This case discusses a legal issue regarding the execution of a judgment more than 5 years after it became final. The Court had approved a compromise agreement between Tan Ching Ji and Uy Tina, where Uy Tina had 6 years to pay a debt of P23,000 to Tan Ching Ji. After the 6-year period expired, Tan Ching Ji filed a motion for execution, which was granted. Uy Tina argued the motion was invalid under the rule that judgments can only be executed by motion within 5 years. However, the Court upheld the execution, finding that the 6-year payment period given to Uy Tina was a term of the obligation, and the debt did not become demandable
This case discusses a legal issue regarding the execution of a judgment more than 5 years after it became final. The Court had approved a compromise agreement between Tan Ching Ji and Uy Tina, where Uy Tina had 6 years to pay a debt of P23,000 to Tan Ching Ji. After the 6-year period expired, Tan Ching Ji filed a motion for execution, which was granted. Uy Tina argued the motion was invalid under the rule that judgments can only be executed by motion within 5 years. However, the Court upheld the execution, finding that the 6-year payment period given to Uy Tina was a term of the obligation, and the debt did not become demandable
This case discusses a legal issue regarding the execution of a judgment more than 5 years after it became final. The Court had approved a compromise agreement between Tan Ching Ji and Uy Tina, where Uy Tina had 6 years to pay a debt of P23,000 to Tan Ching Ji. After the 6-year period expired, Tan Ching Ji filed a motion for execution, which was granted. Uy Tina argued the motion was invalid under the rule that judgments can only be executed by motion within 5 years. However, the Court upheld the execution, finding that the 6-year payment period given to Uy Tina was a term of the obligation, and the debt did not become demandable
This case discusses a legal issue regarding the execution of a judgment more than 5 years after it became final. The Court had approved a compromise agreement between Tan Ching Ji and Uy Tina, where Uy Tina had 6 years to pay a debt of P23,000 to Tan Ching Ji. After the 6-year period expired, Tan Ching Ji filed a motion for execution, which was granted. Uy Tina argued the motion was invalid under the rule that judgments can only be executed by motion within 5 years. However, the Court upheld the execution, finding that the 6-year payment period given to Uy Tina was a term of the obligation, and the debt did not become demandable
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175.
OCENA Tan Ching Ji v. Mapalo (GR No. L-21933, February 22, 1971)
FACTS: The answer to the pivotal legal issue in this appeal on a question of law from a judgment of the CFI of Cotabato is supplied by Uy Tina v. Avila, a certiorari proceeding with the petitioner, the debtor, seeking to quash a writ of execution in favor of one of the respondents, Tan Ching Ji, plaintiff-appellee in this case. The unequivocal holding is that the 5 year period under Rule 39, Section 6 as to when a judgment may be executed on motion is to be counted not from the date, "the judgment became final in the sense that no appeal therefrom could be taken, but when it became executory in the sense that it could already be enforced." There is thus sufficient legal basis for plaintiff's rescission suit, now before this Court on appeal, to set aside the auction sale of Uy Tina's properties, the debtor being the same petitioner in the aforementioned certiorari proceeding, in favor of defendant PNB, insofar as it would adversely affect 4 specific items subject to prior attachment lien secured by plaintiff, included in the very same order of execution issued 5 years after the finality of the judgment but within such period counted from the time it could executed and enforced. So the lower court held. We affirm, but subject to modification. Tan Ching Ji filed a complaint for the rescission of an auction sale of certain properties of Uy Tina in favor of defendant, now appellant PNB. It was shown in such complaint that in a civil case, for the recovery of the sum of money, he obtained a first lien upon the properties of defendant Uy Tina by means of writs of attachment duly issued by the CFI and that subsequently he obtained a judgment in his favor in the sum of P23,000.00. In another civil case filed against the same debtor, PNB was awarded the sum of P8,772.76. It then sued out a writ of execution and caused to be levied upon and sold at public auction the very same properties already attached by plaintiff. The decision in the suit between plaintiff and Uy Tina as noted above, the sum of P23,000.00 to plaintiff, but upon agreement of the parties defendant Uy Tina was given a period of 6 years within which to pay, during which time he could hold and enjoy the fruits of such properties. The judgment debt, however, remained unsatisfied and it was not there was an order for execution based on such judgment. In the meanwhile, the very same property, subject of the attachment, had been acquired by PNB in an execution sale resulting from a judgment in its favor in a suit filed by it against the same debtor for the amount of P8,772.76. The principal legal question on which appellant PNB would seek a reversal of the aforesaid decision is the nullity of an order of execution upon mere motion filed after 5 years from the date it became final. Its appeal is doomed to failure. Such a contention was categorically rejected.
Tan Ching Ji vs. Campua Uy Tina, the parties executed a compromise agreement, which was submitted to and approved by the Court in its decision dated February 4, 1954. Under that agreement the defendant obligated himself to pay plaintiff the sum of P23,000.00 'without interest, within a period of 6 years from date hereof. It was also stipulated that certain properties which had been attached as security would not be released until full payment and that the defendant 'during the period of 6 years, shall hold and fully enjoy the fruits of said properties. After the six-year period had expired, Tan Ching Ji filed a motion for execution. The motion was granted. Campua Uy Tina moved to reconsider, announcing in his motion that he was going to file an ordinary action to enjoin the enforcement of the decision. The court denied the MR. He then invoked "Rule 39, Section 6, which provides that a judgment may be executed on motion within 5 years from the date of its entry, and that after the lapse of such time and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The contention is that since the decision approving the compromise agreement was rendered on February 4, 1954, it could no longer be executed by mere motion when respondent, plaintiff below, moved for that purpose on September 20, 1960, more than five years having then elapsed.
ISSUE: Whether defendant, petitioner here, can be compelled to comply with his obligation under the judgment and, upon failure to do so, could his properties be levied upon, at any time within 6 years from the rendition of the judgment on February 4, 1954?
RULING: He was given that period within which to pay. His obligation was one with a term and the term was indubitably for his benefit, as shown by the fact that the obligation carried no interest liability and that in the meantime he continued in possession and enjoyment of the properties which were under attachment for purposes of security. Under Article 1193 of the Civil Code an obligation with a term is demandable only when the term expires. Had respondent demanded payment from petitioner before the expiration of the term given to him, he could very well have refused to pay on the ground that his obligation had not yet become due. A writ of execution would have been as futile. Since such writ could only have been effectively issued as futile. Since such writ could only have been effectively issued after the lapse of 6 years from February 4, 1954, respondent court committed neither error nor abuse of discretion when he did issue it upon motion on August 14, 1962 pursuant to Rule 39, Section 6."
