PETITIONER: OLIVAREZ REALTY CORPORATION

RESPONDENT: BENJAMIN CASTILLO, GR No. 196251,

DATE: July 9, 2014

PONENTE: Leonen, J.

TOPIC: Summary Judgment

Facts:

Benjamin Castillo was the registered owner of a 346,918-square-

meter parcel of land located in Laurel, Batangas

On April 5, 2000, Castillo and Olivarez Realty Corporation,

represented by Dr. Pablo R. Olivarez, entered into a contract of
conditional sale over the property. Under the deed of conditional
sale, Castillo agreed to sell his property to Olivarez Realty

Corporation for P19,080,490.00. Olivarez Realty Corporation

agreed to a down payment of P5,000,000.00

As to the balance of P14,080,490.00, Olivarez Realty Corporation

agreed to pay in 30 equal monthly installments every eighth day of
the month beginning in the month that the parties would receive a
decision voiding the Philippine Tourism Authority's title to the
property.Under the deed of conditional sale, Olivarez Realty
Corporation shall file the action against the Philippine Tourism
Authority "with the full assistance of [Castillo].

The action against the Philippine Tourism Authority be denied,

Castillo agreed to reimburse all the amounts paid by Olivarez Realty
Corporation. Paragraph D of the deed of conditional sale.

On September 2, 2004, Castillo filed a complaint against Olivarez

Realty Corporation and Dr. Olivarez with the Regional Trial Court of
Tanauan City, Batangas. Castillo alleged that Dr. Olivarez convinced
him into selling his property to Olivarez Realty Corporation on the
representation that the corporation shall be responsible in clearing
the property of the tenants and in paying them disturbance
compensation. He further alleged that Dr. Olivarez solely prepared
the deed of conditional sale and that he was made to sign the
contract with its terms "not adequately explained in Tagalog.

After the parties had signed the deed of conditional sale,

Olivarez Realty Corporation immediately took possession of the
property. However, the corporation only paid P2,500,000.00 of the
purchase price. Contrary to the agreement, the corporation did not
file any action against the Philippine Tourism Authority to void the
latter's title to the property. The corporation neither cleared the
land of the tenants nor paid them disturbance compensation.
Despite demand, Olivarez Realty Corporation refused to fully pay the
purchase price

Arguing that Olivarez Realty Corporation committed substantial

breach of the contract of conditional sale and that the deed of
conditional sale was a contract of adhesion, Castillo prayed for
rescission of contract under Article 1191 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. He further prayed that Olivarez Realty Corporation and
Dr. Olivarez be made solidarily liable for moral damages, exemplary
damages, attorney's fees, and costs of suit.

Castillo filed a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on

the pleadings. He argued that Olivarez Realty Corporation and Dr.
Olivarez "substantially admitted the material allegations of [his]
complaint,"specifically; That the corporation failed to fully pay the
purchase price for his property; That the corporation failed to file an
action to void the Philippine Tourism Authority's title to his property;
and That the corporation failed to clear the property of the tenants
and pay them disturbance compensation.

Should judgment on the pleadings be improper, Castillo argued

that summary judgment may still be rendered as there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact.

Olivarez Realty Corporation and Dr. Olivarez opposed the motion

for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings, arguing
that the motion was "devoid of merit." They reiterated their claim
that the corporation withheld further payments of the purchase
price because "there had been no favorable decision voiding the
title of the Philippine Tourism Authority." They added that Castillo
sold the property to another person and that the sale was allegedly
litigated in Quezon City

The trial court found that Olivarez Realty Corporation and Dr.
Olivarez's answer "substantially [admitted the material allegations
of Castillo's] complaint and did not raise any genuine issue [as to
any material fact].

According to the trial court, the corporation was responsible for

suing the Philippine Tourism Authority and for paying the tenants
disturbance compensation. Since defendant corporation neither filed
any case nor paid the tenants disturbance compensation, the trial
court ruled... that defendant corporation had no right to withhold
payments from Castillo

Issues:

I. Whether the trial court erred in rendering summary judgment;

Ruling:
 The trial court correctly rendered summary judgment, as there
were no genuine issues of material fact in this case

A motion for summary judgment is filed either by the claimant or

the defending party. The trial court then hears the motion for
summary judgment. If indeed there are no genuine issues of material
fact, the trial court shall issue summary judgment.

Section 3, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served

at least ten (10) days before the time specified for the hearing. The
adverse party may serve opposing affidavits, depositions, or
admission at least three (3) days before the hearing. After the
hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file,
show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law

A summary judgment is usually distinguished from a judgment on

the pleadings. Under Rule 34 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
trial may likewise be dispensed with and a case decided through
judgment on the pleadings if the answer filed fails to tender an issue
or otherwise admits the material allegations of the claimant's
pleading.

Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the answer filed fails

to tender any issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations in
the complaint. On the other hand, in a summary judgment, the
answer filed tenders issues as specific denials and affirmative
defenses are pleaded, but the issues raised are sham, fictitious, or
otherwise not genuine.

In this case, Olivarez Realty Corporation admitted that it did not

fully pay the purchase price as agreed upon in the deed of
conditional sale. As to why it withheld payments from Castillo, it set
up the following affirmative defenses: First, Castillo did not file a
case to void the Philippine Tourism Authority's title to the property;
second, Castillo did not clear the land of the tenants; third, Castillo
allegedly sold the property to a third person, and the subsequent
sale is currently being litigated before a Quezon City court.

Considering that Olivarez Realty Corporation and Dr. Olivarez's

answer tendered an issue, Castillo properly availed himself of a
motion for summary judgment.

However, the issues tendered by Olivarez Realty Corporation and

Dr. Olivarez's answer are not genuine issues of material fact. These
are issues that can be resolved judiciously by plain resort to the
pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other papers on file;
otherwise, these issues are sham, fictitious, or patently
unsubstantial.

Petitioner corporation refused to fully pay the purchase price

because no court case was filed to void the Philippine Tourism
Authority's title on the property. However, paragraph C of the deed
of conditional sale is clear that petitioner Olivarez Realty
Corporation is responsible for initiating court action against the
Philippine Tourism Authority:

Castillo's alleged failure to "fully assist" the corporation in filing

the case is not a defense. As the trial court said, "how can [Castillo]
assist [the corporation] when [the latter] did not file the action [in
the first place?]"

Neither can Olivarez Realty Corporation argue that it refused to

fully pay the purchase price due to the Philippine Tourism
Authority's adverse claim on the property. The corporation knew of
this adverse claim when it entered into a contract of conditional
sale. It even... obligated itself under paragraph C of the deed of
conditional sale to sue the Philippine Tourism Authority. This
defense, therefore, is sham.

Contrary to petitioners' claim, there is no "obvious ambiguity" as

to which should occur first the payment of the disturbance
compensation or the clearing of the land within six months from the
signing of the deed of conditional sale. The obligations... must be
performed simultaneously. In this case, the parties should have
coordinated to ensure that tenants on the property were paid
disturbance compensation and were made to vacate the property
six months after the signing of the deed of conditional sale.

On one hand, pure obligations, or obligations whose performance

do not depend upon a future or uncertain event, or upon a past event
unknown to the parties, are demandable at once. On the other hand,
obligations with a resolutory period also take effect at once but
terminate upon arrival of the day certain

Olivarez Realty Corporation's obligation to pay disturbance

compensation is a pure obligation. The performance of the
obligation to pay disturbance compensation did not depend on any
condition. Moreover, the deed of conditional sale did not give the
corporation a period to perform the obligation. As such, the
obligation to pay disturbance compensation was demandable at
once. Olivarez Realty Corporation should have paid the tenants
disturbance compensation upon execution of the deed of conditional
sale.
PETITIONER: CITY OF DAGUPAN

RESPONDENT: ESTER F. MARAMBA

DATE: July 2, 2014

PONENTE: Leonen, J.

TOPIC: Relief from judgments, Orders, or Other Proceedings

Facts:

On August 26, 2004, petitioner city filed a motion for

reconsideration. Maramba filed an opposition on the ground that the
motion was not set for hearing. The opposition prayed that the
motion be stricken off the records.

On October 21, 2004, the trial court denied petitioner city's

motion for lack of notice of time and place of hearing, thus, "the
motion for reconsideration is not entitled to judicial cognizance.” In
a separate order on the same date, the trial court also granted
Maramba's motion for execution and ordered that "a writ of
execution [be] issue[d] in the above-entitled case upon submission
of the certificate of finality.

Petitioner city does not deny that its motion for reconsideration
lacked a notice of hearing. It offered no explanation for this lapse,
except for oversight by its then counsel

Maramba counters that the lack of notice of hearing is not

excusable negligence that warrants relaxation of the rules.

This Court has indeed held time and time again that, under
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, mandatory is the
notice requirement in a motion, which is rendered defective by
failure to comply with the requirement. As a rule, a motion without a
notice of hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the
reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite
pleading

Issues:

Whether the lack of notice of hearing in a motion for reconsideration

is excusable negligence that allows the filing of a petition for relief
of judgment;

Ruling:

The purposes behind the required notice of hearing provide the

time to study the motion for reconsideration and give an opportunity
to be heard were satisfied when Maramba filed an opposition to the
motion.

Maramba was able to file an opposition to petitioner city's

motion for reconsideration on the ground that the motion was not
set for hearing. The opposition prayed that the motion be stricken
off the records.

Principles:

This court held that "when the adverse party has actually had the
opportunity to be heard, and has indeed been heard through
pleadings filed in opposition to the motion, the purpose behind the
rule is deemed duly served."