(G.R. No. 120639. September 25, 1998) Bpi V. Ca Facts: Ricardo Marasigan, Lawyer, Was Issued A Credit Card With A Credit Limit of

[G.R. No. 120639.
September 25, 1998]

BPI v. CA
Facts: Ricardo Marasigan, lawyer, was issued a credit card with a credit limit of
P3000.00 due every 27th of each month by BPI. It was renewed after a year and
his credit limit was increased to P5000.00. Often, he would exceed his credit
limit and would pay his bills by check but BPI tolerated this.
Once, he failed to pay his account and was informed that the bank is
demanding him to settle his account. He issued a check postdated Dec 15, 1989
and the bank employee Tess Lorenzo received the check on Nov 23, 1989. The
check remained in the custody of Jeng Angeles. Mr. Roberto Maniquiz, head of
the collection department of defendant was formally informed of the postdated
check about a week later.
On November 28, 1989, BPI served Marasigan a letter by mail informing him
of the temporary suspension of the privileges of his credit card and the inclusion
of his account number in their Caution List. He was also told to refrain from
further use of his credit card to avoid any inconvenience/embarrassment and
that unless he settles his outstanding account with the defendant within 5 days
from receipt of the letter, his membership will be permanently cancelled. But
this letter has not been shown as received by Marasigan.
So when he used his card on Dec 8, 1989 at Café Adriatico to pay for the
bills of his invited guests, the card was dishonored. His friend paid the bill. He
wrote BPI and requested it to send his exact billing and to return his check to
him because BPI violated their agreement that BPI will not suspend his card upon
his issuance of the check. Marasigan requested a stop payment of the check he
issued in favor of BPI and sent another letter to the bank informing them that a
case will be filed against him if they do not assent to his requests.
He never received a response from the bank and attempts to settle with the
bank also failed. The only letter he received was a final demand notice from the
bank to settle his bills which if not done, the bank will sue him for violation of the
bouncing check law.
Marasigan then filed an action for damages against BPI. The trial court ruled
against BPI finding it in contravention of Art 19 of NCC but it also ordered Marasigan
to pay its outstanding balance with BPI. The lower court believes that even if BPI
had the right to cancel the credit card if the cardholder fails to pay for more than
thirty days, BPI should not have abused such right; that despite some
communications between Marasigan and BPI, BPI never informed Marasigan that his
card had already been suspended; that he was assured that his card will still be
honored as long as he pays his balance; that when the check was received, Jen
Angeles of BPI kept it for a few days before it was given to the head of the collection
department resulting to the dishonoring of the card when Marasigan tried to use it
at Café Adriatico.
The lower court also found out that there was indeed an agreement that BPI will
not cancel Marasigan’s credit card upon settlement of his balance. They accepted
the check even if it did not tally the balance due; that the card was cancelled after a
week from receipt of the check; and that BPI did not inform Marasigan of such
cancellation over the phone to prevent the incident last Dec 8, 1989.
BPI then appealed to CA which only affirmed RTC’s decision.
Issue: Whether BPI is liable for damages arising out from the dishonor of
Marasigan’s credit card.
Ruling: No. There is no legal and factual basis that BPI abused its right under the
terms of the contract.
To find the existence of an abuse of right under Article 19 the following
elements must be present: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised
in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Marasigan failed to prove bad faith on the part of BPI. In fact, BPI allowed him to
use his card for several weeks; and had even notified him of the impending
suspension of his credit card and made special accommodations for him for settling
his outstanding account. As such, BPI cannot be said to have capriciously and
arbitrarily canceled the credit card.
We do not dispute the findings of the lower court that private respondent
suffered damages as a result of the cancellation of his credit card. However, there is
a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a
legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and
damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage
suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the
loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the
consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no
remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury
or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.[12]
In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of
which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of
duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff - a concurrence of injury to the
plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for
the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in
contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of some duty and the
imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; and the
breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury.
It was Marasigan’s failure to settle his obligation which caused the suspension of
his credit card and subsequent dishonor at Café Adriatico. He cannot now pass the
blame to BPI for not notifying him of the suspension of his card. Nowhere is it stated
in the terms and conditions of the application that there is a need of notice before
suspension may be effected as private respondent claims. Lastly, as to the letter
sent by mail to Marasigan, Rules of Evidence provide a disputable presumption that
letters directed and mailed were received in the regular course of mail. Marasigan
failed to rebut the presumption that he received said notice.
As it was Marasigan's own negligence which was the proximate cause of his
embarrassing and humiliating experience, we find the award of damages by the
respondent court clearly unjustified.
Additional Points: There was an arrangement between the parties, wherein BPI
required MARASIGAN to issue a check worth P15,000 as payment for the latter's
billings. However, we find that MARASIGAN was not able to comply with his
obligation. Settled is the doctrine that a check is only a substitute for money and
not money, the delivery of such an instrument does not, by itself operate as
payment. This is especially true in the case of a postdated check. The issuance by
the private respondent of the postdated check was not effective payment. It did not
comply with his obligation under the arrangement with Miss Lorenzo of
BPI. Petitioner corporation was therefore justified in suspending his credit card.
G.R. No. L-15526 December 28, 1963
ENRIQUE J. L. RUIZ and JOSE V. HERRERA, in their behalf and as minority

stockholders of the Allied Technologists, Inc., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, COL. NICOLAS JIMENEZ, Head of
the Engineer Group, Office of the Secretary of National Defense, THE
FINANCE OFFICER of the Department of National Defense, THE AUDITOR of
the Dept. of National Defense, PABLO D. PANLILIO and ALLIED
TECHNOLOGISTS, INC.,
Facts: A contract was entered into by Allied Technologists, Inc. (corporation, for
short), and the Republic of the Philippines, for the construction of the Veterans
Memorial Hospital. Ruiz and Herrera were stockholders and officers of the
corporation. The construction of the hospital was terminated in 1955.
On August 20, 1954, and June 20, 1955, Civil Cases Nos. 23778 and 26601,
respectively, were filed by Ruiz and Herrera against the Secretary of National
Defense, Col. Nicolas Jimenez (Engineer), the Finance Officer, and the Auditor of the
Dept. of National Defense, Pablo D. Panlilio and Allied Technologists, Inc.
Civil Case No. 23778 was dismissed by the lower court and was affirmed by the SC.
(no ground stated)
Civil Case No. 26601 was also dismissed but on appeal, SC reversed the order of
dismissal, under the impression that the real controversy was confined merely
between Auditor of the Dept. of National Defense, Pablo D. Panlilio and Ruiz and
Herrera over the 15% of the contract price, which was retained by the Department
of National Defense.
The retention of the 15% of the contract price in the sum of P34,740.00 was made
to answer for any claim or lien that might arise, in the course of the construction.
The case was remanded to the court of origin, for further proceedings. Panlilio and
the corporation filed their amended answers, stating that the amount retained by
the Department of National Defense was already paid to the corporation as prayed
for by Ruiz and Herrera in their complaint.
Ruiz and Herrera indicated their conformity to the dismissal of the complaint with
respect to the retention of the 15% of the contract price; but insisted upon the
hearing of the second question, which sought the declaration and recognition of
plaintiffs Ruiz and Herrera, as two of the three architects of the hospital. The trial
court, however, dismissed this complaint, for being already academic and moot.
Hence, this appeal was brought by Ruiz and Herrera, who alleged in their lone
assignment of error that "the lower court grievously erred in ordering the dismissal
of the case.
Ruiz and Herrera further argue in their brief that they base their cause of action on
article 21, New Civil Code: Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damages.
They pray for a judicial declaration or recognition that appellants Ruiz and Herrera,
together with appellee Panlilio, were the architects of the Veterans Hospital.
Issue: Whether Ruiz and Herrera are entitled to damages
Ruling: Appellants maintain that their claim for recognition is divisible and
separable from their allegations regarding the non-payment by the government of a
portion of the architectural fees; thereby concluding that what the lower court
should have done, should have been merely to order the striking out of the moot
portion of appellants' cause of action, and should have proceeded with hearing their
claim for recognition. But the allegations in pars. 18 and 19 of the amended
complaint, show otherwise. There is an indivisible and single cause of action which
is primarily to prevent payment exclusively to defendant Panlilio of the amount of
P34,740.00, which said appellants contend should be paid to appellee Allied
Technologists, Inc.; the matter recognizing them together with Pablo Panlilio as
architects of the hospital, being merely incidental thereto.
The trial court was correct in refusing to make such declaration, because it was not
necessary and proper under the circumstances. Ruiz and Herrera were not parties
to the construction agreement. The sole object of the appeal is only to secure for
them a recognition, that they were allegedly the co-architects of Panlilio, in the
construction of the hospital, so as to enhance their professional prestige and not to
impair their standing. If this is the goal of appellants, a judicial declaration to the
effect would seem unnecessary.
But appellants invoke Article 21 of the Civil Code, which states —
Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damages.
contending that the word "injury" in the said article, refers not only to any
indeterminate right or property, but also to honor or credit. It may be added,
however, that this article also envisions a situation where a person has a legal right,
and such right is violated by another in a manner contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy; it presupposes losses or injuries, material or otherwise, which one
may suffer as a result of said violation. The pleadings do not show that damages
were ever asked or alleged, in connection with this case, predicated upon the article
aforecited. And under the facts and circumstances obtaining in this case, one
cannot plausibly sustain the contention that the failure or refusal to extend the
recognition was an act contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
WASSMER vs. VELEZ
Facts: Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer decided to get married and set
September 4, 1954 as their wedding day. Two days before the wedding, Velez
wrote a note to Wassmer that he had to postpone the wedding because his mother
opposes it and that he is leaving on the Convair; and that she should not ask people
about the reason why so as not to create a scandal.
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE .
PAKING
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Wassmer filed an action for damages against Velez but Velez did not file an answer
and was declared in default. A judgment was rendered ordering Velez to pay
Wassmer actual, moral and exemplary damages.
Meanwhile, Velez filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings
and motion for new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut. The
court invited the parties for a possible settlement but Velez failed to appear. So the
court, after granting extensions for Velez to appear, denied his petition for relief.
Velez then filed a "motion for new trial and reconsideration," alleging that the
judgment is contrary to law because "there is no provision of the Civil Code
authorizing" an action for breach of promise to marry; that "mere breach of a
promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong.
Issue: Whether Wassmer is entitled to damages
Ruling: Yes.
The extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is
not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
Both applied for marriage licenses, set a date for the wedding, distributed
invitations, bought dresses, accessories, matrimonial bed, gifts were received,
bridal shower was given; and just two days before the wedding, Velez postponed
the wedding by simply leaving a note.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere
breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a
wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to
walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This
is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be
held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
As to the award of moral and exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00,

moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code.
However, considering the particular circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as
moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.

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[G.R. No. 120639.

September 25, 1998]

G.R. No. L-15526 December 28, 1963

ENRIQUE J. L. RUIZ and JOSE V. HERRERA, in their behalf and as minority

Issue: Whether Ruiz and Herrera are entitled to damages

But appellants invoke Article 21 of the Civil Code, which states —

G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964

WASSMER vs. VELEZ

Issue: Whether Wassmer is entitled to damages

As to the award of moral and exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00,

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