INTERNAL AIDES TO

CONSTRUCTION
THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
AND PRINCIPLES OF LEGISLATION

CONTENTS
 Acknowledgement
3

Introduction
4-5

Internal Aides to Construction

6

Title
7-8

Preamble
9-10

Headings
11-12

Marginal notes
13

Schedules
14-15

Interpretation clause
16-17

2
Illustrations
18

Explanation
19

Proviso
20-21

Conclusion
22

Bibliography
23

3
 INTRODUCTION

As defined in the Black’s Law Dictionary, a Statute is a formal written enactment of a

legislative authority that governs a country, state, city, or county. Typically, statutes command
or prohibit something, or declare policy. The word is often used to distinguish law made by
legislative bodies from the judicial decisions of the common law and the regulations issued by
Government agencies.

Interpretation means the process of ascertaining the true meaning of the words used in a statute.
The object of interpretation of statutes is to determine the intention of the legislature conveyed
expressly or impliedly in the language used. As stated by Salmond, “By interpretation or
construction is meant, the process by which the courts seek to ascertain the meaning of the
legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in which it is expressed.”

Jurists take the help of both Rules and Aids in the interpretation of Statutes. As stated by the
Supreme Court in K.P. Varghese v. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam 1, interpretation of statute
being an exercise in the ascertainment of meaning, everything which is logically relevant should
be admissible. A Rule is a uniform or established course of things. There are three rules of
interpretation of statutes- Literal, Golden and Mischief. An Aid, on the other hand is a device
that helps or assists. For the purpose of construction or interpretation, the court has to take
recourse to various internal and external aids.

The object of interpretation of statutes is to determine the intention of the legislature conveyed
expressly or impliedly in the language used. In Santi Swarup Sarkar v. Pradeep Kumar Sarkar 2,
the Supreme Court held that if two interpretations are possible of the same statute, the one which
validates the statute must be preferred.

Laws enacted by the legislatures are interpreted by the judiciary. There are internal aids to
construction as well as external aids.

1
AIR 1981 SC 1922.
2
AIR 1997 Cal 197.

4
When internal aids are not adequate, court has to take recourse to External aids. External Aids
may be parliamentary material,  historical background, reports of a committee or a
commission, official statement, dictionary meanings, foreign decisions, etc. In Prabhakar Rao
and others v. State of A.P. and others 3,  O. Chennappa, Reddy J. has observed: Where internal
aids are not forthcoming, we can always have recourse to external aids to discover the object of
the legislation. 

3
AIR 1986 SC 120.

5
 INTERNAL AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION

Internal aids mean those aids which are available in the statute itself, though they may not be part
of enactment. Traditionally, all the writers on interpretation of statutes consider the preamble,
title, heading, marginal notes, punctuation, illustrations, definitions, proviso, explanation etc. as
internal aids.

Internal Aids of Interpretation are:-

1. Title
2. Preamble
3. Heading
4. Marginal Notes
5. Schedules
6. Interpretation Clauses
7. Illustrations
8. Explanation
9. Proviso

6
 THE ‘TITLE’

It is now settled that Long Title of an Act is a part of the Act and is admissible as an aid to its
construction. The long title which often precedes the preamble must be distinguished with the
short title; the former taken along with the preamble or even in its absence is a good guide
regarding the object, scope or purpose of the Act, whereas the latter being only an abbreviation
for purposes of reference is not a useful aid to construction. It includes:

1. Long Title

2. Short Title

Long title – Every Statute is headed by a long title and it gives the description about the object
of an Act. For e.g. the long title of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is – “An Act to
consolidate and amend the laws relating to the procedure of the Courts of Civil Judicature”.

In recent times, long title has been used by the courts to interpret certain provision of the statutes.
However, it is useful only to the extent of removing the ambiguity and confusions and is not a
conclusive aid to interpret the provision of the statute.

In Re Kerala Education bill4, the Supreme Court held that the policy and purpose may be
deduced from the long title and the preamble.

In Manohar Lal v. State of Punjab5, Long title of the Act is relied as a guide to decide the scope
of the Act.

Although the title is a part of the Act, it is in itself not an enacting provision and though useful in
case of ambiguity of the enacting provisions, is ineffective to control their clear meaning.

Short Title – The short title of an Act is for the purpose of reference & for its identification. It
ends with the year of passing of the Act. For e.g. Section 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,
4
[2] 1959 1 SCR 995.
5
1961 AIR 418, 1961 SCR (2) 343.

7
says –“This Act may be cited as the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It shall come into force on
the first day of January, 1909.”

Even though short title is the part of the statute, it does not have any role in the interpretation of
the provisions of an Act.

8
 PREAMBLE

The Preamble of a statute like the long title is a part of the Act and is an admissible aid to
construction. Although not an enacting part, the preamble is expected to express the scope,
object and purpose of the Act more comprehensively than the long title. It may recite the ground
and cause of making the statute, the evils sought to be remedied or the doubts which may be
intended to be settled. In the words of Sir John Nicholl: It is to the preamble more specifically
that we are to look for the reason or spirit of every statute, rehearsing this, as it ordinarily does,
the evils sought to be remedied, or the doubts purported to be removed by the statute, and so
evidencing, in the best and most satisfactory manner, the object or intention of the Legislature in
making or passing the statute itself.6

It is expected to express the scope, object and purpose of the Act more comprehensively than the
Long Title. It may recite the ground and cause of making the statute, the evils sought to be
remedied or the doubts which may be intended to be settled, in the best or most satisfactory
manner It is a key to open the minds of the makers of the Act and the issues redressed by them in
such enactment. However, it is not to influence the meaning otherwise ascribable to the enacting
part unless there is a compelling reason for it.

The principle has also been enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Burakar Coal Co.
Ltd. v. Union of India, 7 where Mudholkar, J., speaking for the court observed: “It is one of the
cardinal principles of construction that where the language of an Act is clear, the preamble may
be resorted to explain it. Again, where very general language is used in an enactment which, it is
clear must be intended to have a limited application, the preamble may be used to indicate to
what particular instances, the enactment is intended to apply. We cannot, therefore, start with the
preamble for construing the provisions of an Act, though we could be justified in resorting to it,
nay, we will be required to do so, if we find that the language used by Parliament is ambiguous

6
Brett v. Brett, (1826) 162 ER 456.
7
AIR 1961 SC 954.

9
or is too general though in point of fact parliament intended that it should have a limited
application.

The preamble may, no doubt, be used to solve any ambiguity or to fix the meaning of words
which may have more than one meaning, but it can, however, not be used to eliminate as
redundant or unintended, the operative provision of a statute. 8 A preamble retrospectively
inserted into an earlier Act is not of much assistance for gathering the intention of the original
Act. Similarly, it seems the repeal of a preamble simpliciter will not affect the construction of the
Statute.

8
State of Rajasthan v. Leela Jain, AIR 1965 SC 1296.

10
 HEADINGS

A Heading is to be regarded as giving the key to the interpretation of the clauses ranged under it,
unless the wording is inconsistent with such interpretation, and so the headings may be treated as
Preambles to the provisions following them. A contradictory view can also be taken where a
heading can only be resorted to when the words are ambiguous.

The Supreme Court in Frick India Ltd. v. Union of India,9 has expressed as follows:

“It is well-settled that the headings prefixed to sections or entries cannot control the plain words
of the provision; they cannot also be referred to for the purpose of construing the provision when
the words used in the provision are clear and unambiguous; nor can they be used for cutting
down the plain meaning of the words in the provision. Only, in the case of ambiguity or doubt
the heading or sub-heading may be referred to as an aid in construing the provision but even in
such a case it could not be used for cutting down the wide application of the clear words used in
the provision.”

Justice Lahoti in Raichurmatham Prabhakar Rawatmal Dugar,10  has held “it is permissible to

assign the Heading or Title of a section a limited role to play in the construction of statutes. They
may be taken as very broad and general indicators of the nature of the subject-matter dealt with
thereunder. The Heading or Title may also be taken as a condensed name assigned to indicate
collectively the characteristics of the subject-matter dealt with by the enactment underneath;
though the name would always be brief having its own limitations. In case of conflict between
the plain language of the provision and the meaning of the Heading or Title, the Heading or Title
would not control the meaning which is clearly and plainly discernible from the language of the
provision thereunder.”

9
AIR 1990 SC 689.
10
(2004) 4 SCC.

11
The view is now settled that the Headings or Titles prefixed to sections or group of sections can
be referred to in construing an Act of the Legislature. 11 But conflicting opinions have been
expressed on the question as to what weight should be attached to the headings. “A Heading”,
according to one view, “is to be regarded as giving the key to the interpretation of the clauses
ranged under it, unless the wording is inconsistent with such interpretation; and so the headings
might be treated “as preambles to the provisions following them.”

In Krishnaiah v. State of A.P. and Ors12 it was held that headings prefixed to sections cannot
control the plain words of the provisions. Only in the case of ambiguity or doubt, heading or sub-
heading may be referred to as an aid in construing provision.

2. In Durga Thathera v. Narain Thathera and An 13r  the court held that the headings are like a
preamble which helps as a key to the mind of the legislature but do not control the substantive
section of the enactment.

11
Bhinka v. Charan Singh, AIR 1959 SC 960.
12
AIR 2005 AP 10, 2004 (2) ALD 794, 2004 (2) ALT 730.
13
AIR 1931 All 597, 136 Ind Cas 275.

12
 MARGINAL NOTES

In the older statutes marginal notes were not inserted by the legislature and hence were not part
of the statute and could not be referred to for the purpose of construing the statute. If they are
also enacted by the legislature they can be referred to for the purpose of interpretation. In the
case of the Indian Constitution, the marginal notes have been enacted by the Constituent
Assembly and hence they may be referred to for interpreting the Articles of the Constitution. If
the words used in the enactment are clear and unambiguous, the marginal note cannot control the
meaning, but in case of ambiguity or doubt, the marginal note may be referred to.

In the case of Thakurain Balraj Kunwar v. Rao Jagpatpal Singh14, it was observed that it is well
settled that marginal notes to the sections of an Act of Parliament cannot be referred to for the
purpose of construing the Act.

There can be no justification for restricting the contents of the section by the marginal note. 15 The
marginal note cannot affect the construction of the language used in the body of the section if it
is otherwise clear and ambiguous. The marginal heading cannot control the interpretation of the
words of the section particularly when the language of the section is clear and unambiguous.
Where the language is clear and can admit of no other meaning, the marginal note cannot be read
to control the provisions of the statute. “Marginal notes in an Indian statute, as in an Act of
Parliament cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing the statute.” 16 Although a marginal
note may not be determinative of the content of the provision, it may act as an intrinsic aid to
construction.

14
(1904) ILR 26 All 393 (PC).
15
Emperor v. Sadashiv, AIR 1947 PC 82.
16
C.I.T. v. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai & Co., AIR 1950 SC 134.

13
 SCHEDULES

Schedules at the end contain minute details for working out the provisions of the express
enactment. The expression in the schedule however cannot override the provisions of the express
enactment. It forms part of the statute and it can be interpreted independently as well as with the
aids of interpretation of statutory provision. They are added towards the end and their use is
made to avoid encumbering the sections in the statute with matters of excessive detail. The
division of a statute into sections and schedules is a mere matter of convenience and a Schedule
therefore may contain substantive enactment.

The proper function of a proviso is to except and to deal with a case which would otherwise fall
within the general language of the main enactment and its effect is confined to that case. It is a
qualification of the preceding enactment which is expressed in terms too general to be quite
accurate. As a general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment to qualify or create an exception
to what is in the enactment and ordinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule.
Normally, a proviso does not travel beyond the provision to which it is a proviso. It craves out an
exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted as a proviso and to no other. When
one finds a proviso to a section the natural presumption is that, but for the proviso, the enacting
part of the section would have included the subject-matter of the proviso.

A proviso must be construed with reference to the preceding parts of the clause to which it is
appended. Where the proviso is directly repugnant to a section, the proviso shall stand and be
held a repeal of the section as the proviso speaks the later intention of the makers. A construction
placed upon a proviso which brings it into general harmony with the terms of section should
prevail. The normal function of a proviso is to except something out of the enactment or to
qualify something enacted therein which but for the proviso would be within the purview of the
enactment. As was stated in Mullins v. Treasury of Survey17, when one finds a proviso to a
section the natural presumption is that, but for the proviso, the enacting part of the section would
have included the subject-matter of the proviso. The proper function of a proviso is to except and
17
1885 (5) QBD 170 : AIR 1961 SC 1596 : AIR 1965 SC 1728.

14
to deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general language of the main
enactment and its effect is confined to that case.

It is a qualification of the preceding enactment which is expressed in terms too general to be

quite accurate. As a general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment to qualify or create an
exception to what is in the enactment and ordinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as stating a
general rule. "If the language of the enacting part of the statute does not contain the provisions
which are said to occur in it you cannot derive these provisions by implication from a proviso."18

Coming to the interpretation of proviso and explanation, we may refer to a well known judgment
of the Supreme Court in S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman. 19 After exhaustively referring
to the earlier case law on scope and interpretation of a proviso as well as explanation to a section,
the Supreme Court laid down as under:

“A proviso may serve four different purposes:

(1) qualifying or excepting certain provisions from the main enactment;

(2) it may entirely change the very concept of the intendment of the enactment by insisting on
certain mandatory conditions to be fulfilled in order to make the enactment workable;

(3) it may be so embedded in the Act itself as to become an integral part of the enactment and
thus acquire the tenor and colour of the substantive enactment itself; and

(4) it may be used merely to act as an options addenda to the enactment with the sole object of
explaining the real intendment of the statutory provision.

18
State of Punjab & Anr. v. Ashwani Kumar & Ors, AIR 2009 SC 186.
19
AIR 1985 SC 582 : (1985) 1 SCC 591.

15
 INTERPRETATION CLAUSES

These do not take away the ordinary and natural meaning of the words, but as used: (i) to extend
the meaning of a word to include or cover something, which would not normally be covered or
included; and (ii) to interpret ambiguous words and words which are not plain or clear.

The definition must ordinarily determine the application of the word or phrase defined; but the
definition itself must first be interpreted before it is applied.

When the definition of a word gives it an extended meaning, the word is not to be interpreted by
its extended meaning every time it is used, for the meaning ultimately depends on the context;
and a definition clause does not, ordinarily enlarge the scope of the Act.

Definitions in an Act are to be applied only when there is nothing repugnant in the subject or
context, and this is so even if such a qualifying provisions is not expressly stated by the
legislature.

The words ‘that is to say’ are not words of restriction. They are words of illustration, and the
instances that follow operate as a guide for interpretation.

An interpretation clause may used the very ‘includes’ or ‘means’ or ‘means and includes’, or
‘denotes’ or ‘deemed to be’.

The words ‘includes’ is generally used in the interpretation clause to enlarge the meaning of
words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute; and when it is so used, those words and
phrases must be considered as comprehending, not only such things as they signify according to
their natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall
include.

If the words ‘means’ or ‘means and includes’ are used it affords a exhaustive explanation of the
meaning which, for the purposes of the Act, must inevitably be attached to those words or
expressions.

16
If the word ‘denotes’ is used it has the same significance as ‘includes’.

If the word ‘deemed to be’ is used it creates a fiction and a thing is treated to be that which in
fact it is not.

In the absence of such a definition, the General Clauses Act of the particular legislature which
enacted the statute should be referred to. If the word is not defined there also, the rules of
interpretation would come into play.

The word ‘include’ is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the
meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute; and when it is so used those
words or phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things, as they signify
according to their natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares
that they shall include.

17
 ILLUSTRATIONS

Illustrations appended to a section from part of the statute and although forming no part of the
section, are of relevance and value in the construction of the text of the section and they should
not be readily rejected as repugnant to the section.

It would be the very last resort of construction to make this assumption. The great usefulness of
the Illustrations which have, although not part of the sections, been expressly furnished by the
Legislature as helpful in the working and application of the statute, should not be thus imparied.

As held in Mahomed Sydeol Ariffin v. Yeah Oai Gark,20 “The great usefulness of the Illustrations
which have, although not part of the sections, been expressly furnished by the Legislature as
helpful in the working and application of the statute, should not be thus imparied.”

In a case before the Supreme Court which involved the interpretation of section 106 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872, the Court held that the said provision was not intended to relieve the
prosecution of the burden of proof and was designed to meet certain exceptional cases and had
no application to those cases where the information was as much within the knowledge of the
prosecution as of accused. Referring to the Illustration to section 106, BOSE J., observed:

“We recognize that an Illustration does not exhaust the full content of the section which it
illustrates but it can neither curtail nor expand its ambit.”21

The Supreme Court took the aid of Illustration appended to section 43, Transfer of Property Act,
1882 for the conclusion that the said provision applies to transfers of spes successionis and
enables the transferee to claim the property, provided other conditions of the section are satisfied.
Venkatarama Aiyar, J., quoted the judgment in Ariffins' case,22 and observed: "It is not to be
readily assumed that an Illustration to a section is repugnant to it and rejected.

20
43 IA pp.256, 263; (1916) 2 AC (PC) 575.
21
Shambhu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer, AIR 1956 SC pp.,404, 406.
22
43 IA pp.256, 263.

18
 EXPLANATION

An Explanation is added to a section to elaborate upon and explain the meaning of the words
appearing in the section. The purpose is not to limit the scope of the main section but to explain,
clarify, subtract or include something by elaboration.

The object of an Explanation is to understand the Act in the light of the Explanation. The object
of an Explanation to a statutory provision is-

(a) to explanation the meaning and intendment of the Act itself,

(b) where there is any obscurity or vagueness in the main enactment, to clarify the same so as to
make it consistent with the dominant object which it seems to subserve,

(c) to provide an additional support to the dominant object of the Act in order to make it
meaningful and purposeful,

(d) an Explanation cannot in any way interfere with or change the enactment or any part thereof
but where some gap is left which is relevant for the purpose of the Explanation, in order to
suppress the mischief and advance the object of the Act it can help or assist the court in
interpreting the true purport and intendment of the enactment, and

(e) it cannot, however, take away a statutory right with which any person under a statute has
been clothed or set at naught the working of an Act by becoming an hindrance in the
interpretation of the same.

It does not ordinarily enlarge the scope of the original section which it explains, but only makes
the meaning clear beyond dispute.

19
 PROVISO

A proviso is to provide examples of a specific case which would otherwise fall within the general
language of the main enactment. It excludes, excepts and restricts the application of a section and
its effect is confined to that case.

In CIT vs. Ajax Products Ltd.23, it was held that whether a proviso is construed as restricting the
main provision or as a substantive clause, it cannot be divorced from the provision to which it
stands as a proviso. It must be construed harmoniously with the main enactment.

The proper function of a proviso is to except and to deal with a case which would otherwise fall
within the general language of the main enactment and its effect is confined to that case. It is a
qualification of the preceding enactment which is expressed in terms too general to be quite
accurate. As a general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment to qualify or create an exception
to what is in the enactment and ordinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule.
Normally, a proviso does not travel beyond the provision to which it is a proviso. It craves out an
exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted as a proviso and to no other.

When one finds a proviso to a section the natural presumption is that, but for the proviso, the
enacting part of the section would have included the subject-matter of the proviso. A proviso
must be construed with reference to the preceding parts of the clause to which it is appended.

The proviso is subordinate to the main section. A proviso does not enlarge an enactment except
for compelling reasons. Sometimes an unnecessary proviso is inserted by way of abundant
caution. A proviso may sometimes contain a substantive provision.

A construction placed upon a proviso which brings it into general harmony with the terms of
section should prevail.

23
(1964) 55 ITR 741 (SC), 1965 AIR 1358, 1965 SCR (1) 700.

20
Coming to the interpretation of proviso and explanation, judgment of the Supreme Court in S.
Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman24 may be referred. After exhaustively referring to the
earlier case law on scope and interpretation of a proviso as well as explanation to a section, the
Supreme Court laid down as under:

“A proviso may serve four different purposes:

(1) qualifying or excepting certain provisions from the main enactment;

(2) it may entirely change the very concept of the intendment of the enactment by insisting on
certain mandatory conditions to be fulfilled in order to make the enactment workable;

(3) it may be so embedded in the Act itself as to become an integral part of the enactment and
thus acquire the tenor and colour of the substantive enactment itself; and

(4) it may be used merely to act as an options addenda to the enactment with the sole object of
explaining the real intendment of the statutory provision.

24
AIR 1985 SC 582 : (1985) 1 SCC 591.

21
 CONCLUSION

An attempt is made in this project to give a general view of internal aids which are of the most
practical utility in interpreting statues. The importance of use of these aids is manifest. In any
case, where difficulty arises as to finding out the true intention of the legislature, the use of these
materials could be made by the Courts. Of course, in India, there is no consistent and uniform
approach to the use of intrinsic materials in the sense of determining as an aids for the purpose of
interpretation of a given statute. Undoubtedly, individually as well as collectively, they are very
much useful in finding out the true intention of the legislature. Of course, recourse to this aids
could only be made in case of possibility of more than one interpretation of a given statute.

By a long catena of decisions, it is now well settled that preamble is not a part of enactment. It is
a recital to the intent of the legislature as it enumerates the mischiefs to be remedied. Though it is
considered as a key to the construction of the statute, whenever the enacting part is open to
doubt, it cannot restrict or extend the enacting part when the latter is free from doubt. However,
in India, it is well settled in the field of constitutional law that the preamble to the Constitution of
India is the guideline for interpreting the constitutional provisions. But there is nothing wrong for
Courts to refer to the preamble as well as the title of the Act in construing the statute to know the
intention of the legislature. Whenever there is a reasonable doubt about the provisions in the
statute, it is permissible to refer to the heading of the provision for interpreting the section.
Insofar as marginal notes inserted in the legislation itself are concerned, they are also treated as
guidelines for interpreting the statutes. In many statutes, especially, penal statutes, enacted in the
olden times, it is the practice of the legislature to give illustrations. The illustrations cannot be
used either to cut down or extend the scope of the section.

22
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

#INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES, VEPA P. SARATHI (4TH ED)

#INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES, LEXIS NEXIS, ROSEDAR S R A (1 ST ED)

#INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES, AVTAR SINGH & HARPREET KAUR (4TH ED)

23