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Corruption in justice and security

Query

What are the main types, causes, and impacts of corruption in the security and justice sectors, with
particular reference to the issues facing poor people? What are the lessons learned from attempts to
tackle corruption in the security and justice sectors, particularly in terms of holistic approaches to
reform?

Purpose in legal systems or poor financial management and

national security concerns in defence.
To guide further engagement with country offices on
how to best incorporate anti-corruption measures in Corruption in justice and security institutions has a
security and justice sector reform programmes. negative impact on the lives of the poor, both directly
and indirectly. Direct impacts include reduced
accessibility to services responsible for ensuring their
Content rights and maintaining their safety, and an increased
vulnerability to security threats and crime. The poor are
Introduction
also more likely to be subjected to bribery and extortion,
Corruption in the justice sector
as well as threats, intimidation and victimization by
Corruption in the security sector
security forces (UNODC 2007). Indirect impacts for the
Lessons learned for reforms
poor are mainly economic, resulting from wasted
Research gaps
resources and a reduction in foreign investment.
References
When incorporating anti-corruption measures into
Summary reforms, it is essential to address the issues specific to
particular institutions, as well as the overlap between
the two sectors. Existing approaches often address
Although there are a number of causes and types of institutions in isolation, and fail to address governance
corruption that are specific to the institutions within the and oversight of the sectors as a whole. They also tend
justice or security sector, many forms of corruption are to focus on higher level reforms, overlooking local
common to both, or indeed result from the links knowledge and the use of non-formal mechanisms. A
between the sectors. Factors common to both include number of examples of effective reform processes
lack of transparency and oversight, insufficient exist, which allow a number of key principles to be
sanctions, and personnel related issues. Causes developed regarding effective reforms. However, as
specific to particular sectors include political inference corruption in the justice and security sector is also

Author(s): Catherine Mann, Transparency International, [email protected]

Reviewed by: Robin Hodess, Ph.D., Transparency International, [email protected]
Date: May 2011 Number: 285
U4 Expert Answers provide targeted and timely anti-corruption expert advice to U4 partner agency staff www.U4.no
Corruption in Justice and Security

linked to the specific context in which the institutions judges and court processes, looking at both formal and
are operating, it is important to ensure that each reform informal mechanisms. Analysis of the security sector
process also reflects an understanding of the local will focus on the police, the military and defence
environment. organisations.

1 Introduction 2 Corruption in the justice

sector
At present there is no common definition of the security
Within the justice system there are a number of
or justice sector, or a clear distinction in terms of which
organisations that could be involved in corrupt
institutions belong to each. For example, definitions of
practices before a case reaches the courts. These
the justice sector often refer to enforcement agencies
include the police force, lawyers and prosecutors. Once
such as the police and penal institutions (see USAID),
judicial decisions have been reached, there are also a
whilst definitions of the security sector can often include
number of organisations responsible for enforcing
legal bodies such as courts or tribunals (see the UN).
these decisions such as the prison system. When
Definitions of reform processes are broader still. The
addressing corruption, it is important to be aware of the
DAC-OECD guidelines on security sector reform
links between these different bodies. Although this
CHECK for example list a wide range of organisations
answer will focus on judges and courts responsible for
that could be considered in a reform process. These
the court process itself, the role of external
include the armed forces, the police, customs officials,
mechanisms will also be considered.
intelligence services, judicial and penal institutions, as
well as human rights organisations and the press
(OECD 2005). The diversity of institutions that need to Causes and types of corruption in the
be addressed creates a number of difficulties in justice sector
designing and implementing reform processes, whilst
the lack of a clear definition creates a barrier to Transparency International’s 2007 Global Corruption
effective monitoring and evaluation of reforms (Rynn Report, which focuses on corruption in the judicial
and Hiscock 2009). system, identified several factors which result in corrupt
practices. These included a number related to
The growing understanding of the links between the two personnel such as low judicial and court staff salaries,
sectors, such as the need for effective legislation to poor training and lack of rewards for ethical behaviour
enforce anti-corruption efforts in the security sector, is (Noel Pepys 2007).  
being reflected in the increasing discussion and
development of holistic approaches to reform. This is Lack of transparency can also lead to corruption in the
particularly the case in post-conflict countries, where a courts. In many countries, court proceedings and trial
weak central government, absence of the rule of law outcomes all remain hidden, as do disclosure of assets
and infiltration of security and justice organisations all and the income and selection of judges (USAID 2009).
combine to increase the opportunity for corrupt Access to information including current laws, or
practices. In order to address issues that are related to revisions to laws remains limited (Noel Pepys 2003).
both, reforms need to address the sectors Mechanisms for investigating allegations of corruption
simultaneously, as well as deal with corruption issues within the courts also lack transparency. Research in
that are specific to individual organisations within them. Mexico, for example, found that the mechanisms for
Measures that address corruption directly are also supervising and disciplining judges were opaque, whilst
needed. At present, measures that explicitly address the body responsible for carrying out investigations was
corruption are often missing in reforms, reflecting an not fully independent (Carbonell 2007). Research in
assumption that improvements in governance will also Afghanistan found that the Supreme Court had no
have a positive impact on corruption. effective mechanisms in place to detect, investigate and
prosecute cases of misconduct within the system
With a focus on the poor, this response will discuss the (Chêne 2007).
causes, types and impacts of corruption in the two
sectors separately, before discussing lessons learned One of the main types of corruption in the judiciary is
for reform, particularly regarding the need for holistic political interference and state capture. In some
approaches. The justice sector analysis will focus on countries, such as Russia and Argentina, political

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Corruption in Justice and Security

influence on the judiciary is increasing (Global Access to justice

Corruption Report 2007). Political interference can
influence several areas of the justice system, including A USAID report suggests that under most corrupt
recruitment procedures, court cases and sanctioning judicial systems, ‘the powerful and wealthy can escape
processes. Motivated court rulings where judges stand prosecution and conviction, while large segments of
to gain economically or professionally are common in society are excluded from their rightful access to fair
developing countries (Buscaglia 2007). In cases related and effective judicial services’ (Noel Pepys 2003). A
to commercial law, economic interests often play a key UNDP survey in Indonesia identified a number of
role in influencing outcomes  (Noel Pepys 2007). In perceived barriers to achieving justice through the
Algeria, judges who are seen as ‘too’ independent may courts cited by citizens (UNDP 2007). These included
be transferred to distant locations, whilst in Sri Lanka, cost, bias, fear, and a perception that judges are unfair.
judges who are perceived as problematic can be Research in Nepal found a perception that justice is
reassigned from sensitive positions (2007 Global reserved for the rich and powerful, thus preventing poor
Corruption Report). people from accessing legal services (International
Alert 2010).
Alongside political pressure, a number of other groups
may influence the independence of court cases. Non-state justice systems are common in developing
Research in Afghanistan for example found that the countries, reflecting the failure of the state to provide a
alongside influence by public officials, the system that is accessible to everyone in society (Schärf
independence of the Afghan judiciary is also 2003). In parts of Africa, customary systems operating
undermined by interference from armed groups and outside of the state regime cover up to 90% of the
private individuals (Chêne 2007). Organised crime population (Chirayath et al 2005). Although, non-state
networks can also influence the outcome of court justice institutions increase access to justice among the
processes. A 2009 Europol report suggests that poor, they are often unmonitored and fail to provide
criminal groups use corrupt means to avoid universal access to all citizens. A report by the Vera
investigation and detection, or to impede ongoing Institute of Justice states that non-state institutions
judicial or investigative processes (Europol 2009). often serve the interests of unelected individuals and
powerful groups, leaving the poor out of the decision-
Bribe payments are common in the judiciary. making process. In addition, non-state institutions
Transparency International’s 2010 Global Corruption sometimes coerce conciliation and force confessions
Barometer found an increase in the percentage of (Vera Institute of Justice 2003). The 2004 Sierra Leone
people worldwide who reported paying a bribe in the Justice Sector Development Programme also found
judiciary from 8% in 2006 to 15% in 2010. Indeed in that these systems do not provide equitable justice, in
some countries, paying a bribe is often the only way to particular for women and children.
access legal services or to achieve a result in court
(Noel Pepys 2007). Bribe payments may be used to Quality of Justice
influence court procedures in several ways. For
example: to encourage lawyers to present a sub- Corruption in courts may also result in guilty criminals
standard defence, to persuade court staff to delay a not being convicted. A study in Uganda found that
case, or to sway a judge’s final verdict. Court users may corruption had enabled suspected robbers to be
also pay bribes to administrative personnel in order to released and recommit offences (Government of
alter the legal treatment of files or evidentiary material. Uganda 2002). A 2008 UNODC report Drug Trafficking
as a Security Threat in West Africa links a lack of
Impact of corruption in the justice sector convictions and growth in the drug trade, to corruption
in the justice sector (UNODC 2008).
In developing countries, courts are often too expensive,
difficult for people to get to, and use procedures that Reduced Legitimacy
are hard to understand (DFID 2000). Corruption,  
whether perceived or real, can worsen this situation, Corruption in the justice sector will reduce the
further reducing the accessibility, quality and legitimacy legitimacy of the system and erode public confidence
of the system. (Ferguson and Isima 2004). A 2003 USAID report
suggests that ‘citizens are less likely to abide by the
law if they believe others, particularly governmental

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Corruption in Justice and Security

leaders, are disobeying the law and avoiding detection Increased transparency
and punishment’. Corruption within the justice sector
can also impact the effectiveness and legitimacy of In Costa Rica, efforts have been made to increase
other institutions, including those linked to anti- transparency. As part of an Inter-American
corruption efforts. For example, an anti-corruption Development Bank backed programme (aimed
commission that relies on an attorney general’s office primarily at building the capacity of judges, the public
to prosecute sensitive cases will be hindered if that prosecution and the ombudsman), more information is
office is tainted by corruption (Schulz 2009). now available online. These include laws, budgets,
procurement reports, audits, annual reports and other
Examples of reform relevant documents (Salazar et al 2007). The judiciary
also decided to introduce electronic e-cases so each
Personnel related reforms case could be monitored. The reforms have helped to
reduce public perception of corruption.
Greater controls over judicial appointments and
regulated career development procedures are
increasingly seen as important steps to reducing
3 Corruption in the security
corruption. The introduction of entrance examinations in sector
Argentina, Guatemala and Peru, for example, is said to
have raised the quality of new judicial appointees and This section will discuss corruption in the security
eliminated candidates most likely to adopt undesirable forces with which people most commonly interact, such
behaviour (Hammergren 2007). as the police and the military, as well as examining
higher level corruption in state defence and security
Increasing salaries can also have a positive impact. In organisations.
Georgia, for example, wage increases have helped to
stop judges soliciting bribes. In 2004 the authorities Causes and types of corruption in the
increased judges’ salaries, making them among the security sector
highest paid employees in public service (Karosanidze
and Christensen 2007). Police

Community level reforms As with organisations in the justice sector, corruption in

the police is often attributed to insufficient income, poor
The development of ‘Justice Centres’ in Guatemala recruitment policy and insufficient training. An
provides a strong example of the way in which donors assessment in Uganda, for example, found that low
can effectively work with the local community to salaries, lack of equipment, under staffing and lack of
increase the accessibility and efficiency of the justice organisational development had all affected the
system to the poor (Hendrix 2000). Justice sectors, response capacity of the police in terms of speed and
which are set up according to local needs identified by morale (Government of Uganda 2002). In Nepal it was
the local community, have been effective in Guatemala, found that police often have to pay bribes in order to
providing a way to break with traditional structures and secure promotions (International Alert 2010). Research
introduce alternative services that are accessible to in Georgia also found that official positions needed to
everyone. The organizational and administrative be purchased. Taking bribes was then seen as a
structures are more user-friendly, reduce delays, and necessity to repay this initial investment (di Puppo
minimize exposure to corruption (Hendrix 2000). These 2007).
centres also provide a strong example of effective
holistic reforms, bringing together police, prosecutors, Bribe payments are common in the police force.
judges, public defenders, local civil society, and private Transparency International’s 2010 Global Corruption
law practitioners to address concerns at the local level Barometer found an increase in the percentage of
(Hendrix 2000). people worldwide who reported paying a bribe to the
police from 17% in 2006 to 30% in 2010. A Chr.
Michelsen Institute (CMI) working paper which
examined police corruption in developing countries
suggests the most visible form of police corruption is
the collection of bribes to avoid fines or conviction by

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Corruption in Justice and Security

traffic police (Andvig and Fjeldstad 2008). Bribes may Defence

also be accepted to pass security checkpoints or
borders. The traditional secrecy and exclusiveness of the
security domain has tended to constrain transparency,
Extortion and embezzlement of funds are also common accountability and oversight of the sector (Fluri and
in the police force (Human Rights Watch 2010). In Hadžić 2004).  The need for confidentiality in some
cases where the police force have relative freedom to areas of the defence sector is often overused and
carry out arrests, independent of the courts, innocent reduces opportunities for scrutiny by oversight bodies in
people may be arrested and a bribe requested for their government and civil society (Ball 2002). In Guatemala,
release. Police may also embezzle funds, manipulate for example, it was found that secretiveness had been
time sheets or steal valuables of those under arrest applied to all defence expenditure, including officials'
(Andvig and Fjeldstad 2008). salaries and food allocations (León-Escribano and
Aycinena 2004). Fluri and Hadžić (2004) suggest that
Military official secrecy, justified on grounds of national security,
has been used to avoid political embarrassment or
Within the military, strict hierarchies can provide certain cover up corruption. Secrecy concerns also mean that
officials with a high degree of discretion, allowing them standard practices such as external auditing of budgets
to make decisions without challenge. In transition are not employed. The International Budget
countries, the military often has a monopoly on several Partnership’s Open Budget Index, for example, found
state institutions, giving those in charge a high level of that nearly a quarter of the countries they investigated
influence and control over policy, budgets and did not conduct any security sector audits or only
recruitment. conducted partial ones, often completely excluding
military intelligence agencies or other security sector
In addition, research has shown that although codes of bodies.
conduct have been developed, these are often not
implemented in practice. A recent Transparency The nature of defence procurement procedures further
International UK analysis of defence and military adds to the lack of transparency. Alongside the secret
organisation codes of conduct in a number of countries nature of contracts, the technical and complex nature of
including Argentina, Australia, Croatia, Denmark, defence procurement bids can act to reduce oversight
Germany, Kenya and Ukraine found that legal and transparency of defence contracts. In addition,
frameworks to regulate business conduct were often procurement contracts are often funded outside of the
compliance-based, rather than enforced. It was also main defence budget or entail large post-contract
found that insufficient attention was paid to corruption requirements or offset agreements. This reduces the
issues, especially to the particular risks faced by use of safeguards to monitor and evaluate procedures
defence personnel (Shipley et al 2011). (Pyman 2011). This situation can be made worse by the
‘revolving door’ syndrome. As large contracts are often
A 2010 DCAF report Building Integrity and Reducing implemented over a long period of time, payoffs and
Corruption in Defence suggests that theft and extortion kickbacks can materialize long after the signing of the
are common in the military (Tagarev 2010). Theft can contract (Perito and Kristoff 2010). Finally, the practice
involve the use of funds provided for uniforms and other of using agents and intermediaries, who may be
resources for personal use, or the abuse of authority to susceptible to bribes, is common in the defence and
steal personal property or extort payments. It could also security sector.
involve the registration of so-called ‘ghost soldiers’,
which can account for up to 20 - 30% of some forces Impact of corruption in the security sector
(Tagarev 2010). Ghost soldiers are fictitious soldiers
registered by commanders (often with the help of Within the security sector, the poor will often suffer
administrative officials) so that extra pay, food and directly from the impact of operational forces such as
equipment will be received. This will then be kept for the police and the military, whilst the impact of
personal use or sold on for profit. Bribery can be used corruption in defence industries and ministries will have
to influence personnel decisions, for example to avoid a more indirect influence due to diverted financial
conscription or to gain preferred postings (Tagarev resources.
2010).

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Corruption in Justice and Security

Public trust Research in sub-Saharan Africa has found that defence

corruption can lead to inflated defence budgets
Corruption in the security services can leave people (Magahy et al 2009). This often corresponds with lower
feeling insecure and vulnerable. Research in Africa investment in basic social services for poor people
found, for example, that corruption had caused security (Collier 2004). Perito and Kristoff (2010) state that
services to become ineffective, sometimes predatory although citizens are generally unaware of the impact of
(Magahy et al 2009). At the same time, public distrust this form of corruption on their lives, it results in the
can contribute to an environment where citizens draining of scarce public resources.
perceive corruption to be a more effective recourse for
securing their own protection (Transparency Corruption in defence and security organisations can
International 2010). also reduce operational effectiveness. Poor equipment
or inadequately trained staff can reduce the quality of
Although it is the police with which the poor have security services. This will ultimately reduce the state’s
greatest contact and interaction, local populations will ability to guarantee human security and the wellbeing of
also have contact with the military, particularly during its citizens.
operations. Whether at home or abroad, it is essential
that the military promotes a positive image to retain For example, the Singapore Police Force has
public confidence and respect (Pyman 2011). The succeeded in preventing and minimising police
public image of international forces during a mission corruption by improving its salaries and working
can contribute to the overall success of the operation. conditions (Quah 2007). Similar findings exist for
Georgia where significant salary increases, along with
Increased crime and violence new uniforms, led to a reduction in corruption levels
(Kukhianidze 2006).
Corruption in the security services can lead to
increased levels of crime. For example: bribe payments Examples of reform
to the police force could result in criminals not being
arrested. Corrupt personnel policies, or systems that Personnel related reforms
allow official positions to be bought, will reduce the
overall quality of the security sector. Corruption among As with the justice sector, a number of case studies
border guards and collusion with transportation demonstrate the positive impact of increasing staff
companies have been suggested as key factors aiding salaries in order to reduce corruption levels. For
inefficiencies in tracking and preventing drug trafficking. example, the Singapore Police Force has succeeded in
For example, only an estimated 1% of the heroin minimising police corruption by improving its salaries
trafficked out of Afghanistan in 2008 was seized and working conditions (Quah 2007). Similar findings
(UNODC 2010). exist for Georgia where significant salary increases,
along with new uniforms, led to a reduction in corruption
Shortfalls in the security sector can also lead to an levels (Kukhianidze 2006). Research in South Africa
increase in armed violence. A study by the Centre for also found that the adoption of new uniforms or a new
International Cooperation and Security, Department of name for the service were important steps in signifying
Peace Studies (2005) highlights a number of impacts a break with the past and in regaining public trust
this can have on the poor. It suggests that armed (Bruce 2003). Although not sufficient, this can be a vital
violence has an ‘almost entirely negative impact on first step in improving the lives of those most affected
poverty and development, through displacement, by corruption in the justice and security sectors.
damage to education, health, and agriculture, and
impoverishment of large sections of communities and Training of staff has also been an effective tool for
populations’. The report suggests that these impacts developing integrity and reducing corruption. In
combine to reduce progress in the MDGs. Singapore, training is provided for new recruits. This
includes a number of integrity-based lessons which aim
Wasted resources to build staff resilience to corruption. This training
continues throughout their careers (Quah 2006). The
Corruption in defence can lead to the purchase of course also highlights examples of sanctions to deter
unnecessary equipment, wasting large amounts of offences.
money that could have been used for other purposes.

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Corruption in Justice and Security

Improving financial management in light of now publish simplified information on future and current
secrecy concerns procurements in one place on the ministry website. The
changes have enabled companies to protest against
In order to increase transparency of defence industries, single-source procurement if they feel they have been
concerns regarding national security need to be excluded from a competition (Pyman 2009).
addressed. This involves identifying and justifying which
areas of work need to be carried out without public Integrity Pacts, a tool developed by Transparency
oversight and/or external audit (Ball 2002). In South International, can also be applied to defence
Korea the government separates its defence budget procurement contracts. The pacts are an agreement
into three categories of differing secrecy. This process between a government and all bidders for a public
ensures that secrecy is used only when essential contract. All partners agree not to pay, offer, demand or
(Pyman 2011). accept bribes; collude with competitors to obtain the
contract; or engage in such abuses while executing the
Improved levels of financial planning can also improve contract. For example, in Columbia, the process for
transparency and accountability of the defence budget. purchasing 22 combat aircraft was monitored using
In Bulgaria, the introduction of the Integrated Defence such as pact. Although the bid collapsed in the end due
Resources Management System (IDRMS), similar to to a number of companies withdrawing from the bid, the
systems used by NATO, has enabled an annual budget experience confirmed that it is possible to implement an
to be produced for the Ministry of Defence (Totov). The arms trade procurement process including all the same
process involves economic planning based on an publicity efforts that can be introduced in any other
assessment of existing resources and capacity. In sector’s process.
Bulgaria, the MoD invites the Ministries of Finance and
Economics to assist in this process. Once finalised, the 4 Lessons learned
defence budget becomes a key document for promoting
accountability and monitoring of the budget (Pyman As suggested in the introduction, it is difficult to
2011). Totev suggests this system also increases consider the causes, types and impact of corruption in
senior leaders’ awareness of the importance of the the security and justice sectors in isolation. This is firstly
financial dimension of defence planning. due to the overlap in the operations of the two sectors
and the implications this has for developing effective
Reducing opportunities for corruption in
anti-corruption reforms. For example, as Azami (2009)
defence procurement
suggests in her discussion of police reform in
Afghanistan, if prosecutors and judges continue to
A number of initiatives have demonstrated that defence
release criminals who have been arrested by the police,
procurement can immediately benefit from greater
an effective police force will not mean anything.
transparency and active engagement with civil society.
Secondly, the consequences and impact of corruption
TI-UK’s Defence against Corruption programme has
in justice and security institutions often reflect a
worked with a number of countries to improve the
combination of inefficiencies in both sectors, for
transparency in defence procurement. A notable
example increased levels of crime or the outbreak or
example is that of Transparency International-Croatia
relapse into conflict (Foaleng 2009).
who hosted and facilitated a roundtable event in Zagreb
in 2007 to discuss the procurement of armoured
To date, many reform processes have occurred in silos.
vehicles. The event was attended by senior defence
Whether this happens at the institutional level, sector
officials, other senior officials, representatives from
level or national level, donors are increasingly
international organisations (such as NATO, the
recognising that this can limit the impact of reform
European Union, and OSCE), representatives from
efforts (Domingo 2009). However, although the logic of
defence companies and representatives from the
holistic reforms is now widely accepted, holistic models
media, academia and civil society (Pyman 2009).
focusing on security forces, democratic governance,
Following the event, the national defence procurement
and the rule of law have been largely unsuccessful in
requirements and the full defence budget for the next
practice, for example in Iraq and Afghanistan (Sedra
ten years were published.
2007). A DFID review of security and justice sector
reform programming in Africa states that Sierra Leone
Since November 2005, the Polish Ministry of National
provides the strongest example of effective holistic
Defence has introduced a number of mechanisms to
reforms. The reforms connected all strategic level
reduce opportunity for single source procurement. They

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Corruption in Justice and Security

actors that have a role to play in the delivery of overall Corruption Report provides a useful background
reform outcomes. The report stresses, however, that document.
this positive outcome was the result of incremental
progress and continuous learning of lessons (Ball et al At present there is extensive literature on certain
2007). organisations within the security sector, such as the
police and the military, but less on border security
It is increasingly suggested that reforms need to be systems and border guards, the prison system and
more specifically tailored to local needs. Baker and intelligence organisations. Certain issues also require
Scheye (2007) argue that there is currently a state- greater investigation. For example, evaluation of
centric bias in security sector reform which contradicts attempts to remove ghost soldiers from payrolls is
development principles involving a ‘people-centered, currently lacking.
locally owned’ approach. State-centric approaches
assume that the state alone is capable of delivering Different levels of governance also need further
justice and security; and that it is the main actor in analysis, in particular local level reforms. The work
security and justice. However, as this is often not the conducted by International Alert in Nepal which focuses
case, particularly in post-conflict and fragile state on reforms at the district level provides a useful
contexts, such an approach is unlikely to be effective. example. At present, much donor-supported security
and justice programming focuses on formal security
The current focus of much donor-supported security and justice institutions. The impact of informal
and justice programming is on formal security and institutional factors needs to be better understood. In
justice institutions. In Afghanistan, for example, some addition, more information is required regarding the
have argued that support has been donor-driven rather prevalence of ‘self-help’ responses to security and
than locally-owned, and as a result has overlooked justice shortfalls which are particularly common in
transitional justice and informal justice institutions Africa (Ismail and Hendrickson 2009).
(UNODC 2007). As non-state justice systems are often
more commonly used, particularly by poor people, it is Differences within particular organisations also need to
essential that the shortfalls in these institutions are be identified and evaluated. For example, with regard to
addressed within security sector reform. Linking state border management, it has been highlighted that as the
and non-state security and justice systems could raise role of border guards varies considerably so too can the
standards of reforms by increasing state understanding temptations for corruption (Batara and Sukadis 2007).
of local needs and knowledge, and increasing non-state Institutions should not be treated as a universal body,
actors’ awareness of international standards (Baker and but rather should be investigated in-depth before
Scheye 2007). Resources provided to support reforms developing reforms. It is increasingly recognised that
must also be tailored to the capacities and budget local level requirements are often overlooked in
limitations of national authorities (Domingo 2009). reforms. Local knowledge should, however, provide a
key element of reforms. In Hungary, border
management has been improved through a number of
5 Research Gaps factors. These include the introduction of a legal
framework which takes the opinion of border guards
The literature review carried out for this query has into account and the delegation of power to lower levels
identified a number of strengths and weaknesses in the to improve the speed of responses (Batara and Sukadis
research field. Whilst the causes, types and impacts of 2007).
corruption in the justice and security sector are well
understood and documented, more work is needed to Finally, there is also a need for more case studies or
evaluate how best to address the issues, what has country studies to demonstrate what has been effective
worked so far and what has not. There are a number of in different contexts. Human Rights Watch’s 2010
programmes that are building the evidence base in this report on Corruption and Human Rights Abuses by the
area. For example, the TI-UK Defence against Nigeria Police Force provides a useful example.
Corruption Programme provides valuable sets of case Building such an evidence base would enable trends to
studies and best practice. With regard to the justice be more easily identified, thus aiding future
system, the literature is currently more dispersed development of reforms.
although the Transparency International 2007 Global

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Corruption in Justice and Security

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