(20191BAL0080) State and Political Obligation
(20191BAL0080) State and Political Obligation
(20191BAL0080) State and Political Obligation
ASSIGNMENT - 1
NAME:R. SRIMUGAN
ROLL.NO: 20191BAL0080
SECTION: 4
DATE: 09/04/2020
INTRODUCTION:
In the study of Social Sciences the approaches are extremely important because they help us in
identifying the problems for our study and deciding on the appropriate data to be used. A care must however,
be taken to differentiate between an approach and method, another term which is frequently used by the
social scientists. It must be made clear that the two terms are not synonyms. Method can be defined as a
particular manner or technique to carry out something. It suggests a systematic course of action that helps
procure trustworthy body of knowledge about a particular issue or phenomenon and draw conclusions
thereon. There are quite a few methods that are applied in the study of social sciences such as deductive
method, inductive method, comparative method, scientific method and so on. An approach, in contrast, is a
broader term that takes hold of the method i.e. how to study or inquire along with bringing into focus the
relevant data i.e. what to study for the purpose of understanding the particular phenomenon.
In the words of Vernon Van Dyke: “An approach consists of criteria of selection—criteria employed
in selecting the problems or questions to consider and in selecting the data to bring to bear; it consists of
standards governing the inclusion and exclusion of questions and data.” Furthermore, distinguishing between
a method and an approach Dyke indicates: “In brief, approaches consist of criteria for selecting problems and
relevant data, whereas methods are procedures for getting and utilizing data.” It must also be added that an
approach brings along its method too. This cannot be always true about a method because a method is not
usually committed to a particular approach. In other words an approach suggests its own method while the
vice versa is not true. For instance, behavioural approach is linked to scientific method and normative
approach has association with philosophical method.
CLASSICAL THEORY:
Consent theory:
Though the idea of contract or consent as a basis of obligation is quite ancient and is found in ancient Hindu
thought too, it was mainly in the 16th and the 17th century in Europe that sophisticated theories of contract
were developed to explain political obligation. The explicit expression of this theory is found in the writings
of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. They opine, that men who lived in the state of nature entered into a
contract whereby political authority came into being, which again was based on the consent of the people.
The idea of social contract, however, took a highly philosophical form at the hands of Rousseau, who
reposed the fact of political obligation in the “General Will”. This meant that man no longer remains a slave
to his impulses of appetite after entering into a civil society, but he becomes bound to obey the law of the
general good. (Called General Will).
Thus, the social contract theory justifies the conception that the ruling authority, if he has to be legitimate,
must rest ultimately on the consent of the governed. If the government violates the terms of the contract, the
people have the right to resist. The implications of this theory have been in the direction of safeguarding the
rights and liberties of the people and checking the arbitrariness of rulers.
The advantages of Locke's theory are apparent. In addition to its intuitive clarity, consent provides a clear
basis for content-independence . In leaving the state of nature and consenting to be concluded by the
majority, Adam undertakes an obligation to do whatever the majority decides--though not without limits, on
which more directly. As noted above, this feature grounds political obligations that are comprehensive.
Moreover, consent theory has the great advantage of accounting for what Leslie Green calls "the self-image
of the state." As Green says, the state conceives of itself as a "duty imposer." By issuing directives, it is able
to change people's normative status, to impose duties and other requirements on them, the content of which it
rather than they determines (Green 1988: 86). As Green also argues, other theories of political obligation
encounter difficulties accounting for this feature of political obligations, which is presumably a strong reason
for the continuing attraction of consent theory.
An additional advantage is that consent to government accounts for the fact that government's
authority is limited. Historically, the doctrine of consent arose in connection with limitations placed upon
royal authorities that originated in their need to secure the agreement of other grandees to their plans or
projects (see Klosko 2011). In a simple case, a king would summon nobles who would be asked to agree to a
plan to raise taxes or undertake some war. Their consent would strengthen his position, although, in order to
secure it, he would also have to make concessions. Similarly, according to consent theory, when people
surrender their power to government, this is done on certain conditions. They enter into a contractual
relationship with government--"the social contract"--agreeing to obey it as long as it performs the specific
functions for which it was established. If it fails to fulfill these or oversteps the bounds of its original
commission, it loses its legitimacy and can be resisted or overthrown. Thus consent theory is especially
useful in justifying revolutions, as in Locke's Second Treatise and the Declaration of Independence.
Social contract theory:
The concept of social contract theory is that in the beginning man lived in the state of nature. They had no
government and there was no law to regulate them. There were hardships and oppression on the sections of
the society. To overcome from these
hardships they entered into two agreements which are:-
Pactum Unionis .
Pactum Subjectionis
By the first pact of unionis, people sought protection of their lives and property. As, a result of it a society
was formed where people undertook to respect each other and live in peace and harmony. By the second pact
of subjectionis, people united together and pledged to obey an authority and surrendered the whole or part of
their freedom and rights to an authority. The authority guaranteed everyone protection of life, property and to
a certain extent liberty. Thus, they must agree to establish society by collectively and reciprocally renouncing
the rights they had against one another in the State of Nature and they must imbue some one person or
assembly of persons with the authority and power to enforce the initial contract. In other words, to ensure
their escape from the State of Nature, they must both agree to live together under common laws, and create
an ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM for the social contract and the laws that constitute it. Thus, the authority
or the government or the sovereign or the state came into being because of the two agreements.
Hobbes thus infers from his mechanistic theory of human nature that humans are necessarily and exclusively
self-interested. All men pursue only what they perceive to be in their own individually considered best
interests. They respond mechanistically by being drawn to that which they desire and repelled by that to
which they are averse. In addition to being exclusively self-interested, Hobbes also argues that human beings
are reasonable. They have in them the rational capacity to pursue their desires as efficiently and maximally
as possible. From these premises of human nature, Hobbes goes on to construct a provocative and
compelling argument for which they ought to be willing to submit themselves to political authority. He did
this by imagining persons in a situation prior to the establishment of society, the State of Nature.
Hobbes impels subjects to surrender all their rights and vest all liberties in the sovereign for preservation of
peace, life and prosperity of the subjects. It is in this way the natural law became a moral guide or directive
to the sovereign for preservation of the natural rights of the subjects. For Hobbes all law is dependent upon
the sanction of the sovereign. All real law is civil law, the law commanded and enforced by the sovereign
and are brought into the world for nothing else but to limit the natural liberty of particular men, in such a
manner, as they might not hurt but to assist one another and join together against a common enemy. He
advocated for an established order. Hence, Individualism, materialism, utilitarianism and absolutions are
inter-woven in the theory of Hobbes.
Social Contract by Jean Jacques Rousseau:
Jean Jacques Rousseau was a French philosopher who gave a new interpretation to the theory of
SocialContract in his work “THE SOCIAL CONTRACT” and “ Emile”. According to him, social contract is
not a historical fact but a hypothetical construction of reason.
Prior to the Social Contract, the life in the State of Nature was happy and there was equality among men. As
time passed, however, humanity faced certain changes. As the overall population increased, the means by
which people could satisfy their needs had to change. People slowly began to live together in small families,
and then in small communities. Divisions of labour were introduced, both within and between families, and
discoveries and inventions made life easier, giving rise to leisure time. Such leisure time inevitably led
people to make comparisons between themselves and others, resulting in public values, leading to shame and
envy, pride and contempt. Most importantly however, according to Rousseau, was Humanity the evolution of
private out of property, a simple, which pure state constituted into the pivotal moment in one, characterized
by greed, competition, vanity, inequality, and vice. For Rousseau the invention of property constitutes
humanity s fall from grace out of the State of Nature.
MODERN THEORY:
The development of a recognizable modern conception of political obligation took place during a protracted
period, from roughly the twelfth century until the the mid-seventeenth, culminating with the works of
Hobbes, the Levellers, and Locke.1 This process involved a large number of thinkers and doctrines—too
many to be reviewed in detail here. Passages from numerous earlier works might appear to express modern
views of political obligation, or at least important components of such views.2 But, as a rule, even particular
ideas that were sharply expressed were not clearly woven into the kind of worked-out network of ideas
necessary to represent clear accounts of political obligation.
Prescriptive Theory:
According to this theory, political authority and reverence to it are based on the principle of “customary
rights’. Authority is legitimate, if it is sanctioned by long standing custom or tradition. The people obey their
rulers because the fact of obedience has become like a well- established convention. The traditionalists view
the state as a delicate structure built over the years and which represents a balance of conflicting interest.
Institutions like the state evolve gradually and adapt slowly to change; hence, it is a matter of duty to accept
state authority and obey it while working only for gradual peaceful change. This conservative theory of
political obligation has its affirmation in the writings of Hegel, who believes that the ideas of morality evolve
concretely in the customs and institutions of the state. And since the latest stage in this process is the present
established order, it is entitled to receive our obedience. Further, since the state is the embodiment of a long
evolved and customary morality, it becomes the duty of everyone to do what the state expects of one.
Burke is one of the best known exponents of conservatism who opines that it is unwise for man to totally
disregard custom and tradition. The fact of political obligation is contained in paying unflinching respect to
tradition, which is a sacrosanct affair. Thus, he supported the revolt of American colonialists, which was in
favour of traditional rights of Englishmen, but opposed the French Revolution because it was inspired by the
abstract rights of man “divorced from national traditions”.
Prof. M. Oakeshott is a contemporary upholder of the traditionalist view of obligation. According to him,
political actions can never be anything but traditional, because political reflection cannot exist in advance of
political activity. Politics is a skill, which is learned by practice rather that through theoretical maxims or
systems. Hence, even when we attempt to comprehend other people’s politics, it is always within our own
framework.
Criticism of the Prescriptive Theory of Political Obligation
Like other theories, the prescriptive theory has its own weaknesses. The source of political obligation lies not
only in paying reverence to well-established practices, but also in doing away with them. People desire
change and in case, their hopes are frustrated, they take to the path of revolution. Oakeshott has been
particularly criticised on the ground that he treats even a revolution as an experience connected with the past
and thereby, makes it a purely conservative affair. This means that the exponents of this theory would even
advise the Negroes of African countries to accept racial discrimination laws as ‘legitimate’ for they are based
on the ‘well-established traditions of the realm.’ However, this is far from the truth. In-fact, people only
observe their traditions, in so far as they have their utility and do away with them when their usefulness does
not exist.
Idealistic Theory:
The Idealists trace the source of political obligation in the innate rationality of man. Man is regarded as a
‘political and rational creature’ and the state as a ‘self - sufficing community’ identical with the whole
society. As such, there can be no anti-thesis between the individual and the state. As a consequence, an
individual can seek his best possible development in society alone by obeying the command of the state.
In other words, the source of political obligation is contained in obedience to the state. Both Plato and
Aristotle affirmed that the state and the individuals comprising it ‘form an organic whole’. Such an
affirmation finds its best manifestation in the hands of Hegel who identifies ‘liberty’ of the individual with
his perfect obedience to state. Green too says, that the idea of political obligation is connected with the case
of moral obligation. He suggests that only those actions should be made obligations, which are made to serve
a certain moral end.
The idealistic theories have been criticized on the ground of being too abstract. It places ordinary things in a
highly philosophical or metaphysical form that cannot be understood by a man of average understanding.
Also, the idea of political obligation is not only concerned with man’s obedience to state, but is also
integrally connected with his right to resist abuse of political authority. The idealists are reluctant to
accommodate the right to resistance in their doctrine of political obligation. Even if Green and Bosanquet did
recognize the right in certain exceptional situations, their treatment is vague and uncertain and failed to shake
off the weight of English liberalism. Trietschke even goes to the extent of saying to fall down and worship
the state. Thus, the idea of political obligation is converted into the injunction of blind worship of authority.
Liberal Theory
The Liberal theory of revolution emphasises preserving the status quo in the process of change. That is to say
that the notion of change is made coincidental with the preservation of the existing state of social, economic
and political life. Such a notion is well reflected in the political philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. By
revolution, Plato meant the establishment of an ideal state. To Aristotle revolution implied a change in the
form of government by another or even a change in the type of rulers, which may amount to a revolution.
The trend of approaching revolution with a sense of apprehension and thus, an attempt at making the idea of
change in consonance with the existing order, continued. Further, John Milton linked up the case of
revolution with the maintenance of freedom and went to the extent of choosing a new government in case the
existing rulers deprived the people of their liberty. However, liberal interpretation of the meaning and nature
of revolution takes an important turn at the hands of John Locke. The fact remains that the keynote of
making change in consonance with the defence of status-quo to any possible extent remains altogether
undiscarded. Thus, the English Revolution of 1688 and the French Revolution of 1789 have been accused of
being reactionary.
This theory has been criticized on the ground that thinkers have sought to justify a return to the past as an act
of revolution. As a result, the liberal theory of revolution has been accused of being reactionary, anti-change
and even counter-revolutionary. Here, the revolutionaries announced themselves as the protagonists of the
‘rights of man’. But any analysis of measures by which they gave effect to their principles, shows clearly that
by the ‘rights of man’, they meant in actual the rights of a limited class of men who owned the instrument’s
of production in society. Thus, the liberal tradition was an intellectual revolution primarily made in the
interest of property owners in the new industrial field.
Marxian Theory:
The Marxian theory of political obligation is basically different from other theories on the subject. It
sanctions the case of political non-obligation in the pre-revolutionary stage, total political obligation in the
revolutionary stage and its eventual conversion into social obligation in the post-revolutionary stage. In other
words, the case of political obligation is integrally connected with the character of authority. In Marxian
theory of politics, state is decried as a ‘bourgeois institution’ in capitalist society. It means, after a successful
revolution, the working class has the instruments of power in their hands to consolidate the socialist order in
a way preparing its ‘withering away’ in the final stage of socialism. According to Marxism, the idea of
political obligation cover the cases of ‘discredited state’ in the era of capitalism, the ‘new state’ in the period
of ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’, and the ‘state proper’ when the ‘classless’ society finds its culmination in
the ‘stateless’ pattern of social existence.
The starting point of Marxian theory of politics and with it of political obligation ‘is its categorical rejection
of this view of the state as the trustee, instrument, or agent of society as a whole’. The case of political
obligation arises when the ‘new state’ comes into being after the revolution. The noticeable point in this
theory is that what is forbidden in capitalist society is ordained in the socialist order. Not merely this,
fundamental changes take place that prohibit any opposition to the state at all. The task of the Marxists is to
subordinate the idea of political obligation to the dictates of permanent revolution. In other words, the idea of
political obligation ceases to exist with the withering away of the state in the last stage of socialism (called
communism) and finds its final conversion into the injunction of social obligation. Thus, society will be
composed of the associations of free and equal producers, consciously acting upon a common and rational
plan.
Criticism of the Marxian Theory of Political Obligation
A critical study of Marxian theory shows that it treats the question of political obligation in a way far
away from the real perspective. What is emphatically advocated in the phase of capitalism is firmly denied in
the next stage of social development. People who are exhorted to disobey the ‘bourgeoisie state’ are
commanded not to disobey the state at all after the inauguration of the new social system. Thus, Marx is
accused of building up a theory of political obligation on the basis of expediency alone, and he ignores the
independent individual whose experience only counts in the determination of his obedience to the laws of
state.
Neo-Liberal Theory
According to Neo-liberal thinkers, the meaning of revolution has a different connotation and so its causes
may not be discovered in the sphere of economics alone. Several viewpoints have sprung up in this context,
all pinpointing that revolutions are violent civil disturbances that cause the displacement of one ruling group
by another that has a broader popular basis of support . Historical evidence shows that people having nothing
like “class consciousness” rise in revolt to change their destiny. As such, a revolution would seem to be the
result of deep-rooted and slowly evolving political and social malformations rather than a sudden outbreak.
However, in the last phase, they are sudden and violent.
The cause of revolution has been discussed from the stand point of psychology. David C. Schwartz explained
people’s apathy as a factor, which is known as ‘alienation’. On this basis, he constructs a ‘plausible theory’,
which has its beginning in ‘ambivalence’; then moves on to ‘conflict’, thereon to ‘cognitive consistency’ and
finally to ‘adjustment’. Withdrawal from politics is a dangerous symptom, as it cultivates feelings of apathy
for the system and the result is an outburst of mass anger.
The new liberal thinkers of the present century have in a way tried to follow Marx in so far as he emphasises
the use of force in the capture of power and also rejected him in so far as he confines his attention only to the
parameters of class war. This has led to the meaning of revolution, having different connotations.
A revolution is not only an event, as said by the liberal thinkers, in which one class dislodges another and
captures power. The fact, however, is that it also relates to a particular phase of history extending over a
considerable phase of time, but certainly marked by major ‘social and ideological change.’
Idealistic-Liberal Theory
The idealistic-liberal theory lays emphasis on a moral, spiritual and cultural upheaval through which a group
of persons seeks to establish a new basis for existence. If so, a revolution is not merely a political process,
but a part of the unfolding of human potentiality. A major event of historical significance directed towards a
higher moral end is a revolution, according to this interpretation. Such an orientation finds its impressive
manifestation at the hands of Hegel. To him, it is the ‘reason’ that plays a decisive part in evolution. An
object is a thesis, an element of contradiction develops within it that may be taken as its ‘antithesis.’ The
struggle between the two leads to the emergence of the ‘synthesis’, which has a mixture of both thesis and
anti-thesis and represents a higher stage of development
– a stage which will lead to another higher one and thus, the process of change will continue. A
revolution, therefore, takes place on account of the operation of the law of dialectics in which the
decisive role is played by the geist (spirit). Thus, it becomes something central to the process in
which the ideally rational could become actual.
This idealistic-cum liberal interpretation of the idea of revolution is traceable in the political philosophy of
M.N. Roy, who said that revolution means awakening the urge of freedom in man. As such, revolution is
based on human nature and nothing like violence is needed. It means reorganizing society on the basis of
freedom and equality remains a necessity.
The theory is criticised on the ground of being too abstract to be understood by a man of average
comprehension. The purely philosophical version take the subject of revolution far away from the world of
reality. Revolution as a matter of fact, is an important event that changes the pattern of social, economic and
political development. This means, it is purely a practical affair. It calls for an empirical study. The value
free study of revolution is, however, a logical impossibility.
CONCLUSION:
At the beginning of this essay, I cited Hume's contention concerning the strengths and weaknesses of
consent. On a theoretical level, he says, consent is not only a plausible basis for political obligations but
likely the best there is. As we have noted, consent affirms liberal com-mitments to freedom and autonomy,
and also accounts for the content-independence of political obligations and supports the self-image of the
state. But as Hume notes, in regard to accounting for the political obligations of actual citizens, it does not
succeed. We have surveyed a large numbers of attempts to ground political obligations in consent, all of
which appear to come up short. In spite of these difficulties, it is likely that consent's intuitive appeal largely
explains its continuing hold on public consciousness and theorists' repeated attempts to explain how, in spite
of appearances to the contrary, citizens have actually consented.
To my mind, somewhat ironically, consent's theoretical advantages have had adverse consequences
for dealing with problems of political obligation. Because of the features we have noted, consent has served
as a model for what a successful theory of obligation should look like. A suitable theory must not only
account for the obligations of actual citizens but, like consent, it
should be intuitively plausible, account for content-independence, and explain obligations to obey all laws.
The problem is that these are exacting standards, which it is widely believed no theory in the literature is able
to meet. I believe the appeal of consent theory has contributed to current efforts to find a single moral
principle that is able satisfactorily to account for all political obligations, while difficulties finding such a
theory have contributed to currently widespread skepticism about the existence of political obligations in a
more general sense (see esp. Simmons 1979).