639667

research-article2016
EMR0010.1177/1754073916639667Emotion ReviewMayer et al. The Ability Model of Emotional Intelligence

Special Section: Emotional Intelligence

Emotion Review
Vol. 8, No. 4 (October 2016) 290­–300
© The Author(s) 2016
ISSN 1754-0739

The Ability Model of Emotional Intelligence: DOI: 10.1177/1754073916639667

er.sagepub.com

Principles and Updates

John D. Mayer
Department of Psychology, University of New Hampshire, USA

David R. Caruso
Yale College Dean’s Office, Yale University, USA

Peter Salovey
Office of the President and Department of Psychology, Yale University, USA

Abstract
This article presents seven principles that have guided our thinking about emotional intelligence, some of them new. We have
reformulated our original ability model here guided by these principles, clarified earlier statements of the model that were unclear,
and revised portions of it in response to current research. In this revision, we also positioned emotional intelligence amidst other
hot intelligences including personal and social intelligences, and examined the implications of the changes to the model. We
discuss the present and future of the concept of emotional intelligence as a mental ability.

Keywords
ability measures, broad intelligences, emotional intelligence, personal intelligence, social intelligence

In 1990, two of us proposed the existence of a new intelligence, tional intelligence amidst related “broad” intelligences, taking
called “emotional intelligence.” Drawing on research findings in care to distinguish emotional intelligence from personal and
the areas of emotion, intelligence, psychotherapy, and cognition, social intelligences, and elucidate examples of reasoning for
we suggested that some people might be more intelligent about each one of these intelligences. We wrap up by considering the
emotions than others (Salovey & Mayer, 1990, p. 189). We called influence of the model and its implications for the future.
attention to people’s problem solving in areas related to emotion:
recognizing emotions in faces, understanding the meanings of
emotion words, and managing feelings, among others. We argued Seven Principles of Emotional Intelligence
that, collectively, such skills implied the existence of a broader, We will describe a set of principles that have guided our theoriz-
overlooked capacity to reason about emotions: an emotional ing about emotional intelligence. Together, these principles—
intelligence (Cacioppo, Semin, & Berntson, 2004; Haig, 2005). guidelines really—succinctly represent how we think about
We later characterized the problem-solving people carried out as emotional intelligence.
falling into four areas or “branches” (Mayer & Salovey, 1997).
In the present article, we revisit the theoretical aspects of our
Principle 1: Emotional Intelligence Is a Mental
ability model of emotional intelligence, update the model so as
Ability
to enhance its usefulness, and examine its implications. We
begin by considering a set of principles that guide our thinking Like most psychologists, we regard intelligence as the capacity
about emotional intelligence. After discussing these principles, to carry out abstract reasoning: to understand meanings, to grasp
we revise the four-branch model slightly. We then locate emo- the similarities and differences between two concepts, to formulate

Author note: The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Jessica Hoffmann, Zorana Ivcevic, Kateryna Sylaska, and Ethan Spector, whose comments on an earlier draft
strengthened this work in key areas.
Corresponding author: John D. Mayer, Department of Psychology, University of New Hampshire, 10 Library Way, Durham, NH 03824, USA. Email: [email protected]

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 Mayer et al.  The Ability Model of Emotional Intelligence  291

powerful generalizations, and to understand when generaliza- from socioemotional styles. They confirm what everyday obser-
tions may not be appropriate because of context (Carroll, 1993; vation suggests: that emotionally stable, outgoing, and consci-
Gottfredson, 1997). We agree also that intelligence can be entious people may be emotionally intelligent or not.
regarded as a system of mental abilities (Detterman, 1982). Similarly, a person may possess high analytical intelligence
Regarding how people reason about emotions, we proposed but not deploy it— illustrating a gap between ability and achieve-
that emotionally intelligent people (a) perceive emotions accu- ment (Duckworth, Quinn, & Tsukayama, 2012; Greven, Harlaar,
rately, (b) use emotions to accurately facilitate thought, (c) Kovas, Chamorro-Premuzic, & Plomin, 2009). Intelligence tests
understand emotions and emotional meanings, and (d) manage tend to measure potential better than the typical performance of
emotions in themselves and others (Mayer & Salovey, 1997). everyday behavior. Many people with high levels of intelligence
may not deploy their ability when it would be useful (Ackerman
& Kanfer, 2004). For these reasons, the prediction from intelli-
Principle 2: Emotional Intelligence Is Best gence to individual instances of “smart” behavior is fraught with
Measured as an Ability complications and weak in any single instance (Ayduk &
A foundation of our thinking is that intelligences are best meas- Mischel, 2002; Sternberg, 2004). At the same time, more emo-
ured as abilities—by posing problems for people to solve, and tionally intelligent people have outcomes that differ in important
examining the resulting patterns of correct answers (Carroll, ways from those who are less emotionally intelligent. They have
1993; Mayer, Panter, & Caruso, 2012). (Correct answers are better interpersonal relationships both in their everyday lives and
those that authorities identify within the problem-solving area.) on the job—as articles in this issue and elsewhere address
The best answers to a question can be recognized by consulting (Fernández-Berrocal & Extremera, 2016; Izard et al., 2001;
reference works, convening a panel of experts, or (more contro- Karim & Weisz, 2010; Lopes, 2016; Mayer, Roberts, & Barsade,
versially for certain classes of problems), by identifying a gen- 2008; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2008; Nathanson, Rivers,
eral consensus among the test-takers (Legree, Psotka, Tremble, Flynn & Brackett, 2016; Roberts et al., 2006; Rossen & Kranzler,
& Bourne, 2005; MacCann & Roberts, 2008; Mayer, Salovey, 2009; Trentacosta, Izard, Mostow, & Fine, 2006)
Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2003). Although intelligences predict some long-term behavioral
People are poor at estimating their own levels of intelli- outcomes, predicting any individual behavior is fraught with
gence—whether it is their general intelligence or their emo- uncertainty because of the other personality—and social— vari-
tional intelligence (Brackett, Rivers, Shiffman, Lerner, & ables involved (Funder, 2001; Mischel, 2009).
Salovey, 2006; Paulhus, Lysy, & Yik, 1998). Because people
lack knowledge of what good problem-solving actually
Principle 4: A Test’s Content—the Problem
entails, they estimate their abilities on other bases. These
Solving Area Involved—Must Be Clearly
include a mix of general self-confidence, self-esteem, misun-
Specified as a Precondition for the
derstandings of what is involved in successful reasoning, and
wishful thinking. These nonintellectual features add con-
Measurement of Human Mental Abilities
struct-irrelevant variance to people’s self-estimated abilities, Establishing the content of the area.  To measure emo-
rendering their judgments invalid as indices of their actual tional intelligence well, tests must sample from the necessary
abilities (Joint Committee, 2014). subject matter; the content of the test must cover the area of
problem-solving (Joint Committee, 2014). A test of verbal
intelligence ought to sample from a wide range of verbal
Principle 3: Intelligent Problem Solving Does
problems in order to assess a test-taker’s problem-solving
Not Correspond Neatly to Intelligent Behavior ability. Test developers therefore must cover the key areas of
We believe there is a meaningful distinction between intelli- verbal problem-solving required, such as understanding
gence and behavior. A person’s behavior is an expression of that vocabulary, comprehending sentences, and other similar
individual’s personality in a given social context (Mischel, skills. The specification of a problem-solving area—vocabu-
2009). An individual’s personality includes motives and emo- lary, sentence comprehension, and the like for verbal reason-
tions, social styles, self-awareness, and self-control, all of which ing—defines the intelligence and its range of application. The
contribute to consistencies in behavior, apart from intelligence. content specification is designed to ensure that the test sam-
Among the Big Five personality traits, for example, extraver- ples a representative group of problems.
sion, agreeableness, and conscientiousness correlate near zero
with general intelligence. Neuroticism correlates at r = −.15, Subject matter differs from ability.  Once the test’s content
and openness about r = .30 (DeYoung, 2011). The Big Five is established, the test can be used to identify a person’s men-
exhibit correlations of similar magnitude with emotional intel- tal abilities. People’s problem-solving abilities are reflected
ligence: Neuroticism correlates r = −.17 with emotional intelli- by the correlational (or covariance) structure of the responses
gence and openness r = .18; extraversion and conscientiousness they make to the test items. People’s abilities are revealed
correlate with emotional intelligence between r = .12 and .15, when a group of scores on test items rise and fall together
and agreeableness, r = .25 (Joseph & Newman, 2010). These across a sample of individuals. Note that the mental abilities
correlations indicate the relative independence of intelligences measured by a test are independent to some degree from the

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292  Emotion Review Vol. 8 No. 4

nature of the problems to be solved. That is, a person’s abili- verbal intelligence), visual-spatial processing, working mem-
ties will not necessarily correspond directly to the different ory, long-term storage and retrieval, and speed of retrieval. The
types of content in a subject area—a matter we consider fur- three-stratum model also includes at its lowest level more spe-
ther in the next principle. cific mental abilities. For example, the broad intelligence,
“comprehension-knowledge” includes the specific ability to
understand vocabulary and general knowledge about the world.
Principle 5: Valid Tests Have Well-Defined
Broad intelligences fall into subclasses (McGrew, 2009;
Subject Matter That Draws Out Relevant Schneider & Newman, 2015). One class of broad intelli-
Human Mental Abilities gences reflects basic functional capacities of the brain such as
People exhibit their reasoning abilities as they solve problems mental processing speed and the scope of working memory. A
within a given subject area. As such, a test’s validity depends second class of broad intelligences includes members identi-
both on the content it samples and the human mental abilities it fied by the sensory system they relate to, including auditory
elicits. From this perspective, test scores represent an interaction intelligence and tactile/physical intelligence. Still others may
between a person’s mental abilities and the to-be-solved prob- reflect subject matter knowledge such as verbal intelligence.
lems. If the test content is poorly specified, the items will misrep- Mental abilities in late adolescence and adulthood may be
resent the domain, and any hoped-for research understanding of shaped and strengthened into “aptitude complexes” by educa-
mental abilities may be inconclusive. If problem-solving tional pursuits and interests to form domain-specific knowl-
domains overlap too much with other areas, ability factors redun- edge such as in mathematics, sciences, or government and
dant with other areas may emerge; if the test content is too broad, history (Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997; Rolfhus & Ackerman,
eclectic sets of ability factors may arise, and if the content is too 1999).
narrow the test may fail to draw out key mental abilities. A gar- Emotional intelligence fits such descriptions of a broad
bage in, garbage out process will replace good measurement. intelligence. MacCann, Joseph, Newman, and Roberts (2014)
As implied in the previous lines, human abilities do not collected data on 702 students who took a wide range of intel-
necessarily map directly onto test content: The abilities people ligence tests, including one of emotional intelligence, over an
use to solve problems have their own existence independent of 8-hour testing period. Using confirmatory factor analysis,
the organization of the subject matter involved. In the intelli- MacCann et al. (2014) found that emotional intelligence, indi-
gence field, a test of verbal knowledge may ask a person ques- cated by three of the four branches of the Mayer, Salovey,
tions about nonfiction passages, fiction, poetry, and instruction Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT; Mayer, Salovey,
manuals. Despite the diversity of material, people use just one & Caruso, 2002), fits well among other known broad intelli-
verbal intelligence to comprehend them all. On the other hand, gences within the second-stratum of the Cattell–Horn–Carroll
the skill to identify what is missing in a picture and the skill to model. In a reanalysis of the same data, Legree et al. (2014)
rotate an object in space (in our minds) may appear to draw on were also able to fit emotional intelligence into the Cattell–
the same visual understanding. However, identifying the miss- Horn–Carroll framework; they included all four branches of
ing part of a picture draws primarily on perceptual-organiza- the MSCEIT as indicators of emotional intelligence by cor-
tional intelligence whereas the object-rotation task draws recting for the different response scales used across the test’s
primarily on spatial ability, and these mental abilities are dis- subtasks (Legree et al., 2014).
tinct (Wai, Lubinski, & Benbow, 2009). As applied to emo-
tional intelligence, we need both to describe accurately the
emotional problem solving that people undertake and the abil-
Principle 7: Emotional Intelligence is a
ities people employ to solve those problems—which are two Member of the Class of Broad Intelligences
different matters (Joint Committee, 2014). Focused on Hot Information Processing
We believe that the broad intelligences—especially those
Principle 6: Emotional Intelligence is a Broad defined by their subject matter—can be divided into hot and
Intelligence cool sets. Cool intelligences are those that deal with relatively
impersonal knowledge such as verbal-propositional intelli-
We view emotional intelligence as a “broad” intelligence. The gence, math abilities, and visual-spatial intelligence. We view
concept of broad intelligences emerges from a hierarchical view hot intelligences as involving reasoning with information of
of intelligence often referred to as the Cattell–Horn–Carroll or significance to an individual—matters that may chill our hearts
“three-stratum model” (McGrew, 2009). In this model, general or make our blood boil. People use these hot intelligences to
intelligence, or g, resides at the top of the hierarchy, and it is manage what matters most to them: their senses of social
divided at the second stratum into a series of eight to 15 broad acceptance, identity coherence, and emotional well-being.
intelligences (Flanagan, McGrew, & Ortiz, 2000; McGrew, Repeated failures to reason well in these areas lead to psychic
2009). The model is based on factor-analytic explorations of pain which—at intense levels—is coprocessed in the same
how mental abilities correlate with one another. Such analyses brain centers that process physical pain (Eisenberger, 2015).
suggest that human thinking can be fruitfully divided into areas By thinking clearly about feelings, personality, and social
such as fluid reasoning, comprehension-knowledge (similar to groups, however, people can better evaluate, cope with, and

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 Mayer et al.  The Ability Model of Emotional Intelligence  293

predict the consequences of their own actions, and the behavior emotions, and (d) managing emotions in oneself and others
of the individuals around them. (Mayer & Salovey, 1997). (We referred to these problem-solv-
Emotional intelligence falls within this category because ing areas as branches after the line drawing in our original dia-
emotions are organized responses involving physical changes, gram.)
felt experiences, cognitions, and action plans—all with strong Each branch represents a group of skills that proceeds devel-
evaluative components (Izard, 2010). Social intelligence is opmentally from basic tasks to more challenging ones. The
another member of the category (Conzelmann, Weis, & Süß, Perceiving Emotions branch leads off with the “ability to iden-
2013; Hoepfner & O’Sullivan, 1968; Weis & Süß, 2007; Wong, tify emotions in one’s physical states, feelings, and thoughts,”
Day, Maxwell, & Meara, 1995). Social intelligence is “hot” and proceeds to such developmentally advanced tasks (as we
because social acceptance is fundamentally important to us; saw them then) as the ability to discriminate between truthful
among social animals, group exclusion is a source of primal and dishonest expressions of feeling. The parallel developmen-
pain (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Finally, personal intelli- tal progression in the Understanding branch begins with the
gence—an intelligence about personality—is a newly proposed ability to label emotions and progressed to more challenging
member of this group (Mayer, 2008, 2014; Mayer et al., 2012). tasks such as understanding “likely transitions among emo-
Personal intelligence is a hot intelligence because our sense of tions,” such as from anger to satisfaction.
self is a primary source of inner pleasure and pain—ranging
from self-satisfaction and pride on the positive side to self-
loathing and suicidal thoughts and action on the negative side Update 1. The Four-Branch Model Includes
(Freud, 1962; Greenwald, 1980). More Instances of Problem-Solving Than Before
Table 1 recapitulates the four branches of the original model in
Summary and Applications its four rows, from perceiving emotions to managing emotions
(see left column). To the right, we have included many of the
In this section, we described seven principles that guide our original types of reasoning that illustrated each branch, some-
thinking about emotional intelligence. We employed some of times rewriting them for clarity. Within a row, each set of abili-
these principles—notably that emotional intelligence is an abil- ties is arranged (approximately) from the simplest to the most
ity and a hot intelligence—from the outset of our work. We also complex skills, from bottom to top.
introduced some new principles, such as those concerning broad Based on research since 1997, we have added several areas
intelligences. In the next section, we review the four-branch of problem solving to this revised model that initially we over-
model of emotional intelligence and present an updated view of looked. For example, the “Understanding Emotion” area origi-
our model and of our present thinking, recognizing that these nally included the abilities to label emotions, to know their
principles could lead to other models as well. causes and consequences, and to understand complex emotions.
To those original areas of understanding, we have added emo-
tional appraisal and emotional forecasting—topics that have
The Four-Branch Model: Original and
experienced increased research attention and that have been
Revised directly related to emotionally intelligent reasoning (see also
In this section of the article, we briefly revisit our 1997 four- Barrett, Mesquita, & Gendron, 2011; Dunn, Brackett, Ashton-
branch model of emotional intelligence and then proceed to James, Schneiderman, & Salovey, 2007; MacCann & Roberts,
renew it—as well as to clarify its range of usefulness in the con- 2008)—as well as a sensitivity to cultural contexts (Matsumoto
text of the field’s current understanding of intelligences. More & Hwang, 2012). As others have pointed out, reasoning in an
specifically, we (a) add more abilities to the model, (b) distin- individual area is not necessarily discrete; rather, problem-solv-
guish the four-branch model of problem-solving content from ing activities can spill or cascade into one another. For example,
the structure of human abilities relevant to emotional intelli- emotion perception is often helpful to accurate emotion under-
gence, (c) relate emotional intelligence to closely allied broad standing (see Joseph & Newman, 2010).
intelligences, (d) examine the key characteristics of the prob-
lem-solving involved, and (e) more clearly distinguish between
Update 2: The Mental Abilities Involved
areas of problem-solving and areas of human mental abilities.
in Emotional Intelligence Remain To Be
Determined
The Four-Branch Model of Emotional
When we first proposed the four-branch model, we believed it
Intelligence
could reasonably correspond to four mental ability factors in the
Our four-branch ability model distinguished among four areas area (Mayer & Salovey, 1997). That said, the content domains
of problem-solving necessary to carry out emotional reasoning: are independent of the mental abilities within the domain (by
The first was (a) perceiving emotions, which we regarded as Principles 4 and 5). In fact, the four-branch model is not well
computationally most basic. We then proceeded through the reflected in the factor structure of our ability-based measures
increasingly integrated and more cognitively complex areas of (Legree et al., 2014; Maul, 2011; Palmer, Gignac, Manocha, &
(b) facilitating thought by using emotions, (c) understanding Stough, 2005; Rossen, Kranzler, & Algina, 2008).

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294  Emotion Review Vol. 8 No. 4

Table 1.  The four-branch model of emotional intelligence, with added areas of reasoninga.

The Four Branches Types of Reasoning

4. Managing emotions • Effectively manage others’ emotions to achieve a desired outcomeb

• Effectively manage one’s own emotions to achieve a desired outcomeb
• Evaluate strategies to maintain, reduce, or intensify an emotional responseb
• Monitor emotional reactions to determine their reasonableness
• Engage with emotions if they are helpful; disengage if not
• Stay open to pleasant and unpleasant feelings, as needed, and to the information they convey

3.  Understanding emotions • Recognize cultural differences in the evaluation of emotionsc

• Understand how a person might feel in the future or under certain conditions (affective forecasting)c
• Recognize likely transitions among emotions such as from anger to satisfaction
• Understand complex and mixed emotions
• Differentiate between moods and emotionsc
• Appraise the situations that are likely to elicit emotionsc
• Determine the antecedents, meanings, and consequences of emotions
• Label emotions and recognize relations among them

2. Facilitating thought using • Select problems based on how one’s ongoing emotional state might facilitate cognition
emotiond • Leverage mood swings to generate different cognitive perspectives
• Prioritize thinking by directing attention according to present feeling
• Generate emotions as a means to relate to experiences of another personc
• Generate emotions as an aid to judgment and memory

1.  Perceiving emotion • Identify deceptive or dishonest emotional expressionsb

• Discriminate accurate vs. inaccurate emotional expressionsb
• Understand how emotions are displayed depending on context and culturec
• Express emotions accurately when desired
• Perceive emotional content in the environment, visual arts, and musicb
• Perceive emotions in other people through their vocal cues, facial expression, language, and behaviorb
• Identify emotions in one’s own physical states, feelings, and thoughts

Note. aThe bullet-points are based on Mayer and Salovey (1997) except as indicated in superscripts b and c. Within a row, the bulleted items are ordered approximately from
simplest to most complex, bottom to top. The four-branch model depicts the problem-solving areas of emotional intelligence and is not intended to correspond to the factor
structure of the area.
bAn ability from the original model was divided into two or more separate abilities.

cA new ability was added.

dNote that the Branch 2 abilities can be further divided into the areas of generating emotions to facilitate thought (the bottom two bulleted items) and tailoring thinking to

emotion (the top three bulleted items).

From an empirical standpoint, tasks on the Mayer– that sadness can promote the performance of detail-oriented
Salovey–Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT) have work—and that creativity burgeons with happiness—seems to
been represented by between one and three factors (Legree us integral to the construct (Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987),
et al., 2014; MacCann et al., 2014). Those theorists who favor and additional findings point to the idea that people use inner
a three-factor model have argued for dropping Branch 2, emotional states to solve problems (Cohen & Andrade, 2004;
Facilitating Thought Using Emotions—which describes how Leung et al., 2014). Moreover, tasks that involve Facilitating
drawing on emotions can enhance cognition. Critics contend Thought do correlate with scores of overall emotional intelli-
that confirmatory factor models of the MSCEIT fit branches gence on the MSCEIT.
1, 3 and 4 of the model reasonably well, but not Branch 2 The four-branch model of emotional intelligence demar-
(Joseph & Newman, 2010). cates emotional problem-solving overall. We no longer expect,
We agree that a mental ability factor of Facilitating Thought however, that the specific mental abilities involved in emo-
has not reliably emerged from studies of the MSCEIT. This may tional intelligence will necessarily coincide with the specific
be a failure of the test construction, or because people solve problem solving areas described by the four-branch model.
such problems using their ability at emotional understanding (or
another ability) rather than any reasoning distinctly related to
Update 3. Emotional Intelligence Is a Broad,
facilitating thought.
Hot Intelligence and Invites Comparisons With
Although Facilitating Thought may fail to emerge as a dis-
Personal and Social Intelligences
crete mathematical factor on the MSCEIT, we believe it makes
sense to retain the branch in our four-branch model of problem In our early works we sometimes wrote that emotional intelli-
solving areas. Being able to draw on emotions to facilitate gence was similar to social intelligence (Mayer & Salovey,
thought is part of an overall emotional intelligence: Knowing 1993; Salovey & Mayer, 1990) and at other times we described

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 Mayer et al.  The Ability Model of Emotional Intelligence  295

emotional intelligence as sui generis—it did not appear to be (Table 2, column 3) that include (a) identifying personality-
like any other intelligence—surely nothing in the Cattell–Horn– related information, (b) forming models of personality, (c)
Carroll model as originally formulated. Neither of these posi- guiding personal choices, and (d) systematizing life goals and
tions appear helpful today. plans (Mayer, 2009). Once again, we remind readers that (as
Today, we believe there exists a group of hot intelligences of we now view it) problem-solving areas do not necessarily pre-
which emotional intelligence is a member. Two other candi- dict the structure of mental abilities used to find solutions to
dates for this group are social intelligence and personal intelli- those problems. In fact, the evidence indicates that simpler
gence (see Principle 7). Some of these intelligences are better models may describe mental abilities in both emotional and
understood than others. personal intelligences (Legree et al., 2014; MacCann et al.,
Social intelligence has been the most challenging to measure 2014; Mayer, Panter, & Caruso, 2014).
(Conzelmann et al., 2013; Romney & Pyryt, 1999; Wong et al., The problem-solving areas for social intelligence are less
1995). Work conducted early in the 20th century indicated that well demarcated. From our standpoint, Conzelmann et al.
social intelligence correlated so highly with general intelligence (2013) examined something closer to personal intelligence than
as to be indistinguishable from it (Wyer & Srull, 1989). Recent social intelligence in their operationalization of social under-
research bears this out: Conzelmann et al. (2013) found that standing: They asked test-takers to guess the background infor-
both social memory and social perception appeared to blend mation of a target person and to judge the person’s mental states
into general intelligence, consistent with earlier studies. They (including emotions and thoughts). A definition of social intel-
also found, however, more promising evidence for an independ- ligence that better distinguishes it from emotional and personal
ent social understanding task. intelligences would focus on reasoning about groups and rela-
Another currently researched member of this group is per- tionships between individuals and groups. The relevant areas of
sonal intelligence: the capacity to reason about personalities— reasoning, as we see them, are shown in Table 2, column 3.
both one’s own and the personalities of others. There is now
preliminary evidence that personal intelligence can be meas-
ured, exists, and predicts consequential outcomes ( Mayer et al., Update 4: Emotional Intelligence Can Be
2012; Mayer & Skimmyhorn, 2015). Positioned Among Other Hot Intelligences
The existence of other hot broad intelligences that form a Emotional intelligence, personal intelligence, and social intelli-
group with emotional intelligence arguably does more to gence can be “positioned” amidst one another in different ways.
jeopardize the conceptual integrity of emotional intelligence We suspect that the three intelligences themselves—emotional,
than any other development in the past 25 years. After all, if personal, and social—may each be of comparable complexity in
emotional intelligence were just a part of the arguably broader that they all involve human cognitive reasoning of an equally
personal intelligence, and could not be distinguished from it sophisticated nature.
empirically, then emotional intelligence might need to be sub- At the same time, the problem-solving they address—about
sumed into that broader intelligence. It is for that reason that emotions, personality characteristics, and social processes—
we focus next on a comparative examination of these hot concerns systems at three different levels of complexity: emo-
intelligences. tions are relatively small psychological subsystems; personality
exists at the level of the whole individual; social organizations
Comparative definitions. To fully understand emotional involve groups of people. More formally, the phenomena being
intelligence, it helps to think about its relationship to personal reasoned about occupy different levels along the biopsychoso-
and social intelligences. Emotional, personal, and social intelli- cial continuum, with emotions lowest and social systems high-
gences share in common their concern for the human world of est (Engel, 1977; Sheldon, Cheng, & Hilpert, 2011).
inner experience and outer relationships. That is, they concern One matter that remains indeterminate is, therefore, whether
the understanding of people from their biosocial needs to their all three intelligences can be considered broad intelligences, or
interactions in social groups. To compare these intelligences, whether, alternatively, emotional intelligence (because it con-
we provide working definitions of each one in the first row of cerns the smallest system) is a specific ability within personal
Table 2. Emotional intelligence is defined as “The ability to rea- (or social) intelligence. For now, it seems reasonable to keep
son validly with emotions and with emotion-related information them separate until such a time as mathematical models indicate
and to use emotions to enhance thought” (Table 2, column 2). more about their relationships.
Similar definitions are offered for personal and social intelli- Finally, all three intelligences concern understanding the
gences. Definitions can provide a helpful start to specifying the human world, and yet, because their topic areas are sufficiently
members of the class of hot intelligences. diverse, the capacity to reason in each area may be somewhat
independent of one another. Some people may possess consid-
Problem-solving areas involved. The three intelligences erable social intelligence without having a good deal of emo-
can be specified in a second way by describing each one’s area tional intelligence; some people may possess personal
of problem-solving. Emotional intelligence draws on prob- intelligence without social intelligence. That said, most people
lems described in the four-branch model. Personal intelligence will employ the intelligences in an intertwined fashion. It is
has similarly been divided into four problem-solving areas easier to understand personality if one has a reasonable feel for

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296  Emotion Review Vol. 8 No. 4

Table 2.  A comparison of emotional, personal, and social intelligences.

Characterization Type of hot intelligence

of intelligence
Emotional Personal Social

Brief definition The ability to reason validly with The ability to reason about The ability to understand social rules,
emotions and with emotion- personality—both our own and the customs, and expectations, social situations
related information, and to use personalities of others—including and the social environment, and to recognize
emotions to enhance thought. about motives and emotions, thoughts the exercise of influence and power in social
and knowledge, plans and styles of hierarchies. It also includes an understanding
action, and awareness and self-control. of intra- and intergroup relations.

Problem-solving • Identify emotional content • Identify information about • Identify group memberships: recognize
areas in faces, voices, and designs personality, including introspection dyadic relationships; understand group
and ability to accurately into one’s feelings and reading relations such as age, gender, ethnic,
express emotions. personality from faces. socioeconomic, and other groups.
• Facilitate thinking by drawing • Form models of personality • Identify social dominance and other
on emotions as motivational including labeling traits in ourselves power dynamics among groups.
and substantive inputs. and others and recognizing • Understand contributors to group morale,
• Understand the meaning defensive thinking. cohesion, and dissolution.
of emotions and their • Guide personal choices with inner • Understand how groups use power among
implications for behavior. awareness, including discovering one another.
• Manage emotions in oneself personal interests and making • Recognize and understand the exercise of
and others. personality-relevant decisions. leadership and group power.
• Systematize plans and goals,
including finding a satisfying life
direction and meaning.

Aims of • To achieve desired emotional • To attain goals of self-development, • To achieve membership status in
reasoning states and experiences in effective personal action, and preferred groups, and to influence the
oneself and others. desired interactions with others. reputation of the group in a desired way.

a person’s emotions; easier to understand people if one under- (Newell & Simon, 1972, p. 59). In Newell et al.’s formulation,
stands the social systems they operate within, and so forth. people solve problems by identifying: (a) a finite set of informa-
These relationships explain why the intelligences—even tion (items, relationships among them, and knowledge about
though they can be defined in discrete terms to a considerable them), (b) a small and finite set of operators, and (c) a small num-
degree—are likely to correlate at substantial levels. ber of alternative possible solutions (Newell & Simon, 1972, pp.
810–811). Related models of intelligence that anticipated such
divisions—or that used a similar approach—include Guilford’s
Update 5: Emotional Intelligence Employs
structure of intellect model and the Berlin model of intelligence
Specific Forms of Problem Solving
both of which pair operators with contents (Beauducel & Kersting,
Whatever the structure of human intelligences turns out to be, 2002; Guilford, 1966, 1988).
demarcating the reasoning involved is important to educating These approaches from human and artificial intelligence
people so as to improve their problem solving in the area—and share the idea that test-takers have a certain amount of informa-
also may contribute to the implementation of formal problem tion at their disposal, can operate on that information in certain
solving in the area using artificial intelligence. Our model can valid ways and come up with a set of possible answers.
be expanded to describe the units, operators, and solutions of Consequently, specifying the units, operators, and solutions to a
each intelligence that people manipulate to analyze a problem. specific problem further helps to describe the problem-solving
Our concept of problem analysis borrows heavily from Newell intrinsic to a given task.
and Simon’s (1972) concept of the “problem space.” Their aim A proposed problem space for emotional and personal
was to show “in detail how the processes that occur in human intelligences is provided in Table 3. For example, a person
problem solving can be compounded out of elementary infor- might apply emotional intelligence to the question of whether
mation processes” (Newell, Shaw, & Simon, 1958, p. 152). a friend is sad. To answer the question, the person will draw on
People create a mental problem space when they recognize units that include facial expressions, tone of voice, mood-con-
and encode a problem they hope to solve. Within the problem gruent judgment and situational appraisals. The problem-
space, they specify the criteria for a correct solution, as well as solver then operates on those units given a specific problem.
rules to solve it by. Individuals may also set up intermediate For example, by perceiving her friend’s flaccid facial expres-
stages of problem solving: parts of the problem that can be solved sion, understanding a setback he suffered, and hearing his
individually and are likely to contribute to an ultimate solution negative attitude, she is likely to conclude her friend is sad. A

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 Mayer et al.  The Ability Model of Emotional Intelligence  297

Table 3.  Examples of problem analysis in the realms of emotional and personal intelligences.

Emotional intelligence Personal intelligence

  Key members of the sets Example of a specific problem Key members of the sets Example of a specific problem

To-be-solved Perceive a person’s emotion Does a friend feel sad? Understand a person’s likely Is a colleague at work vengeful
problem behavior toward a coworker?

Units Emotional facial The friend’s mouth is Relationship status; situations The coworker insulted the colleague
involved expressions downturned in public

Postural changes The friend’s movements are Behaviors The colleague fails to pass on
slowed down potentially helpful information to
the coworker

Mood-congruent judgment The friend is critical and Traits The colleague is generally helpful to
pessimistic about the future other coworkers

Situational appraisals The friend just lost a Principles of success In an office, knowledge can be
relationship with a loved one empowering

Operators Translating facial The friend has a sad facial Translating a trait into a likely The colleague would normally have
employed expressions into emotions expression behavior remembered to share the information

Recognizing a loss can lead The friend’s lost love is likely Identifying possible The colleague could be careless,
to sadness to make him feel sad alternative traits and goals vengeful, or forgetful

Knowing how an emotion He will likely cheer up with Evaluating two goals for the The colleague often likes to be
will change with time time conflicts between them helpful but the pattern of events and
actions fits a goal of vengeance

Possible Converging information Yes, the situation and the Converging information leads Yes, the colleague acted vengefully
solutions leads to a “best guess” facial expression converge on to a “best guess” solution/ against the coworker because of the
solution/prediction the idea the friend is sad prediction insult

parallel breakdown is specified in Table 3 for an example per- could turn out to be a part of a larger personal or social intelli-
tinent to personal intelligence. gence. We further know that emotional intelligence predicts
Such analyses point out how the hot intelligences emphasize important outcomes.
somewhat different units of analysis. For emotions, the units If emotional intelligence is a discrete intelligence, we need
involve facial expressions, emotions, and mood-congruent to make the case that there has evolved a separate reasoning
judgment; for personal intelligence, traits, behaviors, and rela- capacity to understand emotions. In fact, there is some evi-
tionship status are important. Each of the hot intelligences is dence to support this idea. For example Heberlein and col-
likely to emphasize different classes of units—although there is leagues showed that the brain areas responsible for perceiving
some overlap as well: Both emotional and personal intelligence emotional expressions—happiness, fear, and anger—are to a
make use of situation understanding. degree distinct from the brain areas for perceiving expres-
Educators, intelligence researchers, and computer scientists sions of personality—shyness, warmth, and unfriendliness
can make use of these analyses. For example, educators can (Heberlein, Adolphs, Tranel, & Damasio, 2004; Heberlein &
develop new curricula that explicitly focus on the units of prob- Saxe, 2005).
lem solving and that explain the varieties of reasoning involved; Correlations among broad intelligence range greatly. In one
educators who understand the units and operators involved may study of ours, spatial and personal intelligences, which are con-
better teach problem solving in the area. ceptually very distinct, correlated r = .23 (Mayer & Skimmyhorn,
2016); in another, personal intelligence and aspects of emo-
tional intelligence were related r = .69 suggesting they are
Discussion closely related intelligences (Mayer et al., 2012).
Twenty-five years after its introduction, a good deal of evi- Thus, there is the possibility that emotional intelligence
dence has accumulated that emotional intelligence exists as a seamlessly operates as part a broader personal or social intelli-
mental ability among the class of hot, broad intelligences. gence, or a combined socio-emotional-personal intelligence. In
Ability measures of emotional intelligence are still evolving, this instance, there would be nothing special or unique about an
and the factor structure of the area remains uncertain—although individual’s ability to reason about emotions; rather, it would
support exists for both one- and three-factor models (Legree be part of a broader reasoning about human nature. In that
et al., 2014; MacCann et al., 2014). Emotional intelligence eventuality, the construction of tests of emotional intelligence

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298  Emotion Review Vol. 8 No. 4

would be nothing more than the construction of a subscale of a Declaration of Conflicting Interests
broader test. The authors receive royalties from Multi-Health Systems on sales
Twenty-five years after the fact, our view is fairly sanguine: of the Mayer–Salovey–Caruso Emotional Intelligence Tests
We believe that it is likely emotional intelligence will be partly (MSCEIT and MSCEIT-YRV).
distinct from both personal and social intelligences. Even if it is
not, there has been much to gain and little to lose from working
out the reasoning employed to understand emotions. Emotional References
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