CASES DECIDED BY JUSTICE DEL CASTILLO:

1. DE LIMA CASE: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over Senator De Lima

HELD: YES. (RTC) have jurisdiction over cases involving violations of Republic Act (RA) 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, even if the offenders are public officials. It is not the
salary grade of a public official that determines which court would have jurisdiction over the case, but
the nature and allegations cited in the Information. RA 9165 specifically gave the RTC jurisdiction over
illegal drugs cases, while the Sandiganbayan was designated as an anti-graft court.

Since De Lima is being charged with conspiring in trading of illegal drugs, and not with any offense
involving graft, it is crystal clear that it is the RTC which has jurisdiction over the matter as well as over
the person of the petitioner. By being government official her liability is aggravated and would
necessitate the imposition of the maximum penalty, pursuant to Section 28.

Further…. "Petitioner's claim, that it was pointless for her to avail of any of other remedies, not only
lacks basis but also strikes at the very core of our judicial system," "Rules are basically promulgated for
the orderly administration of justice. The remedies chosen by the parties must be in accordance with the
established rules and should not depend on their whims.”

2. MEATWORLD VS. HECHANOVA: Illegal Dismissal: Constructive Dismissal

In this case, the employee was re-assigned to different outlets until he was not given any assignment so
he sought the help of Tulfo.
ISSUE: WON there is constructive dismissal which is an illegal dismissal.

HELD: YES. In illegal dismissal cases, the employer bears the burden of proving that the employee’s
termination was for a valid or authorized cause. This rule, however, presupposes that the employee
was dismissed from service.
After a careful review of the instant Petition, the Court finds that although there was no actual dismissal,
the failure of petitioner to assign respondent to a specific branch without any justifiable reason
constituted illegal constructive dismissal.

Constructive dismissal is defined as a “cessation of work because continued employment is rendered

impossible, unreasonable or unlikely.”[76] Similarly, there is constructive dismissal “when an act of clear
discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer has become so unbearable to the employee
leaving him with no option but to forego with his continued employment.” [77] Simply put, it is a
“dismissal in disguise or an act amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were not.”

In closing, while the Court recognizes that the management has the discretion and prerogative to
regulate all aspects of employment, which includes the transfer of employees, work assignments,
discipline, dismissal and recall of workers, the exercise of power is not absolute as “ it must be exercised
in good faith and with due regard to the rights of labor.” More important, “management prerogative
may not be used as a subterfuge by the employer to rid himself of an undesirable worker.

3. LONTON-CRUZ VS. NILO CRUZ: Nullity of Marriage acdg. to Art. 36 of the Family Code
Spouses both have personality disorder. Wife is suffering from histrionic, narcissistic with immaturity,
while Husband is suffering from inadequate personality disorder related to masculine strivings
associated with unresolved oedipal complex. Both disorders are present before the marriage. Wife grew
up in a Happy family environment, thus her view of how family should be. Husband grew up with an
absentee father and only with a mother and long-time maid when his mother left for abroad. Husband
due to work demands has no time for family most of the time. Couple did not have sex for a decade
because of the failure of the husband to perform after he saw his wife gave birth to their first son, and
when later on the wife would tell her family about his husband’s sexual incapacity.
ISSUE: WON there is psychological incapacity.

HELD: NO. Citing Art. 36 of the Family Code: Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.” However, the guidelines in proving such incapacity as laid down in Republic vs CA must
be followed to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. 
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration of the marriage.”
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. 
(5)  Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, ‘mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts’ cannot be accepted as root causes.

Notably, “mere showing of ‘irreconcilable differences’ and ‘conflicting personalities’ [as in the present
case,] in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.” [59] “Nor does failure of the parties to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons” amount to psychological incapacity. [60] We further
elucidated in Yambao v. Republic[61] that the psychological condition should render the subject totally
unaware or incognitive of the basic marital obligations:

Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital

obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill
will. This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of
marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the
conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and
education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. It is
not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is
essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.

4. In RE: ANONYMOUS COMPLAINTS AGAINST HON. BANDONG, RTC BR. 59, LUCENA CITY; Gross
misconduct; conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; violation of SC rules, directives and
circulars.
In this case, the Judge was alleged of watching TV during court trials and hearings, referring cases for
mediation even rape and frustrated murder case, and wrongfully delegating duties to court personnel ie:
the work of a clerk of court is delegated to process server. During the pendency of the investigation, the
Judge already filed for retirement.
ISSUE: WON the judge is guilty of gross misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and violation of SC rules, directives and circulars.

HELD: YES. Judge Bandong violated Sections 1 and 2 Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary to wit: Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of
judicial office.

SECTION 1. The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all other activities.
SECTION 2. Judges shall devote their professional activity to judicial duties, which include not only the
performance of judicial functions and responsibilities in court and the making of decisions, but also
other tasks relevant to the judicial office or the court’s operations.

In case of of trial courts, the conduct of hearings is an important component of their decision-making
process and, conversely, all other official tasks must give way thereto. [27] Hence, for a judge to allow an
activity, and an unofficial one at that, to take precedence over the conduct of hearings is totally
unacceptable. It is a patent derogation of Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 6 and a blatant disregard of the
professional yardstick that “all judicial [officials and] employees must devote their official time to
government service. Judge Bandong’s habit of watching television during office hours violates Section 7
of the same Canon 6 which requires Judges “not to engage in conduct incompatible with the diligent
discharge of judicial duties.”
For the aforecited violations, Judge Bandong is guilty of “Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
[the] service which pertains to any conduct that is detrimental or derogatory or naturally or probably
bringing about a wrong result; it refers to acts or omissions that violate the norm of public
accountability and diminish – or tend to diminish – the people’s faith in the Judiciary.”

Regarding the delegation of medication to court personnel, Judge Bandong should be aware of the
proper procedure in mediation of cases, wanton disregard and mockery of such is tantamount to
misconduct. “Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong
behavior. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful
intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial
evidence. As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate
the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct.”

As to delegation of duties of function of clerk to process server, under Sec. 7, Canon IV of the Conduct
for Court Personnel, “court personnel shall not be required to perform any work or duty outside the
scope of their assigned job description.” Clearly, Judge Bandong violated the SC circulars, rules and
directives in this case.

5. DAR VS. SUSIE IRENE GALLE/LBP VS. SUSIE IRENE GALLE; Just Compensation
In this case, DAR failed to notify the landowner of the subject land acquisition as mandated by law.
Hence, the landowner failed to submit the required statement of income and other proofs to show the
clear financial condition of the estate. The dates of the notice of coverage and the date of receipt of the
claimfolder by the LBP cannot be determined with certainty and makes it impossible to arrive at the
relevant average gross production and selling price as well as the cost of operations to arrive at the
proper just compensation.
ISSUE: WON the computation of DAR/LBP of the just compensation is correct.
HELD: NO
Just Compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property sought to be expropriated.
The measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The compensation, to be just, must be fair not
only to the owner but also to the taker. Even as undervaluation would deprive the owner of his property
without due process, so too would its overvaluation unduly favor him to the prejudice of the public.
Just compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking.
The ‘taking of private lands under the agrarian reform program partakes of the nature of an
expropriation proceeding.’ In computing the just compensation for expropriation proceedings, the RTC
should take into consideration the ‘value of the land at the time of the taking, not at the time of the
rendition of judgment.’ ‘The time of taking is the time when the landowner was deprived of the use
and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred to the Republic.’
The ultimate determination of just compensation in expropriation proceedings remains a judicial
prerogative. Out of regard for the DAR’s expertise as the concerned implementing agency, courts should
henceforth consider the factors stated in Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, as translated into the
applicable DAR formulas in their determination of just compensation for the properties covered by the
said law.  If, in the exercise of their judicial discretion, courts find that a strict application of said formulas
is not warranted under the specific circumstances of the case before them, they may deviate or depart
therefrom, provided that this departure or deviation is supported by a reasoned explanation grounded
on the evidence on record. In other words,  courts of law possess the power to make a final
determination of just compensation. 
In this case, the property was taken by in 1993 when the Zamboanga City Registry of Deeds cancelled
Galle’s titles and transferred the entire property to the State. Therefore, the just compensation shall
be computed based on the rate in 1993

6. CAREER PHILIPPINES SHIPMANAGEMENT, INC. AND COLUMBIAN SHIPMANAGEMENT, LTD. VS.

GODINEZ; Claims for permanent disability compensation
In this case, Godinez was hired as Deck Cadet onboard, but his superior made him clean toilets, didn’t
allow him to properly eat, in short, he suffered from maltreatment, which triggered his Bipolar mental
incapacity. He was repatriated to the Philippines for medical evaluation, after several months, the
doctor made him sign/certify a Certificate of Fitness to work, signed as witness by the doctor, which in
turn was a waiver of liabilities on the part of the agencies. He tried to apply to other shipping agencies
but he always fails due to his mental incapacity.

ISSUE: WON Godinez is entitled to permanent disability compensation.

HELD: YES
The Court concludes that Godinez’s grave illness was directly caused by the unprofessional and
inhumane treatment, as well as the physical, psychological, and mental abuse inflicted upon him by
his superiors, aggravated by the latter’s failure and refusal to provide timely medical and/or professional
intervention, and their neglect and indifference to his condition even as it was deteriorating before their
very eyes.
The Court finds as well that Godinez suffered permanent total disability, as there has been no definite
medical assessment by the company-designated physician regarding his condition – even up to now.
“The company-designated doctor is expected to arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer’s fitness
to work or. to determine [the degree of] his disability within a period of 120 or 240 days from
repatriation, [as the case may be. If after the lapse of the 120/240-day period the seafarer remains
incapacitated and the company-designated physician has not yet declared him fit to work or
determined his degree of disability,] the seafarer is deemed totally and permanently disabled.
Workers are not robots built simply for labor; nor are they machines that may be turned on or off at will;
not objects that are conveniently discarded when every ounce of efficiency and utility has been squeezed
out of them; not appliances that may be thrown away when they conk out. They are thinking and feeling
beings possessed of humanity and dignity, worthy of compassion, understanding, and respect.

7. TSM SHIPPING VS. SHIRLEY DE CHAVEZ; Claim for death benefits; substantial evidence
The husband of Respondent de Chavez was a Chief Cook in Haruna Express and was found dead inside
his cabin’s bathroom hanging by the shower. Reports of Korean police, Ulsan Korea Hospital and
International Inspection and Testing Corporation (INTECO) uniformly found Ryan’s cause of death as
suicide. The wife did not believe the employer and filed for claim of death benefits.

ISSUE: WON the wife is entitled to claim the death benefits for her husband.
HELD: NO.
Under the POEA-Standard Employment Contract “no compensation and benefits shall be payable in
respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death resulting from his willful or criminal act or
intentional breach of his duties, provided however, that the employer can prove that such injury,
incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to the seafater.” While it is true that Labor
contracts are impressed with public interest and provisions of the POEA Employment Contract must be
construed logically and liberally in favor of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their employment onboard
ocean-going vessels, still the rule is that justice in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed with in
the light of established facts, the applicable law, and existing jurisprudence.
In this case, there is a substantial evidence that the husband committed suicide based from the reports
of the hospital and INTECO.

8. MARMETO VS. COMELEC; Local Government Code; COMELEC budget and jurisdiction
Marmeto filed two proposed ordinances/initiative petitions with the Sannguniang Panlungsod of
Muntinlupa. Both were inacted by the Sangguniang due to lack of budget. Marmeto raised the same
with the Comelec but again it was dismissed due to lack of budget and that the ordinance is beyond the
power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to enact as provided in the Local Government Code.
The proposed ordinances/ initiative petitions contained the following:
1. The creation of a sectoral council composed of 12 members from various sectors who will serve as the
people’s representatives for the implementation and management of livelihood programs and projects.
2. The sectoral council will also stand as the people’s representatives that will directly propose, enact,
approve, or reject ordinances through initiative or referendum;
3. An appropriation of P200 million to be allocated for livelihood projects of the people and other
purposes. The net income from the projects will then be used for the delivery of basic services and
facility for Muntinlupa residents.
4. The MPP will create the implementing guidelines and procedure for the utilization of the appropriated
funds, and conduct programs and project feasibility studies. It shall comply with the prescribed
accounting and auditing rules of, and submit monthly accomplishment report to the local government
unit (LGU). It shall also observe transparency and accountability in fund management.
In short, the proposal sought the creation of a sectoral council and the appropriation of the amount of
P200 million for the livelihood programs and projects that would benefit the people of Muntinlupa City.

ISSUE: WON the COMELEC is correct in dismissing the petition due to lack of budget and that the
proposed ordinance/initiative petition is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to enact.
HELD: As regards the dismissal due to lack of budget, Initiative and referendum are the means by which
the sovereign people exercise their legislative power, and the valid exercise thereof should not be easily
defeated by claiming lack of specific budgetary appropriation for their conduct. The Court reiterates its
ruling in Goh that the grant of a line item in the FY 2014 GAA for the conduct and supervision of
elections constitutes as sufficient authority for the COMELEC to use the amount for elections and other
political exercises, including initiative and recall, and to augment this amount from the COMELEC’s
existing savings. The COMELEC, therefore, committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Marmeto’s
second initiative petition on the ground that there were no funds allocated for the purpose.

With regards to the other issue if the proposed ordinance is not whiting the power of the SP to enact,
inasmuch as the COMELEC also has quasi-judicial and administrative functions, It is the COMELEC which
has the power to determine whether the propositions in an initiative petition are within the powers
of a concerned sanggunian to enact. Under the LGC, local legislative power within the city is to be
exercised by the sangguniang panlungsod, which shall be comprised of elected district and sectoral
representatives. The sectoral representatives, moreover shall be limited to three members, coming
from enumerated/identified sectors. Significantly, nothing in the LGC allows the creation of another
local legislative body that will enact, approve, or reject local laws either through the regular legislative
process or through initiative or referendum. In as much as a sanggunian does not have the power to
create a separate local legislative body and that other propositions in Marmeto’s initiative petition
clearly contravene the existing laws, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the petition and cannot be ordered to conduct and
supervise the procedure for the conduct of initiative elections.

9. CF SHARP, ITS PRESIDENT AND GULF MARITIME; Total permanent disability, when conclusive
In this case, respondent was working as seaman and in an unfortunate occasion, he faced an accident
while performing his duties causing his repatriation. On Feb. 10, 2010, He was repatriated and he
immediately report to the company designated physician. He underwent several medications and
therapies until he was diagnosed with Lumbosacral muscular spasm with mild spondylosis and was given
a grade 10 partial disability and was referred to further bone scan. He was scheduled to undergo a bone
scan on July 16, 2010 but instead of undergoing the same, he went to another physician for consultation
where he was diagnosed with Permanent Disability but should still be subject to bone scan. On July 20,
2010, Respondent filed a complaint for payment of permanent disability benefits etc.

ISSUE: WON the respondent is entitled to permanent disability benefits.

HELD: No. Although the respondent has been on an on-going treatment for more than 120 days, the
disability rating given by the company physician and his own physician is inconclusive and premature
because the respondent has yet to undergo bone scan, thus the medical examinations is not yet
terminated. Hence, the degree of injury suffered and the duration of complainant’s medical treatment
should be based on the disability rating stated in paragraph 4, Chest-Trunk-Spine, Section 32 of Standard
Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessel
applicable which states: 4. Fracture of the dorsal or lumbar spines resulting to [severe] or total rigidity of
the trunk or total loss of lifting power of heavy objects ——- GR. 6
“An employee’s disability becomes permanent and total [only 1)] when so declared by the company-
designated physician, or, [2)] in case of absence of such a declaration either of fitness or permanent total
disability, upon the lapse of the 120- or 240-day treatment periods, while the employee’s disability
continues and he is unable to engage in gainful employment during such period, and the company-
designated physician fails to arrive at a definite assessment of the employee’s fitness or disability.’ The
‘mere lapse of the 120-day period itself does not automatically warrant the payment of permanent total
disability benefits.’ ‘If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because
the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability period may be
extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period
that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. The seaman may of course also be declared fit
to work at any time such declaration is justified by his medical condition.”

10. TORRES, ET.AL. VS. ARUEGO; Doctrine of Immutability of Final Judgment

On March 17, 1983 Aruego through her mother filed a case for “compulsory recognition and
enforcement of successional rights”. After trial on the merits, RTC rendered a decision on June 15, 1992
declaring Aruego as illegimate daughter of the deceased and entitled to portions of the properties of the
deceased. On January 4, 1983, Petitioner-torres filed for Motion for partial reconsideration which was
denied. So, they filed a Notice of Appeal of February 12, 1993 but was denied for being filed out of time.

ISSUE: WON the Appeal is meritorious.

HELD: No. A judgment becomes ‘final and executory’ by operation of law. Finality becomes a fact when
the reglementary period to appeal lapses and no appeal is perfected within such period. As a
consequence, no court (not even this Court) can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review a case or
modify a decision that has become final. When a final judgment is executory, it becomes immutable
and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect either by the court which rendered it or
even by this Court. The doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy and sound practice that,  at
the risk of occasional errors, judgments must become final at some definite point in time. The doctrine
on immutability of final judgments admits of exceptions such as the correction of clerical errors or the
making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries in which case there is no prejudice to any party, and where the
judgment is void. These exceptions, however, are not obtaining at bench. Hence, there is no ground to
justify the modification of the Respondent RTC’s June 15, 1992 Decision.

Jurisprudence holds that it is the dispositive portion of the decision that controls for purposes of
execution. If petitioners believed that the dispositive portion of the June 15, 1992 Decision is
questionable, they should have filed a motion for reconsideration or appeal before the said Decision
became final and executory. But as pointed out earlier, while petitioners filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration, they did not raise therein the supposed error of the court in declaring the properties
enumerated in the dispositive portion of the Decision as comprising the estate of Aruego. They also
failed to appeal the Decision and thereby lost the chance to question the Decision and seek a
modification or amendment thereof. The inevitable result of their failure to timely question the Decision
is for them to be bound by the pronouncements therein. To reiterate, once a decision has attained
finality, “not even this Court could have changed the trial court’s disposition absent any showing that
the case fell under one of the recognized exceptions”. As amply discussed above, this case does not fall
under any of the recognized exceptions.

11. COSON VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; Estafa, Art. 315 (b)
Petitioner-Coson is the chairman and CEO of GGDC (corp. engaged in the developing subdivisions and
building houses). GGDC through its president entered into a loan with Private respondent Evangelista.
Later on, another Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed by GGDC through Petitioner-Coson by
virtue of a Board Resolution, in favor of Evangelista for a loan of 4M. The land covered by TCT-261204
was given as collateral for the said loan. Sometime thereafter, Coson and Evangelista executed a MOA
stating the following (1) the petitioner will borrow TCT-261204 to be surrendered to the HDMF to obtain
the loan proceeds from where they will pay Evangelista; (2) they will open a joint account where the
proceeds of the HDMF loan shall be deposited; (3) Coson will make 11 monthly installments as per
schedule in the MOA. Coson issued 11 postadated BDO checks and executed a promissory note
acknowledging his indebtedness and promising to pay the loan as schedule in the MOA. Later on, GGDC
and HDMF entered into a Loan Agreement wherein GGDC was granted 30M for the development of
their new project. HDMF advanced the first trance in the amount of 9M. For failure of Coson to pay the
loan of 4M and to return the TCT-261204 to Evangelista, Evangelista filed a case for Estafa under Art.
315 (b). RTC and CA both find the petitioner guilty of Estafa.

ISSUE: WON Coson is guilty of Estafa under art. 315 (b)

HELD: The petition has merit. The essential elements of estafa under art. 315 (b) are as follows:
1. [T]hat money, goods or other personal properties are received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of, or to return, the same;
2. [T]hat there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or
denial on his part of the receipt thereof;
3. [T]hat the misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
4. [T]hat there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.

Clearly, no estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) was committed by petitioner. There was no
misappropriation or conversion of TCT No. 261204 or the proceeds of the PAGIBIG Fund loan by
petitioner to his own personal use, benefit or advantage. In all his dealings with private complainant, he
acted for and in behalf of GGDC which owns the title and the loan proceeds. The purpose of the loan
from private complainant and from the PAG-IBIG Fund was in pursuance of the housing business of
GGDC, which is not totally unknown to private complainant. Moreover, the Promissory Note dated May
29, 2003 of petitioner acknowledging his indebtedness and the demand letters of private complainant to
petitioner to pay his obligation clearly show that the obligation contracted by petitioner on behalf of
GGDC is purely civil and for which no criminal liability may attach. For his uncollected debt, private
complainant’s remedy is not a criminal action, but a civil action against petitioner.

12. PEOPLE VS. BALANZA; Rape under Art.266-A

Balanza (frat leader) and X (boy, 13 yo) was charged with rape for raping a 14y.o girl. As narrated, the
girl was on her way home from work when the friends/frat members of Balanza forced her to go to a
nipa hut where balanza was. There, the girl was offered a position in the fraternity even if she’s not a
member. She refused and later on the frat members dragged her into a cornfield where she was forced
by Balanza. Balanza forcibly removed her pants and inserted his organ inside the girl’s organ. After
Balanza consummated his bestial act, X followed Balanza’s deeds and raped the girl too. According to
the Defense, there was no private identification and that Balanza was at that time in the house of his
friend, 100 meters away from the nipa hut. X was dropped from the information since he was only 13
yo. And exempt from criminal liability, pursuant to Sec. 6 in rel. to Sec. 20 of RA 9344 of the Juvenile
Justice Welfare Act of 2006 as amended by RA 10630.

ISSUE: WON Balanza was possibly identified since the prosecution failed to sufficiently established
through clear and convincing evidence his identiy. WON Balanza is guilty of rape.

HELD: The appeal is unmeritorious. During the trial, the private complainant positively identified
Balanza as the one who raped her in the cornfield. The court consistently held that positive
identification prevails over the defense of denial and alibi specially when the victim was not actuated by
any improper motive, as in this case. It is also a time-honored principle that, “no young and decent lass
will publicly cry rape if such were not the truth.” Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by RA 8353 provides that rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
In this case, rape was committed through force, threat, or intimidation. Further, the alibi of Balanza that
he was in his friend’s house during the commission of the crime is untenable. Well-settled is the rule
that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was present at another place
at the time of the commission of the crime and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime. In this case, Balanza testified that the house of Joseph is only about 100 meters
more or less from his nipa hut. The element of physical impossibility is thus missing.

13. PEOPLE VS. PANES; Rape under Art. 266-A

Father raped her 13y.o daughter on three occasions. Father was charged with 3 counts of Rape with
qualifying circumstance of minority and relationship. Father argued that his daughter is not-consistent
with her statement; that there was no laceration and that it would be impossible to commit such
because all of his children are always present in the house.

ISSUE: WON Panes is guilty of 3 counts of rape.

HELD: Yes.
On the inconsistencies: The rule is well-settled that youth and immaturity are badges of truth and
sincerity. It is highly improbable for an innocent girl such as private complainant AAA, who is very
naive [in] the ways of this world, to fabricate a charge so humiliating not only to herself but to her
family..
On the issue of impossibility due to presence of other people: Time and again, it has been said that lust
is no respecter of place and time. It is not necessary that the place where the rape is committed be
isolated. Rapists are not deterred from committing their odious acts by the presence of people nearby.
Neither the crampness of the room, nor the presence of other people therein, nor the high risk of being
caught, has been held sufficient and effective obstacle to deter the commission of rape. There have
been too many instances when rape was committed under circumstances as indiscreet and audacious as
a room full of family members sleeping side by side.
On the issue of No lacerations: In any case, it bears emphasis that hymenal laceration is not an element
of rape. Otherwise stated, the presence of lacerations in the victim’s vagina is not necessary to prove
rape. It is not necessary to show that the victim had a reddening of the external genitalia or sustained a
hematoma on other parts of her body to sustain the possibility of a rape charge.

14. PEOPLE VS. PADLAN; Statutory Rape; Acts of Lasciviousness under Art. 336 of RPC in rel. to RA
7610.
Accused Padlan was charged with two counts of rape and 1 count of acts of lasciviousness for raping a 9
yo. Child. The two counts of rape is due to insertion of finger and penis. The acts of lasciviousness is due
to touching of vagina.
ISSUE: WON the accused is guilty of rape and acts of lasciviousness.
HELD: Yes, the accused is guilty of statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness.
On two counts of rape: Under Article 266-A of the RPC, rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of
a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force, threat, or intimidation;
2. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
3. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
4. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
There is statutory rape when: “(1) the offended party is under [twelve] years of age[;] and (2) the
accused has carnal knowledge of her, regardless of whether there was force, threat or intimidation;
whether the victim was deprived of reason or consciousness; or whether it was done through fraud or
grave abuse of authority. It is enough that the age of the victim is proven and that there was sexual
intercourse.

On 1 count of ACL: To be held liable for lascivious conduct under Sec. 5(b), Art. III of RA 7610, the
following elements of Acts of Lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the RPC must be met:
That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
1. Through force, threat or intimidation;
2. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
3. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
4. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
5. That the offended party is another person of either sex.

In addition to the elements under Art. 336 of the RPC, the following requisites for sexual abuse under
Sec. 5(b), Art. III of RA 7610, must also be established to wit:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
In the present case, the Information in Criminal Case No. 275 7-M-2005 specifically stated: (1) that
“AAA” was a nine-year old minor at the time of the incident; and (2) that Padlan committed acts of
lasciviousness against “AAA” by touching her vagina. Contrary to the ruling of the RTC which was
affirmed by the CA, we find that the elements of lascivious conduct under Sec. 5(b), Art. III of RA 7610
have been sufficiently alleged in the Information and duly proven during trial.
Sec. 2(h), of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7610 defines lascivious conduct as:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner
thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person,
whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or
gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or
pubic area of a person. (Emphasis supplied)
More importantly, Sec. 5(b), Art. III of RA 7610 specifically states the following:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. – Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or
group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article
336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case
may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years
of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; x x x
15. SPOUSES ROSARIO VS. PRISCILLA ALVAR; Equitable Mortgage; Conclusiveness of Judgment
In 1989, Spouses Rosario borrowed money from Alvar in the amount of 600K which was secured by REM
over two certificate of titles No.: 167438 and 167439. In 990, the mortgages were discharge. In 1992,
Spouses Rosario executed two DOAS over the two lots in favor of Priscilla’s daughter for a total amount
of 1.8M. In 1994, Priscilla sent a demand letter to spouses Rosario asking them to vacate Lot 1. Spouses
Rosario then filed for a Declaration of Nullity of Contract of Sale and Mortgage and Cancellation of TCTs
and Issuance of new TCTs. Spouses Rosario alleged that Priscilla deceived them into signing the DOAS
when their intention was merely to renew the mortgages over the two lots. Priscilla, in turn, filed for a
Recovery of Possession. The RTC ruled in favor of Priscilla as the rightful owner and asked Spouses
Rosario to vacate the house and restore its possession to its rightful owner. On appeal to CA, the CA
reversed the RTC ruling, saying that the DOAS are deemed equitable mortgage and such simulation does
not result in the nullification of the deeds but requires the reformation of the instrument. Since the lots
are deemed as security for loan of Spouses Rosario under the REM, and Spouses Rosario have not yet
paid their loan, Priscilla may seek the foreclosure of the lots. In 2007, Priscilla sent a letter to Spouses
Rosario demanding the payment of their outstanding obligation. Spouses Rosario failed to pay, so
Priscilla filed a complaint for Judicial Foreclosure of REM. The RTC rendered a decision in favor or
Priscilla.

ISSUE: WON the reformation of instrument (DOAS) is necessary to allow Priscilla to file for judicial
foreclosure of subject the properties.

HELD: No. Reformation of an instrument is a remedy in equity where a written instrument already
executed is allowed by law to be reformed or construed to express or conform to the real intention of
the parties. The rationale of the doctrine is that it would be unjust and inequitable to allow the
enforcement of a written instrument that does not express or reflect the real intention of the parties.
When the CA decided that DOAS were actually mortgages, in effect, it had reformed the instruments
based on the true intention of the parties. Thus, the filing of a separate complaint for reformation of
instrument is no longer necessary.

Further, there is already conclusiveness of judgment as to the issue pertaining to the existence of the
loan and the legal personality of Priscilla to file a case for judicial foreclosure. In res judicata by
conclusiveness of judgment, the following elements are present: (1) the judgment sought to bar the
new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits;
and (4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, but not identity of
causes of action. In this case, all the elements are present.

16. IN RE: REPORT ON THE PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF THE SPOT AUDIT IN THE RTC BRANCH 170; Gross
Misconduct; Gross Ignorance of the Law
Branch 170 granted 790 search warrants (SW) filed in its court. Out of which, 442 yielded negative
results, remained unserved, or were otherwise never returned to the court. Out of 790 SW, 758 SW
applications were granted even though the places of commission of crime were outside the territorial
jurisdiction of Branch 170. Out of 758 (SW), 130 had completely failed to cite the compelling reasons to
warrant their filing in Branch 170. There were also findings that the SW were served/granted even
before the date of filing the application for SW. According to Judge Docena of Branch 170, he had no
control over which SW will be filed in his branch. He also argued that the issuance of SW is inherent in all
courts and venue in search warrant applications is merely procedural and not jurisdictional. He also
maintained that he granted the SW applications in good faith belief that there is merit to the compelling
reasons. He explained that the rule requiring judges to conduct a probing and exhaustive inquiry is
applicable only to the determination of probable cause and not to the compelling reasons.

ISSUE: WON Judge Docena is guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law, gross negligence and gross
misconduct.

HELD: No. To hold a judge administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or
incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, it must be shown that his
acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate intent
to do an injustice. Absent such proof, the judge is presumed to have acted in good faith in exercising
his judicial functions.

Nevertheless, we find sufficient evidence to hold Judge Docena administratively liable for  gross neglect
of duty for the serious mismanagement of search warrant applications in Branch 170.
Section 12. Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:
b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the return has
been made, and if none, shall summon the person to whom the warrant was issued and require him
to explain why no return was made. If the return has been made, the judge shall ascertain whether
Section 11 of this Rule has been complied with and shall require that the property seized be delivered to
him. The judge shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof has been complied with.

In this case, Judge Docena failed to properly monitor the submission of returns as required the Rules of
Court.
Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence “refers to negligence characterized by the want of even slight
care, or by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but
willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to the consequences, in so far as other persons
may be affected. xxx In cases involving public officials, [there is gross negligence] when a breach of duty
is flagrant and palpable.” It is important to stress, however, that the term “gross neglect of duty”
does not necessarily include willful neglect or intentional wrongdoing. It can also arise from situations
where “such neglect which, from the gravity of the case or the frequency of instances, becomes so
serious in its character” that it ends up endangering or threatening the public welfare.

17. STA. ANA ET. AL VS. ATTY. CORTES; Administrative complaint; Disbarment
A complaint for Disbarment was filed against Atty. Cortes for deceit and falsification of public
documents. Accordingly, Atty. Cortes sold two parcels of land which was under his custody by means of
putting a superimposed signature from the Seller, since the seller is already dead. He also did the same
for the donation of 66 properties. Apart from that, he notarized the said deed of sale and deed of
donation in Quezon City, when the alleged sale and donation happened in Carmona, Cavite, as he
himself was a witness to it. Petitioner filed criminal complaints against Cortes, which has been
dismissed. Thus, Petitioner filed for Administrative complaint and disbarment.

ISSUES: (1) WON Atty. Cortes should be disbarred for the acts he committed. (2) WON the disbarment
case should be dismissed due to the dismissal of the criminal complaints.

HELD: (1) Lawyers are instruments in the administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal system,
they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing. It is only in living up to the very high standards and tenets of the legal
profession that the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system can be ensured. Lawyers may be
disciplined – whether in their professional or in their private capacity- for any conduct that is wanting in
morality, honesty, probity and good demeanor.
In this case, Atty. Cortes, acted with deceit when he used the falsified documents to effect the transfer
of properties under his custody. He also knowingly notarized the documents outside of his notarial
commission’s jurisdiction. Atty. Cortes, obviously, was evidently bereft of basic integrity which is an
indispensable sine qua non of his ongoing membership, in good standing, in the legal profession, and as
a duly-commissioned notary public. He also violated Sec. 240 of the Revised Administrative Code: XXX
“No notary shall possess authority to do any notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction.”
For the acts he committed, Atty. Cortes is suspended from the practice of law for 1 year and his notarial
commission is immediately revoked. He is also disqualified from the reappointment as Notary Public for
two years.
(2) The dismissal of the criminal complaint against respondent did not change the sui generis character
of disbarment proceedings. As a member of the Bar, Atty. Cortes should know that administrative cases
against lawyers are sui generis, or a class of their own. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private
interest and afford no redress for private grievance. Disbarment cases are aimed at purging the legal
profession of individuals who obdurately scorn and despise the exalted standards of the noble
profession of law. It is within this Court’s power, as a check and balance to its own system, to ensure
undeviating integrity by members of the Bar both on the professional and the personal level. It is only by
maintaining this integrity and this loyalty to the law, to the Courts of Justice and to their client and the
public at large, that lawyers are enabled to maintain the trust reposed upon them and to deliver justice
inside and outside the courtroom.

18. PALMA VS. HON. OMELIO AND HON. MURCIA; Gross Misconduct
Hon. Omelio and Hon. Murcia conducted sham weddings. Hon. Omelio accordingly conducted a wedding
outside his chambers without the required affidavit of request from the parties to have it conducted in
their residence. He also did not ensure that the solemnizing fee was paid. Meanwhile, while Hon.
Omelio conducted the wedding outside his chambers, it was Hon. Murcia who signed the marriage
certificate on the said wedding without having witnessed the said marriage. Aside from that the place
they’ve indicated in the marriage certificate was that of their chambers, when in fact, it was celebrated
in the house of the parties.

ISSUE: WON Hon. Omelio and Hon. Murcia is guilty of gross misconduct.
HELD: Yes. Both judges violated the rules on solemnization of marriage by the members of the Judiciary.
Although both judges were clothed with authority to solemnize marriages, in this instance however,
they overstepped the bounds of their authority. No less than our Constitution declared that marriage, as
an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
Marriage should not be trivialized, especially by the solemnizing officers themselves. Respondents
herein used their authority to make a mockery of marriage. As judicial officers, they are expected to
know the law on solemnization of marriages. A judge is not only bound by oath to apply the law; he or
she must also be conscientious and through in doing so. Certainly, judges, by the very delicate nature of
their office, should be more circumspect in the performance of their duties.

19. EBCC VS. CIR; Judicial Admission

On Feb.2, 2004, ECC received from the CIR a formal demand letter and final assessment notice dated
Jan. 23, 2004 assessing EBCC of deficiency income tax, VAT, WT on compensation, EWT, and FWT for th
taxable year 2000 in the total amount of P84,868,390.16. On March 3, 2004, EBCC filed with the CIR a
letter protest dated March 2, 2004 and furnished the CIR with the required documents. Due to CIR’s
inaction, EBCC filed a Pet. for Review with the CA. Meanwhile, EBCC availed of the Tax Amnesty Program
under RA 9480. On Nov. 7, 2008, CTA partially withdrawn and terminated the case of EBCC with regard
to deficiency income tax and VAT for the year 2000. On March 18, 2009, CTA sets aside the assessment
against EBCC for deficiency income tax and VAT for the year 2000, in view of the tax amnesty program
availed by EBCC.
On November 30, 2010, the CTA rendered a decision setting aside the assessments for the deficiency of
EWT and WT on compensation as it was correctly paid by EBCC. Further, the FWT was reduced and their
total tax liability was reduced. However, EBCC maintains that they are no longer liable to pay the FWT
considering that they already paid for it and no proof was necessary considering the CIR’s admission in
their memorandum that it has been paid already.

ISSUE: WON there is a judicial admission on the part of CIR that the FWT has been paid already.
HELD: No. The CIR made no judicial admission that EBCC has paid its FWT for the year 2000. Under Sec.
4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, A judicial admission is an admission, verbal or written, made by a
party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, which does not require proof. The admission
may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made. In this case, the alleged judicial admission of CIR was based on a Memorandum
report prepared by the revenue officers recommending the denial of EBCC’s protest. The CIR did not
mention any remittance for the payment of FWT in its answer and in its joint stipulation of facts.
Further, it is a basic rule in evidence that the person who alleges payment has the burden of proving
that payment has indeed been made. More so, in cases filed before the CTA, which are litigated de novo,
party-litigants must prove every minute aspect of their case.

20. CABILES VS. ATTY. CEDO; Non-compliance with MCLE Rules; Violation of Lawyer’s code: Canon 5,
17 and 18, Rule 18.03
In this case, Cabiles hired the services of Atty. Cedo for two cases: Illegal Dismissal and Unjust vexation,
wherein Atty. Cedo received his professional fees accordingly. In the Illegal Dismissal Case, Atty. Cedo
failed to file a reply in the position paper; he also failed to post the required appeal/surety bond which
prohibited them from appealing the case, hence, it became final and executory. Further, Atty. Cedo did
not indicate his MCLE Compliance no in his pleadings, for the fact that he has not complied with any
MCLE Compliance. In the Unjust Vexation Case, Atty. Cedo failed to timely file a complaint, hence, they
were barred by prescription. Because of Atty. Cedo’s neglect in handling the two cases, Cabiles filed for
an administrative complaint for violating the code of Professional Responsibility with the IBP seeking the
disbarment of Atty. Cedo.

ISSUE: Won Atty. Cedo violated the code of professional responsibility.

HELD: YES. The circumstances of this case indicated that respondent lawyer was guilty of gross
negligence for failing to exert his utmost best in prosecuting and in defending the interest of his client,
more so, since he already received an acceptance fee for legal services. Hence, he is guilty of the
following:
Canon 17 – A Lawyer Owes Fidelity to the Cause of His Client and He Shall Be Mindful Of The
Trust And Confidence Reposed In Him.
Canon 18 – A Lawyer Shall Serve His Client with Competence and Diligence.
Rule 18.03 – A Lawyer Shall Not Neglect A Legal Matter Entrusted to Him, And His Negligence in
Connection Therewith Shall Render Him Liable.
Furthermore, Bar Matter 850 mandates continuing legal education for IBP members as an additional
requirement to enable them to practice law. This is “to ensure that throughout their career, they keep
abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of
the practice of law.” Non-compliance with the MCLE requirement subjects the lawyer to be listed as a
delinquent IBP member. In this case, Atty. Cedo failed to indicate his MCLE compliance no. in his
pleadings submitted to NLRC because of the fact that he failed to comply with 3 MCLE Compliance
periods, for this reason, he also violated Canon 5: “A Lawyer Shall Keep Abreast Of Legal Developments,
Participate In Continuing Legal Education Programs, Support Efforts To Achieve High Standards In Law
Schools As Well As In The Practical Training Of Law Students And Assist In Disseminating Information
Regarding The Law And Jurisprudence.”

21. NORTH SEA MARINE SERVICES CORPORATION ET. AL, VS. ENRIQUEZ; Disability Benefits
In this case, Enriquez was hired as an Assistant Plumber in MS Carnival. On Sep. 2, 2008, while
performing his duties, Enriquez experienced nape pains that radiated to his upper back. He was given
medicines immediately by the ship doctor but due to the worsening of his condition, he was medically
repatriated on Oct. 5, 2008. When he arrived in Manila on Oct. 7, 2008, he immediately went to Dr.
Rabago, the company-designated physician. He underwent treatment under Dr. Rabago and nov. 28,
2008, was referred to a physiatrist to under physical therapy. On Dec. 17, 2008, Dr. Rabago declared
Enriquez fit to work, thus Enriquez signed a Certificate of Fitness to work. On Feb. 25, 2008, Enriquez
consulted an independent surgeon, who certified that he is still unfit to work. Because of this Enriquez
filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter to recover permanent Disability benefits under the ITF Cruise
Ship CBA plus other benefits. The Labor Arbiter denied his claim. The NLRC reversed the ruling of the LA
and sided in favor of Enriquez. The CA dismissed the Petition for Certiorari.

ISSUE: (1) WON Enriquez is entitled to permanent disability benefits under the ITF Cruise Ship CBA.
(2) WON the findings of the company physician should be overturned by the findings of a third doctor.
HELD: The petition is meritorious. (1) There is no proof that Enriquez is entitled to recover under the ITF
Cruise Ship CBA since there is no specific details as regards the parties covered thereby, the effectivity or
duration thereof, or even the signature of contracting parties. It is basic that Enriquez has the duty to
prove his own assertions. And his failure to discharge the burden of proving militates against his
entitlement to any of its benefits. Therefore, if Enriquez is entitled to any disability benefits, it should be
governed by the POEA-SEC relevant labor laws which are deemed written in his contract of employment.

(2) The findings of Dr. Rabago shall prevail. Under Sec. 20 B (3) of the POEA-SEC: “3. Upon sign-off from
the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic
wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the
company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a
company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically
incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed
as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result
in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits. If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees
with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer. The
third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both parties.”
It is clear that in order to claim disability benefits, it is the company-designated physician who must
proclaim that the seafarer suffered permanent disability. If the doctor appointed by the seafarer makes
a finding contrary to that of the assessment of the company-designated physician, a third doctor may be
agreed jointly between the employer and seafarer whose decision shall be binding on both of them. In
this case, the employer and respondent did not agree to ask for an assessment from a third doctor. It
was only respondent’s own will to consult another doctor. Considering that respondent did not follow
the proper procedure in seeking another doctor’s opinion and that Dr. Rebago’s findings was made after
an extensive medical treatment on respondent, his findings should prevail.

22. LAS BRISAS RESORT CORP. VS. MARTINEZ LEYBA INC.; Builder in bad Faith; Laches; rightful
owneship
Martinez is the registered owner of three contiguous parcels of land. Las Brisas is the registered owner
of a parcel of land adjacent to the land of Martinez. In 1968, Martinez noticed that the construction of
the fence of Las Brisas seemed to encroach on its land. Hence, Martinez sought for the services of a
licensed geodetic engineer to survey the boundaries of its land. The verification survey plan was
approved by the Regional technical director for Lands of the DENR. The survey revealed that the building
improvements constructed by Las Brisas occupied portions of Martinez’s lands. Hence, on 11 March
1968, Martinez sent a letter to Las Brisas that the fence it constructed encroaches on its land and
request Las Brisas to refrain from further intruding the same. Las Brisas did not respond and continued
developing its land. Two more letters were sent by Martinez in 1970, but again, Las Brisas did not do
anything. On 24 Nov. 1994, Martinez sent a letter again to Las Brisas demanding the latter to cease and
desist from unlawfully holding portions of Martinez’s land occupied by Las Brisas structures and
improvements. Still, no action from Las Brisas. On March 24, 1997, Martinez filed for Quieting of Title,
Cancellation of Title and Recovery of Ownership with Damages against Las Brisas. In defense, Las Brisas
countered that it bought the land in good faith and for value. Las Brisas further countered that Martinez
is already barred by laches from filing an action over the title against them, since it’s more than 20 years
since the alleged encroachment took place. Further, Las Brisas said that they are the rightful owner of
the said part of land which was allegedly they were encroaching upon since they have a registered title
over the same.

ISSUE: (1) WON Las Brisas is a Builder in bad faith. (2) WON the action of Martinez is already barred by
Laches. (3) WON Martinez is the rightful owner of the disputed part of land.

HELD: (1) Yes, Las Brisas is a builder in bad faith. Considering that Martinez, who is the rightful owner of
the land, which was further confirmed by the verification survey plan, sent them several letters already
demanding them to refrain from encroaching upon its land. Las Brisas, despite having been informed by
Martinez, still continued to build thereon. Under the Civil Code, Art. 449. He who builds, plants or sows
in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.
Art. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith may
demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace
things in their former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may
compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent.
Art. 451. In the cases of the two preceding articles, the landowner is entitled to damages from the
builder planter or sower.

(2) No, Martinez is not barred by laches. As the registered owners of the subject property, Martinez’s
has the imprescriptible right to recover possession therof from any person illegally occupying its lands.
Even if petitioners have been occupying these lands for a significant period of time, respondent as the
registered and lawful owner has the right to demand the return thereof at any time. Jurisprudence
consistently holds that ‘prescription and laches cannot apply to registered land covered by the Torrens
system’ because ‘under the Property Registration Decree, no title to registered land in derogation to
that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession .

(3) Yes, Martinez is the rightful owner. Martinez’ title over the land was registered 58 years ahead of
Las Brisas title, and it was further confirmed by the verification survey plan that the alleged land was
part of their title. Jurisprudence dictates that “When two certificates of title are issued to different
persons covering the same land, in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail and in cases of
successive registrations where more than one certificate of title is issued over the same land, the
person holding a prior certificate is entitled to the land as against a person who relies on a subsequent
certificate.
23. CATHAY LAND INC. VS. AYALA LAND; Compromise Agreement; Rule 65
Cathay is the developer of South Forbes Golf City (SFGC) in Silang, Cavite. On Feb. 5, 2003, it filed a
complaint or Easement of right of way with prayer for preliminary injunction/temporary restraining
order against Ayala for allegedly unjustly denying passage to Cathay’s personnel, vehicles and heavy
equipment through its properties by putting up check points and constructing gates which caused the
development of (SFGC) to be interrupted and delayed. Before the trial ensued, Ayala and Cathay
entered into a Compromise Agreement to settle the matter amicably. The Agreement contains amongst
other things, the following undertaking: “Cathay group undertakes that it will not develop and will not
allow the development of high-rise buildings” and “the Ayala Group has the right to withdraw or
suspend the grant of easement of right-of-way subject to this agreement if the Cathay Group or any of
the Grantees shall breach any of the provisions of this Agreement and the Cathay Group or the Grantees
shall have failed to rectify such breach within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of a notice from
the Ayala Group (or any of its assigns)”.
In 2005, Cathay commenced the development of SFGC, However, Ayala noted that Cathay’s marketing
materials showed plans to develop and construct high-rise buildings with 12 floors. Ayala thus made
verbal and written demands to Cathay to abide by the terms and conditions of the Compromise
Agreement particularly on its undertaking not to construct high-rise buildings, but to no avail. Thus, on
July 2008, Ayala filed a motion for execution with TRO and Writ of Injunction to prohibit Cathay from
constructing High Rise Buildings. Ayala based their “high-rise” definition on the Fire Code of the
Philippines which defines it as “at least 15 meters high.” The RTC denied the motion on the ground that
the term “high-rise” building in the IRR of National Building Code is defined as an establishment with 16
floors or 48 meters above established grade.
Ayala filed a motion for reconsideration, and the RTC, through its acting judge, granted the motion on
the ground that the Compromise Agreement is immediately final and executory. As such, Cathay filed
for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA on the ground that the RTC failed to provide any factual and
legal basis in reversing the first court decision and that according to the reversal, high-rise definition
should be in accordance with the law established at the time they entered the compromise agreement
(2003), which is the fire code and not the IRR of NBC which was only published in 2005. CA denied the
Petition.

ISSUE: WON the RTC, through its acting judge, gravely abused its discretion when it granted the
execution of the compromise agreement.
HELD: YES. It is settled that once a compromise agreement is approved by a final order of the court, it
becomes a judgment that is subject to execution, thus, judges have the ministerial duty to enforce it.
However, the court cannot modify, impose terms different from the terms of the agreement, or set
aside the compromises and reciprocal concessions made in good faith by the parties without gravely
abusing their discretion. In this case, the compromise agreement enumerated the remedies of Ayala to
wit: “to notify the Cathay Group of such breach; and second, either   to withdraw or suspend the grant of
easement of right-of-way to the Cathay Group,[51] if the latter does not undertake to rectify the said
breach within 30 days from notice.” Thus, Ayala has no right, under the compromise agreement, to seek
injunctive relief from the courts in case Cathay commits an act contrary to its undertaking. In the
reversed decision of the RTC, it ruled as follows “And let [the] corresponding writ of injunction issue
against the plaintiff in this case for construction of [high-rise] structures ”. Therefore, RTC gravely
abused its discretion when it granted a remedy that is not available to the Ayala Group, thereby
imposing terms different from what was agreed upon by the parties in their Compromise Agreement.

24. ABAGATNAN VS. SPS. CLARITO; Barangay Conciliation; Pre-Trial Brief

Case for unlawful detainer was filed without first having barangay conciliation because the real-parties-
in-interest live in different places, although the attorneys-in-fact live in the same city. Further, the issue
of non-barangay conciliation was not included in the pre-trial brief and as such, not included in the pre-
trial order.
ISSUE: (1) WON the case for unlawful detainer should be dismissed for lack of Barangay Conciliation.
(2) WON the issue regarding the lack of Barangay Conciliation can be tried even if it is not included in the
Pre Trial Order.

HELD: (1) NO. Barangay Conciliation is only applicable to cases where the real-parties-in interest actually
reside within the same city. The express statutory requirement of actual residency
in the LGC pertains specifically to the real parties in interest it cannot be
construed to apply to the attorney-in-fact, as doing so would abrogate the
meaning of a “real party in interest.”
(2) NO. Since the issue on the lack of Barangay Conciliation was not included in the Pre-trial order in
MTCC, it cannot be brought on appeal with the RTC. The non-inclusion of this issue in the Pre-Trial
Order barred its consideration during the trial. This is but consistent with the rule that parties are
bound by the delimitation of issues that they agreed upon during the pre-trial proceedings.

25. DARINES VS. QUITAN and QUINONES; Breach of Contract of Carriage; Moral Damages; Exemplary
Damages; Attorney’s Fees
Darines is a passenger of Amianan Bus en route to Baguio which was driven by Quitan and operated by
Quinones. While traveling to kennon road, the bus hit a truck which was parked on the shoulder of
kennon road. As a result, Darines suffered injuries. While in the hospital, Quinones’ representative, paid
for all the hospital bills. Darines filed for breach of contract of carriage and claimed for Moral Damages,
Exemplary Damages, Actual Damages and Attorney’s Fees. Quinones countered that they are not
negligent as the driver was driving carefully in the speed of 40kmph when the accident happened, and
that it was due to the truck, parked alongside kennon road. Quinones also claimed that he observed due
diligence in the selection and supervision of his employees as he conducted seminars on road safety and
Quitan attended those seminars, who is now in his 12 years of service. The RTC granted the award of
moral damages, exemplary damages and Attorney’s Fees. The CA reversed and set aside the decision of
the RTC.

ISSUE: WON Petitioner is entitled for the award of Moral, Actual, Exemplary Damages and Attorney’s
Fees.
HELD: NO. In an action for breach of contract, moral damages may be recovered only when a) death of
a passenger results; or b) the carrier was guilty of fraud and bad faith even if death does not result;
and that neither of these circumstances were present in the case at bar. Since no moral damages was
awarded then, there is no basis to grant exemplary damages and attorney’s fees to petitioners.

26. UNITED POLYRESINS INC. VS. PINUELA; Illegal Dismissal; ULP

In 2005, Pinuela was elected as a union president of Polyresins Rank and File Assoc. (PORFA) in United
Polyresins Inc. (UPI). The CBA then existing between UPI and PORFA provides that: “Section 3. The
Company shall grant to the Union the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) free of
interest as the union’s capital for establishing a cooperative to meet the needs of its members. Said loan
shall fall due and become payable at the same date that this Bargaining Agreement expires, to wit –
December 31, 2007. In the event of non-payment, all officers and members will be personally
accountable. In case of additional funds, they can make a written request [addressed] to the President
of the company.”
The CBA likewise contained a union security clause which provided that employees who cease to be
PORFA members in good standing by reason of resignation or expulsion shall not be retained in the
employ of UPI. Upon the assumption of Pinuela, he found out that the funds were misappropriated by
the former union president and that there are almost no available funds any more. Several days before
the loan by UPI to PORFA became due, PORFA and UPI met to discuss the proposed new CBA. However,
UPI does not want to discuss any proposed CBA until the P300,000 loan is returned to them. On January
2008, Pinuela filed a complaint before the NCMB for UPI’s refusal to bargain collectively. UPI insisted the
payment of P300,000 and that they will deduct P1,500 from the respective salaries of the union
members. Because of this, PORFA conducted a special election and new president and set officers were
elected. Pinuela was charged with Estafa. On April 2008, the new union officers expelled Pinuela from
the union for allegedly misappropriating the P300,000 loan. On Aprill 11, 2008, PORFA informed UPI of
Pinuela’s expulsion from the union. On April 14, 2008, UPI sent a letter to Pinuela, dismissing him from
service effective immediately. Pinuela filed for a case of Illegal Dismissal. The LA dismissed the
complaint. The NLRC reversed and set aside the decision of the LA. UPI filed a motion for
reconsideration with the NLRC, which overturned its first decision. The CA reversed the decision of the
NLRC and held that Pinuela is illegally dismissed as affirmed by the NLRC’s first decision.

ISSUE: WON Pinuela is illegally dismissed.

HELD: Yes, Although Pinuela was charged with estafa, he has not been convicted of the crime and for
this reason may not be disqualified as a union member. Although the union is given the right to
prescribe its own rules, it may not insist of expelling and assist in the dismissal of Pinuela from UPI
without just cause, since it is an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to “cause or attempt to
cause an employer to discriminate against an employee, including discrimination against an employee
with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or to terminate an employee
on any ground other than the usual terms and conditions under which membership or continuation of
membership is made available to other members.
Further, Pinuela’s alleged failure to return UPI’s P300,000 which was lent to PORFA is immaterial and
may not be used as a ground to terminate his employment. Under the Labor Code, such a contribution
by UPI to PORFA is illegal and constitutes unfair labor practice: XXX (d) To initiate, dominate, assist or
otherwise interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization, including the giving
of financial or other support to it or its organizers or supporters.

27. JAPOS VS. FIRST AGRARIAN REFORM MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE (FARMCOOP); Illegal
Dismissal
Japos is an employee of FARMCOOP. In their personnel policies and procedures it is provided that “A
Personal Leave authority form must be properly filed and approved by the immediate superior prior to
being absent and that in case of AWOL, for first offense – written warning, 2 nd offense- 1-7 days
suspension, 3rd offense- 8-15days suspension and 4th offense- Dismissal.” In 2005, Japos made the
following absences without permission: Jan. 26, Feb. 28, May 24, June 22-28. On June 28, 2005, Japos
received an inter-office memorandum asking him to explain in writing why he was absent from June 22-
28. On June 30, Japos personally submitted his written explanation saying that he suffered from
influenza that’s why he was not able to report for work on the said dates. On July 5, petitioner reported
back to work but was not admitted as he did not present any medical certificate. On the same date, he
was issued a Notice of Termination informing him that effective July 6, 20005, his employment is
terminated. On July 7, 2007, Japos came back to FARMCOOP and submitted his medical certificate.
However, the medical certificate did not indicate the date when he was treated or when he was
supposed to be absent for treatment. Japos filed for an illegal dismissal complaint. The Labor Arbiter
denied the complaint. The NLRC reversed the ruling of the LA. The CA find the dismissal to be valid and
legal.

ISSUE: WON Japos was illegally dismissed.

HELD: No. Under the FARMCOOP policy, petitioner is deemed to have committed a fourth infraction,
which merits the penalty of dismissal under the AWOL Rule. Thus, the absences of Japos from June 22-
July 5, 2005 are unauthorized and inexcusable. The Medical Certificate does not constitute reliable proof
of petitioner’s claimed illness during the period June 22-28, 2005. It does not indicate when and how
petitioner underwent treatment, and for how long. Without these relevant pieces of information, it
cannot be reliably concluded that indeed, petitioner was taken ill on June 22-28, 2005. Evidence, to be
believed, must be credible in itself. “We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its
conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to
the miraculous and is outside judicial cognizance.”

28. PEOPLE VS. NISSORADA; Robbery with Homicide

Appellant Nissorada, together with his three companions, boarded the public utility jeepney and
declared a “hold-up”. The passengers, including Sandagan, were forced at gunpoint to turnover their
cash and possessions. When one of the passengers named Cerbito refused to be divested of his
cellphone, appellant kicked him three to four times with such force that he fell off the jeepney. Still
dissatisfied with the violence, Nissorada vented on Cerbito and fired at him twice, hitting him in his chest
and abdomen resulting in his untimely death. Appellant and his three cohorts then fled together with
their loot. One day, while Sandagan was having a check-up in a hospital, he saw Appellant Nissorada
again, this time conducting a hold-up inside the hospital. Sandagan then told the police that he
(Nissorada) was the same man who took away his cash and killed a passenger several days ago during a
held-up in a jeepney. When Nissorada was apprehended by the police officers, he was charged with
robbery with homicide due the jeepney incident.

ISSUE: WON Appellant committed robbery with homicide.

HELD: YES. The elements of the special crime of robbery with homicide are: (1) taking of personal
property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation
against a person; (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its
generic sense, was committed. The robbery is the main purpose and objective of the malefactor and the
killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of the human life
but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. In this case, all the elements are present.
29. RAM BARBOSA &ROB BARBOSA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; Homicide; Circumstantial
Evidence
Artemio Betita (victim) was inside their home at around 2:45pm when petitioners Barbosa (father and
son) challenged him to get out of his house. The victim responded to the challenge and stepped out of
their house. Minutes later, Betita, the daughter of the victim, heard three-gun shots, when she went
outside, she saw Ram running away with a gun in his hand. She also noticed Rob on the terrace of his
house holding a firearm. She rushed towards her father whom she found lying on the floor with a
gunshot. They brought his father to the hospital but was declared dead on arrival. Petitioners were
charged with murder but was convicted of homicide with the RTC. The RTC considered the
circumstantial evidence to wit: (1) the houses of the victim and petitioners were adjacent and separated
only by a wall; (2) they were business rivals in hauling and trucking; (3) prior to the incident, petitioners
and the victim had an altercation regarding a cargo; (4) petitioner Rob was angered and mauled the
driver of the victim’s truck; (5) the victim was heard murmuring “they are confident of themselves and
they are envious people” in response to petitioner’s mauling of the driver while inside his house a few
minutes before he was killed; (6) someone outside the victim’s house challenged the victim to “get out!”
and show himself; (7) when the victim emerged from his house, three gunshots erupted; (8) after the
victim fell from a fatal bullet wound, petitioner Rob was seen on the terrace of his house holding a long
firearm while petitioner Ram was at the post at the concrete wall near the crime scene also holding a
firearm; (9) petitioner Ram ran away thereafter; and (10) the petitioners are father and son. However,
the RTC held that the there was no qualifying circumstance of treachery since the victim had been
forewarned of the impending assault of the petitioners by accepting the challenge for him to get out of
his house, Thus, the RTC convicted them of homicide only. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: (1) WON the petitioners are guilty of homicide. (2) WON circumstantial evidence is enough to
establish the guilt of the petitioners in the crime of homicide.
HELD: (1) YES. The elements of homicide are: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed that person
without justifying circumstance; (3) the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and (4)
the killing was not attended by any qualifying circumstances of murder, or that of parricide or
infanticide. In this case, the death of the victim was caused by a gunshot wound. Petitioners were seen
holding firearms immediately after the victim was shot. Petitioners’ criminal intent is
conclusively presumed due to the death of the victim. They only desisted from
further shooting the victim after Betita pleaded for them to stop. In the absence of any of the qualifying
circumstances of murder, parricide and infanticide, treachery having been properly disregarded by the
courts below, the crime committed by petitioners was homicide.
(2) YES. The guilt of the petitioners was sufficiently established by circumstantial evidence, which has the
following requisites: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. As enumerated by the RTC, there are several pieces of circumstantial
evidence in this case that form an unbroken chain leading to a fair and logical conclusion that petitioners
committed the crime of homicide.

30. PEOPLE VS. ABELLANOSA; Illegal Recruitment in large scale

Apellant Abellanosa recruited 7 people to work for Brunei. She presented herself as the principal
recruiter of a certain agency and showed a job order from Brunei and a calling card with her name. After
getting placement fees from these 7 people, she promised them that they will be deployed in Brunei
after two months. However, after two months, she told these people that they cannot be deployed
because their documents had already expired. Aggrieved, these people filed a complaint for illegal
recruitment. The RTC found appellant guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale. The CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: WON Abellanosa is guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale.

HELD: YES. Illegal Recruitment is defined as “A]ny act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring contract services, promising
or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee
on non-holder of authority, provided, that any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner
offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged.
It shall likewise include the following acts, whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee,
non-holder, licensee or holder of authority: (m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in
connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment in cases where the
deployment does not actually take place without the worker’s fault. Illegal recruitment when committed
by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage. Illegal
recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three or more persons
individually or as a group. In this case, first, appellant has no authority to conduct recruitment activities.
Second, she collected placement fees and was not able to deploy the people and Lastly, she committed
these acts against 7 people, thus, she is guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale.

31. SPS. DIONISIO ESTRADA VS. PHILIPPINE RABBIT; Moral Damages; Temperate Damages
Dionisio, a school teacher, was on board the Philippine Rabbit bus when a mishap resulting to the
amputation of his right arm. At the time of the incident, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was going towards the
north direction, while the Isuzu truck was travelling towards the south direction. The collision happened
at the left lane or the lane properly belonging to the Isuzu truck. The right front portion of the Isuzu
Truck appears to have collided with the right-side portion of the body of the Philippine Rabbit bus.
Before the collision, the bus was following closely a jeepney. When the jeepney stopped, the bus
suddenly swerved to the left encroaching upon the rightful lane of the Isuzu truck, which resulted in the
collision of the two (2) vehicles. Because of the amputation of his arm, Dionisio filed for a breach of
contract of carriage and claims for moral damages and actual damages. The RTC ruled in favor of
Dionisio. The CA affirmed but deleted the award for moral damages.

ISSUE: WON Dionisio is entitled to moral and actual damages.

HELD: As to the award of moral damages, Dionisio is not entitled. In case of a breach of contract of
carriage, moral damages may only be awarded in case the mishap resulted in the death of a passenger
or in case where the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith. In this case, Dionisio did not die. Further, the
allegations of fraud and bad faith as allegedly committed by the Philippine Rabbit was not proven by
clear and convincing evidence. As to the award of actual damages for loss of earning capacity, Dionisio
is also not entitled, in lieu thereof, the court awards temperate damages. As a rule, documentary
evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity
except when the (1) deceased/injured was self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage;
(2) the deceased/injured was as a daily worker earning less than the minimum wage. In this case,
Dionisio was a school teacher and he did not present any documents to prove his loss of earning
capacity and he was not under the exceptions when documentary evidence may be waived. However, In
several cases, the court awarded temperate damages in lieu of actual damages for loss of earning
capacity where earning capacity is plainly established but no evidence was presented to support the
allegation of the injured party’s actual income.

32. REP. EDCEL LAGMAN VS. EXEC. SECRETARY VS. PRES. DUTERTE; Declaration of Martial law
The President on May 23, 2017, through proclamation no. 216, declared a state of martial law and
suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. Prior to that the
President already called for the armed forces (using his calling out powers), through proclamation no.
55, to stop the lawless violence in Marawi City. Three separate petitions to nullify the said proclamation
were submitted on the following grounds (1) has no sufficient factual basis; (2) there is no rebellion in
Mindanao and public safety does not warrant its declaration; (3) the proclamation should be considered
void for being vague since it included the terms “other rebel groups”; (4) the declaration should only be
effected on the part of Marawi City and not the whole of Mindanao.

ISSUES: (1) WON the proclamation has sufficient factual basis; (2) WON there is rebellion in Mindanao
and public safety does not warrant its declaration; (3) WON the proclamation should be considered void
for being vague since it included the terms “other rebel groups.” (4) WON the declaration should only be
effected on the part of Marawi City and not the whole of Mindanao.

HELD: (1) YES. There is sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus. it bears to emphasize that the purpose of judicial review is not the
determination of accuracy or veracity of the facts upon which the President anchored his declaration of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; rather, only the sufficiency of the
factual basis as to convince the President that there is probable cause that rebellion exists. It must also
be reiterated that martial law is a matter of urgency and much leeway and flexibility should be accorded
the President. As such, he is not expected to completely validate all the information he received before
declaring martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The determination of this
Court as to whether there is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of such, must be based only on
facts or information known by or available to the President at the time he made the declaration or
suspension, which facts or information are found in the proclamation as well as the written Report
submitted by him to Congress.

To summarize, the parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: (1) actual
rebellion or invasion; (2) public safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur; and (3)
there is probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion.

(2) YES. In determining the existence of rebellion, the President only needs to convince himself that
there is probable cause or evidence showing that more likely than not a rebellion was committed or is
being committed. Given the facts in the President’s report, the President was convinced that atrocities
had already escalated to a level that risked public safety and thus impelled him to declare martial law
and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

(3) NO. The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is an analytical tool
developed for testing “on their faces” statutes in free speeches. A facial challenge is allowed to be
made to a vague statute and also to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect on the
protected speech that comes from statutes violating free speech. As such, facial review of
Proclamation no. 216 on the grounds of vagueness is unwarranted since it does not regulate speech,
religious freedom and other fundamental rights that may be facially challenged. What it sees to
penalize is conduct, not speech. The term “other rebel groups” in the Proclamation is not at all vague
when viewed in the context of the words that accompany it. Verily, the text of Proclamation no. 216
refers to “other rebel groups” found in Proclamation no. 55, which is cited by way of reference in its
whereas clauses.

(4) NO. The 1987 Constitution grants to the President, as commander-in-chief the discretion to
determine the territorial coverage of application of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. The 1987 specifically states that in case of invasion or rebellion, when public
safety requires it, the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. It is difficult, if not impossible, to fix the territorial
scope of martial law in direct proportion to the “range” of actual rebellion and public safety simply
because rebellion and public safety have no fixed physical dimensions. Their transitory and abstract
nature defies precise measurements. The overriding and paramount concern of martial law is the
protection of the security of the nation and the good and safety of the public. Thus, limiting the
proclamation and/or suspension to the place where there is actual rebellion would not only defeat the
purpose of declaring martial law, it will make the exercise thereof ineffective and useless.

33. DPWH VS. SPOUSES SALVADOR; Just Compensation; Consequential Damages; Capital Gains Tax
Spouses Salvador are the registered owners of a parcel of land which was bought by DPWH under an
expropriation proceeding. The DPWH issued two checks as full payment of zonal value of the property.
The RTC thereafter issued a corresponding Writ of Possession in favor of the DPWH. Likewise, the RTC
directed the DPWH to pay Spouses Salvador consequential damages equivalent to the value of the CGT
and other taxes necessary for the transfer of the subject property in the Republic’s name.
ISSUE: WON Spouses Salvador are entitled to consequential damages equivalent to the value of the CGT
and other transfer taxes.
HELD: NO. If as a result of the expropriation, the remaining lot suffers from an impairment or decrease
in value, consequential damages may be awarded provided that the consequential benefits which
may arise from the expropriation do not exceed said damages suffered by the owner of the property.
In this case, no evidence was submitted to prove any impairment or decrease in the value of the subject
property as a result of expropriation. Further, the transfer of property through expropriation
proceedings is a sale or exchange within the meaning of the NIRC, and profit from the transaction
constitute capital gain. Since capital gains tax is a tax on passive income, it is the seller, or
respondents in this case, who are liable to shoulder the tax.

34. DUTCH MOVERS VS. LEQUIN; Immutability of judgment; Piercing the veil of corporate fiction
Respondent Lequin is a truck driver of Dutch Movers Inc. (DMI) In 2004, Spouses Lee, through the
Supervisor Furio informed respondent Lequin that DMI will cease its hauling operation. However, DMI
did not file any notice of closure with the DOLE. Thus, respondent filed for illegal dismissal. The LA
dismissed the case for lack of cause of action. The NLRC set aside the decision of the LA and ruled the
respondent was illegally dismissed because DMI placed him on standby and did no longer provided him
with work. Thereafter, the NLRC decision became final and executory. Respondent then filed for Motion
for Writ of Execution and motion to implead Spouses Lee upon discovery that DMI no longer operates.
Respondent insisted that Spouses Lee managed and operated DMI and consistently represented to
respondent that they were the owners of DMI. They further averred that ironically, Spouses Lee’s name
is not in the Articles of Incorporation as neither its shareholders or directors. Upon further inquiry with
DOLE and SEC, DMI did not file any notice of business closure. Given this situation, respondent prayed
that Spouses Lee together with those named officers in the AOI be held solidarily liable with DMI in
paying judgment awards. In their opposition to Motion implead, other named officers in the AOI alleged
that as part of their services for Spouses Lee, they lent their names to them to assist them only in
incorporating DMI. After such, they promptly transferred their assigned rights in favor of Spouses Lee.

ISSUES: (1) WON Spouses Lee can be impleaded together with DMI even if the NLRC’s decision has
already became final and executory; (2) WON Spouses Lee should be held solidarily liable with DMI in
paying the judgment award.

HELD: YES. (1) The principle of immutability of judgment is not absolute. One of its exceptions is when
there is a supervening event occurring after the judgment becomes final and executory, which renders
the decision unenforceable. In this case, supervening events transpired when during the execution of
the judgment award by the NLRC, DMI ceased its operation without filing any formal notice regarding it.
Hence, respondent has no choice but to implead Spouses Lee as the owners of DMI.

(2) YES. Piercing the veil of corporate fiction is allowed, and responsible persons may be impleaded,
and be held solidarily liable even after final judgment and on execution, provided that such persons
deliberately used the corporate vehicle to unjustly evade the judgment obligation, or resorted to
fraud, bad faith, or malice in evading their obligation. In this case, petitioners were impleaded from the
inception of this case. They had ample opportunity to debunk the claim that they illegally dismissed
respondents, and that they should be held personally liable for having controlled DMI and actively
participated in its management, and for having used it to evade legal obligations to respondent. While
such device to defeat labor laws may be deemed ingenious and imaginative, the Court will not
hesitate to draw the line, and protect the right of workers to security of tenure, including ensuring
that they will receive the benefits they deserve when they fall victims of illegal dismissal.
36. GUYAMIN ET. AL. VS. FLORES; Presentation of evidence ex parte; formal offer of evidence.
Respondents Flores are the registered owners of a parcel of land in Cavite and petitioners are their
relatives who have been occupying their land for many years by mere tolerance of respondent’s
predecessors (parents). Respondents reminded petitioners Guyamin to vacate the property because
they decided to sell it. But Guyamin did not follow through. Respondents made several attempts to
settle the matter through barangay conciliation but to no avail. Hence, the Barangay issued a Certificate
to file action. Respondents then filed a complaint for recovery of possession. Petitioners were served
with summon but the receiver refused to acknowledge and sign the receipt, however, the process server
noted such act. Because of the lapse of time for filing an answer, respondents filed for a motion to
declare petitioners in default. After 8 months, petitioners filed their answer with motion to dismiss for
lack of cause of action. Respondents replied to their answer. The RTC declared the petitioners in default
and denied the answer filed by the petitioners. Respondents Flores presented their evidence ex parte.
The RTC and the CA ruled in favor of respondents.
ISSUE: WON the RTC validly rendered its decision without respondent’s formal offer of evidence but
mere presentation of evidence ex parte.

HED: YES. Respondent’s exhibits were presented and marked during the ex parte hearing. The trial court
admitted and considered them in the resolution of the case notwithstanding that no formal offer of
evidence was made. The Rules of Procedures are mere tools aimed at facilitating the attainment of
justice, rather than its frustration. A strict and rigid application of the rules must always be eschewed
when it would subvert the primary objectives of the rules, that is, to enhance fair trials and expedite
justice. Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party.
Technicalities take a backseat to substantive rights, and not the other way around. It should give way
to the realities of the situation.
37. SIY VS. TOMLIN; Replevin
Petitioner Siy was the registered owner of a car. The said car was entrusted to Ong, who owns a second-
hand car showroom, after the latter claimed that he has a prospective buyer. However, Ong failed to
remit the proceeds of the purported sale nor the return the vehicle to Siy. Later on, Siy found out that
the vehicle has been transferred to Chua, thereafter Siy filed a complaint for Carnapping. Ong, upon
learning the complaint, met with petitioner to arrange the return of the vehicle but Ong still failed. Later
on, Siy found out the vehicle was impounded and taken into custody by the PNP-Highway patrol group
at Camp Crame, after Respondent Tomlin, tried to process PNP Clearance of the vehicle with a view to
transfer ownership thereof. Petitioner thus filed for a complaint for recovery of possession with prayer
for replevin. The writ of replevin was then issued. Respondent argued that he bought the car from Chua
and he is now the rightful owner and that he is already the registered owner of the vehicle by showing
the OR/CR issued by the LTO.
ISSUE: WON Petitioner is entitled to the writ of replevin.

HELD: NO. In a writ of Replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is either the owner or
clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to be recovered. The claimant need not be the
owner so as long as he is able to specify his right to the possession of the property and his legal basis
therefor. In this case, there is an implied agency when Siy entrusted the custody of his vehicle to Ong, so
that the latter may sell the same. When Ong was able to sell the subject vehicle to Chua, Petitioner
ceased to be the owner thereof. Nor is he entitled to the possession of the vehicle; together with his
ownership, petitioner lost his right of possession over the vehicle. Petitioner had even no right anymore
to file for carnapping as he was no longer the owner of the vehicle at that time; indeed his right of action
is only against Ong for collection of the proceeds of the sale. Considering that Petitioner is no longer the
rightful owner or possessor of the subject vehicle, he is not entitled for the issuance of the writ of
replevin.

38. ASIA TRUST DEVELOPMENT BANK VS. CIR;

Asiatrust received from the CIR three formal letters of assessment with notice for deficiency taxes for
the years ending June 30, 1996, 1997 and 1998. Asiatrust filed a protest on the assessment notices. Due
to inaction of the CIR on the protest, Asiatrust filed before the CTA a petition for review. During the trial,
Asiatrust manifested that it availed of the Tax abatement program for its deficiency final withholding tax
assessments for years ending 1996 and 1998; and that on June 29, 2007, it paid the basic taxes for the
said fiscal years, respectively. The CTA division partially granted the petition, however it denied the
availment of Asiatrust for Tax Abatement due to its failure to submit a termination letter from the BIR.
Asiatrust filed a manifestation informing CTA division that the BIR issued a Certification certifying that
Asiatrust paid the basic taxes in connection with the One-Time Administrative Abatement. The CTA
division still denied Asiatrust’s claim for Tax abatement due to absence of a termination letter from the
BIR. Both parties appealed to CTA En Banc, but was denied due to the following reasons, as to CIR: it
failed to file a prior motion for reconsideration of the amended decision while as to Asiatrust: lack of the
required termination letter from BIR.
ISSUES: (1) WON Asiatrust may avail of Tax Abatement; (2) WON the CIR correctly filed an appeal to CTA
EN BANC.

HELD: (1) NO. Based on the rules of BIR, an application for tax abatement is considered approved only
upon the issuance of a termination letter. In this case, Asiatrust failed to present a termination letter
from the BIR. Instead, it presented a Certification issued by the BIR to prove that it availed of the Tax
Abatement Program and paid the basic tax. If at all, these documents only prove Asiatrust’s payment of
basic taxes, which is not a ground to consider its deficiency tax assessment closed and terminated.
(2) NO. An appeal to the CTA EN BANC must be preceded by the filing of a timely motion for
reconsideration or new trial with the CTA Division. In this case, the CIR’s failure to move for a
reconsideration of the Amended Decision of the CTA Division is a ground for the dismissal of its Petition
for Review before the CTA EN BANC. Thus, the CTAT En Banc did not err in denying the CIR’s appeal on
procedural grounds.

39. BANKARD INC. (Now RCBC) VS. ALARTE; Preponderance of Evidence

Alarte is a credit card holder provided by Bankard Inc. Bankard filed a collection case against Alarte
before the MeTC for failure of the latter to pay his credit card bills for the purchase of various products.
But only one statement of account (indicating only “previous statement balance”) was presented during
the trial. The MeTC and RTC dismissed the case for lack of proof. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC
for lack of proof.
ISSUE: WON there is a preponderance of evidence.
HELD: There is no preponderance of evidence, however, the evidence shows that although there was
no list of the things purchased by Alarte, there is a “previous statement balance”, which means that
there is a running balance, a continuing and mounting bill of charges consisting of a combined principal
amount with finance and penalty charges imposed, which respondent appears to have failed to pay in
the past. Petitioner’s fault is the fact that its complaint was not well-prepared and its cause is not well-
argued. Petitioner could have simply included a simple summary of respondent’s account; the source of
her debt, such as the credit transactions she made in the and, her past statements of account to prove
their claim. Thus, in the interest of justice the case was remanded to MeTC so that Bankcard can amend
its complaint and adduce additional evidence. After all, credit car arrangements are simple loan
arrangements between the card issuer and the card holder.
40. HERMA SHIPYARD VS. OLIVEROS ET. AL,; Project-based employees
Herma Shipyard is engaged in the business of shipbuilding and repair. The respondents were its
employees occupying various positions. Respondents filed for illegal dismissal and regularization alleging
amongst others that they are deemed regular employees who have been continuously performing tasks
usually, necessary and desirable in its business. Respondents further alleged that they are made to sign
employment contracts for a fixed period ranging from one-four months to make it appear that they
were project-based employees and that petitioners have never submitted a report to DOLE when their
projects ended. Petitioners, on the other hand, argued that the respondents were indeed project based
employees and presented their “Kasunduang Paglilingkod (pang-proyektong kawani)”, which specifically
states for what project and until when they are going to work. The LA dismissed the complaint and held
that respondents are project-based employees. The It is settled, however, that project-
based employees may or may not be performing tasks usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The fact that the job
is usually necessary or desirable in the business operation of the employer
does not automatically imply regular employment; neither does it impair the
validity of the project employment contract stipulating fixed duration of
employmentNLRC affirmed the decision of the LA. The CA reversed the decision of the NLRC.

ISSUE: WON respondents are project-based employees.

HELD: YES. It is settled, however, that project-based employees may or may not
be performing tasks usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or
trade of the employer. The fact that the job is usually necessary or desirable
in the business operation of the employer does not automatically imply
regular employment; neither does it impair the validity of the project
employment contract stipulating fixed duration of employment. Repeated
rehiring of project employees to different projects does not ipso facto make
them regular employees, the rule that employees initially hired on a
temporary basis may become permanent employees by reason of their length
of service is not applicable to project-based employees. It is clear that Herma
Shipyard only hires workers when it has existing contracts for shipbuilding
and repair. It is not engaged in the business of building vessels for sale
which would require it to continuously construct vessels for its inventory and
consequently hire a number of permanent employees.

41. PEOPLE VS. SIBBU; Murder; Treachery; Dwelling; Disguise

Appellant was charged with three counts of murder and attempted murder for allegedly killing the
parents and daughter of Bryan. According to Bryan, around 7pm, they were in their azotea when he saw
within 5 meters, Sibbu, who is carrying a long firearm with a black bonnet over his head. When Sibbu
was near the house, he tried to fix his bonnet thereby providing Bryan the opportunity to see his face.
Bryan then, shouted a warning to his family. Appellant then, fired upon them killing Bryan’s daughter
and his parents. As a defense, Sibbu claimed that he was in his in-laws house tending to his daughter
when the incident happened and that their house is about 1km away from the place of the victim.
ISSUE: WON Sibbu is guilty of murder as qualified by Treachery and aggravated by dwelling and disguise.

HELD: YES. Treachery is present “when the offender commits any of the crimes against person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
take.” In this case, the victims were totally unaware of the impending attack and were all unarmed, thus
they are unable to mount defense in the event of an attack. As regards to the aggravating circumstance
of Dwelling, for this circumstance to be considered, it is not necessary that the accused should have
actually entered the dwelling of the victim to commit the offense; it is enough that the victim was
attacked inside his own house. In this case, the victims were at their azotea in their house when
appellant fired shots at them. The use of disguise was likewise present in this case, since the appellant
was wearing a bonnet during the shooting incident, there could be no other possible purpose of such
but to conceal his identity.

42. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SPS. CHU;

Spouses Chu are the registered owner of parcel of lands acquired by the government on Feb 2009. The
LBP received the claim folders on Feb 2009. DAR has a different computation of just compensation
whereas the LBP, RTC and CA has the same computation. DAR used as basis of its computation for just
compensation the rules under Section 17 of RA 6557. The LBP, RTC and CA used as basis of their
computation the guidelines under RA 9700.

ISSUE: WON the rules for just compensation under Sec. 17 of RA 6657 is the appropriate rule.
HELD: YES. The claim folders were received by LBP prior to July 1, 2009 and as such, should be valued
in accordance with Sec. 17 of RA 6657. Therefore, the RTC and the CA were duty-bound to utilize the
basic formula prescribed and laid down in pertinent DAR regulations existing prior to the passage of RA
9700, to determine just compensation.
For the purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated property is
determined by its character and its price at the time of taking, or the time when the landowner was
deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when the title is transferred in the name of the
beneficiaries. In addition, the factors enumerated under Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, i.e., (a) the
acquisition cost of the land, (b) the current value of like properties, (c) the nature and actual use of the
property, and the income therefrom, (d) the owner’s sworn valuation, (e) the tax declarations, (f) the
assessment made by government assessors, (g) the social and economic benefits contributed by the
farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government to the property, and (h) the nonpayment of taxes
or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land, if any, must be equally
considered.

43. PEOPLE VS. MYRA GAYOSO; Illegal Drugs; Chain of Custody

Policemen held a confirmatory test-buy to buy drugs from the accused. During the search of the house,
SPO4 Bandoy found a tin foil under the mattress. SPO3 De Dios took it from SPO4 Bandoy and gave it to
SPO3 Salamida who found seven sachets of shabu inside, in addition to the four sachets of shabu found
inside the right pocket of the short pants of the accused. The search of the house also revealed several
drug paraphernalia. An inventory of seized items was prepared and the same was signed by the
Barangay Chairman, PO2 Isip, SPO4 Bandoy, and appellant. The sachets of shabu were brought to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) then to the PNP Crime Laboratory for qualitative
examination. The results of the examination verified that the seized sachets contained shabu. The RTC
and the CA found the accused guilty of illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu.
ISSUE: WON the chain of custody was established to prove the guilt of the accused.

HELD: NO. As a general rule, four links in the chain of custody of the confiscated item must be
established. First, the seizure and marking of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer. Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to
the investigating officer. Third, the turnover of the by the investigating officer to the forensic chemist
for laboratory examination and Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized
from the forensic chemist to the court. Marking is the placing by the arresting officer or the poseur-
buyer of his/her initials and signature on the items after they have been seized. It is the starting point in
the custodial link. It is vital that the seized items be marked immediately since the succeeding handlers
thereof will use the markings as reference. The chain of custody rule also requires that the marking of
the seized contraband be done “(1) in the presence of the apprehended violator, and (2) immediately
upon confiscation.”
Corollarily, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations provides as follows: Section 21(a)
The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drug shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and a public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the
physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served;
or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizure of and custody over said
items.

The legal standard that must therefore be observed “is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused.” In this case, the apprehending team did not follow the chain of custody required. Serious
uncertainty is generated on the identity of the shabu in view of the broken linkages in the chain of
custody.

44. BANAOBRA VS. PEOPLE; Illegal search and seizure; Illegal warrantless arrest
Based from a call by an informant to PD Penaflor that an illegal gambling was taking place at the house
of Banaobra, PD Penaflor together with two other policemen went to the house of Banaobra.
Banaobra’s house is surrounded by a bamboo (slats installed 2 inches apart) fence. Because of the
spaces in between the slats, policemen were able to see from the outside what’s going on inside.
Policemen saw money, calculator and papelitos (papers) on the table and Banaobra was holding his
cellphone. Upon seeing this, the policemen went inside the house and apprehended Banaobra. The
Father of Banaobra asked for the warrant of arrest and search warrant but PD Penaflor said that it’s no
longer needed because Banaobra was caught in the act. Thereafter, the policemen seized the money,
paper and calculator on the table. The RTC and CA both found Banaobra guilty of illegal gambling.
ISSUES: (1) WON the warrantless arrest is legal. (1) WON the search and seizure conducted is legal.

HELD: (1) NO. Under Sec. 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, a lawful arrest may be effected even
without a warrant of arrest in the following instances: A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person: (A) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit and offense; (B) When an offense has just been
committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (C) When the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment
or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another. In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5(a), Rule 113, two elements
must concur, namely “(a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in
the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.” In this case, the policemen only acted based on
the tip of the informant then they made an assumption when they saw (from outside the house) the
money, calculator and papers on the table.

(2) NO. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires a judicial warrant based on the existence
of probable cause before a search and an arrest may be effected by law enforcement agents. Without
the said warrant, a search or seizure becomes unreasonable within the context of the Constitution and
any evidence obtained on the occasion of such unreasonable search and seizure shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. “Evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of
such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial
fruit of the poisonous tree.” The warrantless arrest conducted by PD Peñaflor and his team was
unlawful as the same does not satisfy the requirements of an in flagrante delicto arrest. Consequently,
the search and seizure of the effects found inside the house of Bonaobra are likewise illegal since there
could be no valid search incident to an illegal warrantless arrest. Thus, evidence seized from Bonaobra’s
house is inadmissible for being a fruit of the poisonous tree.

45. ALMENDRAS VS. SODACO; Question of Fact vs. Question of Law; Modes of Appeal from RTC
decision
Petitioner filed an amended complaint to annul the Deed of Sale in favour SODACO. SODACO filed a
request for admissions addressed to petitioner. Petitioner failed to file a sworn statement specifically
denying the matters in the request for admission. SODACO filed a motion for Summary Judgment.
Petitioner opposed the Motion for Summary Judgment claiming that he was not personally served a
copy of the Request for Admission. RTC ruled in favor of SODACO. Petitioner filed for a motion for
reconsideration which the RTC denied as well. Aggrieved, petitioner file a petition for review under rule
45 directly with the Supreme Court raising the following issues: (1) whether or not after the filing of a
motion for summary judgment and denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the trial court could
dismiss the petitioner’s complaint motu proprio for petitioner’s failure to file his objections to request
for admission which was only furnished to his counsel? (2) whether or not the trial court could
interprete [sIC] that for [sIC] petitioner’s failure to file his objections to [the] request for admission
which was only furnished to his counsel is an implied admission of the matters specified in the request?
(3) whether or not summary judgment is applicable
ISSUE: WON petitioner correctly filed the petition for review with the SC under rule 45.

HELD: NO. The petition for review filed by the petitioner alleged grave abused of discretion by the
RTC. A petition for review under rule 45 is generally limited only to questions of law or errors of
judgment. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. The test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is whether the appellate court can
determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a
question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact. In this case, the first two issues raised by the
petitioner would require the court to examine the veracity of petitioner’s claim which is beyond the
jurisdiction of this court in a petition for review on certiorari. As to the third issue, determining the
applicability of a summary judgment would require a review of the issues of fact which is again beyond
the ambit of this petition.

Finally, as if the abovementioned procedural flaws were not enough, petitioner went straight to SC
when he had more appropriate remedy of appealing before the CA. The Court, in Murillo v. Consul,
Suarez v. Villarama, Jr. and VelayoFong v. Velayo, had the occasion to clarify the three modes of appeal
from decisions of the RTC, namely: a) ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error, where judgment was
rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; b) petition
for review, where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and
c) petition for review to this Court. The first mode of appeal is governed by Rule 41, and is taken to the
CA on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode, covered by Rule 42, is
brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode,
provided for by Rule 45, is elevated to this Court only on questions of law. Moreover, the filing of the
case directly with this Court departs from the hierarchy of courts. Normally, direct resort from the lower
courts to this Court will not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in the
lower tribunals. As the instant Petition was filed without resorting to a more appropriate remedy before
the CA, the same should be dismissed following our ruling above.

46. TMS SHIPPING VS. PATINO; Premature filing of permanent total disability claim
Patino works on board a vessel of TMS Shipping. He injured his right hand while securing a mooring
rope. He was brought to a medical facility wherein an X-ray result showed that he had a fracture on his
5th metacarpal bone. He was repatriated to Manila on May 4, 2010 and underwent a surgery and
physical therapy. On August 17, 2010, the company designated physician, Dr. Cruz, rendered an interim
assessment of respondent’s disability under the POEA-SEC, Grade 10. On September 8, 2010, Patino
filed a complaint with the NLRC claiming for total and permanent disability benefits. On September 29,
2010, Dr. Cruz declared the respondent to have reached the maximum medical cure after rendering final
disability of Grade 10. On November 19, 2010, respondent consulted a third doctor, Dr. Escutin, who
gave him the assessment of total permanent disability. The LA, NLRC and CA declared that Patino has
suffered from total permanent disability and therefore entitled to claim his benefits under such
category.
ISSUE: WON Patino suffered from total permanent disability and entitled to permanent disability
benefits.

HELD: NO. Respondent’s complaint for permanent disability benefits was premature. The rule is that a
temporary total disability only becomes permanent when the company-designated physician, within
the 240-day period, declares it to be so, or when after the lapse of the said period, he fails to make
such declaration.” After the initial interim assessment of Dr. Cruz, respondent continued with his
medical treatment. Dr. Cruz then rendered on September 29, 2010 a final assessment of Grade 10 upon
reaching the maximum medical cure. Counting from the date of repatriation on May 24, 2010 up to
September 29, 2010, this assessment was made within the 240-day period. Clearly, before the maximum
240-day medical treatment period expired, respondent was issued a Grade 10 disability rating which is
merely equivalent to a permanent partial disability under the POEA-SEC. Thus, respondent could not
have been suffering from a permanent total disability as would entitle him to the maximum benefit of
US$60,000.00.

47.