BLAS F. OPLE v. RUBEN D.

TORRES
GR No. 127685, July 23, 1998

FACTS:
On December 12, 1996, A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos
re: "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System". Petitioner
prays to invalidate thereto on two important constitutional grounds, viz: 1. It is a
usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate; 2. it impermissibly intrudes on our
citizenry's protected zone of privacy. Respondents counter argued the following: 1. The
instant petition is not a justiciable case; 2. A.O. No. 308 was issued within the Executive
and Administrative Powere of the President; 3. The funds necessary for the
implementation of the identification reference system may be sourced from the budgets
of the concerned agencies; and 4. A.O. No. 308 protects an individual’s interest in
privacy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not A.O. No. 308 is a violation of Right To Privacy?

HELD:
No. The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a
mass society. The threats emanate from various sources; governments, journalists,
employers, social scientists, etc.[88] In the case at bar, the threat comes from the
executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to
surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will
facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer,
only the indifferent will fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the
government the power to compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens.
Thus, the petition was granted and Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void for
being unconstitutional.
 VIVARES vs ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE
G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014

FACTS:
 
Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party
they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital
pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were then
uploaded by Angela on her Facebook profile. Julia and Julienne, both minors, were
graduating high school students at St. Theresa’s College (STC), Cebu City. At STC,
Mylene Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s high school department, learned from
her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves
from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Then Julia, Julienne and other students
involved were barred from joining the commencement exercises. Petitioners, who are
the respective parents of the minors, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas
Data. However, RTC dismissed the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or
security of the minors?

HELD: 

No. The respondent STC is clearly aware of incorporating lessons on good cyber
citizenship in its curriculum to educate its students on proper online conduct. Also, it is
not only STC but a number of schools and organizations have already deemed it
important to include digital literacy and good cyber citizenship in their respective
programs and curricula in view of the risks that the children are exposed to every time
they participate in online activities. Furthermore, considering the complexity of the cyber
world and its pervasiveness, as well as the dangers that these children are wittingly or
unwittingly exposed to in view of their unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the
participation of the parents in disciplining and educating their children about being a
good digital citizen is encouraged by these institutions and organizations. As such, STC
cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its students to be
responsible in their dealings and activities in cyberspace. It is, thus, incumbent upon
internet users to exercise due diligence in their online dealings and activities and must
not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves the vigilant. Demanding relief
from the courts, as here, requires that claimants themselves take utmost care in
safeguarding a right which they allege to have been violated. These are indispensable. 
In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors' privacy rights.
In light of the foregoing, the Court denied the petition and affirmed the RTCs ruling.
 MANGILA vs. PANGILINAN
G.R. No. 160739, July 17, 2013

FACTS:

On the following day, June 17, 2003, Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan, Presiding
Judge of the MTCC, conducted a preliminary investigation on the complaints. After
examining Miguel Aaron Palayon, one of the complainants, Judge Pangilinan issued a
warrant for the arrest of Mangila and her cohorts without bail. On the next day, the
entire records of the cases, including the warrant of arrest, were transmitted to the City
Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City for further proceedings and appropriate action in
accordance with the prevailing rules. After conducting a preliminary examination of one
of the complainants, the judge ordered the arrest of Mangila and others without bail, and
the records transmitted to the City Prosecutor for further proceedings in accordance
with law. Mangila filed a petition for habeas corpus, averring that the Judge had no
authority to conduct preliminary investigation, and the issuance of the warrant was
without any justification or probable cause. She argues that habeas corpus is available
to her, as she had no adequate remedy in law since the records of the case were
already forwarded to the Office of the City Prosecutor who had no authority to recall the
warrant of arrest.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus the proper remedy in this case?

HELD: 

No. First, the petition for habeas corpus could not be the proper remedy by which
she could assail the adequacy of the adverse finding. Even granting that there was a
failure to adhere to the law or rule, such failure would not be the equivalent of a violation
of her constitutional rights. Secondly, it was not procedurally correct for her to impugn
the issuance of the warrant of arrest by hinting that the investigating judge did not at all
consider the necessity of determining the existence of probable cause. And, lastly, it
was clear that under Section 5, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the resolution of the investigating judge was not final but was still subject to the review
by the public prosecutor who had the power to order the release of the detainee if no
probable cause should be ultimately found against her. In the context of the rule,
Mangila had no need to seek the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to secure her
release from detention. Her proper recourse was to bring the supposed irregularities
attending the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the issuance of the warrant
for her arrest to the attention of the City Prosecutor. CA, therefore, that the writ of
habeas corpus could not be used as a substitute for another available remedy. Hence,
the Court affirmed the resolution promulgated on October 14, 2003 and November 19,
2003.

In Re: SHANG KO VINGSON YU

UDK NO. 14817, January 13, 2014

FACTS:

Shirly Vingson (Petitioner) alleged that her daughter, Shang Ko

Vingson Yu (Shang Ko) ran away from home.  Petitioner
received an information from the police station in Bacolod City
that Shang Ko was in the custody of Jovy Cabcaban
(Respondent), who was a police officer in the said station.
Since the Respondent would not release Shang Ko to her, the
former sought help from the NBI, who in turn, told her that the
latter is in a private organization, Calvary Kids.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

Petitioner filed a petition for Habeas Corpus against the

Respondent and the unnamed officers of Calvary Kids before
the Court of Appeals (CA), instead of the Regional Trial Court
of Bacolod City, because of several threats against her life in
the said city.

The CA denied her petition for failure to clearly allege who has
custody of Shang Ko.  The former also denied the latter’s
motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the writ of habeas corpus is available in the

case.
HELD:

Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of

habeas corpus is available also in cases involving the rightful
custody over a minor.

REASONING:

The State has the right to intervene where parents treat their
children abusively.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 230324, September 19, 2017

LORIE MARIE TOMAS CALLO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER JAIME H. MORENTE,

BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, OIC ASSOCIATES COMMISSIONERS, BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION, AND BRIAN ALAS, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, ACTING C.J.:**

The Case

This is a petition for a writ of amparo (with Prayer to Issue Interim Reliefs of Immediate
Release of Danielle Tan Parker from Detention) under A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC (The Rule
on the Writ of Amparo). Petitioner Lorie Marie Tomas Callo (Callo) seeks the immediate
release of Danielle Tan Parker from the Immigration Detention Facility, Camp Bagong
Diwa in Bicutan, Taguig City.

The Facts

Danielle Tan Parker (Parker) is a holder of Philippine Passport No. XX5678508 issued by
the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on 5 March 2010 and valid until 4 March 2015.

On 15 January 2013, Parker was charged for deportation for being an undesirable,
undocumented, and overstaying alien, in violation of Section 37(a)(7) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, in relation to Rule XVI, Office Memorandum No.
ADD-01-004. It was alleged that Danielle Nopuente was a fugitive from justice in the
United States of America with an outstanding arrest warrant issued against her.
Subsequently, on 24 January 2013, a Summary Deportation Order (SDO) was issued
against Danielle Nopuente, also known as Isabelita Nopuente and Danielle Tan Parker,
upon verification that she arrived in the Philippines on 23 March 2011 under the
Balikbayan Program, with an authorized stay of a period of one year. Parker was not in
the list of approved applications of the DFA for dual citizenship and her American
Passport had been revoked by the United States Department of State. Thus, she was
considered an undocumented, undesirable, and overstaying alien, in violation of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940.

On 5 June 2014, pursuant to the SDO issued by the Bureau of Immigration, Parker was
arrested in Tagaytay City on the premise that Danielle Nopuente and Danielle Tan
Parker are one and the same person. She was then taken to the Immigration Detention
Facility in Bicutan, Taguig City. She is still currently detained in the Immigration
Detention Facility as the deportation was not carried out due to the fact that Parker is
charged with falsification and use of falsified documents before Branch 4, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Davao City.

On 12 September 2014, Parker, as petitioner, filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus before

Branch 266, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. The Bureau of Immigration was
able to produce the body of Parker before the RTC. The Bureau of Immigration then
alleged that as the SDO had become final and executory, it served as the legal
authority to detain Parker. The Bureau of Immigration also argued that Parker cannot
be released or deported without the final disposition of her pending criminal case in
Davao City.

The RTC dismissed the petition, finding that the detention of Parker was legal.1 Parker
then appealed the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA affirmed the RTC and
found that Parker failed to prove that she was a Filipino citizen to warrant judicial
intervention through habeas corpus.2 The CA gave weight to the Certification dated 20
June 2015 issued by the Office of the Consular Affairs of the DFA that there is "no
available data" regarding any record/information from the year 1990 onwards of
Philippine Passport No. XX5678508. Parker no longer appealed the denial of the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus and the decision of the CA became final and
executory on 5 January 2016.3

On 23 March 2017, Callo filed this petition for a writ of amparo with prayer to issue
Interim Reliefs of Immediate Release of Danielle Tan Parker from Detention. Callo
argues that Parker is a natural-born Filipino citizen and thus, there is no reason for her
to be detained by the Bureau of Immigration.

The Issue

The only issue in this case is whether or not the right to life, liberty, and security of
Parker is threatened by the respondents to warrant the issuance of the writ
of amparo and subsequently the award of the interim reliefs.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

Callo seeks the issuance of the writ of amparo and the interim reliefs available under
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC for the immediate release of Parker. Callo alleges that Parker is a
natural-born Filipino citizen and thus should not have been detained by the Bureau of
Immigration. Moreover, Callo alleges that the life of Parker is endangered in the
detention center; and thus, a writ of amparo with the interim reliefs prayed for should
be issued by this Court.

We disagree.

The protective writ of amparo is a judicial remedy to expeditiously provide relief to

violations of a person's constitutional right to life, liberty, and security, and more
specifically, to address the problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
or threats thereof. Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides:
Sec. 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced

disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear from the above-quoted provision that the writ of amparo covers extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.4 Enforced disappearance is
defined under Republic Act (RA) No. 9851,5 Section 3(g) of which provides:
(g) "Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons" means the arrest, detention, or
abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a
political organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or
to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of
removing from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
This Court also had the opportunity to define extralegal killings and enforced
disappearance:
Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law, without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearance has
been defined by the Court as the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of
deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting
with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of
the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.6
In Navia v. Pardico,7 this Court clarified that with the enactment of RA No. 9851, the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo is now a procedural law anchored, not only on the
constitutional right to life, liberty, and security, but also on a concrete statutory
definition of"enforced or involuntary disappearance." Further, elements constituting
enforced disappearance as defined under RA No. 9851 were clearly laid down by this
Court, viz:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the
State or a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization's refusal to acknowledge or
give information on the fute or whereabouts of the person subject of
the amparo petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection
of the law for a prolonged period of time.8
It is clear that the elements of enforced disappearance are not attendant in this case.
There is also no threat of such enforced disappearance. While there is indeed a
detention carried out by the State through the Bureau of Immigration, the third and
fourth elements are not present. There is no refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of
freedom or refusal to give information on the whereabouts of Parker because as Callo
admits, Parker is detained in the Immigration Detention Facility of the Bureau of
Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration also does not deny this. In fact, the Bureau of
Immigration had produced the body of Parker before the RTC in the proceedings for the
writ of habeas corpus previously initiated by Parker herself.9 Similarly, there is no
intention to remove Parker from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of
time. As the Bureau of Immigration explained, Parker has a pending criminal case
against her in Davao City, which prevents the Bureau of Immigration from deporting
her from the country.

Simply put, we see no enforced or involuntary disappearance, or any threats thereof,

that would warrant the issuance of the writ of amparo. For the issuance of the writ, it is
not sufficient that a person's life is endangered. It is even not sufficient to allege and
prove that a person has disappeared. It has to be shown by the required quantum of
proof that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the government or a political organization, and that there is a refusal
to acknowledge the same or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of the
missing persons.10 In this case, Parker lias not disappeared. Her detention has been
sufficiently justified by the Bureau of Immigration, given that there is an SDO and a
pending criminal case against her.

Callo contends that there is no cause to detain Parker because Parker, a natural-born
Filipino citizen, is a different person from Danielle Nopuente, the person against whom
the SDO was issued.

We disagree.

Callo has failed to prove that Danielle Tan Parker and Danielle Nopuente are two
different persons. In particular, we give weight to the fact that the DFA issued a
certificate verifying that there is no available data on Passport No. XX5678508, which
was the Philippine passport used by Parker.11 Moreover, the Certificate of Live
Birth,12 which purportedly shows that Parker was born in the Philippines on 21 March
1975 of Filipino parents, was only registered on 4 January 2010. There was no
explanation given as to why Parker's birth was registered only after almost 35 years.
Moreover, Callo only alleges facts from the year 2005, allegedly for purposes of
brevity.13 We do not see any reason why facts surrounding the existence of Parker
should only be presented from 2005. In fact, the only period that is thoroughly
discussed about her is from 2010 to 2011. To prove that Parker and Nopuente are two
different persons, the life and existence of Parker should have been alleged and proven
since birth. In this case, there is no allegation nor any proof as to who Parker was, or
what she had been doing, before 2011. Taking all these circumstances into perspective,
Parker had failed to sufficiently prove that she is a different person from Danielle
Nopuente.
Callo contends that Parker's life is endangered in the Immigration Detention Facility
because of the threats against her by her co-detainees and the living conditions of the
facility which pose health problems for Parker. Unfortunately, these allegations even if
proven - will not support the issuance of a writ of amparo. To repeat, the remedy of a
writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy that is meant to balance the government's
awesome power and to curtail human rights abuses.14 The writ covers extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances or threats thereof as specifically defined under RA No.
9851. The circumstances of Parker, as alleged by Callo, do not meet the requirements
for the issuance of the writ of amparo.

Finally, we note that the petition for the writ of amparo was filed by Callo. However,
there was no allegation of her relationshp to Parker.15 In Boac v. Cadapan,16 we
emphasized the importance of the exclusive and successive order of who can file a
petition for a writ of amparo. We held:
Petitioners finally point out that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen do not have the
requisite standing to file the amparo petition on behalf of Merino. They call attention to
the fact that in the amparo petition, the parents of Sherlyn and Karen merely indicated
that they were "concerned with Manuel Merino" as basis for filing the petition on his
behalf.

Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:

The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any qualified person or entity in
the following order:
(a) Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse, children and parents of
the aggrieved party;

(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the
preceding paragraph; or

(c) Any concerned Citizen, organization, association or institution, if there is no known

member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party.
Indeed, the parents of Sherlyn and Karen failed to allege that there were no known
members of the immediate family or relatives of Merino. The exclusive and successive
order mandated by the above-quoted provision must be followed. The order of
priority is not without reason - "to prevent the indiscriminate and groundless
filing of petitions for amparo which may even prejudice the right to life, liberty
or security of the aggrieved party."

The Court notes that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen also filed the petition for habeas
corpus on Merino's behalf. No objection was raised therein for, in a habeas
corpus proceeding, any person may apply for the writ on behalf of the aggrieved party.

It is thus only with respect to the amparo petition that the parents of Sherlyn and
Karen are precluded from filing the application on Merino's behalf as they are not
authorized parties under the Rule. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, while "any person" may file a petition for the writ of habeas corpus, in a petition
for the writ of amparo, the order of priority on who can file the petition should be
strictly followed. In this case, there was no allegation nor proof that Parker had no
immediate family members or any ascendant, descendant, or collateral relative within
the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. In fact, no allegation was made on
any of the familial relationship of Parker as only her whereabouts from 2011 were
alleged and discussed. Therefore, based on the order of priority, Callo had no legal
standing to file this petition.

Given that there is no basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo, the interim reliefs
sought for are also denied. Moreover, we see no need to address the other issues
raised by Callo in this petition, specifically, the condition of the Immigration Detention
Facility and the treatment of Parker in said detention center. A petition for the writ
of amparo is not the proper action to resolve such issues.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C. J., on official leave.

Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Leonen, Jardeleza,
Caguioa, Martires, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Perlas-Bernabe, Tijam, and Gesmundo, JJ., on official business.

RODRIGUEZ VS ARROYO
August 28, 2018Gracezyl Blancoconstitutional law, Political Law, rodriguez vs arroyo, writ of amparo
cases

NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ VS GLORIA MACAPAGAL

ARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, PDG JESUS AME
VERSOZA, LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, MAJ. GEN.
NESTOR Z. OCHOA, P/CSUPT. AMETO G. TOLENTINO,
P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, COL. REMIGIO M. DE VERA,
AN OFFICER NAMED MATUTINA, LT. COL. MINA, CALOG,
GEORGE PALACPAC UNDER THE NAME HARRY,
ANTONIO CRUZ, ALDWIN BONG PASICOLAN AND
VINCENT CALLAGAN
G.R. NO. 191805
NOVEMBER 15, 2011
FACTS: Noriel Rodriguez (petitioner) is a member of Alyansa Dagiti
Mannalon Iti Cagayan, a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang
Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP).
Under the Oplan Bantay Laya, the military tagged KMP members as an
enemy of the state, making its members an easy target of extra-judicial
killings and enforced disappearances.

On September 6, 2009, Rodriguez just alighted from a tricycle driven by

Hermie Antonio Carlos in Brgy. Tapel, Cagayan, when 4 men forcibly took
him and forced him to get inside a car where more men in civilian clothing
were waiting (1 was holding a .45 caliber pistol).
The men started punching Rodriguez inside the car, and forced him to
confess that he is a member of the New People’s Army (NPA). Rodriguez
remained silent until they reached a military camp belonging to the 17th
Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.

Rodriguez was then subjected to beatings and torture by members of the

Philippine Army. Members of the army wanted him to admit that he is an NPA
member and then pinpoint other NPA members and camp locations. Since
Rodriguez cannot answer, he is repeatedly beaten and tortured. Rodriguez
was also coerced to sign several documents to declare that he is a
surenderree.

On September 17, 2009,  Rodriguez’s mother and brother came to see him
(accompanied by members of the CHR – Pasicolan, Cruz and Callagan). They
insisted to take Rodriguez home with them to Manila.

Rodriguez arrived in Manila on September 18. Callagan and 2 military

members went inside their house and took pictures for around 30 minutes
despite Rodriguez’s effort to stop them.

On November 3, Rodriguez and his girlfriend notices that several suspicious-

looking men are following them on the streets, jeepney and MRT.

On December 7, Rodriguez filed  a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and

Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders,
Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties
dated 2 December 2009.

The petition was filed against former President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG.
Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt.
Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Calog, George
Palacpac, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.

Respondents contend that Rodriguez is a double agent, and had been

working as their informant/infiltrator in the fight against NPA rebels.
Then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, through the solicitor-general,
insisted on her immunity from suits (by virtue of her position as president).

Supreme Court granted the writs after finding that the petition sufficiently
alleged the abduction and torture of Rodriguez by members of the Philippine
Army. SC directed the Court of Appeals to hear the petition.

CA ruled in favor of Rodriguez and found Ibrado, Versoza, Bangit, Ochoa,

Tolentino, Santos, De Vera and Matutina liable for his abduction and torture.
As to Calog and Palacpac, the case was dismissed for lack of merit. On
President Arroyo, the case was dismissed on account of her immunity from
suits.

ISSUE:

1. WON President Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent by virtue of her

presidential immunity from suit
2. WON the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in writs of amparo
and habeas data cases.
HELD:

(1) CA’s rationale does not stand anymore since the presidential immunity
from suits only applies during her incumbency. “Incumbent Presidents are
immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their
incumbency and tenure but not beyond.”

“A non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts
committed during the latter’s tenure. We emphasize our ruling therein that
courts should look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity,
especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of
a right.”

Term vs Tenure: The term means the time during which the officer may
claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the
several incumbents shall succeed one another.
The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds
office. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond
the power of the incumbent. The intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution is to limit the president’s immunity from suits during their
tenure (and not term).

“It is clear that former President Arroyo cannot use the presidential immunity
from suit to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether,
within the context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or
accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.”

(2) Yes. The doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine

whether respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the
abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise remedial
measures to protect his rights.

Proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not determine criminal,
civil or administrative liability, but this should not abate the applicability of
the doctrine of command responsibility.

“In the context of amparo proceedings, responsibility may refer to the

participation of the respondents, by action or omission, in enforced
disappearance. Accountability, on the other hand, may attach to respondents
who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and
who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to
discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the
enforced disappearance.”

“Despite maintaining former President Arroyo in the list of respondents in

G.R. No. 191805, and allowing the application of the command responsibility
doctrine to amparo and habeas data proceedings, Rodriguez failed to prove
through substantial evidence that former President Arroyo was responsible
or accountable for the violation of his rights to life, liberty and property. He
likewise failed to prove through substantial evidence the accountability or
responsibility of respondents Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Cruz, Pasicolan and
Callagan.”

SC affirmed the decision of the CA, but with modifications. The case is
dismissed with respect to respondents former President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, P/CSupt. Ameto G. Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos, Calog,
George Palacpac, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicent Callagan for lack
of merit.