Journal of Loss Prevention in The Process Industries

Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 63 (2020) 104040
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Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries

journal homepage: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jlp
Incorporating inherent safety during the conceptual process design stage: A

literature review
Sunhwa Park a, b, Sheng Xu b, William Rogers a, b, Hans Pasman a, Mahmoud M. El-Halwagi a, b, c, *
a
Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center, Texas A&M Engineering Experiment Station, College Station, TX, 77843-3122, USA
b
Department of Chemical Engineering, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, 77843-3122, USA
c
Gas and Fuels Research Center, Texas A&M Engineering Experiment Station, College Station, TX, 77843-3122, USA
A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T
Keywords: This paper reviews principal concepts, tools, and metrics for risk management and Inherently Safer Design (ISD)
Inherently safer design during the conceptual stage of process design. Even though there has been a profusion of papers regarding ISD,
Sustainability the targeted audience has typically been safety engineers, not process engineers. Thus, the goal of this paper is to
Inherently safety assessment
enable process engineers to use all the available design degrees of freedom to mitigate risk early enough in the
Conceptual design stage
Risk management
design process. Mainly, this paper analyzes ISD and inherent safety assessment tools (ISATs) from the perspective
Cost-optimal solution of inclusion in conceptual process design. The paper also highlights the need to consider safety as a major
component of process sustainability. In this paper, 73 ISATs were selected, and these tools were categorized into
three groups: hazard-based inherent safety assessment tools (H-ISATs) for 22 tools, risk-based inherent safety
assessment tools (R-ISATs) for 33 tools, and cost-optimal inherent safety assessment tools (CO-ISATs) for 18
tools. This paper also introduces an integrated framework for coordinating the conventional process design
workflow with safety analysis at various levels of detail.
1. Introduction 1.1. Safety is a key component in sustainability
The design of industrial processes proceeds via several stages that The development path of sustainable manufacturing has strived to
start with high-level synthesis and screening of alternatives in the con balance the three pillars of sustainability—environment, society, and
ceptual design stage. Afterwards, the process continues with more economy (National Research Council, 2011). A broader understanding
analysis that yields the recommended design in the detailed design of sustainability in the chemical process industries (CPIs) should be
stage. Traditionally, techno-economic criteria have been the principal extended to include safety along with the three aforementioned pillars,
objectives in the early process design stage. Safety is usually considered as shown by Fig. 1. The CPIs in particular deal with hazardous materials
in the detailed design stages. At this point, most of the design degrees of and processes that can have a major impact on the wellbeing of sur
freedom including technological and configurational issues have already rounding communities and natural resources.
been determined. The objective of this review paper is to advocate for
the consideration of inherent safety aspects in the conceptual design 1.2. Inherently safer design as a logical component of conceptual process
stage; specifically, the analysis focuses on how various inherent safety design
assessment tools (ISATs) can be utilized by process engineers. Previous
review papers have shown overall views of incorporating inherent safety Inherently Safer Design (ISD) is one of the most effective risk
principles (e.g., grouping different types of methods or research groups) reduction strategies for achieving sustainable chemical facilities. The
with the primary target audience being safety experts. This paper is idea of “removing risks at the design stage” was originally developed in a
aimed at the process design community to show principal safety con pioneering study by a U.K. process engineer, Houston (1971), and was
cepts, definitions, tools, and insights and to enable process engineers to further developed in the ISD concept by Kletz (1985). Instead of merely
apply inherent safety principles during the conceptual design stage. installing safety equipment or devices, ISD is a proactive strategy for
reducing the likelihood or the impact of incidents and endeavoring to
* Corresponding author. Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center, Texas A&M Engineering Experiment Station, College Station, TX, 77843-3122, USA.
E-mail addresses: [email protected] (S. Park), [email protected] (W. Rogers), [email protected] (H. Pasman), [email protected] (M.M. El-Halwagi).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2019.104040
Received 14 October 2019; Received in revised form 29 December 2019; Accepted 29 December 2019
Available online 31 December 2019
0950-4230/© 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
S. Park et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 63 (2020) 104040
achieve cost-optimal safety solutions in the CPIs. 1.3. The direction of this paper
Without an appropriate ISD approach, chemical facilities will be at
increased risk of experiencing devastating events. The lessons learned This paper comprises six sections. Section 2 explains the fundamental
—from previous catastrophic chemical accidents— demonstrated the concepts of safety and ISD based on the developed concept of Kletz and
possible impacts on people, the environment, and the economy in our Amyotte (2010), followed by an explanation of each process design
society (Eckerman, 2018). For example, the 1984 Bhopal disaster in stage. This section was prepared for both process engineers and safety
India resulted in over 2000–8000 fatalities, the number depending on engineers; a process engineer calls for basic safety knowledge, whereas a
different sources (Eckerman, 2018; Lees, 2012); this disaster was trig safety engineer desires to understand process design stages. Section 3
gered by methyl isocyanate, an extremely toxic intermediate, which was highlights a new review paper that mainly analyzes inherent safety
stored for further processing in unnecessary large amounts that far assessment tools (ISATs) for the conceptual design stage via five previ
exceeded acceptable safety limits. Singh et al. (2010) also highlighted ous review papers. Section 4 addresses the methods of reviewing liter
the importance of ISD by analyzing the 1998 Piper Alpha disaster, which ature to select ISATs in this paper. Section 5 groups the selected ISATs in
resulted in 167 fatalities. Although systematic techniques have been three categories and characterizes them. Finally, Section 6 concludes
developed to incorporate green chemistry in conceptual design (e.g., this study with recommendations and possible next steps.
Julia
�n-Dura �n and Laura, 2014; Crabtree and El-Halwagi, 1994), much
less attention has been given to including inherently safer chemistry 2. Understanding inherently safer design (ISD)
during the early stages of process design.
Natural threats are another reason why a chemical facility must 2.1. Hazard vs. risk
apply ISD. Krausmann et al. (2011) concluded that natural events trig
gered 5% of industrial accidents involving process units or stored haz It is essential to make a clear distinction between hazard and risk.
ardous substances. In 2017, for instance, all chemical facilities in the U. Table 1 shows key definitions. Risk is the result of a combination of
S. Houston area expected flooding from Hurricane Harvey based on consequence and likelihood, which can vary widely depending on the
previous events involving excessive rainfall (DeRosa et al., 2019).
However, the excessive rainfall from Hurricane Harvey was so unprec
Table 1
edented that the Arkema Crosby facility lost back-up power and failed to
Definitions for Hazard vs. Risk.
safely store organic peroxide products at low temperature. Eventually,
these organic peroxide products loaded in containers and for Harvey Term Definition
placed on trucks spontaneously combusted producing explosion effects, Hazarda A physical or chemical condition that has the potential for causing
and people within a 1.5-mile radius were required to evacuate (Chem harm to something valued such as people, property, or the
environment
ical Safety Board (CSB) 2018). Such an example—of unpredictable
Riska,b The combination of the expected Consequence and Likelihood of a
natural disasters—represents why process engineers must adopt ISD in single incident or a group of incidents, or in general the effect of
the first place rather than attempting to control a hazard after an event it uncertainty on objectives
triggers occurs. By then it may be impossible to control. Specifically, Risk ¼ f ½Consequence; Likelihood�
Cozzani et al. (2010) referred to chemical accidents triggered by natural Consequenceb Potential loss that can be expressed in quantifiable units (e.g.,
hazards (e.g., floods, earthquake, lightning, etc.) that lie at the interface monetary: $/event)
b
Likelihood The chance of occurrence of the incident (e.g., events/year)
of nature and technology as NaTech.
a
CCPS (2008), Guidelines for hazard evaluation procedures.
b
Pasman (2015), and the more general ISO (2009) definition.
Fig. 1. Safety as a key pillar towards sustainability.
2
circumstances and conditions (Pasman, 2015). On the other hand, a Because the 1st order approach is not always applicable, the 2nd order
hazard is the intrinsic-damage potential (e.g., of a chemical or a process). approach should be the alternative. However, for both methods, elimi
As Kletz (1978) said: “what you don’t have, can’t leak,” if chemical nating or reducing hazards—the potentials—is more effective compared
plants were designed without storage tanks, then storage tanks could not to reducing risks, as a risk is the result of a specific situation with un
possibly leak. Similarly, if hazards could be eliminated, possible acci certainty as mentioned in Section 2.1. Without sufficient information for
dents could be completely avoided in advance. the relevant situation, estimating and reducing risk is essentially
Traditionally, the CPIs have focused on reducing risk values with impossible. However, if ISD compares two or multiple alternatives based
preventive measures—attempting to control a hazard by installing add- on the same or similar conditions, researchers tend to prefer the 2nd
on safety equipment. Despite the chance of failure of protective equip order approach for risk reduction.
ment, it can still lower the risk ranking level, implying increased plant
safety. However, the traditional process-design approach often fails to 2.4. Importance of adopting ISD principles during the conceptual design
remove or sufficiently minimize the inherent hazard. To compensate stage
later, it may require late design changes or costly preventative and more
often protective measures. Therefore, ISD to reduce or eliminate the Process design proceeds through several stages starting with research
inherent hazard is a much more proactive approach to reduce overall and development followed by conceptual process synthesis and design
risk levels and improve plant safety. This approach is best implemented where the basic chemical routes and primary functional steps are
during the conceptual process design stage. determined along with mass and energy balances and high-level techno-
economic analysis. During conceptual design, the process engineers
2.2. Four guidewords for ISD have substantial freedom in making design decisions. Next, detailed
design involves thorough analysis, simulation, assessment, and optimi
The use of ISD is driven by with four guidewords (e.g., Kletz and zation that will define the specifications necessary for construction then
Amyotte, 2010—Intensification, Substitution, Attenuation, and Simplifica operation. When feasible during early design stages, the principal con
tion. ISD excludes/reduces hazards with these guidewords. Table 2 cepts of ISD are well aligned with sustainability. As can be seen from
provides a brief overview of ISD principles. Because intensification is Fig. 3, early design stages have much more flexibility to incorporate ISD
used to minimize the amount of hazardous chemicals, its application has features than the subsequent stages. Therefore, the opportunity to adopt
been developed more actively in the CPIs (Tian et al., 2018) relative to ISD is ideal at the research and conceptual design stages; such oppor
other guidewords. tunity decreases and the project cost increases if changes are made
during the subsequent design stages. Once a conceptual design is
2.3. Process risk management system incorporating ISD completed, the other safety strategies should be applied along with ISD.
However, in this case, the project cost would significantly increase to
For an improved risk management system, ISD should be applied in have the same risk level at the same reliability relative to if ISD was
tandem with other safety strategies because ISD is not intended to be a adopted during the conceptual design stage.
stand-alone strategy. For example, Fig. 2 shows the process risk man Nevertheless, implementing ISD may meet difficulty in the concep
agement system incorporating the principles of ISD, domino effects, and tual design stage for two main reasons: (1) there is insufficient time to
layers of protection, based on the notions of Kletz and Amyotte (2010) incorporate ISD in a traditional approach, and (2) the limitation of
and CCPS (2010). Because early design stages (i.e., conceptual design available information (Table 3) to consider all possible hazardous sce
and preliminary design) offer more flexibility to perform ISD, practi narios. Once process designs are determined in basic or detailed engi
tioners must consider ISD to apply it during these stages. If ISD is neering stages, process engineers develop the relevant documents.
impractical to reduce the chance of potential incidents, it may be more Traditionally, plant project engineers undertake safety analysis with
challenging to achieve tolerable risk ranges with the two other safety piping and instrument diagrams (P&IDs) following basic engineering
strategies. In the final step of the risk management system, chemical design with one of the hazard-identification tools (e.g., HAZard and
companies must iterate this hierarchy strategy until tolerable risk ranges OPerability (HAZOP), Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) or
are obtained. What-if). After preliminary engineering design, it is quite difficult to
The scope of ISD, as originally described by Kletz and Amyotte change the main process or materials to increase ISD. Consequently,
(2010), excluded the concept of domino effects. However, many re only opportunities for installing add-on safety features will increase
searchers subsequent to Kletz and Amyotte have contended that domino instead, as shown in Fig. 3 which shows typical values of opportunities
effects are an intrinsic characteristic to be considered for ISD. For for mitigating risk (expressed as percentages compared to 100% op
example, if chemical plants are inherently safer, corresponding domino portunities during research and conceptual design). Table 3 represents
effects are expected to decrease as well. For this reason, this paper will typically available information per each plant design stage (Towler and
focus on ISD and will not cover the secondary scope, domino effects. Sinnott, 2012). Although the available information is limited, it is
Fig. 2 shows two approaches of ISD: (1) the 1st order ISD attempts to crucial to apply the available information prudently to perform ISD
eliminate hazards in a rigorous approach, and (2) the 2nd order ISD effectively.
reduces hazards (or risks) with its four guidewords (CCPS, 2010).
3. Necessity of a new review paper
Table 2
As stated in Section 2, the effect of ISD is maximized when ISD
Four guidewords for inherently safer design (Kletz and Amyotte, 2010; CCPS,
2010; Abidin et al., 2016). principles are applied during the conceptual design stages. Thus, process
engineers must be consciously aware of ISD and apply it with robust
Guideword Description
safety evaluation tools. Without robust tools, engineers may fail to
Intensification Use smaller quantities of hazardous materials by reducing the size discover a potential hazard or risk, resulting in unsafe design.
of relevant equipment (also called “Minimize”)
By the early 1990s, multiple safety assessment tools had been
Substitution Use less hazardous materials, reactions, and processes
Attenuation Use more moderate process conditions through dilution, developed such as HAZOP (Cameron et al., 2017), Dow (1994) Fire &
refrigeration, and process alternatives, but the total amount of Explosion Index (F&EI), Mond Index (Tyler, 1985), and Safety Weight
chemicals might not be reduced (also called “Moderate”) Hazard Index (SWeHi) (Khan et al., 2001). Although these tools have
Simplification Eliminate unnecessary complexity to decrease the likelihood of contributed to the process safety field, they are inappropriate to use
errors
during the early design stages; however, they can be applied
3
Fig. 2. Process risk management system incorporating three strategies: Inherently Safer Design, avoidance of domino effects, add-on safety and procedure. (Modified
from Kletz and Amyotte (2010) and CCPS (2010)).
conditionally during or after the preliminary engineering stage. For ISD principles during the early design stages.
example, a typical HAZOP study is performed with P&IDs and plot plans Many researchers have focused on safety indices because of their
that are made after finalizing an accurate process design scheme. As the quick and straightforward attributes (Abidin et al., 2018). A safety index
most commonly used safety index, Dow F&EI has functioned to analyze is a tool that assesses the relative safety level among alternative pro
safety for basic process design (Qi et al., 2019; Va �zquez et al., 2017; cesses using safety indicators (or parameters) that can differ depending
Al-Mutairi et al., 2008; Suardin et al., 2007). However, this index tool on the index used. A safety indicator, typically represented as a numeric
also requires detailed information (e.g., equipment sizes, material in value, is the fundamental metric that represents the degree of safety of a
ventories, flows from P&IDs, and plot plans), which may require many process. The lower the value of a combination of indicators, the safer the
assumptions to obtain a total safety index value. Furthermore, Dow, process design is compared to alternatives.
(1994) examines hazard, flammability, and reactivity based on NFPA
(1991). Because the NFPA standard is based on the standard process
3.1. Recent review papers relevant to inherent assessment tools (ISATs)
conditions—defined as a temperature of 20 � C and an absolute pressure
of 1 atm—it does not enable the consideration of chemicals existing in
There have been several review papers discussing how ISATs have
different process conditions. The Mond Index (Tyler, 1985) also requires
been developed. To provide coverage of the topic, five representative
more detailed process design schemes (e.g., pipelines longer than 25 m
review papers focusing on various ISATS were selected. For each paper,
are regarded as separate process units (Edwards and Lawrence, 1993)).
the suggested tools were checked for potential adoption and utilization
Lastly, SWeHi requires information obtained during the detailed engi
in the conceptual design stage.
neering stage such as plant layout, safety system, and barriers (Roy et al.,
Srinivasan and Natarajan (2012) examined the key developments of
2016). Consequently, analyzing proper ISATs is necessary to maximize
inherent safety with 111 articles published between 2000 and 2011.
4
Fig. 3. Typical opportunities of risk management strategies during chemical plant projects.
Table 3 Table 4
Available information per each plant design stage (Modified from Towler and Eight sub-topics for inherently safety research from Srinivasan and Natarajan
Sinnott, 2012). (2012).
Plant Design Stage Available Information Sub-topic of inherent safety Note
Research concept Chemistry, MSDS information Material Defined as chemical’s intrinsic characteristics
Conceptual design Process flow diagram (PFD), Equipment list, Vessel designs, Chemistry Defined as chemical reactions including runaway
Reactor models, Simulation modeling concerns
Preliminary design P&IDs, Process control scheme, Metallurgy, Detailed mass Unit operation Mainly intensification such as microreactor systems
and energy balance, Hydraulics, Offsites Flowsheet and layout Including domino effects
Detailed design Mechanical designs, Instrument specs, Vendor details, Plot Storage and transportation Referred to as the inventory of hazardous materials
engineering plans stored
Procurement, Piping isometric, As built specs Process control and safety Including safety instrumented system (SIS), safety
construction system integrity level (SIL), and pressure safety valve (PSV)
Operation Commissioning log, Operations log, Maintenance log Human factors and Significantly related to the likelihood of events
management systems
Assessment techniques Shown as ISD indices
This article divided the research topics for inherent safety into eight
sub-topics, as shown in Table 4.
As shown in Table 4, the authors considered ISD in the framework of adequate to be utilized during the conceptual design stage. However,
risk management rather than in a strictly technical sense. Hence, this this result can vary depending on the analysis approach on the safety
article expanded the scope of ISD beyond the inherently safer principles indices. Although Roy and his co-authors regarded inventory as an in
of Kletz and Amyotte (2010) by including the research of layout, add-on dicator that can be obtained only with data after the conceptual design
safety features, and human factors. Such expanded scope with several stage, it can be easily estimated during the conceptual design stage. For
risk management features is beyond the scope of this paper. example, available flow rate data (e.g., kg/hr. or ton/hr.) obtained from
Roy et al. (2016) analyzed 25 representative safety indices for their a process simulation software can be exploited to estimate the potential
viability at each stage of a lifecycle in a plant project. The analysis was chemical amount of an inventory (e.g., equipment or pipelines). With an
performed based on the indicators required for executing the safety emphasis on inventory, 9 out of 25 indices were selected to be adequate
indices. In the authors’ result, only 1 index among the 25 indices was for usage during the conceptual design stage. The nine indices are:
5
� Mond Index (Lewis, 1979) � Hybrid approach

� PIIS Index (Edwards and Lawrence, 1993) � Equation-based approach
� ISI (Heikkila
€, 1999) � Graphical approach
� EHS Index (Koller et al., 1999) � Advanced mathematical approach
� GreenPro-I (Khan et al., 2002) � Risk-based approach
� Life Cycle Index (Khan et al., 2004) � Relative ranking
� Process Route Index (Leong and Shariff, 2009)
� Process Stream Index (Shariff et al., 2012) Based on these six categories, the authors developed a table on how
� Risk-based Ranking of Hazardous Thermal Chemical (Busura et al., each indicator was estimated. However, the authors did not limit the
2014). concept of ISD as introduced by Kletz and Amyotte (2010) and included
several articles associated with domino effects in their review—which is
It should be noted that the Mond Index should be excluded, given it also out of the scope in this paper (see Table 2 in Section 2.4).
was already deemed unsuitable, as mentioned in the beginning of Sec Furthermore, the choice of numerous indicators may confuse practi
tion 3. As an extension, this paper will also analyze these 8 indices to tioners regarding prioritization or utilization. For example, it may be
determine their viability during the conceptual design stage. challenging for process engineers to select appropriate indicators to use
Jafari et al. (2018) reviewed inherent process safety indicators in order to evaluate the safety status. As an extension of the article, this
through 62 peer-reviewed articles published between 1990 and 2017. study will pursue more practical comparisons among inherently safer
Notably, this study analyzed two main aspects—ISD indicators and indicators for improved practical applications.
estimation approaches for ISD. As Fig. 4 shows, the authors divided all Tang et al. (2018) conducted a literature review of safety indicators
indicators they found in the articles into six categories: (1) chemical and commonly used in the offshore oil and gas industry. However, there was
physical properties of materials, (2) process conditions, (3) reaction no specific mention about ISATs.
properties, (4) equipment, (5) types of activities/operations, and (6) Athar et al. (2019) reviewed 93 ISATs extracted from 387 articles.
consequences. Fig. 4 presents the indicators the authors found in the 62 The authors followed Kletz’s ISD concept by analyzing ISATs that can be
articles with black-color lining; possible indicators proposed by the used during the early design stages. The authors found that a two-thirds
authors, but not seen in the articles, are presented with red color lining. majority of ISATs developed were hazard-based tools rather than
Furthermore, the authors divided the estimation approaches into six risk-based tools. The reviewed tools were tabulated to represent their
categories: Health, Safety, and Environment scope and output features in check
boxes under the following seven method categories:
Fig. 4. Summary of all indicators under six categories (adopted from Jafari et al. (2018)).
6
� Indexing (57%) proposed inherent safety tools or cost optimization with safety through
� Consequence (13%) the Scopus database or ACS website. Among those journal papers, we
� Graphical (7%) selected ones that can be applied during the conceptual design stage (see
� Numerical (5%) Table 3). The primary scopes of reviewing journal papers in this paper
� Computer-aided (15%) are safety or cost optimization with safety. Inclusion or exclusion of spe
� Optimization (3%) cific ISATs was based on its relevance to conceptual design. For instance,
� Experimental (1%) a tool requires details that are not typically available during conceptual
design, then it was excluded. The search for papers has been ended in the
The percentage in parentheses represents the respective proportion third week of March 2019.
of total ISATs for each method. However, it is likely too difficult to
divide ISATs based on the suggested categories due to many hybrid 5. Inherent safety assessment tools (ISATs) for the conceptual
methods among the seven methods (e.g., indexing with computer-aid, design stage
indexing and graphical, or consequence and computer-aid).
5.1. The division of three ISATs
4. Method of reviewing literature
This paper analyzes ISATs based on the three categories shown in
As seen in the background information provided in the previous Fig. 5: Hazard-based ISAT (H-ISAT), Risk-based ISAT (R-ISAT), and Cost-
sections, this paper aims to analyze the characteristics of inherent safety Optimal ISAT (CO-ISAT) (see Fig. 6).
assessment tools (ISATs), which can be viable in the conceptual design The primary purpose of each ISAT is denoted with bold letters in
stage. Various inherent safety tools were selected and reviewed. After Fig. 5. The purpose of H-ISATs has been to rank inherent hazard levels
wards, the selected ISATs were categorized into risk management sys among alternatives, while R-ISATs have selected safer process design(s)
tem terms, ‘hazard and risk’ (Table 2); These categories will help via the measures of consequence and likelihood. Finally, CO-ISATs have
practitioners smoothly adopt ISATs as the approach aligns closely with a proposed optimal decision-making for sustainability with economic
conventional risk management system. Furthermore, this paper will analysis and safety constraints.
explore how economic, safety, and sustainability can be optimized and Fig. 5 shows the essential and supplementary steps for each ISAT
reconciled during the conceptual design stage. distinguished with straight and dotted lines, respectively. For example,
In addition to the 291 articles from the previous review papers, the consequence analysis in R-ISAT is an essential step in selecting an
further journal papers were retrieved based on the relevance to the inherently safer process design, while the calculation of damage
Fig. 5. Schematic representation of three inherent safety assessment tools for the conceptual design stage.
7
Fig. 6. Distribution of different types among 22 selected H-ISATs.
distance is a supplementary step. The connections between other ISATs data in a process. For example, integrating data between a process
are not requisite steps, so all connection lines are shown as dotted lines. simulator (e.g., Aspen Plus or HYSYS) and Visual Basic for Application
The dotted lines between different ISATs represents multi-ISAT frame (VBA) language can save significant time and streamline the safety
works that have been proposed by researchers (e.g., ranking inherent analysis process.
levels in H-ISATs, followed by estimating inherent risk levels in R- Early H-ISATs calculated inherent safety levels with only pure
ISATs). chemicals, while several researchers have considered chemical mixtures
ISATs may be used independent of each other or in a specific since 2009.
sequence. The usage of the three ISATs can be described by the following It is worth defining different process scopes—process routes, steps,
use cases: 1) H-ISAT followed by CO-ISAT, 2) R-ISAT followed by a CO- units, and streams—to compare H-ISATs, as authors typically developed
ISAT, or 3) H-ISAT followed by R-ISAT, followed finally by CO-ISAT. The their own methods with varying definitions. The following selected
CR-ISATs and CO-ISATs have more complex steps in comparison with H- definitions will help clarify the H-ISATs mentioned in Table 5:
ISAT. H-ISATs solely estimate inherent safety level via selected in
dicators on a comparative basis. In some cases, the procedure to deter � Process route: an overall process compiled of a series of process
mine H-ISATs is used as part of R-ISATs. However, R-ISATs select a safer steps—equipment and streams—converting raw materials to a
process design based on two modes. The first mode, Mode 2.1, utilizes required product and waste via intermediate materials (Lawrence,
damage distance based on potential consequence. Meanwhile, the sec 1996)
ond mode, Mode 2.2, utilizes inherent risk level along with the measure � Process step: a partial process route that can be characterized based
of consequence and its likelihood. Moreover, CO-ISATs can have three on its process functions (e.g., reaction steps and distillation trains),
types of safety constraints from (1) Mode 1: inherent hazard levels via H- which typically includes multiple pieces of process equipment
ISATs, (2) Mode 2.1, or (3) Mode 2.2, which are ordered in increasing � Process unit: defined, according to ISO (2006), as the “smallest
effort from (1) to (3). The choice will depend on the severity of the safety element considered in the life cycle inventory analysis for which
situation. input and output data are quantified.” The process unit was referred
According to the above-mentioned points, the detailed analysis for to as a process step by Palaniappan, Srinivasan, and Tan (2002a),
each ISAT will be described in the following subsections. whereas Li et al. (2011) and Gangadharan et al. (2013) referred to it
as process equipment. To avoid confusion, this paper avoids usage of
the “process unit” term.
5.2. Hazard-based inherent safety assessment tools (H-ISATs)
� Process stream: referred to as a process pipeline
This study selected 22 H-ISATs that contain limited but viable in
Table 5 also compared process scopes to estimate inherent safety
formation applicable during the conceptual design stage. Most of the
levels (see Fig. 7). Most of the initial H-ISATs compared multiple process
selected H-ISATs were proposed for the safety scope except for two tools
routes to determine the safer process routes, while several later H-ISATs
(IOHI in Table 5 #8, and graphical method for inherent occupational
compared multiple streams or pieces of equipment within a process
health assessment in Table #11), which are for health. Table 5 lists the
route to estimate safety levels. Fig. 8 shows the processes used in the
H-ISATs in chronological order to provide an overview with five primary
case studies among 20 H-ISATs. Many authors adopted the same Methyl
characteristics: (1) types of H-ISATs, (2) purpose of each tool, (3)
Methacrylate process as was used in the pioneer H-ISAT, PIIS, to have a
computer aid, (4) types of chemical component, and (5) process design
reference to compare with their new methods.
scopes compared for inherent safety levels.
All 18 indices in H-ISATs measure an inherent safety level with
The selected 22 H-ISATs have been characterized into five different
multiple safety indicators that can be classified into two categories:
types of methods (Fig. 5); Index methods were the most commonly
chemical indicators and process indicators. Chemical indicators account
proposed methods followed by graphical methods, a fuzzy logic method,
for the hazard presented by the chemicals in the process, while process
and a hybrid index plus fuzzy logic method.
indicators refer to the hazard presented by the operating conditions in
59% of the tools in Table 5 adopted computer-aided methods to
the process. However, researchers have not clearly defined the differ
efficiently deal with large amounts of data. Prior to utilizing a computer
entiating factors between chemical indicators and process indicators.
simulator, it has been stated a challenge to obtain feasible process data,
For instance, Edwards and Lawrence (1993) regarded inventory as a
such as inventory values. In this manner, required overall yield was
chemical indicator, while Heikkil€ a (1999) regarded it as a process in
proposed to indirectly quantify the amount of chemicals in a process or
dicator. Further, heat of reaction was considered as a chemical indicator
supplement an inaccurate inventory value (e.g., PIIS, Table 5 #1).
by Heikkil€ a (1999), while it was considered as a process indicator by
However, enabling practitioners to obtain process data through com
Ahmad et al. (2014). This paper will consider whether an indicator is a
puter software reduces the time and effort required to collect indicator
8
Table 5
List of 22 Hazard-based Inherent Safety Assessment Tools (H-ISATs) selected.
No. Authors (Year) H-ISAT Remark Computer Chemical Process design scope compared for
aid component inherent safety levels
Name Typea Pure Mixture Route Stream Equipment etc.
1 Edwards and Prototype Index for S Assessed the inherent safety of _ _

Lawrence (1993); Inherent Safety (PIIS) chemical process routes
Lawrence (1996)
2 Heikkil€
a (1999) Inherent Safety Index S Proposed a practice that can be _ _
(ISI) adopted quickly by the potential
practitioners
3 Palaniappan, i-Safe S As an extension of PIIS ISI, _ _ _
Srinivasan, and proposed an automated tool
Tan (2002a); including five supplementary
(2002b) indices were proposed for
rigorous ranking
4 Gupta and Graphical method G Avoided equalizing the same _ _
Edwards (2003) numerical value among different
indicators
5 Gentile et al. Fuzzy logic based F Minimized uncertainty in scoring _ _ _ _
(2003); Gentile inherent safety index index with fuzzy logic methods, Reactor
(2004) based on ISI.
6 Leong and Shariff Inherent Safety Index S Simplified process equipment _ _ _ _
(2008) Module (ISIM) that have unsafe level compared Reactor
to others
7 Leong and Shariff Process Route Index N Estimated the outcome of an _ _ _
(2009) (PRI) explosion in a non-scoring
system
8 Hassim and Inherent Occupational N Estimated inherent occupational _ _
Hurme (2010a) Health Index (IOHI) health hazard using three
different types of index
calculations: additive-type,
average-type, and worst case-
type.
9 Li et al. (2011) Enhanced Inherent S Overcame ISI limitations—only _ _ _ _
Safety Index (EISI) considering maximum value for
indicators and not considering
complexity
10 Shariff et al. Process Stream Index N Compared individual streams at _ _ _
(2012) (PSI) one single process route
11 Hassim et al. Graphical method for G Developed based on IOHI and _ _
(2013) inherent occupational experts’ comments
health assessment
12 Gangadharan Comprehensive Inherent S Proposed a connection score _ _ _
et al. (2013) Safety Index (CISI) among process steps as an
extension of EISI
13 Zaini et al. (2014) Toxic Release Route N Compared toxicity among _ _ _
Index (TRRI) multiple process routes
14 Zaini et al. (2014) Toxic Release Stream N Compared toxicity among all _ _ _
Index (TRSI) process streams in a route after
estimating TRRI
15 Ahmad et al. Numerical Descriptive N Overcame the disadvantages of _ _
(2014) Inherent Safety index-based methods that
Technique (NuDIST) evaluated inherently safer level
with discrete safety indicators
16 Ahmad et al. NuDIST N Considered flammability limits _ _
(2016)b for a mixture
17 Ahmad et al. Graphical and G Ranked, through visualization, _ _
(2016a) Numerical Descriptive inherent safety levels
Technique for Inherent Identified the most hazardous
Safety Assessment chemical
(GRAND)
2-Diemnsional Graphical
Rating (2DGR)
18 Pasha et al., Inherent Safety Index for N Calculated the inherent safety _ _ _ (H/E)
(2017) Shell and Tube Heat level of explosion for a Shell and
Exchanger (ISISTHE) Tube Heat Exchanger (STHE)
through a similar approach of PSI
19 Pasha et al., Overall Safety Index for N Considered heat exchanger _ _ _ _ (H/E)
(2017) Heat Exchanger Network network
(OSIHEN)
20 Ahmad et al. Inherent Safety N Updated a tool as an extension of _ _
(2017) Assessment Technique NuDIST and GRAND
for Preliminary Design
Stage (ISAPED)
(continued on next page)
9
Table 5 (continued )
No. Authors (Year) H-ISAT Remark Computer Chemical Process design scope compared for
aid component inherent safety levels
Name Typea Pure Mixture Route Stream Equipment etc.
21 Song et al. (2018) Inherent Safety SþF Proposed a framework based on _ _ _

Performance Indices fuzzy logic methods with an
(ISPI) index method
22 Athar et al. (2019) Process Stream N Assessed process piping as an _ _ _
Characteristic Index extension of PSI
(PSCI)
a
S: Index type in a scoring system, N: Index type in a non-scoring system, G: graph approach, and F: Fuzzy logic approach, H/E: heat exchanger.
Fig. 7. Process route configuration with process step (or unit), equipment, and stream.
process or chemical indicator based on the majority views among 18 For the 7 process indicators (Lawrence, 1996; Heikkila
€, 1999).
indices. As a result, there were 13 chemical indicators and 7 process
indicators as shown below: 1) Temperature: a measure of the thermal energy that cause a fire or an
For the 11 chemical indicators. explosion (Srinivasan and Nhan, 2008) or of burns to humans
(Hassim and Hurme, 2010a)
1) Flammability: the tendency of a material to combust in air 2) Pressure: a measure of the energy present that cause materials to
(Heikkil€a, 1999) escape from the process within a relatively short time
2) Explosiveness: ability to form an explosive mixture with air 3) Inventory: the amount of process material that is closely related to
3) Density: used to explain the principle of fluid mechanics that can reaction rate or conversion in a reactor. Inventory is the key indicator
impact during an incident of the inherent safety principle, intensification
4) Lower heat of combustion: measure of energy 4) Type of equipment (ISBL and OSBL): a measure of the possibility that
5) Toxicity: property that destroys life or causes injury, measured by a piece of equipment is unsafe
the threshold limit (or exposure limit or R-phrase for the occu 5) Mode of process: three types of process modes—batch, semi-batch,
pational health hazard in Hassim and Hurme (2010a)) and continuous process—can be related to workplace exposure
6) Chemical interaction: consideration of unintended reaction (Hassim and Hurme, 2010a)
among raw materials, intermediates, and byproducts (Pala 6) Yield: a measure of inventory or flow needed to obtain a required
niappan, Srinivasan, and Tan, 2002b) product
7) Corrosiveness: associated with the reliability and integrity of a 7) Structure: a description of inherent safety associated with the process
chemical plant, as corrosion increases the risk of leaks in a pro configuration
cess by lessening the strength of an equipment material (Heikkila €,
1999) Fig. 9 shows the number of indicators used among 18 indices in H-
8) Material phase (gas, liquid, and solid): related to the way chem ISATs. In terms of the number of indicators, the most used indicator was
icals will be handled and exposed (Hassim and Hurme, 2010a). pressure, followed by temperature, explosiveness, and toxicity. On the
For example, solid processes are likely to be performed manually other hand, some indicators (e.g., viscosity, type of equipment, and
so that it has more changes to have higher exposure to workers structure) were used only once.
9) Reactivity: a measure of stability (Palaniappan, Srinivasan, and Various indices in H-ISATs have been developed with either a scoring
Tan, 2002a) system or a non-scoring system. Indices in a scoring system grade the
10) Heat of reaction (heat of main reaction and heat of side reaction): indicators depending on their scales (Appendix A), whereas indices in a
a measure of the hazard of the reaction and the possibility to non-scoring system utilize the actual indicator values in a process
control the reaction without any scoring (Appendix B). The two tables rigorously compare
11) Viscosity: a measure of the mass of the fluid flow regime inside scores and equations of individual indices based on chemical and pro
process piping (Athar et al., 2019) cess indicators mentioned above.
12) Volatility: related to inhalation and absorption in terms of Appendix A compares 8 indices that score individual indicators via a
occupational health hazard. It can be characterized by the vapor sub-range to calculate total safety scores. Initially, indices in the scoring
pressure or atmospheric boiling point in a liquid substance, or by system served as a yardstick that measures inherent safety with possible
a smaller dusk in a solid substance (Hassim and Hurme, 2010a) indicators and their ranges. The range of each indicator must be
13) Type of reaction: a measure of reactivity to supplement heat of reasonable to effectively compare the indicator among different process
reaction that cannot indicate all the reaction characteristic (Song routes, steps, units, or streams. Because the calculation approaches are
et al., 2018) highly dependent on the scoring technique, it is imperative to
10
Fig. 8. Histogram of process used in the case studies in 22 H-ISATs.
understand the differing guidelines of each index. Fig. 10 represents the showing it with numbers. For example, one graphical method separately
origins of the scoring systems among individual indicators. Preexisting plotted five key indicators (temperature, pressure, flammability,
scoring standards (e.g., Dow F&EI and Mond), adopted by a group of explosiveness, and toxicity) (Gupta and Edwards, 2003), while another
authors for one of the indices, are shown by blue colored bars, while 2-dimensional graphical rating, 2DGR, simultaneously plotted the fre
authors’ own discretional choices are shown by yellow colored bars. The quency of the most hazardous chemicals with their process route and a
x-axis addresses the number of each scoring scale used among 7 indices. total safety score for each route (Ahmad et al., 2016a).
The analysis of the results in Fig. 10 illustrates that most base standards
used were proposed by PIIS and ISI, and these standards were reused in 5.3. Risk-based inherent safety assessment tools (R-ISATs)
other indices. Three new methods were proposed as alternatives to
scoring-based indices: a fuzzy logic method, non-scoring-based indices, The primary limitations of H-ISATs are the inability to illustrate
and graphical methods. Because each indicator in the scoring-based potential incident scenarios and their damage impacts. H-ISATs aggre
indices results in subjective ranges and discontinuities at the range gate multiple indicators for different types of hazards, which can be
limits, the alternatives were proposed in an attempt to overcome these related to potential incidents. However, they do not cover the entirety of
limitations. First, Gentile et al. (2003) attempted to minimize the un ISD.
certainty of scaled boundaries with a fuzzy logic method. Second, ten To resolve these limitations, many researchers have developed R-
non-scoring-based indices (Appendix B) utilized actual chemical and ISATs, which can consider concrete incident scenarios through different
process condition values for each indicator, instead of the value based on approaches in the conceptual design stage. Table 9 summarizes 33
a scoring system. For example, operating pressure values were exploited selected R-ISATs. Although researchers have sought to propose R-ISATs
in all ten indices in Appendix B. Even though Ahmad et al. (2014) as an easy-to-use method, multiple extra steps are unavoidable for R-
distinguished their method from a scoring-based index method, NuDIST, ISATs in comparison with H-ISATs. For this reason, several frame
which is based on statistical analysis, was classified in this paper into a works—including expanded H-ISATs—also were proposed. The column
non-scoring index. This is because the method is in accordance with our “ISAT used” in Table 9 helps to understand the proposed framework as
definition of a safety index in Section 3. Lastly, graphical methods were an extension step of H-ISATs.
used in an attempt to visualize an inherent safety level instead of The proposed R-ISATs can be grouped into three types of approaches:
11
Fig. 9. Histogram of indicators in H-ISATs.
12
Fig. 10. Papers with scoring scales of 8 indices in H-ISATs.
(1) qualitative-based, (2) index-based, and (3) quantitative-based ap R-ISATs in Mode 2.1 estimates the consequence impact in a selected
proaches. The main difference among the three approaches is the way scenario by considering damage distances, human life damages, and
the incident scenarios are considered. Qualitative approaches depend on structure damages. Because the likelihood of possible incidents was not
the practitioner’s creative ideas and knowledge to obtain possible sce considered in Mode 2.1, the potential damage in a worst-cases scenario
narios. Thereby, their possible scenarios (e.g., safer process or equip has been compared among the alternatives. Through this comparison,
ment) are enumerated without rigorous numeric values. In contrast, the practitioners can determine which process design is safer.
outcome of quantitative approaches is numerically shown in the appli Mode 2.2 R-ISATs provide the likelihood of possible incidents in
cation of a quantitative risk analysis (QRA). During a QRA, a conse detail, except for qualitative approaches. Three types of likelihood have
quence analysis together with its likelihood is carried out to provide a been taken into account in a scenario to yield an inherent risk as shown
measure of risk (AIChE, 2000). Furthermore, index-based approaches in Fig. 12: (1) initial event likelihood, (2) consequence likelihood, and
follow each author’s scenarios or concerns through multiple sub-indices. (3) consequence damage likelihood. Fault tree analysis (FTA) is often
A more detailed comparison is shown in Table 6. utilized for the initial events, while event tree analysis (ETA) is
Similar to the conventional distinction between consequence and employed for the outcome consequences due to the initial events.
risk assessment tools, R-ISATs are divided into Mode 2.1, referred to as Finally, Profit functions are for consequence damage impacts. Fig. 12
consequence assessment, and Mode 2.2, referred to as risk assessment shows that consequence damage likelihoods are mostly utilized to esti
(see Fig. 5). Fig. 11 provides the results obtained from the analysis of the mate inherent risk, while initial event likelihoods are the least used.
33 R-ISATs selected. Various index-based approaches have been utilized Table 7 shows the breakdown of R-ISATs in terms of their scopes.
in Mode 2.1 R-ISATs, while Mode 2.2 is typically associated with Compared to health and environment, safety accounts for 67% of all R-
quantitative-based approaches. This is due to how Mode 2.2 obtains ISATs (22/33) and has, therefore, been prioritized. However, in order to
inherent risk as a numerical value via possible consequence and its improve sustainability in chemical plants, multiple scopes in 18% R-
likelihood. Furthermore, it is noted that QAISD (Table 9 #14) and QI2SD ISATs have been considered simultaneously. All five studies, including
(Table 9 #16) were grouped into Mode 2.2 as these tools qualitatively safety, health, and environment, employ index-based approaches to
take into account the likelihood based on the ISD guide combine different scopes after utilizing each sub-index.
word—simplicity. Meanwhile, HPS (Table 9 #29), which does not The incident scenarios in R-ISATs can be classified into seven events:
include any likelihood aspect, was categorized into Mode 2.1. fire, explosion, dispersion of toxic chemicals, or the various
13
Fig. 10. (continued).
Table 6
Summary of three different approaches in R-ISATs.
Qualitative-based approaches Index-based approaches Quantitative-based approaches
Basis of Brainstorming techniques (e.g., HAZOP Author’s subjective considerations QRA

development or Checklist)
Advantages Potential to consider all hazardous Relatively easy to perform � Clear approach to select the inherent safety level or safer
scenarios design among alternatives
� More systematic approach
Disadvantages Essential judgement Limited scope for the consideration of Potential to obtain enough information in the concept design
possible scenarios stage
combinations of them. Table 8 illustrates the number and frequency of Although the layout of a chemical plant is not determined in the
the used scenarios in R-ISATs. In order to suggest a more realistic sce conceptual design stage, several R-ISATs utilized ISD to propose sound
nario, 46% of studies in the literature rigorously represented all three alternatives. For example, in case a possible incident occurs, reasonable
scenarios. As a pioneer, Lawrence (1996) introduced four-factor index distances of equipment from an engineering building have been illus
without a concrete scenario to emphasize the importance of risk trated under the given safety criteria (Shariff et al., 2016).
assessment in the early design stage. In the early design stages, there is typically a striking lack of
Several researchers have employed optimization tools to suggest an knowledge on lay-out, plant environment, and distance to residential
effective ISD solution given multiple aspects to be considered effective. areas, perhaps, even no idea where the plant, if built, will be located. In
For instance, Patel et al. (2010) illustrated the process for obtaining 11 that case, what remains is in principle the consequence part of risk
alternative solvents via the optimization-based tool, mixture integer assessment—Mode 2.1 R-ISATs. For that in the first place, data are
non-linear program (MINLP), followed by consequence analysis and needed on the nature and quantity of the various inventories the plant
potential damage distance. Furthermore, Cabezas et al. (1999) opti will have. The reviewed Mode 2.1 R-ISATs all require knowledge and
mized possible environmental effects. effort to calculate potential source terms and physical effects, that will
14
Fig. 11. The division of R-ISATs into two modes (Fig. 5) and their approaches.
Fig. 12. Three types of likelihoods considered in the quantitative-based and index-based Mode 2.2 R-ISATs.
impede designers to apply it. example, Shariff and Zaini (2010) and Shariff and Wahab (2013) pro
The main advantage of Mode 2.2 is a well-defined acceptable or posed one alternative that can reduce the potential consequence asso
tolerable criterion that increase the potential for clear decision-making. ciated with a column and storage vessel. Pasha et al., (2017) applied two
In case that the inherent risk acceptability levels were not below the inherently safer design principles-attenuation and simplification—for
defined tolerable zone, it is required to find a better alternative. For alternative designs on heat exchanger networks when the basic design
15
Table 7
The number and frequency of scopes considered in 33 R-ISATs.
Scope considered Safety Health Environment Safety þ Health Health þ Environment Safety þ Health þEnvironment
Number (Frequency) 22 (67%) 2 (6%) 3 (9%) 1 (3%) 0 (0%) 5 (15%)
Table 8
The number and frequency of the 28 scenario types considered for safety scope in R-ISATs.
Scenario type No scenario Fire Explosion Toxicity Fire Fire Explosion Fire
þ Explosion þ Toxicity þ Toxicity þ Explosion
þ Toxicity
Number (Frequency) 1 (4%) 2 (7%) 3 (11%) 4 (14%) 4 (14%) 1 (4%) 0 (0%) 13 (46%)
did not meet the criterion. For the acceptable/tolerable criteria, “as Low approach is not considered sufficient to estimate ISD effects.
as reasonably practicable” (ALARP) principle has been utilized in Mode Initial attempts required additional information that are unlikely to
2.2 R-ISAT. be available in the conceptual design stage. Such information includes
Even though R-ISATs have been developed to overcome the limita vulnerability factors of a specific area (Khan et al., 2004), or the cost of
tions of H-ISATs, they also have their own notable limitations. First, an add-on system (Khan and Amyotte, 2004). Indirect costs expected the
compared to H-ISATs, R-ISATs require additional effort—in terms of losses arising from business interruptions, insurance, and penalties from
time, and safety knowledge (e.g., consequence modeling, ETA, FTA, or the authorities, etc. The 12% (2/17) of CO-ISATs accounts for economic
Probit functions). Second, scenarios considered with R-ISATs have aspect along with vulnerability, which is capable of being damaged in
inherent uncertainties when compared to conventional risk assessment the surrounding area of the process plant.
tools. Conventional tools utilize detailed information as they are Table 11 presents the scope considered in CO-ISATs between safety,
employed subsequently to detailed design. On the other hand, R-ISATs health, and environment. Similar to R-ISATs, the most considered scope
are ideally implemented during the conceptual design stage and, as was safety at 44% (8/18) of CO-ISATs, followed by the five CO-ISATs in
such, can use only limited information available during that stage. the combination of safety and environment. Lastly, four–CO–ISATs were
able to simultaneously consider the 3 scopes.
5.4. Cost-optimal inherent safety assessment tools (CO-ISATs) For CO-ISATs, the decision-making tools have been adopted to
demonstrate cost factors along with safety. The used decision-making
This section analyzes CO-ISATs to understand how cost-optimal procedures in the 15 CO-ISATs are divided into the five main cate
inherent safety solutions are obtained. gories (Table 12): (1) multi-criteria decision making procedure (MCD),
The selected CO-ISATs were developed for the conceptual design (2) multi-objective formulation procedure (MOF), (3) sensitivity anal
stage in the same manner as previous ISATs in Sections 5.2 and 5.3. ysis, (4) index method, and (5) graphical method.
Table 12 chronologically lists the selected 18 CO-ISATs to provide an MCD by itself is not able to establish various solutions (or alterna
overview with four primary characteristics: (1) scopes, (2) ISAT used, tives) in a single run. However, by utilizing a weighting scheme that
(3) safety evaluation modes, and (4) decision-making procedures. accounts for the importance of individual attributes, MCD is capable of
Reviewing used safety tools in CO-ISATs reveals whether the selected changing a multi-objective problem into a single-objective problem. For
CO-ISATs were viable in the conceptual design stage. For example, example, Analytical hierarchy process (AHP), which is a type of MCD,
initial CO-ISATs uses SWeHI (Table 12 #4) and Mond Index (Table 12 finds an optimal solution by utilizing weight factors (Khan et al., 2004;
#5)—which may not feasible in the conceptual design stage (see Section Khan et al., 2002).
3). That is, these CO-ISATs require additional information not available Meanwhile, MOF finds multiple solutions in a single run. For
during the conceptual design stage as they were not developed based on example, Pareto front, which is a type of MOFs, presents an array of
H-ISATs or R-ISATs. However, these initial attempts at developing CO- optimal solutions for multiple problems simultaneously. The optimal
ISATs (Khan and Amyotte, 2005; Tugnoli et al., 2008) influenced sub solution point is then selected using specific techniques such as Shan
sequent CO-ISATs. In contrast, more recent CO-ISATs have been devel non’s Entropy and Bellman-Zadeh’s techniques (Eini et al., 2018).
oped based on H-ISATs (e.g., PRI and PSI) and R-ISATs (e.g., FEDI) to Khan and Abbasi (1997) firstly proposed an index approach to
address these short-comings. evaluate inherent safety along with a cost consideration. The net
Because the simultaneous evaluation of safety and economy is inherent safety of a selected process is calculated with a formulation that
fundamental in CO-ISATs, it is essential to comprehend the basis of each combines values obtained from multiple sub-indices. Of the multiple
evaluation. In terms of safety evaluation, this paper divides CO-ISATs sub-indices, an asset density index, which is associated with vulnera
into three modes depending on the approach to account for safety bility of possible incidents, considers economic aspects.
constraints (see Fig. 5)—Mode 1, Mode 2.1, and Mode 2.2. In Mode 1, A graphical approach was adopted to visually compare each alter
safety is taken into account through inherent hazard levels by utilizing native (e.g., energy, recycle ratio) (Thiruvenkataswamy et al., 2016;
one H-ISAT (e.g., PSI or PRI in Table 5). In contrast, Mode 2.1 and Mode Ortiz-Espinoza et al., 2017).
2.2 consider safety based on the potential damages and inherent risk Sensitivity analysis estimates how different values of an independent
levels, respectively. Practitioners can utilize one of the three modes variable affect a dependent variable. This procedure was utilized with a
depending on the relevancy of each mode’s characteristics. Table 10 standalone, MCD, MOF, or a graphical approach among the 15 CO-
summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of each mode of CO- ISATs.
ISATs. Furthermore, in terms of economy evaluation, Fig. 13 repre Around 60% (5/16) of CO-ISATs employ computer-aided software to
sents 19 different types of costs considered. It is worth noting that use their tools effectively. Since Medina-Herrera et al. (2014) used
approximately 33% of researchers accounted for incident costs (e.g., Computer-aided Molecular Design (CAMD) and MATLAB, all subsequent
fatality, injury, environment damages, etc.) along with conventional researchers began utilizing computer-aided software including process
cost evaluations (e.g., ROI, TAC, operating cost, etc.) as the conventional simulators (e.g., Aspen HYSYS and Plus).
16
Table 9
List of 33 Risk-based Inherent Safety Assessment Tools (R-ISATs) selected.
No. Authors (Year) R-ISAT Remark H-ISAT Mode Scope Likelihood
a used
Name Type 2.1 2.2 S H E IL CL DL
1 Lawrence (1996) Four-factor index IN Update PIIS based on eight experts’ _ _

opinions
2 Cave and Edwards Environment Hazard Index IN Assessed the impact of hazardous _ _
(1997) (EHI) chemicals on aquatic and terrestrial
ecosystem
3 Khan and Abbasi Rapid risk analysis-based QN Proposed a tool to aid in decision- _ _ _
(1998a) design (RRABD) making with a scenario-based
structure
4 Khan and Abbasi Hazard Identification and IN Proposed HIRA including two indices: _ _
(1998b) Ranking (HIRA) FEDI and TDI
Fire and Explosion Damage
Index (FEDI)
Toxicity Damage Index (TDI)
5 Koller et al. (1999) Assessment of environment-, IN Analyze source and starting points of _ _ _ _
health-, and safety possible problems
6 Cabezas et al. WAste Reduction (WAR) IN utilized conservation equation and _ _
(1999) algorithm chemical environmental impact
indices
7 Gunasekera and Atmospheric Hazard Index IN Utilized fuzzy set for a scaling (weight _ _
Edwards (2003) (AHI) scheme) to incorporate different 5
categories
8 Shah et al. (2003); Substance, Reactivity, IN Semi-quantitatively likelihood was _ _ _ _
Shah et al. (2005) Equipment and Safety- proposed (e.g., Low, medium, high,
Technology (SREST) layer moderate, critical high)
assessment tool
9 Shariff et al. (2006) Integrated Risk Estimation QN selected preliminary control room _ _ _
Tool (iRET) layout
10 Hassim and Process Route Healthiness IN Quantified health hazards for workers _ _
Edwards (2006) Index (PRHI)
11 Tugnoli et al. (2007) Key Performance Indicator QN defined the potential accident _ _ _
(KPI) scenarios associated to each process
equipment through the damage
distances
12 Srinivasan and Inherent Benign-ness Indicator IN Quantified hazards, health and _ _ _ _
Nhan, 2008 (IBI) environmental impact of a chemical
process route based on a statistical
analysis
13 Shariff and Leong Inherent Risk Assessment QN Integrated risk quantification tool _ _ _ _ _
(2009) (IRA) with process design simulator
14 Hassim and Hurme Health Quotient Index (HQI) IN Quantified workers health risk from _ _
(2010b) chronic exposure
15 Patel et al. (2010) Design tool for inherently safer QN Determined inherently safer solvent _ _
solvent process incorporating an optimization tool
16 Shariff and Zaini TOxic Release Consequence QN Presented an evolution of iRET _ _ _
(2010) Analysis Tool (TORCAT)
17 Rusli and Shariff, Qualitative Assessment for QL Prepared work-flow diagram _ _
2010 Inherently Safer Design including possible ISD variables
(QAISD) enables practitioners brainstorming
18 Tugnoli et al. (2012) Inherent Safety Key QN As an extension of KPI, external _ _ _
Performance Indicators (IS- threats were considered.
KPI)
19 Rusli et al. (2013) Quantitative Index of IN þ Identified risk based on two sub- _ _
Inherently Safer Design QL indices, damage index (DI) and
(QI2SD) framework Likelihood index of Hazard Conflicts
Inherent Risk of Design Index (LIHC) of IRDI
(IRDI)
20 Shariff and Wahab, Inherent Fire Consequence QN demonstrated its potential to _ _ _
2013 Estimation Tool (IFCET) minimize the consequences of pool
fire
21 Shariff and Zaini, Toxic Release Inherent Risk QN Demonstrated one of ISD principle, _ _ _
2013 Assessment (TRIRA) attenuation, after calculating risk
level for a selected toxic release
scenario
22 Rocha-Valadez et al. Inherently safer sustained QN Predicted sustained casing pressure _ _
(2014) casing pressure testing for well from early pressure buildup
integrity
23 Ordouei et al. Risk index for used in IN Used incident data for the severity _ _ _ _
(2014) conceptual design and the likelihood
24 Abidin et al. (2016a, Three-stage ISD Matrix (TIM) QL Identified the trade-off ISD _ _
b) modification toward the risk by
combining a matrix and guide word
techniques
17
Table 9 (continued )
No. Authors (Year) R-ISAT Remark H-ISAT Mode Scope Likelihood
used
Name Typea 2.1 2.2 S H E IL CL DL
25 Abidin et al. (2016a, A framework including TIM IN þ Quantified the impact of ISD _ _ _
b) and HIRA QL modification
26 Shariff et al. (2016) IFCET QN Demonstrated its potential to _ _ _
minimize the consequences of BLEVE
27 Jha et al. (2016) Enhanced Inherent Safety QN Proposed a framework that can apply � PRI _ _ _ _
Intervention Framework inherent safety principle by � PSI
(Enhanced ISIF) modifying the worst stream, selected
via PRI and PSI
28 Warnasooriya and Inherent Chemical Process IN Compared routes based on inherent � PIIS _ _ _ _
Gunasekera (2017) Route Index (ICPRI) safety, health, and environmental
Environmental Toxicity friendliness via weighting scheme
Hazard Index (ETHI)
Occupational health Hazard
Index (OhHI)
Chemical Route Safety Index
(CRSI)
29 Pasha et al., (2017) IRA QN Assessed inherent risk for shell and � ISISTHE _ _ _ _ _
tube heat exchanger network � OSIHEN
30 Abidin et al. (2018) Inherent Safety Benefits Index IN As an extension of TIM, quantitively _ _ _ _
(ISBI) identified the benefits of ISD options
31 Eljack et al. (2019) Inherently Safer Design Tool (i- QN Developed a semi-quantitative safety _ _ _
SDT) metric that can assess process safety
based on historical incident data.
32 Athar et al. (2019) Inherently Safer Process Piping QN Predicted the potential damage from PSCI _ _ _
(ISPP) technique a jet fire incident
33 Ahmad et al. (2019) Hazard Prevention Strategies QL Proposed a qualitative thematic _ _
(HPS) analysis based on the extracted data
from accident databases
a
S: Safety, H: Health, E: Environment, IL: Initial Likelihood, CL: Consequence Likelihood, DL: Consequence Damage Likelihood.
Table 10
Summary of different safety evaluations in CO-ISATs.
Mode 1 Mode 2.1 Mode 2.2
Advantages � Easy to perform � Expected incident impacts � Expected incident impacts

� Straight-forward step and results � Potential to calculate incident impacts to monetary � Potential to calculate incident impacts to monetary
values directly. values directly
� Results can be associated with safety policy (e.g.,
ALARP)
Disadvantages � Potential to fail possible incident � Required further knowledge (e.g., consequence modeling)
scenarios � Complicated calculation steps
� Reliable incident database for incident scenarios
For reference, even though the optimization of storage vessel layouts utilize the principles of inherent safety during the conceptual design
is beyond the scope of this study, several researchers examined its stage. Therefore, the review focused on various ISATs that are poten
application during the early design stages (de Lira-Flores et al., 2018; tially viable for including in conceptual design.
Bernechea and Viger, 2013; Bernechea and Arnaldos, 2014). To start with, this review highlighted the fundamentals of safety in
Table 12 shows that CO-ISATs may adopt more enhanced H-ISATs or Section 2 and analyzed previous review papers for ISD in Section 3.
R-ISATs. Some safety tools (e.g., SWeHI or Mond index) used in CO- Section 2 clarified and distinguished the various design stages. Because
ISATs may not be feasible in the conceptual design stage, as of the specific nature of conceptual design and the limited details
mentioned in Section 3. Some of the early ISATs (e.g., ISI proposed in available at that stage, it was found that most ISATs are not appropriate
1999) were utilized in some cases. For better decision-making, re for immediate adoption by process engineers during conceptual design.
searchers can reconcile a more plausible H-ISATs or R-ISATs when they Section 4 described the approach used in selecting and reviewing the
perform CO-ISATs. literature. In Section 5, this review paper explored viable ISATs that
were developed for the conceptual design stage. Since safety was
6. Concluding remarks and suggestions prioritized in this paper, the selected tools were named ISATs. However,
various tools for health, environment, and economics—the other ele
The primary objective of this review paper was to establish a ments of sustainable process design in CPI—also were taken into ac
comprehensive perspective of ISATs that can enable process engineers to count in tandem with safety. Reorganizing the ISATs was imperative for
Table 11
The number and frequency of scopes considered in 18 CO-ISATs.
Scope considered Safety Health Environment Safety þ Health SafetyþEnvironment HealthþEnvironment Safety þ Health þEnvironment
Number (Frequency) 8 (44%) 0 (0%) 1 (6%) 0 (0%) 5 (28%) 0 (0%) 4 (22%)
18
Fig. 13. The 19 different types of costs considered in the 18 CO-ISATs.
deciding purpose and categorizing them accordingly. In this study, 73 defining the needs and specifications of such ISATs and the quantifica
ISATs were selected, and these tools were categorized into three groups: tion of safety features of Intensification, Substitution, Attenuation, and
hazard-based inherent safety assessment tools (H-ISATs) for 22 tools, Simplification using appropriate level of details available during the
risk-based inherent safety assessment tools (R-ISATs) for 33 tools, and conceptual design stage.
cost-optimal inherent safety assessment tools (CO-ISATs) for 18 tools. In addition to the aforementioned observations and recommenda
The goal of any of these ISATs is to discover a safer design and even tions, there are also needs for more studies in the following areas:
tually, a more sustainable process design.
H-ISATs utilize multiple indicators available in the process design 1. ISATs for the offshore industry: Of the 73 ISTATs, only Rocha-
scheme, while R-ISATs estimate potential damages or inherent risk. Valadez et al. (2014) (Table 9 #22) suggested an ISAT that could be
Furthermore, CO-ISATs account for multiple objectives simulta used in the offshore oil and gas industry. Therefore, further devel
neously—safety and economics with health and/or environment as op opment for the specific case of the industry is required.
tion. This paper illustrated the necessary measures and goals for each 2. ISATs utilizing a dynamic simulator to consider abnormal con
ISAT (presented in Fig. 5) and analyzed the detailed information pro dition: Up until now, all simulators used in ISATs have only been for
vided in Section 5. The overall view of 73 ISATs would help practitioners steady-state conditions. However, studying abnormal conditions
determine the tool that would be optimal for them. with a dynamic simulator would enable process designers to reduce
This review attempted to offer a comprehensive overview of ISATs. the likelihood of potential adverse events, as many incidents occur
The review also identified that numerous inherent safety tools have been during abnormal process conditions.
developed with the assumption that sufficient process details are 3. ISATs adopting the integral process design step, process syn
available. This is not the case for the conceptual design stage during thesis: In general, process designers handle process design via pro
which many of the key design decision are still being made. For ISATs to cess synthesis—whose aim is “to optimize the logical structure of
be effectively and efficiently utilized by process engineers, safety re chemical process, specifically the sequence of step, the choice of
searchers and engineers should endeavor to develop metrics and tools chemical employed and the source and destination of recycle stream”
that are consistent with the nature of conceptual design and utilizable by (Johns, 2001; El-Halwagi, 2017). In other words, rather than
process engineers. On the other hand, process engineers should compromising feedstock and products, this approach seeks an
endeavor to apply ISATs and to collaborate with safety experts on optimal alternative from the given resources.
19
Table 12
List of 18 Cost-Optimal Inherent Safety Assessment Tools (CO-ISATs) selected.
No. Authors (Year) Remark ISAT (or Scope Modes used in CO-ISAT Used decision-making procedure
safety tool)
S H E Mode Mode Mode MCD MOF IN GA SA
used
1 2.1 2.2
1 Khan and Abbasi (1997) � New tool named as Accident Hazard _ _ _ _

Index (AHI)
2 Young et al. (2000) � Weighting scheme WAR _ _ _ _
3 Khan et al. (2002) � New tool named as GreenPro-I _ _ _ _ _ _
� A holistic and integrated
methodology for a cleaner and
greener process
4 Khan et al. (2004) � New tool named as Life cycle _ _ _ _ _
indexing system (LInX)
5 Khan and Amyotte � New tool named as Integrated SWeHI _ _ _ _
(2004); Inherent Safety Index (I2SI)
Khan and Amyotte (2005) � Similar to the HAZOP study
procedure
6 Tugnoli et al. (2008) � A specific quantitative assessment Mond index _ _ _ _ _
procedure with normalized
indicators
7 Medina et al. (2009) � Calculated total cost based on the _ _ _ _
cost of equipment plus the cost of
incidents
8 Medina-Herrera et al. � Selected safer solvent including _ _ _ _
(2014) economic considerations
9 Medina-Herrera et al. � Selected safer distillation systems _ _ _
(2014)
10 Eini et al. (2015) � Optimal decision-making for refrig _ _ _ _
erant cycles
11 Abidin et al. (2016) � As an extension task of TIM, cost was TIM _ _ _
estimated
12 Eini et al., 2016a) and � Considered thermo-economic anal _ _ _ _
Eini et al., 2016b ysis along with ISD
13 Thiruvenkataswamy et al. � Only considered main streams FEDI _ _ _
(2016)
14 Ortiz-Espinoza et al., � A procedure for the inclusion of � PRI _ _ _ _ _
(2017) inherent safety, economic factors, � PSI
and environment impact
15 Martinez-Gomez et al. � Proposed a multi-objective formula _ _ _
(2017) tion approach
16 Guillen-Cuevas et al. � New tool named as Safety And � FEDI _ _ _ _ _ _
(2017) Sustainability Weighted Return On � PRI
Investment Metric (SASWROIM)
17 Eini et al. (2018) � Optimal decision-making for a _ _ _ _
reactor network system
18 Teh et al. (2019) � A systematic tool to conduct � ISI _ _ _ _ _
sustainability assessment via fuzzy � HQI
optimization � WAR
S: safety; H: Health; E: Environment; MCD: multi-criteria decision making; MOF-multi-objective formulation; IN: index; GA: graphical approach; SA: sensitivity
analysis.
4. ISATs for NaTech: The occurrence of natural disasters have occurred in process supply chains, ISD would aid in creating an
increased over the last few decades. Due to the intrinsic unpredict improved sustainable process system. For example, the safety level
able nature of natural threats in the CPIs, resulting adverse incidents and cost benefits can vary depending on feedstocks, transported
from natural threats are typically difficult to control and will add to chemicals, or chemical phases.
the likelihood of an event. Therefore, ISD can proactively be applied
for these cases. Declaration of competing interest
5. ISATs for supply chains: There was a lack of consideration of ISD in
the context of supply chains. Since numerous incidents have None.
List of Abbreviations
2DGR 2-dimensional graphical rating

AHI accident hazard index
ALARP as low as reasonably practicable
ALOHA area location of hazardous atmospheres
BLEVE boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion
CISI comprehensive inherent safety index
CPI chemical process industries
CRSI chemical route safety index
20
EHI environment hazard index

EISI enhanced inherent safety index
ETA event tree analysis
ETHI environmental toxicity hazard index
FEDI fire, explosion and damage index
FMEA failure mode and effect analysis
FTA fault tree analysis
GRAND graphical and numerical descriptive technique for inherent safety assessment
HAZOP hazard and operability
H-ISAT hazard-based Inherent safety assessment tool
HIRA hazard identification and ranking
HPS hazard prevention strategies
HQI health quotient index
I2SI integrated inherent safety index
IBI inherent benign-ness indicator
ICPRI inherent chemical process route index
IFCET inherent fire consequence estimation tool
IRA Inherent risk assessment
iRET integrated risk estimation tool
IRDI inherent risk of design index
IOHI inherent occupational health index
ISAT inherent safety assessment tool
ISAPEDS inherent safety assessment technique for preliminary design stage
ISBI inherent safety benefits index
ISD inherently safer design
i-SDT inherently safer design tool
ISI inherent safety index
ISIF inherent safety intervention framework
ISIM inherent safety index module
ISISTHE inherent safety Index for shell and tube heat exchanger
IS-KPI inherent safety key performance indicators
ISPI inherent safety performance indices
ISPP inherently safer process piping
KPI key performance indicator
LInX life cycle indexing system
MINLP mixture integer non-linear program
NPEI net potential economic impact
NuDIST numerical descriptive inherent safety technique
OhHI occupational health hazard index
OSIHEN overall safety index for heat exchanger network
PIIS prototype Index for Inherent Safety
PFD process flow diagram
P&ID piping and instrument diagram
PRI process route index
PRHI process route healthiness index
PSCI process stream characteristic index
PSI process stream index
PSV process safety valve
QAISD qualitative assessment for inherently safer design
QRA quantitative risk analysis
R-ISAT risk-based inherent safety assessment tool
RRABD rapid risk analysis-based design
SASWROIM safety and sustainability weighted return on investment metric
SIL safety integrity level
SREST substance, reactivity, equipment and safety-technology
SWeHI safety weight hazard index
SWROIM sustainability weighted return on investment metric
TDI toxicity damage index
TIM three-stage ISD matrix
TORCAT toxic release consequence analysis tool
TRIRA toxic release inherent risk assessment
TRSI toxic release stream index
TRRI toxic release route index
VBA visual basic for application
WAR waste reduction
21
Appendix A. Summary of 8 indices using a scoring system in H-IASTs
Division Indicator Symbol PIIS (1993) ISI (1999) i-Safe (2002) ISIM
(2008)
Chemical Flammability ICF 0–4 0–4 0–4 –

indicators Explosiveness ICE 1–10 0–4 0–4 0–4
Density ICD – – – –
Lower heat of ICH – – – –
combustion
Toxicity ICT 0–8 0–6 0–6 –
Chemical ICI – 0–4 0–4 –
interaction
Corrosiveness ICC – 0–2 0–2 –
Material phase ICM – – – –
Reactivity ICRE – – 0–4 –
Heat of ICR – ICR1: main reaction (0–4) ICR1: main reaction (0–4) –
reaction ICR2: side reaction (0–4) ICR2: side reaction (0–4)
Viscosity ICV – – – –
Volatility ICO – – – –
Type of ICK – – – –
reaction
Total IC IC ¼ ðICF þ ICE þ ICT Þmax IC ¼ ðICF þ ICE þ ICT Þmax þ ICI þ IC ¼ maxðICF þ ICE þ ICT þ ICI þ ICC þ –
chemical where IC is the value of the ICC þ ICR1 þ ICR2 ICRE þ ICR1 þ ICR2 Þ
indicator chemical that has the highest where ICF, ICE, and ICT are the where individual indicators are the
total chemical score in a values of the chemical that has maximum values for one step in a process
process step. the highest total chemical score in route for the worst-case.
a process step.
Process Temperature IPT 0–10 0–4 0–4 0–4

indicators Pressure IPP 1–10 0–4 0–4 0–4
Inventory IPI 1–10 0–5 0–5 –
Type of IPE – – – –
equipment
ISBL IPE1 – 0–4 0–4 –
OSBL IPE2 – 0–3 0–3 –
Yield IPY 1–10 – – –
Process modes IPM – – – –
Structure IPS – 0–5 – –
Total process IP IP ¼ maxðIPT þ IPP þ IPI þ IP ¼ maxðIPT þ IPP þ IPI þ IPE þ IP ¼ maxðIPT þIPP þIPE1 þIPY ) where IP is –
indicator IPY Þ IPS Þ the sum of maximum individual indicators
where IP is the sum of where IP is the sum of maximum from the same process step as Ic.
maximum individual individual indicators from the
indicators from the same same process step as Ic.
process steps as Ic.
Total hazard score Itotal n

P n
P n
P –
ITotal ¼ ðIC þ IP Þ ITotal ¼ ðIC þ IP Þ ITotal ¼ ðIC þ IP Þ
i i i
where n is the number of where n is the number of process where n is the number of process steps.
process steps. steps.
Division Indicator Symbol IOHI (2010) EISI (2011) CISI (2013)
Chemical Flammability ICF – 0–4 0–4

indicators Explosiveness ICE – 0–4 0–4
Density ICD – – –
Lower heat of ICH – – –
combustion
Toxicity ICT ICT1 based on 0–6 0–6
OEL0–4/ICT2 R-
phrase: 0–5
Chemical ICI – 0–4 0–4
interaction
Corrosiveness ICC 0–2 0–2 0–2
Material ICM 1–3 – –
phase
Reactivity ICRE – – –
Heat of ICR – – –
reaction
Viscosity ICV – – –
Volatility ICO 0–3 – –
Type of ICK – – –
reaction
Total IC IC ¼ n
P n
P
IC ¼ ðICFi þ ICEi þ ICTi þ ICIi þ ICCi Þ � ðflow rateÞi IC ¼ ½ðICFi þ ICEi þ ICTi þ ICCi Þ � ðflow rateÞi � þ
chemical Pn
i i
maxðICT1 þ
indicator i where n is the number of chemicals in a process ICI � ðtotal flow rateÞ
ICT2 þ ICC þ route. where n is the number of chemicals in a process
ICM þ ICO Þ route.
22
(continued )
Division Indicator Symbol IOHI (2010) EISI (2011) CISI (2013)
where n is the
number of steps
Process Temperature IPT 0–3 0–4 0–4

indicators Pressure IPP 0–3 0–4 0–4
Inventory IPI – 0–5 0–5
Type of IPE – – –
equipment
ISBL IPE1 – 0–4 0–4
OSBL IPE2 – 0–3 –
Yield IPY – – –
Process IPM 1–3 – –
modes
Structure IPS – 0–5 –
Total process IP n
P n
P n
P
IP ¼ ðIPT þ IP ¼ ðIPTi þ IPPi þ IPIi þ IPE1i þ IPE2i þ IPSi Þ � IP ¼ ðIPTi þ IPPi þ IPIi þ IPEi Þ �
indicator i i i
IPP þ IPM Þ No: of i connection score
where n is the where n is the number of equipment types in a where n is the number of equipment in a process
number of steps process route. route.
Total hazard score Itotal ITotal ¼ Ic þ IP ITotal ¼ Ic þ IP ITotal ¼ Ic þ IP
Division Indicator Symbol ISPI (2018)
Chemical Flammability ICF 1–5

indicators Explosiveness ICE 1–10
Density ICD –
Lower heat of ICH –
combustion
Toxicity ICT 1–9
Chemical interaction ICI –
Corrosiveness ICC –
Material phase ICM –
Reactivity ICRE –
Heat of reaction ICR 1–5
Viscosity ICV –
Volatility ICO –
Type of reaction ICK 0.2–1
Total chemical IC IC ¼ maxðICF þ ICE þ ICT þ ICR � ICK Þ

indicator where ICF, ICE, and ICT are the values of the chemical that has the highest total chemical score in a process step.
Process Temperature IPT 1–5

indicators Pressure IPP 1–5
Inventory IPI 1–6
Type of equipment IPE –
ISBL IPE1 0.1–1
OSBL IPE2 –
Process modes IPM –
Yield IPY –
Structure IPS –
Total process indicator IP IP ¼ max ðIPT þ IPP þ IPI Þ � IPE

where IP is the sum of maximum individual indicators from the same process step as Ic.
Total hazard score Itotal n

P
ITotal ¼ ðIC þ IP Þ � IS;max
i
where n is the number of streams or equipment, andIS is the supplement indicators of safeness, complexity, and
operability.
Appendix B. Summary of 10 indices using a non-scoring system in H-IASTs
23
Division Indicator Symbol PRI (2009) PSI (2012) TRRI (2014) TRSI (2014)
Chemical Flammability ICF – – – –

indicators Explosiveness ICE Average ðUFLmix – LFLmix Þ% ðUFLmix – LFLmix Þ% of individual stream – –
S. Park et al.
ðUFLmix – LFLmix Þ% of all streams

Density ICD Average fluid density ½kg =m3 � Density ½kg=m3 � of individual stream Average fluid density ½kg =m3 � Density value ½kg=m3 � of individual stream
Average density ½kg=m3 � of all streams Density value ½kg=m3 � of all streams
Lower heat of ICH Average heating value ½kJ =kg� Heating value ½kJ=kg� of individual stream – –
combustion Average heating ½kJ=kg� of all streams
Toxicity ICT – – Average toxicity level ½ppm� Toxicity level value ½ppm� of individual stream
Average toxicity level½ppm� of all streams
Chemical interaction ICI – – – –
Corrosiveness ICC – – – –
Material phase ICM – – – –
Reactivity ICRE – – – –
Heat of reaction ICR – – – –
Viscosity ICV – – – –
Volatility ICO – – – –
Type of reaction ICK – – – –
Process Temperature IPT Used for the calculation of Used for the calculation of UFLmix and LFLmix – –
indicators UFLmix and LFLmix
Pressure IPP Average pressure½bar� Pressure ½bar� of individual stream Average pressure½bar� Pressure ½bar� of individual stream
Average pressure ½bar�of all streams Average pressure ½bar� of all streams
Inventory IPI – – – –
Type of equipment IPE – – – –
ISBL IPE1 – – – –
OSBL IPE2 – – – –
Process modes IPM – – – –
Yield IPY – – – –
Structure IPS – – – –
24
Total hazard Itotal ICE � ICD � ICH � IPP Itotal ¼ A0 � ðICE � ICD � ICH � IPP Þ ITotal ¼ A0 � ðICD � ICT � Itotal ¼ A0 � ðICD � ICH � IPP Þ
ITotal ¼
score 108 where A0 is a magnifying factor. A0 ¼ 10 was used for the IPP Þ where A0 is a magnifying factor.
case study. where A0 is a magnifying
factor
Division Indicator Symbol TRSI (2014) NuDIST (2014; 2016) ISAPED (2017)
� � ��
Chemical Flammability ICF – 1 1
100 � 1 0:02x
where; x is a flash point 100 � 1
indicators 1 þ 3:03e 1 þ 3:03e 0:02x
where, x is a flash point
� � � �
Explosiveness ICE – 1 1
100 � 0:14x
where; x is ðUFLmix – LFLmix Þ% 100 �
1 þ 1096:63e 1 þ 1096:63e 0:14x
where x is ðUFLmix – LFLmix Þ%
Density ICD Density value ½kg=m3 � of individual stream – –
Density value ½kg=m3 � of all streams
Lower heat of ICH – – –
combustion
� � ��
Toxicity ICT Toxicity level value ½ppm� of individual stream 1 1
100 � 1 0:012x
wherer is TLV STEL ðshort 100 � 1 0:012x
wherer is TLV STEL ðshort
Average toxicity level½ppm� ofall streams 1 þ 403:4288e 1 þ 403:4288e
term exposure limitÞ term exposure limitÞ
Chemical ICI – – –
interaction
Corrosiveness ICC – – –
Material ICM – – –
phase
� �
Reactivity ICRE – 1 –
100 � 2:8x
where x is the NFPA reactivity rating
1 þ 207:43e
Heat of ICR – –
reaction
(continued )
Division Indicator Symbol TRSI (2014) NuDIST (2014; 2016) ISAPED (2017)
100 �
S. Park et al.
� �
1
where x is the heat of endotermic reaction100 �
1 þ 601:85e 0:016x
� �
1
where x is the heat of exothermic reaction
1 þ 403:43e0:006x
Viscosity ICV – – –
Volatility ICO – – –
Type of ICK – – –
reaction
Process Temperature IPT – 100 � 100 �

� � � �
indicators 1 1
0:012x
where x is the temperature above 25� C100 � 0:012x
where x is the temperature above 25� C100 �
1 þ 403:43e 1 þ 403:43e
� �
1 1
� ��
1 1
0:012x
where x is the temperature below 25� C 0:012x
where x is the temperature below 25� C
�
1 þ 0:0025e � 1 þ 0:0025e
Pressure IPP Pressure ½bar� of individual stream 1 100 �
100 � 0:2x
where x is the operating pressure ½bar� � �
Average pressure ½bar� of all streams 1 þ 148:41e 1
0:2x
where x is the operating pressure ½bar�
� 1 þ 148:41e
Inventory IPI – –
100 � 1
� ��
1
0:12x
where x is the percentage yield:
1 þ 1339:43e
Type of IPE – – –
equipment
ISBL IPE1 – – –
OSBL IPE2 – – –
Process IPM – – –
25
modes
Yield IPY – – –
Structure IPS – – –
Total hazard Itotal Itotal ¼ A0 � ðICD � ICH � IPP Þ ITotal ¼ ICF þ ICE þ ICT þ ICRE þ ICR þ IPT þ IPP ITotal ¼ ICF þ ICE þ ICT þ IPT þ IPP
score where A0 is a magnifying factor. where each indicator uses the maximum value. where each indicator uses the maximum value.
Division Indicator Symbol ISISTHE (2017) OSIHEN (2017) PSCI (2019)
Chemical indicators Flammability ICF – – –

Explosiveness ICE ðUFLmix – LFLmix Þ% of a specific STHE ðUFLmix – LFLmix Þ% of a specific STHE ðUFLmix – LFLmix Þ% of individual stream
ðUFLmix – LFLmix Þ% of all heat exchangers ðUFLmix – LFLmix Þ% of all heat exchangers ðUFLmix – LFLmix Þ% of all streams
Density ICD – – Density ½kg=m3 � of individual stream
Average density ½kg=m3 � of all streams
Lower heat of combustion ICH Heating value ½kJ=kg� of a specific STHE Heating value ½kJ=kg� of a specific STHE Heating value ½kJ=kg� of individual stream
Average heating ½kJ=kg� of all heat exchangers Average heating ½kJ=kg� of all heat exchangers Average heating ½kJ=kg� of all streams
Toxicity ICT – – –
Chemical interaction ICI – – –
Corrosiveness ICC – – –
Material phase ICM – – –
Reactivity ICRE – – –
Heat of reaction ICR – – –
Viscosity ICV – – Viscosity of individual stream
Average viscosity of all streams
Volatility ICO – – –
Type of reaction ICK – – –
Process indicators Temperature IPT CMTD ½Co � of a specific STHE CMTD ½Co � of a specific STHE Temperature ½Co � of individual stream
Average CMTD ½Co �of all heat exchangers Average CMTD ½Co �of all heat exchangers Average temperature ½Co �of all streams
where CMTD is corrected mean temperature difference where CMTD is corrected mean temperature difference
Pressure IPP
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Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 63 (2020) 104040

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries

Incorporating inherent safety during the conceptual process design stage: A

1. Introduction 1.1. Safety is a key component in sustainability

Fig. 1. Safety as a key pillar towards sustainability.

� Mond Index (Lewis, 1979) � Hybrid approach

Fig. 6. Distribution of different types among 22 selected H-ISATs.

Name Typea Pure Mixture Route Stream Equipment etc.

1 Edwards and Prototype Index for S Assessed the inherent safety of _ _

Name Typea Pure Mixture Route Stream Equipment etc.

21 Song et al. (2018) Inherent Safety SþF Proposed a framework based on _ _ _

Fig. 8. Histogram of process used in the case studies in 22 H-ISATs.

Fig. 9. Histogram of indicators in H-ISATs.

Fig. 10. Papers with scoring scales of 8 indices in H-ISATs.

Fig. 10. (continued).

Basis of Brainstorming techniques (e.g., HAZOP Author’s subjective considerations QRA

Number (Frequency) 22 (67%) 2 (6%) 3 (9%) 1 (3%) 0 (0%) 5 (15%)

1 Lawrence (1996) Four-factor index IN Update PIIS based on eight experts’ _ _

Advantages � Easy to perform � Expected incident impacts � Expected incident impacts

Number (Frequency) 8 (44%) 0 (0%) 1 (6%) 0 (0%) 5 (28%) 0 (0%) 4 (22%)

Fig. 13. The 19 different types of costs considered in the 18 CO-ISATs.

1 Khan and Abbasi (1997) � New tool named as Accident Hazard _ _ _ _

2DGR 2-dimensional graphical rating

EHI environment hazard index

Appendix A. Summary of 8 indices using a scoring system in H-IASTs

Chemical Flammability ICF 0–4 0–4 0–4 –

Process Temperature IPT 0–10 0–4 0–4 0–4

Total hazard score Itotal n

Chemical Flammability ICF – 0–4 0–4

(continued on next page)

Process Temperature IPT 0–3 0–4 0–4

Total hazard score Itotal ITotal ¼ Ic þ IP ITotal ¼ Ic þ IP ITotal ¼ Ic þ IP

Division Indicator Symbol ISPI (2018)

Chemical Flammability ICF 1–5

Total chemical IC IC ¼ maxðICF þ ICE þ ICT þ ICR � ICK Þ

Process Temperature IPT 1–5

Total process indicator IP IP ¼ max ðIPT þ IPP þ IPI Þ � IPE

Total hazard score Itotal n

Appendix B. Summary of 10 indices using a non-scoring system in H-IASTs

Chemical Flammability ICF – – – –

ðUFLmix ​ – ​ LFLmix Þ% of all streams

Process Temperature IPT – 100 � 100 �

Division Indicator Symbol ISISTHE (2017) OSIHEN (2017) PSCI (2019)

Chemical indicators Flammability ICF – – –

Itotal ¼ A0 � ðICE � ICD � ICH � ICV � IPT � IPP Þ

where A0 is a magnifying factor.

biodiesel production: flammability parameter. Procedia Eng. 148, 1177–1183.

process scheduling. J. Loss Prev. Process. Ind. 21, 543–549.

facilities to minimize project risk. Saf. Sci. 51, 49–62.

Health Saf. 21, 27–38.

of inherent environmental hazard. Comput. Chem. Eng. 21, S965–S970.

Cozzani, Valerio, Campedel, Michela, Renni, Elisabetta, Krausmann, Elisabeth, 2010.

Engineers, New York, NY. No. 303, 1971-c2002.

methodology. Process Saf. Environ. Prot. 120, 1–13.

of Chemical Engineers, New York.

Saf. Environ. Prot. 71, 252–258.

Eini, Saeed, Abdolhamidzadeh, Bahman, Reniers, Genserik, Rashtchian, Davood, 2015.

Bahadori, Alireza, 2016b. ’Multi-objective optimization of a cascade refrigeration

ðUFLmix – LFLmix Þ% of all streams