San Ildefonso Lines V CA 289 SCRA 568

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568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (Thirteenth


Division)

*
G.R. No. 119771. April 24, 1998.

SAN ILDEFONSO LINES, INC. and EDUARDO JAVIER,


petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Thirteenth
Division) and PIONEER INSURANCE and SURETY
CORPORATION, respondents.

Actions; Independent Civil Actions; Pleadings and Practice; It


is easily deducible from the present wording of Section 3, Rule 111
of the Rules of Court as brought about by the 1988 amendments to
the Rules on Criminal Procedure—particularly the phrase “. . .
which has been reserved”—that the “independent” character of
these civil actions does not do away with the reservation
requirement. Prior reservation is a condition sine qua non before
any of these independent civil actions can be instituted and
thereafter have a continuous determination apart from or
simultaneous with the criminal action.—There is no dispute that
these so-called “independent civil actions” based on the
aforementioned Civil Code articles are the exceptions to the
primacy of the criminal action over the civil action as set forth in
Section 2 of Rule 111. However, it is easily deducible from the
present wording of Section 3 as brought about by the 1988
amendments to the Rules on Criminal Procedure—particularly
the phrase “. . . which has been reserved”—that the “independent”
character of these civil actions does not do away with the
reservation requirement. In other words, prior reservation is a
condition sine qua non before any of these independent civil
actions can be instituted and thereafter have a continuous
determination apart from or simultaneous with the criminal
action. That this should now be the controlling procedural rule is
confirmed by no less than retired Justice Jose Y. Feria, remedial
law expert and a member of the committee which drafted the
1988 amendments.

Same; Same; Same; Now that the necessity of a prior


reservation is the standing rule that shall govern the institution of
the independent civil actions referred to in Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court, past pronouncements that view the reservation requirement
as an “unauthorized amendment” to substantive law—i.e., the
Civil Code, should no longer be controlling; Far from altering
substantive rights, the primary purpose of the reservation is to
avoid multiplicity of

_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.

569

VOL. 289, APRIL 24, 1998 569

San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (Thirteenth


Division)

suits, to guard against oppression and abuse, to prevent delays, to


clear congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in
short, the attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation
to the parties-litigants.—Now that the necessity of a prior
reservation is the standing rule that shall govern the institution
of the independent civil actions referred to in Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court, past pronouncements that view the reservation
requirement as an “unauthorized amendment” to substantive law
—i.e., the Civil Code, should no longer be controlling. There must
be a renewed adherence to the time-honored dictum that
procedural rules are designed, not to defeat, but to safeguard the
ends of substantial justice. And for this noble reason, no less than
the Constitution itself has mandated this Court to promulgate
rules concerning the enforcement of rights with the end in view of
providing a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases which should not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights. Far from altering substantive rights, the
primary purpose of the reservation is, to borrow the words of the
Court in “Caños v. Peralta”: “. . . to avoid multiplicity of suits, to
guard against oppression and abuse, to prevent delays, to clear
congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in short,
the attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to
the parties-litigants.”

Same; Same; Same; Insurance; Subrogation; An insurer, as


subrogee under Article 2207 of the Civil Code, is not exempt from
the reservation requirement with respect to its damages suit based
on quasi-delict arising from the same act or omission complained
of in the criminal case.—Clearly then, private respondent PISC,
as subrogee under Article 2207 of the Civil Code, is not exempt
from the reservation requirement with respect to its damages suit
based on quasi-delict arising from the same act or omission of
petitioner Javier complained of in the criminal case. As private
respondent PISC merely stepped into the shoes of Ms. Jao (as
owner of the insured Toyota van), then it is bound to observe the
procedural requirements which Ms. Jao ought to follow had she
herself instituted the civil case.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the


Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

570

570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (Thirteenth
Division)

     Tanjuatco, Sta. Maria, Tanjuatco for petitioners.


          Conrado Mangahas & Associates for private
respondents.

MARTINEZ, J.:

At around 3:30 in the afternoon of June 24, 1991, a Toyota


Lite Ace Van being driven by its owner Annie U. Jao and a
passenger bus of herein petitioner San Ildefonso Lines, Inc.
(hereafter, SILI) figured in a vehicular mishap at the
intersection of Julia Vargas Avenue and Rodriguez Lanuza
Avenue in Pasig, Metro Manila, totally wrecking the
Toyota van and injuring Ms. Jao and her two (2)
passengers in the process.
A criminal case was thereafter filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig on September 18, 1991 charging the
driver of the bus, herein petitioner Eduardo Javier, with
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with
multiple physical injuries.
About four (4) months later, or on January 13, 1992,
herein private respondent Pioneer Insurance and Surety
Corporation (PISC), as insurer of the van and subrogee,
filed a case for damages against petitioner SILI with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, seeking to recover the
sums it paid the assured under a motor vehicle insurance
policy as well as other damages, totaling P564,500.00
(P454,000.00 as actual/compensatory damages; P50,000.00
as exemplary damages; P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
P10,000.00 as 1litigation expenses; and P500.00 as
appearance fees.)
With the issues having been joined upon the filing of the
petitioners’ answer to the complaint for damages and after
submission by the parties of their respective pre-trial
briefs, petitioners filed on September 18, 1992 a
Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Civil Proceedings
grounded on the pendency of the criminal case against
petitioner Javier in the Pasig RTC and the failure of
respondent PISC to make a res-

________________

1 See Complaint, Rollo, pp. 35-38.

571

VOL. 289, APRIL 24, 1998 571


San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (Thirteenth
Division)

ervation to file a separate damage suit in said criminal


action. This was denied by the Manila
2
Regional Trial Court
in its Order dated July 21, 1993, ruling thus:

“Answering the first question thus posed, the court holds that
plaintiff may legally institute the present civil action even in the
absence of a reservation in the criminal action. This is so because
it falls among the very exceptions to the rule cited by the movant.
“It is true that the general rule is that once a criminal action
has been instituted, then civil action based thereon is deemed
instituted together with the criminal action, such that if the
offended party did not reserve the filing of the civil action when
the criminal action was filed, then such filing of the civil action is
therefore barred; on the other hand, if there was such reservation,
still the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has
been rendered in the criminal action;
“But, this rule (Section 2, Rule 111, Revised Rules of Court) is
subject to exemptions, the same being those provided for in
Section 3 of the same rule which states:

‘Section 3. When civil action may proceed independently.—In the cases


provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the independent civil action which has been reserved may be
brought by the offended party, shall proceed independently of the
criminal action, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.’

“Besides, the requirement in Section 2 of Rule 111 of the


former Rules on Criminal Procedure that there be a reservation in
the criminal case of the right to institute an independent civil
action has been declared as not in accordance with law. It is
regarded as an unauthorized amendment to our substantive law,
i.e., the Civil Code which does not require such reservation. In
fact, the reservation of the right to file an independent civil action
has been deleted from Section 2, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, in consonance with the decisions of this
Court declaring such requirement of a reservation as ineffective.
(Bonite vs. Zosa, 162 SCRA 180)
“Further, the Court rules that a subrogee-plaintiff may
institute and prosecute the civil action, it being allowed by Article
2207 of the Civil Code.”

_______________

2 Annex F, Rollo, pp. 43-47.

572

572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (Thirteenth
Division)

After their motion for reconsideration of said July 21, 1993


Order was denied, petitioners elevated the matter to this
Court via petition for certiorari which was, however,
referred to public respondent Court of Appeals for
disposition. On February 24, 1995, a decision adverse to
petitioners once again was rendered by respondent court,
upholding the assailed Manila Regional Trial Court Order
in this wise:

“A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,


whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed (if the
tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover damages
on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to
the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the
two cases vary.
“To subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said
articles to the result of the criminal prosecution-whether it be
conviction or acquittal-would render meaningless the independent
character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Art. 31,
that this action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
“In Yakult Phil. vs. CA, the Supreme Court said:

‘Even if there was no reservation in the criminal case and that the civil
action was not filed before the filing of the criminal action but before the
prosecution presented evidence in the criminal action, and the judge
handling the criminal case was informed thereof, then the actual filing of
the civil action is even far better than a compliance with the requirement
of an express reservation that should be made by the offended party
before the prosecution presented its evidence.’

“The purpose of this rule requiring reservation is to prevent


the offended party from recovering damages twice for the same
act or omission.
“Substantial compliance with the reservation requirement
may, therefore, be made by making a manifestation in the
criminal case that the private respondent has instituted a
separate and independent civil action for damages.
“Oft-repeated is the dictum that courts should not place undue
importance on technicalities when by so doing, substantial justice
is sacrificed. While the rules of procedure require adherence, it
must

573

VOL. 289, APRIL 24, 1998 573


San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (Thirteenth
Division)

be remembered that said rules of procedure are intended to


promote, not defeat, substantial justice, and therefore, they
should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense.”

Hence, this petition for review after a motion for


reconsideration of said respondent court judgment was
denied.
The two (2) crucial issues to be resolved, as posited by
petitioners, are:

1) If a criminal case was filed, can an independent


civil action based on quasi-delict under Article 2176
of the Civil Code be filed if no reservation was made
in the said criminal case?
2) Can a subrogee of an offended party maintain an
independent civil action during the pendency of a
criminal action when no reservation of the right to
file an independent civil action was made in the
criminal action and despite the fact that the private
complainant is actively participating through a
private prosecutor in the aforementioned criminal
case?

We rule for petitioners.


On the chief issue of “reservation,” at the fore is Section
3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which reads:

“Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently.—In the


cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, the independent civil action which has been
reserved may be brought by the offended party, shall proceed
independently of the criminal action, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.”

There is no dispute that these so-called “independent civil


actions” based on the aforementioned Civil Code articles
are the exceptions to the primacy of the criminal action3
over the civil action as set forth in Section 2 of Rule 111.
However, it

________________

3 Section 2. Rule 111 of the Rules of Court reads in part:

“Sec. 2. Institution of separate civil action.—Except in the cases provided for in


Section 3 hereof, after the criminal action has been commenced, the civil action
which has been

574

574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (Thirteenth
Division)

is easily deducible from the present wording of Section 3 as


brought about by the 1988 amendments to the Rules on
Criminal Procedure—particularly the phrase “. . . which
has been reserved”—that the “independent” character of
these civil actions does not do away with the reservation
requirement. In other words, prior reservation is a
condition sine qua non before any of these independent civil
actions can be instituted and thereafter have a continuous
determination apart from or simultaneous with the
criminal action. That this should now be the controlling
procedural rule is confirmed by no less than retired Justice
Jose Y. Feria, remedial law expert and a member of the
committee which drafted the 1988 amendments, whose
learned explanation on the matter was aptly pointed out by
petitioners, to wit:

“The 1988 amendment expands the scope of the civil action which
is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless
waived, reserved or previously instituted x x x.
Under the present Rule as amended, such a civil action
includes not only recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal
Code and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, but also damages under Article 2176 of the said
code. x x x
Objections were raised to the inclusion in this Rule of
quasidelicts under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. However, in view of Article 2177 of the said code
which provides that the offended party may not recover twice for
the same act or omission of the accused, and in line with the
policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits, these objections were
overruled. In any event, the offended party is not precluded from
filing a civil action to recover damages arising from quasi-delict
before the institution of the criminal action, or from reserving his
right to file such a separate civil action, just as he is not precluded
from filing a civil action for damages under Articles 32, 33 and 34
before the institution of the criminal action, or from reserving his
right to file such a separate civil action. It is only in those cases
where the offended party has not previously filed a civil action or
has not reserved his right to file a separate civil action

_______________

reserved cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.
x x x      x x x      x x x.”

575

VOL. 289, APRIL 24, 1998 575


San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (Thirteenth
Division)

that his civil action is deemed impliedly instituted with the


criminal action.
It should be noted that while it was ruled in Abella vs. Marave
(57 SCRA 106) that a reservation of the right to file an
independent civil action is not necessary, such a reservation is
necessary under the amended rule. Without such reservation, the
civil action is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, unless previously waived or instituted. (Italics ours. Justice
Jose Y. Feria [Ret.], 1988 Amendments to the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, a pamphlet, published by Central Lawbook
Publishing
4
Co., Inc., Philippines Legal Studies, Series Nos. 3, 5-
6).

Sharing the same view on the indispensability of a prior


reservation is Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, whose
analysis of the historical changes in Rule 111 since the
1964 Rules of Court is equally illuminating. Thus,
“1. Under Rule 111 of the 1964 Rules of Court, the civil
liability arising from the offense charged was
impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless
such civil action was expressly waived or reserved.
The offended party was authorized to bring an
independent civil action in the cases provided for in
Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code
provided such right was reserved.
In the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the same
Rule 111 thereof reiterated said provision on the
civil liability arising from the offense charged. The
independent civil actions, however, were limited to
the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33 and 34 of
the Civil Code, obviously because the actions
contemplated in Articles 31 and 2177 of said Code
are not liabilities ex delicto. Furthermore, no
reservation was required in order the civil actions
in said Articles 32, 33 and 34 may be pursued
separately.
2. The present amendments introduced by the
Supreme Court have the following notable features
on this particular procedural aspect, viz.:

a. The civil action which is impliedly instituted with


the criminal action, barring a waiver, reservation or
prior institution thereof, need not arise from the
offense charged, as

_______________

4 Petition, pp. 10-11; Rollo, pp. 11-12.

576

576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (Thirteenth
Division)

the phrase ‘arising from the offense charged’ which creates


that nexus has been specifically eliminated.

b. The independent civil actions contemplated in the


present Rule 111 include the quasi-delicts provided
for in Art. 2176 of the Civil Code, in addition to the
cases provided in Arts. 32, 33 and 34 thereof. It is
necessary, however, that the civil liability under all
the said articles arise ‘from the same act or
omission of the accused.’ Furthermore, a reservation
of the right to institute these separate civil actions is
again required, otherwise, said civil actions are
impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless
the former are waived or filed5 ahead of the criminal
action.” (Emphasis supplied.)
6
In fact, a deeper reading of the “Yakult Phils. vs. CA” case
relied upon by respondent court reveals an
acknowledgement of the reservation requirement. After
recognizing that the civil case instituted by private
respondent therein Roy Camaso (represented by his father
David Camaso) against petitioner Yakult Phils. (the owner
of the motorcycle that sideswiped Roy Camaso, only five
years old at the time of the accident) and Larry Salvado
(the driver of the motorcycle) during the pendency of the
criminal case against Salvado for reckless imprudence
resulting to slight physical injuries, as one based on tort,
this Court said:

“The civil liability sought arising from the act or omission of the
accused in this case is a quasi-delict as defined under Article 2176
of the Civil Code as follows:
x x x      x x x      x x x.”
“The aforecited rule [referring to the amended Section 1, Rule
111] requiring such previous reservation also covers quasi-delict as
defined under Article 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the
same act or omission of the accused” (Italics supplied).

_______________

5 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Volume II, 1995 Edition, p.


275.
6 190 SCRA 357, October 5, 1990.

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VOL. 289, APRIL 24, 1998 577


San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (Thirteenth
Division)

But what prompted the Court to validate the institution


andnon-suspension of the civil case involved in “Yakult”
was thepeculiar facts attendant therein. Thus,

“Although the separate civil action filed in this case was without
previous reservation in the criminal case, nevertheless since it
was instituted before the prosecution presented evidence in the
criminal action, and the judge handling the criminal case was
informed thereof, then the actual filing of the civil action is even
far better than a compliance with the requirement of an express
reservation that should be made by the offended party before the
prosecution presents its evidence.”

The distinct factual scenario in “Yakult” simply does not


obtain in this case. No satisfactory proof exists to show that
private respondent PISC’s damage suit was instituted
before the prosecution presented its evidence in the
criminal case pending in the Pasig Regional Trial Court.
Neither is there any indication that the judge presiding
over the criminal action has been made aware of the civil
case. It is in this light that reliance on the “Yakult” case is
indeed misplaced.
Now that the necessity of a prior reservation is the
standing rule that shall govern the institution of the
independent civil actions referred to in Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court, past pronouncements that view the
reservation requirement as an “unauthorized amendment”
to substantive law—i.e., the Civil Code, should no longer be
controlling. There must be a renewed adherence to the
time-honored dictum that procedural rules are designed,
not to defeat, but to safeguard the ends to substantial
justice. And for this noble reason, no less than the
Constitution itself has mandated this Court to promulgate
rules concerning the enforcement of rights with the end in
view of providing a simplified and inexpensive procedure
for the speedy disposition of cases which should 7
not
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Far from
altering sub-

________________

7 Article VIII, Section 5(5), 1987 Constitution.

578

578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (Thirteenth
Division)

stantive rights, the primary purpose of the reservation


8
is,
to borrow the words of the Court in “Caños v. Peralta” :

“. . . to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression and


abuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested dockets, to simplify
the work of the trial court; in short, the attainment of justice with
the least expense and vexation to the parties-litigants.”
Clearly then, private respondent9 PISC, as subrogee under
Article 2207 of the Civil Code, is not exempt from the
reservation requirement with respect to its damages suit
based on quasi-delict arising from the same act or omission
of petitioner Javier complained of in the criminal case. As
private respondent PISC merely stepped into the shoes of
Ms. Jao (as owner of the insured Toyota van), then it is
bound to observe the procedural requirements which Ms.
Jao ought to follow had she herself instituted the civil case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 24, 1995
and the Resolution dated April 3, 1995 denying the motion
for reconsideration thereof are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The “MANIFESTATION AND MOTION TO
SUSPEND CIVIL PROCEEDINGS” filed by petitioners is
GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.

          Regalado (Chairman), Melo, Puno and Mendoza,


JJ., concur.

Judgment reversed and set aside.

_______________

8 115 SCRA 843.


9 Article 2207. “If the plaintiff’s property has been insured, and he has
received indemnity from the insurance company for the injury or loss
arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of, the insurance
company shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured against the
wrongdoer or the person who has violated the contract. If the amount paid
by the insurance company does not fully cover the injury or loss, the
aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the person
causing the loss or injury.”

579

VOL. 289, APRIL 24, 1998 579


Caraan vs. Court of Appeals

Notes.—The doctrine of subrogation has its roots in


equity—it is designed to promote and to accomplish justice
and is the mode by which equity adopts to compel the
ultimate payment of a debt by one who in justice, equity
and good conscience ought to pay. (Philippine American
General Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 273
SCRA 262 [1997])
A final judgment rendered in a civil case absolving the
defendant from civil liability is no bar to a criminal action.
(Bordador vs. Luz, 283 SCRA 374 [1997])

——o0o——

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