic human-world gap of modern philosophy and (b)
the pairing of an inscrutable vital principle with calculable bland matter. But
she then pivots into an attack on (c) the very viability of individual things
and (d) the notion of discrete causal agents. The problem is that points (c)
and (d) need not result from points (a) and (b). In my view this is the wrong
choice on Bennett’s part, as will be argued at the close of this review.
Chapter Six, ‘Stem Cells and the Culture of Life’, applies the results of
Chapter Five to recent political events. Bennett makes the interesting claim
that the ‘culture of life’ represented by Catholics and evangelicals, and by
politicians such as George W. Bush and Tom DeLay, is in fact a kind of vitalism
in which the divine spark of life is opposed to bland inert matter. With this
form of vitalism she contrasts Driesch’s and her own: ‘unlike that evangelical
vitalism, the “critical,” “modern,” or “scientific” vitalism of Driesch pairs
an affirmation of non-material agencies (entelechies) at work in nature with
an agnosticism about the existence of any supernatural agency’ (p84). This
identification of the tacit evangelical metaphysics is interesting enough.
What makes it even more interesting is the parallel consideration, unstated

128 New Formations

by Bennett, that there should be agnosticism not just about any supernatural
agency, but about any natural agency as well: a point often forgotten by the
scientistic metaphysics that has recently begun to appear even in continental
circles.
Chapter Seven, ‘Political Ecologies’, makes fascinating use of Darwin,
Dewey, and Latour against the human-centred politics of Jacques Rancière.
Darwin and Latour are linked here through their respective meditations on
worms. Darwin notes the importance of worms in fertilizing the earth and
gradually burying objects for archaeologists to find. Latour encounters worms
in the specific case of an advancing patch of Amazon jungle, as described in
his famous chapter of Pandora’s Hope. This intertwining of human and non-
human is bolstered further by Dewey’s marvellous point in Art as Experience
that some things inside our body are foreign to us (bacteria, drugs, implants)
while some things lying outside our body are intimate parts of us (hometowns,
friends, family). While inhuman objects need not be granted equal political
rights (p104) all are potential elements of a political public (p102). This
separates Bennett from Rancière (and, by implication, from Alain Badiou).
While Bennett appreciates Rancière’s notion of politics as a disruption of
the ordinary, ‘his description of the [political] act increasingly takes on a
linguistic cast.... It is an “objection to a wrong”, where a wrong is defined as
the unequal treatment of beings who are equally endowed with a capacity for
human speech’ (p106). Bennett even reports a public exchange with Rancière
after a talk in London, when she asked him openly about nonhuman political
actors. ‘Rancière said no: he did not want to extend the concept of the political
that far; nonhumans do not qualify as participants in a demos’ (p106). If
it remains unclear how we would go about letting nonhumans be political
actors, it seems clear enough that any politics based on a bad ontology of
human-versus-world will reach bad political conclusions.
Chapter Eight, ‘Vitality and Self-Interest’, sums up many of the book’s
conclusions and adds some final observations. The writing also takes
on especial lyrical power in these concluding pages: ‘I am a material
configuration, the pigeons in the park are material compositions, the viruses,
parasites, and heavy metals in my flesh and in pigeon flesh are materialities,
as are neurochemicals, hurricane winds, E. coli, and the dust on the floor’
(p112). In a time when ‘embodiment’ is often still viewed as a stirring
philosophical breakthrough, Bennett pushes things a needed step further:
‘In a world of vibrant matter, it is not enough to say that we are “embodied”.
We are, rather, an array of bodies, many different kinds of them in a nested
set of microbiomes’ (pp112-113). While accepting Latour’s argument against
separating pure nature from pure culture, Bennett makes the excellent point
that Latour may be too quick in abandoning the inspirational power of nature
as a means of resetting our failed human concepts (p121). Bennett ends the
book with a series of acknowledgments of the figures she views as among the
chief forerunners of her position: Spinoza, Whitehead, Serres, and Deleuze.

Reviews 129
Substance remains too static a notion, despite Spinoza’s different use of the
term, since nature ‘operates not in the service of a pre-given end but for the
sake of itself as process’ (p118). Anything that acts ‘has already entered an
agentic assemblage’ (p121). In referring to her own prose, Bennett stresses her
need to choose the appropriate verbs (p119), as if she were less interested in
nouns and their ‘static’ tendencies. With a wonderfully irreverent flourish, she
ends the book with a four-sentence ‘Nicene Creed,’ whose first two sentences
give a sufficient flavour of the whole: ‘I believe in one matter-energy, the
maker of things seen and unseen. I believe that this pluriverse is traversed
by heterogeneities that are continually doing things’ (p122).
We may be at a turning point in continental philosophy: a moment when
the increasingly sterile human-world couplet is losing legitimacy as the pillar
of our discipline. In nearly every case where key issues are touched upon
in Vibrant Matter, Bennett makes a fresh choice. We have seen that Bennett
avoids the typical, futile half-measure of saying that the human subject is not
all-powerful but meets with resistance from the world. Instead, she proposes
that philosophy treat the relations between things as no different in kind from
those between human and thing, and in this way she tacitly encroaches on
the terrain of the natural sciences. The old correlation of ‘man and world’ is
dissolved, as all human and inhuman actors are placed on the same footing:
atoms and stones are no less inscrutable than élan vital or the death drive.
And here one can only applaud. Yet it is less clear why dissolving the artificial
gap between human and world as kinds of beings entails that we need to
challenge the existence of individual things altogether. Instead of simply
placing flowers, armies, Italians, Chinese, radios, and hurricanes on the same
ontological footing by dissolving the rift between people and things, Bennett
also wants to dissolve the rift that divides any given thing from any other.
Ultimately, what is real in her new Nicene Creed is a pluriverse not of many
things, but of ‘one matter-energy’ that is ‘traversed by heterogeneities’. The
danger for Bennett, as for Deleuze and Deleuze’s Spinoza, is that objects are
liberated from slavery to the human gaze only to fall into a new slavery to a
single ‘matter-energy’ that allows for no strife between autonomous individual
things. Although it is true that Deleuze rescued us in the mid-1990s from
an endless repetition of text-centred philosophies, it is less clear in 2011
whether he remains the liberator we need. For this reader at least, Bennett
resembles DeLanda in being most interesting when she departs from Deleuze
most markedly.

130 New Formations

 Entrenched Media

Rainer Emig
Friedrich Kittler, Optical Media: Berlin Lectures 1999, Anthony Enns
(trans), Cambridge and Malden, MA, Polity Press, 2009, 250 pp, £17.99
paperback.

It is no coincidence that the English-speaking Humanities are discovering

Friedrich Kittler almost twenty years after his writings caused a stir in the
German-speaking world. His ostensibly anti-Humanist approach to literature
and culture chimes with the recent fashion for supposedly post-humanist
forms of thinking. At the same time, his early and comprehensive interest in
the media not as mere by-products of cultural transformations, but as their
trigger and core supplements Media Studies as a discipline that has to a
large extent become the victim of its own success in academia and the public
perception. There, his radically materialist thinking appears like a breath of
fresh air - even when it is a blast from the past.
John Durham Peters’ useful Introduction to Anthony Enns very readable
translation of Kittler’s 1999 lectures on optical media, situates Kittler’s
thinking neatly in opposition to Adorno and Horkheimer’s offhand rejection
of the modern mass media in their Dialectic of Enlightenment and connects it,
equally plausibly, with Foucault’s thinking in terms of discursive formations
and their disruptions. This affinity also affected the problematic translation of
Kittler’s groundbreaking study Aufschreibesysteme of 1985 (literally: Systems of
Notation) as Discourse Networks. Already in this polemical revision and radical
expansion of Kittler’s original field of German Literary Studies, the materiality
and technology of the media of notation triumphs over attempts to link the
resulting texts to the old Humanist chestnuts of genius or inspiration. His
lectures on optical media, fourteen years on, attempt a similar feat, this time
for the whole of Western Culture.
This claim for universality accounts for much of the appeal of the lectures.
It also produces many equally irritating areas of vagueness, contradictoriness,
and sheer pig-headedness. Peters’ Introduction wisely labels Kittler’s approach
‘media philosophy’. Kittler himself, in his lectures, rejects both traditional
literature-based Media Studies and context-based sociological Media Studies
as waffle and gossip. He freely admits that he does not watch many films and
kicks off his lecture by apologizing for the absence of Powerpoint, since he is
unable to connect his laptop and the data projector. In contrast to the textual
and contextual jumble of methods that amounts to Media Studies, Kittler’s
general premise is anthropological and as simple as it is convincing. Human
culture has traditionally chosen most of its symbols in the sphere of the visual.
Consequently, if one uses a broad definition of media, most of human culture

DOI:10.3898/NEWF.71.REV02.2011 Reviews 131

has functioned via visual media, from the ancient Greeks’ idea of the soul via
Medieval notions of God’s presence (or absence) to Enlightenment’s emphasis
on illumination and the counter-Reformation’s use of spectacle - all the way to
nineteenth- and twentieth-century contributions to media apparatuses in the
shape of the photographic camera, film, TV and ultimately digital media.
In order to achieve such a wide sweep in his argument, Kittler obviously
has to rely on other sources, most noticeably Friedrich von Zglinicki’s rather
traditional late 1970s history of film. Yet he manages to give them his own
twist. Especially the chapters on early visual media, such as the camera obscura,
are full of exciting insights. There, Kittler manages to develop his strictly
materialist media philosophy that tries to discursively relate changes in human
perception and self-definition with media change. He also manages to add,
mostly convincingly, his second major hobby-horse: war. Most innovations in
optical media were (at least also) used in warfare, if they did not originate in it.
When metaphorically applied to the counter-Reformation and to issues such
as the deus ex machina and Absolutism, Kittler’s ideas achieve their greatest
stimulating force.
Conversely, Kittler’s lectures lose much of their fascinating pull when
he goes past his climactic historic scenario, the First World War. There,
media and war technology as well as the technological innovations in
transport and communication technology that gave us the modern world
- and Modernism as an artistic response to it - can be traced in their closest
analogies and collaborations. Such parallels and interfaces become lost,
and the arguments of Kittler’s lectures somewhat tired and repetitive, when
he reaches the Second World War. Why this should have been the war of
colour film remains enigmatic. Only because the Nazi propaganda machine
produced light entertainment fare in coloured images? Kittler’s lectures
took place before the discovery of allied war documentary film in colour,
but until now our image of this war has been a black-and-white one, and
this was certainly true for the people who had to live through it. Kittler is
equally weak on the introduction of sound into film, and has almost nothing
to say on television that goes beyond the by now well-matured theses of
Marshall McLuhan, who, together with Harold Innes, is his most reliable
ally. In fact Kittler repeats McLuhan’s problematic dictum that the content
of a medium is always an old medium at least three times - without realising
that this only seemingly adds stability to his universalist enterprise. 1999
was also clearly too early to make any meaningful predictions about HD
television (Kittler nonetheless bravely claims that this new technology spells
the end of celluloid-based film). It would have been early enough, though, to
make more sensible pronouncements on digital media than the reductively
apocalyptic claim that ‘visible optics must disappear into a black hole of
circuits’ (p225). Here the conservative pessimism of Kittler’s old nemesis
Adorno and Horkheimer catches up with him.
Apart from the perhaps understandable fact that a book of such sweep

132 New Formations

cannot be strong in all its parts, the two greatest reservations about Kittler’s
method derive indeed from his anti-Humanism. ‘Man’ or ‘Mankind’ are no-go-
areas for Kittler, and one might feel sympathy for his avoidance of essentialist
premisses that underly many simplistic sociological forms of Media Studies.
Yet where does reception come into Kittler’s mechanistic universe? Where
is the role of the imagination that enables people from different historical
eras and cultural locations (Kittler is traditional concerning the former and
ignorant concerning the latter) to perceive the same optical phenomenon
as having very different meanings? Ultimately, his strictly materialist view of
one medium passing on its content to another leaves the issue of users, their
preconceptions and interests, aside. It also bypasses the important question
of agency. Why does media change take place? Kittler’s method of interlinked
historical anecdotes that all reveal the same teleology of intimately connected
media- and war-interests only replaces the traditional creation and progress
myths with a ghost in the machine.
Despite these serious reservations, Kittler’s lectures provide stimulating
and provocative reading. They are certainly not suitable as introductory
material, but can be profitably employed to attack stale opinions and open
the view for a wider integration of the media into our histories of culture and
knowledge - with or without human agency or interest at their core.

Reviews 133
 Precarious, Pointillist

Deborah Staines
Judith Butler, Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable?, London and New
York, Verso, 2009.

In 2006, Judith Butler visited Sydney, and gave a public lecture in a modern
recital hall strikingly panelled with blonde Australian timber and gold leaf.
The street address - Angel Place - added a delicious irony, as did the gift of
dripping red flowers, and altogether the sense of occasion expressed the high
esteem in which Butler is held worldwide. There, Butler chose not to recap
her popular and influential philosophies of gender, as she might easily have
done and instead spoke intently about being an American citizen during the
Abu Ghraib abuses. Butler’s increasingly direct contribution to international
affairs seemed then to mark the passing of so many of the late twentieth
century’s major thinkers - Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, Said - whose intellectual
company she had kept, and who had written in resistance to the offences of
political violence. With her homeland launching an apparently limitless war
on Others, Butler has responded with critiques of statist political culture.
Following Precarious Life (2004), Frames of War reflects this commitment,
bringing together five essays written and revised between 2004-08.
Appropriately, Butler notes that she is writing in response to the contemporary
situation - Frames is neither treatise nor transhistorical narrative. However, it is
concerned with epistemological and ontological problems that are more than
incidental. The ‘frames’ under consideration are Western cultural structures
of recognition and of knowledge. Butler demonstrates how such frames shape
the representation of war, circumscribe war’s meaning, and efface violence’s
affect. Further, she links these epistemological issues to post-structuralist
understandings of socially constructed ontologies, to conclude that in these
wars, Others become ‘ungrievable’ casualties. This paradigm is also explored
across a number of other topics including abortion, sexuality, torture, and
religion. Thus, the book elaborates an existential politic that Butler locates
in the ‘precarity’ of life. The immediate context is the US-initiated conflicts
in Iraq and Afghanistan, but Butler aims to contribute an insight applicable
to many debates about violence and the human.
Certainly, Butler brings an unimpeachable degree of ethics to writing
on war. Her position of responsiveness is reclaimed from its current military
overuse, and brought back to Foucault’s reflexive ethos, to self conduct amidst
cultures of domination and atrocity. War’s destructiveness has a compelling
gravity that attracts and challenges the writer, but its pitiless light also
exposes weakness. Butler does not wield the eloquence of Simone Weil or the
practicality of Mary Kaldor, for comparison. At times, Butler’s approach is a

134 New Formations DOI:10.3898/NEWF.71.REV03.2011

pointillist semiosis, highly abstracted from its fleshly materiel, a meta-reading
of the regulation of affect rather than a close reading of experience. (Even
so, the chapter entitled ‘Survivability, Vulnerability, Affect’ delivers a measure
of justice by featuring the poetry of Guantanamo Bay inmates and giving it a
far wider audience than it would otherwise have.) Overall, this undertaking
tends to exert the question without evoking an alternative.
Nonetheless, her paradigm makes explicit that the interconnectedness of
a globalised world, whilst accelerating the waging of war, does not necessarily
bring with it an increased sense of responsibility for lives destroyed, lost and
abandoned. It is an argument that has to be made repeatedly, and Butler has
its measure, reviving a politics of recognition that has lain fallow. These lives
are neither abstractions nor distant in time - they are dying every day in wars
that we in the West continue to fund - and Butler urges us to embrace precarity,
that in precarity ‘we are bound to one another’ (43). This is in stark contrast
to state security discourse, which simultaneously disavows and defends against
precarity. Butler theorises the interdependence produced by acts of violence,
particularly in the centrepiece essay ‘Torture and the Ethics of Photography’,
on the Abu Ghraib photographs, reaffirming that the entry of the Abu Ghraib
photos into global culture was a pivotal event, as striking for political thinkers
as the televised coverage of September 11, 2001. The two sets of images are
indispensable to Butler’s critique of representational frames.
Yet, the audience for this work is unclear, as it sits apart from foreign affairs
commentary, from cultural anthropology, from literary criticism, from poesis;
it comes closest perhaps to aspects of the feminist International Relations
written by Christine Sylvester, Vivienne Jabri, and Jenny Edkins. It works into
the broader field of feminist security theory, and articulates a claim for non-
violence (179-184) in human action. Yet, Butler’s convolutions tend to impede
perspicacity, especially in the introductory manifesto, where she is at pains
to specify her terms and cite her predecessors. In this, Butler’s intellectual
contribution seems stifled by an institutional labour - grinding the academic
publication mill - that distances the reader from her most urgent points. Still,
Butler clearly wants the book to be an intervention, to ‘reorient politics on
the Left toward a consideration of precarity as an existing and promising site
for coalitional exchange’ (28) - and Cornel West’s blurb declares this book
an ‘intellectual masterpiece’. Exactly why the Left needs to be re-engaged to
pacifism is a question perhaps best answered by memories of Tony Blair’s
enthusiasm for the Iraq war. Whether Frames is a major Butler text remains
to be seen, but her philosophical detailing can be a useful complement to
other kinds of work; for years now, transnational feminism has been oriented
to emancipating Dalit communities from caste violence in India, raising
children in the orphanages of war-torn Africa, and promoting women’s
health in South American shanty towns. In those places, the consideration
of precarity proceeds from visceral encounter, and dialogue is the necessary
site of transformational coalitions.

Reviews 135
 In Our Time Of Dying

David W. Hill

Slavoj Žižek, Living in the End Times, London, Verso, 2010, 415 pp; £20
cloth.

The publication of Slavoj Žižek’s Living in the End Times was something of a
media event in Britain. An interview with the philosopher and psychoanalyst
appeared in the Observer whilst (an increasingly frustrated) Gavin Esler made
a commendable attempt at a conversation with the motor-brained thinker
on the BBC’s Newsnight program. All of which suggests that the book is one
of Žižek’s more populist offerings. ‘Serious’ Žižek produces work of such
philosophical insight that they cannot be ignored; ‘popular’ Žižek offers
laughs and film references - but without ever obscuring the vital ideas within.
This latest offering is no exception to the latter, a wonderful mix of jokes,
provocations, popular culture - and a serious message about a series of
impending crises being brought about by global capitalism.
The premise of the book is that the global capitalist system is facing a
fatal catastrophe occasioned by the ecological crisis, the biogenetic revolution,
the imbalances of the system itself (e.g. struggles over scarce resources), and
the rapid growth of social divisions and exclusions (e.g. gated communities,
slums). The book is organised into five chapters, each corresponding to
Elisabeth Kübler-Ross’ famous stages of coming to terms with death: denial,
anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance. Žižek’s hypothesis is that we
can see these five stages in the way we (as a society) attempt to deal with the
coming apocalypse.
Denial: the way ideology works to mask the fundamental disorder. The
first chapter begins with an excellent analysis of the burqa/niqab debate in
France that briskly introduces the reader to Žižek’s account of denial. We are
taught, he says, that racism is a product of intolerance; if only we were more
tolerant, the world would be a better place. This is to forget the ‘background
noise’ (p6), an ideological move that would have us ignore the violence
that sustains the system. Racism is not the product of intolerance, it is the
product of injustice and inequality; tolerance is not the cure - emancipation
and political struggle is. The same ideological move, tuning-out background
noise, can be seen with recycling: ‘we are bombarded from all sides with
injunctions to recycle personal waste, placing bottles, newspapers, etc., in the
appropriate bins. In this way, guilt and responsibility are personalized - it is not
the entire organization of the economy which is to blame, but our subjective
attitude which needs to change’ (p22). This chapter is easily the strongest;
it carries a clear message applicable to a range of supposedly ethical actions

136 New Formations DOI:10.3898/NEWF.71.REV04.2011

that merely allow for the furtherance of wider injustice: charitable donations,
bags for life, non-wasteful food consumption, difference politics, and so on.
Denial is shown to be the most commonly found stage in our response to the
impending death of our way of being, adding urgency to Žižek’s argument
here but already suggesting that the stages to follow will be less impactful.
Anger: protests/violent explosions in response to the injustices of the
system. In a pleasant meander, the second chapter begins with a discussion
of What If? histories (brim-full of ideology, as it happens) and passes through
a discussion of Radovan Karadžić and the parallax between his identity as
war-criminal and as spiritual leader and poet. The most important message
in this chapter regards political mobilisation. Instead of offering sympathy
for the plight of the excluded, like the liberals, those who want change, says
Žižek, should begin by identifying with them. We should not ask why some are
excluded from public space but what we are doing included in it. Here Žižek
is identifying spaces of exclusion as sites for resistance: ‘The crowds in the
slums constitute a huge reservoir for political mobilization: if the Left does
not act there, who will?’ (p124). This is Žižek’s most politically practicable
message in the book, a welcome call to return to the grass roots in order that
we might throw off the denial so well articulated in the first chapter.
Bargaining: changing things here-and-there to preserve the status quo. In
the third chapter Žižek calls for a return to critique of political economy: the
economy is always political so is the key site of struggle. ‘Only in capitalism
is exploitation “naturalized”, inscribed into the functioning of the economy,
and not the result of extra-economic pressure and violence. This is why,
with capitalism, we enjoy personal freedom and equality: there is no need
for explicit social domination, since domination is already implicit in the
structure of the production process’ (p207). The expert discussions of Marx
and Hegel that follow see a shift in tone. No longer does the book read in
the way that Žižek talks whilst presenting an off-the-wall documentary (The
Pervert’s Guide to Cinema) or whilst being Mercurial in interview. Instead, the
need to perform seems to drop away as he gets down to some serious work.
As for bargaining, Žižek launches a criticism of the idea of minimum wage,
a minor tweak that would gloss over the gross flaws in global capitalism.
Depression: the zero-point when bargaining fails. The fourth chapter finds
Žižek at his most psychoanalytical, examining new subjective pathologies
brought about by the collapsing system. He offers the notion of ‘abstract
violence’ (p291), something like market speculation which does not seem to
affect human reality in its own sphere and yet has disastrous effects in others
(joblessness in other regions of the world, etc.). This is (in psychoanalytic
terms) a trauma, an intrusion of the Real that appears meaningless since
its cause is not easily perceived. This is why, according to Žižek, we tend to
understand such abstract forms of disaster as natural. ‘Global capitalism thus
generates a new form of illness which is itself global, indifferent to the most
elementary distinctions such as that between nature and culture’ (p295).

Reviews 137
 With the discussion of depression, it begins to feel as if the five-stage format
is strained. Whilst the account of how we perceive the deleterious effects of
global capitalism is merited, lengthy and technical discussion of hard-to-pin-
down pathologies is somewhat dazzling - the risk here being that the message
is lost in translation (from ‘Lacanese’).
Acceptance: seeing the situation as a chance for a new beginning rather
than as a threat. After going in search of communist culture (in Kafka,
Platonov, Sturgeon, Vertov, and Satie) Žižek discusses subversion through
sheer brutality, using the German rock band Rammstein as a launch-pad.
Observing that Blair could be re-elected despite massive unpopularity, that
Berlusconi could hold a majority despite his clownishness, Žižek remarks
that ‘some form of violence will clearly have to be rehabilitated’ if the
Left is to ‘awaken’ the people (p390). However it is vital to note that Žižek
is not advocating a program of total violence. Once we accept that the
catastrophe we are heading towards is not an ‘uncontrollable quasi-natural
power’ (p387), which is to say, once we confront the abstract violence of
the system and give up on bargaining, another way becomes possible. What
should we do? Nothing? Some violent revolutionary act? Local pragmatic
interventions? Here Žižek advises that there is no need to choose, any one
of these strategies being appropriate at different times - even doing nothing
can, when appropriate, be a radical act. If these are the routes then what is
the destination? For Žižek, it is, of course, the dictatorship of the proletariat.
This shift from commentary and diagnosis to political response shows Žižek
for what he is: an excellent theorist and psychoanalyst, not a political figure.
It is not easy to ascertain what form resistance should really take (how do
we choose between violence, pragmatism, nothing?) and the organisation
of the dictatorship of the proletariat is opaque. In what way does it differ
from that in Marx? If it does not, then how would that work?
Between chapters are diverting interludes, with discussions on such topics
as Josef Fritzl, Silvio Berlusconi, and the animated film Kung Fu Panda. An
interlude on architecture is notable for exemplifying Žižek’s scenic routes
through topics: ‘So, back to postmodern architecture’ (p261) he writes, after
getting side-tracked by the phenomenological experience of shit in a section
that also includes the author’s musings on Sarah Palin as a failed feminist
icon (‘drill, baby, drill!’ (p270)).
There are comments on Emmanuel Levinas at several points in the
1. For example, book that echo those made often in Žižek’s other work.1 For example, in his
in Slavoj Žižek,
Violence: Six Sideways discussion of the burqa he writes:
Reflections, London,
Profile, 2008.
why does the encounter with a face covered by a burqa trigger such
anxiety? Is it that a face so covered is no longer the Levinasian face: that
Otherness from which the unconditional ethical call emanates? But what
if the opposite is the case? From a Freudian perspective, the face is the
ultimate mask that conceals the horror of the Neighbor-Thing: the face is

138 New Formations

 what makes the Neighbor le semblable, a fellow-man with whom we identify
and empathize (p2).

Žižek notes that if the face is covered then it reveals the abyss of the other,
causing anxiety. I do not disagree with this but I find the reading of Levinas
uncharitable. The Levinasian other is a source of anxiety. Unknowable -
forever ‘the stranger in the neighbour’2 - the other is a source of ontological 2. Emmanuel
Levinas, Otherwise
insecurity: we cannot know what there is with the other. Further, the infinite Than Being, or Beyond
demands that are placed on the ‘I’ in encounter with the other are surely Essence, A. Lingis
(trans), Pittsburgh,
a source of further ill-ease, responsibility initiated against the will as the ‘I’ Duquesne University
is ‘ordered toward the face of the other’.3 The Levinasian ethical encounter Press, 2008, p123.

involves being-towards-the-other despite oneself, adding an element of terror

3. Ibid., 11.
that Žižek does not here acknowledge. Since the face in Levinas is not the
flesh-and-bones face, but rather coincides with it, then the coincidence of this
face with the veil could equally be said to reveal the horror of the other.
Living in the End Times is exhilarating to read. The first chapter is where
I feel the lasting impression is derived: an eloquent, bold analysis of the
ideas and actions that prop-up an ailing system. To read this is to arm one’s
self for future debates. Whilst the subsequent chapters do not retain this
practical dimension to the same degree, they are nonetheless academically
rigid theorisations of what comes next. This is ‘popular’ Žižek at his finest.

Reviews 139