G.R. No.

L-17920             May 30, 1962

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ORLANDO CARREON, defendant-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.

Pedro Samson C. Animas for defendant-appellee.

BARRERA, J.:

On February 17, 1960, Orlando Carreon was charged in the Municipal Court of Ozamis City (Crim.
Case No. 2916) with the crime of Other Light Threats defined and penalized under Article 285 of the
Revised Penal Code, in an information which reads:

That on or about the 13th day of February, 1960, in Zamora St., in front of the Public Market,
City of Ozamis, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, threaten one
Manuel M. Mananquil by then and there holding and pushing his shoulder, at the same time
drawing his sidearm, and uttering to the latter in a threatening tune the following words:
"Unsay imong gui inspection sa akong igsoon sa bukid nga wala ka may labut sa Bureau of
Education" which if translated to the English language means, "What inspection did you
make to my sister in the mountain when you are not connected with the Bureau of
Education?" as a result of which Manuel M. Mananquil was scared and frightened.

Contrary to Article 285, of the Revised Penal Code.

To this information, the accused Carreon filed a motion to dismiss (quash) on March 29, 1960, on
the ground of insufficiency of evidence against him, to which, the prosecution duly filed an answer
(opposition) on April 4, 1960. On the same date (April 4), the Municipal Judge denied said motion,
for the reason that "the evidence stands sufficient for conviction" of the accused Carreon. Thereafter,
trial of the case proceeded and after submission, the Municipal Judge, on June 29, 1960, rendered a
decision convicting the accused Carreon, not of Other Light Threats as charged, but of Unjust
Vexation. Said decision in part states:

Upon a careful examination of the evidence adduced by the parties, the Court is inclined to
believe that accused Orlando Carreon did not draw his revolver against Manuel Mananquil
nor threaten him with any weapon. . . . In view of this finding, the Court seriously doubts as to
whether the accused could be held guilty of the crime of light threat as charged in the
information.

There is no question, however, that in confronting and treating the offended party in the
manner testified to by Sgt. Obido and Patrolman Cuevas, the accused did unjustly vex or
annoy the said offended party. That there was really intention of the accused to vex the
offended party on the night in question, was shown by the fact that shortly before the incident
in question occurred, the accused met the offended party at Zulueta Street and, in a hard
and provoking manner, asked the latter what he was inspecting about in the slaughter-house
of the public market of this City.

xxx     xxx     xxx
 If the accused committed the offense of unjust vexation, can he be convicted and sentenced
accordingly under the information filed in this case?

It is alleged, among others, in the information that the accused threatened one Manuel M.
Mananquil by then and there bolding and pushing his shoulder, . . . and uttering to the latter
in a threatening tone the following words: "What inspection did you make to my sister in the
mountain when you are not connected with the Bureau of Education?" These allegations in
the information, in the opinion of the Court, substantially describe the offense of unjust
vexation which was duly proven by the evidence presented during the trial. Hence, the
accused can be convicted and sentenced accordingly.

WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of unjust vexation, and
there being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attendant in the commission of the
crime, the Court hereby sentences Orlando Carreon to pay a fine of P25.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. 1äwphï1.ñët

SO ORDERED.

From this decision, the accused Carreon appealed to the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental
(docketed as Crim. Case No. 5282), by filing his notice of appeal on July 20, 1960. There the City
Fiscal reproduced the same information filed in the Municipal Court.

On August 11, 1960, the accused Carreon, through counsel, filed a motion to quash the information,
on the grounds that (1) any further proceeding or trial of the case will constitute double jeopardy; and
(2) the facts charged in the information do not constitute the offense of Unjust Vexation. To this
motion, no opposition was filed by the prosecution.

On October 24, 1960, the Court of First Instance dismissed the case, in an order of this tenor:

ORDER

Finding the motion to quash filed by Atty. Pedro Samson C. Animas to be well-founded, this
case is hereby ordered DISMISSED, with costs de-oficio, and the cancellation of the bail
bond posted for the provisional release of the accused.

SO ORDERED.

From this order, the prosecution has taken the present appeal, claiming that the trial Court erred in
granting the accused Carreon's said motion to quash.

There is merit in the appeal. The first ground urged by appellee, both in the Court of First Instance
and here in this appeal, in support of his motion to quash, which the trial court sustained, is that any
further proceeding or trial of the case will constitute double jeopardy on his part; and this seems to
be predicated on the statement of the Municipal Court that it "seriously doubts as to whether the
accused could be held guilty of the crime of light threat as charged in the information", and on the
fact that the accused was instead convicted of Unjust Vexation. Counsel for the accused interprets
this action on the part of the Municipal Court as a judgment of acquittal with respect to the offense of
light threat and, since the information in the Court of First Instance is captioned "Other Light
Threats", it is argued that proceeding under that information would place the accused in jeopardy for
the second time.
This contention, if plausible, is nevertheless not valid. In the first place, the cited statement of the
Municipal Court is not a finding of acquittal, but a mere statement of a doubt. Secondly, the rule is
well-settled that when an accused unqualifiedly appeals from a sentence of the trial court — as did
the accused in this case — he waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and
throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render
such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant (Lontoc
v. People, 74 Phil. 513, 519). If this is true with respect to appeals from the Courts of First Instance,
with more force would it be in relation to appeals from the municipal or justice of the peace courts,
where Rule 119 of the Rules of Court specifically provides:

SEC. 8. Effect of appeal. — After the notice of appeal, all the proceedings and judgment of
the justice of the peace or municipal court are vacated, and the case shall be tried in all
respects anew in the Court of First Instance as if it were a case originally instituted in that
court.

Under this provision, when an appeal has been perfected, the judgment of the justice of the peace or
municipal court is vacated, and the case is tried de novo in the Court of First Instance, as if it were
there originally instituted. No new information need be filed in the latter court in order that it may
acquire jurisdiction to try and decide the case (Crisostomo v. Director of Prisons, 41 Phil. 368;
People v. Co Hick, 62 Phil. 501). The prosecution may choose to stand on the information filed in the
justice of the peace court, or to file a new information in the Court of First Instance, provided the
same charges the same criminal act1 for which the accused was tried by the justice of the peace
court (Andres v. Wolfe, 5 Phil. 60).

In the instant case, when the accused Carreon filed a notice of appeal on July 20, 1960 from the
judgment of the Municipal Court of Ozamis convicting him of Unjust Vexation, said judgment was
vacated, and the information against him for Other Light Threats was automatically — as in fact it
was actually — reproduced (refiled) in the Court of First Instance of Mizamis Oriental, which will try
and decide the case anew, as if it was there originally instituted, completely unaffected by what the
Municipal Court had found. In fine, against the proceeding to be had in the Court of First Instance,
which is brought about by the appeal taken to the accused Carreon himself, he can not interpose the
plea of double jeopardy.

The second ground invoked by the accused Carreon for the quashing of the information is that the
facts charged therein do not constitute the crime of Unjust Vexation. But the information previously
filed in the Municipal Court and reproduced (refiled) in the Court of First Instance upon appeal of the
accused Carreon charges him with the crime of Other Light Threats, and not of Unjust Vexation.
What the Court of First Instance will determine, after due trial, whether the accused will be found
guilty of light threats or unjust vexation under the facts alleged in the information and proved during
the hearing, is something which cannot be anticipated at this stage. And, since the accused himself
admits the sufficiency of the information as to Other Light Threats, the Court of First Instance should,
in the circumstances, have denied the motion to quash.

WHEREFORE, the order of the trial court (dated October 24, 1960) appealed from is hereby set
aside, and the case is remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. No costs. So ordered.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
Not any designated offense as specified by the fiscal which may be erroneous.
 G.R. No. 193034, July 20, 2015

RODGING REYES, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SALUD M.

GEGATO, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For this Court's resolution is the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, dated August 17, 2010, of petitioner Rodging Reyes assailing the
Resolution1 dated November 23, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
00421-MIN.

The facts are the following:

Petitioner, in a complaint filed by private respondent Salud M. Gegato, was charged

with Grave Threats before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Bayugan and
Sibagat, Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, which reads as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

That on or about the 16th day of October 2001, at about 5:10 o'clock in the afternoon,
more or less, in the premises and vicinity, particularly at Avon Store, situated at Atis
Street, Poblacion, in the municipality of Bayugan, province of Agusan del Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
Accused, with deliberate intent, moved by personal resentment and hatred, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously threatened the life of Mrs. Salud Gegato,
speak and utter by telephone the following threatening words, to wit; “SALUD,
UNDANGA ANG IMONG PAGSIGI UG TSISMIS SA AKONG ASAWA, KAY MAULAWAN ANG
AKONG ASAWA. WARNINGAN TAKA AYAW PANG HILABOT SA AMONG KINABUHI KAY
BASIN PATYON TAKA,” meaning (Salud, stop your rumor against my wife because she
will be embarrassed. I’m warning you, don't mind our lives for I might kill you), which
acts cast fear and danger upon the life of the victim Salud Gegato, to the damage and
prejudice consisting of actual, moral and compensatory damages.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, Philippines, October 23, 2001.2

chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Before arraignment, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash based on the ground of

jurisdiction and that the crime is not Grave Threats under Article 282 of the Revised
Penal Code, but Other Light Threats under Article 285, paragraph 2 of the same Code.

The MCTC, in its Order dated June 3, 2002, denied the motion. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was also denied by the same court in an Order dated July 25, 2002.

On September 13, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit the presiding judge on the
ground that private respondent is the Court Interpreter of the same court, but it was
denied in the court's Order dated September 16, 2002 based on the Order of this Court
dated July 3, 2002 regarding the same motion for inhibition of the same presiding
judge filed earlier by the petitioner with this Court. Based on that Order of this Court,
the basis of the inhibition does not fall within the absolute disqualification rule under
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, and neither does it appear to be a just or
valid reason under paragraph 2 thereof. This Court also ordered the presiding judge to
set aside the Order of Inhibition and directed the same presiding judge to hear and
decide the case with dispatch applying the Rules on Summary Procedure.3 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The MCTC, in a Decision4 dated August 10, 2005, found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In view of the foregoing, this Court finds the Accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of GRAVE THREATS under Paragraph 1 (2) imposing condition, without the
offender attaining his purpose, and is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment,
considering one (1) mitigating circumstance, the medium period of arresto mayor or a
period of two (2) months and one (1) day to four (4) months.

In addition, he is ordered to pay Private Complainant [the] following civil liabilities.

a. The amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) Pesos as moral damages.

b. the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) Pesos for litigation expenses and
for Attorney’s Fees as it is clear from the trials that complainant was assisted by a
Private Prosecutor for a fee.

SO ORDERED.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, in its Decision5 dated April 2, 2007, denied
petitioner's appeal but found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Other Light Threats under Article 285, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, instead of
Grave Threats as originally adjudged by the MCTC. The RTC ruled that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, accused is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 10 days of arresto

menor and the moral damages of P100,000.00 be reduced to P50,000.00, attorney's
fee of P20,000.00 stands.

The original decision is hereby modified.

If accused does not file an appeal within the reglementary period, let the entire records
be returned back to the Court of origin for proper disposition thereat.6
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and in its Amended Decision7 dated May
16, 2007, the RTC denied the motion and modified its original decision reducing the
amount of moral damages to P10,000.00 and the attorney’s fees to P10,000.00.

Thus, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Extension of Time to File a
Petition for Review. However, instead of filing a petition for review within the 15-day
period allowed by the CA, petitioner filed a second Motion for Extension of Time asking
for another 15 days within which to file his petition for review.  Afterwhich, petitioner
filed his petition.

Thereafter, the CA, in its Resolution8 dated August 2, 2007, dismissed the petition. The
Resolution partly reads, as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Petitioner's first Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review asking for
fifteen (15) days from June 6, 2007 or until June 21, 2007 is DENIED for failure to pay
the full amount of the docket fees pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. His
second motion for extension is likewise DENIED as no further extension may be granted
except for most compelling reason.

The petition subsequently filed is, however, NOTED but DISMISSED on the following
grounds:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. Filed beyond the reglementary period;

2. Failure of petitioner to pay complete docket fees as prescribed by law. It is deficient

by P3,530.00;

3. Failure of petitioner to indicate a complete statement of material dates as required

under the Rules. Petitioner did not mention in the body of the petition when he received
the RTC's Order dated May 16, 2007 denying his Motion for Reconsideration;

4. Failure of petitioner to attach pertinent documents material in the petition. No copy

of the May 16, 2007 Order denying his Motion for Reconsideration was attached to the
petition.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On August 14, 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied by
the CA in its Resolution dated October 17, 2008 for failure of the petitioner to furnish
copies to the Solicitor General and the private respondent.

Thus, petitioner filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration. The CA, in its Resolution
dated November 23, 2009, denied the said motion, the dispositive portion of which,
reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ACCORDINGLY, the Court RESOLVES to:

1. DISPENSE with the Offices of the Solicitor General's comment on the petitioner's
second Motion for Reconsideration dated 13 November 2008;

2. GRANT the petitioner's second Motion for Reconsideration dated 13 November 2008,
and RECONSIDER and SET ASIDE the Court's 17 October 2008 Resolution dismissing
the petitioner's first Motion for Reconsideration dated 13 August 2007; and

3. DENY the petitioner's first Motion for Reconsideration dated 13 August 2007; and

4. DISMISS with finality the instant petition for review.

SO ORDERED.9
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On December 28, 2009, petitioner filed a third Motion for Reconsideration, but was
resolved by the CA on June 24, 2010, as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Court RESOLVES to merely NOTE WITHOUT ACTION the petitioner's third Motion
for Reconsideration, in view of Our 23 November 2009 Resolution dismissing this
petition with finality.10
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Hence, the present petition.

Petitioner insists that the CA erred in favoring procedural technicalities over his
constitutional right to due process.

It must be remembered that petitioner filed three (3) successive Motions for
Reconsideration before the CA on August 14, 2007, November 13, 2008, and December
28, 2009.

In its Resolution dated November 23, 2009, the CA granted the petitioner's second
Motion for Reconsideration setting aside its previous Resolution dated October 17, 2008
and dismissing the first Motion for Reconsideration dated August 13, 2007. The CA, in
the same Resolution, discussed the other grounds for the dismissal of the petition as
contained in its first Resolution dated August 2, 2007. Thus, the CA not only denied the
first Motion for Reconsideration dated August 13, 2007 but also dismissed the Petition
for Review filed earlier.

However, as keenly pointed out by the OSG in its Comment11 dated January 11, 2011,
instead of elevating the present case before this Court within the period provided under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner opted to file a third motion for reconsideration,
which was filed without leave of court and notwithstanding the express declaration of
the CA that petitioner's first Motion for Reconsideration dated August 13, 2007 was
denied and the case already dismissed with finality.12 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

At the outset, the Court emphasizes that second and subsequent motions for
reconsideration are, as a general rule, prohibited. Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of
Court provides that "no second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final
resolution by the same party shall be entertained." The rule rests on the basic tenet of
immutability of judgments. "At some point, a decision becomes final and executory and,
consequently, all litigations must come to an end."13 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The general rule, however, against second and subsequent motions for reconsideration
admits of settled exceptions. In Neypes v. Court of Appeals,14 the Court declared:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, we
have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal
application of the Rules. In those situations where technicalities were dispensed with,
our decisions were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set
by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare cases where procedural rules were not
stringently applied, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a
grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a
healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee
that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his
cause.15
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The circumstances surrounding this case do not warrant the relaxation of the rules.
Petitioner failed to present compelling justification or reason to relax the rules of
procedure. The CA ruled that, “[t]he petitioner's attribution to inadvertence (as the
cause) of his failure to indicate a complete statement of material dates and to attach
pertinent documents material to the petition is not compelling or reasonable enough for
the Court to disregard the mandate in Rule 42, Sec. 3 of the Rules, x x x.”16 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

It must be noted that the CA has acted favorably upon petitioner's second motion for
reconsideration. However, that does not mean that petitioner is already right in arguing
that the reglementary period for the filing of the present petition before this Court
should be reckoned from his receipt of the denial of his third Motion for
Reconsideration. As correctly observed by the OSG, “[t]o condone such a procedurally
irregular practice would lead into an absurd situation where petitioner would, in effect,
be rewarded for unilaterally suspending the running of the reglementary period to
appeal by filing prohibited pleadings.”17 This is in consonance with this Court's ruling
in Securities and Exchange Commission v. PICOP Resources, Inc.,18 thus:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The same issue was the focal point in Obando v. Court of Appeals.19 In Obando, this
Court maintained the prohibitory nature of a second motion for reconsideration and its
gnawing implications in the appeal process. Said the court:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x [T]he Rules of Court are explicit that a second motion for reconsideration shall not
be allowed. In this case, petitioners filed not only a second motion for reconsideration,
but a third motion for reconsideration as well. Since the period to appeal began to
run from the denial of the first motion for reconsideration, the notice of appeal
which petitioners filed six months after the denial of their first motion for
reconsideration was correctly denied for having been filed late. (Emphasis supplied)
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Since the second motion for reconsideration was not allowed, this Court ruled that it did
not toll the running of the period to appeal. More so, would a third motion for
reconsideration.

In Dinglasan v. Court of Appeals,20 this Court explained the reason why it is unwise to

reckon the period of finality of judgment from the denial of the second motion for
reconsideration.
To rule that finality of judgment shall be reckoned from the receipt of the resolution or
order denying the second motion for reconsideration would result to an absurd
situation whereby courts will be obliged to issue orders or resolutions denying what is
a prohibited motion in the first place, in order that the period for finality of
judgments shall run, thereby, prolonging the disposition of cases. Moreover, such a
ruling would allow a party to forestall the running of the period for finality of judgments
by virtue of filing a prohibited pleading; such a situation is not only illogical but also
unjust to the winning party.

xxxx
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The overt consequence of the introduction of a prohibited pleading was pointed out
succinctly by this Court in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Ascot Holdings and Equities,
Inc.:21 cralawlawlibrary

It is obvious that a prohibited pleading cannot toll the running of the period to appeal
since such pleading cannot be given any legal effect precisely because of its being
prohibited.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Clearly, a second motion for reconsideration does not suspend the running of the period
to appeal and neither does it have any legal effect.22
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Hence, the CA did not commit any error when it properly noted without action the
petitioner's third motion for reconsideration for being a prohibited pleading, as well as
merely a reiteration of his arguments in his first motion for reconsideration. Therefore,
the said motion for reconsideration is a mere scrap of paper that does not deserve any
consideration and the filing of the same did not toll the running of the prescriptive
period for filing a petition based on Rule 45.23 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

It is significant to emphasize that the CA dismissed the petition due to the following
procedural infirmities: (1) it was filed beyond the reglemetary period; (2) petitioner
failed to pay the complete docket fee; (3) the petition failed to indicate a complete
statement of material dates since petitioner did not mention in the body of the petition
when he received the RTC's Order dated May 16, 2007 denying his Motion for
Reconsideration; and (4) petitioner failed to attach pertinent documents material in the
petition as no copy of the May 16, 2007 Amended Decision was attached to the
petition.

Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court states the need to pay docket fees, thus:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. - A party desiring to appeal from a
decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
may file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same
time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and other lawful fees,
depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, x x x.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The rule is that payment in full of the docket fees within the prescribed period is
mandatory.24 In Manchester v. Court of Appeals,25 it was held that a court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. The
strict application of this rule was, however, relaxed two (2) years after in the case
of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion,26 wherein the Court decreed that where the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the docket fee, the court may
allow payment of the fee within a reasonable period of time, but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. This ruling was made on the premise
that the plaintiff had demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the
additional docket fees required.27 Thus, in the more recent case of United Overseas
Bank v. Ros,28 the Court explained that where the party does not deliberately intend to
defraud the court in payment of docket fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by
the rules by paying additional docket fees when required by the court, the liberal
doctrine enunciated in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., and not the strict regulations set in
Manchester, will apply.

Admittedly, this rule is not without recognized qualifications. The Court has declared
that in appealed cases, failure to pay the appellate court docket fee within the
prescribed period warrants only discretionary as opposed to automatic dismissal of the
appeal and that the court shall exercise its power to dismiss in accordance with the
tenets of justice and fair play, and with great deal of circumspection considering all
attendant circumstances.29 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In that connection, the CA, in its discretion, may grant an additional period of fifteen
(15) days only within which to file the petition for review upon proper motion and the
payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs
before the expiration of the reglemetary period and that no further extension shall be
granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15)
days.30 Therefore, the grant of any extensions for the filing of the petition is
discretionary and subject to the condition that the full amount of the docket and lawful
fees are paid before the expiration of the reglementary period to file the petition. In its
Resolution dated November 23, 2009, the CA clearly explained its denial of petitioner's
motion for extension of time to file a petition for review, thus:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Clearly, there are pre-requisites before a motion for extension to file a Rule 42 petition
for review could even be granted. The petitioner must pay the full amount of the docket
and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the
reglementary period. This requirement was not met by the petitioner as the docket fees
he had paid are actually deficient by Three Thousand Five Hundred Thirty Pesos
(P3,530.00). Granting the petitioner's two (2) motions for extension of time to file
petition for review would have been beyond the pale of the limits allowed by the Rules
for the Court in that instance, considering that the petitioner failed to fulfill a
requirement.31
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Petitioner now begs this Court for leniency in the interest of justice. While there is a
crying need to unclog court dockets, on the one hand, there is, on the other, a greater
demand for resolving genuine disputes fairly and equitably,32 for it is far better to
dispose of a case on the merit which is a primordial end, rather than on a technicality
that may result in injustice.33 However, [i]t is only when persuasive reasons exist that
the Rules may be relaxed to spare a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his
failure to comply with the prescribed procedure.34 In the present case, petitioner failed
to convince this Court of the need to relax the rules and the eventual injustice that he
will suffer if his prayer is not granted.

Nevertheless, granting that this Court would decide the merits of this case, the petition
would still be denied. In its petition, the arguments presented by petitioners are factual
in nature. The well-entrenched rule is that only errors of law and not of fact are
reviewable by this Court in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 under which
this petition is filed. It is not the Court’s function under Rule 45 to review, examine and
evaluate or weigh once again the probative value of the evidence presented.35 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
dated August 17, 2010, of petitioner Rodging Reyes is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. Thus, the Resolution dated November 23, 2009 of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Villarama, Jr., Perez,* and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

*
 Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, per Special
Order No. 2084 dated June 29, 2015.

1
 Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Carmelo, with Associate Justices Edgardo T.
Lloren and Leoncia R. Dimagiba, concurring; rollo, pp. 41-47.

2
Rollo, p. 78.

3
Id. at 96.

4
 Penned by Presiding Judge Eliseo M. Campos, id. at 93-118.

5
 Penned by Presiding Judge Hector B. Salise, id. at 142-144.
6
Id. at 144.

7
Id. at 150-151.

8
Id. at 254.

9
Id. at 13.

10
Id. at 20-21.

11
Id. at 319-333.

12
Id. at 324.

13
McBurnie v. Ganzon, G.R. Nos. 178034 and 178117, and 186984-85, October 17,
2013, 707 SCRA 646, 664, citing Verginesa-Suarez v. Dilag, 671 Phil. 222, 228 (2011).

14
 506 Phil. 613. (2005).

15
Neypes v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 625-626.

16
 Resolution dated November 23, 2009, p. 5; rollo, p. 12.

17
Rollo, p. 325.

18
 588 Phil. 136 (2008).

19
 419 Phil. 124 (2001).

20
 533 Phil. 548 (2006).

21
 562 Phil. 974 (2007).

22
Securities and Exchange Commission v. PICOP Resources, Inc., supra, at 151-153.
23
 Rules of Court, Rule 37, Section 2, last paragraph.

24
The Heirs of the late Ruben Reinoso, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 669 Phil. 272, 280
(2011), citing Pedrosa v. Hill, 327 Phil. 153, 158 (1996).

25
 233 Phil. 579 (1987).

26
 252 Phil. 280 (1989).

27
Sun Insurance Office Ltd., v. Asuncion, supra, at 291.

28
 556 Phil. 178, 197 (2007).

29
Julian v. Development Bank of the Philippines and the City Sheriff, 678 Phil. 133, 144
(2011), citing Meatmasters International Corporation v. Lelis Integrated Development
Corporation, 492 Phil. 698, 702-703 (2005), citing La Salette College v. Pilotin, 463
Phil. 785, 794 (2003); American Express International, Inc. v. Sison, 591 Phil. 182, 191
(2008), citing Spouses Buenaflor v. Court of Appeals, 400 Phil. 395, 401-402 (2000).

30
 Rule 42, Section 1.

31
Rollo, p. 12.

32
Santos v. Court of Appeals, 323 Phil. 762, 770 (1996).

33
The Heirs of the late Ruben Reinoso, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, et al., supra note 24, at
281.

34
Sebastian v. Hon. Morales, 445 Phil. 595, 605 (2003).

35
Lorenzo v. People, 514 Phil. 644, 653 (2005). cralawred

G.R. No. L-26395      November 21, 1969

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs. MONICO O. CERVERA, Defendant-Appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor

General Isidro C. Borromeo and Solicitor Pedro A. Ramirez for
plaintiff-appellant.
Benjamin M. Valente for defendant-appellee.

CONCEPCION, C.J.: chanrobles virtual law library

Appeal from an order of dismissal of the Court of First Instance of

Antique, upon the ground of double jeopardy. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On September 29, 1962, Ambrosio Elequin filed, with the Municipal

Court of Sibalom, Antique, two criminal complaints against Monico
O. Cervera. In the first complaint, Criminal Case No. 682, Cervera
was charged with grave oral defamation, later changed to slight
defamation. It alleged:

That on or about September 28, 1962, between 4:00 and 5:00

o'clock in the afternoon, while inside the restaurant in the poblacion
of Sibalom, Antique, Philippines, .. the said accused MONICO O.
CERVERA did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
utter to the undersigned the following words in the Visayan dialect,
to wit: chanrobles virtual law library
"Baboy ikaw; wala huya; Hijodepota ikaw; Bastos, patay huya
mabato ikaw? Sabat; Caron badilon ta; Palotawon co caron ikaw sa
suba," and other words of similar import, which when translated
into English, means: "You are pig; Shameless; Son of a Bastard
(whore); Shameless (rough); you will fight? Answer. I will shoot you
and throw your body into the river," and words of similar import.

Charging Cervera with grave threats, it was alleged in the second

complaint, Criminal Case No. 683:

That on or about September 28, 19,62, between 4:00 and 5:00

o'clock in the afternoon, while the undersigned was inside the
restaurant of Juana de los Santos, situated in the vicinity of the
public market, within the Poblacion of Sibalom, Antique, ... the said
accused MONICO O. CERVERA, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously, threaten to kill the undersigned and
throw his body into the river, when he uttered the following words,
as follows, to wit: chanrobles virtual law library

"Caron badilon ta; Patyon ta; Caron palotawon co caron ikaw sa

suba; Pa lukpon co ang olo mo; Sabat cay badilon to ikaw," and
words of similar import, and which when translated into English
reads as follows: "I will shoot you; I will kill you; I will throw your
body into the river; I will blast your head; Answer and I will shoot
you," and other words of similar import.

On April 15, 1963, the defendant filed a motion to quash the

complaint in Criminal Case No. 683, for grave threats, upon the
ground: (1) that the charge therein should have been for light
threats, the acts imputed to him having been allegedly committed in
the heat of anger; and (2) that he would be placed twice in
jeopardy of punishment for the same act. The motion was denied on
May 9, 1963. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The two cases were jointly tried. After the introduction of the
evidence for the prosecution, on January 27, 1964, the defendant
moved to dismiss both cases, upon the ground of insufficiency of
the evidence to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The
complainant objected to the motion, which was denied on February
28, 1964. Thereafter, the municipal court proceeded with the trial,
up to its conclusion. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On April 15, 1964, said court rendered judgment in the two cases,
acquitting the defendant in Criminal Case No. 682, for slight oral
defamation, but finding him guilty of light threats in Criminal Case
No. 683 and sentencing him to pay a fine of P100.00, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The defendant appealed from the judgment in Criminal Case No.

683 to the Court of First Instance of Antique, in which the Provincial
Fiscal charged the defendant with light threats, under an
information (Criminal Case No. 428) alleging:

That on or about the 28th day of September, 1962, in the

municipality of Sibalom, province of Antique, Republic of the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, in the presence of several persons, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously threaten Ambrosio
Elequin with a blunt instrument (caborata) and at the same time
uttering the following words, to wit: "Caron badilon ta; Patyon ta;
Caron palotawon co caron ikaw sa suba; Pa lukpon co ang olo mo;
Sabat cay badilon to ikaw." which translated into English is as
follows: (I will shoot you; I will kill you; I will throw your body into
the river; I will blast your head; Answer so that I will shoot you),
and other words of similar import.

The defendant moved to quash the information, upon the ground

that his acquittal in Criminal Case No. 682 of the municipal court for
slight oral defamation was a bar to his prosecution for light threats,
both the oral defamation and the light threats having been allegedly
committed on one and the same occasion. The prosecution objected
thereto alleging that, although made on a single occasion, the
utterances conveyed distinct implications and meanings falling
under two separate provisions of the Revised Penal Code, one for
oral defamation, and the other for threats. On December 3, 1965,
the court of first instance denied the motion to quash, holding that
the offense of oral defamation, of which the defendant had been
acquitted, was not necessarily included in the offense of light
threats.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The defendant filed a motion for reconsideration. Relying principally
upon People vs. Yebra,1 on February 28, 1966, the court of first
instance reconsidered its order of December 3, 1965 and dismissed
the information, upon the theory that having been committed on
the same occasion, the offense of oral defamation was necessarily
included in that of light threats, and that, in view of defendant's
acquittal in the case for oral defamation, his prosecution for the
offense of light threats would place him in double jeopardy. The
prosecution sought a reconsideration, which said court of first
instance denied on April 22, 1966. Hence, this appeal by the
prosecution. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Appellant maintains that People vs. Yebra2 is not in point, because

in that case only one information was filed, whereas, in the present
case, there have been two separate criminal complaints, one for
oral defamation and another for light threats. In the Yebra case, the
trial court dismissed the information, upon the ground that it
charged two offenses, namely libel and threats, committed and
made in a letter written and sent by the defendant. In reversing the
order of dismissal, this Court held that the libelous remarks
contained in said letter were merely preparatory acts culminating in
the final threat, which was the offense committed by the
defendant. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the case at bar, the court of first instance seemed to believe that
defendant's acquittal in criminal case No. 682 of the municipal
court, for slight defamation, necessarily implied his acquittal for the
threatening remarks alleged in the complaint in that case, for, apart
from setting forth the insults heaped upon the complainant, it was
averred therein that the accused had added: "You will fight? (Will
you fight?) Answer. I will shoot you and throw your body into the
river," and "words of similar import." The conclusion thus reached
by the court of first instance is untenable. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

To begin with, a remark that is literally insulting may be made

without the slightest intention of casting any aspersion upon the
person to whom it is addressed or even as an expression of
affection for him or of joy upon seeing him. So, too, a person may
say that he will kill another and throw his body into the river, for the
purpose, not of intimidating, but of insulting him, as a manifestation
of the former's contempt for him and to express the feeling that the
former considers the latter so worthless and insignificant, as well as
so lacking in manly qualities, that the former could do whatever he
wanted to with the latter, as if he were a chicken or a rat. Thus, in
the Yebra case, it was held that the offensive remarks made by the
accused did not constitute defamation, the remarks being merely an
incident preliminary to the threat made by him, in the heat of
anger.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We note that - unlike the complaint in case No. 683 of the municipal
court, in which it is alleged that the defendant had threatened to
kill the complainant - in case No. 682 of the same court, the
complaint did not allege that the remarks above-quoted were
uttered with the intention of intimidating the complainant.
Moreover, in choosing to designate the offense therein charged as
grave oral defamation, and, later, as slight oral defamation, the
complainant impliedly indicated therein that said remarks had not
been made for the purpose of intimidating him. Indeed, the words
"You will fight? (Will you fight?) Answer," allegedly uttered by the
defendant, before saying "I will shoot you and throw your body into
the river," suggested that he had doubts about the courage of the
complainant, not only to fight, but, even to answer him back. The
defendant intimated thereby that complainant was afraid of him.
Thus, the complaint in case No. 682, when considered in its
entirety, strongly suggests the intention of asserting that the acts
therein set forth were performed for no other purpose than
to insult the complainant. We are not prepared, therefore, to hold
that the crime of light threat was included in the charge contained
in said complaint. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Secondly, we should bear in mind that the two (2) cases were heard
and decided, by the municipal court, at the same time. Let us
suppose that the complaint in said case No. 682 was exactly
identical to that filed in case No. 683 of the municipal court, and
that, in deciding both, the same declared that, since the two (2)
cases involved one and the same offense, it was not proper to twice
punish the accused therefor, and that, accordingly, he should be
and was convicted in one case only, and acquitted in the other. In
such event, it would be clear that said judgment of conviction would
not violate the constitutional injunction against double jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

No such infringement has similarly taken place in the case at bar.

Besides, a breach of the fundamental law should not be assumed.
On the contrary, the municipal judge is presumed to have done his
duty and complied with the law, unless and until the contrary is
clearly established, and the defendant has not done so. Indeed, the
decision of the municipal court, in said case No. 682, does not
appear in the record of the present case. Neither does the latter
show that the judgment of acquittal in case No. 682 was based
either upon failure to prove the facts alleged in the complaint or
upon proof that the allegations thereof are not true. What is more,
the denial of the motion to quash filed by the defendant, in the
municipal court, upon the conclusion of the evidence for the
prosecution, premised upon the alleged insufficiency of the evidence
to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and his conviction in
case No. 683 of said court indicate the exact opposite and that his
acquittal in case No. 682 was due merely to the belief that said
facts constituted the crime of light threat, not slight defamation.
Under these circumstances, the court of first instance erred in
reconsidering its order of December 3, 1965 and in dismissing the
information in the present case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from should be, as it is hereby set

aside, and the case at bar remanded to the Court of First Instance
of Antique for further proceedings, in conformity with this decision,
without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando and

Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar and Barredo, JJ., took no part.