CASE DIGEST

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
II

J. Double Jeopardy
Art. III, Sec. 21. No person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act
is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.

Submitted:

WILLY C. DUMPIT
FIRST YEAR - LLB
 PEOPLE vs. COURT OF SILAY
G.R. No. L-43790 December 9, 1976

FACTS:

On June 4, 1974, the accused Sensio, Millan and Jochico, scalers of

Hawaiian-Philippine Company, with intent of gain and to cause damage by
conniving, cooperating and mutually helping one another did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously alter or falsify the sugar cane weight report card or
"tarjeta", a private document showing the weight of sugarcane belonging to
Deogracias de la Paz, particularly those loaded in cane cars Nos. 1686, 1743 and
1022 by increasing the total actual weight thereby causing damage to the central and
other cane planters.
After the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its case, the
respondents moved to dismiss the charge against them since evidences presented
were not sufficient to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acting on
the motion, respondent court issued its order dismissing the case on the ground that
the acts committed by the accused do not constituted the crime of falsification under
Art. 172 of RPC defining the crime of falsification which was charged earlier and that
their case be dismissed. The respondents reiterated the fact that the dismissal was
due to lack of merits of the prosecution which would have the same effect as an
acquittal will bar the prosecution from prosecuting the accused for it will be unjust for
the accused due to double jeopardy rule Art. 21 of the Philippine Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the grant of the petition of the court would place the accused
in double jeopardy?

HELD:

Yes. The grant of the petition of the court will put the accused in
double jeopardy because it has been dismissed due to lack of merits. It is true
that the criminal case of falsification was dismissed on a motion of the
accused however this was a motion filed after the prosecution had rested its
case. This would be tantamount therefore to acquittal that will bar the
prosecution of another case. The requisites of a valid defense of
double jeopardy include: First, that there should be a valid complaint, second
would be that such complaint be filed before a competent court and to which
the accused has pleaded and that defendant was previously acquitted,
convicted or dismissed or otherwise terminated without express consent of
the accused. In the instant case, there was double jeopardy when first is that
the ground for the dismissal of the case was due to insufficiency of evidence
and second, when the proceedings have been reasonably prolonged as to
violate the right of the accused to a speedy trial.
 PEOPLE vs. PINEDA
G.R. No. L-44205, Feb. 16, 1993

FACTS:

In 1993, private respondent Consolacion Naval was separately accused of

having committed the crime of estafa and falsification both at the Court of First
Instance Rizal. She sought the dismissal of the latter charge on the supposition that
she is in danger of being convicted for the same offense. The Honorable Gregorio G.
Pineda, Presiding Judge of Branch 21 was persuaded to the contrary thereafter on
the belief that the alleged falsification was a necessary means of committing estafa.
It is this perception, along with the denial of the motion for re-evaluation therefrom which the
people impugns via the special civil action for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court correctly dismissed the offense of falsification?

HELD:

No. In order that a defendant may successfully allege former jeopardy, it is

necessary that he had previously been convicted, or acquitted or being convicted of
the offense charged, that is the former case against him for the same offense has
been dismissed or otherwise terminated without express consent by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon valid complainant or information, and after the
defendant had pleaded to the charge. In the case at bar, the mere filing of two
information charging the same offense is not an appropriate basis for the invocation
of double jeopardy since the first jeopardy has not yet set in by a previous conviction,
acquittal, or termination of the case without the consent of the accused.

   
 PEOPLE vs. ADIL
G.R. No. L-41863, April 22, 1977

FACTS:

On April 12, 1975 in the Municipality January, Province of Iloilo, the

respondent Fama Jr., with deliberate intent, and without any justifiable motive, armed
with pieces of stone willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and throw
pieces of stone at Miguel Viajar, hitting him on the lower right eye which would heal
from five (5) to nine (9) days barring complications but leaving a permanent scar and
deforming on the right face. The first case proceeded and accused pleaded not guilty
during arraignment. After several postponements by the prosecution, the first
criminal case was dismissed invoking his constitutional right to speedy trial. He also
moves for the dismissal of the second case on the ground of double jeopardy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the private respondent can invoke double jeopardy in the
second allegation?

HELD:

No. This is because the second offense was not in existence at the time of the
first prosecution. This means that such case has no possibility for the accused during
the first prosecution to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. In the
instant case, when the complaint was filed on April 15, 1975, only three days had
passed since the incident in which the injuries were sustained took place, and there
were yet no indicators of graver injury or consequence to be suffered by said
offended party. The case No. 3335 was just filed later and the wound on the face of
Viajar had already healed, that the alleged deformity became apparent. Therefore, in
the case at bar, the plea of double jeopardy of private respondent cannot be invoked.
 PEOPLE vs. RELOVA
G.R. No. L-45129, March 6, 1987

FACTS:

On Feb.1 1975, Batangas police together with personnel of Batangas Electric

Light System searched and examined the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice
Plant owned by accused Manuel Opulencia. They discovered electric
wiring devices have been installed without authority from the city government. The
Said devices are designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric
current consumption in the plant’s electric meter. The case was dismissed on the
ground of prescription. On Nov 24, 1975, another case was filed against Mr.
Opulencia by the Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas for a violation of
Ordinance regarding unauthorized electrical installations with resulting damage and
prejudice to the City. Before arraignment, Opulencia filed a motion to quash on the
ground of double jeopardy. The Assistant fiscal’s claim is that it is not double
jeopardy was punishable by an ordinance, where in the case was dismissed, as
opposed to the second offense which is theft of electricity which is punishable by the
Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused can invoke double jeopardy in his second
offense?

HELD:

Yes. The bill of rights gives two instances or kinds of double jeopardy. The

first sentence states that “No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense. The second states that “If an act is punishable by a law or
an ordinance, the conviction or acquittal shall bar to another prosecution for the
same act”. In the present case, it was evident that the charges filed against Mr.
Opulencia falls on the 2nd kind definition of double jeopardy wherein it contemplates
double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. Furthermore, even if the offenses
charged are not the same, owing that the first charge constitutes a violation of
an ordinance and the second charge was a violation against the RPC, the fact that
the two charges originated from one and the same act of conviction or acquittal
under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other hence
making it fall against double jeopardy. Thus, the fact that Mr. Opulencia was
acquitted on the first offense should bar the 2nd complaint against him coming from
the same identity or act.
 IVLER vs. SAN PEDRO
G.R. No. 172176, November 17, 2010

FACTS:

In August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler was charged before MTC Pasig City
regarding vehicular collision with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries; and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property. The petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on
the first offense and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this
conviction, petitioner moved to quash the second offense for placing him in jeopardy
of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MTC
refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. The petitioner
elevated the matter to the RTC in a petition for certiorari while Ivler sought from the
MTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal case. Without acting on petitioner’s
motion, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s
absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. Seven days later, the MTC issued
a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his
arraignment until after his arrest.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Jason Ivler can invoke double jeopardy in further proceedings
in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property?

HELD:

Yes. Adhering to one’s constitutional right under Article III, Section 21 of the
Philippine Constitution protects him for post-conviction prosecution for the same
offense. This is because once convicted or acquitted of an act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the
essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Art. 365 of the RPC lies in
the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would merit
punishment of felony. The law penalizes thus careless act, not the result thereof. The
gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty; it
does not qualify the substance of the offense. As the negligent act is single, whether
the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the criminal offense
remains one and the same, and cannot be split into different crimes. Thus, the
second prosecution is constitutionally impermissible under Double Jeopardy Clause.
 MERENCILLO vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 142369-70, April 13, 2007

FACTS:

On September 13, 1995 Juanito Merencillo was charged of violation of Sec. 3

(b) of RA 3019 and Direct bribery. In exchange for the approval of the Certificate
Authorizing Registration (CAR), the petitioner demanded from private complainant
Ma. Angeles Ramasola Cesar P20,000.00. Due to the repeated demand of the
petitioner and delaying the release of CAR, private complainant seek the help of the
authorities. As a result, petitioner was caught in the entrapment instituted by the police.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner appealed the decision to the
Sandiganbayan which was denied affirming the RTC decision. Hence, this petition for review of
certiorari, contending that he was twice in jeopardy when he was prosecuted
for violation of Sec. 3 (b)of RA 3019 and for direct bribery.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner was placed in double jeopardy?

HELD:

No. The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or RA 3019 Sec. 3 (b) states
that acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared unlawful.
Any one in public office can be charged with this law in addition to a felony under the
RPC for the same act. There is no double jeopardy if a person is charged
successively for violation of the Sec.3 of RA 3019 and the RPC. The rule against
double jeopardy prohibits twice placing a person in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. In the case at bar, the elements of the crime of direct bribery defined
and punished under RPC and those violation of Sec.3 (b) of RA 3019 shows that
there is neither identity nor necessary inclusion between the two offenses although
the two charges against the petitioner stemmed from the same transaction, the same
act gave rise to two separate and distinct offenses. Thus the petitioner cannot invoke
his right to double jeopardy.
 PS BANK vs. BERMOY
G.R. No. 151912, September 26, 2005

FACTS:

On May 11, 1994, the accused spouses Pedrito and Gloria Bermoy was
charged with estafa though falsification of a public document in the Regional Trial
Court. The respondents pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. The defense filed after
the prosecution rested its case on the ground that the prosecution failed to identify
respondent spouses as the accused. The trial court dismissed the case. A certiorari
was then filed by petitioner to Court of Appeals. The CA denied petition stating that
the trial court was correct in granting the demurrer to evidence for insufficiency of
evidence on account of lack of proper identification of the accused.  But even
assuming that the trial court erred, the acquittal of the accused can no longer be
reviewed either on appeal or on petition for certiorari for it would violate the right of
the accused against double jeopardy. However, the Solicitor General contends that
the trial court’s dismissal of Criminal Case was tainted with grave abuse of discretion
thus, double jeopardy is not applicable to this case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not double jeopardy attached to the case?

HELD:

Yes. By Section 7 of the Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
the courts are barred from entertaining such appeal as it seeks an inquiry into the
merits of the dismissal. Here, the trial court was correct in granting the demurrer to
evidence for its insufficiency on account of lack of proper identification of the
accused. The trial court had jurisdiction to resolve the demurrer to evidence filed by
the accused, either by denying it or by dismissing the case for lack of sufficient
evidence. If the demurrer is granted, resulting in the dismissal of the criminal case
and the acquittal of the accused, this can no longer be reviewed unless it can be
shown that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction. In the case at bar, the latter was not observed assuming the
trial court committed an error. Thus, the acquittal of the accused can no longer be
reviewed either on appeal or on petition for certiorari for it would violate the right of
the accused against double jeopardy.

PAULIN vs. GIMENEZ

G.R. No. 103323, January 21, 1993

FACTS:

On November 10, 1989 in Talisay Cebu, the jeep ridden by private

respondent and Barangay Captain Castro Belme Mabuyo was overtaken by the
Nissan Patrol ridden by herein petitioners, the spouses Dr. Ramon and Angela
Paulin, annihilated the former with dust. Irritated by this incident, Mabuyo followed
the petitioners until the latter entered the gate of an establishment. He inquired the
nearby security guard for the identity of the owner of the vehicle and was was
informed that it belonged to and Dr. Ramon Paulin. On the next, while he is on duty,
the petitioners pointed their guns at him. He immediately ordered his subordinate to
call the police and block road to prevent the petitioners’ escape. When police arrived,
petitioners were immediately apprehended.
The respondent filed grave threats against the petitioners with (Criminal Case
No. 5204). The petitioners filed motion and it was dismissed by the court. The
respondent then filed a MOR thus the dismissal was reversed. Because of that,
petitioners filed for certiorari, prohibition, damages, with relief
of preliminary injunction and the issuance of a TRO”. The petition was dismissed for
lack of merit and for being a prohibited pleading and ordered to proceed with
the trial of the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners’ right against double jeopardy was violated?

HELD:

No. Double jeopardy is present when the dismissal of the case must be

without the express consent of the accused. When the dismissal was ordered upon
motion or with the express assent of the accused, he has waived his protection
against double jeopardy. Here, the MTC decision in dismissing the case is not
acquittal from the charge because there was no finding made as to the guilt against
double jeopardy. In the present, the dismissal was granted upon motion of the
petitioners. Hence, double jeopardy was not attached.

ICASIANO vs SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 95642, May 28, 1992

FACTS:

On February 17, 1987, Roman Magbago filed an administrative complaint with

the Supreme Court against MTC Judge of Naic, Cavite Aurelio G. Icasiano, Jr. for
grave abuse of authority. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit. On March 17, 1987, Magbago filed same complaint to the Office of the
Ombudsman and was again dismissed due to lack of merit.
Moreover, the Solicitor General's memorandum in the present case states that
the office of the Tanodbayan received another complaint from the same Romana
Magbago. The Tanodbayan then conducted a preliminary investigation against the
petitioner for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices. Another
complaint was lodged against him for the same violation and a corresponding
information was filed with Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Aurelio G. Icasiano, Jr. was placed in double jeopardy?

HELD:

No. Double jeopardy does not apply because the dismissal by the
Tanodbayan of the first complaint cannot bar the present prosecution. A preliminary
investigation is not a trial to which double jeopardy attaches. In the case at abr, the
preliminary investigation was conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman to grant
the petitioner with due process even if the Ombudsman was just merely reviewing
the Tanodbayan's original dismissal of the complaint involving the same parties and
the same facts, and he could have filed the information even without a new
preliminary investigation. Hence, the petition was denied. The temporary restraining
order issued was lifted and the Sandiganbayan was ordered to proceed with Criminal
Case.
 LEJANO vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 176389, December 14, 2010

FACTS:

On June 30, 1991, Estellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela and
Jennifer were brutally killed at their home in Paranaque City. Four years after, star-
witness Jessica Alfaro pointed the culprits namely Hubert Webb, Antonio Lejano,
Artemio Ventura, Michael Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel
Rodriguez and Joy Filart. She also pointed a police officer Gerardo Biong as an
accessory after the crime. Alfaro stated that the accused got high of shabu and was
asked to see Carmela at their residence. When Webb was informed that Carmela
had male visitor, Webb was provoked and thereafter consumed more drugs and
plotted gang rape on Carmela. Webb denied all allegations and stated his alibi that
he was in the United States when crime took place. He even presented documentary
evidence and photocopies of his passport with four stamps recording his entry and
exit from Philippines and US.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the judgement of acquittal will place the accused under double
jeopardy?

HELD:

Yes. As a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it

places the accused to double jeopardy. A motion for reconsideration after an
acquittal is possible, but the grounds are extraordinary and narrow specially when
there is a grave abuse of discretion and mock trial. In the present controversy,
although Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he was not able to bring pleas for
reconsideration under such exceptions. He failed to specify the violations of court
due process and grave abuse of discretion and that he did not alleged the Court a
fake review of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Visconde’s petition for Court
review on evidences and to render another judgement cannot be allowed since it is
unconstitutional and thus the judgement of acquittal cannot be reconsidered
anymore for it will place the accused in double jeopardy.

PEOPLE vs. GALMAN

G.R. No. 72670, September 12, 1986

FACTS:

On August 21, 1983, former Senator Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino was

assassinated at the Manila International Airport. The military investigators reported
after three days that it was Rolando Galman, a communist-hired gunman who killed
Ninoy. President Ferdinand Marcos created a Fact Finding Board to investigate due
to large masses of people who joined in the ten-day national mourning yearning for
the truth, justice and freedom. Majority and minority reports rejected the military
version. They stated that Rolando Galman had no subversive affilitions and alleged
the soldiers to have shot ninoy because only them are in the staircase. But President
Marcos concurred that evidence shows Galman was the killer.
Petitioners filed TRO of which the Court resolved to issue restraining order
prayed for. The Court after ten days dismiss the petition and lift TRO enjoining the
Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. The petitioners filed a MR alleging that
the dismissal because it did not indicate the legal ground urging the case be set for a
full hearing. However, Sandiganbayan acquitted all the accused of the crime
charged, and totally absolving them of any civil liability. Thereafter, the Court majority
denied petitioners' MR for lack of merit. Thus, petitioners filed their motion to admit
their second MR alleging that respondents committed serious irregularities
constituting mistrial resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the
constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign rights of the people for due
process of law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause?

HELD:
 No. There was no double jeopardy. Courts’ Resolution of acquittal was a void
judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. A void judgment has no
judgement at all. Therefore, there was no double jeopardy attached. In the present
case, it was exposed by Deputy Tanod Bayan Manuel Herrera that the
Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to manipulate
Galman-Aquino murder case. Hence, with this declaration of the nullity proceedings,
the cases must not be tried in an impartial court. The petitioners’ second MR was
granted ordering Re-Trial of the said cases with proper due process requirements.

PEOPLE vs. BALISACAN

G.R. No. L-26376, August 31, 1966

FACTS:

In February 1, 1965, Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the

Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte for stabbing Leonicio Bulaoat inflicting upon
the latter wounds that immediately caused his death. Upon arraignment, the accused
pleaded guilty. However, when he was allowed to present evidence to prove
mitigating circumstances, he testified that it was self-defense since Bulaoat was
strangling him. He further stated that he voluntarily surrendered himself to the police
authorities. With these testimonies from the accused, the Court rendered a decision
acquitting him. Thus, the prosecution appealed therefrom. Appellant contended that
there was an error in acquitting the accused since the he pleaded guilty during
arraignment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the prosecution’s appeal placed the accused in double

jeopardy?

HELD:

No. A plea of guilty is an unconditional admission of guilt with respect to the

offense charged. It is also well settled that the existence of a plea is an essential
requisite to double jeopardy. Here, the defendant was only allowed to testify to
establish mitigating circumstances fixing the penalty. In this present case, the
accused pleaded guilty at first however, he testified that he acted in complete self-
defense. This testimony had the effect of eliminating his plea of guilty and
the court should have required him to plead a new charge but this was not done.
Moreover, the court decided the case without giving the prosecution any opportunity
to present its evidence. This clearly acted without due process of law. This lack of
fundamental prerequisites perforce its action as null and void. Therefore, this cannot
constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy. The judgement appealed
was set aside and the case was remanded to the Court for further proceeding under
another judge.

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