EN BANC

[A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC. July 22, 2005.]

RE: LETTER DATED 21 FEBRUARY 2005 OF ATTY. NOEL S. SORREDA

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CONTEMPT; DIRECT CONTEMPT;
UNFOUNDED ACCUSATIONS OR ALLEGATIONS OR WORDS IN THE PLEADINGS TENDING
TO EMBARRASS THE COURT OR BRING IT INTO DISREPUTE CONSTITUTE DIRECT
CONTEMPT. — Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to embarrass the
court or to bring it into disrepute have no place in a pleading. Their employment serves no
useful purpose. On the contrary, they constitute direct contempt of court or contempt in
facie curiae and a violation of the lawyer's oath and a transgression of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. In Ang vs. Castro, this Court held that if a pleading containing
derogatory, offensive and malicious statements is submitted in the same court or judge in
which the proceedings are pending, it is direct contempt, equivalent as it is to a
misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the
administration of justice. Direct contempt is punishable summarily.
2. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEY; FIDELITY THEREOF TO HIS CLIENT MUST NOT
BE PURSUED AT THE EXPENSE OF TRUTH AND ORDERLY ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
BUT MUST BE DONE WITHIN THE CONFINES OF REASON AND COMMON SENSE. — While
a lawyer owes absolute delity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his client's
genuine interest and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, as
well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds
of the law. A lawyer is entitled to voice his criticism within the context of the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech which must be exercised responsibly. After all, every right
carries with it the corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility,
but freedom with responsibility. The lawyer's delity to his client must not be pursued at
the expense of truth and orderly administration of justice. It must be done within the
confines of reason and common sense.
3. ID.; ID.; NO UNBRIDLED LICENSE TO INSULT AND MALIGN THE COURT AND
BRING IT INTO DISREPUTE. — Atty. Sorreda, as a citizen and as an o cer of the court, is
entitled to criticize the rulings of this Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have
lapsed with error. But, certainly, this does not give him the unbridled license to insult and
malign the Court and bring it into disrepute. Against such an assault, the Court is duty-
bound "to act to preserve its honor and dignity . . . . and to safeguard the morals and ethics
of the legal profession." As o cer of the court, Atty. Sorreda has the duty to uphold the
dignity and authority of the courts and to promote con dence in the fair administration of
justice. No less must this be and with greater reasons in the case of the country's highest
court, the Supreme Court, as the last bulwark of justice and democracy.
4. ID.; ID.; FREE EXPRESSION MUST NOT BE USED AS A VEHICLE TO SATISFY
ONE'S IRRATIONAL OBSESSION TO DEMEAN, RIDICULE, DEGRADE AND DESTROY THE
COURT AND ITS MAGISTRATES. — Atty. Sorreda must be reminded that his rst duty is not
to his client but to the administration of justice, to which his client's success is wholly
subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and
ethics. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascription can hardly be justi ed nor
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 can it have a place in the dignity of judicial forum. Civility among members of the legal
profession is a treasured tradition that must at no time be lost to it. Here, Atty. Sorreda
has transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment and constructive criticism to the
detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Free expression, after all, must not be
used as a vehicle to satisfy one's irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and
even destroy this Court and its magistrates.
5. ID.; ID.; GROSS MISCONDUCT THEREOF, WHETHER IN HIS PROFESSIONAL OR
PRIVATE CAPACITY, PUTS HIS MORAL CHARACTER IN SERIOUS DOUBT AS MEMBER OF
THE BAR, AND RENDERS HIM UNFIT TO CONTINUE IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW;
IMPOSABLE PENALTY FOR GROSS MISCONDUCT. — We have constantly reminded that
any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, puts his
moral character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him un t to continue
in the practice of law. In the very recent similar case of Tacardon, et al. vs. Ponce Enrile, we
imposed on the respondent therein the penalty of suspension from the Bar. Here, as in
Tacardon, we nd the exclusion of Atty. Sorreda from the Bar a tting sanction until he
proves himself worthy to enjoy the privileges of membership to the profession. It is
imperative to instill in him sense of discipline that should teach him anew of his duty to
respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal. This rehabilitation must be done outside
the brotherhood he has dishonored and to which he will be allowed to return only after he
has purged himself of his misdeeds.

RESOLUTION

GARCIA , J : p

In a letter 1 to the Chief Justice bearing date February 21, 2005, with copies thereof
furnished all the Associate Justices of the Court and other government entities, RTC
judges and counsels listed thereunder, Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, who identi ed himself as
"member, Philippine Bar", expressed his frustrations over the unfavorable outcome of and
the manner by which the Court resolved the following cases filed by him, to wit:
1. UDK-12854, Ramon Sollegue vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
2. G.R. No. 149334, Artemio Dalsen vs. Commission on Elections

3. G.R. No. 148440, Lilia Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals

4. G.R. No. 152766, Lilia Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals, et al.

5. G.R. No. 154310, Noel Sorreda vs. Court of Appeals, et al.

6. G.R. No. 155446, Allan Reynold Cu vs. Court of Appeals, et al.

7. G.R. No. 156630, Ronilo Sorreda vs. Court of Appeals, et al.

8. G.R. No. 157046, Ronilo Sorreda vs. National Labor Relations Commission,
et al.
9. G.R. No. 164163, Glenn Caballes vs. People, et al.

10. G.R. No. 164677, Marissa Macarilay vs. Hon. Alba-Estoesta, et al.

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 In said letter, Atty. Sorreda recounted the alleged circumstances surrounding the
dismissal on February 7, 2000 2 of the very rst case he led with the Court, UDK-12854 ,
entitled Ramon Sollegue vs. Court of Appeals, et al. Frustrated with the adverse ruling
thereon, Atty. Sorreda had previously written a letter 3 dated April 2, 2001 addressed to the
Chief Justice, copy furnished all the Associate Justices of this Court, the Court of Appeals
and the Office of the Solicitor General, denouncing the Court, as follows:
Mr. Chief Justice, I believe the manner the Court comported itself in the
aforesaid case is totally execrable and atrocious, entirely unworthy of the majesty
and o ce of the highest tribunal of the land. It is the action not of men of reason
or those who believe in the rule of law, but rather of bullies and tyrants from
whom "might is right." I say, shame on the High Court, for shoving down a hapless
suitor's throat a ruling which, from all appearances, it could not justify.
Reacting to the above, the Court, in an en banc Resolution dated August 14, 2001, 4
required Atty. Sorreda to show cause why he should not be properly disciplined "for
degrading, insulting and dishonoring the Supreme Court by using vile, offensive,
intemperate and contemptuous derogatory language against it".
In response to the "show cause" order, Atty. Sorreda addressed two (2) more letters
to the Court dated December 2, 2001 5 and June 16, 2002, 6 arguing for the propriety of his
action and practically lecturing the Court on his concepts of Legal and Judicial Ethics and
Constitutional Law. In its Resolutions of January 15, 2002 7 and August 27, 2002 8 the
Court merely noted said two letters.
Quoted from his earlier communications are the following statements of Atty.
Sorreda disparaging the Court with intemperate, insulting, offensive and derogatory
language, to wit:
"SOMETHING HAS GOT TO BE SERIOUSLY AND TERRIBLY WRONG WITH
THE COUNTRY'S JUSTICE SYSTEM" 9

"WHAT IS HAPPENING TO THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THIS COUNTRY, MR.

CHIEF JUSTICE?
xxx xxx xxx
I therefore deplore and condemn in the strongest term such strong-handed
actuations as the Honorable Court has displayed. They are as one might expect in
a dictatorship or authoritarian regime." 1 0

Persistent in imputing to the Court and its Justices offensive and uncalled remarks,
Atty. Sorreda again went on a rampage in his subject letter of February 21, 2005:
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Chief Justice, I do not doubt that these ten cases are among the most
palpably meritorious cases that have ever been brought before the Supreme
Court, or any court of justice for that matter. I cannot doubt that were it not for the
Sollegue "miscounting," and the other incidents that ensued from it, at least some
of these ten cases would have met with entirely different endings, so obvious and
patent are their merits to any reasonable and impartial mind.

In short, Mr. Chief Justice, it is obvious that the High Court has
taken it personally against me. To the detriment of my innocent clients.
And of justice .
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 Mr. Chief Justice, why should this be? If the Court had anything against
me, I stood ready to have the ax fall on my own neck, if it came to that. As I had
stated in one communication —
[I]f there is one thing I agree with in the High Court's position, it is
that . . . if indeed I had wronged the Court in the way it had described, and
if indeed my explanations and arguments "lack merit," I should indeed be
disciplined; and surely no less than DISBARMENT will do. It should also be
done as swiftly as possible, given the gravity of the charge and the high
dignity and importance of the institution attacked. Now on January 22,
2002 and May 7, 2002, the Court has resolved to deny to the undersigned
the "full opportunity" for self-defense that he request . . . therefore he is
now left without any defense, and he can only wonder why no sanction
has come down until the present time.

Might it be because I had continued, "Of course, I shall also only expect
that such judgment, when it does come, will be a fully-reasoned one, as
thoroughly discussed perhaps as that in I n re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562, for the
proper guidance of all concerned" — and the Court knows that it is not able to give
such a "fully-reasoned judgment" as I ask? But rather than admit it has done
wrong and rectify the same, it would rather "get back" at me by means of
unfavorable rulings in the cases I elevate to it — let the innocent litigants, whose
only mistake was to hire me as their counsel, and the cause of justice suffer as
they may. aEDCSI

Mr. Chief Justice, that is not only unjust; that is craven

cowardice, to deal with an adversary like that. It is not something I
would have expected from the supreme judges of the land .
I can only view other happenings in the Honorable Court in such light. The
same veri cations that were previously unfaulted, suddenly became course for
dismissal. What other interpretation can I give it, than that the court had run out of
excuses to dismiss, since I was being careful not to repeat the same adjudged
"shortcomings"; and was now scrounging every which way for one, just so to
make sure I continue to get my "comeuppance."

That of the rst nine cases, not one was assigned to the Third Division-
only either to the Second Division, then chaired by Justice Josue N. Bellosillo,
which handled the Sollegue case; or the First Division, chaired by the Chief
Justice, to whom I have directly written afterwards. Could it be only a coincidence
— or is it a more likely explanation that the powers-that-be in the Court wanted to
be very sure I never get favorable ruling? Especially when it is considered that,
following Justice Bellosillo's retirement on November 12, 2003, for the rst time in
the history of the nation's judiciary a vacancy in the Supreme Court was lled up
way beyond the constitutionally prescribed period of 90 days — and after so
much mystery and intrigue has surrounded the appointment of his successor,
Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario. In fact Justice Nazario was sworn in on July 14,
2004, just one day before a new retirement took place, this time of Justice Jose C.
Vitug. It was only following this latest retirement, that for the rst time this
counsel had a case assigned to other than the First and Second Division. Could it
be that Justice Vitug, then Chairman of the Third Division, and Justice Nazario,
erstwhile presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, had redoubtable reputations
for independent-mindedness; and the powers-that-be in the court exercised their
utmost in uence to at least prevent the both of them sitting in the bench at the
same time, lest together they should "buck the system" and divide the Court, if not
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 successfully sway the Court to favorably rule on the undersigned counsel's cases
before it?
xxx xxx xxx

But this time, in these ten cases I have recounted, I am wholly convinced
that the court is in the wrong. I cannot but thus be lled with both acute sadness
and burning indignation. Sadness as counsel, to come to the realization
that the high institution of which I am an o cer has sunk to such a
low. Indignation as a citizen, that the public o cers who are supposed
to serve him and help him nd justice, should instead give judgments
that so insult the intelligence and glare with iniquity .

Mr. Chief Justice, whatever gave the Court the notion that it could
pronounce 29 days as greater than 60 days, and not to have to account for it?
Who can believe that the supposedly most illustrious legal minds of the land,
would miss seeing grave abuse of discretion in the actions of an agency that
directly contravened numerous laws and rules all at once? How could
democracy's vaunted "last bulwark" suffer a widow and her children to thereafter
live in their toilet, by sanctioning the plainly void sale and illegal demolition of
their erstwhile family home? Did the court pause for even three minutes to put
itself in the shoes of an evidently innocent man kept locked up for three years
now on a manifestly false and fabricated charge, before it so blandly invoked its
"discretion" not to entertain his appeal at all? Where did the Court get such
brazenness, such shameless boldness, as to dismiss on the ground that
the docket fees had not been paid, when the evidence clearly show they
in fact were? What manner of men are you- even challenging the
citizenry to inform on the corrupt, and the bar to become like "Frodo" in
the ght against society's evils in your public speeches and writings,
and yet you yourselves committing the same evils when hidden from
public view. Are all these rulings in the ten cases not the clearest
manifestation that the supreme magistrates have bought into the
'What-are-we-in-power-for' mentality ? (Underscoring ours)

Upon instructions of the Chief Justice, Atty. Sorreda's aforesaid letter of 21 February
2005 was included in the March 15, 2005 en banc agenda of the Court.
In an en banc Resolution 1 1 dated March 15, 2005, the Court again required Atty.
Sorreda to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt
for maliciously attacking the Court and its Justices.
By way of compliance to the second "show cause" order, Atty. Sorreda, in his letter
of May 10, 2005 1 2 , again with copies thereof furnished the Justices, judges and lawyers
thereunder listed, states that he "does not see the need to say any more" because the
"cause" has "already been shown as clear as day" in his earlier letter of 21 February 2005,
adding that "[T]he need is for the High Tribunal to act on the instant matter swiftly and
decisively". While admitting "the great seriousness of the statements and imputations I
have leveled against the Court", he dared the Court whether "it is capable of a judgment
that will be upheld by the Supreme Judge"'.
After going over the records of the cases in which Atty. Sorreda accuses the Court
of being unfair in the resolution thereof, the Court stands by its rulings thereon. Atty.
Sorreda mockingly stated that the Court does not know how to count when it dismissed
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 the Sollegue case on ground of failure to le the petition therein within the reglementary
period. For the enlightenment of the good counsel, the Court dismissed the petition in
Sollegue not only for failure to have it led within the period xed in Sec. 4, Rule 65 but also
for failure to submit the duplicate original or certi ed true copy of the questioned
resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 28, 1999 in accordance with Sec. 1, Rule 65
and Sec. 3, Rule 46, in relation to Sec. 2, Rule 56. 1 3 In another case, Ronilo Sorreda vs. CA,
Atty. Sorreda claimed that said case was dismissed on the mere ground of insu cient
veri cation. Again, Atty. Sorreda must be reminded that the petition was dismissed not
merely for defective veri cation but more so because the petition was evidently used as a
substitute for a lost remedy of appeal. 1 4 We see no need to belabor the grounds for the
dismissal of the other cases enumerated by counsel, said grounds having been stated in
the respective minute resolutions which were plain, clear, simply worded and
understandable to everyone, even to those who do not have a formal education in law.
Su ce it to say that the dismissal of those petitions was the result of a thorough
deliberation among members of this Court.
Atty. Sorreda's imputation of manipulation in the assignment and ra e of cases is
utterly baseless and at best a mere figment of his imagination.
Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to embarrass the court or
to bring it into disrepute have no place in a pleading. Their employment serves no useful
purpose. On the contrary, they constitute direct contempt of court or contempt in facie
curiae and a violation of the lawyer's oath and a transgression of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
I n Ang vs. Castro 1 5 , this Court held that if a pleading containing derogatory,
offensive and malicious statements is submitted in the same court or judge in which the
proceedings are pending, it is direct contempt, equivalent as it is to a misbehavior
committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration
of justice. Direct contempt is punishable summarily. 1 6
Atty. Sorreda's conduct likewise violated the Code of Professional Responsibility,
specifically —
CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 11.03 — A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the courts.
Rule 11.04 — A lawyer shall not attribute to a judge motives not supported
by the record or having no materiality to the case.

While a lawyer owes absolute delity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his
client's genuine interest and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's
rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, 1 7 he must do so only
within the bounds of the law. 1 8 A lawyer is entitled to voice his criticism within the context
of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech which must be exercised
responsibly. After all, every right carries with it the corresponding obligation. Freedom is
not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. The lawyer's delity to
his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and orderly administration of justice.
It must be done within the confines of reason and common sense. 1 9
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 Atty. Sorreda, as a citizen and as an o cer of the court, is entitled to criticize the
rulings of this Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed with error. But,
certainly, this does not give him the unbridled license to insult and malign the Court and
bring it into disrepute. Against such an assault, the Court is duty-bound "to act to preserve
its honor and dignity . . . and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession". 2 0
The eloquent words of the late Justice Conrado V. Sanchez in Rheem of the
Philippines vs. Ferrer 2 1 are enlightening:
By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have become commonplace. Really,
there could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof.
Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one
such duty: "To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and
judicial o cers." As explicit is the rst canon of legal ethics which pronounces
that "[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial o ce, but for
the maintenance of its supreme importance." That same canon, as a corollary,
makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against "unjust
criticism and clamor." And more. The attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a
conduct that should be "with all good delity . . . to the courts." Worth
remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts "can only be maintained
by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial o ce which he is
bound to uphold." ATESCc

I n Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, 22 Justice Sanchez further

elucidated:
A lawyer is an o cer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument
or agency to advance the ends of justice." His duty is to uphold the dignity and
authority of the courts to which he owes delity, " not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice." Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve.
For, to undermine the judicial edi ce "is disastrous to the continuity of
government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people." Thus has it been
said of a lawyer that "[a]s an o cer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to
help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the
courts so essential to the proper administration of justice."

Likewise, in Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, 2 3 we held:

Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free
speech. No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What
respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like
all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs
an occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirement of equally
important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the
maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of
justice. There is no antimony between free expression and the integrity of the
system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom
of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and
orderly system of dispensing justice, with the context, in other words, of viable
independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general
community.

As o cer of the court, Atty. Sorreda has the duty to uphold the dignity and authority
of the courts and to promote con dence in the fair administration of justice. 2 4 No less
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 must this be and with greater reasons in the case of the country's highest court, the
Supreme Court, as the last bulwark of justice and democracy
Atty. Sorreda must be reminded that his rst duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice, to which his client's success is wholly subordinate. His conduct
ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. The use of
intemperate language and unkind ascription can hardly be justi ed nor can it have a place
in the dignity of judicial forum. Civility among members of the legal profession is a
treasured tradition that must at no time be lost to it. 2 5
Here, Atty. Sorreda has transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment and
constructive criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Free
expression, after all, must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy one's irrational obsession to
demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its magistrates. 2 6
We have constantly reminded that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his
professional or private capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a member of
the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law. 2 7
In the very recent similar case of Tacardon, et al vs. Ponce Enrile , 2 8 we imposed on
the respondent therein the penalty of suspension from the Bar. Here, as in Tacardon, we
nd the exclusion of Atty. Sorreda from the Bar a tting sanction until he proves himself
worthy to enjoy the privileges of membership to the profession. It is imperative to instill in
him sense of discipline that should teach him anew of his duty to respect courts of justice,
especially this Tribunal. This rehabilitation must be done outside the brotherhood he has
dishonored and to which he will be allowed to return only after he has purged himself of his
misdeeds. 2 9

WHEREFORE, ATTY. NOEL S. SORREDA is found guilty both of contempt of court and
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility amounting to gross misconduct as an
o cer of the court and member of the Bar. He is hereby inde nitely SUSPENDED as a
member of the Bar and is prohibited from engaging in the practice of law until otherwise
ordered by this Court.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Court Administrator to be distributed
to all courts for their information. This Resolution shall be spread in his personal record
and is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga and Chico-
Nazario, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 2-16.

2. Rollo of UDK-12854, p. 175.
3. See 2nd Indorsement dated 13 July 2001 of the former 2nd Division of the Court; Rollo
of UDK-12854, pp. 207-209.
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 4. Rollo of UDK-12854, p. 211.
5. Rollo of UDK-12854, pp. 218-309.
6. Rollo of UDK-12854, pp. 324-396.
7. Rollo of UDK-12854, p. 310.
8. Rollo of UDK-12854, p. 398.
9. Stated in Atty. Sorreda's letter addressed to the Chief Justice when his petition in the
case of Artemio Dalsen vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 149334 was denied.
10. Stated in Atty. Sorreda's letter addressed to the Chief Justice when his petition in the
case of Lilia Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148440 was denied.
11. Rollo, p. 17.
12. Rollo, pp. 18-26.
13. SC Minute Resolutions dated February 7, 2000 and June 19, 2000.

14. SC Minute Resolution dated January 27, 2003.

15. 136 SCRA 453 [1985].
16. Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
17. Choa vs. Chiongson, 329 Phil 270 [1996] citing Suarez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
91133, March 22, 1993, 220 SCRA 274 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
18. Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
19. Supra.
20. In re: Wenceslao Laureta, March 12, 1987, 148 SCRA 382.
21. No. L-22979, June 26, 1967, 20 SCRA 441.

22. No. L-27072, 31 SCRA 1 [1990], citing People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 60 A.L.R. 851, 855;
In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595; Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1949 ed., p. 160; and People
vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572.
23. No. L-79690, 166 SCRA 316 [1988].

24. In re: Published Alleged Threats Against Members of the Court in the Plunder Law Case
Hurled by Atty. Leonardo De Vera, A.M. No. 01-12-03-SC, 385 SCRA 285 [2002].
25. Alonte vs. Savellano, et al., 350 Phil 700 [1998].
26. Ariosa vs. Tamin, A.M. No. RTJ-92-798, 344 SCRA 589 [2000].
27. Sebastian vs. Calis, A.C. No. 5118, Sept. 9, 1999.
28. G.R. No. 159286, April 5, 2005.
29. In re Almacen, No. L-27654, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 562.

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