Case Digests

Case No: 1
Title: Spouses Archibal Latoja and Charito Latoja v. Honorable Elvie Lim
G.R. No.: 198925
Ponente: C.J. Sereno, First Division
Date of Promulgation: July 13, 2016
Topic: Sales
Nature of the Action: Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus under Rule 65
of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court assailing the Order2 in Civil Case No. 3488 issued by
Hon. Elvie P. Lim (Judge Lim) as acting presiding judge of Regional Trial Court Branch
2 (RTC-Br. 2), Borongan, Eastern Samar.
Facts: Respondent Cabe, together with Donato A. Cardona II (Cardona II), executed a
Deed of Sale with Pacto de Retro over a parcel of land. registered under the "Heirs of
Donato Cardona represented by Jovita T. Cardona." The sale was with the conformity of
Jovita Cardona and spouses Rhodo and Myrna Cardona (Spouses Cardona). For failure of
Cardona II to repurchase the property from her within one year as agreed upon in the
deed, Cabe filed a Petition for Consolidation 56 of Ownership. The Petition was granted
by the trial court through a Decision.
RTC-Br. 2 then issued a Writ of Execution. Register ofDeeds cancelled OCT No. 41 and
issued, in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 114-2011000028 under the name
of respondent Cabe. Thereafter, Cabe prayed for the issuance of a Writ of Possession.
This of Judge Lim as acting Presiding Judge of RTC-Br. 2.16 In accordance with the
assailed Order, a Writ of Possession was issued in favor of Cabe. 17 Subsequently, a
Notice of Demand was granted through the assailed Order to Vacate18 was issued by the
court sheriffofRTC-Br. 2 pursuant to the Writ of Possession.
Petitioner-spouses Archibal and Charito Latoja (Spouses Latoja) now come to us alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Lim. They allege that in 2006, this same
Judge Lim rendered a Judgment by in an Action for Partition of Real Properties. This
action was filed by Spouses Latoja against Spouses Cardona, who are the parents of
Compromise Cardona II, respondent in the consolidation case. The Judgment by
Compromise awarded OCT No. 41 on a 50/50 pro indiviso ownership to Spouses Latoja
and Spouses Cardona pursuant to their Compromise Agreement.
Spouses Latoja contend that Judge Lim, as acting presiding judge of RTC-Br. 2, wrongly
granted the motion for the issuance of a Writ of Possession to Cabe despite the Judgment
by Compromise he had previously rendered in the partition case. Judge Lim was then the
presiding judge of RTC- Br. 1, Borongan, Eastern Samar when he awarded half of the
same property to petitioners. Alleging that they are in possession of a portion of
petitioners also pray for the issuance of a TRO to the subject property, enjoin the
implementation of the assailed Order in view of the issuance of the Notice to Vacate
issued by the court sheriff. In a resolution, this court granted the TRO prayed for.
Respondent Cabe contends that the Decision in the consolidation case had become final
after this Court dismissed the appeal of Cardona II and before the Judgment by
Compromise was rendered. Therefore, Judge Lim was simply guided by the rule on the
finality of judgment when he issued the assailed Order. Cabe asserts that she is therefore
entitled to the writ of possession prayed for.
Issue: Whether public respondent Judge Lim committed grave abuse of discretion when
he issued the Order granting the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession in favor of
private respondent Cabe in the consolidation case.
Ruling: YES. Judge Lim committed grave abuse o f discretion in granting the Motion for
Issuance o f Writ o f Possession. Jurisprudence provides only these four instances when a
writ of possession may issue: (1) land registration proceedings; (2) extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage of real property; (3) judicial foreclosure of property, provided
that the mortgagor has possession, and no third party has intervened; and (4) execution
sales.
Respondent Cabe sought the writ as a consequence of the trial court's Decision ordering
the consolidation of the title over the subject property and vesting absolute ownership
thereof in her name. Since the instant case clearly does not fall among the four instances
enumerated above, the issuance of the Writ of Possession was not proper.
Deprived of possession, Cabe's remedy is not a Writ of Possession, but any o f the
available actions for the recovery o f possession o f real property, specifically the
following: accion interdictal, when the dispossession has not lasted for more than one
year; accion publiciana, when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year; or
accion reivindicatoria, which seeks the recovery of ownership and necessarily includes
possession.
Therefore, the right of respondent Cabe to possess the subject property must be founded
on the terms of the Pacto de Retro Sale itself, and not on the Decision in the consolidation
case. It would be erroneous to conclude that she is entitled as a matter of right to
possession of the subject property by virtue of the Decision on consolidation, which has
become final and executory. Moreover, Judge Lim committed grave abuse of discretion
in issuing the Order granting Cabe's motion for the issuance of a writ of possession, as he
went against basic law and established jurisprudence.
Case No: 2
Title: RG Cabrera Corporation, Inc. vs. DPWH and COA
G.R. No.: 221773
Ponente: J. Mendoza, En Banc
Date of Promulgation: October 18, 2016
Topic: Lease
Nature of the Action: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 of the Revised Rules of
Court seeks to reverse and set aside the March 17, 2015 Decision 1 and the August 18,
2015 Resolution2 of the Commission on Audit (COA) in COA CP Case Nos. 2011-200
and 2011-228, denying the consolidated claims of petitioner RG Cabrera Corporation,
Inc. (RG Cabrera) against the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH),
Pampanga 2nd Engineering District, Guagua, Pampanga (DPWH Pampanga).
Facts: From February to July 1992, the DPWH Pampanga entered into several contracts
for lease of equipment with RG Cabrera for the maintenance and restoration of portions
of the Porac-Gumain Diversion Channel System. Later, on September 1, 1992, the
DPWH Pampanga leased another four (4) bulldozers from RG Cabrera covered by
another contract of lease of equipment. At the end of the lease period, RG Cabrera tried
to collect the agreed rentals from the DPWH Pampanga but failed to receive any
payment.
This prompted RG Cabrera to file five (5) separate complaints for collection of sum of
money against the DPWH before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Guagua,
Pampanga (RTC). In all the cases, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) objected on
the ground that the said contracts were defective because of their failure to follow the
requirements of the law.
The RTC granted the separate complaints of RG Cabrera involving the contracts of lease
of equipment. The trial court held that the contracts of lease were binding upon the
parties and, therefore, the DPWH was bound to comply with the said contracts and to pay
the agreed fees. It noted that RG Cabrera was able to prove that it had performed its
obligation under the said contracts warranting it to receive payment therefor.
When the cases were appealed by the OSG before the Court of Appeals (CA), the RTC
decisions were reversed. The appellate court explained that the state was immune from
suit and that the money claims should have been filed before the COA.
RG Cabrera elevated the cases to this Court, which denied the petitions for failure to
show that the CA committed any reversible error. Thus, the Court sustained the CA
ruling that RG Cabrera should have filed its claims with the COA.
The COA upheld the decision of the COA Regional Office denying RG Cabrera's money
claims
Issue: Whether RG Cabrera is entitled to recover rentals from the equipment leased
pursuant to the subject lease contracts.
Ruling: YES. COA denied the money claims filed by petitioner RG Cabrera for the lack
of a prior certification as to the availability of the necessary funds. The denial was based
on Sections 86 and 87 of P.D. No. 1445, which read:
Section 86 - Certificate showing appropriation to meet contract. Except in the case of a

contract for personal service, for supplies for current consumption or to be carried in
stock not exceeding the estimated consumption for three (3) months, or banking
transactions of government-owned or controlled banks no contract involving the
expenditure of public funds by any government agency shall be entered into or authorized
unless the proper accounting official of the agency concerned shall have certified to the
officer entering into the obligation that funds have been duly appropriated for the purpose
and that the amount necessary to cover the proposed contract for the current fiscal year is
available for expenditure on account thereof, subject to verification by the auditor
concerned. The certificate signed by the proper accounting official and the auditor who
verified it, shall be attached to and become an integral part of the proposed contract, and
the sum so certified shall not thereafter be available for expenditure for any other purpose
until the obligation of the government agency concerned under the contract is fully
extinguished.
Section 87 - Void contract and liability of officer. Any contract entered into contrary to
the requirements of the two immediately preceding sections shall be void, and the officer
or officers entering into the contract shall be liable to the government or other contracting
party for any consequent damage to the same extent as if the transaction had been wholly
between private parties.
It is true that the existence of appropriation and the attachment to the contract of the
certification showing availability of funds are conditions sine qua non for the execution
of government contracts. The absence thereof, however, does not necessarily mean that
the contractor is precluded from receiving payment for the services rendered.
To deny RG Cabrera of compensation for the lease of its equipment to the government
would be tantamount to injustice, which cannot be countenanced by this Court. This is
especially true as the use of the equipment was for the rehabilitation of the areas severely
affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption. The government and the people of Pampanga
clearly benefited from the lease subject contracts. It is but just that RG Cabrera receive
compensation for the use of its equipment.
Case No: 3
Title: Philippines National Bank vs. Heirs of Benedicto and Azucena Alonday
G.R. No.: 171865
Ponente: J. Bersamin, First Division
Date of Promulgation: October 12, 2016
Topic: Mortgage
Nature of the Action: Extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage on the subject property.
Facts: On September 26, 1974, The Spouses Benedicto and Azucena Alonday (Spouses
Alonday) obtained an agricultural loan of P28,000.00 from the petitioner at its Digos,
Davao del Sur Branch, and secured the obligation by constituting a real estate mortgage
on their parcel of land situated in Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur.
On June 11, 1980, the Spouses Alonday then obtained a commercial loan for P16, 700.00
from the petitioner's Davao City Branch, and constituted a real estate mortgage over their
598 square meter residential lot situated in Ulas, Davao City.
The Spouses Alonday made partial payments on the commercial loan, which they
renewed on December 23, 1983 for the balance of P15,950.00. The renewed commercial
loan, although due on December 25, 1984, was fully paid on July 5, 1984.
On August 6, 1984, respondents Mercy and Alberto Alonday, the children of the Spouses
Alonday, demanded the release of the mortgage over the property.
The petitioner informed them, however, that the mortgage could not be released because
the agricultural loan had not yet been fully paid, and that as the consequence of the
failure to pay, it had foreclosed the mortgage.
It appeared that notwithstanding such foreclosure, a deficiency balance of P91,525.22

remained.4 Hence, the petitioner applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage.
A notice of extra-judicial sale was issued on August 20, 1984, and the property was sold
on September 28, 1984 to the petitioner in the amount of P29,900.00. Since the Alondays
were unable to redeem the property, the petitioner consolidated its ownership. Later on,
the property was sold for P48,000.00 to one Felix Malmis on November 10, 1989.
RTC: Ruled that because the property had already been sold to Malmis, a third party not
brought within the trial court's jurisdiction, it could not order the return of the property;
and that it was ordering the petitioner instead to pay the respondents the value of the
property under its present market valuation.
CA: Affirmed the RTC’s ruling.
Issue: Whether the all embracing or dragnet clause contained in the first mortgage
contract executed between the parties for the security of the first loan could authorize the
foreclosure of the property under the mortgage to secure a second loan despite the full
payment of the second loan.
Ruling: YES. The petitioner wrongly insists that the CA, through the foregoing
ratiocination, held that the all-embracing or dragnet clauses were altogether invalid as to
prior obligations. What the CA, although reiterating that the Court upheld the validity of
using real estate mortgages to secure future advancements, only thereby pointed out that
it could not find similar rulings as to mortgages executed to secure prior loans.
All-embracing or dragnet clauses have been recognized as valid means to secure debts of
both future and past origins. Even so, we have likewise emphasized that such clauses
were an exceptional mode of securing obligations, and have held that obligations could
only be deemed secured by the mortgage if they came fairly within the terms of the
mortgage contract. For the all-embracing or dragnet clauses to secure future loans,
therefore, such loans must be sufficiently described in the mortgage contract. If the
requirement could be imposed on a future loan that was uncertain to materialize, there is
a greater reason that it should be applicable to a past loan, which is already subsisting and
known to the parties.
Nonetheless, it was undeniable that the petitioner had the opportunity to include some
form of acknowledgement of the previously subsisting agricultural loan in the terms of
the second mortgage contract The mere fact that the mortgage constituted on the property
made no mention of the pre-existing loan could only strongly indicate that each of the
loans of the Spouses Alonday had been treated separately by the parties themselves, and
this sufficiently explained why the loans had been secured by different mortgages.
Another indication that the second mortgage did not extend to the agricultural loan was
the fact that the second mortgage was entered into in connection only with the
commercial loan.
We further concur with the CA and the RTC in their holding that the mortgage contracts
executed by the Spouses Alonday were contracts of adhesion exclusively prep red by the
petitioner:
Under Article 1306 of the Civil Code, the contracting parties "may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they
are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy." This is an
express recognition by the law of the right of the people to enter into all manner of lawful
conventions as part of their safeguarded liberties. The objection against a contract of
adhesion lies most often in its negation of the autonomy of the will of the parties in
contracts. A contract of adhesion, albeit valid, becomes objectionable only when it takes
undue advantage of one of the parties the weaker party- by having such party just adhere
to the terms of the contract. In such situation, the courts go to the succor of the weaker
party by construing any obscurity in the contract against the party who prepared the
contract, the latter being presumed as the stronger party to the agreement, and as the party
who caused the obscurity.
The petitioner should be held liable for interest on the actual damages of P717,600.00
representing the value of the propetiy with an area 598 square meters that was lost to
them through the unwarranted foreclosure, the same to be reckoned from the date of
judicial demand (i.e., the filing of the action by the Spouses Alonday). At the time
thereof, the rate was 12% per annum, and such rate shall run until June 30, 2013.
Thereafter, or starting on July 1, 2013, the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum until
full payment of the obligation, pursuant to the ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames,27 which
took into consideration the lowering of interest rates by the Monetary Board.
Case No: 4
Title: Marcelino Repuela and Cipriano Repuel v. Estate of the Spounses Otillo Larawan
G.R. No.: 219638
Ponente: J. Mendoza, Second Division
Date of Promulgation: December 07, 2016
Topic: Contracts
Nature of the Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assails the May 29, 2014 Decision and the June 10, 2015 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 03976, which reversed and set aside the February 23,
2011 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Seventh Judicial Region, Branch 7,
Cebu City, in Civil Case No. CEB-28524, a case for Annulment of Documents, Quieting
of Title, Redemption, Damages, and Attorney's Fees.
Facts: Spouses Lorenzo and Magdalena Repuela owned Lot No. 3357, situated in
Lawaan III, Talisay City, Cebu. After they had passed away, their children Marcelino
Repuela and Cipriano Repuela succeeded them as owners of the subject property.
Cipriano and Marcelino claimed that after the death of their parents, they went to the
house of Otillo Larawan to borrow P200.00 for Marcelino's fare to Iligan City; that to
secure the loan, the spouses Otillo and Juliana Larawan required them to turn over the
certificate of titleof the property; that they were made to sign a purported mortgage
contract but they were not given a copy of the said document; that Cipriano affixed his
signature while Marcelino, being illiterate, just placed his thumb mark on the document;
that they remained in possession of the land despite the mortgage and had been planting
bamboos, corn, bananas, and papayas thereon and sharing the produce between them; and
that they also paid the taxes due on the property.
Cristina Repuela Ramos went to the City Treasurer's Office of Talisay City, upon the
request of her father, to verify whether Spouses Larawan were paying the realty taxes on
the mortgaged property. She learned that Spouses Larawan did not pay the taxes and the
tax declaration on the subject property was already in their names as early as 1964; that in
the Registry of Deeds of Cebu, the property was already cancelled and a new certificate
of title had been issued to Otillo; that Spouses Larawan were able to transfer the
certificate of title to their names by virtue of the Extajudicial Declaration of Heirs and
Sale bearing the signature of her father Cipriano and the thumb mark of her uncle
Marcelino; and that her father and uncle remembered that they were made to sign a blank
document.
Cipriano and Marcelino, on account of this predicament, were compelled to file a

complaint before the RTC for the annulment of the Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs and
Sale and the cancellation of the property. During the trial, Catalina Burlas, who lived next
to the subject property, and Alma Abellanosa, City Assessor of Talisay City, were also
presented as witnesses for the Repuela brothers.
For the Estate of Spouses Larawan, on the other hand, the transaction between the
Repuela brothers and Otillo was a sale and not a mortgage of a parcel of land. The Estate
also invoked laches on the part of the Repuela brothers for failing to file a complaint
during the lifetime of Spouses Larawan. Galileo Larawan, son of Spouses Larawan and
the sole witness for the Estate, testified that he knew of the transaction between his father
and the Repuela brothers because his father brought him along to the office of Atty.
Celestino Bacalso, where the document entitled Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs and
Sale was prepared; that the said document was signed by Cipriano and thumbmarked by
Marcelino which was witnessed by Hilario Bacalso and Fernando Abellanosa; that he
witnessed the Repuela brothers affix their signature and thumbmark after Atty. Bacalso
read and explained to them the contents of the document in the Cebuano dialect; that after
the document was notarized, his father handed P2,000.00 to the Repuela brothers as
consideration for the sale; and that he was only six years old when these all happened.
Galileo also pointed out that the new certificate of title, in the name of Spouses Larawan,
was issued by the Register of Deeds, that his mother paid the real estate taxes during her
lifetime and, after her death, he himself made the payments; that he secured the tax
declaration for the subject property from the office of the Talisay City Assessor; that their
family had been in possession of the subject property and they had harvested and enjoyed
the produce of the land such as bamboos, jackfruit and 100 coconut trees; and that there
were no other persons claiming ownership over the land, as the Repuela brothers never
offered to redeem the subject property from their family.
RTC: Decided in favor of the Repuela brothers. It held that the transaction between the
parties was not a sale but an equitable mortgage. The testimony of Galileo for the
respondent, who was admittedly just six (6) years old then, was "likely colored by the
lens of adult perspective and self-interest." It believed the claim of Cipriano, who only
had the benefit of a Grade One education, and the illiterate Marcelino, that they merely
signed a document without knowing its nature.
CA: Reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.
Issue: Whether the Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirsand Sale amounted to an equitable

mortgage.
Ruling: YES. Equitable mortgage is one which, although lacking in some formality, or
form, or words, or other requisites demanded by a statute, reveals the intention of the
parties to charge real property as security for a debt, and contains nothing impossible or
contrary to law.
For a presumption of an equitable mortgage to arise, two requisites must first be satisfied,
namely: that the parties entered into a contract denominated as a contract of sale and that
their intention was to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage. There is no single
conclusive test to determine whether a deed of sale, absolute on its face, is really a simple
loan accommodation secured by a mortgage. Article 1602, in relation to Article 1604 of
the Civil Code, however, enumerates several instances when a contract, purporting to be,
and in fact styled as, an absolute sale, is presumed to be an equitable mortgage. Thus:
ART. 1602. The contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage, in any of the
following cases:
(1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate;
(2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise;
(3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument
extending the period of redemption or granting a new period is executed;
(4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price;
(5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold;
(6) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is
that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other
obligation.
In any of the foregoing case, any money, fruits, or other benefit to be received by the
vendee as rent or otherwise shall be considered as interest which shall be subject to the
usury laws.
ART. 1604. The provisions of Article 1602 shall also apply to a contract purporting
to be an absolute sale.
Evident from Article 1602, the presence of any of the circumstances set forth therein
suffices for a contract to be deemed an equitable mortgage. No concurrence or an
overwhelming number is needed. In other words, the fact that some or most of the
circumstances mentioned are absent in a case will not negate the existence of an equitable
mortgage.
In this case, it appears that two (2) instances enumerated in Article 1602 — possession of
the subject property and inference that the transaction was in fact a mortgage attended the
assailed transaction.
Case No: 5
Title: Eddie Cortel Y Carna and Yellow Bus Line, INC. v. Cecile Gepaya-Lim
G.R. No.: 218014
Ponente: J. Carpio, Second Division
Topic: Torts and Damages
Nature of the Action:

Facts: On 29 October 2004, Cartel was driving a bus, operated by Yellow Bus Line,
which was on its way from Marbel, Koronadal to Davao City. At around 9:45 in the
evening, as the bus was traversing Crossing Rubber in the Municipality of Tupi, South
Cotabato, Cortel noticed two trucks with glaring headlights coming from the opposite
direction. Cortel stated that he was driving at a speed of 40 to 50 kilometers per hour. He
claimed that upon noticing the trucks, he reduced his speed to 20 kilometers per hour.
However, the bus hit a black motorcycle which allegedly had no tail light reflectors. The
impact dragged the motorcycle at a distance of three meters before it came to a full stop.
Lim, who was riding the motorcycle, was thrown upward and then slammed into the bus,
hitting the base of its right windshield wiper. The motorcycle got entangled with the
broken bumper of the bus. According to Cortel, Lim was wearing a black jacket and was
riding without a helmet at the time of the accident.
Felix Larang (Larang), the bus conductor, alighted from the bus to aid Lim. Larang gave
instructions to Cortel to move back to release Lim and the motorcycle from the front
bumper of the bus. After reversing the bus and freeing Lim and the motorcycle, Cortel
drove the bus away and went to a nearby bus station where he surrendered to authorities.
Cortel claimed that he left the scene of the incident because he feared for his life.
Respondent Cecile Gepaya-Lim, Lim's widow, filed a complaint for damages against
petitioners. During trial, SPO4 Eddie S.
Cortel's bus and the motorcycle were going in the same direction. SPO4 Orencio testified
that that the bus bumped the motorcycle from behind. The motorcycle's engine and
chassis were severely damaged, while its rear rim was totally damaged by the accident.
Yellow Bus Line presented and offered in evidence photographs showing that the bus'
right front windshield and wiper were damaged. The bus' lower right side bumper was
also perforated. During the preliminary conference, Yellow Bus Line also presented
Cortel's certificates showing that he attended the following seminars: (1) Basic Tire Care
Seminar; (2) Basic Tire Knowledge and Understanding Retreading; and (3) Traffic Rules
and Regulations, Defensive Driving and Road Courtesy Seminar.
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error m affirming with
modifications the decision of the trial court.
Ruling:
Case No: 6
Title: Arsenio Tabasondra v. Spouses Conrado Constantino and Tarcila Tabasondra-
Constantino
G.R. No.: 196403
Ponente: J. Bersamin, First Division
Topic: Co-Ownership
Facts: The parties herein were the children of the late Cornelio Tabasondra from two
marriages. The respondents Tarcila Tabasondra-Constantino and the late Sebastian
Tabasondra were the children of Cornelio by his first wife, Severina; the petitioners,
namely: Arsenio Tabasondra, Fernando Tabasondra, Cornelio Tabasondra, Jr., Mirasol
Tabasondra-Mariano, Fausta Tabasondra-Tapacio, Myrasol Tabasondra-Romero,
Marlene Tabasondra-Maniquil, and Guillermo Tabasondra, were children of Cornelio by
his second wife, Sotera.
Cornelio, Valentina, and Valeriana, all surnamed Tabasondra. were siblings. They were
also the registered owners of the three (3) parcels of land located at Dalayap, Tarlac City.
Cornelio died on March 15, 1991, while Valentina and Valeriana both died single on
August 19, 1990 and August 4, 1998, respectively. They all died intestate and without
partitioning the property. Thus, the Plaintiffs-Appellees and the Defendants-Appellants,
as descendants of Cornelio, possessed and occupied the property.
Issue:
Ruling:
Case No: 7
Title: Alicia P. Logarta v. Catalino M. Mangahis
G.R. No.: 213568
Topic: LTD - Land Registration
Nature of the Action: A petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision dated
December 13, 2013 and the Resolution dated June 27, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 98819, which affirmed the Order dated June 27, 2011 and the Amended
Order dated December 29, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Bifian, Laguna, Branch 25
(RTC) in LRC Case No. B-4122, directing the cancellation of Entry No. 626131, Entry
No. 626132, Entry No. 626133, and Entry No. 626134 on Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. CL0-763.
Facts: Respondent Catalino M. Mangahis (respondent) is the registered owner of a parcel

of land in Barangay Malitlit, Sta. Rosa, Laguna. He authorized a certain Venancio
Zamora to sell the subject property, who, in tum, delegated his authority to Victor Pefia.
On January 23, 2001, Pefia entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with Carmona
Realty and Development Corporation, represented by petitioner Alicia P. Logarta for the
sale to Carmona Realty of contiguous parcels of land in Malitlit, Sta. Rosa, Laguna which
included the subject property.
Carmona Realty agreed to deposit in escrow the total consideration of Pl,476,834,000.00

within thirty (30) days from the execution of the MOA. The release of the escrow
deposits was subject to Pefia's submission of a number of documents, among others, the
order of conversion from the Department of Agrarian Reform allowing the use of the
Malitlit Estate for residential, industrial, commercial, or a combination of the foregoing
uses, the transfer of the TCTs and the Certificates of Land Ownership in Carmona
Realty's name, and the release waiver and quitclaim executed by complainants and/or
order of dismissal of pending cases involving any of the lands constituting the Malitlit
Estate. The parties also agreed to make the same effective unless Carmona Realty
withdraws from it by reason of force majeure or fails to make the escrow deposits within
the period specified therein, in which case the MOA shall be considered automatically
null and void.
On March 28, 2003, the MOA was annotated pursuant to the Sworn Statement to Request
for Annotation executed by petitioner and the Secretary's Certificate issued by Marianito
R. Atienza, Carmona Realty's Corporate Secretary.
On August 8, 2008, respondent filed a petitionto cancel the subject entries on the ground
that the MOA was a private document that had no legal effect because the Notary Public
before whom it was acknowledged was not commissioned as such in the City of Manila
for the year 2001. In the same petition, respondent also sought the revocation of Zamora's
authority to sell the subject property. In opposition, petitioner contended that the MOA
was duly notarized in Makati City where the Notary Public, Atty. Loreto Navarro, was
commissioned. She also maintained that Pefia had the authority to enter into the MOA at
the time it was executed, considering that respondent expressed his intention to revoke
the same only in the petition. During the trial, respondent's brother and authorized
representative, Emiliano M. Mangahis, asserted that the subject entries should be
cancelled because the purpose for which they were made is no longer present since
petitioner did nothing to enforce the MOA. On the other hand, petitioner argued that she
is not the proper party to the case as she merely acted as representative of Carmona
Realty in the MOA.
RTC: Granted the petition and ordered the cancellation of the subject entries. It found
that the subject entries are adverse claims which ceased to be effective 30 days after
registration and should, therefore, be cancelled, pursuant to Section 70 of Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 1529,24 otherwise known as the "Property Registration Decree," which
states:
Section 70. Adverse claim. Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse
to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if
no other provision is made in this Decree for registering the same, make a statement in
writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired,
a reference to the number of the certificate of title of the registered owner, the name of
the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is
claimed.
CA: Dismissed petitioner's appeal and affirmed the RTC ruling.
Issue: Whether or not the CA and the RTC erred in ordering the cancellation of the
subject entries.
Ruling:
Case No: 8
Title: Spouses Augusto and Nora Navarro v. Rural Bank of Tarlac, INC.
G.R. No.: 180060
Topic: Extinguishment of Obligations
Nature of the Action: concerns the availability of the remedy of an ordinary appeal
under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court in challenging the decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) to resolve a case by way of a summary judgment. The Court of Appeals
(CA) dismissed the appeal outright in light of Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
The provision directs the dismissal of appeals filed through Rule 41 if they merely raise
pure questions of law. Spouses Augusto and Nora Navarro now come before this Court
arguing that their appeal should not have been dismissed, since the issues they raised
included questions of fact.
Facts: petition stems from the complaint for a sum of money filed by the Rural Bank of
Tarlac, Inc., against Spouses Navarro. It is undisputed that petitioners obtained a bank
loan in the amount of P558,000 for the purchase of a motor vehicle, and that they were
unable to complete the agreed monthly installments. It is also uncontested that they
surrendered their vehicle (a 1998 Kia Advantage van) to the bank, so that the latter could
sell it and apply the proceeds of the sale to their obligations. The parties, however,
disagreed as to the effect of the surrender of the vehicle under that circumstance.
According to the bank, petitioners still had an unpaid balance of P315,677.80 excluding
interests, penalties, and liquidated damages even after the sale of the van. It claimed that
their monthly installments amounted to only P92,322.20, while it was able to sell the
vehicle for only P150,000.00. Thus, it alleged that it could only credit the total amount of
P242,322.20 in their favor.
Spouses Navarro did not deny that they had executed a Promissory Note in favor of the
bank, and that the terms were correctly reflected in the note. They claim, however, that
when they surrendered the vehicle, they understood that it would serve as complete
satisfaction of their remaining loan obligation by way of a dacion en pago.
In view of the spouses' Answer, the bank filed a Motion for Summary Judgment under
Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court. It alleged that the only issue before the trial
court was whether the selling price of the vehicle was enough to satisfy the unpaid
balance, interest, and other charges. It argued that a summary judgment was proper, since
there was no more genuine issue relating to any material fact, and that the matter before
the court was merely the computation of the remaining balance. To support its motion,
the bank presented the Promissory Note executed by the spouses for the amount of
P558,000, as well as the receipts for the sale of the vehicle to a certain Corazon Quesada
for P150,000; and acknowledged the spouses' total monthly installments of
P92,322.20.Based on its own accounting, the total payments amounted to P242,322.20,
while their total running balance was P315,677.80 excluding interests, penalties, and
liquidated damages.
Spouses Navarro opposed the motion. While they did not assail the amount for which the
van was sold, they nevertheless asserted that by surrendering the vehicle, their remaining
obligation must be deemed to have been fully paid. To prove their assertion, they
presented an acknowledgment receipt, which stated that the bank had "[r]eceived one
unit KIA ADVANTAGE VAN, in good and running condition." They argued that there still
existed a question of fact, since there must be a proper accounting of their correct
balance. In the alternative, they averred that the deductible amount for the sale of the van
must be based on its value at the time they surrendered it to the bank. They also claimed
that their monthly installments had already amounted to P161,137.69. The spouses,
however, did not attach receipts or any other kind of evidence to support this contention.
Issue: whether Spouses Navarro resorted to the wrong remedy of filing an ordinary
appeal under Rule 41, instead of a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, when
they questioned the correctness of the decision of the RTC to resolve the dispute through
a summary judgment before the CA.
Ruling:
Case No: 9
Title: Heirs of Gamaliel Albano vs Sps Ravanes
G.R. No.: 183645
Ponente: J. Jardeleza, Third Division.
Topic: Lease
Nature of the Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to annul the August 29, 2007 Decision (CA Decision) and July 7, 2008
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 96111. The CA Decision
reversed the May 29, 2006 Decision of Branch 68, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City and reinstated the January 19, 2004 Decision of Branch 69, Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Pasig City. The MeTC ordered petitioners to: (a) vacate the lot owned by
respondent-spouses; and (b) pay the monthly back rentals from the month of default until
the leased premises are vacated.
Facts: Respondent Mena Ravanes, married to Roberto Ravanes, is the registered owner
of a parcel of land located in Caniogan, Pasig City. On about thirty-five (35) square
meters of the property stands the two-storey residential house of petitioners. Petitioners'
father, Gamaliel Albano, purchased the house in 1986 from a certain Mary Ong
Dee. Petitioners leased the property from Mena with the agreement that they will vacate
it, regardless of their rental payments, when the latter and her family would need to use it.
Respondent-spouses informed petitioners that their daughter, Rowena, is getting married

and would need the property to build her house. However, petitioners refused to vacate
the property. Thus, respondent-spouses filed a complaint in the Office of
the Barangay Captain of Caniogan against petitioners. Having failed to reach an amicable
settlement, however, the Barangay issued a certificate to Hie action on June 22, 2000.
On September 14, 2000, respondent-spouses filed a Complaint for Ejectment against

petitioners in the MeTC of Pasig City. Respondent-spouses cited Section 5 (c) of Batas
Pambama Blg. 877 (BP 877) as a ground for ejectment:
Section 5. Grounds for Judicial Ejectment. - Ejectment shall be allowed on the following
grounds:
xxx
(c) Legitimate need of owner/lessor to repossess his property for his own use or for the
use of any immediate member of his family as a residential unit, such owner or
immediate member not being the owner of any other available residential unit within the
same city or municipality: Provided, however, That the lease for a definite period has
expired: Provided, further, Thai the lessor has given the lessee formal notice three (3)
months in advance of the lessor's intention to repossess the properly: and Provided,
finally. That the owner/lessor is prohibited from leasing the residential unit or allowing
its use by a third party for at least one year.
xxx
Respondent-spouses stated that their daughter needs the property to build her conjugal
home.They pleaded that they do not own any other available residential units within
Pasig City or anywhere else. They also stated that the lease between them and petitioners
had already lapsed as of December 31, 1999. Respondent-spouses claimed they notified
petitioners of their intent to repossess the property at least three (3) months in advance.
They prayed for the MeTC to order petitioners to vacate the property and remove the
improvements in it. They also sought payment of petitioners' rent for July 2000 and
attorney's fees.
In their Answer dated October 4, 2000, petitioners countered that respondent-spouses and

their predecessors-in-interest assured them that they can stay in the property for as long
as they are paying the agreed monthly rentals. Petitioners claimed that their harmonious
relationship with respondent-spouses changed in February 2000 when the latter suddenly
refused to accept the rental payments for January to June 2000. They belied the claim that
respondent-spouses do not own other lots in Pasig City, asserting that respondent-spouses
have other suitable residential houses and apartment units in Pasig City as evidenced by
photocopies of land titles attached to their Answer.Consequently, petitioners argued that
the Complaint should be dismissed because respondent-spouses do not need the property
for their personal use.
Further, petitioners alleged respondent-spouses handed them the notice to vacate only on
June 15, 2000. The notice demanded petitioners to vacate the premises on or before July
13, 2000. Thus, they were given only a 28-day notice, which was short of the 3-month
notice requirement under BP 877.chanrobleslaw
By way of counterclaim, petitioners prayed that respondent-spouses be ordered to pay

moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Petitioners also asked that, in the event
the MeTC ruled in favor of respondent-spouses, they be ordered to reimburse petitioners
the amount the latter incurred for the repair of their house.
In their Position Paper dated December 26, 2000, respondent-spouses admitted ownership

of several properties in Pasig City, but insisted that these properties were not available for
their daughter because they were on lease. Respondent-spouses explained that they chose
to eject petitioners rather than their other lessees because petitioners are delinquent in
their rental payments. Respondent-spouses also alleged that they complied with the 3-
month notice requirement because they waited for 91 days—from June 15, the date when
petitioners received the notice to vacate, until September 14, 2000—to file the case for
ejectment.ch
In their Position Paper dated January 2, 2001, petitioners reiterated that respondent-

spouses have no legal ground to eject them on the basis of an alleged legitimate need for
personal use of the property because respondent-spouses own other available lots in Pasig
City, and because the 3-month notice requirement was not complied with.
Both parties raised the issue of whether petitioners can be legally ejected from the
property under Section 5 (c) of BP 877.
MeTC: Denied petitioners' counterclaim on the ground that they do not have the right to
be paid the value of their house's improvements since they built it at their own risk.
Petitioners, however, may remove the improvements if respondent-spouses refuse to
reimburse one-half of its total value.
RTC: The assailed decision is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE on the

ground of denial of due process, and this Court is now tasked to look into the issue of
whether or not the plaintiffs have met the following requirements of Section 5, par (c) of
the Rental Law as amended:
rya). A legitimate need of owner/lessor to repossess his property for his own use or for
the use of any immediate member of his family;
b). The need to repossess is for residential [purpose|;
c). Such owner or immediate family member does not own any other available residential
unit within the city or municipality;
d). The lease agreement should be for a definite period;
e). The period of lease has expired;
f). The lessor has given the lessee a formal notice three (3) months in advance of the
lessor's intention to repossess the property.
CA: The CA set aside the Decision of the RTC and reinstated the Decision of the MeTC.
Issue: (1.) Whether the CA Decision is already final and executory;

(2.) Whether the execution of the lease contract is a supervening event that will justify the
stay of execution of the CA Decision; and
(3.) Whether the respondent-spouses complied with Section 5 (c) of BP 877.
Ruling:
Case No: 10
Title: Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. vs. Sps. Arnulfo and Evelyn Fuentebella
G.R. No.: 188283
Ponente: C.J. Sereno. First Division
Topic: Breach of Contract, Damages
Nature of the Action: A petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Cathay Pacific
Airways Ltd. from the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 and Resolution2 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 87698. The CA affirmed with modification the Decision3 issued by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) Branch 30 in San Jose, Camarines Sur, in Civil Case No. T-635.
Facts: In 1993, the Speaker of the House authorized Congressmen Arnulfo Fuentebella,
Alberto Lopez and Leonardo Fugoso to travel on official business to Sydney, Australia,
to confer with their counterparts in the Australian Parliament from 25 October to 6
November 1993.
On 22 October 1993, respondents bought Business Class tickets for Manila to Sydney via
Hong Kong and back. They changed their minds, however, and decided to upgrade to
First Class. From this point, the parties presented divergent versions of facts.
According to respondents, their travel arrangements, including the request for the
upgrade of their seats from Business Class to First Class, were made through Cong.
Lopez. The congressman corroborated this allegation. On the other hand, petitioner
claimed that a certain Carol Dalag had transacted on behalf of the congressmen and their
spouses for the purchase of airline tickets for Manila-Hong Kong-Sydney-Hong Kong
Manila. According to petitioner, on 23 October 1993, one of the passengers called to
request that the booking be divided into two: one for the Spouses Lopez and Spouses
Fugoso, and a separate booking for respondents. Cong. Lopez denied knowing a Carol
Dalag. He was not questioned regarding the request for two separate bookings. However,
in his testimony, he gave the impression that the travel arrangements had been made for
them as one group. He admitted that he had called up petitioner, but only to request an
upgrade of their tickets from Business Class to First Class. He testified that upon
assurance that their group would be able to travel on First Class upon cash payment of the
fare difference, he sent a member of his staff that same afternoon to pay. Petitioner
admits that First Class tickets were issued to respondents, but clarifies that the tickets
were open-dated (waitlisted). There was no showing whether the First Class tickets
issued to Sps. Lopez and Sps. Fugoso were open-dated or otherwise, but it appears that
they were able to fly First Class on all the segments of the trip, while respondents were
not.
On 25 October 1993, respondents queued in front of the First Class counter in the airport.
They were issued boarding passes for Business Class seats on board CX 902 bound for
Hong Kong from Manila and Economy Class seats on board CX 101 bound for Sydney
from Hong Kong. They only discovered that they had not been given First Class seats
when they were denied entry into the First Class lounge. Respondent Fuentebella went
back to the check-in counter to demand that they be given First Class seats or at the very
least, access to the First Class Lounge. He recalle~ that he was treated by the ground staff
in a discourteous, arrogant and rude manner. He was allegedly told that the plane would
leave with or without them.
During trial, petitioner offered the transcript of the deposition of its senior reservation
supervisor, Nenita Montillana. She said that based on the record locator, respondents had
confirmed reservations for Business Class seats for the Manila-Hong Kong, Sydney-
Hong Kong, and Hong Kong-Manila flights; but the booking for Business Class seats for
the Hong Kong-Sydney leg was "under request;" and due to the flight being full,
petitioner was not able to approve the request.
Montillana admitted that First Class tickets had been issued to respondents, but qualified
that those tickets were open-dated. She referred to the plane tickets, which bore the
annotations "OPEN F OPEN" for all sectors of the flight. Petitioner explained that while
respondents expressed ~their desire to travel First Class, they could not be
accommodated because they had failed to confirm and the sections were full on the date
and time of their scheduled and booked flights. Petitioner also denied that its personnel
exhibited arrogance in dealing with respondents; on the contrary, it was allegedly
respondent Fuentebella who was hostile in dealing with the ground staff.
Respondents alleged that during transit through the Hong Kong airport on 25 October
1993, they were treated with far less respect and courtesy by the ground staff.
Petitioner used the deposition of Manuel Benipayo, airport service officer, and Raquel
Galvez-Leonio, airport services supervisor, to contradict the claims of respondents.
Benipayo identified himself as the ground staff who had dealt with respondents'
complaint. He testified that around five o'clock on 25 October 1993, respondent
Fuentebella loudly insisted that he be accommodated on First Class. But upon checking
their records, he found out that respondents were only booked on Business Class.
Benipayo tried to explain this to respondents in a very polite manner, and he exerted his
best effort to secure First Class seats for them, but the plane was already full. He
presented a telex sent to their Hong Kong office, in which he requested assistance to
accommodate respondents in First Class for the Hong Kong-Sydney flight. He claimed
that he was intimidated by respondent Fuentebella into making the notations "Involuntary
Downgrading" and "fare difference to be refunded" on the tickets.
Respondents narrated that for their trip from Hong Kong to Sydney, they were squeezed
into very narrow seats for eight and a half hours and, as a result, they felt groggy and
miserable upon landing. Respondents were able to travel First Class for their trip from
Sydney to Hong Kong on 30 October 1993. However, on the last segment of the itinerary
from Hong Kong to Manila on 2 November 1993, they were issued boarding passes for
Business Class. Upon arrival in the Philippines, respondents demanded a formal apology
and payment of damages from petitioner.
The latter conducted an investigation, after which it maintained that no undue harm had
been done to them.
RTC: The RTC ruled in favor of respondents and awarded P5 million as moral damages,
Pl million as exemplary damages, and P500, 000 as attorney’s fees.
CA: The CA affirmed the R TC Decision with the modification that the attorney's fees be
reduced to Pl00, 000.
Issue: whether respondents should have been given First Class seat accommodations for
all the segments of their itinerary.
Ruling:
Case No: 11
Title: Anna Marie L. Gumabon vs. Philippine National Bank
G.R. No.: 202514
Ponente: J. Carpio, Second Division.
Topic: Damages
Nature of the Action: a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court filed by Anna Marie Gumabon (Anna Marie) assailing the December 16, 2011
decision and June 26, 2012 resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV. No.
96289. The CA reversed the Regional Trial Court (RTC)'s ruling in Civil Case No. Q-04-
53432 favoring Anna Marie.
Facts: On August 12, 2004, Anna Marie filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money
and damages before the RTC against the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the PNB
Delta branch manager Silverio Fernandez (Fernandez). The case stemmed from the
PNB’s refusal to release Anna Marie’s money in a consolidated savings account and in
two foreign exchange time deposits, evidenced by Foreign Exchange Certificates of Time
Deposit (FXCTD).
In 2001, Anna Marie, together with her mother Angeles and her siblings Anna Elena and
Santiago deposited with the PNB Delta Branch. The Gumabons also maintained eight (8)
savings accounts in the same bank. Anna Marie decided to consolidate the eight (8)
savings accounts and to withdraw P2,727,235.85 from the consolidated savings account
to help her sister’s financial needs. Anna Marie called the PNB employee handling her
accounts, Reino Antonio Salvoro, to facilitate the consolidation of the savings accounts
and the withdrawal. When she went to the bank on April 14, 2003, she was informed that
she could not withdraw from the savings accounts since her bank records were missing
and Salvoro could not be contacted.
On April 15, 2003, Anna Marie presented her two FXCTDs, but was also unable to
withdraw against them. Fernandez informed her that the bank would still verify and
investigate before allowing the withdrawal since Salvoro had not reported for work.
Thus, Anna Marie sent two demand letters dated April 23 and April 25, 2003 to the PNB.
After a month, the PNB finally consolidated the savings accounts and issued a passbook
for Savings Account. The PNB also confirmed that the total deposits amounted to
P2,734,207.36. Anna Marie, her mother, and the PNB executed a Deed of Waiver and
Quitclaim dated May 23, 2003 to settle all questions regarding the consolidation of the
savings accounts. After withdrawals, the balance of her consolidated savings account was
P250,741.82.
On July 30, 2003, the PNB sent letters to Anna Marie to inform her that the PNB refused
to honor its obligation and that the PNB withheld the release of the balance of
P250,741.82 in the consolidated savings account. According to the PNB, Anna Marie
pre-terminated, withdrew and/or debited sums against her deposits. Thus, Anna Marie
filed before the RTC a complaint for sum of money and damages against the PNB and
Fernandez. As to the two FXCTDs, Anna Marie contended that the PNB’s refusal to pay
her time deposits is contrary to law. The PNB cannot claim that the bank deposits have
been paid since the certificates of the time deposits are still with Anna Marie.
As to the consolidated savings account, Anna Marie stated that the PNB had already
acknowledged the account’s balance in the Deed of Waiver and Quitclaim amounting to
P2,734,207.36. As of January 26, 2004, the remaining balance was P250,741.82. PNB
presented no concrete proof that this amount had been withdrawn. Anna Marie prayed
that the PNB and Fernandez be held solidarily liable for actual, moral, and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney’s fees, costs of suit, and legal interests because of the PNB’s
refusal to honor its obligations.
The PNB alleged that Anna Marie was guilty of contributory negligence in her bank
dealings. In her reply, Anna Marie argued that the best evidence of her withdrawals is the
withdrawal slips duly signed by her and the passbooks pertaining to the accounts. PNB,
however, failed to show any of the withdrawal slips and/or passbooks, and also failed to
present sufficient evidence that she used her accounts’ funds.
RTC: RTC ruled in Anna Marie’s favour.
CA: Reversed the RTC’s ruling.
Issue: Whether Anna Marie is entitled to the payment of the following amounts:
(a) $10,058.01 or the outstanding balance under FXCTD No. 993902;
(b) $20,244.42 for FXCTD No. 993992;
(c) P250,741.82 for SA No. 6121200; and
(d) Damages.
Ruling: No. Philippine National Bank is ORDERED to pay Anna Marie Gumabon. PNB
is liable to Anna Marie for actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s
fees for its negligent acts as a banking institution.
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 8791

Declares the State’s recognition of the “fiduciary nature of banking that requires high
standards of integrity and performance.” It cannot be overemphasized that the banking
business is impressed with public interest. The trust and confidence of the public to the
industry is given utmost importance. Thus, the bank is under obligation to treat its
depositor’s accounts with meticulous care, having in mind the nature of their relationship.
The bank is required to assume a degree of diligence higher than that of a good father of a
family.
Case No: 12
Title: Philippine National Oil Company and PNOC Dockyard & Engineering
Corporation vs. Keppel Philippines Holdings, Inc.
G.R. No.: 202050
Ponente: J. Brion, Second Division.
Topic: Contract; Sales
Nature of the Action: A petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, appealing the decision dated 19 December 20111 and resolution dated 14
May 20122 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86830. These assailed CA
rulings affirmed in toto the decision dated 12 January 20063 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTQ of Batangas City, Branch 84, in Civil Case No. 7364.
Facts: Almost 40 years ago the respondent Keppel Philippines Holdings, Inc. (Keppel)
entered into a lease agreement with Luzon Stevedoring Corporation covering 11 hectares
of land located in Bauan, Batangas. The lease was for a period of 25 years for a
consideration of P2.1 million. At the option of Lusteveco, the rental fee could be totally
or partially converted into equity shares in Keppel.
At the end of the 25-year lease period, Keppel was given the "firm and absolute option to
purchase the land for P4.09 million, provided that it had acquired the necessary
qualification to own land under Philippine laws at the time the option is
exercised. Apparently, when the lease agreement was executed, less than 60% of
Keppel's shareholding was Filipino-owned, hence, it was not constitutionally qualified to
acquire private lands in the country.chanrobleslaw
If, at the end of the 25-year lease period (or in 2001), Keppel remained unqualified to
own private lands, the agreement provided that the lease would be automatically renewed
for another 25 years. Keppel was further allowed to exercise the option to purchase the
land up to the 30th year of the lease (or in 2006), also on the condition that, by then, it
would have acquired the requisite qualification to own land in the
Philippines.anrobleslaw
Together with Keppel's lease rights and option to purchase, Lusteveco warranted not to
sell the land or assign its rights to the land for the duration of the lease unless with the
prior written consent of Keppel. Accordingly, when the petitioner Philippine National Oil
Corporation (PNOC) acquired the land from Lusteveco and took over the rights and
obligations under the agreement, Keppel did not object to the assignment so long as the
agreement was annotated on PNOC's title.
On 8 December 2000, Keppel wrote PNOC informing the latter that at least 60% of its
shares were now owned by Filipinos. Consequently, Keppel expressed its readiness to
exercise its option to purchase the land. Keppel reiterated its demand to purchase the land
several times, but on every occasion, PNOC did not favourably respond. To compel
PNOC to comply with the Agreement, Keppel instituted a complaint for specific
performance with the RTC against PNOC. PNOC countered Keppel's claims by
contending that the agreement was illegal for circumventing the constitutional prohibition
against aliens holding lands in the Philippines. It further asserted that the option contract
was void, as it was unsupported by a separate valuable consideration. It also claimed that
it was not privy to the agreement.
RTC: the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Keppel and ordered PNOC to execute a
deed of absolute sale upon payment by Keppel of the purchase price of P4.09 million.
Issue: (a.) Whether the terms of the Agreement amounted to a virtual sale of the land to
Keppel that was designed to circumvent the constitutional prohibition on aliens owning
lands in the Philippines.
(b.) Whether the option to purchase the land given to Keppel is supported by a separate
valuable consideration.
(c.) whether Keppel's equity ownership meets the 60% Filipino-owned capital
requirement of trie Constitution, in accordance with the Court's ruling in Gamboa v.
Teves.
Ruling:
(a.) Yes. Preserving the ownership of land, whether public or private, in Filipino hands is
the policy consistently adopted in all three of our constitutions. Under the
1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions, no private land shall be transferred, assigned, or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain. Consequently, only Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations whose capital is 60% owned by Filipinos citizens, are constitutionally
qualified to own private lands.
(b.)
(c.) Yes. Filipinization is the spirit that pervades the constitutional provisions on national
patrimony and economy. The Constitution has reserved the ownership of public and
private lands, the ownership and operation of public utilities, and certain areas of
investment to Filipino citizens, associations, and corporations. To qualify, sixty per cent
(60%) of the association or corporation's capital must be owned by Filipino citizens.
Although the 60% Filipino equity proportion has been adopted in our Constitution since
1935, it was only in 2011 that the Court interpreted what the term capital constituted.
In Gamboa v. Teves, the Court declared that the "legal and beneficial ownership of 60
percent of the outstanding capital stock must rest in the hands of Filipino
nationals." Clarifying the ruling, the Court decreed that the 60% Filipino ownership
requirement applies separately to each class of shares, whether with or without voting
rights.
Case No: 13
Title: Thelma Rodriguez vs. Spouses Jaime Sioson and Armi Sioson, et al.
G.R. No.: 199180
Ponente: J. Velasco Jr., Third Division
Topic: Sales
Nature of the Action: A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision dated May 26, 2011 and Resolution dated October 21, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 94867, which nullified the Joint Decision
dated August 13, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bataan, Branch 3.
Facts: This petition is the aftermath of a series of sales transactions entered into by Neri
delos Reyes over a portion of a property and registered in the name of Neri delos Reyes,
married to Violeta Lacuata.
Sometime in 1997, the Municipality of Orani, Bataan purchased from Neri an area of
about 1.7 hectare, to be used for the extension of the Municipality's public market.
Among other things, it was agreed that upon full payment of the purchase price, Neri will
surrender the mother title to the Municipality for subdivision of the property on the
condition that Neri will equitably share in the expense thereof. however, were retained by
the Municipality pending Neri's payment of his share in the expenses incurred for the
subdivision of Lot 398. These were placed under the custody of the Municipal Treasurer,
where they continue to remain.
Neri, however, alleged that then Municipal Mayor Mario Zufiiga suggested that he sell
the lot to his aunt, petitioner Thelma Rodriguez. The Municipality would then expropriate
the same from Thelma. Neri agreed to the suggestion. After agreeing to the amount of
Pl,243,000.00 as the selling price, Thelma, on March 20, 1997, issued a check for said
amount payable to Neri. When it fell due, no sufficient funds were available to cover the
check. Consequently, it was agreed that Thelma would pay the purchase price in
installments from March 20, 1997 to September 4, 1997. Thelma, however, was only able
to pay P442,293.50.
On November 12, 2001, Thelma caused the annotation of an adverse claim. At about the
same time, Thelma saw an announcement that a new Orani Common Terminal would be
built on the lot. As she has not yet entered into any agreement regarding the utilization of
said lot, Thelma filed a Complaint for Injunction against then incumbent mayor Efren
Pascual, Jr. and the Municipality under claim of ownership. To support her claim,
Thelma incorporated in her complaint a copy of an undated and unnotarized deed of
absolute sale allegedly executed by Neri. In their joint verified answer, Mayor Pascual
and the Municipality acknowledged that Thelma became the owner of the lot by way of
purchase from Neri.
In 2002, Neri executed an affidavit claiming that the owner's copies of Lot A and Lot B
were lost. Two days after, or on May 10, 2002, Neri caused the cancellation of Thelma's
adverse claim. Neri also caused the reconstitution of new owner's copies. Thereafter, new
copies were issued, and Neri then sold Lot A to Spouses Jaime and Armi Sioson, Spouses
Joan and Joseph Camacho, and Agnes Samonte in a deed of sale. A special power of
attorney was executed by Violeta delos Reyes in favor of Neri for the purpose. Upon the
issuance, the respondents declared Lot A for tax purposes and paid them accordingly.
They sought to take actual possession thereof by filling it; however, after they filled said
lot with about truckloads of soil/fillings, Thelma sent two armed blue guards who entered
the premises and set up a tent therein. The respondents brought the matter to the attention
of barangay authorities who referred them to the municipal mayor. As the municipal
mayor did not take any action, the respondents filed a forcible entry case against Thelma
before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Orani-Samal, Bataan. The said ejectment case
is still pending.
After Thelma learned of the second sale of Lot 398-A, she filed against the respondents a
complaint for the Declaration of Nullity of the Second Sale. The respondents countered
that they are innocent purchasers for value having bought Lot A at the time when
Thelma's adverse claim was already cancelled. While they admit Thelma's possession of
the subject property, they, however, qualify that possession is being contested in a
separate action for forcible entry. The respondents also filed a verified answer-in-
intervention contending that they are the present registered owners of Lot A, and as such,
Thelma is not entitled to any relief.
RTC:
(1.) Thelma is entitled to the relief of permanent injunction against the respondents. (2)
The second deed of sale entered into by Neri with the respondents is here by declared null
and void, The second deed of sale is likewise declared null and void, and accordingly, the
Register of Deeds for the Province of Bataan is ordered to cancel said certificate of title
and to reinstate
(3) The new owner's copy is hereby declared null and void as the original owner's copy is
not lost but actually exists and is presently in the custody of the Municipal Treasurer of
Orani, Bataan. In consequence, defendant Register of Deeds of Bataan is directed to
cancel said new owner's copy; and
(4) The respondents are hereby ordered to jointly and severally pay to Thelma attorney's
fees in the amount of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00). All counterclaims of
the respondents are denied for lack of basis in fact and in law.
CA: CA erred in reversing the RTC decision.

Issue: Whether the transaction between Neri and Thelma is a contract of sale or a
contract to sell.
Ruling:
Case No: 14
Title: Sulpicio Lines, Inc. vs. Napoleon Sesante, et al.
G.R. No.: 172682
Ponente: C.J. Sereno, First Division.
Topic: Contract; Damages
Nature of the Action: This appeal seeks to undo and reverse the adverse decision
promulgated on June 27, 2005, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with
modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 91, in Quezon City
holding the petitioner liable to pay temperate and moral damages due to breach of
contract of carriage.
Facts: The M/V Princess of the Orient, a passenger vessel owned and operated by the
petitioner, sank near Fortune Island in Batangas. Of the 388 recorded passengers, 150
were lost. Napoleon Sesante, then a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) and
a lawyer, was one of the passengers who survived the sinking. He sued the petitioner for
breach of contract and damages.
Sesante alleged in his complaint that the M/V Princess of the Orient left the Port of
Manila while Metro Manila was experiencing stormy weather; later that night, he had
noticed the vessel listing starboard, so he had gone to the uppermost deck where he
witnessed the strong winds and big waves pounding the vessel; that at the same time, he
had seen how the passengers had been panicking, crying for help and frantically
scrambling for life jackets in the absence of the vessel's officers and crew; that sensing
danger, he had called a certain Veney Ceballos through his cellphone to request him to
inform the proper authorities of the situation; that thereafter, big waves had rocked the
vessel, tossing him to the floor where he was pinned by a long steel bar; that he had freed
himself only after another wave had hit the vessel; that he had managed to stay afloat
after the vessel had sunk, and had been carried by the waves to the coastline of Cavite
and Batangas until he had been rescued; that he had suffered tremendous hunger, thirst,
pain, fear, shock, serious anxiety and mental anguish; that he had sustained injuries, and
had lost money, jewelry, important documents, police uniforms and the .45 caliber pistol
issued to him by the PNP; and that because it had committed bad faith in allowing the
vessel to sail despite the storm signal, the petitioner should pay him actual and moral
damages of P500,000.00 and Pl,000,000.00, respectively.
In its defense, the petitioner insisted on the seaworthiness of the M/V Princess of the
Orient due to its having been cleared to sail from the Port of Manila by the proper
authorities; that the sinking had been due to force majeure; that it had not been negligent;
and that its officers and crew had also not been negligent because they had made
preparations to abandon the vessel because they had launched life rafts and had provided
the passengers assistance in that regard.
RTC: Rendered its judgment in favor of the respondent. The petitioner, being negligent,
was liable to Sesante pursuant to Articles 1739 and 1759 of the Civil Code; that the
petitioner had not established its due diligence in the selection and supervision of the
vessel crew; that the ship officers had failed to inspect the stowage of cargoes despite
being aware of the storm signal; that the officers and crew of the vessel had not
immediately sent a distress signal to the Philippine Coast Guard; that the ship captain had
not called for then "abandon ship" protocol; and that based on the report of the Board of
Marine Inquiry (BMI), the erroneous maneuvering of the vessel by the captain during the
extreme weather condition had been the immediate and proximate cause of the sinking.
Issue: (1.) Is the complaint for breach of contract and damages a personal action that
does not survive the death of the plaintiff?
(2.) Is the petitioner liable for damages under Article 1759 of the Civil Code?
(3.) Is there sufficient basis for awarding moral and temperate damages?
Ruling:
I. No. Sesante's claim against the petitioner involved his personal injury caused by the
breach of the contract of carriage. Pursuant to the aforecited rules, the complaint survived
his death, and could be continued by his heirs following the rule on substitution.
Section 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. Whenever a party to a pending action dies,
and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the
court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and
address of his 1 legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with
his duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
II. YES. The petitioner was directly liable to Sesante and his heirs. The liability of
common carriers under Article 1759 is demanded by the duty of extraordinary diligence
required of common carriers in safely carrying their passengers.2
Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death or injuries to passengers through
the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may
have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common
earners.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
III. YES. The aforestated negligent acts of the officers and crew of M/V Princess of the
Orient could not be ignored in view of the extraordinary duty of the common carrier to
ensure the safety of the passengers. The totality of the negligence by the officers and
crew of M/V Princess of the Orient, coupled with the seeming indifference of the
petitioner to render assistance to Sesante, warranted the award of moral damages.
Case No: 15
Title: Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company Vs. Chuy Lu Tan, et al.,
G.R. No.: 202176
Date of Promulgation: August 1, 2016
Topic:
Nature of the Action: A petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside
the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated March 20, 2012 and June 11,
2012, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 92543; The assailed CA Decision reversed and
set aside the July 17, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 61, in an action for collection of a sum of money, docketed as Civil Case No. 00-
349, while the CA Resolution denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Facts: Respondents Chuy Lu Tan and Romeo Tanco obtained five loans from herein
petitioner Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company with an aggregate amount of Nineteen
Million Nine Hundred Thousand Pesos (P19,900,000.00). These loans are evidenced by
five Promissory Notes executed by Chuy and Tanco on various dates.
As security for the said loans, Chuy executed a Real Estate Mortgage located in Quezon
City. In addition to the said mortgage, herein respondents Sy Se Hiong and Tan Chu Hsiu
Yen also executed a Continuing Surety Agreement whereby they bound themselves to be
solidarily liable with Chuy and Tanco for the principal amount of P 19,900,000.00 plus
interests thereon at the rate or rates stated in the obligation secured thereby, any or all
penalties, costs and expenses which may be incurred by Metrobank.
Subsequently, Chuy and Tanco failed to settle their loans despite Metrobank's repeated
demands for payment. In a final demand letter of Metrobank's counsel notified
respondent Chuy their obligations, comprising the principal amount loaned, together with
interest and penalties, amounted to P24,353,062.03. Consequently, on Metrobank
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and the property was sold to it as the highest
bidder for the amount of P24,572,268.00. However, in separate letters to the respondents,
Metrobank claimed that after application of the bid price to the respondents' outstanding
obligation and the payment of the costs of foreclosure, accrued interest, penalty charges,
attorney's fees and other related expenses, there remained a deficiency of Pl,641,815.00.
As such, Metrobank demanded from respondents the payment of the said deficiency. For
respondents' failure to heed Metrobank's demand, the latter filed a suit for collection of a
sum of money with the RTC of Makati.
RTC: Ordered the respondents to pay jointly and severally, the herein plaintiff
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) the sum of ONE MILLION SIX
HUNDRED FORTY-ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FIFTEEN PESOS
(1,641,815.00), with interest at the legal rate.
CA: Reversed the RTC’s ruling and dismissed the Metrobank’s complaint.
Issue:
Ruling:
Case No: 16
Title: Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc. vs. UE Monthly Associated, et al.
G.R. No.: 181387
Date of Promulgation: September 5, 2016
Topic: Failure to prove their rights to the properties / Third-Party Claims
Nature of the Action: This petition for review on Certiorari, Cameron Granville 3 Asset
Management, Inc. assails the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution in CA-G.R. SP
No. 88049, which affirmed the levy and sale of certain personal properties allegedly
mortgaged to Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank), petitioner's
predecessor-in-interest. These properties were sold by the Sheriff of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) after Labor Arbiter Joselito Cruz Villarosa (LA) denied
Metrobank's third-party claim on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. Both the
NLRC and the CA affirmed this ruling.
Facts: The dispute in this case stemmed from the levy and execution sale made by NLRC
Sheriff Manolito G. Manuel. The subject of the execution were certain machinery,
equipment, tools and implements owned by UE.
Automotive Manufacturing, Inc. located at its manufacturing plant at General Mascardo

St., Caloocan City. The levy was made pursuant to a final and executory NLRC judgment
against UEAMI in an illegal dismissal case, in which it was ordered to pay P53,729,534
to complainants UEAMI Monthly Associates and UE Automotive Workers Union-NFL.
Metrobank filed an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim with the LA. Through its Senior
Manager Ramon S. Miranda, the bank claimed that the machines and equipment levied
upon by Sheriff Manuel were covered by three mortgage documents executed in favor of
the bank by UEAMI, i.e., a Mortgage Trust Indenture, an Amended Mortgage Trust
Indenture, and a Second Amended Mortgage Trust Indenture. As expected, respondents
opposed Metrobank's third-party claim. They asserted that they were not bound by the
mortgage agreements cited by the bank, because the instruments were not registered and
consequently had no effect on third parties.
Metrobank filed with the LA a reply to comment to Third-party Claim with Motion to Set
Hearing. Aside from emphasizing the superiority of its claim over the property, the bank
also manifested its intention to present evidence of its mortgage lien over the chattels.
Consequently, it requested that the third-party claim be set for hearing. It appears from
the records that this motion was not acted upon by the LA.
LA: LA denied Metrobank's third-party claim. However, in the interest of justice, the LA
directed Metrobank and other third-party claimants to post a bond to defer the execution
sale
NLRC: Affirmed LA’s ruling.
CA: Dismissed the Petition for Certiorari and ruled that the NLRC did not act with grave
abuse of discretion in affirming the LA's denial of the third-party claim filed by
Metrobank.
Issue: (1.) Whether the CA erred in applying the Revised Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC, which does not require the LA to conduct a hearing before deciding Metrobank's
third-party claim.
(2) Whether the CA erred in denying Metrobank's third-party claim.
Ruling: No. This Court agrees with the CA that a hearing is not required before a third-
party claim can be decided by the LA, albeit for a different reason than the supposed
repeal of Rule IV, Section 2 of the 1993 NLRC Manual on Execution of Judgment (1993
Manual). Furthermore, the Court believes that Metro bank has failed to present sufficient
evidence of the third-party claim.
Case No: 17
Title: The Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao vs. Florentina Prudencio, et al.
G.R. No.: 187942
Ponente: J. Velasco Jr., Third Division.
Topic: The nullity of the Extra-Judicial Partition does not automatically result
Nature of the Action: this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the October 21, 2008
Decision and May 11, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
77100. The CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the Regional Trial Court-Branch
4 of Tuguegarao City (RTC) declaring as null and void the sale to petitioner of 96,926
square meters (sq. m.) of a lot located in Baggao, Cagayan covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 14306 and ordering petitioner to reconvey the property to
Florentina Prudencio, substituted by her heirs, namely: Exequiel, Lorenzo, Primitivo,
Marcelino, Juliana, Alfredo and Rosario, all surnamed Domingo; Avelina Prudencio,
assisted by her husband Victoriano Dimaya; Ernesto Penalber and Rodrigo Talang
(respondents-appellees).
Facts: Felipe Prudencio married twice during his lifetime. With his first wife, Elena
Antonio, he begot five (5) children, namely: Valentina, Eusebia, Paula, Florentina and
Avelina. With his second wife, Teodora Abad, he had two (2) children namely: Felipe
Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora.
During the marriage of Felipe and Elena, they acquired a parcel of land located at Sitio
Abbot, Barrio Imurung, Baggao, Cagayan. When Elena died, Felipe and their children
became co-owners of the property. Felipe then died intestate during his second marriage.
Upon his death, Teodora, Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition of the Estate of the late Felipe with Waiver of Rights in favor of Teodora. While
the Extra-Judicial Partition acknowledged that the Cagayan lot was acquired during the
marriage of Felipe and Elena, it stated that Felipe and Elena did not have any children
who could inherit the property; hence, Teodora and her children with Felipe are the only
living heirs by operation of law.
The Extra-Judicial Partition also provided that Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora waived their
rights over the Cagayan lot in favor of their mother Teodora. Accordingly, title to the
Cagayan lot was transferred to Teodora's name. Teodora sold the Cagayan lot to
respondents Spouses Isidro Cepeda and Salvacion Divini.
Spouses Cepeda sold the Cagayan lot to petitioner for P16,500.00. Thereafter,
respondents-appellees filed a Complaint for Partition with Reconveyance against
petitioner, Spouses Cepeda and Teodora, Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora before the RTC.
They alleged that they are the children and grandchildren of Felipe by his first marriage.
They asserted that upon the death of Elena, they became the owners of Elena's conjugal
share on the Cagayan lot, while the other undivided half remained with Felipe. Upon the
death of Felipe, respondents-appellees then became owners as well of Felipe's conjugal
share in the property, together with Teodora, Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora. The Cagayan
lot should, therefore, be distributed.
Respondents-appellees posited that they were fraudulently deprived of their rightful

shares in the estate of Felipe and Elena when the Extra-Judicial Partition declared
Teodora as the sole owner of the Cagayan lot. Thus, they prayed that they be declared the
owners pro indiviso of the undivided portion of the Cagayan lot, and that this portion be
reconveyed to them. They also sought payment of moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees. Petitioner filed an Answer with Cross Claim. It countered that Spouses
Cepeda were in possession of the Cagayan lot at the time they offered it for sale. It denied
knowledge of the existence of any defect over Spouses Cepeda's title. Petitioner stated
that in fact, Atty. Pedro R. Perez Jr. (petitioner's lawyer), verified the title and ownership
of Spouses Cepeda before it purchased the Cagayan lot. Thus, it averred that it was an
innocent purchaser for value.
Nevertheless, petitioner insisted that Spouses Cepeda should be held liable for the
Cagayan lot plus interest and damages, or for the rescission of the sale with
reimbursement of the purchase price plus interest and damages, in case the claim for
reconveyance of respondents-appellees is successful. It contended that the Deed of Sale
between petitioner and Spouses Cepeda expressly stated that the latter shall answer for
any claim of any other possible heir who might be deprived of their lawful participation
in the estate of the original register owner. Spouses Cepeda maintained that their title
over the Cagayan lot was clean and that they had no knowledge that other persons had
interest on it because Teodora's title over the property was clean. They asserted that like
petitioner, they were purchasers for value and in good faith. Therefore, petitioner has no
cause of action against them.
RTC: RTC ruled in favor of respondents-appellees. The RTC held that it was impossible
for Teodora and her children to not know that Felipe had children/heirs by his first
marriage. It observed that the real property taxes on the Cagayan lot, from 1963 to 1968,
were actually paid by respondent-appellee Ernesto Penalber, the grandson of Felipe by
her daughter Valentina. Therefore, the execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition was done
in bad faith.
Issue: Whether petitioner is a buyer in good faith and for value.
Ruling: No. Articles 979, 980 and 981 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Civil Code)
state that all the children of the deceased shall inherit from him and by implication should
participate in the settlement of his/her estate, to wit:
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other
ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from
different marriages. An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in
the same manner as a legitimate child.
Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right,
dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are
dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of
representation.
Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court which reads:
Sec. l. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs.-lf the decedent left no will
and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or
legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing
letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a
public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree,
they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may
adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the
register of deeds. The parties to an extrajudicial settlement, whether by public instrument
or by stipulation in a pending action for A/ partition, or the sole heir who adjudicates the
entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit shall file, simultaneously with and as a
condition precedent to the filing of the public instrument, or stipulation in the action for
partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a bond with the said
register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal property involved
as certified to under oath by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the payment of
any just claim that may be filed under section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the
decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two
(2) years after the death of the decedent.
Case No: 18
Title: Social Security System vs. Commission on Audit
G.R. No.: G.R. No. 210940
Ponente: J. Mendoza, En Banc.
Topic: Funds of the SSS were merely held in trust for the benefit of workers
Nature of the Action: This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules
of Court seeks to reverse and set aside the January 30, 2013 Decision and the December
6, 2013 Resolution of the Commission on Audit (COA), which affirmed Notice of
Disallowance (ND) No. SSS-2207-02 (2004) relative to the payment of Extraordinary
and Miscellaneous Expenses (EME), medical expenses, rice allowance, and provident
fund (other benefits) to the members of the Social Security Commission (SSC) in
the total amount of P4,314,683.99.
Facts: On May 14, 1997, the SSC of the Social Security System (SSS) approved
Resolution No. 360 granting a new compensation package for its members, including
medical benefits, rice allowance, and a provident fund. These benefits were incorporated
in the SSS Manual on Personnel Policies, Rules and Regulations or commonly known in
the SSS as the "Blue Book.”anrobleslaw
On September 22, 1999, the SSC issued Resolution No. 790 granting EME to its
members at similar rates then given to members of the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS). EME included, but was not limited to, expenses incurred for meetings,
seminars, conferences, official entertainment, and public relations. In the same resolution,
the SSC further approved additional budgetary appropriations in the amount of
approximately P 4.49 million to cover the payment of EME. It also covered the increase
in EME of its Chairman to P750,000.00 per year, which was the rate being given to his
counterpart in the GSIS.
Issue: Whether the members of the SSC are entitled to the EME, medical benefit, rice
allowance and the provident fund.
Ruling:
Case No: 19
Title: Naga Centrum, Inc. vs. Sps. Ramon J. Orzales and Nenita F. Orzales
G.R. No.: 203576
Ponente: J. Del Castillo, Second Division.
Topic: Easement of Right of Way
Nature of the Action: This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to set aside: a) the
May 23, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 93926
affirming the December 23, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City,
Branch 22 in Civil Case No. 2004-0036, which in turn granted herein respondents -
spouses Ramon and Nenita Orzales - an easement of right of way; and b) the CA's
August 28, 2012 Resolution denying herein petitioner Naga Centrum Inc.'s Motion for
Reconsideration.
Facts: The plaintiffs-appellees own a house and lot situated at No. 28-B Valentin Street,
Sabang, Naga City which is surrounded on the North by the property of Aurora dela
Cruz; on the West, by the property of Bernardo Tawagon; and on the East and South, by
the property of the defendant-appellant. The plaintiffs-appellees alleged that when they
acquired their property in 1965, their access to the public highway (Valentin Street) was
through Rizal Street, which forms part of a property now owned by the defendant-
appellant. But when the squatters inhabiting said place were evicted, the defendant-
appellant caused Rizal Street to be closed by enclosing its property with a concrete fence.
Although the plaintiffs-appellees were allowed to pass through the steel gate of the
defendant-appellant, the same is subject to the schedule set by the latter. This prompted
the plaintiffs-appellees to ask for a permanent right of way through the intervention of the
court after the defendant-appellant refused their offer to buy the portion where the
proposed right of way is sought to be established.
The defendant-appellant, however, alleged that there is an existing passageway leading to

Valentin Street along Lot 1503 of Cad-290 which is available to the plaintiffs-appellees.
Accordingly, it argued that the plaintiffs-appellees' cause of action should be against the
owner of the said property. But since the said owner of Lot 1503 was not impleaded, the
instant complaint is defective for failure to implead indispensable party. It also denied
mat it granted the plaintiffs-appellees right of way on its property stating that title use by
the latter of Rizal Street as access to Valentin Street is unauthorized and illegal.
Moreover, it said that the property of the plaintiffs-appellees became isolated due to their
own acts. As a counterclaim, the defendant-appellant asked for damages in the form of
litigation expenses, attorney's fees, and nominal damages.
On December 23, 2008, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs-
appellees. The trial court found based on the two ocular inspections conducted that the
property of the plaintiffs-appellees is indeed isolated, and that an outlet to a public road
could be most conveniently and practically established along the property of the
defendant-appellant which is considerably bigger in size at 1.9 hectares than that of the
other surrounding adjacent owners, like Bernardo Tawagon, whose property measures
only 140 square meters, Felisa Estela, 90 square meters, and Aurora dela Cruz, 116
square meters, and which would provide the shortest route fora the public road to the
former's property[; t]hat the isolation of their property was not due to their own act[; t]hat
the easement would be established on the portion least prejudicial to the property of the
defendant-appellant, that is, alongside the boundary of its property and that of Felisa
Estela and Aurora dela Cruz[; and t]hat the plaintiffs-appellees were willing to pay the
corresponding damages provided for by law if the right of way would be granted.
The trial court held that since the plaintiffs-appellees have an existing sufficient outlet to
a public road through Rizal Street when they bought their property in 1965, it was not
necessary for them to demand a right of way from the vendor of their property as
suggested by the defendant-appellant. It opined that had the plaintiffs-appellees known
that Rizal Street would someday be closed by the defendant-appellant, they 'would never
built a house whose access would be towards the skies'. As to the concrete structure
constructed by the defendant-appellant along the proposed right of way, the trial court
held that the portion which extends or obstructs the said proposed right of way should be
considered an illegal structure because it was placed after the instant complaint had
already been filed.
RTC: 1. GRANTING unto plaintiffs spouses Ramon and Nenita Orzales a LEGAL
EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY with a width of two (2) meters and length of Twenty
(20) meters, or a total area of Forty (40) square meters, to be established as defendant
Naga Centrum, Inc.'s property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 45221
and Tax Declaration No. 010200772, particularly alongside its boundary line and the
properties of Felisa Estela and Aurora de la Cruz towards Valentin Street as proposed and
indicated in the sketch (Exhibits E and 17 found in page 191 of the records) and specially
marked as Exhibit E-4;
2. ORDERING the said plaintiffs to PAY the defendant the amount of Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00), as and by way of the reasonable indemnity for the value
of the said land affected by the easement of right of way, plus Ten Thousand Pesos
(910,000.00) representing the reasonable amount to answer for the damages to be
suffered by the said servient estate as a consequence of such easement;
and cralawlawlibrary
3. ORDERING the defendant to VOLUNTARILY REMOVE and/or DEMOLISH all the

portion of its building on the subject property which extends or obstructs the said
easement of right of way at its expense within fifteen (15) days upon compliance [by] the
plaintiffs of the immediately preceding paragraph.
CA:
Issue: (a.) WHETHER [THEN] HONORABLE PAIRING JUDGE OF BRANCH 22
HAS JURISDICTION TO RENDER THE ASSAILED DECISION
(b.) WHETHER PLAINTIFF HAS THE RIGHT TO DEMAND RIGHT OF WAY.
(c.) ASSUMING THERE IS THE RIGHT TO DEMAND RIGHT OF WAY,

WHETHER XXX THE CHOSEN RIGHT OF WAY IS THE LEAST PREJUDICIAL
TO THE PETITIONER
Ruling: No.
Case No: 20
Title: Spouses Mamerto and Adelia Timado v. Rural Bank of San Jose INC.
G.R. No.: 201436
Ponente: J. Brion., Second Division.
Topic: Damages
Nature of the Action: resolve the petition for review on certiorari assailing the March
30, 2012 decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89866
entitled "Spouses Mamerto Timado and Delia Timado v. Rural Bank of San Jose, Inc.,
Teddy Monasterio, in his capacity as its Manager, and Gilbert Passion, " that affirmed
with modification the October 31, 2006 Regional Trial Court (RTC) joint decision in
Civil Case No. IR-2974 and Special Civil Action No. IR-3187.
Facts: On August 15, 1994, the petitioners obtained a loan from Rural Bank amounting
to ₱178,000.00. As security for the loan, they executed a real estate mortgage over a
parcel of land located in Nabua, Camarines Sur, and a chattel mortgage over one (1) unit
of rice mill machinery with accessories and one (1) unit of diesel engine in favor of the
bank.
The petitioners eventually failed to pay their loan amortizations. As of August 27, 1997,
their outstanding obligation to Rural Bank amounted to ₱125,700.00. Consequently, the
bank informed the petitioners of its intention to foreclose the real estate and chattel
mortgages to cover the unpaid balance.
On April 1, 1998, the petitioners filed a complaint for reformation of instruments7with

prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order and damages against the
respondents before the RTC, Branch 35, Iriga City.
On April 6, 1998, Rural Bank proceeded with the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage and sold the property at a public auction where it emerged as the highest
bidder. The provisional deed of sale was registered with the Office of the Provincial
Register of Camarines Sur. The petitioners failed to redeem the property within the one-
year redemption period. As a result, the title was consolidated in Rural Bank’s name and
a definite certificate of sale was issued in its favor.11
On November 9, 2000, the petitioners filed a petition for indirect contempt with
damages against the respondents, alleging that the latter had pre-empted judicial
authority by foreclosing the mortgages and selling the properties at a public auction
during the pendency of the reformation of instruments case.
On February 7, 2002, while the reformation of instruments and indirect contempt cases
were pending, Rural Bank filed an ex-parte petition for issuance of writ of possession
over the subject property. Because of this, the petitioners filed their third petition for
indirect contempt.
RTC: RTC dismissed the complaint for reformation of instruments and petition for
indirect contempt filed by the petitioners and ordered the Clerk of Court to issue a writ of
possession in favor of the respondents.
CA: CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Issue: 1) whether the award of exemplary damages is proper, considering the CA’s
deletion of the award of moral damages; and 2) whether the award of attorney’s fees is
supported by the factual and legal premises in the text of the RTC decision.
Ruling: No. the award of exemplary damages is deleted and the amount of attorney's fees
is fixed at ₱l00,000.00. Costs against spouses Mamerto and Delia Timado.
Case No: 21
Title: Stronghold Insurance vs Pamana Resort Hotel and Marina Club
G.R. No.: 174838
Date of Promulgation: June 1, 2016
Topic: Credit: Applicable Interest Rate
Nature of the Action: Petition for Review filed by Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc.
(Stronghold) assailing the Decision dated July 20, 2006 and Resolution dated September
26, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 94313.
Facts: The case stems from an action for sum of money filed by Pamana Island Resort
Hotel and Marina Club, Inc. and Flowtech Construction Corporation against Stronghold
on the basis of a Contractor's All Risk Bond obtained by Flowtech in relation to the
construction of Pamana's project in Pamana Island, Subic Bay.
A fire in the project burned down cottages being built by Flowtech, resulting in losses to
Pamana. In a Decision by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 135
declared Stronghold liable for the claim. Besides the award of insurance proceeds,
exemplary damages and attorney's fees, the trial court ordered the payment of interest at
double the applicable rate, following Section 243 of the Insurance Code which
Stronghold was declared to have violated, and reads:
Sec. 243. The amount of any loss or damage for which an insurer may be liable, under
any policy other than life insurance policy, shall be paid within thirty days after proof of
loss is received by the insurer and ascertainment of the loss or damage is made either by
agreement between the insured and the insurer or by arbitration; but if such ascertainment
is not had or made within sixty days after such receipt by the insurer of the proof of loss,
then the loss or damage shall be paid within ninety days after such receipt. Refusal or
failure to pay the loss or damage within the time prescribed herein will entitle the assured
to collect interest on the proceeds of the policy for the duration of the delay at the rate of
twice the ceiling prescribed by the Monetary Board, unless such failure or refusal to pay
is based on the ground that the claim is fraudulent.
RTC: Rendered its Order granting Stronghold's motion.
CA: CA rendered its Decision granting Pamana's petition,

Issue:
Ruling:
Case No: 22
Title: Spouses Poon vs Prime Savings Bank
G.R. No.: 183794
Topic: Oblicon: Resolution vs Rescission; Fortuitous Event; Penal Clause; Reduction of
Penalty
Nature of the Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals
(CA) Decision which affirmed the Decision issued by Branch 21, Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Naga City.
Facts: Petitioners owned a commercial building in Naga City, which they used for their
bakery business. On 3 November 2006, Matilde Poon and respondent executed a 10-year
Contract of Lease over the building for the latter's use as its branch office in Naga City.
They agreed to a fixed monthly rental of P60,000, with an advance payment of the rentals
for the first 100 months in the amount of P6,000,000. As agreed, the advance payment
was to be applied immediately, while the rentals for the remaining period of the Contract
were to be paid on a monthly basis. In addition, paragraph 24 of the Contract provides:
24. Should the lease[ d] premises be closed, deserted or vacated by the LESSEE, the
LESSOR shall have the right to terminate the lease without the necessity of serving a
court order and to immediately repossess the leased premises. Thereafter the LESSOR
shall open and enter the leased premises in the presence of a representative of the
LESSEE (or of the proper authorities) for the purpose of taking a complete inventory of
all furniture, fixtures, equipment and/or other materials or property found within the
leased premises.
The LESSOR shall thereupon have the right to enter into a new contract with another
party. All advanced rentals shall be forfeited in favor of the LESSOR. Barely three years
later, however, the BSP placed respondent under the receivership of the Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) by virtue of BSP Monetary Board Resolution No.
22, 7 which reads:
On the basis of the report of Mr. Candon B. Guerrero, Director of Thrift Banks and Non-
Bank Financial Institutions (DTBNBFI), in his memorandum dated January 3, 2000,
which report showed that the Prime Savings Bank, Inc. (a) is unable to pay its liabilities
as they became due in the ordinary course of business; (b) has insufficient realizable
assets as determined by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas to meet its liabilities; ( c) cannot
continue in business without involving probable losses to its depositors and creditors; and
( d) has wilfully violated cease and desist orders under Section 37 that has become final,
involving acts or transactions which amount to fraud or a dissipation of the assets of the
institution;
The BSP eventually ordered respondent's liquidation. Respondent vacated the leased
premises and surrendered them to petitioners. Subsequently, the PDIC issued petitioners
a demand letter asking for the return of the unused advance rental amounting to
P3,480,000 on the ground that paragraph 24 of the lease agreement had become
inoperative, because respondent's closure constituted force majeure. The PDIC likewise
invoked the principle of rebus sic stantibus under Article 1267 of Republic Act No. 386
(Civil Code) as alternative legal basis for demanding the refund. Petitioners, however,
refused the PDIC's demand. They maintained that they were entitled to retain the
remainder of the advance rentals following paragraph 24 of their Contract. Consequently,
respondent sued petitioners before the RTC of Naga City for a partial rescission of
contract and/or recovery of a sum of money.
RTC: RTC ordered the partial rescission of the lease agreement.
CA: CA affirmed the R TC Decision
Issue: Whether ( 1) respondent may be released from its contractual obligations to

petitioners on grounds of fortuitous event under Article 1174 of the Civil Code and
unforeseen event under Article 1267 of the Civil Code; (2) the proviso in the parties'
Contract allowing the forfeiture of advance rentals was a penal clause; and (3) the penalty
agreed upon by the parties may be equitably reduced under Article 1229 of the Civil
Code.
Ruling:
Case No: 23
Title: NDC Tagum Foundation vs Sumakote
G.R. No.: 190644
Ponente: C.J. Sereno., First Division.
Topic: Torts: Award of Attorney's fees (just the penultimate par. before dispositive
portion)
Nature of the Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals
(CA) Decision which affirmed the Resolution issued by the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Evelyn B.
Sumakote (respondent) against the NDC Tagum Foundation; and Anita B. Somoso
(Somoso) and Lida U. Na+tavio (Natavio ), its President and Administrator, respectively.
The CA, however, modified the NLRC ruling by awarding, in favor of respondent
nominal damages in the amount of P30,000 for petitioners' noncompliance with the
hearing requirement in dismissal cases.
Facts: Respondent was a full-time nursing instructor at the College of Nursing of the
NDC Tagum Foundation before she was appointed as its dean. She also operated a
nursing review and caregiver training center while simultaneously working at the NDC
Tagum 4 Foundation While respondent was still under contract with the NDC Tagum
Foundation, the University of Mindanao (UM) engaged her services as consultant for the
establishment of the UM' s Nursing Department. She was interviewed for deanship at the
UM; and within that month, her appointment as full-time program head was approved by
the president of the university. She was also listed as faculty member in the permit
application it submitted to the Commission on Higher Education (CHED). In a letter,
Natavio advised respondent that her engagement with the UM was in conflict with the
interests of the NDC Tagum Foundation, and that it was an act of disloyalty. Moreover,
even her work attendance was already affected. She was then requested to formally
declare her plan to leave the NDC Tagum Foundation, so it could appoint a new dean.
Respondent did not respond to the letter. She declined the appointment at the UM, as she
had decided to stay with the NDC Tagum Foundation. Respondent received another letter
from Natavio requiring the former to explain why she should not be dismissed on the
ground of neglect of duty because of her moonlighting activities. The letter also stated
that respondent not only had poor work attendance, but also neglected to update the
school curriculum. On the following day, respondent submitted a written explanation
denying the charges of neglect. She contended that she had not received any
compensation from the UM; therefore, her work there could not be considered as
moonlighting. She also questioned the timing of the management's objection to her
review and training center, considering that it had been operational since 1999.
Petitioners placed respondent on preventive suspension for five days pending the
outcome of the management's investigation of her supposed moonlighting activities and
her reported attempts to pirate some of the school's instructors for transfer to the UM. In a
letter of even date, Somoso notified respondent of the latter's preventive suspension and
directed her to explain why she should not be dismissed based on the reports. The next
day, respondent submitted a letter denying the latest allegation and seeking a clarification
of her employment status. In addition, she prayed that the management's decision be
made only after a proper investigation.
Petitioners notified her of her dismissal from employment. Upon a Complaint filed by
respondent, the labor arbiter declared her dismissal illegal, ordering her reinstatement and
the payment of back wages, as well as moral and exemplary damages. The NLRC
reversed the arbiter's Decision. It ruled that respondent was dismissed for just because her
moonlighting activities constituted dishonesty, serious misconduct, and gross neglect of
duty.
Issue: whether the CA erred in holding that respondent was not given the opportunity to
be heard and to present her defense prior to her dismissal.
Ruling:
Case No: 24
Title: People vs Totong Avila y Alecante
G.R. No.: 201584
Ponente: J. Perez, Third Division.
Date of Promulgation: June 15, 2016.
Topic: Torts: Award for Actual Damages and Loss of earning capacity, basis thereof.
Nature of the Action: Resolve in this Decision the appeal from the September 13, 2011
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04311. The CA
sustained the September 9, 2009 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 219
of Quezon City, which found Apolonio "Totong" Avila (accused-appellant) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder, and imposed on him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Facts: Ryan Vasquez, the 9-year-old brother of the victim, returned home after
borrowing a guitar next door as instructed by his sister. Ryan was atop the staircase
leading to their house when he saw "Totong" and another man lingering outside their
door. Ryan saw the two men peeping inside the house and out of fear of being spotted by
Totong and his companion; he hid in a spot by the stairs, which was more or less 8 meters
away from where the men were standing. While hiding, Ryan saw Totong fire the first
shot. The bullet went through the door, hitting his sister Janjoy on the right side of her
body. Totong then kicked the door open and shot Janjoy on the head. The two men
immediately fled the scene. Ryan rushed inside the house and saw his sister lying on the
ground bleeding. He hurried to his Ate Milda's nearby house and asked for help. Ryan's
Ate Milda and Kuya Ricky brought Janjoy to the hospital.cralawred
The victim's neighbor and aunt sought to shed light on the whereabouts of accused-
appellant before and after the shooting incident. Bryan Hermano, a 19 year old
construction worker and neighbor of the Vasquez family, testified that on the same night
between the hours of 7 and 8 o'clock in the evening, he was at the basketball court when
he overheard Totong talking to his companion, Bong Muslim, about his plan to kill Rovic
Vasquez, father of the victim. Unfortunately, before he could warn Rovic Vasquez, he
learned that Janjoy was already shot. Jonalyn Vasquez, aunt of the victim, was at home
that night, she heard a gunshot coming from the next house. Upon hearing the gun shot,
she immediately went outside and saw the accused walking on the pathway between her
house and the victim's house. She claimed that no person other than the accused used said
pathway after the shooting incident. The father of the victim, Rovic Vasquez, testified as
to the funeral and burial expenses incurred by his family. He maintained that he incurred
expenses for the burial lot and coffin and expenses for food and drinks during the wake.
A handwritten receipt showing a breakdown of total expenses was also submitted.
The defense of accused-appellant is one of denial and alibi. His version of the facts as
summarized in his Brief is hereby adopted as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"Between 11 o'clock to 12 o'clock in the evening of October 20, 2002, Apolonio Avila
was inside a room which he rented on that same day at Freedom Park, Batasan Hills
Quezon City. While sleeping, he heard a loud bang at the door and several men forcibly
entered. They introduced themselves as policemen and barangay officials further asked
him if he was Totong. Avila was then informed that he was a suspect in a crime that took
place at the lower part of Batasan and was invited to go to Police Station without being
presented a warrant of arrest. Upon arrival thereat, they waited for Rovic Vasquez, the
private complainant in the case. At that time, he was not required to give any statement
nor was he asked to sign a waiver. When the complainant arrived, he was brought to
Camp Karingal to be incarcerated. He was not informed of the reason of his detention and
was subjected to inquest proceeding only after three (3) days. He affirmed that he was
only renting a room in Freedom Park and was a resident of Santiago, Caloocan City. He
confirmed knowing the complainant as he was a 'kababayan' but he firmly denied
knowing a 'Toto Pulis' and 'Boy Muslim'.”
Accused-appellant was the sole witness for the defense. On cross-examination, he

testified that Rovic Vasquez, father of the victim, was his friend and kababayan. He
claimed that he has known Rovic for a long time and there was no point in time when
their friendship has turned sour even at the time when he was arrested. He also claimed
that he only moved to Freedom Park, Batasan Hills, Quezon City because the
complainant invited him to their place to rent a room as it would be more convenient for
him. Accused-appellant also testified that no weapon search was conducted when he was
apprehended, neither was he subjected to a paraffin test.
RTC: The Regional trial court found accused-appellant guilty.
CA: Affirmed the decision of the RTC and denied the appeal.
Issue:
Ruling: Accused-appellant Apolonio "Totong" Avila is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder
Case No: 25
Title: People of the Philippines vs Oadasan, Jr.
G.R. No.: 194605
Ponente: J. Bersamin, En Banc.
Date of Promulgation: June 14, 2016.
Topic: Torts: Civil Liability for death caused by crime or quasi-delict.

Facts:
RTC:
CA:
Issue:
Ruling:

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Case No: 1

Section 86 - Certificate showing appropriation to meet contract. Except in the case of a

It appeared that notwithstanding such foreclosure, a deficiency balance of P91,525.22

CA: Affirmed the RTC’s ruling.

Cipriano and Marcelino, on account of this predicament, were compelled to file a

CA: Reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.

Issue: Whether the Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirsand Sale amounted to an equitable

Nature of the Action:

Nature of the Action:

Facts: Respondent Catalino M. Mangahis (respondent) is the registered owner of a parcel

Carmona Realty agreed to deposit in escrow the total consideration of Pl,476,834,000.00

CA: Dismissed petitioner's appeal and affirmed the RTC ruling.

Respondent-spouses informed petitioners that their daughter, Rowena, is getting married

On September 14, 2000, respondent-spouses filed a Complaint for Ejectment against

In their Answer dated October 4, 2000, petitioners countered that respondent-spouses and

By way of counterclaim, petitioners prayed that respondent-spouses be ordered to pay

In their Position Paper dated December 26, 2000, respondent-spouses admitted ownership

In their Position Paper dated January 2, 2001, petitioners reiterated that respondent-

RTC: The assailed decision is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE on the

Issue: (1.) Whether the CA Decision is already final and executory;

Section 2 of Republic Act No. 8791

CA: Affirmed the RTC’s ruling.

CA: CA erred in reversing the RTC decision.

CA: Affirmed the RTC’s ruling.

Automotive Manufacturing, Inc. located at its manufacturing plant at General Mascardo

NLRC: Affirmed LA’s ruling.

Respondents-appellees posited that they were fraudulently deprived of their rightful

CA: Affirmed the RTC’s ruling.

Issue: Whether petitioner is a buyer in good faith and for value.

Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court which reads:

The defendant-appellant, however, alleged that there is an existing passageway leading to

3. ORDERING the defendant to VOLUNTARILY REMOVE and/or DEMOLISH all the

(b.) WHETHER PLAINTIFF HAS THE RIGHT TO DEMAND RIGHT OF WAY.

(c.) ASSUMING THERE IS THE RIGHT TO DEMAND RIGHT OF WAY,

On April 1, 1998, the petitioners filed a complaint for reformation of instruments7with

CA: CA affirmed the RTC decision.

RTC: Rendered its Order granting Stronghold's motion.

CA: CA rendered its Decision granting Pamana's petition,

RTC: RTC ordered the partial rescission of the lease agreement.

CA: CA affirmed the R TC Decision

Issue: Whether ( 1) respondent may be released from its contractual obligations to

Accused-appellant was the sole witness for the defense. On cross-examination, he

RTC: The Regional trial court found accused-appellant guilty.

Nature of the Action:

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