Javier Security Special Watchman Agency v. Shell Craft - Button Corp.

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-18639. January 31, 1963.]

"JAVIER SECURITY SPECIAL WATCHMAN AGENCY" and


CONCEPCION D. JAVIER, in her own behalf and as guardian ad litem
of the minors CLARO D. JAVIER and RENE D. JAVIER , plaintiffs-
appellants, v s . SHELL CRAFT & BUTTON CORPORATION , defendant-
appellee.

Navarro & Layosa for plaintiffs-appellants.


Concepcion & Llacer for defendant-appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; CONTRACTS WHEREIN THE PERSONAL


QUALIFICATIONS OF THE DEBTOR HAVE BEEN TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION;
PRINCIPLE IN OLD CIVIL CODE BROADENED IN NEW CIVIL CODE. — Although Article
1161 of the old Civil code has not been reenacted in the new Civil Code, its spirits is
latent in other provisions of the said Code, such as its Articles 1311 and 1726, which
have broadened the principle that the creditor cannot be compelled to accept the
performance of the obligation or the rendition of a service by a third person whom the
personal quali cations and circumstances of the debtor have been taken into
consideration in the ful llment of the obligation, making it applicable not only to
obligations to do but to all kinds of obligations.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLE IN CASE AT BAR. — The fact that
the owner and manager of the watchman agency in the present case was not required
to guard in person the premises of the company, does not negate that the guarding job
was entrusted to him by reason of his personal quali cations. After his death, therefore,
the company is free to engage other guards, and it can not be compelled to repose its
trust and con dence in the deceased owner's wife and heirs as to whom the contract is
to be deemed not transmissible.

DECISION

J.B.L. J :
REYES, J.B.L., p

This case for breach of contract with damages was led originally with the Court
of First Instance of Manila. After trial, the court a quo dismissed the complaint on 14
October 1958. Plaintiffs elevated it to the Court of Appeals, but the latter remanded it
to this Court, because only questions of law are involved.
The facts are simple and undisputed.
Since 1954, H. L. Swiryn had engaged at P290.00 a month the services of
Federico E. Javier to guard the premises of appellee Shell-Craft & Button Corporation,
of which Swiryn is the vice-president and manager. Because the services rendered by
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Federico E. Javier were e cient, defendant corporation renewed annually its contract
with him. The last renewal, on 4 May 1956 (Exhibit 3), would have expired on 1
December 1957, as per agreement, which stipulated the following:
"For and in consideration of the sum of P290.00 per month, the JAVIER
SECURITY SPECIAL WATCHMAN AGENCY with business address at 3195 Sta.
Mesa Blvd., Manila, through its representative, Federico E. Javier, hereby agrees to
guard the establishment of SHELL-CRAFT and BUTTON CORPORATION, located
at 114 Beata, Pandacan, subject to the following conditions;

1. That in order to carry out this agreement, the JAVIER SECURITY


SPECIAL WATCHMAN AGENCY will furnish the necessary guards or watchmen
between the hours of 4:00 P.M. and 8:00 A.M. daily, seven days a week;

2. That the number of said guards or watchmen will not be less than
two (2);

3. That Javier Security Special Watchman Agency shall be responsible


for the payment of the salaries of said guards or watchmen and such other
benefits to which they may be entitled under existing labor laws;

4. That the JAVIER SECURITY SPECIAL WATCHMAN AGENCY shall


furnish the SHELL-CRAFT & BUTTON CORPORATION every 15th and end of the
month a copy of the payrolls and time records duly signed by each and every
guard or watchman who might be employed by the said JAVIER SECURITY
SPECIAL WATCHMAN AGENCY;

5. That this Contract shall expire on December 1, 1957 renewable for


another year upon mutual consent."

It is pertinent to note that the "Javier Security Special Watchman Agency" is


merely a service name adopted by the late Federico E. Javier to identify his business,
which was owned and managed exclusively by him. The "Javier Security Special
Watchman Agency" is not a corporation nor a registered partnership. Hence, it has no
personality to sue or to be sued.
Before the contract expired, Federico E. Javier died suddenly on 9 May 1957. His
widow, appellant Concepcion D. Javier, was then in Hongkong. To guard the compound
of the corporation, Swiryn engaged the services of another agency on the same day. For
this reason, the heirs of Federico E. Javier sued for breach of contract, with damages
for its unexpired term from 9 May to 1 December 1957.
The only issue to be resolved is whether or not said Exhibit "C" is a personal
contract, in the sense that the rights and obligations thereunder are intransmissible to
the heirs of a party thereto. The trial court held the contract to be "intuitu personae", and
dismissed the action; whereupon the plaintiffs appealed.
From the conditions of Exhibit "C", and according to the ndings of fact of the
trial court, the primordial consideration which prompted Swiryn to enter into the
contract was the personality (i.e., the quali cations) of the deceased, who supervised
personally the watchmen employed and controlled by him. To the corporation, it was
immaterial who were the guards assigned by Federico E. Javier to watch its
establishment. The lower court, in its decision above-referred to, aptly stated:
". . . In the matter of security guard duty, discipline and promptness on the
part of the guards is indispensable, and this was the primary reason why the
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defendant engaged the services of the Javier Security Special Watchman Agency,
because with the personal supervision and attention the late Federico Javier had
over his guards, the defendant had found their services very satisfactory, for
which reason since 1954, it had retained the services of said watchman agency
until the death of said Federico Javier on May 9, 1957, as testi ed to by Mr. H. L.
Swiryn, manager of the defendant corporation. Considering that at that time Mr.
Swiryn could not have expected any other person to render the same personal
supervision and attention that the deceased Federico Javier had exercised over
his guards during his lifetime, and considering further the immediate need of
guard duty in the premises of the defendant after his death, specially so when it
was not until one week after his death that the widow went to see Mr. Swiryn to
have plaintiffs' guards continue guarding its premises, the defendant was
justi ed in replacing the guards of plaintiffs' agency." (Record on Appeal, pp. 25-
26).

While the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 has not seen t to reenact Article
1161 of the Civil Code of 1889 to the effect that —
"In obligations to do the creditor can not be compelled to accept the
performance of the obligation or the rendition of a service by third person when
the personal quali cations and circumstances of the debtor have been taken into
consideration in the creation of the obligation."

it is not to be assumed that the omission implies that the rule embodied in that article
has been discarded altogether. The spirit of Article 1161 of the old Civil Code is latent
in other provisions of the new Code, such as its Articles 1311 and 1726.
"ART. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their
assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from
the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision
of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property he received from the
decedent."

"ART. 1726. When a piece of work has been entrusted to a person by


reason of his personal qualifications, the contract is rescinded upon his death."

If at all, the Civil Code of the Philippines appears to have broadened the principle,
and made it applicable to all kinds of obligations, not only to obligations to do; for
among the rules governing performance (payment) of obligations, Article 1236
(paragraph 1) prescribes that:
"ART. 1236. The creditor is not bound to accept payment or
performance by a third person who has no interest in the ful llment of the
obligation, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary."

The fact that the late Federico Javier was not required to guard in person the
premises of the appellee company does not negate that the guarding job was
entrusted to him by reason of his personal quali cations. It is clear that the failure to
specify in the contract the conditions required of the individual guards and watchmen
proves, not that they were of no concern to the company, but that the latter relied upon
their proper selection and supervision by Javier himself. This trust and con dence the
company can not be compelled to repose in Javier's wife or heirs, and as to them, the
contract is to be deemed not transmissible.
Because the widow could not be expected to perform the contract for custodial
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services celebrated by her husband, and because upon the death of Javier no one could
take his place (his widow being at the time in Hongkong and his children minors), while
the premises could not be left unguarded by trusted persons, the appellee was entitled
to regard its contract with Javier terminated then and there. Hence it was free to
engage other guards.
The decision appealed from is a rmed, with costs against the plaintiffs-
appellants.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes,
Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

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