Chapter 1

WATER RIGHTS:
THE STATE, THE MARKET
THE COMMUNITY

ho does water belong to? Is it private property or a com­

W mons? What kind of rights do or should people have?
What are the rights of the state? What are the rights of corpo­
rations and commercial interests? Throughout history, societ­
ies have been plagued with these fundamental questions.
We are currently facing a global water crisis, which promises
to get worse over the next few decades. And as the crisis deepens,
new efforts to redefine water rights are under way. The global­
ized economy is shifting the definition of water from common
property to private good, to be extracted and traded freely. The
global economic order calls for the removal of all limits on and
regulation of water use and the establishment of water markets.
Proponents of free water trade view private property rights as the
only alternative to state ownership and free markets as the only
substitute to bureaucratic regulation of water resources.
More than any other resource, water needs to remain a com­
mon good and requires community management. In fact, in most
societies, private ownership of water has been prohibited. An­
cient texts such as the Institute of Justinian show that water and
other natural sources are public goods: “By the law of nature
20 Water Wars
Vandana Shiva 21

these things are common to mankind—the air, running water,

the sea, and consequently the shore of the sea.”1 In countries like As natural rights, water rights are usufructuary rights; water
India, space, air, water, and energy have traditionally been viewed can be used but not owned. People have a right to life and the re­
as being outside the realm of property relations. In Islamic tradi­ sources that sustain it, such as water. The necessity of water to life
tions, the Sharia, which originally connoted the “path to water,” is why, under customary laws, the right to water has been ac­
provides the ultimate basis for the right to water. Even the cepted as a natural, social fact:
United States has had many advocates for water as a common The fact that right over water has existed in all ancient laws, in­
good. “Water is a moving, wandering thing, and must of necessity cluding our own dharmasastras and the Islamic laws, and also
continue to be common by the law of nature,” wrote William the fact that they still continue to exist as customary laws in the
Blackstone, “so that I can only have a temporary, transient, modern period, clearly eliminates water rights as being purely
usufructuary property therein.”2 legal rights, that is, rights granted by the state or law.3
The emergence of modern water extraction technologies has Riparian Rights
increased the role of the state in water management. As new tech­
Riparian rights, based on concepts of usufructuary rights,
nologies displace self-management systems, people’s democratic
common property, and reasonable use, have guided human set­
management structures deteriorate and their role in conservation
tlement all over the world. In India, riparian systems have long
shrinks. With globalization and privatization of water resources,
existed along the Himalaya. The famous grand Anicut (canal) on
new efforts to completely erode people’s rights and replace col­
the Kaveri at the Ullar River dates back a thousand years and is
lective ownership with corporate control are under way. That
believed to be the oldest hydraulic structure to control the flow
communities of real people with real needs exist beyond the state
of rivers in India. It is still functioning. In the northeast, old ripar­
and the market is often forgotten in the rush for privatization.
ian systems known as dongs guide the use of water. In Maharashtra,
Water Rights as Natural Rights conservation structures were known as bandharas.
Throughout history and across the world, water rights have The ahar and pyne systems of Bihar, where an unlined inunda­
been shaped both by the limits of ecosystems and by the needs of tion canal (pynè) transfers water from a stream into a catchment
people. In fact, the root of the Urdu word abadi, or human setde­ basin (ahar), also evolved from a riparian doctrine. Unlike mod­
ern Sone canals built by the British, which have failed to meet the
ment, is ab, or water, reflecting the formation of human settle-
needs of the people, the ahars andpynes still provide water to peas­
ments and civilization along water sources. The doctrine of
ants. In the United States, riparian systems were introduced by
riparian right—the natural right of dwellers supported by a water
the Spanish, who had brought them from the Iberian Peninsula.4
system, especially a river system, to use water—also arose from
These systems were adopted in Colorado, New Mexico, and Ari­
this concept of ab. Water has traditionally been treated as a natu­ zona, as well as the eastern settlements.
ral right—a right arising out of human nature, historic condi­ Early riparian principles were based on the notion of sharing
tions, basic needs, or notions of justice. Water rights as natural and conserving a common water source. They were not attached
rights do not originate with the state; they evolve out of a given to property rights. As historian Donald Worster notes:
ecological context of human existence.
22 Water Wars Vandana Shiva 23

In ancient times, the riparian doctrine was less a method of The cowboy sentiment “might is right” meant that the eco­
ascertaining individual property rights and more the expres­ nomically powerful could invest in capital-intensive means to ap­
sion of an attitude of non-interference with nature. Under propriate water regardless of the needs of others and the limits of
the oldest form of the principle a river was to be regarded as water systems. This frontier logic granted the first appropriator
no one’s private property. Those who lived along its banks
an exclusive right to the water. Latecomers could appropriate wa­
were granted rights to use the flow for natural purposes like
ter on the condition that prior rights were honored first. Cowboy
drinking, washing, or watering their stock, but it was a
economics permitted the diversion of water from streams to be
usufructuary right only—a right to consume so long as the
river was not diminished.5 used on nonriparian lands. If the appropriator did not use the wa­
ter, he was forced to forfeit his right.
Even European colonists who first settled in the eastern The cowboy logic allowed the transfer and exchange of wa­
United States adhered to these basic tenets. But as the western ter rights among individuals, who often disregarded water’s eco­
part of the country began to be inhabited, usufructuary rights logical functions or its functions beyond mining. Although rights
were no longer prevalent. The riparian concept was instead be­ were based on first settlement, the true first settlers—Native
lieved to have emerged from English common law and conse­ Americans—were denied water appropriation rights. Miners and
quently centered around individual property ownership. “The colonizers, assumed to be the first inhabitants, were granted all
men and women who settled the American West did not belong rights to use the water sources.8
to that older world... [They] rejected the traditional riparianism,” Disregard for the limits of nature’s hydrological cycle meant
writes Worster. “Instead, they chose to set up over most of the that rivers could be drained and polluted by mining waste. Disre­
region the doctrine of prior appropriation because it offered gard for the natural rights of others meant that people were de­
them a greater freedom to exploit nature.”6 Universal water nied access to water, and regimes of unequal and nonsustainable
rights were thus severely curtailed. water use and water-wasteful agriculture began to spread across
Cowboy Economics: The Doctrine of Prior the American west.
Appropriation and the Advent of Privatization
Contemporary Cowboy Economics
It was in the mining camps of the American west that the
The current push to privatize common water sources had its
cowboy notion of private property and the rule of appropria­
foundation in cowboy economics. Champions of water privatiza­
tion—Qui prior est in tempore, potior est in jure (He who is first in time
tion, such as Terry Anderson and Pamela Snyder of the conserva­
is first in right)—first emerged. The doctrine of prior appropria­
tive Cato Institute, not only acknowledge the link between
tion established absolute rights to property, including the right to
current privatization efforts and cowboy water laws, but also
sell and trade water. New water markets blossomed and soon re­
look at the earlier western appropriation philosophy as a model
placed natural water rights and the value of water was determined
for the future:
by the monopolistic first setders. Prior appropriation “gave no
preference to riparian landowners, allowing all users an opportu­ From the western frontier, especially the mining camps, came
the doctrine of prior appropriation and the foundation of wa­
nity to compete for water and to develop far from streams.”7
ter marketing. This system provided the essential ingredients
24 Water Wars Vandana Shiva 25

for an efficient market in water wherein property rights were revenue, the peasants and commons were destroyed. Some
well-defined, enforced and transferable.9 300,000 water tanks built over centuries in pre-British India were
destroyed, affecting agricultural productivity and earnings.
The current push to reintroduce and globalize the lawless­
The East India Company was driven out by the first move­
ness of the frontier is a recipe for destroying our scarce water re­
ment for independence in 1857. In 1858, the British passed the
sources and for excluding the poor from their water share.
Madras Compulsory Labor Act of 1858, popularly known as the
Parading as the anonymous market, the rich and powerful use the
Kudimaramath Act, mandating peasants to provide labor for the
state to appropriate water from nature and people through the
maintenance of the water and irrigation systems.11 Because
prior-appropriation doctrine. Private interest groups systemati­
kudimaramath was based on self-management and not coercion,
cally ignore the option of community control over water. Be­
the act failed to mobilize community participation and to rebuild
cause water falls on earth in a dispersed manner, because every
the commons.
living being needs water, decentralized management and demo­
Self-managed communities have not just been a historical re­
cratic ownership are the only efficient, sustainable, and equitable
systems for the sustenance of all. Beyond the state and the market ality; they are a contemporary fact. State interference and privat­
lies the power of community participation. Beyond bureaucracies ization have not wiped them out entirely. In a nationwide survey
and corporate power lies the promise of water democracy. covering districts in dry tropical regions in seven states, N. S.
Jodha finds that the most basic fuel and fodder needs of the poor
Water as a Commons throughout India continue to be satisfied from common prop­
Water is a commons because it is the ecological basis of all erty resources.12 Jodha’s studies of commons in the fragile Thar
life and because its sustainability and equitable allocation depend desert also reveal that village community councils still adjudicate
on cooperation among community members. Although water grazing rights: institutional rules and regulations determine peri­
has been managed as a commons throughout human history and ods of restricted grazing, the rotational patterns for grazing, the
across diverse cultures, and although most communities manage numbers and types of animals to be grazed, the rights to dung and
water resources as common property or have access to water as a fuel wood collection, and the rules for lopping trees for green
commonly shared public good even today, privatization of water fodder. Village councils also appoint their own watchmen to en­
resources is gaining momentum. sure that no community member or outsider breaks the rules.
Prior to the arrival of the British in south India, communities Similar rules exist for maintenance of wells and tanks.
managed water systems collectively through a system called Tragedy of the Commons
kudimaramath (self-repair). Before the advent of corporate rule by
John Locke’s treatise on property effectively legitimized the
the East India Company in the 18th century, a peasant paid 300
theft of the commons in Europe during the enclosure move­
out of 1,000 units of grain he or she earned to a public fund, and
ments of the 17 th century. Locke, son of wealthy parents, sought
250 of those units stayed in the village for maintenance of com­
to defend capitalism—and his family’s massive wealth—by argu­
mons and pubhc works.10 By 1830, peasant payments rose to 650
ing that property was created only when idle natural resources
units, out of which 590 units went straight to the East India Com­
were transformed from their spiritual form through the applica-
pany. As a result of increased payments and lost maintenance
 26 Water Wars Vandana Shiva 27

don of labor: “Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that Hardin’s prediction about the doom of commons has at its
Nature hath provided and left in it, he hath mixed his labor with center the idea that competition is the driving force in human so­
it, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it cieties. If individuals do not compete to own property, law and
his property.”13 Individual freedom was dependent upon the order will be lost. This argument has failed to hold ground when
freedom to own, through labor, the land, forests, and rivers. tested in large sections of rural societies in the Third World,
Locke’s treatises on property continue to inform theories and where the principle of cooperation, rather than competition,
practices that erode the commons and destroy the earth. among individuals still dominates. In a social organization based
In contemporary times, water privatization is based on on cooperation among members and need-based production, the
Garrett Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons, first published in 1968. logic of gain is entirely different from those in competitive societ­
To explain his theory, Hardin calls on us to imagine a scenario: ies. Garrett Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons misses the critical
Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each point that under circumstances in which common lands cannot
herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the even support the basic needs of the population, a tragedy is inevi­
commons. Such an arrangement may work reasonably satis­ table—with or without competition.
factorily for centuries because tribal wars, poaching, and dis­
Communities and Commons
ease keep the numbers of both man and beast well below the
carrying capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes the day In the upper reaches of the Rio Grande Valley in Colorado,
of reckoning, that is, the day when the long-desired goal of so­ water is still managed as a commons. I had the opportunity to
cial stability becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent logic visit San Luis, home of traditional acequia systems (gravity-driven
of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy.14 irrigation ditch) that nurture soils, plants, and animals. I was there
Hardin assumes that commons were socially unmanaged, to offer solidarity to the local communities engaged in a major
open-access systems with no ownership. And Hardin sees the ab­ struggle to defend the commons and the oldest system of water
sence of private property as a recipe for lawlessness. rights in Colorado. What the irrigation ditches produce is not
Although Hardin’s theory about the commons has gained merely a market commodity but a denseness of life. “The ditches <
tremendous popularity, it is has several holes. His assumption make a lot of plant life possible in what is really a cold, barren
about commons as unmanaged, open-access systems stems from desert,” says Joseph Gallegos, a fifth-generation farmer working
the belief that management takes effect only in the hands of pri­ on ancestral lands in San Luis. “More plants means that the wild­
vate individuals. But groups do manage themselves, and life—birds and mammals—have a home. The ecologists call this
commons are regulated rather well by communities. Moreover, biodiversity. I call it life, terray vida.”'5
commons are not open-access resources as Hardin proposes; When the water of the Rio Grande is auctioned to the high­
they in fact apply the concept of ownership, not on an individual est bidder, it is taken away from the agri-pastoral community
basis, but at the level of the group. And groups do set rules and whose rights to the water are tied to the responsibility of main­
restrictions regarding use. Regulations of utility are what protect taining a “watershed commonwealth.”16 Markets fail to capture
pastures from overgrazing, forests from disappearing, and water diverse values, and they fail to reflect the destruction of ecologi-
resources from vanishing.
28 Water Wars Vandana Shiva 29

cal value. Water that replenishes ecosystems is considered water ocean is filled up drop by drop. These beautiful lessons are not
wasted. Joseph Gallegos raises an important point when he asks: to be found in any textbook but are actually couched in the
memory of our society. It is from this memory that the shrutis
Whose point of view is this? The cottonwood trees that line the
of our oral traditions have come.... The people of Rajasthan
acequia banks don’t think the leaking water is wasted. Nor do did not entrust the organisation of such a boundless work to
the birds and other animals that live in the trees. The ditches either the central or federal government, not even to what in
create habitat niches for wildlife, and that is a good thing for the modern parlance is termed as the private sphere. It is the peo­
animals and the farmers. It is not wasteful, unless of course you
ple themselves who in each house, in each village, gave fru­
are an urban developer greedily looking for more water for the
ition to this structure, maintained it, and further developed it.
cities’ maniacal growth needs. The gringo treats water like a
“Pindwari” is to help others through one’s effort, one’s
commodity. You know the saying, “In Colorado water flows labour, one’s hard work. The drops of sweat streaming down
uphill, towards money.”17
the brow of the people of Rajasthan continue to flow so as to
When money determines value and courts get involved, com­ collect the drops of rain.19
mon resources are stripped from farmers and lost to private com­ Traditional water systems based on local management were
panies. And, as Devon Pena points out, insurance against water scarcity in drought-prone regions of
The attack on common property rights involves the legal codifi­ Gujarat. These systems were managed mainly by village commit­
cation of production that produces violent but legally sanc­ tees. In the event of floods, famines, and other calamities, the
tioned invasions, enclosures, and expropriations of space. The king also helped; the role of a central authority was, therefore,
law itself violates the integrity of places as habitat for mixed primarily in disaster mitigation. Local institutions in water man­
communities of humans and non-humans.18 agement included farmers’ associations, local irrigation function­
This is exactly what transpired in the Rito Seco Watershed in Colo­ aries, local irrigation technicians, the village water associations,
rado, when courts allowed the Battle Mountain Gold Mine to and the community labor system, maintained by contributions
transfer water from agriculture to industrial use. from each family.
In India, farmers’ associations for the construction and
Community Rights and Water Democracies maintenance of water systems were once widespread. In
Under conditions of scarcity, sustainable systems of water Karnataka and Maharashtra the associations were known as
management evolved from the idea of water as commons passed panchayats. In Tamil Nadu, they were called nattamai, kavai
on from generation to generation. Labor in conservation and com­ maniyam, nir maniyam, oppidisangam, or eri variyam (tank committee).
munity building became the primary investment in water re­ Tanks and ponds often served more than one village, and in such
sources. In the absence of capital, people working collectively cases representatives from each village or farmers’ association
provided the major input or “investment” in water works. As ensured democratic control. These committees could also collect
Anupam Mishra of the Gandhi Peace Foundation observes: tank dues and taxes from users. Lands were also donated, espe­
The ways of collecting the drops of Palar, i.e., of rainfall, are as cially for financing capital expenditures on waterworks.
unending as the names of clouds and drops. The pot like the Village water systems required irrigation functionaries who
looked after the day-to-day operation of irrigation systems. In the
30 Water Wars Vandana Shiva 31

Himalayas, where kuhls served community irrigation needs, irri­ create disincentives for conservaron. Local communities do not
gation managers were called kohlis. In Maharashtra, they were conserve water or maintain water systems if external agen­
known as pat karis, havaldars, andjogalaya. In Karnataka and Tamil cies—bureaucratic or commercial—are the only beneficiaries of
Nadu, they were known as nirkatti, nirganti, nirpaychi, niranikkans, their efforts and resources.
or kamkukatti. Higher prices under free-market condidons will not lead to
To ensure neutrality, nirkattis viete chosen from the landless conservation. Given the tremendous economic inequalities,
caste—the Harijans—who were granted autonomy from land­ there is a great possibility that the economically powerful will
owners and caste groups. Only Harijans held the power to close waste water while the poor will pay the price. Community rights
and open the tanks or vents. Once the farmers laid down the are a democratic imperative—they hold states and commercial
rules of distribution, no individual farmer could interfere and interests accountable and defend people’s water rights in the
those who did could be fined. This protection of the associations form of decentralized democracy.
from the economically powerful ensured water democracy. The Right to Clean Water Versus the Right to Pollute
Compensations were based on investments of one’s own la­
bor and could not be substituted by capital or by others’ labor. In Prior to passage of the Water Act of India in 1974, almost all
south India, collective labor investment was the primary invest­ judicial decisions were in favor of polluters. In addition to being
ment in the construction and maintenance of village water systems protected by law, polluters also had more economic and political
known as kudimaramath. Each able-bodied person was required to power than ordinary citizens. They were even more successful in
help maintain and clean channels. Nir kattis also summoned using the legal processes in their favor. When the impact of in­
farmers to clean the supply and field channels. The ancient eco­ dustrial pollution was not severe or when industrialization was
nomic treatise, Arthasastra, included certain punishments for de­ seen as a symbol of progress, courts tended to uphold the rights
faulters from any kind of cooperative construction. Violators were of the industrialists to pollute water as exemplified in a number of
expected to send their servants and bullocks to carry on their work cases: Deski Sugar Mills v. Tups Kabar, Empress v. Holodhan Poorroo;
and to share the costs, without laying any claim to the return. Emperor v. Nana Ram; Imperatix v. Neelappa; Darvappa Queen v.
The self-management systems suffered when the govern­ Vitiichakkon; Reg v. Partha; and Imperatix v. Hari Baput. As water
ment took control over water resources during Bridsh rule. Com­ pollunon intensified with the spread of industrialization, it could
munity ownership was further eroded with the emergence of be handled only through criminal or penal sanedons. However,
bore wells and tube wells, which made individual farmers de­ the courts alone could not protect people’s right to clean water.
pendent on capital. Collective water rights were undermined by By the 1980s, as the threat from pollution increased, the right
state intervention, and resource control was transferred to exter­ to clean water had to be defended as a fundamental right. The Su­
nal agencies. Revenues were no longer reinvested in local infra­ preme Court of India introduced a new principle of environmen­
structure but diverted to government departments. tal rights in the famous case Ratlam Municipality v. Vardhichand.
Community rights are necessary for both ecology and de­ The municipality had to remove public nuisances, whether it had
mocracy. Bureaucratic control by distant and external agencies the financial capability to do so or not. Ratlam established a new
and market control by commercial interests and corporations type of natural right and recognized customary rights as a consti-
32 Water Wars Vandana Shiva 33

tutional guarantee. But even after Ratlam and the Water Act, the It is not surprising that pollution permits are ecologically
big polluters were not brought under the law. In most cases, the blind. They merely consider “incentives for gains from trade.” If
Central Water Pollution Board was against small factories.20 pollution control costs are low, an industry will sell discharge
In the industrial world, antipollution regulations were intro­ rights, and if costs are high, an industry will buy discharge rights.
duced primarily to clean up rivers. In 1969, the Cuyahoga River in While such cost-benefit analysis might appear to create trade ad­
Cleveland, Ohio, which served as a dump site for industries, was vantages, this market of pollution is ecologically dangerous.
so contaminated by chemicals that it caught fire. In 1972, the Trade in pollution permits violates ecological democracy and
United States passed the Clean Water Act, which established that people’s right to clean water on several counts. It changes the role
no one had a right to pollute water and that everyone had a right of governments from protector of people’s water rights to advo­
to clean water. Before the passage of the law, water pollution was cate of polluters’ rights. Governments assume regulatory roles
handled as a matter of common law involving trespassing and that are anti-environment, anti-people and pro-polluter industry.
nuisance. The act set the goal of rendering the waters fishable and TDPs exclude nonpolluters and ordinary citizens from an active
swimmable by 1983, and eliminating discharges of water pollut­ democratic role in pollution control, since the trade in pollution
ants by 1985. Since the passage of the Clean Water Act in 1972, is restricted to polluter industries.
US pollution from point sources has been dramatically reduced,
showing the power of regulation in pollution control. Big Polluters: Old and New
In 1977, as a result of pressure from industry, the focus in the The struggle between the right to clean water and the right to
United States shifted from control-point discharge regulation to pollute is the struggle between the human and environmental
water quality standards. Tacidy, this shift marked a move away rights of ordinary citizens and the financial interests of busi­
from pollution as a violation to pollution as permissible. Com­ nesses. Pollution is a by-product of industrial technologies and
panies attempted to reintroduce the right to pollute through global trade. Handmade paper and vegetable dyes cause no pollu­
back-door efforts such as tradable pollution rights or tradable tion; indigenous leather treatment is also very prudent and water
discharge permits (TDPs). Although TDPs have faced resistance conserving; fresh vegetables and fruits do not require water, ex­
from environmentalists, they still remain a popular market myth cept for cultivation.
for solving pollution problems. By contrast, modern industrial papermaking and leather pro­
Supporters of the free market promote TDPs as an alterna­ cessing create massive pollution. Pulp uses 60,000 to 190,000 gal­
tive to the “command-and-control” of environmental regulation. lons of water per ton of paper or rayon. Bleaching uses 48,000 to
However, trade in pollution is also government sanctioned. As 72,000 gallons of water per ton of cotton. Packaging green beans
free-market advocates Snyder and Anderson admit, “Tradable and peaches for long-distance trade can use up to 17,000 and
pollution rights are essentially an assignment by a governmental 4,800 gallons per ton, respectively.22
agency of a right to discharge a specified level of pollution into a The overuse and pollution of scarce water resources is not
water body or water course.” 1 The government also sets pollu­ restricted to old industrial technologies; it is a hidden component
tion standards, albeit on the basis of a fictitious “bubble,” an of the new computer technologies. A study by South West Net­
imagined boundary covering a designated area. work for Environmental and Economic Justice and the Cam-
 34 Water Wars
Vandana Shiva 35
paign for Responsible Technology reveals that the process of
1. Water is nature’s gift
chip manufacturing requires excessive amounts of water.
On average, processing a single six-inch silicon wafer uses We receive water freely from nature. We owe it to nature to
2,275 gallons of deionized water, 3,200 cubic feet of bulk gases, use this gift in accordance with our sustenance needs, to keep it
22 cubic feet of hazardous gases, 20 pounds of chemicals, and clean and in adequate quantity. Diversions that create arid or wa­
285 kilowatts hours of electrical power.23 In other words, terlogged regions violate the principles of ecological democracy.
if an average plant processes 2,000 wafers per week (the new 2. Water is essential to life
state-of-the-art Intel facility in Rio Rancho, New Mexico, for
Water is the source of life for all species. All species and eco­
example, can produce 5,000 wafers per week) it would need
4,550,000 gallons of water per week and 236,600,000 gallons systems have a right to their share of water on the planet.
per year for wafer production alone.24 3. Life Is interconnected through water
The study finds that out of the 29 Superfund sites in Santa Clara Water connects all beings and all parts of the planet through
Jid County, California, 20 were created by the computer industry. the water cycle. We all have a duty to ensure that our actions do
* ' The Principles of Water Democracy not cause harm to other species and other people.

At the core of the market soludon to pollution is the assump- 4. Water must be free for sustenance needs
tion that water exists in unlimited supply. The idea that markets
Since nature gives water to us free of cost, buying and selling
can mitigate pollution by facilitating increased allocation fails to
it for profit violates our inherent right to nature’s gift and denies
recognize that water diversion to one area comes at the cost of wa­
the poor of their human rights.
ter scarcity elsewhere.
► In contrast to the corporate theorists who promote market so- 5. Water is limited and can be exhausted
,,l lutions to pollution, grassroots organizations call for political and Water is limited and exhaustible if used nonsustainably.
ecological solutions. Communities fighting high-tech industrial Nonsustainable use includes extracting more water from ecosys­
pollution have proposed the Community Environmental Bill of tems than nature can recharge (ecological nonsustainability) and
Rights, which includes rights to clean industry; to safety from consuming more than one’s legitimate share, given the rights of
harmful exposure; to prevention; to knowledge; to participation; to others to a fair share (social nonsustainability).
protection and enforcement; to compensation; and to cleanup.25
6. Water must be conserved
' All of these rights are basic elements of a water democracy in
which the right to clean water is protected for all citizens. Markets Everyone has a duty to conserve water and use water
can guarantee none of these rights. sustainably, within ecological and just limits.
There are nine principles underpinning water democracy:
36 Water Wars Vandana Shiva 37

7. Water is a commons 1 Institutes ofJustinian 2.1.1

2 William Blackstone, quoted in Walter Prescott Webb, The Great Plains
Water is not a human invention. It cannot be bound and has (New York: Grosset and Dunlop, 1931).
no boundaries. It is by nature a commons. It cannot be owned as 3 Chattarpati Singh, “Water and Law” (n.d.)
4 Devon Pena, ed., Chicano Culture, Ecology and Politics (Tucson, AZ:
private property and sold as a commodity.
University of Arizona Press, 1998), p. 235.
5 Donald Worster, Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth of the
8. No one holds a right to destroy
American West (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), p. 88.
No one has a right to overuse, abuse, waste, or pollute water 6 Ibid., p.89.
7 Ibid., p.104.
systems. Tradable-pollution permits violate the principle of sus­
8 Ibid., p.90.
tainable and just use. 9 Terry Anderson and Pamela Snyder, Water Markets: Priming the Invisible
Pump (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1997), p. 75.
9. Water cannot be substituted 10 Jatinder Bajaj, “Green Revolution: A Historical Perspective” (paper
presented at CAP/TWN Seminar on “Crisis of Modern Science,”
Water is intrinsically different from other resources and
Penang, November 1986), p. 4.
products. It cannot be treated as a commodity. 11 Nirmal Sengupta, Managing Common Property: Irrigation in India and The
Philippines (New Delhi: Sage, 1991), p. 30.
12 N.S. Jodha, “Common Property Resources and RuralPoor,” Economic and
Political Weekly 21, No. 7 (July 5,1986).
13 John Lock, Second Treatise on Civil Government, (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus
Books, 1986), p. 20.
14 Garrett Hardin, “Tragedy of the Commons,” Sdente 162 (1968): pp.
1243-1248.
15 Devon Pena, ed., Chicano Culture, Ecology and Politics (Tucson, AZ:
University of Arizona Press, 1998), p. 235.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid., p. 242.
18 Devon Pena, “A Gold Mine, An Orchard, and an Eleventh
Commandment,” in Pena ed., Chicano Culture, Ecology and Politics (Tucson,
AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1998), pp. 250-251.
19 Anupam Mishra, “The Radiant Raindrops of Rajasthan,” translated by
Maya Jani (New Delhi: Research Foundation for Science, Technology
and Ecology, 2001).
20 Chattarpati Singh, “Water and Law.”
21 Terry Anderson and Pamela Snyder, Water Markets, p. 149.
22 Peter Rogers, America’s Water Federal Roles and Responsibilities (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1993).
23 South West Network for Environmental and Economic Justice and
Campaign for Responsible Technology, Sacred Waters (1997), pp. 19-20.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., pp. 133-134.