People v. Sandiganbayan
People v. Sandiganbayan
People v. Sandiganbayan
DECISION
PERALTA , J : p
Before this Court is a petition 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the Resolution 2 of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated
February 28, 2005 dismissing Criminal Case No. 27991, entitled People of the
Philippines v. Victoria Amante for lack of jurisdiction.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City,
Province of Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. On January 14, 1994, she was able
to get hold of a cash advance in the amount of P71,095.00 under a disbursement
voucher in order to defray seminar expenses of the Committee on Health and
Environmental Protection, which she headed. As of December 19, 1995, or after almost
two years since she obtained the said cash advance, no liquidation was made. As such,
on December 22, 1995, Toledo City Auditor Manolo V. Tulibao issued a demand letter
to respondent Amante asking the latter to settle her unliquidated cash advance within
seventy-two hours from receipt of the same demand letter. The Commission on Audit,
on May 17, 1996, submitted an investigation report to the Of ce of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB-Visayas), with the recommendation that respondent
Amante be further investigated to ascertain whether appropriate charges could be led
against her under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, otherwise known as The Auditing
Code of the Philippines. Thereafter, the OMB-Visayas, on September 30, 1999, issued a
Resolution recommending the ling of an Information for Malversation of Public Funds
against respondent Amante. The Of ce of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), upon review of
the OMB-Visayas' Resolution, on April 6, 2001, prepared a memorandum nding
probable cause to indict respondent Amante.
On May 21, 2004, the OSP led an Information 3 with the Sandiganbayan
accusing Victoria Amante of violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445, which reads as
follows: DcIHSa
That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent
thereto at Toledo City, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused VICTORIA AMANTE, a high-
ranking public officer, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo
City, and committing the offense in relation to of ce, having obtained cash
advances from the City Government of Toledo in the total amount of SEVENTY-
ONE THOUSAND NINETY-FIVE PESOS (P71,095.00), Philippine Currency, which
she received by reason of her of ce, for which she is duty-bound to liquidate the
same within the period required by law, with deliberate intent and intent to gain,
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said cash
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advances of P71,095.00, Philippine Currency, despite demands to the damage
and prejudice of the government in aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was raf ed to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter,
Amante led with the said court a MOTION TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT AND MOTION
FOR REINVESTIGATION 4 dated November 18, 2004 stating that the Decision of the
Of ce of the Ombudsman (Visayas) dated September 14, 1999 at Cebu City from of an
* incomplete proceeding in so far that respondent Amante had already liquidated
and/or refunded the unexpected balance of her cash advance, which at the time of the
investigation was not included as the same liquidation papers were still in the process
of evaluation by the Accounting Department of Toledo City and that the Sandiganbayan
had no jurisdiction over the said criminal case because respondent Amante was then a
local of cial who was occupying a position of salary grade 26, whereas Section 4 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan shall have original
jurisdiction only in cases where the accused holds a position otherwise classi ed as
Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classi cation Act of 1989, R.A.
No. 6758.
The OSP led its Opposition 5 dated December 8, 2004 arguing that respondent
Amante's claim of settlement of the cash advance dwelt on matters of defense and the
same should be established during the trial of the case and not in a motion for
reinvestigation. As to the assailed jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the OSP
contended that the said court has jurisdiction over respondent Amante since at the
time relevant to the case, she was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo
City, therefore, falling under those enumerated under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249.
According to the OSP, the language of the law is too plain and unambiguous that it did
not make any distinction as to the salary grade of city local officials/heads.
The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution 6 dated February 28, 2005, dismissed the
case against Amante, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this case is hereby dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction. The dismissal, however, is without prejudice to the ling of
this case to the proper court.
AEDHST
The Motion for Reinvestigation led by the movant is hereby considered moot
and academic.
SO ORDERED.
In claiming that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case in question,
petitioner disputes the former's appreciation of this Court's decision in Inding v.
Sandiganbayan. 7 According to petitioner, Inding did not categorically nor implicitly
constrict or con ne the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4 (a)
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(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is
either a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code. Petitioner adds that the enumeration in Section (a) (1) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249, which was made applicable to
cases concerning violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, equally applies to offenses committed in relation to
public office.
Respondent Amante, in her Comment 8 dated January 16, 2006, averred that, with
the way the law was phrased in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, it is obvious
that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was de ned rst, enumerating the several
exceptions to the general rule, while the exceptions to the general rule are provided in
the rest of the paragraph and sub-paragraphs of Section 4. Therefore, according to
respondent Amante, the Sandiganbayan was correct in ruling that the latter has original
jurisdiction only over cases where the accused is a public of cial with salary grade 27
and higher; and in cases where the accused is public of cial below grade 27 but his
position is one of those mentioned in the enumeration in Section 4 (a) (1) (a) to (g) of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended and his offense involves a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A.
No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; and if the
indictment involves offenses or felonies other than the three aforementioned statutes,
the general rule that a public of cial must occupy a position with salary grade 27 and
higher in order that the Sandiganbayan could exercise jurisdiction over him must apply.
The same respondent proceeded to cite a decision 9 of this Court where it was held
that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or law; it
cannot be xed by the will of the parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived,
enlarged or diminished by, any act or omission of the parties, neither is it conferred by
acquiescence of the court. HDTSCc
In its Reply 1 0 dated March 23, 2006, the OSP reiterated that the enumeration of
public of cials in Section 4 (a) (1) to (a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606 as falling within the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan should include their commission of other
offenses in relation to of ce under Section 4 (b) of the same P.D. No. 1606. It cited the
case of Esteban v. Sandiganbayan, et al. 1 1 wherein this Court ruled that an offense is
said to have been committed in relation to the of ce if the offense is "intimately
connected" with the of ce of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the
performance of his official functions.
The petition is meritorious.
The focal issue raised in the petition is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As
a background, this Court had thoroughly discussed the history of the conferment of
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 1 2 thus:
. . . The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the
highest norms of of cial conduct required of public of cers and employees,
based on the concept that public of cers and employees shall serve with the
highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and ef ciency and shall remain
at all times accountable to the people. 1 3
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on
December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. 1 4
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further
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altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30,
1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended
on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modi ed
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. . . .
Specifically, the question that needs to be resolved is whether or not a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod under Salary Grade 26 who was charged with violation of The
Auditing Code of the Philippines falls within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
This Court rules in the affirmative. EHTIDA
The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again
amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. The alleged commission of the offense,
as shown in the Information was on or about December 19, 1995 and the ling of the
Information was on May 21, 2004. The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to
be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the
commission of the offense. 1 5 The exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A.
8249, where it expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in
the present case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of
the Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the said
two provisions states:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
of cials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense :
The present case falls under Section 4 (b) where other offenses and felonies
committed by public of cials or employees in relation to their of ce are involved. Under
the said provision, no exception is contained. Thus, the general rule that jurisdiction of a
court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the
action, not at the time of the commission of the offense applies in this present case.
Since the present case was instituted on May 21, 2004, the provisions of R.A. No. 8249
shall govern. Verily, the pertinent provisions of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by R.A. No.
8249 are the following:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction
in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal
accused are of cials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission
of the offense:
(5) All other national and local of cials classi ed as Grade "27" and
higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4 (a), the following offenses are specifically enumerated:
violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction
over the said offenses, the latter must be committed by, among others, of cials of the
executive branch occupying positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classi ed as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classi cation Act
of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are classi ed as
Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided
that they hold the positions thus enumerated by the same law. Particularly and
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exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
of cials of the diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and higher;
Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all of cers of higher rank;
PNP chief superintendent and PNP of cers of higher rank; City and provincial
prosecutors and their assistants, and of cials and prosecutors in the Of ce of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of the
same law provides that other offenses or felonies committed by public of cials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their of ce also fall under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent law, respondent
Amante, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of the alleged
commission of an offense in relation to her of ce, falls within the original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.
However, the Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution, dismissed the case with the
following ratiocination:
. . . the ruling of the Supreme Court in the Inding case, stating that the Congress'
act of speci cally including the public of cials therein mentioned, "obviously
intended cases mentioned in Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, when committed by the of cials enumerated in (1) (a)
to (g) thereof, regardless of their salary grades, to be tried by the Sandiganbayan".
Obviously, the Court was referring to cases involving violation of R.A. No. 3019,
R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code only
because they are the speci c cases mentioned in Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606
as amended, so that when they are committed even by public of cials below
salary grade '27', provided they belong to the enumeration, jurisdiction would fall
under the Sandiganbayan. When the offense committed however, falls under
Section 4(b) or 4(c) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended, it should be emphasized that
the general quali cation that the public of cial must belong to grade '27' is a
requirement so that the Sandiganbayan could exercise original jurisdiction over
him. Otherwise, jurisdiction would fall to the proper regional or municipal trial
court. SHCaEA
A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those
public of cials enumerated in Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only
be charged in the Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or
felonies in relation to their of ce. The said other offenses and felonies are broad in
scope but are limited only to those that are committed in relation to the public of cial
or employee's of ce. This Court had ruled that as long as the offense charged in the
information is intimately connected with the of ce and is alleged to have been
perpetrated while the accused was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of
his of cial functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had the
accused not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid of ce, the accused is held
to have been indicted for "an offense committed in relation" to his of ce. 1 7 Thus, in the
case of Lacson v. Executive Secretary, 1 8 where the crime involved was murder, this
Court held that:
The phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of
murder, provided it was committed in relation to the accused's of cial functions.
Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction
is the of cial position or rank of the offender — that is, whether he is one of those
public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. . . . .
Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan, 19 where the public of cial was
charged with grave threats, this Court ruled:
. . . In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations that the
accused, petitioner herein, took advantage of his of cial functions as municipal
mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan when he committed the crime of grave threats as
de ned in Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code against complainant Simeon G.
Legaspi, a municipal councilor. The Of ce of the Special Prosecutor charged
petitioner with aiming a gun at and threatening to kill Legaspi during a public
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hearing, after the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical of petitioner's
administration. Clearly, based on such allegations, the crime charged is intimately
connected with the discharge of petitioner's of cial functions. This was
elaborated upon by public respondent in its April 25, 1997 resolution wherein it
held that the "accused was performing his of cial duty as municipal mayor when
he attended said public hearing" and that "accused's violent act was precipitated
by complainant's criticism of his administration as the mayor or chief executive
of the municipality, during the latter's privilege speech. It was his response to
private complainant's attack to his of ce. If he was not the mayor, he would not
have been irritated or angered by whatever private complainant might have said
during said privilege speech." Thus, based on the allegations in the information,
the Sandiganbayan correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case.
Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading of the
Information led against respondent Amante for violation of The Auditing Code of the
Philippines reveals that the said offense was committed in relation to her of ce,
making her fall under Section 4 (b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended.
According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if the intention of the
law had been to extend the application of the exceptions to the other cases over which
the Sandiganbayan could assert jurisdiction, then there would have been no need to
distinguish between violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code on the one hand, and other offenses or felonies
committed by public of cials and employees in relation to their of ce on the other. The
said reasoning is misleading because a distinction apparently exists. In the offenses
involved in Section 4 (a), it is not disputed that public of ce is essential as an element
of the said offenses themselves, while in those offenses and felonies involved in
Section 4 (b), it is enough that the said offenses and felonies were committed in
relation to the public of cials or employees' of ce. In expounding the meaning of
offenses deemed to have been committed in relation to office, this Court held: CaSHAc
In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated on the
scope and reach of the term "offense committed in relation to [an accused's]
of ce" by referring to the principle laid down in Montilla v. Hilario [90 Phil 49
(1951)], and to an exception to that principle which was recognized in People v.
Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The principle set out in Montilla v. Hilario is that an
offense may be considered as committed in relation to the accused's of ce if "the
offense cannot exist without the of ce" such that "the of ce [is] a constituent
element of the crime . . . ." In People v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice
Concepcion, said that "although public of ce is not an element of the crime of
murder in [the] abstract", the facts in a particular case may show that
. . . the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accused's]
respective of ces and was perpetrated while they were in the performance,
though improper or irregular, of their of cial functions. Indeed, [the
accused] had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not
have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. . . . 2 0
Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provision of Section 4 (b) does not
mention any quali cation as to the public of cials involved. It simply stated, public
of cials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of the same section. Therefore, it
refers to those public of cials with Salary Grade 27 and above, except those
speci cally enumerated. It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words
of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and
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signi cation, 2 1 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special
legal meaning to those words. 2 2 The intention of the lawmakers — who are, ordinarily,
untrained philologists and lexicographers — to use statutory phraseology in such a
manner is always presumed. 2 3
WHEREFORE , the Petition dated April 20, 2005 is hereby GRANTED and the
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated February 28, 2005 is
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE . Consequently, let the case be REMANDED to the
Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED . acHDTE
Footnotes
20. Cunanan v. Arceo, G.R. No. 116615, March 1, 1995, 242 SCRA 88, 96.
21. Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 479 Phil. 265, 287 (2004), citing Mustang Lumber, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 430, 448 (1996).
22. Id., citing PLDT v. Eastern Telecommunications Phil., Inc., 213 SCRA 16, 26 (1992).
23. Id., citing Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra, at 347-348.