Republic of the Philippins before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104.

Said
SUPREME COURT Informations in substantially identical language allege:
Manila
That on or about the (1st and 2nd days) of February the
EN BANC  accused without any authority of law, did, then and there,
G.R. Nos. 83837-42 April 22, 1992 willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in (his/her)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, possession and control and custody one (cal .45 pistol,
vs. armalite rifle, handgranade, fragmentation granade, M-14
HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge of Branch 104, RTC, rifle), without first securing any license/permit from the
Quezon City, PATERNA RUIZ, NOLI G. NARCA, FR. NICK RUIZ, LYDIA proper authority and that said firearm is being used in
R. NARCA, RODOLFO CORTEZA and TOMAS DOMINADO, respondents. support and furtherance of the crime of subversion or
rebellion. 2
NOCON, J.:
The facts 3 as presented by the prosecution reveal that sometime in February
In a Petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the 1988, elements of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the
People raise the issue of whether the crime of illegal possession of firearms, Philippines apprehended the private respondents in separate operations.
ammunition and explosives, punishable under P.D. 1866, is absorbed by the
crime of subversion, i.e., membership in a subversive organization, Various ammunitions, firearms, and explosives were found in their
punishable under R.A. 1700, as amended. possession, while subsequent searches in their respective hide-outs resulted
in the confiscation of several subversive materials, including documents
The People filed this petition assailing the Resolution dated May 4, 1988 of showing that they are ranking members of the Communist Party of the
respondent Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, granting the motion of private Philippines/New People's Army, or are mere members.
respondents to quash the Information charging them with violation of P.D.
1866, as being void ab initio and the order dated June 8, 1988 denying Private respondents, in their motion to quash, 4 argued that the filing of two
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said resolution. (2) separate informations for each of the accused violates the rule on double
jeopardy, and that there being only a single criminal intent, the other offense
Private respondents Paterna Ruiz, Noli Narca, Fr. Nick Ruiz, Lydia Narca, of illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives should be
Rodolfo Corteza, and Tomas Dominado, were charged with Subversion absorbed in the charge of violation of R.A. 1700, following the doctrine
under R.A. 1700 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch in People v.  Hernandez. 5
40, based on the following information filed on February 10, 1988:
The respondent Judge, in his questioned resolution, agreed with this
That on or about the 1st and 2nd day of February, 1988 in contention and held:
Quezon City, Metro Manila Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named After evaluating the grounds and the arguments in support of
accused, conspiring together, confederating with and the same, the Court is of the opinion that the motion to
mutually helping one another by overt acts with the common quash, as prayed for should be GRANTED.
objective to overthrow the duly constituted government of the
Republic of the Philippines, did, then and there, willfully and Applying by analogy the doctrine laid down in the case
unlawfully and feloniously affiliate themselves with, become of People v. Hernandez (99 Phil. 515), the possession of
and remain members of the Communist Party of the firearms, ammunition and explosives to which all the
Philippines/National Democratic Front and/or its successor accused are charged before this Court is a constitutive
or of any subversive association in violation of said law. 1 ingredient of the crime of subversion and, hence, absorbed
by the same and cannot be punished separately. Deadly
On February 12, 1988, six separate informations for violation of P.D. 1866 weapons are needed and necessary to generate the kind of
(Illegal Possession of Firearms) were filed against the same respondents force and violence to accomplish the purpose of subversion.
 As pointed out by Atty. Poncevic Ceballos, counsel for the member of a subversive organization against the
accused, the elements of force, violence and other illegal Government is but a circumstance which raises the penalty
means mentioned in the law (R.A., 1700 as amended), may to be imposed upon the offender. (Emphasis supplied)
be done with the use of violence, explosives and ammunition
or the possession thereof. 6 (Emphasis supplied) Furthermore, in the case of Buscayno vs.  Military Commissions, 12 this Court
said that subversion, like treason, is a crime against national security, while
It should be recalled that in People v. Hernandez, supra, and even in the rebellion is a crime against public order. Rising publicly and taking arms
more recent cases of Enrile v. Amin, 7and Enrile v.  Salazar, 8 the issue against the Government is the very element of the crime of rebellion. 13 On
resolved is that the crime of rebellion cannot be complexed with, nor may a the other hand, R.A. 1700 was enacted to outlaw the Communist Party of the
separate information be filed, for violation of common crimes, since force and Philippines (CPP), other similar associations and its successors because
violence are already necessary ingredients of the same. their existence and activities constitute a clear, present and grave danger to
national security. 14
Private respondents do not dispute the fact that rebellion is distinct from
subversion. However, they want to adopt by analogy existing jurisprudence The first Whereas clause of R.A. 1700 states that the CPP is an organized
on rebellion to subversion on the theory that both crimes are political conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence
offenses intended to destabilize and overthrow the government with the use but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means. This is a recognition
of force, violence or other illegal means. 9 The trial court went along with that subversive acts do not only constitute force and violence (contra to the
respondents when it stated: arguments of private respondents), but may partake of other forms as well.
One may in fact be guilty of subversion by authoring subversive materials,
. . . The possession of said items by all the accused, as where force and violence is neither necessary or indispensable.
alleged in the information, is the very element of force,
violence, or other illegal means in the crime of subversion. Private respondents contended 15 that the Court in Misolas
16
So that the crime of alleged possession of firearms in v.  Panga   impliedly ruled that if an accused is simultaneously charged with
furtherance of rebellion or, subversion cannot be separated violation of P.D. 1866 and subversion, the doctrine of absorption of common
from the charge of subversion. the former crime being crimes as applied in rebellion would have found application therein. The
merely an element of the latter crime. 10 respondents relied on the opinion of this Court when it said:

We cannot agree. . . . in the present case, petitioner is being charged

specifically for the qualified offense of illegal possession of
If We are to espouse the theory of the respondents that force and violence firearms and ammunition under PD 1866. HE IS NOT BEING
are the very essence of subversion, then it loses its distinction from rebellion. CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME OF
In People v. Liwanag,11 the Court categorically distinguished subversion from SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
rebellion, and held: FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HE BEING SEPARATELY
CHARGED FOR SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Thus, the rulings of the
Violation of Republic Act No. 1700, or subversion, as it is
Court in Hernandez, Geronimo and  Rodriguez find no
more commonly called, is a crime distinct from that of actual
application in this case. 17
rebellion. The crime of rebellion is committed by rising
publicly and taking up arms against the Government for any
of the purposes specified in Article 134 of the Revised Penal This is however a mere obiter. In the above case, the Court upheld the
Code; while the Anti-Subversion Act (Republic Act No. 1700) validity of the charge under the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. 1866.
punishes affiliation or membership in a subversive The Court opined that the dictum in the Hernandez case is not applicable in
organization as defined therein. In rebellion, there must be a that case, considering that the legislature deemed it fit to provide for two
public uprising and taking of arms against the Government; distinct offenses: (1) illegal possession of firearms qualified by subversion
whereas, in subversion, mere membership in a subversive (P.D. 1866) and (2) subversion qualified by the taking up of arms against the
association is sufficient and the taking up of arms by a Government (R.A. 1700). "The practical result of this may be harsh or, it may
pose grave difficulty on an accused in instances similar to those that obtain in law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either
the present case, but the wisdom of the legislature in the lawful exercise of its shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same
power to enact laws is something that the Court cannot inquire into . . ." 18 act.

The Court further said: Implementing the constitutional provision, Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of
Court provides as follows:
Undeniably, it is easier to prove that a person has unlawfully
possessed a firearm and/or ammunition under P.D. 1866 When the accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the
than to establish that he had knowingly, willfully and by overt case against him has been dismissed or otherwise
acts affiliated himself with, became or remained a member of terminated without his express consent, by a court of
the Communist Party of the Philippines and/or its successor competent jurisdiction, upon valid complaint or information or
or of any subversive organization under R.A. 1700, as other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to
conviction under the latter "requires that membership must sustain a conviction, and after the accused had pleaded to
be knowing or active, with specific intent to further the illegal the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the
objectives of the Party" (quoting from People v. dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution
Ferrer, supra). for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the
same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
However, that the same act may be penalized under two necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
different statutes with different penalties, even if considered charged in the former complaint or information.
highly advantageous to the prosecution and onerous to the
accused, will not necessarily call for the invalidation of the Thus, according to a long line of cases, in order that a defendant may
third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. 1866 which provides for successfully allege former jeopardy, it is necessary that he
the higher penalty. 19 had  previously been (1) convicted or (2) acquitted, or (3) in jeopardy of being
convicted of the offense charged, that is, that the former case against him for
On the issue of whether the filing of the subsequent information constitutes the same offense has been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
double jeopardy, the trial court in its resolution articulated, thus: express consent, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint
or information, and after the defendant has pleaded to the charge.
On the question of double jeopardy, the Court agrees with
the observation of the herein accused that the filing of two Premises considered, We find this petition meritorious and the resolution of
separate informations against each of the accused constitute the trial court dated May 4, 1988 quashing the informations for violation of PD
a violation of their constitutional right of not being twice put in 1866 is hereby reversed and the informations reinstated. Let this case be
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense where it can be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings and trial. Cost de oficio.
shown that the offenses in question arise from a single SO ORDERED.
criminal intent. (People v. Elkanish, 90 Phil. 53) Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.
The case of People v.  Elkanish, 20 relied upon by the Honorable Judge, is not Regalado, J., concurs in the result.
in point with the present case. Since We have resolved that P.D. 1866 can be Bellosillo, J., took no part.
prosecuted independently of R.A. 1700, there can be no double jeopardy. Separate Opinion
Double jeopardy can be invoked only if one offense is inseparable from CRUZ, J., dissenting:
another and proceeds from the same act, in which case, they cannot be I dissent for the reasons stated in my dissent in Baylosis v. Chavez, G.R. No.
subject to separate prosecutions. Art. III, Section 21 of the present 98136, Oct. 3, 1991.
Constitution provides: Gutierrez, J., dissents.

Sec. 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of Separate Opinions

punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I dissent for the reasons stated in my dissent in Baylosis v. Chavez, G.R. No. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
98136, Oct. 3, 1991. NARCISO B. NAZARENO. ALFREDO NAZARENO, petitioner,
Gutierrez, J., dissents. vs.
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION,
Muntinglupa, Metro Manila, P/SGT. JACINTO MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO
TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD, and P/SGT. MAURO
Republic of the Philippines AROJADO, respondents.
SUPREME COURT
Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567.
Manila
Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82.
Ramon S. Esguerra, Barbara Anne C. Migallos and Agripino G. Morga for
EN BANC petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-84.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioner in G.R. No. 83162.
G.R. No. 81567 July 9, 1990 Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Raneses, Sy, Taquio & Association for petitioner
in G.R. No. 85727.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. No. 86332.
ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA. The Solicitor General for the respondents.
MANOLITA O. UMIL, and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V.
SESE, petitioners,
vs. PER CURIAM:
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON
MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.
The are eight (8) petitioners for habeas corpus filed before the Court, which
G.R. Nos. 84581-82 July 9, 1990
have been consolidated because of the similarity of issues raised, praying for
AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,
the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, ordering the respective
vs.
respondents to produce the bodies of the persons named therein and to
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN. RAMON MONTANO, respondents.
explain why they should not be set at liberty without further delay.
G.R. Nos. 84583-84 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY.
DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE. DOMINGO T. In their respective Returns, the respondents uniformly assert that the
ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE, petitioners, privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not available to the petitioners as
vs. they have been legally arrested and are detained by virtue of valid
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO informations filed in court against them.
CARINO, LT. COL. REX D. PIAD, T/SGT. CONRADO DE TORRES, S/SGT.
ARNOLD DURIAN, and Commanding Officer, PC-INP Detention Center, The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as their arrests were
Camp Crame, Quezon City, respondents. made without warrant and, that no preliminary investigation was first
G.R. No. 83162 July 9, 1990 conducted, so that the informations filed against them are null and void.
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
VICKY A. OCAYA AND DANNY RIVERA. VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, petitioner, The Court has carefully reviewed the contentions of the parties in their
vs. respective pleadings, and it finds that the persons detained have not been
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES CATALUNA, illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of their constitutional right to liberty,
COL. NESTOR MARIANO, respondents. and that the circumstances attending these cases do not warrant their
G.R. No. 85727 July 9, 1990 release on habeas corpus.
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF:
DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU, petitioner, The arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous complaint is
vs. recognized in law. The occasions or instances when such an arrest may be
BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents. effected are clearly spelled out in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,
G.R. No. 86332 July 9, 1990 as amended, which provides:
 Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace A brief narration of the facts and events surrounding each of the eight (8)
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a petitions is in order.
person:
I
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil vs. Ramos), the record shows that, on 1 February
an offense; 1988, the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command
(RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential information about a member of the
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being treated for a gunshot wound at
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon verification,
be arrested has committed it; and it was found that the wounded person, who was listed in the hospital records
as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of two (2) CAPCOM soldiers the
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is day before, or on 31 January 1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio,
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case Caloocan City. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to
is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While
confinement to another. confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988, Rolando Dural was positively
identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood of the
CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the
seated inside the car identified as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato
person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered
Manligot.
to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
As a consequence of this positive identification, Rolando Dural was referred
to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed
An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under Section 5 paragraphs (a) and (b)
with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an information charging
of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is justified when the person
Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of "Double Murder with
arrested is caught in  flagranti delicto, viz., in the act of committing an offense;
Assault Upon Agents of Persons in Authority." The case was docketed
or when an offense has just been committed and the person making the
therein as Criminal Case No. C-30112 and no bail was recommended. On 15
arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested
February 1988, the information was amended to include, as defendant,
has committed it. The rationale behind lawful arrests, without warrant, was
Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing of the original information, was still
stated by this Court in the case of People vs. Kagui Malasugui 1 thus:
unidentified.
To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and
Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with
searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a
this Court on behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva.
warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the
The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus on 9 February 1988 and the
mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most
respondents filed a Return of the Writ on 12 February 1988. Thereafter, the
depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many
parties were heard on 15 February 1988.
instances.

On 26 February 1988, however, Roberto Umil and Renato Villanueva posted

The record of the instant cases would show that the persons in whose behalf
bail before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where charges for violation
these petitions for habeas corpus have been filed, had freshly committed or
of the Anti-Subversion Act had been filed against them, and they were
were actually committing an offense, when apprehended, so that their arrests
accordingly released. The petition for habeas corpus, insofar as Umil and
without a warrant were clearly justified, and that they are, further, detained by
Villanueva are concerned, is now moot and academic and is accordingly
virtue of valid informations filed against them in court.
dismissed, since the writ of habeas corpus does not lie in favor of an
accused in a criminal case who has been released on bail. 2
As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the duly constituted authorities. If killing and other acts of
act of shooting the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers aforementioned. Nor was he violence against the rebels find justification in the exigencies
arrested just after the commission of the said offense for his arrest came a of armed hostilities which is of the essence of waging a
day after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case of
unjustified. invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining them
while any of these contingencies continues cannot be less
However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New justified. . . . 3
Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being
a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified The record, moreover, shows that the criminal case filed against Rolando
as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. for "Double Murder, etc." was tried in the court
crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such below and at the conclusion thereof, or on 17 August 1988, Rolando Dural
crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. were found guilty of the charge and sentenced
connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in accordingly. Rolando Dural is now serving the sentence imposed upon him
the nature of continuing crimes. As stated by the Court in an earlier case: by the trial court. Thus, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available to
him. For, as held in the early case of U.S. vs. Wilson: 4
From the facts as above-narrated, the claim of the petitioners
that they were initially arrested illegally is, therefore, without In this case, whatever may be said about the manner of his
basis in law and in fact. The crimes of insurrection or arrest, the fact remains that the defendant was actually in
rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such court in the custody of the law on March 29, when a
crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the complaint sufficient in form and substance was read to him.
furtherance, on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or To this he pleaded not guilty. The trial followed, in which, and
in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. in the judgment of guilty pronounced by the court, we find no
2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set error. Whether, if there were irregularities in bringing him
them apart from the common offenses, aside from their personally before the court, he could have been released on
essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide a writ of habeas corpus or now has a civil action for
magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the herein detainees damages against the person who arrested him we need not
was well within the bounds of the law and existing inquire. It is enough to say that such irregularities are not
jurisprudence in our jurisdiction. sufficient to set aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint and after a trial free from error.
2. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as
its fighting armed elements, or for committing non-violent II
acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of
capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell In G.R. Nos. 84581-82 (Roque vs. De Villa), the arrest of Amelia
the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra, without warrant, is also justified. When
prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, apprehended at the house of Renato Constantino in Marikina Heights,
therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the Marikina, Metro Manila, Wilfredo Buenaobra admitted that he was an NPA
prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by courier and he had with him letters to Renato Constantino and other
a judge of the existence of probable cause before the members of the rebel group. Amelia Roque, upon the other hand, was a
issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of member of the National United Front Commission, in charge of finance,
bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a and admitted ownership of subversive documents found in the house of her
judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or sister in Caloocan City. She was also in possession of ammunition and a
capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against fragmentation grenade for which she had no permit or authority to possess.
government forces, or any other milder acts but equally in
pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture The record of these two (2) cases shows that on 27 June 1988, one Rogelio
is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that Ramos y Ibanes, a member of the NPA, who had surrendered to the military
involves the very survival of society and its government and
authorities, told military agents about the operations of the Communist Party of the NUFC and a ranking member of the International Department of the
of the Philippines (CPP) and the New Peoples Army (NPA) in Metro Manila. Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).
He identified some of his former comrades as "Ka Mong", a staff member of
the Communications and Transportation Bureau; "Ka Nelia", a staff member At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day (12 August 1988),
in charge of finance; "Ka Miller", an NPA courier from Sorsogon and Lopez, Wilfredo Buenaobra arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the
Quezon; "Ka Ted", and "Ka Totoy". He also pointed to a certain house Villaluz Compound. When accosted, he readily admitted to the military
occupied by Renato Constantino located in the Villaluz Compound, Molave agents that he is a regular member of the CPP/NPA and that he went to the
St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, which is used as a safehouse place to deliver letters to "Ka Mong", referring to Renato Constatino, and
of the National United Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPP-NPA. other members of the rebel group. On further questioning, he also admitted
that he is known as "Ka Miller" and that he was from Barangay San Pedro,
In view of these revelations, the Constantino house was placed under military Lopez, Quezon. Among the items taken from him were the following:
surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a search warrant issued by
Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, a search of the (1) Handwritten letter addressed to "Ka Bing & Co. from A &
house was conducted at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, by a combined Co." dated August 11, 1988;
team of the Criminal Investigation Service, National Capital District (CIS-
NCD) and the Constabulary Security Group (CSG). In the course of the (2) Handwritten letter addressed to "ROD from VIC (Schell
search, the following articles were found and taken under proper receipt: datre)" dated August 11, 1988;

a) One (1) Colt M16A1 long rifle with defaced serial number; (3) Handwritten letter addressed to "Suzie" from "Vic", dated
August 11, 1988.
b) One (1) Cal. .380 ACT/9mm Model PPK/8 SN: 260577 & 2605778;
Also found Buenaobra's possession was a piece of paper containing a
c) Two (2) fragmentation hand grenades; written but jumbled telephone number of Florida M. Roque, sister of Amelia
Roque alias "Ka Nelia", at 69 Geronimo St., Caloocan City. Acting on the
d) Fifty-six (56) live ammunition for Cal. 5.56 mm; lead provided as to the whereabouts of Amelia Roque, the military agents
went to the given address the next day (13 August 1988). They arrived at the
e) Five (5) live ammunition for Cal. .380; place at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning. After identifying themselves as
military agents and after seeking permission to search the place, which was
granted, the military agents conducted a search in the presence of the
f) One (1) ICOM VHF FM Radio Transciever SN: 14903
occupants of the house and the barangay captain of the place, one Jesus D.
Olba.
g) One (1) Regulated power supply 220V AC;
The military agents found the place to be another safehouse of the
h) One (1) Antennae (adjustable); NUFC/CPP. They found ledgers, journals, vouchers, bank deposit books,
folders, computer diskettes, and subversive documents as well as live
i) One (1) Speaker with cord ALEXAR; ammunition for a .38 SPL Winchester, 11 rounds of live ammunition for a cal.
.45, 19 rounds of live ammunition for an M16 Rifle, and a fragmentation
j) Voluminous Subversive documents. grenade. As a result, Amelia Roque and the other occupants of the house
were brought to the PC-CIS Headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City, for
When confronted, Renato Constatino could not produce any permit or investigation. Amelia Roque admitted to the investigators that the voluminous
authority to possess the firearms, ammunition, radio and other documents belonged to her and that the other occupants of the house had no
communications equipment. Hence, he was brought to the CIS Headquarters knowledge of them. As a result, the said other occupants of the house were
for investigation. When questioned, he refused to give a written statement, released from custody.
although he admitted that he was a staff member of the executive committee
On 15 August 1988, Amelia Roque was brought to the Caloocan City Fiscal not produce any. Hence, they were brought to PC Headquarters for
for inquest after which an information charging her with violation of PD 1866 investigation. Found in their possession were the following articles:
was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. The case is
docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-1196. Another information for a) Voluminous subversive documents
violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Amelia Roque before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, which is docketed therein as b) One (1) Cal. 7.65 MOD 83 2C Pistol SN: 001412 with one
Criminal Case No. C-150458. (1) magazine for Cal. 7.65 containing ten (10) live
ammunition of same caliber;
An information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed
against Wilfredo Buenaobra before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Marikina, c) One (1) Cal. 7.65 Pietro Barreta SN; A18868 last digit
Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 23715. Bail tampered with one (1) magazine containing five (5) live
was set at P4,000.00. ammunition of same caliber.

On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed before this Court At the PC Stockade, Domingo Anonuevo was identified as "Ka Ted", and
on behalf of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra. At the hearing of the Ramon Casiple as "Ka Totoy" of the CPP, by their comrades who had
case, however, Wilfredo Buenaobra manifested his desire to stay in the PC- previously surrendered to the military.
INP Stockade at Camp Crame, Quezon City. According, the petition
for habeas corpus filed on his behalf is now moot and academic. Only the
petition of Amelia Roque remains for resolution. On 15 August 1988, the record of the investigation and other documentary
evidence were forwarded to the Provincial Fiscal at Pasig, Metro Manila, who
conducted an inquest, after which Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple
The contention of respondents that petitioners Roque and Buenaobra are were charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 before the
officers and/or members of the National United Front Commission (NUFC) of Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. The cases are docketed therein
the CPP was not controverted or traversed by said petitioners. The as Criminal Cases Nos. 74386 ad 74387, respectively. No bail was
contention must be deemed admitted. 5 As officers and/or members of the recommended.
NUFC-CPP, their arrest, without warrant, was justified for the same reasons
earlier stated vis-a-vis Rolando Dural. The arrest without warrant of Roque
was additionally justified as she was, at the time of apprehension, in On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on
possession of ammunitions without license to possess them. behalf of Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, alleging that the said
Anonuevo and Casiple were unlawfully arrested without a warrant and that
the informations filed against them are null and void for having been filed
III without prior hearing and preliminary investigation. On 30 August 1988, the
Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, and after the respondents had filed a
In G.R. Nos. 84583-84 (Anonuevo vs. Ramos), the arrest of Domingo Return of the Writ, the parties were heard.
Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, without warrant, is also justified under the
rules. Both are admittedly members of the standing committee of the NUFC The petitioners' (Anonuevo and Casiple) claim that they were unlawfully
and, when apprehended in the house of Renato Constatino, they had a bag arrested because there was no previous warrant of arrest, is without merit
containing subversive materials, and both carried firearms and ammunition The record shows that Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were
for which they had no license to possess or carry. carrying unlicensed firearms and ammunition in their person when they were
apprehended.
The record of these two (2) cases shows that at about 7:30 o'clock in the
evening of 13 August 1988, Domingo T. Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple There is also no merit in the contention that the informations filed against
arrived at the house of Renato Constatino at Marikina Heights, Marikina, them are null and void for want of a preliminary investigation. The filing of an
which was still under surveillance by military agents. The military agents information, without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted,
noticed bulging objects on their waist lines. When frisked, the agents found is sanctioned by the Rules. Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, as
them to be loaded guns. Anonuevo and Casiple were asked to show their amended, reads:
permit or license to possess or carry firearms and ammunition, but they could
 Sec. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without a warrant. — IV
When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an
offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint In G.R. No. 83162 (Ocaya vs. Aguirre), the arrest without warrant, of Vicky
or information may be filed by the offended party, peace Ocaya is justified under the Rules, since she had with her unlicensed
officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having ammunition when she was arrested. The record of this case shows that on
been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the 12 May 1988, agents of the PC Intelligence and Investigation of the Rizal PC-
offended party or arresting officer or person. INP Command, armed with a search warrant issued by Judge Eutropio
Migrino of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, conducted a
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, search of a house located at Block 19, Phase II, Marikina Green Heights,
the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation Marikina, Metro Manila, believed to be occupied by Benito Tiamson, head of
by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must the CPP-NPA. In the course of the search, Vicky Ocaya arrived in a car
sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised driven by Danny Rivera. Subversive documents and several rounds of
Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer ammunition for a .45 cal. pistol were found in the car of Vicky Ocaya. As a
and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible result, Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera were brought to the PC Headquarters
person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may for investigation. When Vicky Ocaya could not produce any permit or
apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the authorization to possess the ammunition, an information charging her with
investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from violation of PD 1866 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro
its inception. Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 73447. Danny
Rivera, on the other hand, was released from custody.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary
investigation having been first conducted, the accused may On 17 May 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed, with this Court on
within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the behalf of Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera. It was alleged therein that Vicky
information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same Ocaya was illegally arrested and detained, and denied the right to a
right to adduced evidence in his favor in the manner preliminary investigation.
prescribed in this Rule.
It would appear, however, that Vicky Ocaya was arrested in flagranti
The petitioners Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, however, refused to delicto so that her arrest without a warrant is justified. No preliminary
sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as investigation was conducted because she was arrested without a warrant
amended. In the informations filed against them, the prosecutor made and she refused to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
identical certifications, as follows: Code, pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rule of Court, as amended.

This is to certify that the accused has been charged in V

accordance with Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, that no preliminary investigation was The petitioners Vicky Ocaya, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, and
conducted because the accused has not made and signed a Amelia Roque claim that the firearms, ammunition and subversive
waiver of the provisions of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal documents alleged to have been found in their possession when they were
Code, as amended; that based on the evidence presented, arrested, did not belong to them, but were "planted" by the military agents to
there is reasonable ground to believe that the crime has justify their illegal arrest.
been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof. The petitioners, however, have not introduced any evidence to support their
aforesaid claim. On the other hand, no evil motive or ill-will on the part of the
Nor did petitioners ask for a preliminary investigation after the informations arresting officers that would cause the said arresting officers in these cases
had been filed against them in court. Petitioners cannot now claim that they to accuse the petitioners falsely, has been shown. Besides, the arresting
have been deprived of their constitutional right to due process. officers in these cases do not appear to be seekers of glory and bounty
hunters for, as counsel for the petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple say, "there
is absolutely nothing in the evidence submitted during the inquest that and search anyone who should visit the residence of
petitioners are on the 'AFP Order of Battle with a reward of P150,000.00 Constantino, such as petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple?
each on their heads.'" 6 On the other hand, as pointed out by the Solicitor Must this Honorable Court yield to Anonuevo and Casiple's
General, the arrest of the petitioners is not a product of a witch hunt or a flimsy and bare assertion that they went to visit Constantino,
fishing expedition, but the result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA who was to leave for Saudi Arabia on the day they were
safehouses pointed to by no less than former comrades of the petitioners in arrested thereat?
the rebel movement.
As to petitioner Roque, was it unreasonable for the military
The Solicitor General, in his Consolidated Memorandum, aptly observes: authorities to effect her arrest without warrant considering
that it was Buenaobra who provided the leads on her
. . . . To reiterate, the focal point in the case of petitioners identity? It cannot be denied that Buenaobra had connection
Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple, was the lawful with Roque. Because the former has the phone number of
search and seizure conducted by the military at the the latter. Why the necessity of jumbling Roque's telephone
residence of Renato Constantino at Villaluz Compound, number as written on a piece of paper taken from
Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila. The Buenaobra's possession? Petitioners Roque and Buenaobra
raid at Constantino's residence, was not a witch hunting or have not offered any plausible reason so far.
fishing expedition on the part of the military. It was a result of
an in-depth military surveillance coupled with the leads In all the above incidents, respondents maintain that they
provided by former members of the underground subversive acted reasonably, under the time, place and circumstances
organizations. That raid produced positive results. to date, of the events in question, especially considering that at the
nobody has disputed the fact that the residence of time of petitioner's arrest, incriminatory evidence, i.e,
Constantino when raided yielded communication equipment, firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive documents were
firearms and ammunitions, as well as subversive documents. found in their possession.

The military agents working on the information provided by Petitioners, when arrested, were neither taking their snacks
Constantino that other members of his group were coming to nor innocently visiting a camp, but were arrested in such
his place, reasonably conducted a "stake-out" operation time, place and circumstances, from which one can
whereby some members of the raiding team were left behind reasonably conclude tat they were up to a sinister plot,
the place. True enough, barely two hours after the raid and involving utmost secrecy and comprehensive conspiracy.
Constantino's arrest, petitioner Buenaobra arrived at
Constantino's residence. He acted suspiciously and when IV
frisked and searched by the military authorities, found in his
person were letters. They are no ordinary letters, as even a In. G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the release on habeas corpus of the
cursory reading would show. Not only that, Buenaobra petitioner Deogracias Espiritu, who is detained by virtue of an Information for
admitted that he is a NPA courier and was there to deliver Violation of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition) filed
the letters to Constantino. with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is similarly not warranted.

Subsequently, less than twenty four hours after the arrest of The record of the case shows that the said petitioner is the General
Constantino and Buenaobra, petitioners Anonuevo and Secretary of the Pinagkaisahang Samahan ng Tsuper at Operators
Casiple arrived at Constantino's place. Would it be Nationwide (PISTON), an association of drivers and operators of public
unreasonable for the military agents to believe that service vehicles in the Philippines, organized for their mutual aid and
petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple are among those protection.
expected to visit Constantino's residence considering that
Constatino's information was true, in that Buenaobra did
come to that place? Was it unreasonable under the Petitioner claims that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 23 November
circumstances, on the part of the military agents, not to frisk 1988, while he was sleeping in his home located at 363 Valencia St., Sta.
Mesa, Manila, he was awakened by his sister Maria Paz Lalic who told him Bukas tuloy ang welga natin, sumagot na ang Cebu at Bicol
that a group of persons wanted to hire his jeepney. When he went down to na kasali sila, at hindi tayo titigil hanggang hindi binibigay ng
talk to them, he was immediately put under arrest. When he asked for the gobyerno ni Cory ang gusto nating pagbaba ng halaga ng
warrant of arrest, the men, headed by Col. Ricardo Reyes, bodily lifted him spare parts, bilihin at and pagpapalaya sa ating pinuno na si
and placed him in their owner-type jeepney. He demanded that his sister, Ka Roda hanggang sa magkagulo na. 10 (emphasis supplied)
Maria Paz Lalic, be allowed to accompany him, but the men did not accede
to his request and hurriedly sped away. The police finally caught up with the petitioner on 23 November 1988. He
was invited for questioning and brought to police headquarters after which an
He was brought to Police Station No. 8 of the Western Police District at Information for violation of Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code was filed
Blumentritt, Manila where he was interrogated and detained. Then, at about against him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 11
9:00 o'clock of the same morning, he was brought before the respondent Lim
and, there and then, the said respondent ordered his arrest and detention. Since the arrest of the petitioner without a warrant was in accordance with
He was thereafter brought to the General Assignment Section, Investigation the provisions of Rule 113, Sec. 5(b) of the Rules of Court and that the
Division of the Western Police District under Police Capt. Cresenciano A. petitioner is detained by virtue of a valid information filed with the competent
Cabasal where he was detained, restrained and deprived of his liberty. 7 court, he may not be released on habeas corpus. He may, however be
released upon posting bail as recommended. However, we find the amount
The respondents claim however, that the detention of the petitioner is of the recommended bail (P60,000.00) excessive and we reduce it to
justified in view of the Information filed against him before the Regional Trial P10,000.00 only.
Court of Manila, docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 88-683-85, charging
him with violation of Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition). VII

The respondents also claim that the petitioner was lawfully arrested without a In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno vs. Station Commander), we also find no merit
judicial warrant of arrest since petitioner when arrested had in fact just in the submission of Narciso Nazareno that he was illegally arrested and is
committed an offense in that in the afternoon of 22 November 1988, during a unlawfully detained. The record of this case shows that at about 8:30 o'clock
press conference at the National Press Club. in the morning of 14 December 1988, one Romulo Bunye II was killed by a
group of men near the corner of T. Molina and Mendiola Streets in Alabang,
Deogracias Espiritu through tri-media was heard urging all Muntinglupa, Metro Manila. One of the suspects in the killing was Ramil
drivers and operators to go on nationwide strike on Regal who was arrested by the police on 28 December 1988. Upon
November 23, 1988, to force the government to give into questioning, Regal pointed to Narciso Nazareno as on of his companions in
their demands to lower the prices of spare parts, the killing of the said Romulo Bunye II. In view thereof, the police officers,
commodities, water and the immediate release from without warrant, picked up Narciso Nazareno and brought him to the police
detention of the president of the PISTON (Pinag-isang headquarters for questioning. Obviously, the evidence of petitioner's guilt is
Samahan ng Tsuper Operators Nationwide). Further, we strong because on 3 January 1989, an information charging Narciso
heard Deogracias Espiritu taking the place of PISTON Nazareno, Ramil Regala, and two (2) others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye
president Medardo Roda and also announced the formation II was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case is
of the Alliance Drivers Association to go on nationwide strike docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 731.
on November 23, 1988. 8
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail, but the
Policemen waited for petitioner outside the National Pres Club in order to motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated 10 January 1989, even
investigate him, but he gave the lawmen the slip. 9 He was next seen at as the motion to post bail, earlier filed by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga,
about 5:00 o'clock that afternoon at a gathering of drivers and symphatizers was granted by the same trial court.
at the corner of Magsaysay Blvd. and Valencia Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila
where he was heard to say: On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on
behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the Court issued the
writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the case on court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of
30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve the petition. record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue
the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the
of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna issued a resolution denying the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason
petition for habeas corpus, it appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or
the custody of the respondents by reason of an information filed against him order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the
with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila which had taken discharge of a person charged with a convicted of an
cognizance of said case and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by offense in the Philippines or of a person suffering
said Narciso Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of the evidence imprisonment under lawful judgment. (emphasis supplied)
against him).
At this point, we refer to petitioner's plea for the Court of re-examine and,
The findings of the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, thereafter, abandon its pronouncement in Ilagan vs. Enrile, 13 that a writ
Laguna are based upon the facts and the law. Consequently, we will not of habeas corpus is no longer available after an information is filed against
disturb the same. Evidently, the arrest of Nazareno was effected by the the person detained and a warrant of arrest or an order of commitment, is
police without warrant pursuant to Sec. 5(b), Rule 113, Rules of Court after issued by the court where said information has been filed. 14 The petitioners
he was positively implicated by his co-accused Ramil Regala in the killing of claim that the said ruling, which was handed down during the past dictatorial
Romulo Bunye regime to enforce and strengthen said regime, has no place under the
II; and after investigation by the police authorities. As held in People present democratic dispensation and collides with the basic, fundamental,
vs. Ancheta: 12 and constitutional rights of the people. Petitioners point out that the said
doctrine makes possible the arrest and detention of innocent persons despite
lack of evidence against them, and, most often, it is only after a petition
The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by
for habeas corpus is filed before the court that the military authorities file the
reason of a crime, does not presuppose as a necessary
criminal information in the courts of law to be able to hide behind the
requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence
protective mantle of the said doctrine. This, petitioners assert, stands as an
of a crime. For the detention to be perfectly legal, it is
obstacle to the freedom and liberty of the people and permits lawless and
sufficient that the agent or person in authority making the
arbitrary State action.
arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the
existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime and
that the same grounds exist to believe that the person We find, however, no compelling reason to abandon the said doctrine. It is
sought to be detained participated therein. based upon express provision of the Rules of Court and the exigencies
served by the law. The fears expressed by the petitioners are not really
unremediable. As the Court sees it, re-examination or reappraisal, with a
VIII
view to its abandonment, of the Ilagan case doctrine is not the answer. The
answer and the better practice would be, not to limit the function of
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges the habeas corpus to a mere inquiry as to whether or not the court which
have been filed in the proper courts against the petitioners. The rule is, that if issued the process, judgment or order of commitment or before whom the
a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer detained person is charged, had jurisdiction or not to issue the process,
under process issued by a court judge, and that the court or judge had judgment or order or to take cognizance of the case, but rather, as the Court
jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, of if such person is itself states in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, 15 "in all petitions for habeas corpus the
charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed. court must inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioner's detention-from
Section 4, Rule 102, Rules of Court, as amended is quite explicit in providing the moment petition was taken into custody up to the moment the court
that: passes upon the merits of the petition;" and "only after such a scrutiny can
the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution has in
Sec. 4. When writ is allowed or discharge authorized. — If it fact been satisfied." This is exactly what the Court has done in the petitions
appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty at bar. This is what should henceforth be done in all future cases of habeas
is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
corpus. In Short, all cases involving deprivation of individual liberty should be Except for this reservation and appeal, I concur with the decision.
promptly brought to the courts for their immediate scrutiny and disposition.
 
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in
G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's provisional FELICIANO, J., concurring:
liberty is hereby ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.
I concur in the result reached in each of the eight (8) consolidated Petitions
SO ORDERED. for Habeas Corpus. At the same time, I have some reservations concerning
certain statements made by the Court in G.R. No. 81567 (Umil, et al. v.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Ramos) (Part I of the Decision) and in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) (Part
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., VI of the Decision).
concur.
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil, et al. v. Ramos), the per curiam opinion states
  categorically that: "the crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal
to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance
  thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State
and are in the nature of continuing crimes." The majority here relies
upon Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile (121 SCRA 472 [1983]). The majority there
 
made the same equally broad statement but without any visible effort to
examine the basis, scope and meaning of such a sweeping
Separate Opinions statement. Garcia-Padilla did not even identify the specific offenses which it
regarded as "in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from
  the common offenses" (121 SCRA at 489). It appears to me that in G.R. No.
85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) (Part VI of the Decision), the per curiam opinion has
CRUZ, J., dissenting and concurring: in effect included the offense of "inciting to sedition" penalized under Article
142 of the Revised Penal Code as a "continuing offense" under the
I dissent insofar as the ponencia affirms the ruling in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile capacious blanket of the majority opinion in Garcia-Padilla, at least for
that subversion is a continuing offense, to justify the arrest without warrant of purposes of determining the legality of the arrest without a warrant of
any person at any time as long as the authorities say he has been placed petitioner Deogracias Espiritu.
under surveillance on suspicion of the offense. That is a dangerous doctrine.
A person may be arrested when he is doing the most innocent acts, as when I would respectfully recall to my learned colleagues in the Court that "inciting
he is only washing his hands, or taking his supper, or even when he is to sedition" is defined in Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code in terms of
sleeping, on the ground that he is committing the "continuing" offense of speech 1 and that consequently it is important constantly do distinguish
subversion. Libertarians were appalled when that doctrine was imposed between speech which is protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom
during the Marcos regime. I am alarmed that even now this new Court is of speech and of the press and speech which may constitutionally be
willing to sustain it. I strongly urge my colleagues to discard it altogether as regarded as violative of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code. Precisely
one of the disgraceful vestiges of the past dictatorship and uphold the rule because speech which the police authorities might regard as seditious or as
guaranteeing the right of the people against unreasonable searches and criminal inciting to sedition may well turn out to be only an exercise of a
seizures. We can do no less if we are really to reject the past oppression and constitutionally guaranteed freedom, I would submit that we must apply the
commit ourselves to the true freedom. Even if it be argued that the military concept of "continuing offense" narrowly for purposes of application of
should be given every support in our fight against subversion, I maintain that Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court.
that fight must be waged honorably, in accordance with the Bill of Rights. I do
not believe that in fighting the enemy we must adopt the ways of the enemy, In my view, the very broad statement made about "continuing crimes" in G.R.
which are precisely what we are fighting against. I submit that our more No. 81567 (Umil, et al v. Ramos) constitutes dictum, considering that
important motivation should be what are we fighting for. Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. had already been tried in the court
below for "double murder, etc." and found guilty of the offense charged, (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
sentenced accordingly, and at least in the case of Rolando Dural, service of escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
the sentence imposed upon him by the trial court had already begun. serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
Similarly, in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) the statement that the arrest of confinement to another.
petitioner Espiritu without a warrant was in accordance with the provisions of
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court does not appear strictly In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
necessary, considering that the petitioner had already been charged in a without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or
valid information filed with the competent court, which court had presumably jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section
issued an order for his commitment, and considering further that he is entitled 7. 1
to bail.
"Rolando Dural," so states the majority, "was arrested for being a member of
There is thus no obstacle, to my mind, to a careful examination of the the New People's Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization," 2 and
doctrine of "continuing crimes" as applied to such offenses as subversion and that "[s]ubversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural
inciting to sedition and possibly other offenses, in some future case where without a warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an
that issue is raised squarely and is unavoidable. offense when arrested." 3

Cortes, J., concurs. As I said, I beg to differ.

  First, Rolando Dural was charged with "Double Murder with Assault upon
Agents of Authority." 4 If he had been guilty of subversion — the offense for
SARMIENTO, J.,  dissenting: which he was supposedly arrested via a warrantless arrest — subversion
was the logical crime with which he should have been charged.
I beg to differ from my brethren. I submit that habeas corpus lies in all eight
cases. The authorities could not have rightly arrested him for subversion on account
of the slay of the two CAPCOM soldiers, a possible basis for violation of the
Anti-Subversion Act, because as the majority points out, "he was not arrested
G.R. No. 81567
while in the act of shooting [them] . . . [n]or was he arrested just after the
commission of the said offense for his arrest came a day after the said
The majority says that Rolando Dural's arrest without a warrant is lawful shooting incident." 5
under the Rules of Court, which reads:
Second, I do not believe that a warrantless (or citizen's) arrest is possible in
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace case of subversion — in the absence of any overt act that would justify the
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a authorities to act. "Subversion," as the term is known in law, means
person: "knowingly, wilfully and by overt acts affiliat[ing] [oneself] with, becom[ing] or
remain[ing] a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines and/or its
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has successor or of any subversion association as defined in sections two and
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit three hereof. . . . " 6 Logically, the military could not have known that Dural, at
an offense; the time he was taken, was a member of the New People's Army because he
was not performing any over act that he was truly, a rebel. Indeed, it had to
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he take a "verification"6 before he could be identified as allegedly a member of
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to the underground army. Under these circumstances, I am hard put to say that
be arrested has committed it; and he was committing subversion when he was arrested, assuming that he was
guilty of subversion, for purposes of a warrantless arrest.
 "Overt act" is made up of "[e]very act, movement, deed and that is reason enough to dismiss habeas corpus as moot and academic. It is
word of the [accused]," 7 indicating intent to accomplish a the duty of this Court, in my opinion, to make sure that Buenaobra has made
criminal objective. Dural, at the time he was arrested, was his choice freely and voluntarily. Personally, I find it indeed strange why he
lying in a hospital bed. This is not the overt act contemplated should prefer to stay in jail than go scot-free.
by law.
There is further no doubt that Buenaobra's petition is one impressed with a
Under the Rule above-quoted, the person must have either been public interest. In one case 14 we denied a motion to withdraw a petition
apprehended in flagranti (first paragraph) or after the act, provided that the for habeas corpus in view of its far-reaching importance to the motion, I do
peace officer has "personal knowledge" that he, the suspect, is guilty. not see how we should act differently, perhaps even insouciantly, here,
(second paragraph.) As I stated, Dural was not caught in the act. Moreover, especially since it involves persons who think and believe differently from the
what the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command rest of us.
(RIOU-CAPCOM) had in its hands was a mere "confidential information." I do
not think that this is the personal knowledge referred to by the second Both Buenaobra and Amelia Roque supposedly admitted that they were
paragraph. 8 Plainly and simply, it is hearsay. ranking officers of the Communist Party of the Philippines. According to the
majority, Buenaobra and Roque are bound by their admissions. 15
The rule, furthermore, on warrantless arrest is an exceptional one. By its
language, it may be exercised only in the most urgent cases and when the That both parties had admitted to be members of the Communist Party of the
guilt of an offender is plain and evident. What I think we have here is purely Philippines (the National United Front Commission) is a naked contention of
and simply, the military taking the law in its hands. the military. The fact that it has not been controverted, in my view, does not
justify the couple's arrest without warrant. Worse, by relying on the bare word
By stamping validity to Rolando Dural's warrantless arrest, I am afraid that of the military, this very Court has, to all intents and purposes, condemned
the majority has set a very dangerous precedent. With all due respect, my the duo for a crime (subversion and/or illegal possession of firearms) the
brethren has accorded the military a blanket authority to pick up any Juan, bone of contention, precisely, below.
Pedro, and Maria without a warrant for the simple reason that subversion is
supposed to be a continuing offense. G.R. Nos. 84583-84

That Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New People's I also find the warrantless arrests of Domingo Añonuevo and Ramon Casiple
Army" 9 is furthermore to me, a hasty statement. It has yet to be established to be contrary to law. That they are "admittedly members of the standing
that Dural is indeed a member of the Communist Party's military arm. And committee of the NUFC" 16 and that "subversive materials" 17 and unlicensed
unless proven guilty, he is presumed, and must be presumed most of all by firearms were found in their possession, are, like Buenaobra's and Roque's
this Court, to be innocent. cases, barren claims of the military. I also fear that by the majority's strong
language (that Añonuevo and Casiple are admitted NUCF officers) the
The majority also says that habeas corpus is moot and academic because majority has pronounced the petitioners guilty, when the lower courts have
Dural has been convicted and is serving sentence. I likewise take exception. yet to sit in judgment. I think we should be the last to preempt the decision of
It has been held that: "The writ may be granted upon a judgment already the trial courts. We would have set to naught the presumption of innocence
final." 10 accused persons enjoy.

The writ of liberty is a high prerogative writ. 11 Vindication of due process is its G.R. No. 83162
historic office. 12
With respect to the case of Vicky Ocaya, I am afraid that I am inclined
G.R. Nos. 84581-82 towards the same conclusion. There was basis — at the outset — to say that
Ocaya was probably guilty of illegal possession of firearms. As I have
In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, the majority avers that he had observed, a warrantless arrest must be predicated upon the existence of a
"manifested his desire to stay in the PC-INP stockade," 13 for which habeas crime being actually committed or having been committed. What I find here,
corpus has supposedly become moot and academic. I am not convinced that rather, is nothing less than a successful fishing expedition conducted by the
military upon an unwary citizen. I am quite distressed to note that this is still I also find, for reasons to be set forth hereinafter, a glossing over of the
possible under a supposed democracy. fundamental rights of the petitioners under the Constitution in the authorities'
handling of the petitioners' cases.
G.R. No. 85727
I hold that Garcia-Padilla is no longer good law under the present
Deogracias Espiritu was fast asleep in his house when he was placed under Constitution. Two reasons persuade me. First, it is repugnant to due process
arrest. For the life of me, I can not figure out how one can be picked upon in of law. ("The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the
one's own home and held moments later without a warrant of arrest. prosecution of offenses which require the determination by a judge of the
existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of
arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable." 21 Under the 1987
Espiritu was allegedly guilty of inciting to sedition as a result of a speech
Constitution, not even "[a] state of martial law suspend[s] the operation of
delivered in a press conference at the National Press Club on November 21,
[the Charter]. . ." 22 Second, it leaves the liberty of citizens to the whim of one
1988. He was, however, arrested the day after, November 22, 1988. Under
man ("On these occasions [the existence of a state of emergency], the
these circumstances, it eludes me how an arrest without a warrant could be
President takes absolute command, for the very life of the Nation and its
justified, either under paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of the Rule on
government, which, incidentally, includes the courts, is in grave peril. In so
warrantless arrests.
doing, the President is answerable only to his conscience, the people and to
God. For their part, in giving him the supreme mandate as their President,
The majority avers that since an information had been filed with the court, the people can only trust and pray that, giving him their own loyalty and
Espiritu's detention, is allegedly justifiable. The question is whether or not an without patriotism, the President will not fail them." 23 ) Under the Charter now
information is an authority to hold a person in custody. Under the Rules, an prevailing, the Chief Executive shares, to a certain extent, the exercise of
information means "an accusation in writing charging a person with an emergency powers, with Congress. 24
offense subscribed by the fiscal and filed with the court." 18 It is not, however,
an order to keep one under detention.
As a law advocate under the regime of Marcos, I had challenged the
soundness of Garcia-Padilla. I doubted whether it could stand up under the
G.R. No. 86332 aegis of the 1973 Constitution. I still doubt whether it can withstand scrutiny
under the 1987 Constitution.
The offense for which Narciso Nazareno is being held — the fatal shooting of
Romulo Bunye II — was committed on December 14, 1988. It was, however, The majority also fails to point out that six days after Garcia-Padilla was
only on December 28, 1988 that the police collared a suspect, Ramil Regala, handed down, the Court promulgated Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, 25 a case that in
who subsequently pointed to Nazareno as his accomplice. It also escapes my view has significantly whittled down Garcia-Padilla's very esse. In that
me how Nazareno, under these circumstances, could have been validly put case, Mr. Justice Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr. wrote for the majority:
under arrest without a warrant or the existence of the circumstance described
under either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above-quoted: The crime had
xxx xxx xxx
long been committed prior to the arrest.

16. After a person is arrested . . . without a warrant . . . the

G.R. Nos. 81567; 84581-82; 84583-84; 83162;
proper complaint or information against him must be filed
85727 & 86332; Postscripts
with the courts of justice within the time prescribed by law. . .
The majority has disposed of these cases on the bedrock of what I view as
17. Failure of the public officer to do so without any valid
doctrines that have lost their luster:
reason would constitute a violation of Art. 125, Revised
Penal Code, as amended. And the person detained would be
1. The teaching of Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, 19 which held that subversion is a entitled to be released on a writ of habeas corpus, unless he
continuing offense; is detained under subsisting process issued by a competent
court. 26
2. The ruling in Ilagan v. Enrile. 20
I also gather from the records that none of the petitioners had been: (1) The apprehensions in question chronicle in my mind the increasing pattern of
informed of their right to remain silent; and (2) to have competent and arrests and detention in the country without the sanction of a judicial decree.
independent counsel. 27 Four years ago at "EDSA", and many years before it, although with much
fewer of us, we valiantly challenged a dictator and all the evils his regime had
As I said, the majority is denying habeas corpus on self-serving claims of the stood for: repression of civil liberties and trampling on of human rights. We
military that the petitioners (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Añonuevo, and set up a popular government, restored its honored institutions, and crafted a
Casiple) are members of the Communist Party of the Philippines — and that democratic constitution that rests on the guideposts of peace and freedom. I
they have supposedly confessed to be in fact members of the outlawed feel that with this Court's ruling, we have frittered away, by a stroke of the
organization. The question that has not been answered is whether or not pen, what we had so painstakingly built in four years of democracy, and
these supposed confessions are admissible, for purposes of a warrantless almost twenty years of struggle against tyranny.
arrest, as evidence of guilt, in the absence of any showing that they were
apprised of their constitutional rights. I am perturbed by the silence of the It also occurs to me that I am interposing what looms as a quixotic outlook of
majority. I am distressed because as we held in one case, violation of the Philippine law on warrantless arrests and its implications on liberty. It is an
Constitution divests the court of jurisdiction and entitles the accused impression that does not surprise me. Quixotic as they may seem, and
to habeas corpus. 28 modesty aside, my views reflect a strong bias on my part — forged by years
of experience and sharpened by a painful and lonely struggle for freedom
According to the majority, a "re-examination or re-appraisal . . . of and justice — toward men and women who challenge settled beliefs. If this
the Ilagan doctrine is not the answer." 29 In my considered opinion, Ilagan dissent can not gain any adherent for now, let it nevertheless go on record as
v. Enrile 30 does not rightfully belong in the volumes of Philippine a plea to posterity and an appeal for tolerance of opinions with which we not
jurisprudence. In that case, the petitioners, three Davao-based lawyers, were only disagree, but opinions we loathe.
held by virtue of a simple information ("the petition herein has been rendered
moot and academic by virtue of the filing of an Information against them for I feel it is my duty to articulate this dissent.
Rebellion . . . and the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against them" 31 )
without any preliminary investigation (examination) having been previously  
conducted (to justify the issuance of a warrant).i•t•c-aüsl As I have stated, an
information is not a warrant of arrest. The fact that an information exists does Separate Opinions
not mean that a warrant will be issued.
CRUZ, J., dissenting and concurring:
Accused persons have the right of preliminary investigation
(examination). 32 It forms part and parcel of due process of law .33
I dissent insofar as the ponencia affirms the ruling in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile
that subversion is a continuing offense, to justify the arrest without warrant of
I find the majority's reliance on U.S. v. Wilson, 34 an ancient (1905) decision, any person at any time as long as the authorities say he has been placed
inapt and untenable. In that case, the accused had been served with a under surveillance on suspicion of the offense. That is a dangerous doctrine.
warrant and thereafter taken into custody. The question that faced the Court A person may be arrested when he is doing the most innocent acts, as when
was whether or not the warrant was valid, amid the accused's charges that he is only washing his hands, or taking his supper, or even when he is
the judge who issued it did not examine the complainant under oath. We held sleeping, on the ground that he is committing the "continuing" offense of
that the query was academic, because the accused had already pleaded, subversion. Libertarians were appalled when that doctrine was imposed
and the case had entered the trial stage. during the Marcos regime. I am alarmed that even now this new Court is
willing to sustain it. I strongly urge my colleagues to discard it altogether as
The cases at bar are not on all fours. Here, no warrant has been issued. I one of the disgraceful vestiges of the past dictatorship and uphold the rule
submit that in that event, the petitioners are entitled to freedom by way of the guaranteeing the right of the people against unreasonable searches and
writ of liberty. seizures. We can do no less if we are really to reject the past oppression and
commit ourselves to the true freedom. Even if it be argued that the military
x x x           x x x          x x x should be given every support in our fight against subversion, I maintain that
that fight must be waged honorably, in accordance with the Bill of Rights. I do
not believe that in fighting the enemy we must adopt the ways of the enemy, In my view, the very broad statement made about "continuing crimes" in G.R.
which are precisely what we are fighting against. I submit that our more No. 81567 (Umil, et al v. Ramos) constitutes dictum, considering that
important motivation should be what are we fighting for. Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. had already been tried in the court
below for "double murder, etc." and found guilty of the offense charged,
Except for this reservation and appeal, I concur with the decision. sentenced accordingly, and at least in the case of Rolando Dural, service of
the sentence imposed upon him by the trial court had already begun.
 
Similarly, in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) the statement that the arrest of
petitioner Espiritu without a warrant was in accordance with the provisions of
FELICIANO, J., concurring:
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court does not appear strictly
necessary, considering that the petitioner had already been charged in a
I concur in the result reached in each of the eight (8) consolidated Petitions valid information filed with the competent court, which court had presumably
for Habeas Corpus. At the same time, I have some reservations concerning issued an order for his commitment, and considering further that he is entitled
certain statements made by the Court in G.R. No. 81567 (Umil, et al. v. to bail.
Ramos) (Part I of the Decision) and in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) (Part
VI of the Decision).
There is thus no obstacle, to my mind, to a careful examination of the
doctrine of "continuing crimes" as applied to such offenses as subversion and
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil, et al. v. Ramos), the per curiam opinion states inciting to sedition and possibly other offenses, in some future case where
categorically that: "the crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal that issue is raised squarely and is unavoidable.
to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance
thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State
Cortes, J., concurs.
and are in the nature of continuing crimes." The majority here relies
upon Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile (121 SCRA 472 [1983]). The majority there
made the same equally broad statement but without any visible effort to  
examine the basis, scope and meaning of such a sweeping
statement. Garcia-Padilla did not even identify the specific offenses which it SARMIENTO, J.,  dissenting:
regarded as "in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from
the common offenses" (121 SCRA at 489). It appears to me that in G.R. No. I beg to differ from my brethren. I submit that habeas corpus lies in all eight
85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) (Part VI of the Decision), the per curiam opinion has cases.
in effect included the offense of "inciting to sedition" penalized under Article
142 of the Revised Penal Code as a "continuing offense" under the G.R. No. 81567
capacious blanket of the majority opinion in Garcia-Padilla, at least for
purposes of determining the legality of the arrest without a warrant of
petitioner Deogracias Espiritu. The majority says that Rolando Dural's arrest without a warrant is lawful
under the Rules of Court, which reads:
I would respectfully recall to my learned colleagues in the Court that "inciting
to sedition" is defined in Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code in terms of Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace
speech 1 and that consequently it is important constantly do distinguish officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
between speech which is protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom person:
of speech and of the press and speech which may constitutionally be
regarded as violative of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code. Precisely (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
because speech which the police authorities might regard as seditious or as committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
criminal inciting to sedition may well turn out to be only an exercise of a an offense;
constitutionally guaranteed freedom, I would submit that we must apply the
concept of "continuing offense" narrowly for purposes of application of
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court.
 (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he the underground army. Under these circumstances, I am hard put to say that
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to he was committing subversion when he was arrested, assuming that he was
be arrested has committed it; and guilty of subversion, for purposes of a warrantless arrest.

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has "Overt act" is made up of "[e]very act, movement, deed and
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is word of the [accused]," 7 indicating intent to accomplish a
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case criminal objective. Dural, at the time he was arrested, was
is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one lying in a hospital bed. This is not the overt act contemplated
confinement to another. by law.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested Under the Rule above-quoted, the person must have either been
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or apprehended in flagranti (first paragraph) or after the act, provided that the
jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section peace officer has "personal knowledge" that he, the suspect, is guilty.
7. 1 (second paragraph.) As I stated, Dural was not caught in the act. Moreover,
what the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command
"Rolando Dural," so states the majority, "was arrested for being a member of (RIOU-CAPCOM) had in its hands was a mere "confidential information." I do
the New People's Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization," 2 and not think that this is the personal knowledge referred to by the second
that "[s]ubversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural paragraph. 8 Plainly and simply, it is hearsay.
without a warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an
offense when arrested." 3 The rule, furthermore, on warrantless arrest is an exceptional one. By its
language, it may be exercised only in the most urgent cases and when the
As I said, I beg to differ. guilt of an offender is plain and evident. What I think we have here is purely
and simply, the military taking the law in its hands.
First, Rolando Dural was charged with "Double Murder with Assault upon
Agents of Authority." 4 If he had been guilty of subversion — the offense for By stamping validity to Rolando Dural's warrantless arrest, I am afraid that
which he was supposedly arrested via a warrantless arrest — subversion the majority has set a very dangerous precedent. With all due respect, my
was the logical crime with which he should have been charged. brethren has accorded the military a blanket authority to pick up any Juan,
Pedro, and Maria without a warrant for the simple reason that subversion is
supposed to be a continuing offense.
The authorities could not have rightly arrested him for subversion on account
of the slay of the two CAPCOM soldiers, a possible basis for violation of the
Anti-Subversion Act, because as the majority points out, "he was not arrested That Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New People's
while in the act of shooting [them] . . . [n]or was he arrested just after the Army" 9 is furthermore to me, a hasty statement. It has yet to be established
commission of the said offense for his arrest came a day after the said that Dural is indeed a member of the Communist Party's military arm. And
shooting incident." 5 unless proven guilty, he is presumed, and must be presumed most of all by
this Court, to be innocent.
Second, I do not believe that a warrantless (or citizen's) arrest is possible in
case of subversion — in the absence of any overt act that would justify the The majority also says that habeas corpus is moot and academic because
authorities to act. "Subversion," as the term is known in law, means Dural has been convicted and is serving sentence. I likewise take exception.
"knowingly, wilfully and by overt acts affiliat[ing] [oneself] with, becom[ing] or It has been held that: "The writ may be granted upon a judgment already
remain[ing] a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines and/or its final." 10
successor or of any subversion association as defined in sections two and
three hereof. . . . " 6 Logically, the military could not have known that Dural, at The writ of liberty is a high prerogative writ. 11 Vindication of due process is its
the time he was taken, was a member of the New People's Army because he historic office. 12
was not performing any over act that he was truly, a rebel. Indeed, it had to
take a "verification"6 before he could be identified as allegedly a member of G.R. Nos. 84581-82
In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, the majority avers that he had observed, a warrantless arrest must be predicated upon the existence of a
"manifested his desire to stay in the PC-INP stockade," 13 for which habeas crime being actually committed or having been committed. What I find here,
corpus has supposedly become moot and academic. I am not convinced that rather, is nothing less than a successful fishing expedition conducted by the
that is reason enough to dismiss habeas corpus as moot and academic. It is military upon an unwary citizen. I am quite distressed to note that this is still
the duty of this Court, in my opinion, to make sure that Buenaobra has made possible under a supposed democracy.
his choice freely and voluntarily. Personally, I find it indeed strange why he
should prefer to stay in jail than go scot-free. G.R. No. 85727

There is further no doubt that Buenaobra's petition is one impressed with a Deogracias Espiritu was fast asleep in his house when he was placed under
public interest. In one case 14 we denied a motion to withdraw a petition arrest. For the life of me, I can not figure out how one can be picked upon in
for habeas corpus in view of its far-reaching importance to the motion, I do one's own home and held moments later without a warrant of arrest.
not see how we should act differently, perhaps even insouciantly, here,
especially since it involves persons who think and believe differently from the Espiritu was allegedly guilty of inciting to sedition as a result of a speech
rest of us. delivered in a press conference at the National Press Club on November 21,
1988. He was, however, arrested the day after, November 22, 1988. Under
Both Buenaobra and Amelia Roque supposedly admitted that they were these circumstances, it eludes me how an arrest without a warrant could be
ranking officers of the Communist Party of the Philippines. According to the justified, either under paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of the Rule on
majority, Buenaobra and Roque are bound by their admissions. 15 warrantless arrests.

That both parties had admitted to be members of the Communist Party of the The majority avers that since an information had been filed with the court,
Philippines (the National United Front Commission) is a naked contention of Espiritu's detention, is allegedly justifiable. The question is whether or not an
the military. The fact that it has not been controverted, in my view, does not information is an authority to hold a person in custody. Under the Rules, an
justify the couple's arrest without warrant. Worse, by relying on the bare word information means "an accusation in writing charging a person with an
of the military, this very Court has, to all intents and purposes, condemned offense subscribed by the fiscal and filed with the court." 18 It is not, however,
the duo for a crime (subversion and/or illegal possession of firearms) the an order to keep one under detention.
bone of contention, precisely, below.
G.R. No. 86332
G.R. Nos. 84583-84
The offense for which Narciso Nazareno is being held — the fatal shooting of
I also find the warrantless arrests of Domingo Añonuevo and Ramon Casiple Romulo Bunye II — was committed on December 14, 1988. It was, however,
to be contrary to law. That they are "admittedly members of the standing only on December 28, 1988 that the police collared a suspect, Ramil Regala,
committee of the NUFC" 16 and that "subversive materials" 17 and unlicensed who subsequently pointed to Nazareno as his accomplice. It also escapes
firearms were found in their possession, are, like Buenaobra's and Roque's me how Nazareno, under these circumstances, could have been validly put
cases, barren claims of the military. I also fear that by the majority's strong under arrest without a warrant or the existence of the circumstance described
language (that Añonuevo and Casiple are admitted NUCF officers) the under either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above-quoted: The crime had
majority has pronounced the petitioners guilty, when the lower courts have long been committed prior to the arrest.
yet to sit in judgment. I think we should be the last to preempt the decision of
the trial courts. We would have set to naught the presumption of innocence G.R. Nos. 81567; 84581-82; 84583-84; 83162;
accused persons enjoy. 85727 & 86332; Postscripts

G.R. No. 83162 The majority has disposed of these cases on the bedrock of what I view as
doctrines that have lost their luster:
With respect to the case of Vicky Ocaya, I am afraid that I am inclined
towards the same conclusion. There was basis — at the outset — to say that 1. The teaching of Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, 19 which held that subversion is a
Ocaya was probably guilty of illegal possession of firearms. As I have continuing offense;
2. The ruling in Ilagan v. Enrile. 20 is detained under subsisting process issued by a competent
court. 26
I also find, for reasons to be set forth hereinafter, a glossing over of the
fundamental rights of the petitioners under the Constitution in the authorities' I also gather from the records that none of the petitioners had been: (1)
handling of the petitioners' cases. informed of their right to remain silent; and (2) to have competent and
independent counsel. 27
I hold that Garcia-Padilla is no longer good law under the present
Constitution. Two reasons persuade me. First, it is repugnant to due process As I said, the majority is denying habeas corpus on self-serving claims of the
of law. ("The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the military that the petitioners (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Añonuevo, and
prosecution of offenses which require the determination by a judge of the Casiple) are members of the Communist Party of the Philippines — and that
existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of they have supposedly confessed to be in fact members of the outlawed
arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable." 21 Under the 1987 organization. The question that has not been answered is whether or not
Constitution, not even "[a] state of martial law suspend[s] the operation of these supposed confessions are admissible, for purposes of a warrantless
[the Charter]. . ." 22 Second, it leaves the liberty of citizens to the whim of one arrest, as evidence of guilt, in the absence of any showing that they were
man ("On these occasions [the existence of a state of emergency], the apprised of their constitutional rights. I am perturbed by the silence of the
President takes absolute command, for the very life of the Nation and its majority. I am distressed because as we held in one case, violation of the
government, which, incidentally, includes the courts, is in grave peril. In so Constitution divests the court of jurisdiction and entitles the accused
doing, the President is answerable only to his conscience, the people and to to habeas corpus. 28
God. For their part, in giving him the supreme mandate as their President,
the people can only trust and pray that, giving him their own loyalty and According to the majority, a "re-examination or re-appraisal . . . of
without patriotism, the President will not fail them." 23 ) Under the Charter now the Ilagan doctrine is not the answer." 29 In my considered opinion, Ilagan
prevailing, the Chief Executive shares, to a certain extent, the exercise of v. Enrile 30 does not rightfully belong in the volumes of Philippine
emergency powers, with Congress. 24 jurisprudence. In that case, the petitioners, three Davao-based lawyers, were
held by virtue of a simple information ("the petition herein has been rendered
As a law advocate under the regime of Marcos, I had challenged the moot and academic by virtue of the filing of an Information against them for
soundness of Garcia-Padilla. I doubted whether it could stand up under the Rebellion . . . and the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against them" 31 )
aegis of the 1973 Constitution. I still doubt whether it can withstand scrutiny without any preliminary investigation (examination) having been previously
under the 1987 Constitution. conducted (to justify the issuance of a warrant).i•t•c-aüsl As I have stated, an
information is not a warrant of arrest. The fact that an information exists does
The majority also fails to point out that six days after Garcia-Padilla was not mean that a warrant will be issued.
handed down, the Court promulgated Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, 25 a case that in
my view has significantly whittled down Garcia-Padilla's very esse. In that Accused persons have the right of preliminary investigation
case, Mr. Justice Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr. wrote for the majority: (examination). 32 It forms part and parcel of due process of law .33

xxx xxx xxx I find the majority's reliance on U.S. v. Wilson, 34 an ancient (1905) decision,
inapt and untenable. In that case, the accused had been served with a
16. After a person is arrested . . . without a warrant . . . the warrant and thereafter taken into custody. The question that faced the Court
proper complaint or information against him must be filed was whether or not the warrant was valid, amid the accused's charges that
with the courts of justice within the time prescribed by law. . . the judge who issued it did not examine the complainant under oath. We held
that the query was academic, because the accused had already pleaded,
and the case had entered the trial stage.
17. Failure of the public officer to do so without any valid
reason would constitute a violation of Art. 125, Revised
Penal Code, as amended. And the person detained would be The cases at bar are not on all fours. Here, no warrant has been issued. I
entitled to be released on a writ of habeas corpus, unless he submit that in that event, the petitioners are entitled to freedom by way of the
writ of liberty.
 x x x           x x x          x x x PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
The apprehensions in question chronicle in my mind the increasing pattern of TIBURCIO ABALOS, accused-appellant.
arrests and detention in the country without the sanction of a judicial decree.
Four years ago at "EDSA", and many years before it, although with much REGALADO, J.:p
fewer of us, we valiantly challenged a dictator and all the evils his regime had
stood for: repression of civil liberties and trampling on of human rights. We In this appeal, accused-appellant Tiburcio Abalos seeks absolution from the
set up a popular government, restored its honored institutions, and crafted a judgment of conviction rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, of
democratic constitution that rests on the guideposts of peace and freedom. I Catbalogan, Samar which pronounced him guilty of the complex crime of
feel that with this Court's ruling, we have frittered away, by a stroke of the direct assault with murder in Criminal Case No. 2302. His arguments in the
pen, what we had so painstakingly built in four years of democracy, and present appeal turn on the central question of unwarranted credence
almost twenty years of struggle against tyranny. allegedly extended by the trial court to the version of the criminal incident
narrated by the sole prosecution witness. The totality of the evidence
It also occurs to me that I am interposing what looms as a quixotic outlook of adduced, however, indubitably confirms appellant's guilt of the offense
Philippine law on warrantless arrests and its implications on liberty. It is an charged. Accordingly, we affirm.
impression that does not surprise me. Quixotic as they may seem, and
modesty aside, my views reflect a strong bias on my part — forged by years An information filed in the trial court, dated April 21, 1983, imputed the crime
of experience and sharpened by a painful and lonely struggle for freedom of direct assault with murder to herein appellant Tiburcio
and justice — toward men and women who challenge settled beliefs. If this Abalos, alias "Ewet," with the allegations —
dissent can not gain any adherent for now, let it nevertheless go on record as
a plea to posterity and an appeal for tolerance of opinions with which we not That on or about the 20th day of March, 1983, at nighttime,
only disagree, but opinions we loathe. in the Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Samar,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
I feel it is my duty to articulate this dissent. Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to
kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and knowing
fully well that one Sofronio Labine was an agent of a person
in authority being a member of the Integrated National Police
with station at Catbalogan, Samar, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and strike
said Sofronio Labine with a piece of wood, which said
accused ha(d) conveniently provided himself for the purpose
while said P/Pfc. Sofronio Labine, a duly appointed and
qualified member of the said INP, was engaged in the
performance of his official duties or on the occasion of such
performance, that is, maintaining peace and order during the
barangay fiesta of Canlapwas, of said municipality, thereby
inflicting upon him "Lacerated wound 2 inches parietal area
Republic of the Philippines right. Blood oozing from both ears and nose" which wound
SUPREME COURT directly caused his death.
Manila
That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating
SECOND DIVISION  circumstance of nocturnity was present.1

G.R. No. 88189 July 9, 1996 At his arraignment on June 7, 1983, appellant, with the assistance of
counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. 2 The trial conducted thereafter
culminated in the decision3 of the trial court on February 3, 1989 finding parked beside the store of Rodulfo Figueroa, Jr. near their home in Barangay
appellant guilty as charged and meting out to him the penalty of "life Canlapwas when he noticed a man in fatigue uniform suddenly accost his
imprisonment, with the accessories of the law." Appellant was likewise father. At that time, appellant's father had just arrived from a trip from Wright,
ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P30,000.00; actual Samar and had just alighted from his service vehicle, a Ford Fiera.
and compensatory damages in the amount of P2,633.00, with P15,000.00 as
moral damages; and to pay the costs. 4 The man tried to disarm Major Abalos of his firearm but the latter resisted
and while the two were grappling for possession of the gun, appellant
As recounted by prosecution witness Felipe Basal, a farmer residing in instinctively went to the rescue of his father. He got a piece of wood from
Barangay Pupua, Catbalogan, Samar, appellant assaulted the victim, Pfc. Figueroa's store with which he then clubbed Labine whom he did not
Sofronio Labine, at around 8:00 P.M. of March 20, 1983, which was then the recognize at that point. When Labine fell to the ground from the blow,
day of the barangay fiesta celebrations in Barangay Canlapwas, Catbalogan, appellant immediately fled to Barangay Mercedes nearby, fearing that the
Samar. The incident transpired near the house of appellant at the man had companions who might retaliate. When he came to know of the
said barangay. Felipe Basal was then having a drinking session in front of identity of his victim the following morning, he forthwith surrendered to the
the shanty of one Rodulfo Figueroa, Jr. which was situated just a few meters authorities.7
from the residence of appellant.
As mentioned at the outset, the foregoing version of the factual antecedents
According to Basal, at about that time he noticed the father of appellant, as presented by appellant was roundly rejected by the lower court which
Police Major Cecilio Abalos, scolding his employees in his transportation found the same unworthy of belief. Appellant ascribes reversible errors to the
business for turning in only two hundred pesos in earnings for that day. While trial court (a) in not giving credence to the evidence adduced by the defense;
Major Abalos was thus berating his employees, appellant arrived and asked (b) in believing the evidence presented by the prosecution; (c) in relying on
his father not to scold them and to just let them take part in the prosecution's evidence which falls short of the required quantum of
the barangay festivities. This infuriated the elder Abalos and set off a heated evidence that would warrant a conviction; (d) in finding that treachery
argument between father and son.5 attended the commission of the crime and failing to credit in appellant's favor
his voluntary surrender; and (e) in finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
While the two were thus quarreling, a woman shouted "Justicia, boligue doubt of the crime charged.8
kumi!  Adi in mag-a-aringasa." meaning, "Police officer, help us! Somebody's
making trouble here." The victim, Pfc. Sofronio Labine, then appeared on the In the main, appellant insists that the trial court should not have given
scene and asked Major Abalos, "What is it, sir?" The victim saluted Abalos credence to the story of the lone eyewitness for the prosecution. He also
when the latter turned around to face him. As Major Abalos leveled his contends that since the testimony of that witness bore clear traces of
carbine at Labine, appellant hurriedly left and procured a piece of wood, incredibility, particularly the fact that he could not have had a clear view of
about two inches thick, three inches wide and three feet long, from a nearby the incident due to poor visibility, the prosecution should have presented as
Ford Fiera vehicle. well the woman who had called for help at the height of the incident if only to
corroborate Basal's narration of the events. Appellant also assails as
He then swiftly returned and unceremoniously swung with that wooden piece inherently incredible the fact that it took quite a time for witness Felipe Basal
at Labine from behind, hitting the policeman at the back of the right side of to come forward and divulge what he knew to the authorities. All these,
his head. Labine collapsed unconscious in a heap, and he later expired from unfortunately, are flawed arguments.
the severe skull fracture he sustained from that blow. Felipe Basal and his
wife took flight right after appellant struck the victim, fearful that they might be From the evidence in the case at bar, the prosecution has convincingly
hit by possible stray bullets6 should a gunfight ensue. proved, through the clear and positive testimony of Basal, the manner in
which the victim was killed by herein appellant. The record is bereft of any
Appellant's testimony, on the other hand, is of a different tenor. He admits showing that said prosecution witness was actuated by any evil motivation or
having struck Labine with a piece of wood during the incident in question but dubious intent in testifying against appellant. Moreover, a doctrine of long
claims that he did so in the erroneous belief that his father was being standing in this jurisdiction is that the testimony of a lone eyewitness, if
attacked by a member of the New People's Army (NPA). According to credible and positive, is sufficient to convict an accused. 9 There was thus no
appellant, he was then seated inside their family-owned Sarao jeepney need, as appellant would want the prosecution to do, to present in court the
woman who shouted for assistance since her testimony would only be Appellant's flight right after he had assaulted the victim is also corrosive of
corroborative in nature. his testimony. For, if it were true that he had merely labored under the wrong
notion that his father was being attacked by a member of the NPA, and that it
The presentation of such species of evidence in court would only be was an innocent case of error in personae, he could have readily
warranted when there are compelling reasons to suspect that the eyewitness surrendered to his father right then and there. After all, Cecilio Abalos was a
is prevaricating or that his observations were inaccurate. 10 Besides, it is up police major and was the Station Commander of the Integrated National
to the People to determine who should be presented as prosecution witness Police (INP) in Wright, Samar. Further, there was no necessity at all for him
on the basis of its own assessment of the necessity for such to flee from the crime scene for fear of retaliation considering that he was in
testimony. 11 Also, no unreasonable delay could even be attributed to Felipe the company of his own father who, aside from his position, was then armed
Basal considering that during the wake for Pfc. Labine, Basal came and with a carbine. Appellant's explanation is, therefore, absurd and should be
intimated to the widow of the victim that he was going to testify regarding her considered as self-serving evidence with no weight in law.
husband's slaying. 12
On the offense committed by appellant, the trial court correctly concluded
Appellant's contention that the deceased had attacked and attempted to that he should be held accountable for the complex crime of direct assault
divest his father of his firearm is rather preposterous considering that no with murder. There are two modes of committing atentados contra la
reason was advanced as to why the deceased patrolman would assault a autoridad o sus agentes under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. The
police officer of superior rank. Parenthetically, the condition of visibility at the first is not a true atentado as it is tantamount to rebellion or sedition, except
time of the incident was conducive not only to the clear and positive that there is no public uprising. On the other hand, the second mode is the
identification of appellant as the victim's assailant but likewise to an actual more common way of committing assault and is aggravated when there is a
and unobstructed view of the events that led to the victim's violent death. weapon employed in the attack, or the offender is a public officer, or the
offender lays hands upon a person in authority. 15
Basal was seated just a few meters away from the protagonists whom he all
knew, he being also a long-time resident of that municipality. There was a Appellant committed the second form of assault, the elements of which are
twelve-foot high fluorescent lamppost located along the road and which, by that there must be an attack, use of force, or serious intimidation or
appellant's own reckoning, was just seventeen meters away from resistance upon a person in authority or his agent; the assault was made
them. 13 Notwithstanding the fact that a couple of trees partly obstructed the when the said person was performing his duties or on the occasion of such
post, the illumination cast by the fluorescent lamp and the nearby houses performance; and the accused knew that the victim is a person in authority or
provided sufficient brightness for the identification of the combatants. his agent, that is, that the accused must have the intention to offend, injure or
assault the offended party as a person in authority or an agent of a person in
authority. 16
Curiously enough, appellant's assertion that there was poor visibility is
ironically contradicted by his testimony which is detailed on facts that one
could readily recall after witnessing an event in broad daylight. While Here, Labine was a duly appointed member of the then INP in Catbalogan,
appellant considers unbelievable Basal's identification of him supposedly Samar and, thus, was an agent of a person in authority pursuant to Article
because of inadequate lighting, he himself, under the same conditions, could 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. There is also no dispute that
clearly see his father's assailant wearing a fatigue uniform which was he was in the actual performance of his duties when assaulted by appellant,
different from that worn by policemen. He even asserts that he saw his father that is, he was maintaining peace and order during the fiesta in Barangay
clutching the carbine with his hands holding the butt while his purported Canlapwas. Appellant himself testified that he personally knew Labine to be a
assailant held on tightly to the rifle. 14 What these facts establish is that the policeman 17 and, in fact, Labine was then wearing his uniform. These facts
lights in the area at the time of the incident were enough to afford Basal an should have sufficiently deterred appellant from attacking him, and his defiant
excellent view of the incident, contrary to appellant's pretense. Appellant's conduct clearly demonstrates that he really had the criminal intent to assault
testimony is thus negated by the rule that evidence, to be believed, must and injure an agent of the law.
have been given not only by a credible witness, but that the same must also
be reasonably acceptable in itself. When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in authority
for that matter, there arises the complex crime of direct assault with murder
or homicide. 18 The killing in the instant case constituted the felony of murder
qualified by alevosia through treacherous means deliberately adopted Pfc.
Labine was struck from behind while he was being confronted at the same THIRD DIVISION
time by appellant's father. The evidence shows that appellant deliberately
went behind the victim whom he then hit with a piece of wood which he  
deliberately got for that purpose.
G.R. No. 109617 August 11, 1997
Obviously, appellant resorted to such means to avoid any risk to himself,
knowing fully well that his quarry was a policeman who could readily mount a PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
defense. The aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and vs.
nocturnity, however, were not duly proven, as correctly ruled by the court FELIPE SION @ "JUNIOR," JOHNNY JUGUILON, EDONG SION, FELIX
below. On the other hand, appellant's voluntary surrender even if duly taken SION @ "ELLET," and FEDERICO DISU @ MIGUEL," accused.
into account by the trial court would have been inconsequential.
FELIPE SION @ "JUNIOR" and FEDERICO DISU @ "MIGUEL," accused-
The offense is a complex crime, the penalty for which is that for the graver appellants.
offense, to be imposed in the maximum period. Considering that the more
serious crime of murder then carried the penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death, the imposable penalty should have been death.
The mitigating circumstance, in that context, would have been unavailing and
inapplicable since the penalty thus imposed by the law is indivisible. 19 At all DAVIDE, JR., J.:
events, the punishment of death could not be imposed as it would have to be
reduced to reclusion perpetua due to the then existing proscription against In its decision1 in Criminal Case No. D-10796 dated 20 January 1993, but
the imposition of the death penalty. 20 promulgated on 8 February 1993, Branch 44 (Dagupan City) of the Regional
Trial Court of the First Judicial Region decreed as follows:
However, the designation by the trial court of the imposable penalty as "life
imprisonment" is erroneous, as the same should properly be denominated WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Felipe Sion alias "Junior"
as reclusion perpetua. 21 Also, the death indemnity payable to the heirs of the and Federico Disu alias Miguel Disu guilty beyond reasonable doubt
victim, under the present jurisprudential policy, is P50,000.00. as principals of the crime of Murder pursuant to Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, and in view of the attendance of the
ACCORDINGLY, with the MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed upon aggravating circumstance of cruelty which is not offset by any
accused-appellant Tiburcio Abalos should be reclusion perpetua, and that mitigating circumstance, the two accused are hereby sentenced to
the death indemnity is hereby increased to P50,000.00, the judgment of the suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, and to indemnify jointly the
court a quo in Criminal Case No. 2302 is AFFIRMED in all other respects, heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs of the
with costs against accused-appellant. proceedings.

SO ORDERED. Accused Felipe Sion alias "Junior" and Federico Disu alias Miguel

Disu are ordered to pay jointly the heirs of the victim the sum of
Romero, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur. P11,910.00 as actual damages.

SO ORDERED.

Felipe Sion alias "Junior," whose full name is Felipe Rodriguez Sion,

Jr.2 (hereafter appellant Sion), and Federico Disu alias "Miguel" (hereafter
appellant Disu), seasonably appealed therefrom to this Court 3 in view of the
Republic of the Philippines penalty imposed.4
SUPREME COURT
Manila
The case against appellants commenced with the filing of a criminal upwards hitting the left lobe of the
complaint for Murder5 on 19 November 1991 in Criminal Case No. 2141 (SP- lung
91) before the Fourth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Fabian-San Jacinto
in the Province of Pangasinan. Charged with appellants therein were Johnny — stab wound right lateral side of
Juguilon, Edong Sion, Felix Sion alias "Ellet," and "four (4) other John Does." the neck 1 1/2, inch in depth
After appropriate preliminary examination, Judge Sergio Garcia of said court
issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused with no bail fixed for their — stab wound 1 1/2 inches in width,
temporary liberty.6 However, the warrant was served only on appellant Disu, 1 1/2 in depth mid scapular area, left
while the rest then remained at large. Upon appellant Disu's motion for bail,
to which Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Restituto Dumlao, Jr., recommended
that bail be fixed at P40,000.00 for said accused only, the court fixed said — contusion superimposed abrasion
accused's bail at such amount; and upon filing and approval of the bail bond, left eyebrow
appellant Disu was ordered released.7 Subsequently, one Atty. Fernando
Cabrera filed, for the rest of the accused, a motion to reduce the bail from which caused his instant death, to the damage and
P40,000.00 to prejudice of his heirs.
P20,000.00.8 As Provincial Prosecutor Dumlao agreed to a reduction of
P10,000.00, the court granted the motion and fixed bail at P30,000.00. None CONTRARY to Art. 248, Revised Penal Code.
of them, however, filed a bail bond.
The information was docketed as Criminal Case No. D-10796 and assigned
For failure of the accused to submit the required counter-affidavits, the to Branch 44 thereof.
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, finding probable cause against all the accused
for the crime of murder on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution, On 2 June 1992, accused Sion was arrested. 11 Then on 10 June 1992, the
ordered the transmittal of the record of the case, including the bail bond of RTC annulled and voided the bail earlier granted to appellant Disu by the
accused Federico Disu, to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of MCTC Judge Sergio Garcia for luck of proper hearing, denied the motion for
Pangasinan for appropriate action.9 bail filed by appellant Sion, and ordered their detention in jail. 12

On 21 January 1992, an Information 10 was filed with the Regional Trial Court Since only appellants Sion and Disu were arrested, the case proceeded
(RTC), First Judicial Region, in Dagupan City, Pangasinan, against against them only. Upon arraignment, both pleaded not guilty to the charge
appellants Sion and Disu and Johnny Juguilon, Edong Sion, Felix and waived pre-trial.13
Sion alias "Ellet," and four (4) unidentified persons (designated as John,
Peter, Richard and Paul Doe), accusing them of the crime of murder
The prosecution's witnesses were Cesar and Felicitas Abaoag, the brother
committed as follows:
and the wife of the victim, respectively; Dr. Leopoldo Manalo, San Fabian
Municipal Health Officer; Rosendo Imuslan, barangay captain of Barangay
That on or about October 16, 1991 in the evening at Brgy. Binday, Binday; and SPO1 Ricardo Abrio. On the other hand, the defense presented
municipality of San Fabian, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and as its witness appellant Disu; appellant Sion; Corazon Sion, wife of appellant
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named Sion; and Dr. Leopoldo Manalo.
accused, armed with stones and a bladed weapon conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another with intent to kill with
The evidence for the prosecution as established by the testimonies of its
treachery and evident premeditation did, then and there wilfully,
witnesses is partly summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General in the
unlawfully and feloniously hurl with stones, attack and stab Fernando
Brief for the Appellee, as follows:
Abaoag inflicting upon him the following injuries:

On or about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of October 16, 1991, Cesar

— stab wound 1 1/2 inches in width,
Abaoag was at the barangay road in front of his house situated in
9 inches in depth between 10-11
Binday, San Fabian, Pangasinan. He was with his elder brother
ICS, mid axillary area slanting
Carlos Abaoag and Ricardo Manuel (p. 6, TSN, August 20, 1992)
when all of a sudden, Ronnie Manuel arrived coming from the west The victim was rushed to St. Blaise Hospital in San Fabian but he
complaining that he was being chased by Felipe Sion and Johnny was pronounced dead on arrival (pp. 24-25, TSN, August 20, 1992).
Juguilon (p. 7, TSN, id.). On that same occasion, Fernando Abaoag
also arrived at the scene. He said to Ronnie, "why Ronnie, you are Dr. Leopoldo Manalo, a Municipal Health Officer of San Fabian,
making trouble again." The latter answered, "I am not making trouble Pangasinan conducted  post mortem examination (Exh. A) on the
uncle because while I was inside the house of Eling Alcantara, Felipe body of the victim. The result of his findings showed that Fernando
Sion and Johnny Juguilon were trying to stab me. (p. 8, TSN, id.). Abaoag sustained the following injuries, to wit:
Seconds later, Felipe Sion and Johnny Juguilon appeared and
started throwing stones. Fernando Abaoag told them to stop throwing 1) stab wound 1 1/2 inches in width, 9 inches in depth between 10-
stones but before they desisted and left, one of them uttered "even 11, ICS, mid axillary area slanting upwards hitting the left lobe of the
you Andong, you are interfering, you will also have your day, vulva of lung
your mother, you Abaoag[s]" (pp. 9-10, id.) Apparently, the utterance
was directed against Fernando Abaoag whose nickname is Andong.
2) stab wound right lateral side of the neck 1 1/2 inches in width, 1
1/2 inch in depth
Subsequently thereafter, at about 9:00 o'clock on that same evening,
Cesar Abaoag while inside his house lying down on his bed heard
the sound of stone throwing at the nearby house of his brother 3) stab wound 1 1/2 inches in width, 1 1/2 in depth mid scapular
Fernando. He went out to see who were throwing stones (14, area, left
TSN, id.). When already near the house of Lolly Galdones, Cesar
Abaoag saw his brother Fernando already outside his house. He also 4) contusion superimposed abrasion left eyebrow.14
saw Johnny Juguilon, one of the members of the group of stone
throwers, hurl a big stone against Fernando. Upon being hit on the Dr. Manalo further testified that the stab wounds were caused by a sharp-
left eyebrow, Fernando turned his back towards Felix Sion, Edong pointed instrument, possibly a dagger, with the first wound hitting the lower
Sion and Miguel Disu who were also throwing stones towards his lobe of the left lung causing severe bleeding and its eventual collapse. He
direction. On the other hand, appellant Felipe Sion, who was near determined the cause of death to be hemorrhagic shock secondary to
the victim, with a very sharp double bladed dagger, stabbed multiple stab wounds.15
Fernando, first on the left side just below the armpit, then on the left
waistline and finally on the right side of the neck below the jaw (pp. Barangay Captain Imuslan testified that he and Kagawad Fernando
18-19, TSN, id.). Gatchalian, on the night of the incident, found a small bolo and a bloodied
double-bladed weapon (dagger) near the scene of the crime. 16 Cesar Abaoag
Cesar tried to extend help to his brother but Miguel Disu hurled a recognized this weapon as the one used by appellant Sion in stabbing the
stone on him which landed on his right side below the armpit. When victim.17 On her part, Felicitas Abaoag declared that she spent more than
he heard Felipe Sion shouting to his companions saying, "we will P11,000.00 for the wake and burial of her husband whose death saddened
also kill Cesar," Cesar desisted in helping brother (pp. 22-23, her, she being left alone to take care of their children. 18
TSN, id.). Instead, he ran to his brother's house and informed
Felicitas, the wife, about the helpless condition of Fernando (pp. 22- In his defense, appellant Sion, brother and cousin of accused Edong 19 Sion
23, TSN, id.). Upon being informed, Felicitas accompanied by Carlos and Felix Sion alias "Ellet," respectively, admitted that on the night in
Abaoag, went to the place of the incident. The assailants were no question, he participated in a stone-throwing incident and "free-for-all rumble"
longer there. She only saw her husband lying prostate on the ground between his group (the Sions and Johnny Juguilon) on one hand, and the
very weak in the state of dying. When she inquired what happened, Abaoags and Manuels, on the other. However, he professed his innocence,
Fernando answered "naalaak" which in English means "I was hit" claiming that it was his brother Edong Sion and Johnny Juguilon who
(pp. 4-5, TSN, July 27, 1992). Fernando told his wife that his stabbed the victim.20 His version of the incident was summarized by the trial
assailants were Felipe Sion, Miguel Disu, Edong Sion, Johnny court, thus:
Juguilon and Felix Sion (p. 6, TSN, id.)
On October 16, 1991 at about 7:00 p.m., he, together with Johnny
Juguilon went to the house of Eling Alcantara as he wanted to talk
 with his son, his friend. Ronnie Manuel was already there when they After the conclusion of trial, the court granted appellants' motion to file a
arrived. While at the place, Johnny Juguilon and Ronnie Manuel memorandum within fifteen days. Despite the extension given, appellants'
came out and started fighting with each other. Ronnie and Manuel counsel did not file the memorandum. Thus, in its order of 11 December
ran and proceeded to the place of his cousin. He was pacifying 1992, the trial court declared the case submitted for decision. 24
Johnny Juguilon and Ronnie Manuel but Johnny Juguilon threw
stones at Ronnie Manuel. At this point, Fernando Abaoag intervened On 8 February 1993, the trial court promulgated its decision, 25 the dispositive
in the quarrel saying, "vulva of your mother Johnny, you are too portion quoted in the introductory paragraph of this ponencia.
much, you will also have your day." Johnny Juguilon answered
"vulva of your mother Andoy, do not interfere because you are not As to the culpability of appellants Sion and Disu, the trial court found:
our enemy." After the verbal exchange, he took Johnny Juguilon to
their (Sion's) house . . . . At about 9:00 p.m., that same evening, they
stoned their house, its sides and the stairs. He and Idong and The defense of accused Federico Disu alias Miguel Disu and Felipe
Johnny Juguilon looked for Cesar Abaoag, Ronnie Manuel, Ricky Rodriguez Sion, Jr. deserve scant consideration. Cesar Abaoag
Manuel, Andong Abaoag and two (2) other companions. They were narrated in detail how his brother Fernando Abaoag was stoned by
at the place of Marta Soriano. After that, they still threw stones accused Johnny Juguilon, Federico Disu and Felix Sion and how
towards them. There was a free for all rumble between Ronnie accused Felipe Sion stabbed Fernando Abaoag three times. Cesar
Manuel, Ricky Manuel, the Abaoags and Idong Sion, and Johnny Abaoag saw Johnny Juguilon throw stone hitting the left eyebrow of
Juguilon, Ellet Sion and himself, in front of the house of Loly Fernando Abaoag, and when his brother (Fernando Abaoag) turned
Galdones. He denied the testimony of Cesar Abaoag that he stabbed left, accused Federico Disu alias Miguel Disu, Idong Sion and Felix
Fernando Abaoag three times and before he was stabbed Johnny Sion simultaneously threw stones toward him (Fernando Abaoag).
Juguilon stoned him (Fernando Abaoag). It was Idong Sion and Then, at a distance of two (2) meters, Cesar Abaoag saw accused
Johnny Juguilon who stabbed Fernando Abaoag. After Fernando Felipe Sion stab Fernando Abaoag three times, hitting the left side
Abaoag was stabbed, they ran away. His group also ran away. He below the armpit, then on the left waistline and the right side of the
went home and rushed towards Johnny Juguilon because he was neck below the jaw of the deceased with the use of a sharp double
stabbed. He brought Juguilon to the St. Blaise Clinic and Hospital. bladed dagger.
He did not report the incident to Barangay Captain Rosendo Imuslan.
On October 17, 1:00 p.m., he presented himself to Kagawad Lagman Cesar Abaoag could not be mistaken in the identification because he
who brought him to the Police Station . . . .21 was two meters away when he saw the accused Felipe Sion stab his
brother, and, moreover, there was a light illuminating the place of the
In his defense, appellant Disu offered denial and alibi. He declared that he incident coming from the houses of Marta Soriano and Loly
had no participation in the killing of Fernando Abaoag, and during the whole Caldones. Cesar Abaoag identified the dagger (Exhibit D).
night of 16 October 1991, while the quarrel, stoning and stabbing incidents in
question were taking place, he was resting and sleeping in the house of his The narrations of Cesar Abaoag are bolstered by the testimony of Dr.
employer, Felicidad Gatchalian, after driving the latter's jeepney the entire Leopoldo Manalo, the doctor who conducted the postmortem
day. However, before proceeding home from work that afternoon, he went to examination on the cadaver of Fernando Abaoag. Dr. Manalo stated
the store of Oping Juguilon to buy cigarettes and dropped by the house of that "stab wound 1 1/2 inches in width, 9 inches in depth between
appellant Sion where he stayed for about five minutes. He only learned about 10-11 ICS, mid-axillary area slanting upwards hitting the left lobe of
the killing the following morning when he was told that he was one of the the lung" is located below the left armpit. The second stab wound,
suspects. He was arrested about a month after the incident. 22 "stab wound right lateral side of the neck 1 1/2 inches in width, 1 1/2
in depth," is located at the right side of the nec[k] at the back. The
On rebuttal, Cesar Abaoag refuted the testimony of appellant Sion. Cesar doctor stated that the wounds were caused possibly by a dagger.
asserted that neither his brothers, the Manuels nor himself threw stones at
Sion's house; there was no free-for-all fight between the Sions and the Finally, it is well to quote the statement uttered by Fernando Abaoag
Abaoags; Johnny Juguilon and Edong Sion merely threw stones at, but did in the presence of Felicitas Abaoag, to wit: "naalaak, which means, I
not stab, Fernando Abaoag; and it was only appellant Sion who stabbed was hit, take note of this because I cannot survive these injuries of
Fernando Abaoag.23 mine". Fernando Abaoag told Felicitas Abaoag, Felipe Sion, Miguel
 Disu, Idong Sion, Johnny Juguilon and Felix Sion stabbed him. (2-12 accused as the ones who "stabbed" him was "an impossibility." Moreover,
tsn July 27, 1992). This is a dying declaration because it was made the prosecution witnesses were limited to relatives of the victims; "other vital
under a consciousness of impending death (Section 37, Rule 130, witnesses" — such as Marta Soriano, Loly Galdones, or Eling Alcantara —
Rules of Court). 26 should have been presented to corroborate the "biased" testimonies of Cesar
and Felicitas Abaoag.
The trial court likewise found that conspiracy was duly established by the
prosecution, thus: Appellants further contend that: (1) there was no treachery since the stabbing
of the victim was not "sudden"; (2) cruelty was not proven because "there is
As stated in the decision, accused Johnny Juguilon threw stone, no clear testimony" that the first stab wound was fatal and the second and
hitting the left eyebrow of Fernando Abaoag, and Edong Sion, Felix third wounds were "unnecessary"; (3) conspiracy cannot be deduced from
Sion and Federico (Miguel) Disu simultaneously threw stones upon the mere fact that all the accused threw stones at the victim before the
the deceased, while accused Felipe Sion alias "Junior" stabbed him stabbing; (4) appellant Sion voluntarily surrendered even before the police
(victim) three times, resulting in the latter's death.27 started investigating the case when he was not yet a suspect; and (5)
appellant Sion could not have testified that it was Edong Sion and Johnny
Juguilon who stabbed the victim if such were not true, considering that the
It then appreciated against appellants (a) the qualifying circumstance of
former is his brother and the latter his barriomate; and (6) appellant Sion bore
treachery because the "attack was so sudden that the victim had no time to
no grudge against the victim and did not escape.
defend himself" and (b) the generic aggravating circumstance of cruelty
because "there were three stab wounds" and the first wound — which
"caused severe bleeding and collapse of the lung" and the death of Fernando On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, in its Brief for the
Abaoag — "was deliberately augmented by inflicting the other wounds which Appellee, supports the trial court's findings and conclusions, except as to the
are unnecessary for its commission."28 It did not, however, appreciate evident appreciation of cruelty, which it concedes to be erroneous.
premeditation for lack of "substantial" evidence;29 nor give the benefit of
voluntary surrender in favor of appellant Sion since his surrender was merely Our careful review of the record of the evidence adduced by the parties
"forced by circumstances," as he "presented himself to Kagawad Lagman convinces us that prosecution witness Cesar Abaoag positively identified
because he was suspected as one of the persons who stabbed the victim." 30 appellants as being present during the incident in question and saw appellant
Sion stab the victim thrice. As correctly found by the trial court:
Appellants, through counsel, seasonably filed their Notice of Appeal. 31
Cesar Abaoag could not be mistaken in the identification because he
In their eight-page Appellant's Brief, filed by counsel de oficio Atty. Iris L. was two meters away when he saw the accused Felipe Sion stab his
Bonifacio,32 appellants plead for their acquittal, contending that the trial court brother, and, moreover, there was a light illuminating the place of the
erred: (1) in convicting them of murder; (2) in taking into account the incident coming from the houses of Marta Soriano and Loly
aggravating circumstance of cruelty; (3) in ruling that conspiracy was Caldones. Cesar Abaoag identified the dagger (Exhibit D).
established; (4) in not appreciating the presence of voluntary surrender; and
(5) in disregarding the defense of appellant Sion that it was Edong Sion and Cesar Abaoag also saw the rest of the accused, including appellant Disu,
Johnny Juguilon who were responsible for the death of Fernando Abaoag. throwing stones at the victim. He was definite, however, that it was only
accused Johnny Juguilon who was able to hit the victim at the left eyebrow.
In support of their first assigned error, appellants attack the identification The three stab wounds inflicted by appellant Sion and the injury at the left
made of them by prosecution witnesses. They claim that if witness Cesar eyebrow caused by the stone thrown by Juguilon jibed with the post
Abaoag actually saw appellant Sion stab the victim, then Cesar should have mortem findings of Dr. Manalo as he described the injury on the left eyebrow
immediately informed Felicitas Abaoag, the victim's wife, of this fact. Cesar's as "contusion superimposed abrasion left eyebrow." 33 If Cesar had any
failure was then unusual and unnatural. Then, too, Felicitas Abaoag's ulterior motive to testify against appellant Disu, he could have declared that it
testimony on her husband's alleged dying declaration was "not specific" as was Disu, and not Juguilon, who hit the victim with a stone. Cesar then
far as the assailant's identities were concerned because the victim merely honestly narrated what he observed.
said "naalaak" ("I was hit"), without identifying appellant Sion as the one who
stabbed him; and, her claim that her husband identified all the five (5)
That Cesar did not at once inform Felicitas Abaoag that it was appellant Sion A He said he was stabbed and he was injured.
who stabbed her husband, was not proof, as appellants suggest, that Cesar
was absent from the crime when it was committed. Cesar's presence was Q What do you mean by word "naalaak"?
admitted by appellant Sion himself on direct examination, thus:
A I was hit.
Q Did you see Cesar Abaoag on that occasion
anywhere near Fernando Abaoag when you said he COURT:
was stabbed by Johnny Juguilon and Idong Sion?
Proceed.
A Yes, sir. 34
PROSECUTOR DUMLAO:
Furthermore, Cesar satisfactorily explained his failure to forthwith inform
Felicitas of this fact. At that time, Cesar himself was running away from the
accused who had hit him with a stone. His pressing concern then was to get Q Do you know the reason why he was hit?
someone to help his wounded brother; besides, he was scared of accused
Felix Sion, uncle of appellant Sion, who was a "notorious" character in their A What I understand is that in the course of his
neighborhood.35 It is settled that delay in divulging the name of the pacifying the trouble between his nephew and the
perpetrator of a crime, if sufficiently explained, does not impair the credibility rest, he was stabbed, sir.
of the witness nor destroy its probative value. 36 In any event, in his sworn
statement37 which was submitted on 22 October 1991 before Judge Sergio Q Aside from the statement of your husband
Garcia, he narrated what he had witnessed and mentioned appellants Sion Fernando Abaoag that he was hit, what else did he
and Disu as among the perpetrators of the crime. say, if you know?

The identifications of appellants and their co-accused were further bolstered A He said, take note of this because I know I cannot
by the declaration made by the victim to his wife, Felicitas Abaoag. The trial survive with these injuries of mine.
court correctly characterized this as a "dying declaration,"38 having been
made under the consciousness of impending death. The victim was already COURT:
weak his wife saw him and he knew that he would not survive the injuries he
sustained; he even died a few minutes later while on the way to the
Q What else did he tell you aside from that?
hospital.39 When Felicitas saw her husband, he told her what had happened
to him, who caused his injuries and that he did not expect to live, thus:
A He said, remember that in case I cannot survive
with the injuries that I sustained, the men who
Q What happened next after that when you met your
stabbed me are Felipe Sion, Miguel Disu, Idong
husband?
Sion, Johnny Juguilon and Felix Sion,
sir.  40 (emphasis supplied)
A Immediately asked him what happened to him.
We find these statements given by the victim to his wife to have met the
Q And what was the answer of Fernando Abaoag? requisites of a dying declaration under Section 37 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, viz: (a) death is imminent and the declarant was conscious of that fact;
A He said, "naalaak," which means, I was hit. (b) the preliminary facts which bring the declaration within its scope must be
made to appear; (c) the declaration relates to the facts or circumstances
COURT: pertaining to the fatal injury or death; and (d) the declarant would have been
competent to testify had he survived. 41 Dying declarations are admissible in
Q Did you ask him why he said "naalaak"? evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule because
of necessity and trustworthiness. Necessity, because the declarant's death
renders impossible his taking the witness stand, and it often happens that other evidence to refute the charges, he did not care to dispute the
there is no other equally satisfactory proof of the crime; and trustworthiness, statements of Felicitas and Cesar Abaoag identifying him and detailing his
for it is "made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and every participation in the crime. 49 He raised this claim for the first time only during
hope of this world is gone; when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and his testimony in court almost one (1) year after the stabbing incident and his
the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the initial surrender, and notably, only after the hope of apprehending Idong Sion
truth.42 We find no ulterior motive on the part of Felicitas to fabricate the and Johnny Juguilon, together with the other accused, already seemed
declarations of her husband. remote. Such failure to immediately disclose the information as soon as he
was implicated in the crime and his prolonged silence on a vital matter hardly
We likewise find to be without basis appellants' claim that all the prosecution inspire belief, being unnatural and inconsistent with ordinary habits of men
witnesses were biased due to their relation to the victim's family. Plainly, and common experience.
witnesses Imuslan (the barangay captain) and Dr. Manalo were not related to
the victim, while the relationship of witnesses Cesar Abaoag and Felicitas That appellant Sion did not flee, unlike his brother Edong and Johnny
Abaoag to the victim, as brother and wife, respectively, neither disqualified Juguilon, neither proved his innocence. Non-flight — unlike flight of an
them as witnesses nor rendered their testimony unworthy of belief. It is not to accused which validly serves as a badge of guilt — is simply inaction which
be lightly supposed that relatives of the deceased would callously violate may be due to several factors; hence, it should not be construed as an
their conscience to avenge the death of a dear one by blaming it on persons indication of innocence.50
whom they believe to be innocent thereof. 43 A witness' relationship to a
victim, far from rendering his testimony biased, would even render the same Appellant Sion's claim of lack of ill-feeling or grudge against Fernando
more credible as it would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in Abaoag was belied and contradicted by his admission in court that just before
vindicating the crime to accuse somebody other than the real culprit. 44 the stabbing of the victim, he and his co-accused hurled stones at and fought
with the Abaoags, including Fernando, whom he blamed for allegedly stoning
Neither was the failure of the prosecution to present other witnesses, such as his house. 51 It is also belied by his actuation and utterance made earlier in
those mentioned by the appellants, fatal to the cause of the People. It is well- the evening of 16 October 1991 when Fernando Abaoag interfered in the
settled that the decision as whom to present as witnesses for the prosecution quarrel between appellant Sion and Fernando's nephew, Ronnie Manuel,
is addressed to the sound discretion of the prosecutor handling the case and which prompted appellant Sion and Johnny Juguilon to curse and warn
the non-presentation of certain witnesses by the prosecution is not a Fernando, thus: "even you Andong [Fernando Abaoag] you are interfering,
plausible defense.45 The prosecution is not obliged to present all possible you are siding with your nephew Ronnie Manuel, you have also your
witnesses, especially if their testimony will only serve to corroborate that of day . . . . you Abaoags."52 Appellant Sion also admitted that he "had an ill-
another eyewitness' testimony, in which case the former may every well be feeling towards" Ronnie Manuel, the victim's nephew, because "he was
dispensed with considering that the testimony of a single witness, if credible making trouble" inside his jeepney "5 days before the incident."53
and positive to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
would suffice.46 In light of the positive identification of appellants, appellant Disu's alibi must
fail.
The trial court correctly rejected appellant Sion's defense that it was not he
who stabbed the victim, but his brother Edong Sion and Johnny Juguilon, It is settled that alibi is a weak defense for it is easy to concoct and fabricate;
both of whom fled after the incident. Constituting a mere denial of Cesar it cannot prevail over and is worthless in the face of the positive identification
Abaoag's positive testimony that it was appellant Sion who stabbed the by credible witnesses that an accused perpetrated the crime. 54 We are
victim, such must fail in light of the settled rule of evidence that positive unable to discern any plausible reason, and appellant Disu does not offer
testimony is stronger that negative testimony. 47 Moreover, the claim was any, why he should be falsely implicated by Cesar Abaoag and mentioned in
made rather late in the day, casting serious doubt as to its veracity. From the the victim's dying declaration as one of the victim' assailants, if appellant Disu
time that appellant Sion presented himself to Kagawad Lagman and the was not actually present during the incident and had no participation in the
police authorities on 17 October 1991, and during his subsequent commission of the crime. As to his motive or lack thereof, appellant Disu
incarceration, he never told anyone nor made any statement that he was not claims that he had no misunderstanding with Fernando Abaoag or his
one who stabbed the victim; he did not even so inform his close relatives, not family.55 However, Felipe Sion, Jr., disclosed that appellant Disu was close to
even his wife who visited him in jail. 48 Also, during the preliminary the Sion clan, which explains why appellant Disu sympathized with and
investigation, when he had the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits and joined the Sions and Juguilon in assaulting the victim: Federico Disu was
Sion Jr.'s jeepney conductor for five (5) months, the latter teaching the former agree as to the latter as the prosecution failed to prove the essential
how to drive for three (3) months; and when Disu became a driver himself, elements of evident premeditation, viz: (a) the time when appellants
they had the same route and saw each other every day at the determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that they
poblacion.56 Disu even admitted that on 16 October 1991, after 5:00 p.m., he clung to their determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between such
"dropped by" the house of Felipe Sion, which he often did before. 57 determination and execution to allow them to reflect upon the consequences
of their act.62
We now rule on the presence or absence of conspiracy. There is conspiracy
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the We disagree, however, with the trial court's finding as regards the qualifying
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 58 Direct proof of a previous circumstance of treachery. Under the law, there is treachery when the
agreement to commit a crime is not necessary; it may be deduced from the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from acts methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly or specifically
of the accused themselves when such point to a joint purpose design, to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which
concerted action and community of interest.59 Once conspiracy is the offended party might make. 63 We find no clear and convincing evidence
established, the act of one is the act of all.60 of treachery. Cesar Abaoag's testimony as to how his brother was attacked
lacks sufficient detail showing conclusively that the mode and manner of the
In this case, appellants and the other accused were already at the barangay assault rendered the victim entirely defenseless. He merely testified that
road of Binday, near the houses of Lolly Galdones and Marta Soriano, when when he and his brother proceeded west of the barangay road of Binday, he
Fernando Abaoag, who was looking for the persons who just stoned his saw Johnny Juguilon stone his brother and hit him on the left eyebrow.
house several times, and Cesar Abaoag, arrived. Immediately, Johnny Fernando Abaoag then turned to the left with his back towards Felix Sion,
Juguilon threw a stone at Fernando hitting him on the left eyebrow; then, Edong Sion, Miguel Disu and the four (4) other unidentified companions, who
Edong, and Felix Sion and appellant Disu, "simultaneously" threw stones, then "simultaneously" threw stones at Fernando. "Seconds later," Cesar saw
also at Fernando. As Fernando turned away from his assailants, appellant appellant Sion holding a very sharp double bladed dagger and stab his
Sion "rushed" and stabbed the victim three (3) times, even as the latter brother three (3) times; Fernando Abaoag, when stabbed, "was just standing
raised his arms saying, "I will not fight back." When Cesar Abaoag tried to and said 'I will not fight.'"64 They were six (6) meters away from Johnny
help his brother Fernando, appellant Disu threw and hit Cesar with a stone. Juguilon when the latter first hurled a stone at Fernando which signaled the
Appellant Sion then commanded his companions to also kill Cesar, other accused to the same.65
prompting the latter to run away. Then the assailants fled, leaving behind a
small bolo and a dagger. The confluence of their acts indubitably manifested Considering therefore the distance between the assailants and the victim
a community of interest and unity of purpose and design to take Fernando when the attack commenced, and the fact the three were two (2) waves of
Abaoag's life. stoning which preceded the stabbing of the victim, these should have
sufficiently forewarned him of the greater danger which loomed and
We also find to be unsupported by evidence appellant's claim, through the prompted him to escape. Moreover, in light of the absence of clear details
testimony of appellant Sion, that the fatal stabbing of Fernando Abaoag was showing conclusively that the stabbing was inflicted from behind or the victim
a result of a "free-for-all rumble," thereby possibly tempering their liability to was entirely helpless when stabbed, we are not prepared to conclude that the
that of causing death in a tumultuous affray under Article 251 of the Revised attack was "so sudden and unexpected" as to render the victim entirely
Penal Code, which carries a penalty lower than that for homicide. 61 In this defenseless. Treachery cannot qualify the killing to murder when the victim
case, it was ascertained beyond doubt that appellant Sion inflicted the fatal was forewarned of the attack by the assailant, or when the attack was frontal,
stab wounds; hence, this claim must be rejected. or the attack was not so sudden as to have caught the deceased completely
unaware.66 Furthermore, the evidence does not disclose that the means of
execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by appellants.
Having resolved appellants' liability for Fernando Abaoag's death, we now
rule on the circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime.
Absent then of any qualifying circumstance, the crime committed was
homicide as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
In convicting appellants of murder, the trial court considered the qualifying
Code.
circumstance of treachery, and disregarded the qualifying circumstance of
evident premeditation, which was likewise alleged in the information. We
The trial court likewise erred in appreciating against appellants the generic or Sangguniang Barangay member, and not to the police authorities, implying
aggravating circumstance of cruelty,67 based solely on the fact that the victim that the former is not a person in authority. 76 This ignores Section 388 of the
was stabbed thrice, with the first stab wound hitting the lower left lung Local Government Code of 1991 which expressly provides, in part, that "[f]or
causing severe bleeding and its collapse. In fact, appellee concedes this purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the punong barangay, sangguniang
error of the trial court. Cruelty cannot be appreciated in absence of any barangay members, and members of the lupong tagapamayapa in each
showing that appellants, for their pleasure and satisfaction, caused the victim barangay shall be deemed as persons in authority in their
to suffer slowly and painfully and inflicted on him unnecessary physical and jurisdictions . . . ."77 This law expands the definition of a person in authority
moral pain; and, the mere fact that wounds in excess of what was under the Revised Penal Code, wherein among the barangay officials, only
indispensably necessary to cause death were found on the body of the victim the barangay captain or chairman, now called Punong Barangay, is
does not necessarily imply that such wounds were inflicted with cruelty and expressly considered a person in authority, as provided in Article 152 thereof.
with the intention of deliberately intensifying the victim's suffering. 68 In the Thus, in addition to the Punong Barangay, the members of the Sangguniang
instant case, the evidence only shows that the three (3) stab wounds were Barangay, or Kagawads, and members of the Lupong Tagapayapa are now
delivered in succession, nothing more. considered not merely as agents of, but as persons, in authority. 78

We agree with appellants that appellant Sion is entitled to the benefit of the WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of Branch 44 (Dagupan City) of the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, which requires that "the Regional Trial Court of the First Judicial Region in Criminal Case No. D-
offender voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in authority." 69 Its 10796 is MODIFIED. As modified, appellants FELIFE SION, alias "JUNIOR"
requisites are: (a) the offender had not been actually arrested; (b) the or FELIFE RODRIGUEZ, JR., and FEDERICO DISU, alias "MIGUEL," are
offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the latter's agent; hereby declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, as principals, of the
and (c) the surrender was voluntary. 70 For a surrender to be voluntary, it must crime of HOMICIDE as defined and penalized in Article 249 of the Revised
be spontaneous and show the intent of the accused to submit himself Penal Code, with the former entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
unconditionally to the authorities, either: (1) because he acknowledges his voluntary surrender, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, they are
guilt; or (2) because he wishes to save them the trouble and expense sentenced, respectively, to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from eight
incidental to his search and capture.71 (8) years of  prison mayor minimum, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and
eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum, and an indeterminate
As shown by the records, in the afternoon of 17 October 1991, appellant Sion penalty ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day of  prision
"presented" himself to Kagawad Modesto Lagman who, in turn, "escorted mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and
and surrendered" him to the police in the poblacion. 72 His admission that he one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum as maximum, with all the
surrendered because he was already suspected as one of the perpetrators of accessory penalties therefor, and subject to the provision of Article 29 of the
the crime does not make his surrender "forced by circumstances" as ruled by Revised Penal Code. Except as so modified, the rest of the challenged
the trial court. His arrest at that time was neither imminent nor inevitable. At judgment stands.
the time of his surrender, no warrant of arrest against him had yet been
issued, the same having been issued only on 19 November 1991. 73 In fact, Costs against accused-appellants.
he was released from custody after a few days, and was ordered committed
to jail only sometime in June 1992, after his motion for bail was denied by the SO ORDERED.
trial court on 10 June 1992 and was thus taken into custody. 74 This
subsequent fact should not diminish nor erase the favorable effect of Felipe Narvasa, C.J., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Sion Jr.'s voluntary surrender on 17 October 1991. As has been held,
whatever the accused's reason for surrendering — either the fear of reprisal
from victim's relatives or, in this case, his knowledge that he was already a
suspect — "does not gainsay the spontaneity of the surrender, nor alter the
fact that by giving himself up, he saved the State the time and trouble of
searching for him until arrested."75

We disagree with Appellee's submission that there was no voluntary

surrender because appellant Sion surrender to a mere barangay "Kagawad"
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
 
G.R. No. 107383 December 7, 1994
FELIX NIZURTADO, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Melquiades P. De Leon for petitioner.
Eugene C. Paras collaborating counsel for the petitioner.

VITUG, J.:

An information, accusing Felix Nizurtado of having committed the complex

crime of malversation of public funds through falsification of public document,
reads:

That on or about August 25, 1983, and for sometime prior or

subsequent thereto, in the City of Caloocan, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, a public officer, being then the
Barangay Captain of Panghulo, Malabon, Metro Manila, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify and
attest Resolution No. 17 Series of 1983 by making it appear
that on August 25, 1983 the Barangay council of Panghulo
met and identified T-shirt manufacturing as its livelihood
project, when in truth and in fact, as the accused fully well
knew, no such meeting was held, where T-shirt
manufacturing was identified and approved by the Barangay
Council as its livelihood project, and thereafter, accused
submitted the falsified resolution to the MHS-MMC-KKK
Secretariat which endorsed the same to the Land Bank of
the Philippines, which on the basis of said endorsement and
the falsified resolution, encashed LBP check No. 184792 in
the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00),
which check was earlier received by him as Barangay
Captain of Panghulo in trust for the Barangay for its
livelihood project and for which fund accused became
accountable, and upon receipt thereof herein accused, with
deliberate intent and grave abuse of confidence did then and
 there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, Felix V. Nizurtado was the Barangay Captain of Barangay
misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit Panghulo, Malabon, Metro Manila from 1983 to 1988.
the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) out of
the funds for which he was accountable, to the damage and In April or May 1983, Nizurtado and Manuel P. Romero,
prejudice of the government in the said amount. Barangay Treasurer of Panghulo, attended a seminar at the
University of Life, Pasig, Metro Manila. The seminar was
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1 about the Barangay Livelihood Program of the Ministry of
Human Settlements (MHS), the Metro Manila Commission
When arraigned by the Sandiganbayan, Nizurtado pleaded "not guilty" to the (MMC), and the Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran (KKK).
charge. During the pre-trial, held on 17 July 1989, the prosecution and the Under the program, the barangays in Metro Manila could
defense stipulated thusly: avail of loans of P10,000.00 per barangay to finance viable
livelihood projects which the Barangay Councils would
identify from the modules developed by the KKK Secretariat
1. That sometime in 1983 and 1984, accused Felix Nizurtado
or which, in the absence of such modules, the Councils
was the Barangay Captain of Barangay Panghulo of
would choose subject to the evaluation/validation of the
Malabon, Metro Manila and discharged his functions as
Secretariat.
such;

After the seminar, Nizurtado received a check for

2. That sometime in 1983, the Ministry of Human
P10,000.00 intended for Barangay Panghulo and issued in
Settlements, the Metro Manila Commission and Kilusang
his name. The check, however, could be encashed only
Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran (KKK) undertook a Livelihood
upon submission to the Secretariat of a resolution approved
Program for Barangays in Metro Manila consisting of loans in
by the Barangay Council identifying the livelihood project in
the amount of P10, 000.00 per barangay.
which the loan would be invested. He entrusted the check to
Romero for safekeeping.
3. That as Barangay Captain of Barangay Panghulo,
accused received a check in the amount of P10,000.00 for
In one of its regular sessions, which was on the second
said barangay's livelihood program;
Saturday of each month, the Barangay Council of Panghulo
discussed the project in which to invest the P10,000.00.
4. That the check, to be encashed, had to be supported by a Among the proposals was that of Romero that a barangay
project proposal to be approved by the KKK; service center be established. But the meeting ended without
the Councilmen agreeing on any livelihood project.
5. That the accused encashed the check received by him in
the amount of P10,000.00 with the Land Bank of the A few days after the meeting, Nizurtado got back the check
Philippines; and from Romero, saying that he would return it because, as
admitted by Nizurtado during the trial, the Councilmen could
6. That the accused distributed the amount of P10,000.00 in not agree on any livelihood project. Nizurtado signed a
the form of loans of P1,000.00 each to members of the receipt dated August 4, 1983, for the check "to be returned to
barangay council. 2 the Metro Manila Commission."

After evaluating the evidence adduced, the Sandiganbayan came out with its After a few more days, Nizurtado asked Romero to sign an
factual findings and conclusions, hereunder detailed: unaccomplished resolution in mimeograph form. All the blank
spaces in the form were unfilled-up, except those at the
It appears from the evidence, testimonial and documentary, bottom which were intended for the names of the Barangay
as well as from the stipulations of the parties that accused Councilmen, Secretary, and Captain, which were already
filled-up and signed by Councilmen Marcelo Sandel, Jose
Bautista, Alfredo Aguilar, Alfredo Dalmacio, F.A. Manalang Santos Gomez Barangay Councilman
(the alleged Barangay Secretary), and Nizurtado. In asking Jose Bautista Barangay Councilman
Romero to sign, Nizurtado said that the MMC was hurrying Alfredo Dalmacio Barangay Councilman
up the matter and that the livelihood project to be stated in Ceferino Roldan Barangay Councilman
the resolution was that proposed by Romero — barangay
service center. Trusting Nizurtado, Romero affixed his The word "none" was inserted in the space intended for the
signature above his typewritten name. When he did so, the names of the Councilmen who did not attend. The resolution
blank resolution did not yet bear the signatures of was given the number "17" series of "1983." Finally, the last
Councilmen Santos Gomez and Ceferino Roldan. line before the names and signatures of the Councilmen was
completed by typewriting the date so that it now reads:
The blank resolution having already been signed by Romero,
Nizurtado asked him to talk with Gomez and secure the UNANIMOUSLY APPROVED this 25th day
latter's signature. Romero obliged and upon his pleading that of August, 1983.
his proposed barangay service center would be the one
written in the blank resolution, Gomez signed. But before he The resolution as fully accomplished is now marked Exhibit
returned the resolution, he had it machine copied. The D.
machine copy is now marked Exhibit J.
Other supporting documents for the encashment of the
Unknown to Romero and Gomez, the blank but signed check of P10,000.00 were also prepared, signed, and filed
resolution was later on accomplished by writing in the blank by Nizurtado. They were: Project Identification (Exhibit B),
space below the paragraph reading: Project Application in which the borrower was stated to be
Samahang Kabuhayan ng Panghulo (Exhibit C and C-1),
WHEREAS, the Barangay Council now in Project Location Map (Exhibit E), and Promissory Note
this session had already identified one (Exhibit F).
livelihood project with the following title and
description: The application for loan having been approved, the
Promissory Note (Exhibit F) was re-dated from August to
the following: October 18, 1983, placed in the name of the Samahang
Kabuhayan ng Panghulo represented by Nizurtado, and
Title : T-shirt Manufacturing made payable in two equal yearly amortizations of P5,000.00
Description : Manufacture of each from its date. The purpose of the loan was stated to be
round neck T-shirts of T-Shirt Manufacturing of round neck shirts of various sizes
various sizes and colors. and colors.

The other blank spaces in the resolution were also filled-up. Nizurtado encashed the check on the same day, October 18,
Thus "Panghulo," "Brgy. Hall," and "August 25, 1983" were 1983, and re-lent the cash proceeds to himself, Sandel,
typewritten in the spaces for the name of the Barangay, the Aguilar, Bautista, Dalmacio, and Roldan at P1,000.00, and to
place where and the date when the council meeting took Manalang and Oro Soledad, Barangay Court Secretary and
place, respectively. In the blank spaces for the names of the Barangay Secretary, respectively, at P500.00 each.
members of the Council who attended the meeting were
typewritten the names of On April 25, 1984, Nizurtado who was then on leave wrote
Sandel, then acting Barangay Captain, informing him that
Felix Nizurtado Barangay Captain per record, he, Romero, and Gomez had not made any
Marcelo Sandel Barangay Councilman remittance for the account of their P1,000.00 loans from the
Alfredo Aguilar Barangay Councilman
barangay livelihood fund of P10,000.00 and advising him to On the basis of its above findings, the Sandiganbayan convicted the accused
collect, through the Secretary or Treasurer. of the offense charged. The dispositive portions of its decision, promulgated
on 18 September 1992, read:
Since Romero and Gomez had not borrowed any amount
from the said fund, they told Sandel to ask Nizurtado if he WHEREFORE, the Court finds Felix Nizurtado y Victa guilty
had any proof of their alleged loans. So Sandel wrote beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
Nizurtado on May 2, 1984, but the latter did not answer. malversation of public funds committed through falsification
of public document and, appreciating in his favor . . . two
This attempt to collect from Romero and Gomez prompted mitigating circumstances and applying the Indeterminate
them to make inquiries. They learned that the check for Sentence Law, imposes upon him the penalties of
P10,000.00 was indeed encashed by Nizurtado and that the imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS, NINE (9)
blank resolution which they had signed was filled-up to make MONTHS, and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of prision
it appear that in a Council meeting where all councilmen correccional  as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS, EIGHT (8)
were present on August 25, 1983, T-shirt manufacturing was MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as maximum;
adopted as the livelihood project of Panghulo. But no such perpetual special disqualification; and a fine of P10,000.00.
meeting occurred on that day or on any other day. Neither
was Nizurtado authorized by the Council to submit T-shirt No pronouncement is made as to civil liability, there having
Manufacturing as the livelihood project of Panghulo. been complete restitution of the amount malversed.

On August 9, 1984, Romero and Gomez lodged their With costs.

complaint against Nizurtado with the Office of the
Tanodbayan. After due preliminary investigation, this case SO ORDERED.4
was filed.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, Nizurtado has filed the
As of September 7, 1984, the members of the Council who instant petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan in
had received P1,000.00 each, as well as Bacani (also that —
referred to as Manalang) and Soledad who had received
P500.00 each had paid their respective loans to Nizurtado 1. It has committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that
who, in turn, remitted the payments to the MMC on these Resolution No. 17, dated August 25, 1983, of the Barangay
dates: Council of Panghulo, Malabon, Metro Manila (Exh. "D") is a
falsified document and that the petitioner is the forger
April 16, 1984 P1,450.00 thereof; and
August 14, 1984 3,550.00
September 7, 1984 2. It has committed serious error of law and gravely abused
3,000.00 its discretion in finding petitioner guilty of malversation of the
———— amount of P10,000.00 which he had received as a loan from
the then Metro Manila Commission in his capacity as
Total P8,000.00 representative of the Samahang Kabuhayan ng Barangay
Panghulo, Malabon, Metro Manila. 5
In June 1987, after demands for payment, Dalmacio remitted
the balance of P2,000.00 from his pocket because, as acting The Solicitor General Agrees in all respects with the Sandiganbayan in its
Barangay Captain, he did not want to leave the Barangay findings and judgment except insofar as it has found petitioner to have
with an indebtedness.3 likewise committed the crime of falsification of a public document.

Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

 Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property. — (a) the offender is a public officer;
Presumption of malversation. — Any public officer who, by
reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public (b) he has the custody or control of funds or property by
funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or reason of the duties of his office;
misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or
negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public (c) the funds or property involved are public funds or
funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be property for which he is accountable; and
guilty the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or
property, shall suffer:
(d) he has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has
consented to, or through abandonment or negligence
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and permitted, the taking by another person of, such funds or
maximum periods, if the amount involved in the property.
misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two
hundreds pesos.
Nizurtado was a public officer, having been the Barangay Captain of
Panghulo, Malabon, Metro Manila, from 1983 to 1988; in that capacity, he
2. The penalty of prision mayor  in its minimum and medium received and later encashed a check for P10,000.00, specifically intended by
periods, if the amount involved is more than two hundred way of a loan to the barangay for its livelihood program; and the funds had
pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos. come from the Ministry of Human Settlements, the Metro Manila Commission
and "Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran."
3. The penalty of  prision mayor  in its maximum period
to reclusion temporal  in its minimum period, if the amount The only point of controversy is whether or not Nizurtado has indeed
involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than misappropriated the funds.
twelve thousand pesos.
Petitioner was able to encash the check on 18 October 1988 on the basis of
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and a resolution of the Barangay Council, submitted to the KKK Secretariat, to the
maximum periods, if the amount involved is more than effect that a livelihood project, i.e., "T-shirt manufacturing," had already been
twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand identified by the council. The money, however, instead of its being used for
pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall the project, was later lent to, along with petitioner, the members of the
be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion Barangay Council. Undoubtedly, the act constituted "misappropriation" within
perpetua. the meaning of the law.6

In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer Accused-appellant sought to justify the questioned act in that it was only
the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine when the members of the Barangay Council had realized that P10,000.00
equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the was not enough to support the T-shirt manufacturing project, that they
total value of the property embezzled. decided to distribute the money in the form of loans to themselves. He
submitted, in support thereof, a belated 7 certification issued by Rodolfo B.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any Banquicio, Chief of District IV of the Support Staff and Malabon Sub-District
public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon Officer of KKK, to the effect that Barangay Captains were given discretionary
demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be  prima authority to invest the money in any viable project not falling within the list of
facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or project modules provided by the MHS-NCR Management. Lending the
property to personal use. unutilized funds to the members of the Barangay council could have hardly
been meant to be the viable project contemplated under that certification.
The elements of malversation, essential for the conviction of an accused, Furthermore, it would appear that only Regional Action Officer Ismael
under the above penal provisions are that — Mathay, Jr., and Deputy Regional Action Officer Lilia S. Ledesma were the
officials duly authorized to approve such projects upon the recommendation
of the KKK Secretariat.8 We could see no flaw in the ratiocination of the xxx xxx xxx
Sandiganbayan, when, in rejecting this defense, it said:
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any
The defense evidence that the Barangay Council changed act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
the T-shirt Manufacturing to whatever business ventures
each members of the Council would select for investment of In falsification under the above-quoted paragraph, the document
his P1,000.00 has, as already stated, little, if any, probative need not be an authentic official paper since its simulation, in fact, is
value. the essence of falsification. So, also, the signatures appearing
thereon need not necessarily be forged. 11
But assuming there was such a change, the same is of no
avail. The Resolution marked Exhibit D expressly stated that In concluding that the Barangay Council resolution, Exhibit "D," 12 was a
the P10,000.00 "shall only be appropriated for the purpose/s falsified document for which petitioner should be held responsible, the
as provided in the issued policies and guidelines of the Sandiganbayan gave credence to the testimonies of Barangay Councilman
program." The guidelines, in turn, prescribed that the Santos A. Gomez and Barangay Treasurer Manuel P. Romero. The two
livelihood project shall be identified from the modules testified that no meeting had actually taken place on 25 August 1983, the
developed by the KKK Secretariat or, as stipulated in the date when
Resolution itself, in the absence of such modules, shall be "T-shirt manufacturing" was allegedly decided to be the barangay livelihood
chosen by the Samahang Kabuhayan "subject to the project. The Sandiganbayan concluded that Nizurtado had induced Romero
evaluation/validation of the KKK Secretariat." There is and Gomez to sign the blank resolution, Exhibit "J" 13 on the representation
absolutely no showing that the alleged substitute projects that Romero's proposal to build a barangay service center would so later be
which each lendee of P1,000.00 would select were among indicated in that resolution as the barangay livelihood project.
those of the developed modules or were submitted to the
KKK Secretariat for evaluation/validation.9 The established rule is that unless the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan
are bereft of substantial evidence to support it, those findings are binding on
Accused-appellant criticizes the Sandiganbayan for its having failed to this court.
consider the fact that no valid demand has been made, or could have been
made, for the repayment of the loaned sum. Demand merely raises a  prima The Sandiganbayan has considered the mitigating circumstances of
facie  presumption that missing funds have been put to personal use. The voluntary surrender and restitution in favor of Nizurtado. Deputy Clerk of
demand itself, however, is not an element of, and not indispensable to Court Luisabel Alfonso Cortez, on 17 January 1989, has certified to the
constitute, malversation. Even without a demand, malversation can still be voluntary surrender of the accused thusly:
committed when enough facts, such as here, are extant to prove it. 10
CERTIFICATION
Accused-appellant was charged with having committed the crime through the
falsification of a public document punishable under paragraph 2 of Article 171
of the Revised Penal Code. THIS CERTIFIES that accused FELIX NIZURTADO in
criminal Case No: 13304 voluntarily surrendered before this
court on JANUARY 17, 1989  and posted his bail bond in
The pertinent provisions read: said case.

Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or Manila, Philippines, JANUARY 17, 1989
ecclesiastic minister. — The penalty of prision mayor  and a
fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any
public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of ABEL
his official position, shall falsify a document by committing CORTEZ
any of the following acts: Deputy
Court  14
Voluntary surrender (Art. 13, par. 7, Revised Penal Code), therefore, may Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law (which can apply since the maximum
thus be treated as a modifying circumstance independent and apart from term of imprisonment would exceed one year), the court is to impose an
restitution of the questioned funds by petitioner (Art. 13, par. 10, Revised indeterminate sentence, the minimum of which shall be anywhere within the
Penal Code). We are convinced, furthermore, that petitioner had no intention range of the penalty next lower in degree (i.e.,  prision correccional in its
to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. (Art. 13, par. 3, Revised medium period to  prision correccional  in its maximum period or anywhere
Penal Code), entitling him to three distinct mitigating circumstances. from two years, four months and one day to six years) and the maximum of
which is that which the law prescribes after considering the attendant
Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, when a single act constitutes modifying circumstances. In view of the mitigating circumstances present in
two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary this case, the fine of P10,000.00 may also be reduced (Art. 66, Revised
means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall Penal Code) and, since the principal penalty is higher than prision
be imposed, the same (the penalty) to be applied in the maximum period. correccional, subsidiary imprisonment would not be warranted. (Art. 39, par.
The penalty prescribed for the offense of malversation of public funds, when 3, Revised Penal Code).
the amount involved exceeds six thousand pesos but does not exceed
twelve thousand pesos, is  prision mayor in its maximum period to  reclusion The law and the evidence no doubt sustains Nizurtado's conviction. Given all
temporal  in its minimum period; in addition, the offender shall be sentenced the attendant circumstances, it is, nevertheless, the personal and humble
to suffer perpetual special disqualification and to pay a fine equal to the opinion of the assigned writer of this  ponencia that appellant deserves an
amount malversed (Art. 217[3], Revised Penal Code). The penalty of prision executive commutation of the statutory minimum sentence pronounced by
mayor  and a fine of five thousand pesos is prescribed for the crime of this Court.
falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. The former (that
imposed for the malversation), being more severe than the latter (that WHEREFORE, the decision of the Sandiganbayan convicting Nizurtado for
imposed for the falsification), is then the applicable prescribed penalty to be malversation of public funds through falsification of public document is
imposed in its maximum period. The actual attendance of two separate AFFIRMED but the sentence, given the circumstances here obtaining, is
mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and restitution, also found by MODIFIED by imposing on petitioner a reduced indeterminate sentence
the Sandiganbayan and uncontested by the Solicitor General, entitles the of from  two years, four months and one day to eight years, eight months
accused to the penalty next lower in degree. For purposes of determining and one day, perpetual special disqualification and a fine of P2,000.00.
that next lower degree, the full range of the penalty prescribed by law for the
offense, not merely the imposable penalty because of its complex nature, SO ORDERED.
should, a priori, be considered. It is our considered view that the ruling
in  People vs. Gonzales, 73 Phil. 549, as opposed to that of People vs.
Fulgencio, 92 Phil. 1069, is the correct rule and it is thus here reiterated. In Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo,
fine, the one degree lower than prision mayor  maximum to  reclusion Melo, Quiason, Puno, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
temporal  minimum is prision mayor minimum to prision mayor medium
(being the next two periods in the scale of penalties [see Art. 64, par 5, in Feliciano, J., is on leave.
relation to Art. 61, par 5, Revised Penal Code]) the full range of which is six
years and one day to ten years. This one degree lower penalty should,
conformably with Article 48 of the Code (the penalty for complex crimes), be
imposed in its maximum period or from eight years, eight months and one
day to ten years. The presence of the third mitigating circumstance
of praeter intentionem  (lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed) would result in imposing a period the court may deem
applicable.  15  Considering, however, that the penalty has to be imposed in
the maximum period, the only effect of this additional mitigating circumstance
is to impose only the minimum portion of that maximum period,  16 that is,
from eight years, eight months and one day to nine years, six months and
ten days, from which range the maximum of the indeterminate sentence shall
be taken.
 Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato. On 9 May 1989 the
Provincial Governor of Cotabato requested the Office of the Ombudsman in
Manila to conduct an investigation on a complaint for bribery, dishonesty,
abuse of authority and giving of unwarranted benefits by petitioner and other
officials of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. The
complaint was initiated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cotabato
through a resolution advising the Governor to report the involvement of
petitioner and others in the illegal cutting of mahogany trees and hauling of
illegally-cut logs in the area.2

On 1 August 1989 Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote the
Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City requesting that he be furnished copy
of the complaint against petitioner. Atty. Palmones then asked his client
Ursua to take his letter-request to the Office of the Ombudsman because his
law firm's messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to some personal matters.
Before proceeding to the Office of the Ombudsman petitioner talked to Oscar
Perez and told him that he was reluctant to personally ask for the document
since he was one of the respondents before the Ombudsman. However,
Perez advised him not to worry as he could just sign his (Perez) name if ever
he would be required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint. 3

When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City he

was instructed by the security officer to register in the visitors' logbook.
Republic of the Philippines Instead of writing down his name petitioner wrote the name "Oscar Perez"
SUPREME COURT after which he was told to proceed to the Administrative Division for the copy
Manila of the complaint he needed. He handed the letter of Atty. Palmones to the
Chief of the Administrative Division, Ms. Loida Kahulugan, who then gave
FIRST DIVISION him a copy of the complaint, receipt of which he acknowledged by writing the
name "Oscar Perez."4
 
Before petitioner could leave the premises he was greeted by an
G.R. No. 112170 April 10, 1996 acquaintance, Josefa Amparo, who also worked in the same office. They
conversed for a while then he left. When Loida learned that the person who
CESARIO URSUA, petitioner, introduced himself as "Oscar Perez" was actually petitioner Cesario Ursua, a
vs. customer of Josefa Amparo in her gasoline station, Loida reported the matter
COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly
charged.
BELLOSILLO, J.:p
On 18 December 1990, after the prosecution had completed the presentation
of its evidence, petitioner without leave of court filed a demurrer to evidence
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which
alleging that the failure of the prosecution to prove that his
affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City
supposed alias was different from his registered name in the local civil
for violation of Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A. No. 6085,
registry was fatal to its cause. Petitioner argued that no document from the
otherwise known as "An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases". 1
local civil registry was presented to show the registered name of accused
which according to him was a condition sine qua non for the validity of his Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no
conviction. person shall use any name different from the one with which
he was christened or by which he has been known since his
The trial court rejected his contentions and found him guilty of violating Sec. childhood, or such substitute name as may have been
1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085. He was sentenced to suffer authorized by a competent court. The name shall comprise
a prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day of prision the patronymic name and one or two surnames.
correccional minimum as minimum, to four (4) years of prision
correccional medium as maximum, with all the accessory penalties provided Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias or aliases shall
for by law, and to pay a fine of P4,000.00 plus costs. apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those legally
provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. Separate proceedings shall be had for each alias, and each
new petition shall set forth the original name and
the alias or aliases for the use of which judicial authority has
On 31 May 1993 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner but
been, obtained, specifying the proceedings and the date on
modified the penalty by imposing an indeterminate term of one (1) year as
which such authority was granted. Judicial authorities for the
minimum to three (3) years as maximum and a fine of P5,000.00.
use of aliases shall be recorded in the proper civil
register . . . .
Petitioner now comes to us for review of his conviction as he reasserts his
innocence. He contends that he has not violated C.A. No. 142 as amended
The above law was subsequently amended by R.A. No. 6085, approved on 4
by R.A. No. 6085 as he never used any alias name; neither is "Oscar Perez"
August 1969. As amended, C.A. No. 142 now reads:
his alias. An alias, according to him, is a term which connotes the habitual
use of another name by which a person is also known. He claims that he has
never been known as "Oscar Perez" and that he only used such name on Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema,
one occasion and it was with the express consent of Oscar Perez himself. It television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in
is his position that an essential requirement for a conviction under C.A. No. athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally
142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 has not been complied with when the accepted practice, no person shall use any name different
prosecution failed to prove that his supposed alias was different from his from the one with which he was registered at birth in the
registered name in the Registry of Births. He further argues that the Court of office of the local civil registry or with which he was baptized
Appeals erred in not considering the defense theory that he was charged for the first time, or in case of all alien, with which he was
under the wrong law.5 registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such
substitute name as may have been authorized by a
competent court: Provided, That persons whose births have
Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light
not been registered in any local civil registry and who have
of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in
not been baptized, have one year from the approval of this
construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and
act within which to register their names in the civil registry of
the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and
their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic
purpose.6 The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where
name and one or two surnames.
a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would
defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.7
Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for
authority therefor in proceedings like those legally provided
For a clear understanding of the purpose of C.A. No. 142 as amended, which
to obtain judicial authority for a change of name and no
was allegedly violated by petitioner, and the surrounding circumstances
person shall be allowed to secure such judicial authority for
under which the law was enacted, the pertinent provisions thereof, its
more than one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth
amendments and related statutes are herein cited. C.A. No. 142, which was
the person's baptismal and family name and the name
approved on 7 November 1936, and before its amendment by R.A. No. 6085,
recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrant's
is entitled An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases. It provides as follows:
name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names
other than his original or real name, specifying the reason or
 reasons for the desired alias. The judicial authority for the There can hardly be any doubt that petitioner's use
use of alias, the Christian name and the alien immigrant's of alias "Kheng Chiau Young" in addition to his real name
name shall be recorded in the proper local civil registry, and "Yu Cheng Chiau" would add to more confusion. That he is
no person shall use any name or names other than his known in his business, as manager of the Robert Reid, Inc.,
original or real name unless the same is or are duly recorded by the former name, is not sufficient reason to allow him its
in the proper local civil registry. use. After all, petitioner admitted that he is known to his
associates by both names. In fact, the Anselmo Trinidad,
The objective and purpose of C.A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act Inc., of which he is a customer, knows him by his real name.
No. 3883, An Act to Regulate the Use in Business Transactions of Names Neither would the fact that he had encountered certain
other than True Names, Prescribing the Duties of the Director of the Bureau difficulties in his transactions with government offices which
of Commerce and Industry in its Enforcement, Providing Penalties for required him to explain why he bore two names, justify the
Violations thereof, and for other purposes, which was approved on 14 grant of his petition, for petitioner could easily avoid said
November 1931 and amended by Act No. 4147, approved on 28 November difficulties by simply using and sticking only to his real name
1934.8 The pertinent provisions of Act No. 3883 as amended follow — "Yu Kheng Chiau."

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to use or sign, on The fact that petitioner intends to reside permanently in the
any written or printed receipt including receipt for tax or Philippines, as shown by his having filed a petition for
business or any written or printed contract not verified by a naturalization in Branch V of the above-mentioned court,
notary public or on any written or printed evidence of any argues the more against the grant of his petition, because if
agreement or business transactions, any name used in naturalized as a Filipino citizen, there would then be no
connection with his business other than his true name, or necessity for his further using said alias, as it would be
keep conspicuously exhibited in plain view in or at the place contrary to the usual Filipino way and practice of using only
where his business is conducted, if he is engaged in a one name in ordinary as well as business transactions. And,
business, any sign announcing a firm name or business as the lower court correctly observed, if he believes (after he
name or style without first registering such other name, or is naturalized) that it would be better for him to write his
such firm name, or business name or style in the Bureau of name following the Occidental method, "he can easily file a
Commerce together with his true name and that of any other petition for change of name, so that in lieu of the name "Yu
person having a joint or common interest with him in such Kheng Chian," he can, abandoning the same, ask for
contract, agreement, business transaction, or business . . . . authority to adopt the name Kheng Chiau Young."

For a bit of history, the enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made All things considered, we are of the opinion and so hold, that
primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese of adopting scores petitioner has not shown satisfactory proper and reasonable
of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the grounds under the aforequoted provisions of Commonwealth
field of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious Act No. 142 and the Rules of Court, to warrant the grant of
names which for obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained his petition for the use of an alias name.
against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a
thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or intended
an alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in
proceedings and recorded in the civil register.9 addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the
first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A man's
In Yu Kheng Chiau v. Republic 10 the Court had occasion to explain the name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by
meaning, concept and ill effects of the use of an alias within the purview of his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known
C.A. No. 142 when we ruled — by several different names and these are known as aliases. 11 Hence, the use
of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a
single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be
known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not
fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in
the case at bench.

It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the

Ombudsman as "Oscar Perez," which was the name of the messenger of his
lawyer who should have brought the letter to that office in the first place
instead of petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request of his lawyer
to obtain a copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a respondent. There
is no question then that "Oscar Perez" is not an alias name of petitioner.
There is no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to use that
name as his second name in addition to his real name. The use of the name
"Oscar Perez" was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he
was not even legally required to expose his real identity. For, even if he had
identified himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would
still be able to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office
of the Ombudsman could not refuse him because the complaint was part of
public records hence open to inspection and examination by anyone under
the proper circumstances.

While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such
does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as
amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business
transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent
are not present here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from
those contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended.
There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never
intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute
is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable,
mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious
consequences. 12 Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be
construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. 13 The reason
for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and
the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would
be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. 14 Indeed, our mind cannot
rest easy on the proposition that petitioner should be convicted on a law that
does not clearly penalize the act done by him.

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that

of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
petitioner CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Vitug, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

 BRION, J.:

The People of the Philippines (the People) filed this Petition for Review on
Certiorari1 to seek the reversal of the Sandiganbayan’s Joint Resolution
dated July 12, 2004, granting respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada’s (Estrada)
demurrer to evidence in Crim. Case No. 26565.2

THE FACTS

On April 4, 2001, an Information for plunder (docketed as Crim. Case No.

26558) was filed with the Sandiganbayan against respondent Estrada,
among other accused. A separate Information for illegal use of alias,
docketed as Crim. Case No. 26565, was likewise filed against Estrada. The
Amended Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 reads:

That on or about 04 February 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto,

in the City of Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being then President of the Republic of the
Philippines, without having been duly authorized, judicially or
administratively, taking advantage of his position and committing the offense
in relation to office, i.e., in order to CONCEAL THE ill-gotten wealth HE
ACQUIRED during his tenure and his true identity as THE President of the
Republic of the Philippines, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF AS ‘JOSE VELARDE’ IN SEVERAL
TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ the SAID alias "Jose Velarde" which
IS neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing
documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Crim. Case Nos. 26565 and 26558 were subsequently consolidated for joint
Republic of the Philippines
trial. Still another Information, this time for perjury and docketed as Crim.
SUPREME COURT
Case No. 26905, was filed with the Sandiganbayan against Estrada. This
Manila
was later consolidated, too, with Crim. Cases No. 26558 and 26565.

EN BANC
Estrada was subsequently arrested on the basis of a warrant of arrest that
the Sandiganbayan issued.
G.R. Nos. 164368-69               April 2, 2009
On January 11, 2005, we ordered the creation of a Special Division in the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, Sandiganbayan to try, hear, and decide the charges of plunder and related
vs. cases (illegal use of alias and perjury) against respondent Estrada. 3
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and THE HONORABLE SPECIAL
DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
At the trial, the People presented testimonial and documentary evidence to
prove the allegations of the Informations for plunder, illegal use of alias, and
DECISION
perjury. The People’s evidence for the illegal alias charge, as summarized by (2) Documents duly identified by witnesses showing that Lucena
the Sandiganbayan, consisted of: Ortaliza was employed in the Office of the Vice President and, later
on, in the Office of the President when Estrada occupied these
A. The testimonies of Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank positions and when deposits were made to the Jose Velarde Savings
(PCIB) officers Clarissa G. Ocampo (Ocampo) and Atty. Manuel Account No. 0160-62502-5.
Curato (Curato) who commonly declared that on February 4, 2000,
Estrada opened a numbered trust account (Trust Account C-163) The People filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits in the consolidated cases, which
with PCIB and signed as "Jose Velarde" in the account opening the Sandiganbayan admitted into evidence in a Resolution dated October 13,
documents; both Ocampo and Curato also testified that Aprodicio 2003.4 The accused separately moved to reconsider the Sandiganbayan
Lacquian and Fernando Chua were present on that occasion; Resolution;5 the People, on the other hand, filed its Consolidated
Comment/Opposition to the motions.6 The Sandiganbayan denied the
B. (1) The testimony of PCIB-Greenhills Branch Manager Teresa motions in its Resolution dated November 17, 2003.7
Barcelan, who declared that a certain Baby Ortaliza (Ortaliza)
transacted several times with her; that Ortaliza deposited several After the People rested in all three cases, the defense moved to be allowed
checks in PCIB Savings Account No. 0160-62502-5 under the to file a demurrer to evidence in these cases. 8 In its Joint Resolution dated
account name "Jose Velarde" on the following dates (as evidenced March 10, 2004,9 the Sandiganbayan only granted the defense leave to file
by deposit receipts duly marked in evidence): demurrers in Crim. Case Nos. 26565 (illegal use of alias) and 26905
(perjury).
a. 20 October 1999 (Exh. "MMMMM")
Estrada filed separate Demurrers to Evidence for Crim. Case Nos. 26565
b. 8 November 1999 (Exh. "LLLLL") and 26905.10 His demurrer to evidence for Crim. Case No. 26565 (illegal use
of alias) was anchored on the following grounds11:
c. 22 November 1999 (Exh. "NNNNN")
1. Of the thirty-five (35) witnesses presented by the prosecution, only
two (2) witnesses, Ms. Clarissa Ocampo and Atty. Manuel Curato,
d. 24 November 1999 (Exh. "OOOOO")
testified that on one occasion (4 February 2000), they saw movant
use the name "Jose Velarde";
e. 25 November 1999 (Exh. "PPPPP")
2. The use of numbered accounts and the like was legal and was
f. 20 December 1999 (Exh. "QQQQQ") prohibited only in late 2001 as can be gleaned from Bangko Sentral
Circular No. 302, series of 2001, dated 11 October 2001;
g. 21 December 1999 (Exh. "RRRRR")
3. There is no proof of public and habitual use of alias as the
h. 29 December 1999 (Exh. "SSSSS") documents offered by the prosecution are banking documents which,
by their nature, are confidential and cannot be revealed without
i. 4 January 2000 (Exh. "TTTTT") following proper procedures; and

j. 10 May 2000 (Exh. "UUUUU") 4. The use of alias is absorbed in plunder.

k. 6 June 2000 (Exh. "VVVVV") The People opposed the demurrers through a Consolidated Opposition that
presented the following arguments:12
l. 25 July 2000 (Exh. "WWWWW")
1. That the use of fictitious names in bank transaction was not
expressly prohibited until BSP No. 302 is of no moment considering
that as early as Commonwealth Act No. 142, the use of alias was
 already prohibited. Movant is being prosecuted for violation of C.A. 142 only if the use of the alias is public and habitual. In Estrada’s case, the
No. 142 and not BSP Circular No. 302; Sandiganbayan noted, the application of the principles was not as simple
because of the complications resulting from the nature of the transaction
2. Movant’s reliance on Ursua vs. Court of Appeals (256 SCRA 147 involved – the alias was used in connection with the opening of a numbered
[1996]) is misplaced; trust account made during the effectivity of R.A. No. 1405, as
amended,14 and prior to the enactment of Republic R.A. No. 9160. 15
3. Assuming arguendo that C.A. No. 142, as amended, requires
publication of the alias and the habitual use thereof, the prosecution Estrada did not publicly use the alias "Jose Velarde":
has presented more than sufficient evidence in this regard to convict
movant for illegal use of alias; and a. Estrada’s use of the alias "Jose Velarde" in his dealings with
Dichavez and Ortaliza after February 4, 2000 is not relevant in light
4. Contrary to the submission of movant, the instant case of illegal of the conclusion that the acts imputed to Estrada under the
use of alias is not absorbed in plunder. Information were the act/s committed on February 4, 2000 only.
Additionally, the phrase, "Estrada did … represent himself as ‘Jose
Velarde’ in several transactions," standing alone, violates Estrada’s
Estrada replied to the Consolidated Opposition through a Consolidated Reply
right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation,
Opposition.
because it is very general and vague. This phrase is qualified and
explained by the succeeding phrase – "and use and employ the said
THE ASSAILED SANDIGANBAYAN’S RULING alias ‘Jose Velarde’" – which "is neither his registered name at birth
nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI
The Sandiganbayan issued on July 12, 2004 the Resolution now assailed in Bank and/or other corporate entities." Thus, Estrada’s
this petition. The salient points of the assailed resolution are: representations before persons other than those mentioned in the
Information are immaterial; Ortaliza and Dichavez do not fall within
First – the coverage of Estrada’s indictment. The Sandiganbayan found that the "Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities" specified in
the only relevant evidence for the indictment are those relating to what is the Information. Estrada’s representations with Ortaliza and
described in the Information – i.e., the testimonies and documents on the Dichavez are not therefore covered by the indictment.
opening of Trust Account C-163 on February 4, 2000. The Sandiganbayan
reasoned out that the use of the disjunctive "or" between "on or about 04 b. The Sandiganbayan rejected the application of the principle in the
February 2000" and "sometime prior or subsequent thereto" means that the law of libel that mere communication to a third person is publicity; it
act/s allegedly committed on February 4, 2000 could have actually taken reasoned out that that the definition of publicity is not limited to the
place prior to or subsequent thereto; the use of the conjunctive was simply way it is defined under the law on libel; additionally, the application of
the prosecution’s procedural tool to guard against any variance between the the libel law definition is onerous to the accused and is precluded by
date stated in the Information and that proved during the trial in a situation in the ruling in Ursua that CA No. 142, as a penal statute, should be
which time was not a material ingredient of the offense; it does not mean and construed strictly against the State and favorably for the accused. It
cannot be read as a roving commission that includes acts and/or events ruled that the definition under the law on libel, even if it applies,
separate and distinct from those that took place on the single date "on or considers a communication to a third person covered by the
about 04 February 2000 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto." The privileged communication rule to be non-actionable. Estrada’s use of
Sandiganbayan ruled that the use of the disjunctive "or" prevented it from the alias in front of Ocampo and Curato is one such privileged
interpreting the Information any other way. communication under R.A. No. 1405, as amended. The
Sandiganbayan said:
Second – the People’s failure to present evidence that proved Estrada’s
commission of the offense. The Sandiganbayan found that the People failed Movant’s act of signing "Jose Velarde" in bank documents being
to present evidence that Estrada committed the crime punished under absolutely confidential, the witnessing thereof by bank officers who
Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6085 were likewise sworn to secrecy by the same law cannot be
(CA 142), as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Ursua v. Court of considered as ‘public’ as to fall within the ambit of CA 142 as
Appeals.13 It ruled that there is an illegal use of alias within the context of CA amended. On account of the absolute confidentiality of the
 transaction, it cannot be said that movant intended to be known by The People filed this petition raising the following issues:
this name in addition to his real name. Confidentiality and secrecy
negate publicity. Ursua instructs: 1. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in
dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565 and in holding that the use by
Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to respondent Joseph Estrada of his alias "Jose Velarde" was not
another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that public despite the presence of Messrs. Aprodicio Laquian and
the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real Fernando Chua on 4 February 2000;
name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition in C.A.
No. 142 as amended. 2. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in
dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565 and in holding that the use by
c. The Sandiganbayan further found that the intention not to be respondent Joseph Estrada of his alias "Jose Velarde" was allowable
publicly known by the name "Jose Velarde" is shown by the nature of under banking rules, despite the clear prohibition under
a numbered account – a perfectly valid banking transaction at the Commonwealth Act No. 142;
time Trust Account C-163 was opened. The opening, too, of a
numbered trust account, the Sandiganbayan further ruled, did not 3. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in
impose on Estrada the obligation to disclose his real identity – the dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565 and in applying R.A. No. 1405 as
obligation R.A. No. 6713 imposes is to file under oath a statement of an exception to the illegal use of alias punishable under
assets and liabilities.16 Reading CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405 and R.A. Commonwealth Act No. 142;
No. 6713 together, Estrada had the absolute obligation to disclose
his assets including the amount of his bank deposits, but he was 4. Whether the alleged harmonization and application made by the
under no obligation at all to disclose the other particulars of the bank court a quo of R.A. No.1405 and Commonwealth Act No. 142 were
account (such as the name he used to open it). proper;

Third – the effect of the enactment of R.A. No. 9160.17 The Sandiganbayan 5. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in
said that the absolute prohibition in R.A. No. 9160 against the use of limiting the coverage of the amended Information in Crim. Case No.
anonymous accounts, accounts under fictitious names, and all other similar 26565 to the use of the alias "Jose Velarde" by respondent Joseph
accounts, is a legislative acknowledgment that a gaping hole previously Estrada on February 4, 2000;
existed in our laws that allowed depositors to hide their true identities. The
Sandiganbayan noted that the prohibition was lifted from Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP) Circular No. 251 dated July 7, 2000 – another confirmation 6. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in
that the opening of a numbered trust account was perfectly legal when it was departing from its earlier final finding on the non-applicability
opened on February 4, 2000. of Ursua v. Court of Appeals and forcing its application to the instant
case.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that the provisions of CA No. 142, as interpreted in
Ursua, must necessarily be harmonized with the provisions of R.A. No.1405 THE COURT’S RULING
and R.A. No. 9160 under the principle that every statute should be construed
in a way that will harmonize it with existing laws. A reasonable scrutiny, the The petition has no merit.
Sandiganbayan said, of all these laws in relation to the present case, led it to
conclude that the use of an alias within the context of a bank transaction The Law on Illegal Use of Alias and the Ursua Ruling
(specifically, the opening of a numbered account made before bank officers)
is protected by the secrecy provisions of R.A. No. 1405, and is thus outside Sections 1 and 2 of CA No. 142, as amended, read:
the coverage of CA No. 142 until the passage into law of R.A. No. 9160.
Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio
THE PETITION or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of
pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name
different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of the Following the doctrine of stare decisis, 20 we are guided by the Ursua ruling on
local civil registry or with which he was baptized for the first time, or in case how the crime punished under CA No. 142 may be committed. Close
of an alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of immigration upon adherence to this ruling, in other words, is unavoidable in the application of
entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent and the determination of criminal liability under CA No. 142.
court: Provided, That persons whose births have not been registered in any
local civil registry and who have not been baptized, have one year from the Among the many grounds the People invokes to avoid the application of the
approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of Ursua ruling proceeds from Estrada’s position in the government; at the time
their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or of the commission of the offense, he was the President of the Republic who
two surnames. is required by law to disclose his true name. We do not find this argument
sufficient to justify a distinction between a man on the street, on one hand,
Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority and the President of the Republic, on the other, for purposes of applying CA
therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority No. 142. In the first place, the law does not make any distinction, expressly or
for a change of name and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial impliedly, that would justify a differential treatment. CA No. 142 as applied to
authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the Estrada, in fact allows him to use his cinema or screen name of Joseph
person's baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil Estrada, which name he has used even when he was already the President
registry, if different, his immigrant's name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if of the Philippines. Even the petitioner has acquiesced to the use of the
he has such names other than his original or real name, specifying the screen name of the accused, as shown by the title of the present petition.
reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial authority for the use of Additionally, any distinction we make based on the People’s claim unduly
alias, the Christian name and the alien immigrant's name shall be recorded in prejudices Estrada; this is proscribed by the Ursua dictum that CA No. 142,
the proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or names as a penal statute, should be construed strictly against the State and in favor
other than his original or real name unless the same is or are duly recorded of the accused.21 The mode of violating CA No. 142 is therefore the same
in the proper local civil registry. whoever the accused may be.

How this law is violated has been answered by the Ursua definition of an The People also calls our attention to an earlier Sandiganbayan ruling
alias – "a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him (Resolution dated February 6, 2002) denying Estrada’s motion to quash the
publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real Information. This earlier Resolution effectively rejected the application of
name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute Ursua under the following tenor:
name authorized by a competent authority." There must be, in the words of
Ursua, a "sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name The use of the term "alias" in the Amended Information in itself serves to
(the alias) in addition to his real name from that day forth … [for the use of bring this case outside the ambit of the ruling in the case of Ursua v. Court of
alias to] fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended." 18 Appeals (256 SCRA 147 [1996]), on which the accused heavily relies in his
motion to quash. The term "alias" means "otherwise known as" (Webster
Ursua further relates the historical background and rationale that led to the Third New International Dictionary, 1993 ed., p. 53). The charge of using an
enactment of CA No. 142, as follows: "alias" logically implies that another name has been used publicly and
habitually. Otherwise, he will not be known by such name. In any case, the
The enactment of C.A. No. 142 was made primarily to curb the common amended information adverts to "several transactions" and signing of
practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names and documents with the Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities where
aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a the above-mentioned alias was allegedly employed by the accused.
practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for
obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained against the Chinese The facts alleged in the information are distinctly different from facts
who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. established in the Ursua case where another name was used by the accused
C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias in a single instance without any sign or indication that that [sic] he intended to
was duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil be known from that day by this name in addition to his real name. 22
register.19
The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in In an exercise of caution given Ursua’s jurisprudential binding effect, the
applying Ursua notwithstanding this earlier final ruling on its non-applicability People also argues in its petition that Estrada’s case is different from Ursua’s
– a ruling that binds the parties in the present case. The People thus claims for the following reasons: (1) respondent Estrada used and intended to
that the Sandiganbayan erred to the point of gravely abusing its discretion continually use the alias "Jose Velarde" in addition to the name "Joseph
when it resurrected the application of Ursua, resulting in the reversal of its Estrada"; (2) Estrada’s use of the alias was not isolated or limited to a single
earlier final ruling. transaction; and (3) the use of the alias "Jose Velarde" was designed to
cause and did cause "confusion and fraud in business transactions" which
We find no merit in this argument for two reasons. First, the cited the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent. The People also
Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere interlocutory order – a ruling denying a argues that the evidence it presented more than satisfied the requirements of
motion to quash23 – that cannot be given the attributes of finality and CA No. 142, as amended, and Ursua, as it was also shown or established
immutability that are generally accorded to judgments or orders that finally that Estrada’s use of the alias was public.
dispose of the whole, of or particular matters in, a case. 24 The
Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere interlocutory order because its effects In light of our above conclusions and based on the parties’ expressed
would only be provisional in character, and would still require the issuing positions, we shall now examine within the Ursua framework the assailed
court to undertake substantial proceedings in order to put the controversy to Sandiganbayan Resolution granting the demurrer to evidence. The
rest.25 It is basic remedial law that an interlocutory order is always under the prosecution has the burden of proof to show that the evidence it presented
control of the court and may be modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds with the Sandiganbayan satisfied the Ursua requirements, particularly on the
shown at any time before final judgment. 26 Perez v. Court of Appeals,27 albeit matter of publicity and habituality in the use of an alias.
a civil case, instructively teaches that an interlocutory order carries no res
adjudicata effects. Says Perez: What is the coverage of the indictment?

The Decision in CA-G.R. No. 10415 having resolved only an interlocutory The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely erred and abused its
matter, the principle of res judicata  cannot be applied in this case. There can discretion in limiting the coverage of the amended Information in Crim. Case
be no res judicata where the previous order in question was not an order or No. 26565 to Estrada’s use of the alias "Jose Velarde" on February 4, 2000.
judgment determinative of an issue of fact pending before the court but was It posits that there was a main transaction – one that took place on February
only an interlocutory order because it required the parties to perform certain 4, 2000 – but there were other transactions covered by the phrase "prior to or
acts for final adjudication. In this case, the lifting of the restraining order subsequent thereto; the Information specifically referred to "several
paved the way for the possession of the fishpond on the part of petitioners transactions" … "with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities." To
and/or their representatives pending the resolution of the main action for the People, the restrictive finding – that the phrase "prior to or subsequent
injunction. In other words, the main issue of whether or not private thereto" is absorbed by the phrase "on or about 04 February 2000" –
respondent may be considered a sublessee or a transferee of the lease drastically amends the succeeding main allegations on the constitutive
entitled to possess the fishpond under the circumstances of the case had yet criminal acts by removing the plurality of both the transactions involved and
to be resolved when the restraining order was lifted. 28 the documents signed with various entities; there is the undeniable essential
relationship between the allegations of the multiplicity of transactions, on one
Second, in the earlier motion to quash, the Sandiganbayan solely looked at hand, and the additional antecedent of "prior to or subsequent thereto," on
the allegations of the Information to determine the sufficiency of these the other. It argues that the Sandiganbayan reduced the phrase "prior to or
allegations and did not consider any evidence aliunde. This is far different subsequent thereto" into a useless appendage, providing Estrada with a
from the present demurrer to evidence where the Sandiganbayan had a fuller convenient and totally unwarranted escape route.
view of the prosecution’s case, and was faced with the issue of whether the
prosecution’s evidence was sufficient to prove the allegations of the The People further argues that the allegation of time is the least exacting in
Information. Under these differing views, the Sandiganbayan may arrive at a satisfying the constitutional requirement that the accused has to be informed
different conclusion on the application of Ursua, the leading case in the of the accusation against him. Section 6 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
application of CA 142, and the change in ruling is not per se indicative of Court provides that an allegation of the approximate date of the commission
grave abuse of discretion. That there is no error of law is strengthened by our of the offense will suffice, while Section 11 of the same Rule provides that it
consideration of the Sandiganbayan ruling on the application of Ursua. is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the
offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the crime.
This liberality allegedly shaped the time-tested rule that when the "time" The heretofore cited Information states that "… on or about 04 February
given in the complaint is not of the essence of the offense, the time of the 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila,
commission of the offense does not need to be proven as alleged, and that Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense was named accused [did] … willfully, unlawfully and criminally REPRESENT
committed at any time within the period of the statute of limitations and HIMSELF AS ‘JOSE VELARDE’ IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND use
before the commencement of the action (citing People v. Bugayong [299 and employ the SAID alias "Jose Velarde" which IS neither his registered
SCRA 528, 537] that in turn cited US v. Smith [3 Phil. 20, 22]). Since name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable
allegations of date of the commission of an offense are liberally interpreted, PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities."
the People posits that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
disregarding the additional clause "prior to or subsequent thereto"; under the We fully agree with the disputed Sandiganbayan’s reading of the Information,
liberality principle, the allegations of the acts constitutive of the offense finally as this was how the accused might have similarly read and understood the
determine the sufficiency of the allegations of time. The People thus claims allegations in the Information and, on this basis, prepared his defense.
that no surprise could have taken place that would prevent Estrada from Broken down into its component parts, the allegation of time in the
properly defending himself; the information fully notified him that he was Information plainly states that (1) ON February 4, 2000; (2) OR before
being accused of using the alias Jose Velarde in more than just one instance. February 4, 2000; (3) OR sometime prior or subsequent to February 4, 2000,
in the City of Manila, Estrada represented himself as "Jose Velarde" in
We see no merit in these arguments. several transactions in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or
other corporate entities.
At its core, the issue is constitutional in nature – the right of Estrada to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Under the Under this analysis, the several transactions involving the signing of
provisions of the Rules of Court implementing this constitutional right, a documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities all had
complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the their reference to February 4, 2000; they were all made on or about or prior
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions or subsequent to that date, thus plainly implying that all these transactions
complained of as constituting the offense in the name of the offended party; took place only on February 4, 2000 or on another single date sometime
the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where before or after February 4, 2000. To be sure, the Information could have
the offense was committed.29 As to the cause of accusation, the acts or simply said "on or about February 4, 2000" to capture all the alternative
omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and approximate dates, so that the phrase "sometime prior or subsequent
aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language thereto" would effectively be a surplusage that has no meaning separately
and not necessarily in the language used in the statute, but in terms sufficient from the "on or about" already expressed. This consequent uselessness of
to enable a person of common understanding to know the offense charged the "prior or subsequent thereto" phrase cannot be denied, but it is a direct
and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances, and for the court to and necessary consequence of the use of the "OR" between the two phrases
pronounce judgment.30 The date of the commission of the offense need not and the "THERETO" that referred back to February 4, 2000 in the second
be precisely stated in the complaint or information except when the precise phrase. Of course, the reading would have been very different (and would
date is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been clearly in accord with the People’s present interpretation) had the
have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its Information simply used "AND" instead of "OR" to separate the phrases; the
commission.31 intent to refer to various transactions occurring on various dates and
occasions all proximate to February 4, 2000 could not be disputed.
The information must at all times embody the essential elements of the crime Unfortunately for the People, the imprecision in the use of "OR" is the reality
charged by setting forth the facts and circumstances that bear on the the case has to live with. To act contrary to this reality would violate Estrada’s
culpability and liability of the accused so that he can properly prepare for and right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him; the
undertake his defense.32 In short, the allegations in the complaint or multiple transactions on several separate days that the People claims would
information, as written, must fully inform or acquaint the accused – the result in surprise and denial of an opportunity to prepare for Estrada, who has
primary reader of and the party directly affected by the complaint or a right to rely on the single day mentioned in the Information.
information – of the charge/s laid.
Separately from the constitutional dimension of the allegation of time in the
Information, another issue that the allegation of time and our above
conclusion raise relates to what act or acts, constituting a violation of the People posits, is allowed only if the laws intended to be harmonized refer to
offense charged, were actually alleged in the Information.1avvphi1 the same subject matter, or are at least related with one another. The three
laws which the Sandiganbayan tried to harmonize are not remotely related to
The conclusion we arrived at necessarily impacts on the People’s case, as it one another; they each deal with a different subject matter, prohibits a
deals a fatal blow on the People’s claim that Estrada habitually used the Jose different act, governs a different conduct, and covers a different class of
Velarde alias. For, to our mind, the repeated use of an alias within a single persons,33 and there was no need to force their application to one another.
day cannot be deemed "habitual," as it does not amount to a customary Harmonization of laws, the People adds, presupposes the existence of
practice or use. This reason alone dictates the dismissal of the petition under conflict or incongruence between or among the provisions of various laws, a
CA No. 142 and the terms of Ursua. situation not obtaining in the present case.

The issues of publicity, numbered accounts, and The People posits, too, that R.A. No. 1405 does not apply to trust
the application of CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405, transactions, such as Trust Account No. C-163, as it applies only to
and R.A. No. 9160. traditional deposits (simple loans). A trust account, according to the People,
may not be considered a deposit because it does not create the juridical
relation of creditor and debtor; trust and deposit operations are treated
We shall jointly discuss these interrelated issues.
separately and are different in legal contemplation; trust operation is separate
and distinct from banking and requires a grant of separate authority, and trust
The People claims that even on the assumption that Ocampo and Curato are funds are not covered by deposit insurance under the Philippine Deposit
bank officers sworn to secrecy under the law, the presence of two other Insurance Corporation law (R.A. No. 3591, as amended).
persons who are not bank officers – Aprodicio Laquian and Fernando Chua –
when Estrada’s signed the bank documents as "Jose Velarde" amounted to a
The People further argues that the Sandiganbayan’s conclusion that the
"public" use of an alias that violates CA No. 142.
transaction or communication was privileged in nature was erroneous – a
congruent interpretation of CA No. 142 and R.A. No. 1405 shows that a
On the issue of numbered accounts, the People argues that to premise the person who signs in a public or private transaction a name or alias, other
validity of Estrada’s prosecution for violation of CA No. 142 on a mere than his original name or the alias he is authorized to use, shall be held liable
banking practice is gravely erroneous, improper, and constitutes grave abuse for violation of CA No. 142, while the bank employees are bound by the
of discretion; no banking law provision allowing the use of aliases in the confidentiality of bank transactions except in the circumstances enumerated
opening of bank accounts existed; at most, it was allowed by mere in R.A. No. 1405. At most, the People argues, the prohibition in R.A. No.
convention or industry practice, but not by a statute enacted by the 1405 covers bank employees and officers only, and not Estrada; the law
legislature. Additionally, that Estrada’s prosecution was supposedly based on does not prohibit Estrada from disclosing and making public his use of an
BSP Circular No. 302 dated October 11, 2001 is wrong and misleading, as alias to other people, including Ocampo and Curato, as he did when he made
Estrada stands charged with violation of CA No. 142, penalized since 1936, a public exhibit and use of the alias before Messrs. Lacquian and Chua.
and not with a violation of a mere BSP Circular. That the use of alias in bank
transactions prior to BSP Circular No. 302 is allowed is inconsequential
Finally, the People argues that the Sandiganbayan ruling that the use of an
because as early as CA No. 142, the use of an alias (except for certain
alias before bank officers does not violate CA No. 142 effectively encourages
purposes which do not include banking) was already prohibited. Nothing in
the commission of wrongdoing and the concealment of ill-gotten wealth under
CA No. 142 exempted the use of aliases in banking transactions, since the
pseudonyms; it sustains an anomalous and prejudicial policy that uses the
law did not distinguish or limit its application; it was therefore grave error for
law to silence bank officials and employees from reporting the commission of
the Sandiganbayan to have done so. Lastly on this point, bank regulations
crimes. The People contends that the law – R.A. No. 1405 – was not
being mere issuances cannot amend, modify or prevail over the effective,
intended by the Legislature to be used as a subterfuge or camouflage for the
subsisting and enforceable provision of CA No. 142.
commission of crimes and cannot be so interpreted; the law can only be
interpreted, understood and applied so that right and justice would prevail.
On the issue of the applicability of R.A. No. 1405 and its relationship with CA
No. 142, that since nothing in CA No. 142 excuses the use of an alias, the
We see no merit in these arguments.
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it ruled that R.A. No.
1405 is an exception to CA No. 142’s coverage. Harmonization of laws, the
We agree, albeit for a different reason, with the Sandiganbayan position that SECTION 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government to give
the rule in the law of libel – that mere communication to a third person is encouragement to the people to deposit their money in banking institutions
publicity – does not apply to violations of CA No. 142. Our close reading of and to discourage private hoarding so that the same may be properly utilized
Ursua – particularly, the requirement that there be intention by the user to be by banks in authorized loans to assist in the economic development of the
culpable and the historical reasons we cited above – tells us that the required country. (Underscoring supplied)
publicity in the use of alias is more than mere communication to a third
person; the use of the alias, to be considered public, must be made openly, If the money deposited under an account may be used by bank for
or in an open manner or place, or to cause it to become generally known. In authorized loans to third persons, then such account, regardless of whether it
order to be held liable for a violation of CA No. 142, the user of the alias must creates a creditor-debtor relationship between the depositor and the bank,
have held himself out as a person who shall publicly be known under that falls under the category of accounts which the law precisely seeks to protect
other name. In other words, the intent to publicly use the alias must be for the purpose of boosting the economic development of the country.
manifest.
Trust Account No. 858 is, without doubt, one such account. The Trust
To our mind, the presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as Agreement between petitioner and Urban Bank provides that the trust
Jose Velarde and opened Trust Account No. C-163 does not necessarily account covers "deposit, placement or investment of funds" by Urban
indicate his intention to be publicly known henceforth as Jose Velarde. In Bank for and in behalf of petitioner. The money deposited under Trust
relation to Estrada, Lacquian and Chua were not part of the public who had Account No. 858, was, therefore, intended not merely to remain with the bank
no access to Estrada’s privacy and to the confidential matters that transpired but to be invested by it elsewhere. To hold that this type of account is not
in Malacañan where he sat as President; Lacquian was the Chief of Staff with protected by R.A. 1405 would encourage private hoarding of funds that could
whom he shared matters of the highest and strictest confidence, while Chua otherwise be invested by bank in other ventures, contrary to the policy behind
was a lawyer-friend bound by his oath of office and ties of friendship to keep the law.
and maintain the privacy and secrecy of his affairs. Thus, Estrada could not
be said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be for public Section 2 of the same law in fact even more clearly shows that the term
consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were also inside the "deposits" was intended to be understood broadly:
room at that time. The same holds true for Estrada’s alleged representations
with Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming the evidence for these representations
to be admissible. All of Estrada’s representations to these people were made SECTION 2. All deposits of whatever nature with bank or banking institutions
in privacy and in secrecy, with no iota of intention of publicity. in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government
of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are
hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be
The nature, too, of the transaction on which the indictment rests, affords examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau
Estrada a reasonable expectation of privacy, as the alleged criminal act or office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of
related to the opening of a trust account – a transaction that R.A. No. 1405 impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or
considers absolutely confidential in nature. 34 We previously rejected, in dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the
Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan,35 the People’s nitpicking argument on the alleged money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
dichotomy between bank deposits and trust transactions, when we said: (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)1avvphi1

The contention that trust accounts are not covered by the term "deposits," as The phrase "of whatever nature" proscribes any restrictive interpretation of
used in R.A. 1405, by the mere fact that they do not entail a creditor-debtor "deposits." Moreover, it is clear from the immediately quoted provision that,
relationship between the trustor and the bank, does not lie. An examination of generally, the law applies not only to money which is deposited but also to
the law shows that the term "deposits" used therein is to be understood those which are invested. This further shows that the law was not intended to
broadly and not limited only to accounts which give rise to a creditor-debtor apply only to "deposits" in the strict sense of the word.lawphil.net Otherwise,
relationship between the depositor and the bank. there would have been no need to add the phrase "or invested.

The policy behind the law is laid down in Section 1: Clearly, therefore, R.A. 1405 is broad enough to cover Trust Account No.
858.36
We have consistently ruled that bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405 (the in this review and accordingly find no reversible error of law in the assailed
Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) are statutorily protected or recognized zones Sandiganbayan ruling.
of privacy.37 Given the private nature of Estrada’s act of signing the
documents as "Jose Velarde" related to the opening of the trust account, the WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit.
People cannot claim that there was already a public use of alias when
Ocampo and Curato witnessed the signing. We need not even consider here SO ORDERED.
the impact of the obligations imposed by R.A. No.1405 on the bank officers;
what is essentially significant is the privacy situation that is necessarily
implied in these kinds of transactions. This statutorily guaranteed privacy and ARTURO D. BRION
secrecy effectively negate a conclusion that the transaction was done Associate Justice
publicly or with the intent to use the alias publicly.

The enactment of R.A. No.9160, on the other hand, is a significant

development only because it clearly manifests that prior to its enactment,
numbered accounts or anonymous accounts were permitted banking
transactions, whether they be allowed by law or by a mere banking
regulation. To be sure, an indictment against Estrada using this relatively
recent law cannot be maintained without violating the constitutional
prohibition on the enactment and use of ex post facto laws. 38

We hasten to add that this holistic application and interpretation of these

various laws is not an attempt to harmonize these laws. A finding of
commission of the offense punished under CA No. 142 must necessarily rest
on the evidence of the requisites for culpability, as amplified in Ursua. The
application of R.A. No. 1405 is significant only because Estrada’s use of the
alias was pursuant to a transaction that the law considers private or, at the
very least, where the law guarantees a reasonable expectation of privacy to
the parties to the transactions; it is at this point that R.A. No. 1405
tangentially interfaces with an indictment under CA 142. In this light, there is
no actual frontal clash between CA No. 142 and R.A. No. 1405 that requires
harmonization. Each operates within its own sphere, but must necessarily be
read together when these spheres interface with one another. Finally, R.A.
No. 9160, as a law of recent vintage in relation to the indictment against
Estrada, cannot be a source or an influencing factor in his indictment.

In finding the absence of the requisite publicity, we simply looked at the

totality of the circumstances obtaining in Estrada’s use of the alias "Jose
Velarde" vis-à-vis the Ursua requisites. We do not decide here whether
Estrada’s use of an alias when he occupied the highest executive position in
the land was valid and legal; we simply determined, as the Sandiganbayan
did, whether he may be made liable for the offense charged based on the
evidence the People presented. As with any other accused, his guilt must be
based on the evidence and proof beyond reasonable doubt that a finding of
criminal liability requires. If the People fails to discharge this burden, as they
did fail in this case, the rule of law requires that we so declare. We do so now
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 162187 November 18, 2005

CRISTE B. VILLANUEVA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and HORST-KESSLER VON
SPRENGEISEN, Respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 76999 dismissing the petition
for certiorari assailing the finding of the Secretary of Justice that no probable
cause exists against private respondent Horst-Kessler Von Sprengeisen for
perjury.

The Antecedents

On April 2, 1996, the Refractories Corporation of the Philippines (RCP) filed a

protest before the Special Committee on Anti-Dumping of the Department of
Finance against certain importations of Hamburg Trading Corporation (HTC),
a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines.
The matter involved 151.070 tons of magnesite-based refractory bricks from
Germany.2 The case was docketed as Anti-Dumping Case No. I-98.

The protest was referred to the Bureau of Import Services (BIS) of the
Department of Trade and Industry, to determine if there was a prima
facie case for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7843, the Anti-Dumping
Law. Sometime in February 1997, the BIS submitted its report to the Tariff
Commission, declaring that a prima facie case existed and that continued
importation of refractory bricks from Germany would harm the local industry.
It adopted the amount of DM 1,200 per metric ton as the normal value of the
imported goods.3

The HTC received a copy of the said report on February 14, 1997. However,
before it could respond, the chairman of the Tariff Commission prodded the
parties to settle the matter amicably. A conference ensued between RCP
Senior Vice President and Assistant General Manager Criste Villanueva and
Republic of the Philippines Jesus Borgonia, on the one hand, and HTC President and General Manager
SUPREME COURT Horst-Kessler Von Sprengeisen and Sales Manager Dennis Gonzales, on the
other. During the conference, the parties agreed that the refractory bricks
were imported by the HTC at a price less than its normal value of DM 1,200,
and that such importation was likely to injure the local industry. The parties BY THE PROTESTANT IN THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT WITHOUT
also agreed to settle the case to avoid expenses and protracted litigation. THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT OF THE PROTESTEE.9
HTC was required to reform its price policy/structure of its importation and
sale of refractory bricks from Germany to conform to the provisions of R.A. The motion was verified by Von Sprengeisen. The HTC averred therein that
No. 7843 and its rules and regulations. Jesus Borgonio thereafter prepared Villanueva violated Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code when he
and signed a compromise agreement containing the terms agreed upon surreptitiously inserted the phrase "based on the findings of the BIS" in the
which Villanueva and Borgonia signed. 4 Bienvenido Flores, an Office Clerk of agreement without the knowledge and consent of Von Sprengeisen and
RCP, delivered the agreement to HTC at the 9th Floor of Ramon Magsaysay despite their agreement to put behind them the findings of the BIS. Appended
Center Building, 1680 Roxas Boulevard, Manila by Von Sprengeisen’s to the motion was an Affidavit of Merit executed by Von Sprengeisen in which
approval.5 he alleged, inter alia, that sometime in February 1997, the BIS came out with
its Report declaring that the normal value of the magnesite-based refractory
However, Von Sprengeisen did not sign the agreement. Borgonia revised the bricks was DM 1,200 per metric ton; before
agreement by inserting the phrase "based on the findings of the BIS" in HTC could respond to the report, Villanueva invited him to a conference for
paragraph 1 thereof. Villanueva and Borgonia signed the agreement and had the purpose of finding the best solution to the pending case before the
the same delivered to the office of HTC on April 22, 1997 by Lino M. Commission; he and Gonzales attended the meeting during which it was
Gutierrez, a technical assistant of RCP. Gonzales received the agreement agreed, by way of a compromise, that the parties will accept the amount of
and delivered the same to Von Sprengeisen. After 20 minutes, Gonzales DM 1,050 per metric ton as the normal value for all magnesite-based
returned, with the agreement already signed by Von Sprengeisen. 6 Gonzales, refractory bricks from Germany; when he received the draft of the
who had also signed, then gave it to Gutierrez. On the same day, Notary compromise agreement prepared by Villanueva, he approved the same;
Public Zenaida P. De Zuñiga notarized the agreement. 7 Gonzales delivered a subsequently, Villanueva transmitted a compromise agreement already
copy of the notarized Agreement to HTC.8 signed by him to Von Sprengeisen for his review, approval and signature;
believing that the compromise agreement reproduced the contents of the first
RCP submitted the compromise agreement to the Tariff Commission. During compromise agreement, he signed the second agreement without reading it;
the May 9, 1997 hearing before the Commission for the approval of the when he received, on March 4, 1998, a copy of the decision of the Tariff
agreement, a representative of HTC appeared. He offered no objection to the Commission based on the compromise agreement of the parties wherein the
Agreement. The Commission submitted its report to the Special Committee committee adopted the findings and recommendations of the BIS (that the
which rendered a decision declaring that, based on the findings of the BIS, normal value of the shipment was DM 1,200 per metric ton), he was shocked
the normal value of the imported refractory bricks was DM 1,200 per metric because he never agreed to the use of such findings for the reformation of its
ton. HTC received a copy of the decision on March 4, 1998. Neither RCP nor price policies; there was, in fact, an agreement between him and Villanueva
HTC appealed the decision to the Court of Tax Appeals. to put behind them the findings of the BIS; he called up Villanueva at his
office but failed to contact him despite several attempts; suspecting that
something amiss happened, he had the draft of the first compromise
In the meantime, HTC imported refractory bricks from Germany anew and
agreement retrieved but his secretary failed to locate the same; it was only
noted that the normal value of the said importation under the decision of the
sometime later that his secretary found the folder-file containing the draft and
Special Committee based on the BIS report was DM 1,200 per metric ton. On
was appalled to discover that Villanueva had substantially altered the first
July 28, 1998, the HTC filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside and/or Vacate
draft of the compromise agreement; this made him conclude and confirm his
Judgment with the Special Committee on Anti-Dumping, praying that such
suspicion that Villanueva, thru deceit and fraud, induced him to sign the
decision be declared null and void on the following grounds:
compromise agreement to the prejudice of the HTC. 10
1. THE FRAUD HAD BEEN COMMITTED BY THE PROTESTANT DURING
The RCP opposed the motion. But, in a parallel move, Villanueva, in his
THE NEGOTIATION FOR THE PREPARATION OF THE COMPROMISE
capacity as Senior Vice President and Assistant General Manager of RCP,
AGREEMENT.
filed a criminal complaint for perjury against Von Sprengeisen in the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Manila. Appended thereto was a complaint-affidavit
2. THAT INSERTIONS AND/OR SUBSTITUTION OF THE FACTS NOT executed by Villanueva wherein he declared, inter alia, that Von Sprengeisen
AGREED UPON WAS DELIBERATELY AND SURREPTITIOUSLY MADE made the following false statements in the Urgent Motion, thus:
a. [Complainant] was the one who called up his office, inviting him to a agreement because he and Villanueva were at odds on the BIS finding the
meeting for the purpose of finding the best and most equitable solution to the normal price of the goods was DM 1,200 per metric ton. He insisted that it
case (p. 3, Urgent Motion); would have been senseless of him to agree to such insertion; as such, he did
not make any willful and deliberate assertion of any falsehood as to any
b. RCP and Hamburg Trading agreed to put behind them the findings and material fact.13
recommendations of the Bureau of Import Services (BIS) with respect to the
anti-dumping protest filed by RCP (p. 3, Urgent Motion); Investigating Prosecutor Francisco G. Supnet found no probable cause for
perjury against the private respondent and recommended the dismissal of the
c. The original version of the Compromise Agreement sent to him was merely complaint. Second Assistant City Prosecutor Leoncia Dimagiba reviewed the
a draft (p. 3, Urgent Motion); resolution of Prosecutor Supnet and found probable cause for perjury against
the private respondent for alleging in his Affidavit of Merit
that he was induced to sign the compromise agreement through fraud and
d. The phrase "based on the findings of the Bureau of Import Services" was
deceit. According to the Second Assistant City Prosecutor, the allegation of
inserted in paragraph 1 of the final Compromise Agreement without his
the private respondent "thru deceit and fraud to sign the final Compromise
knowledge and consent (p. 3, Urgent Motion); and
Agreement" was a deliberate assertion of a falsehood, designed as it was
merely to give the BIS the impression that private respondent was misled into
e. [Complainant] was the one who surreptitiously inserted the aforesaid agreeing to the compromise agreement. She further opined that the
phrase (p. 3, Urgent Motion).11 allegation was perjurious, considering that the private respondent had
sufficient time to pass upon the Compromise Agreement and could have
Villanueva also alleged that Von Sprengeisen made the following false availed the services of legal minds who could review the terms and
statements in his Affidavit of Merit: conditions thereof before signing the same;14 hence, she recommended the
reversal of Prosecutor Supnet’s resolution and the filing of the information.
a. [Complainant] invited him to a conference for the purpose of finding the The City Prosecutor approved the recommendation of the Second Assistant
best solution to the case; City Prosecutor. Accordingly, an Information for perjury was filed against the
private respondent with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila.
b. [Complainant and he] agreed to put behind [them] the findings and
recommendation of the BIS submitted to the Secretary of Finance; The private respondent appealed the resolution to the Secretary of Justice,
who reversed the resolution of the City Prosecutor on September 20, 2002.
c. We agreed to the amount of DM 1,050/ton as the normal value for all According to the Justice Secretary, the complainant failed to establish the
magnesite-based refractory bricks from Germany; materiality of the alleged false assertions and that the said assertions were
willful and deliberate. Moreover, the allegations in the Affidavit of Merit are
not altogether false since the intention of the parties in executing the
d. The original version of the Compromise Agreement sent to him was merely
compromise agreement was precisely to put behind the ruling of the BIS,
a draft; and
despite which the complainant inserted the condition that the parties would
be bound by such findings and recommendations. 15 The decretal portion of
e. Through deceit and fraud, [complainant] induced [respondent] to sign the the resolution reads:
final Compromise Agreement.12
WHEREFORE, the appealed resolution of the City Prosecutor of Manila is
In his Counter-Affidavit, Von Sprengeisen averred that whoever called the hereby REVERSED. The City Prosecutor is directed to withdraw the
other for a conference was not a material matter. Since the first draft of the information for perjury against respondent Horst-Kessler von Sprengeisen
Compromise Agreement transmitted to him was by fax, he asked the and to report the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
complainant to send to him the hard copy of the Agreement for his signature.
He further narrated that when he received the hard copy of the compromise
SO ORDERED.16
agreement, he did not bother to review since he assumed that it contained
the same provisions in the faxed copy. He did not suggest that the phrase
"based on the findings of the BIS" be inserted in the hard copy of the
Villanueva then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the and positive causes; nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based
resolution of the Justice Secretary, alleging therein that grave abuse of on opinion and reasonable belief. It is enough that it is believed that the act
discretion, amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, was committed in or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. He avers that,
issuing the said resolution.17 The private respondent, for his part, sought the contrary to the claim of the private respondent in his Affidavit of Merit, the
dismissal of the petition alleging that, as found by the Justice Secretary, there meeting between him and Jesus Borgonio, on the one hand, and the private
was no probable cause against him for perjury.18 respondent and HTC Sales Manager Dennis Gonzales, on the other, was
arranged by the latter and not by him. As gleaned from the draft and final
On February 13, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the copies of the compromise agreement, the parties made express reference to
resolution of the Justice Secretary.19 the prima facie findings of the BIS that the actual export price of HTC was
below the fair market value. By agreeing that such findings of the BIS be
included in the Compromise Agreement, the said private respondent
The CA declared that, as posited by the Office of the Solicitor General in its
impliedly agreed to such findings as basis of the price for which HTC would
comment on the petition, the parties had agreed to put behind them the
sell the German-made magnesite-based refractory bricks in the Philippines.
findings and recommendations of the BIS with respect to the anti-dumping
The petitioner avers that the fact that the amount of DM 1,050 per metric ton
protest. The appellate court stated that its finding is buttressed by the fact
was not specifically mentioned in the compromise agreement was of no
that the amount of DM 1,050 was not mentioned in the first compromise
importance, considering the parties’ acceptance of such findings is based on
agreement and that, under such agreement, the HTC obliged itself "to reform
R.A. No. 7843. He points out that the private respondent could not have
its pricing policy and structure with respect to refractory products being
failed to notice the difference between the first draft and the final copy of the
imported to and sold in the Philippines in accordance with the provisions of
agreement before signing it because, as alleged by Lino Gutierrez in his reply
R.A. No. 7843 and its implementing rules and requirements." The CA
affidavit, it took the private respondent twenty minutes or so after receiving
emphasized that it was inclined to believe that there was no meeting of the
the agreement to review the final draft before signing it. Moreover, the Urgent
minds of the parties when the petitioner inserted the phrase "based on the
Motion to Set Aside and/or Vacate Judgment signed by the private
findings of the BIS" in the revised compromise agreement; hence, there
respondent was filed more than 15 months from the execution of the
could not have been perjury when the private respondent executed the
compromise agreement and after four months from the Tariff Commission’s
Affidavit of Merit and the Urgent Motion to Set Aside and/or Vacate
approval thereof.
Judgment. The CA also agreed with the findings of the Secretary of Justice
that the insertion of the condition in the compromise agreement that the
parties would be bound by the BIS findings and recommendation gave the The petitioner argues that it is incredible that during the interregnum of 19
private respondent reason to believe that he was deceived by the petitioner months, the private respondent failed to discover the revisions/insertions in
into signing the Agreement; as such, the private respondent’s allegation in the final draft of the compromise agreement. Considering the premises, the
his Affidavit of Merit, that he was induced to signing the Compromise petitioner submits, the private respondent’s filing of the Urgent Motion for and
Agreement through fraud and deceit, was not altogether false. Consequently, in behalf of HTC was merely an afterthought, to enable the latter to escape
the CA ruled, the private respondent did not make any willful and deliberate compliance with the terms and conditions of the Agreement.
assertion of a falsehood.20 The appellate court conformed to the disquisitions
of the Secretary of Justice in the assailed resolution and concluded that the The petitioner further insists that the insertion of the contested phrase in the
private respondent did not, in the Affidavit of Merit, make a willful and final draft of the compromise agreement was necessary although it may not
deliberate assertion of a falsehood.21 be in the best interest of HTC. He posits that the falsehoods made by the
private respondent in his Urgent Motion and Affidavit of Merit were material to
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court the proceedings in the Anti-Dumping Office of the Tariff Commission because
against private respondent Von Sprengeisen and the Secretary of Justice, these were used to set aside the compromise agreement executed by the
insisting that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to parties.
excess or lack of jurisdiction in dismissing the petition and affirming the
assailed resolution. In his Comment on the petition, the private respondent avers that the issues
raised by the petitioner are factual, hence, improper in a petition for
The petitioner maintains that, during the preliminary investigation, he review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The determination of
adduced substantial evidence to prove probable cause for perjury against the the existence of a probable cause is primarily an administrative sanction of
private respondent. He maintains that probable cause does not mean actual the Secretary of Justice. He insists that the findings of the Justice Secretary
should be accorded great respect, especially since the same were upheld by The determination of its existence lies within the discretion of the prosecuting
the CA. He asserts that the petitioner failed to establish in the CA and in this officers after conducting a preliminary investigation upon complaint of an
Court that the Justice Secretary committed a grave abuse of discretion offended party.24 The Resolution of the Secretary of Justice declaring the
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in her resolution. absence or existence of a probable cause affirmed by the CA is accorded
high respect. However, such finding may be nullified where grave abuse of
The petition has no merit. discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is established. 25

The pivotal issue in this case is factual – whether or not, based on the Perjury is defined and penalized in Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code,
records, there was probable cause for the private respondent’s indictment for thus:
perjury.
Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation.
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that only questions of fact may be The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in
raised in a petition for review on certiorari. Findings of facts of a quasi-judicial its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who, knowingly
agency, as affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive on the Court, unless making untruthful statements and not being included in the provisions of the
cogent facts and circumstances of such a nature warranting the modification next preceding articles, shall testify under oath or make an affidavit upon any
or reversal of the assailed decision were ignored, misunderstood or material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath
misinterpreted. Thus, the Court may delve into and resolve factual issues in in cases in which the law so requires.
exceptional cases. The petitioner has failed to establish that any such
circumstance is present in the case at bar.22 Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath,
shall commit any of the falsehoods mentioned in this and the three preceding
The Court finds that the public respondent did not commit any grave abuse of articles of this section shall suffer the respective penalties provided therein.
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
resolution, and that the CA did not commit any reversible error in its assailed Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration may affect the earnest
decision and resolution. If at all the public respondent erred in issuing the concerns of the parties before a tribunal. The felony is consummated when
assailed resolution, such is merely an error in the exercise of jurisdiction, the false statement is made.26
reversible by a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
especially so where, as in this case, the issues before the CA were factual The seminal modern treatment of the history of perjury concludes that one
and not legal. The absence or existence of probable cause in a given case consideration of policy overshadows all others – the measures taken against
involves a calibration and a reexamination of the evidence adduced by the the offense must not be so severe as to discourage aggrieved parties from
parties before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila and the probative lodging complaints or testifying.27 As quoted by Dean Wigmore, a leading
weight thereof. The CA thus ruled correctly when it dismissed the petition 19th Century Commentator, noted that English law, "throws every fence
before it. round a person accused of perjury, for the obligation of protecting witnesses
from oppression or annoyance, by charges, or threats of charges, of having
Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has been made false testimony is far paramount to that of giving even perjury its
defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that deserts."28
a crime has been committed and that the private respondent is probably
guilty thereof. It is such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would Perjury is the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or
lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe or entertain an affirmation administered by authority of law on a material matter. 29 The
honest or strong suspicion that a thing is so. The term does not mean "actual elements of the felony are:
or positive cause;" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on
opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not (a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit
require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a upon a material matter.
conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained
of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception
of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge."23 (b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer,
authorized to receive and administer oath.
(c) That in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and evidence aliunde tending to show perjury independently of the declarations of
deliberate assertion of a falsehood. testimony of the accused.39

(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by The term "material matter" is the main fact subject of the inquiry, or any
law or made for a legal purpose.30 circumstance which tends to prove that fact, or any fact or circumstance
which tends to corroborate or strengthen the testimony related to the subject
A mere assertion of a false objective fact, a falsehood, is not enough. The of the inquiry, or which legitimately affects the credence of any witness who
assertion must be deliberate and willful. 31 Perjury being a felony by dolo, testified. In this case, a matter is material if it has a material effect or
there must be malice on the part of the accused. 32 Willfully means tendency to influence the Commission in resolving the motion of HTC one
intentionally; with evil intent and legal malice, with the consciousness that the way or the other. The effects of the statement are weighed in terms of
alleged perjurious statement is false with the intent that it should be received potentiality rather than probability. 40 The prosecution need not prove that the
as a statement of what was true in fact. It is equivalent to "knowingly." false testimony actually influenced the Commission.41
"Deliberately" implies meditated as distinguished from inadvertent acts. 33 It
must appear that the accused knows his statement to be false or as The private respondent did err when he declared, in the motion of the HTC
consciously ignorant of its truth.34 and his affidavit, that it was the petitioner who invited him to a
conference. The truth of the matter is that it was Gonzales who did so.
Perjury cannot be willful where the oath is according to belief or conviction as Nonetheless, the issue of who called for a conference is of de
to its truth. A false statement of a belief is not perjury. Bona fide belief in the minimis importance because, after all, the parties agreed to meet after having
truth of a statement is an adequate defense. 35 A false statement which is been prodded by the Chairman of the Commission to settle the case instead
obviously the result of an honest mistake is not perjury. of going through the tribulations and expenses of a protracted litigation. No
adverse inference (related to the merits of their respective contention in this
case) can be ascribed as to whoever called the conference. After all, parties
There are two essential elements of proof for perjury: (1) the statement made
are even urged to settle cases amicably.
by the defendants must be proven false; and (2) it must be proven that the
defendant did not believe those statements to be true. 36
Besides, as correctly declared by the Second Assistant City Prosecutor in her
resolution:
Knowledge by the accused of the falsity of his statement is an internal act. It
may be proved by his admissions or by circumstantial evidence. The state of
mind of the accused may be determined by the things he says and does, The allegation that it was complainant who invited respondent to the meeting
from proof of a motive to lie and of the objective falsity itself, and from other may not be a deliberate lie. Respondent may not have known who arranged
facts tending to show that the accused really knew the things he claimed not the meeting, but as he was able to talk to complainant, he presumed that it
to know.37 was complainant who extended the invitation. Moreover, the identity of the
one who initiated the meeting is not material considering that there was a
meeting of the minds of the Parties.42
A conviction for perjury cannot be sustained merely upon the contradictory
sworn statements of the accused. The prosecution must prove which of the
two statements is false and must show the statement to be false by other The Court also agrees with the contention of the private respondent that the
evidence than the contradicting statement. 38 The rationale of this principle is copy of the first agreement transmitted to him was a fax copy of the draft, and
thus: that, contrary to the allegations of the private respondent, such agreement
was prepared by Borgonia and not by the petitioner. As gleaned from page
two of the agreement, the particulars of the residence certificates of the
… Proof that accused has given contradictory testimony under oath at a
petitioner and the private respondent were not typewritten, hence, cannot as
different time will not be sufficient to establish the falsity of testimony charged
yet be notarized. As claimed by the private respondent, a copy was
as perjury, for this would leave simply one oath of the defendant as against
transmitted to him for his personal review, and if he found it to be in order,
another, and it would not appear that the testimony charged was false rather
the petitioner and Borgonia would prepare and sign the agreement and give
than the testimony contradictory thereof. The two statements will simply
it back to him for review and signature, with the particulars of his community
neutralize each other; there must be some corroboration of the contradictory
tax certificate indicated in the final copy.
testimony. Such corroboration, however, may be furnished by
Undeniably, the identity of the person who prepared or caused to prepare the on the amount recommended by the BIS (DM 1,200) while the private
compromise agreement subsequently signed by the petitioner and the private respondent insisted on DM 950. There was an impasse. By way of a
respondent was of prime importance because only such person should be compromise, the parties agreed to do away with the BIS recommended base
charged for perjury. The private respondent erroneously stated in his Affidavit value and agreed for HTC to base the normal value of the importation per
of Merit and Urgent Motion that it was the petitioner who prepared the metric ton under R.A. No. 7843 and the rules issued implementing the law.
agreement that was signed by the parties. It turned out that it was Borgonia This is gleaned from the affidavit of Borgonia:
who prepared the first and the second copies. However, the private
respondent cannot be held liable for perjury since it was Borgonia who 13. During the meeting, Mr. von Sprengeisen suggested that the value of DM
prepared the agreement and not the petitioner. The Court agrees with the 1,050/ton be applied as the price at which Hamburg Trading would sell
following contention of the private respondent in his counter-affidavit: German-made magnesite-based refractory bricks in the Philippines. Mr.
Villanueva did not agree to the suggested value, as we considered it low. In
4.6 While complainant claims that it was not he but Mr. Borgonia who made the end, both parties decided to base the determination of the price on the
the insertions, there is no doubt that, indeed, the insertions were made into provisions of Republic Act No. 7843 and its implementing rules and
the document. Since complainant is the signatory to the Compromise regulations. …44
Agreement, it is but natural for one to presume that he had made the
insertions. At the same time, I can not be expected to know that it was Mr. Borgonia prepared the first compromise agreement and incorporated therein
Borgonia, as claimed by complainant, who made such insertions. 43 the agreement of the petitioner and the private respondent arrived at during
the conference, thus:
Indeed, Borgonia was merely the Manager of the Management Information
Group of RCP, whereas the petitioner was no less than its Senior Vice 1. For the purpose of buying peace and by way of concession in order to end
President and Assistant General Manager, Borgonia’s superior. Unless and litigation, the SECOND PARTY undertakes and commits to reform its pricing
until approved by the petitioner, any agreement prepared by Borgonia was policy and structure with respect to refractory products being imported
merely a piece of paper, barren of any legal effect. In this case, the interest sold in the Philippines in accordance with the provisions of Republic
compromise agreement prepared by Borgonia had the petitioner’s Act 7843 and its implementing rules and regulations.45
imprimatur. Borgonia was merely a witness to the agreement. For all legal
intents and purposes, the petitioner had the compromise agreement If, as claimed by the petitioner in his Affidavit-Complaint, he and the private
prepared under his supervision and control. It cannot thus be concluded that respondent had agreed that HTC will use as basis for its price policy and
the private respondent made a deliberate falsehood when he alleged that the structural revision, the BIS report, for sure, Borgonia would have incorporated
agreement was prepared by the petitioner. the said agreement in the first compromise agreement. He did not, and
Borgonia has not offered any explanation for such failure. The petitioner
The Court is not persuaded by the petitioner’s claim that, during the signed the draft of the agreement without any plaint or revision. It was only in
conference, he and the private respondent agreed that, based on the BIS the second compromise agreement that was later signed by the petitioner
report, the normal value of the imported refractory bricks per metric ton was and the private respondent that Borgonia incorporated the phrase
DM 1,200, and that such report would be used as basis for the revision of the "based on the findings of the BIS." Borgonia and the petitioner made the
price policy and structure of HTC. insertion on their own, without the a priori consent of the private respondent.

It bears stressing that, during the conference, the petitioner and the private The Court is not convinced by the petitioner’s contention (and that of
respondent had agreed on three aspects of the case: (1) based on the prima Borgonia in his Affidavit) that the petitioner and the private respondent had
facie findings of the BIS, the normal value of the goods per meter ton was agreed to leave the final determination of the base value or price of
DM 1,200 and that the actual export price of HTC was below the fair market importation per metric ton to a third party (BIS). The private respondent could
value; (2) to terminate the case, HTC will have to adjust and revise its price not have agreed to the use of the BIS report because, as mentioned, he had
policy and structure for imported refractory bricks to conform to R.A. No. strenuously objected to its use as basis for the revision of its price policy and
7843 and rules and regulations implementing the law; and (3) if HTC fails or structure. For HTC to admit that the BIS finding of DM 1,200 per metric ton
refuses to comply with its undertaking, RCP will be entitled to a writ of was the normal value of the refractory bricks from Germany for the purpose
execution without need of demand. However, the petitioner and the private of resolving the anti-dumping case is one thing; but for HTC to agree to be
respondent could not have agreed on such base price; the petitioner insisted
bound by the BIS recommendation for the purpose of revising its price policy and the rules and regulations implementing the same to determine the base
and structure is completely a different matter. price for the revision of the price policy and structure of HTC.

With the petitioner and the private respondent’s admission of the prima Admittedly, the respondent did not object to the offending phrase before and
facie findings of the BIS, the Commission can prepare its recommendation to after signing the agreement and for a considerable stretch period until HTC
the Special Committee on the protest of the RCP to the HTC importation filed its motion. However, we do not agree with the contention of the
subject of the case. Thereafter: petitioner that such failure of the respondent to object to the offending phrase
for such period of time amounted to an admission that, indeed, the private
D. The Special Committee shall, within fifteen (15) days after receipt of the respondent was aware of the offending phrase in the Agreement, and to his
report of the Commission, decide whether the article in question is being agreement thereto; and estopped the private respondent from alleging that
imported in violation of this section and shall give due notice of such he was deceived by the petitioner into signing the Compromise Agreement.
decision. In case the decision of dumping is in the affirmative, the special In his appeal to the DOJ, the private respondent declared that:
committee shall direct the Commissioner of Customs to cause the dumping
duty, to be levied, collected and paid, as prescribed in this section, in addition 3.9 True, respondent-appellant may have been remiss and lacking in
to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on such article, and circumspect in failing to review the hard copy Compromise Agreement and
on the articles of the same specific kind or class subsequently imported notice the insertion. Being in the trading business, respondent-appellant
under similar circumstances coming from the specific country. personally handles hundreds of documents daily and is on the telephone for
most of the day communicating with suppliers and customers. And he had no
In the event that the Special Committee fails to decide within the period reason to believe that either complainant-appellee or Mr. Borgonia would
prescribed herein, the recommendation of the Commission shall be deemed make such an insertion, especially after respondent-appellant had accepted
approved and shall be final and executory. 46 the fax Compromise Agreement wording and conveyed such acceptance to
complainant-appellee’s office. Respondent-appellant also had to reason to
even think that such a surreptitious insertion would be made; after all, he had
On the matter of the revision or adjustment of the price policy and structure of
a very warm and friendly meeting with complainant-appellee and Mr.
HTC, the parties had agreed to accomplish the same in due time. It goes
Borgonia and came out of it with a feeling that he could trust complainant-
without saying that the RCP retained the right to object to or protest to the
appellee (p. 4, Annex "C").
price policy and structure revision of HTC.

3.10 Hence, when respondent-appellant alleges that he was induced to sign

The agreement of the petitioner and the private respondent not to be bound
the hard copy Compromise Agreement through fraud and deceit, respondent-
by the base value in the BIS report for the revision of its price policy and
appellant honestly believes that he was misled into signing it. He was misled
structure is not unexpected because: (1) the findings of the BIS are
by the fact that he had been sent the fax Compromise Agreement by
only prima facie, meaning to say, not conclusive, and HTC was accorded a
complainant-appellee, that he had conveyed its acceptability to complainant-
chance to base its price policy and structure on evidence and informations
appellee and now requested for the hard copy for execution, that he had
other than those contained in the BIS report; (2) the normal value of the
been led to trust that the findings and recommendation of the BIS were being
imported refractory bricks may fluctuate from time to time, hence, the need
put behind them and that complainant-appellee had agreed to such a
for any importer to revise its price policy and structure from time to time; and
compromise. The transmittal of the hard copy Compromise Agreement,
(3) the base value to be used by HTC in revising its price policy would be
without any notice or mention by complainant-appellee or complainant-
scrutinized and resolved initially by the Commission, by the Special
appellee’s office that it contained
Committee and by the Court of Tax Appeals on appeal.
insertions or wording different from the fax Compromise Agreement, and on
respondent-appellant’s understanding that the wording of the hard copy
The process agreed upon by the petitioner and the private respondent was Compromise Agreement would be exactly the same as the fax Compromise
not only practical and fair, but in accord with law as well. Agreement, constitutes the fraud or deceit allegedly by respondent-
appellant.47
In fine, the private respondent did not commit any falsehood in the Urgent
Motion and his Affidavit of Merit when he declared that he and the In his rejoinder-affidavit, the private respondent explained that:
petitioner put behind them the BIS report, and agreed to use R.A. No. 7843
2. Again, contrary to the allegations in the Reply-Affidavits, I was unable to
review the Compromise Agreement delivered by Mr. Gutierrez on 22 April
1997 as I was busy with numerous calls and business at the time it was
Republic of the Philippines
delivered. Also, I had been led to believe in our meetings with Mr. Villanueva
SUPREME COURT
and Mr. Borgonia that I could trust them. So, after having seen the fax
Compromise Agreement and being amenable to it, I trusted that they would
send a genuine hard copy. As it turned out, I was mistaken. 48 SECOND DIVISION

Moreover, even before filing the Urgent Motion and signing the Affidavit of G.R. No. 139984. March 31, 2005
Merit, the private respondent tried for several times to contact the petitioner,
but the latter failed to return his calls. This reinforced the suspicion of the LEOPOLDO OANI, Petitioners,
private respondent that the insertion of the offending phrase was not, after vs.
all, inadvertent but deliberate, calculated to deceive him to the prejudice of PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
HTC. The private respondent may be blamed for putting too much trust and
confidence on the petitioner, but he certainly cannot be indicted for perjury for DECISION
lack of probable cause.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The petitioner failed to append to his petition records of the Commission that
the private respondent appeared for HTC, on May 9, 1997, before the During the school year 1988-1989, the Panabo High School in Panabo,
Commission for the hearing on the Compromise Agreement; and showing Davao del Norte, headed by its Principal, Leopoldo Oani, implemented the
that the private respondent did not object thereto. free secondary school program of the government. During the period of
November 1, 1988 to December 31, 1989, the high school received the
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of amount of ₱648,532.00 from the Department of Education, Culture and
merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. Sports (DECS) for Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE). 1 Of
76999 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner. the said amount, ₱551,439.13 was earmarked for the purchase of various
supplies, materials and equipment.2
SO ORDERED.
On March 1, 1990, the DECS Secretary received a letter 3 from the Parents
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Teachers Association of the Panabo High School regarding the investigation
of Principal Oani and Bonifacio Roa, the Resident Auditor regarding, among
Associate Justice other things, the alleged overpricing of 12 fire extinguishers for ₱15,000.00
each. The Regional Office of the COA then issued Assignment Order No. 90-
137 dated March 2, 1990 to a team of auditors, composed of Jaime P.
Naranjo, as Chairman, and Bienvenido Presilda and Carmencita Enriquez,
as members. The team had the following tasks:

To determine whether the MOOE Funds of the Panabo High School,

particularly for supplies, materials and equipment were utilized and/or
expended in accordance with existing laws, rules and regulations.

Specific Objectives:

1. To be able to identify losses of funds resulting from fraudulent

transactions.
2. To be able to determine the following: manufacture and refill stored pressure type (Light Pink only) mono-
ammonium phosphate for ABC fires.6
a) Existence of fraud.
On June 27, 1989, Oani approved Purchase Order No. 2 7 for nine units of fire
b) Extent of fraud committed. extinguishers and requested Powerline to deliver the supplies. Upon delivery
thereof, Oani approved a disbursement voucher 8 in favor of the supplier for
the amount of ₱54,747.00. The supplier acknowledged receipt of the said
c) Method or means by which fraud was committed.
amount through check.9.
d) Persons liable.4
The members of the Audit Team that conducted a re-canvass for fire
extinguishers of the same brand and features as those supplied by Cunanan
The team gathered information based on interviews of the persons involved, discovered that each unit could be purchased for only ₱2,970.00, inclusive of
including Oani and Roa, and other school personnel. They also secured 10% allowance. The purchase of the nine units of fire extinguishers was,
documents from government agencies and private entities to verify the thus, overpriced by ₱23,040.00.10
purchase and delivery of fire extinguishers, as well as office and school
supplies to the high school which were charged against the MOOE. They,
Oani had also approved a Requisition and Issue Voucher for a set of Stereo
likewise, conducted ocular inspections of other business establishments in
Amplifier and components described therein, thus:
connection with the said purchases.

The team discovered that on June 23, 1989, Oani had approved a Quantity Article
Requisition and Issue Voucher5 for the acquisition of 15 units of fire 1 set Stereo Amplifier –
extinguishers for the use of the high school as mandated by Presidential
Decree No. 1185, also known as the Fire Code of the Philippines. The Consisting of the [ff]:
supplies are described in the voucher as follows:   1 unit Sound Research
SR 100A 200 Watts
Quantity Unit Article
15 Units 10 lbs. capacity 1 unit Sound Research 6
powerline fire Mic. Mixer
extinquisher ABC
Tri-Class dry 1 set 12" 3-Way Speaker
chemical System

general purpose – 1 unit Radio Cassette –

BRAND NEW - Portable
    In compliance with
PD 1185 known as 1 unit Phono – Magnetic
Fire Code of the
Philippines. 2 units Microphone &
Microphone Stand w/
The amount of ₱55,000.00 was certified as available for the purpose. Instead Holder
of conducting a public bidding, Oani decided to purchase the fire 3 pieces Electrical Bell 8-10 inches
extinguishers from the Powerline Manufacturing Industry (Powerline, for diameter11
brevity) for ₱54,747.00. Powerline was owned by Francisco Cunanan and
had its business address at Km. 5, Carnation St., Buhangin, Davao City. The
Separate invitations to bid were sent to ASM Enterprise, Edwin Marketing
enterprise was authorized by the Department of Trade and Industry to
and RS Marketing,12 which submitted their bids to the Awards Committee
composed of Oani, as Chairman, and Domingo Pintongan, Mercita Jayoma the performance of their official functions, committing the offense in relation
and Roa as members. The contract was awarded to ASM Marketing. 13 to their office and conspiring and confederating with each other, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, criminally and with evident bad faith cause undue
On December 28, 1989, Oani approved a Purchase Order 14 for a complete injury to the Government in the following manner: in the purchase of nine (9)
set of amplifiers for the price of ₱35,650.00 and requested the ASM fire extinguishers for the Panabo High School, accused deliberately
Marketing to deliver the merchandise. As per Oani’s request, Arlene disregarded the requirements on public bidding by allowing the forms such
Lomugdang, the accounting clerk of the school, issued a Certification that the as Request for Quotations and Canvass to be accomplished by the winning
amount of ₱35,650.00 was available for the said expense. 15 bidder notwithstanding the fact that no canvass was made at all, as [a] result
of which the nine (9) fire extinguishers were purchased from Powerline
Company at the total price of ₱54,747.00, although the real amount of such
Check No. 095751 was drawn against the MOOE for ₱35,650.00 in payment
fire extinguishers and which was supposed to have been paid was only
of the said supplies and was remitted to the ASM Marketing, after the
₱2,560.00 per unit or ₱23,040.00 in all, thereby causing undue injury to the
disbursement voucher16 for the said amount was approved by Oani.
government in the amount of THIRTY-ONE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
PESOS (₱31,700.00), Philippine Currency.
Canvass forms were distributed to business enterprises, including Red Lion
Marketing for the purchase of office supplies. The contract was awarded to
CONTRARY TO LAW.19
Red Lion Marketing for the price of ₱61,912.35. The office supplies were
delivered to the school, after which Oani approved the disbursement voucher
for the said amount which was drawn against the MOOE. 17 The supplier The other Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 18886, reads:
thereafter received payment thereon.
That on or about the month of December 1989, in the Municipality of Panabo,
In a separate transaction, Oani again approved the purchase of office Province of Davao del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
supplies chargeable against the MOOE. The contract was awarded to the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, both public officers,
Red Lion Marketing for ₱111,912.35. The supplies were delivered by Red LEOPOLDO OANI being then the Secondary School Principal and
Lion Marketing to the high school per Sales Invoice Nos. 486, 487, 488 and BONIFACIO ROA being then the Resident Auditor, both of Panabo High
489 on March 10, 1989. Oani approved Disbursement Voucher No. 101- School, Davao del Norte, while in the performance of their official functions,
8903-01718 in favor of Red Lion Marketing for the said amount. Payment for committing the offense in relation to their office, and conspiring and
the merchandise was, likewise, received by the supplier. confederating with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
criminally and through evident bad faith cause undue injury to the
Government in the following manner: in the purchase of sound equipment,
The Auditing Team conducted a review of the prices of the stereo set and
supplies and materials for the Panabo High School, accused deliberately
school and office supplies, and discovered that they could be purchased for
disregarded the requirements on public bidding by allowing the forms such
only ₱144,621.51 instead of the ₱227,857.45 paid by the school. The
as Request for Quotations and Canvass to be accomplished by the winning
Auditing Team recommended the filing of administrative and criminal
bidders themselves notwithstanding the fact that no canvass was made at all,
complaints for violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against Oani and Roa.
as a result of which the sound equipment, office forms and office supplies
were purchased from ASM Marketing and Red Lion Marketing for a total
On March 30, 1993, Informations were filed against Oani and Roa in the price of ₱227,857.45, although the real amount supposed to have been paid
Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019. The was only ₱144,621.51, thus, causing undue injury to the Government in the
accusatory portion of the Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 18885 amount of EIGHTY-THREE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE &
reads: 94/100 pesos (₱83,235.94), Philippine Currency.

That on or about the month of December 1989, and sometime prior or CONTRARY TO LAW.20
subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Panabo, Province of Davao del
Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
Oani admitted that no public bidding was conducted prior to the purchase
above-named accused, both public officers, LEOPOLDO OANI being then
and delivery of the fire extinguishers, but averred that he was authorized to
the Secondary School Principal and BONIFACIO ROA being then the
purchase the same by negotiation because Francisco R. Cunanan, the
Resident Auditor, both of the Panabo High School, Davao del Norte, while in
proprietor of Powerline, submitted a Certification dated "January 1988" The actual period of accused LEOPOLDO E. OANI’s preventive
pursuant to COA Circular No. 91-368 and Article 7, Section 442 of the imprisonment, if any, shall be credited to the service of his sentence.
Government Auditing Rules and Regulations (GARR), stating that the
company is the only authorized and duly-licensed manufacturer and As to accused BONIFACIO ROA y GALINDO, he is hereby ACQUITTED of
exclusive distributor of Powerline fire extinguishers brand, and that no other the crime charged in both Criminal Cases No. 18885 and 18886.
dealer, sub-dealer or distributor was appointed or authorized to sell his major
line products.21 Oani averred that a canvass of prices was done for the Accordingly, the cash bond of the said BONIFACIO ROA posted in both
purchase of the office and school supplies, and that the Bidding Committee cases in the amount of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (₱15,000.00) each, as
awarded the contract to ASM Marketing based on the abstract of bids placed evidenced by O.R. No. 2968083 and O.R. No. 2968084, is hereby ordered
by the suppliers at the scheduled bidding. He then approved the purchase CANCELLED.
orders for the supplies to ASM Marketing which delivered the equipment. The
same procedure was followed for the purchase of the office supplies. He
asserted that the law and the COA procedures were followed in the bidding Considering that the facts from which civil liability against the said Bonifacio
process and the purchase of school and office supplies. Roa might arise did not exist, no civil liability is imposed against him.

Oani further averred that the trial court erred in relying solely on the Audit The Honorable Commissioner, CID, is hereby ordered to CANCEL the name
Report of the auditing team. He asserted that it was not his duty to check of BONIFACIO ROA y GALINDO from his Commission‘s Hold Departure List,
whether those participating in the bidding were bona fide dealers. As long as if any.
such bidder could purchase the supplies and materials indicated in the
bidding request and the price is reasonable, there was sufficient basis to With costs against accused LEOPOLDO E. OANI.22
award the contracts. He admitted the possibility that he had made a wrong
assessment of the bidding and canvass, but claimed that he acted in good Oani, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari with
faith. this Court and raised therein the following sole issue:

After trial, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision acquitting Roa, but WHETHER OR NOT THE GUILT OF THE PETITIONER WAS PROVEN
convicting Oani of the crimes charged. The fallo of the decision reads: BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT TO CONVICT HIM OF VIOLATION OF
SEC. 3(e) OF RA 3019, AS AMENDED.23
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered CONVICTING accused
LEOPOLDO E. OANI of the crime[s] charged in both Criminal Cases Nos. We note that the issues raised by the petitioner are factual. Under Rule 45 of
18885 and 18886, his guilt having been proven beyond reasonable doubt. the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised that in a petition for
Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. 18885, Leopoldo E. Oani is hereby review on certiorari. The Court is not a trier of facts; hence, it is not its duty to
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) re-examine and reevaluate the evidence of the parties. Moreover, the
MONTH as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS as maximum, and to suffer findings of facts of the CA or the Sandiganbayan are, as a general rule,
perpetual disqualification from public office. He is ordered to restitute to the conclusive on the Court. And while the Court may entertain and resolve
treasurer of the Panabo National High School the amount of TWENTY- factual issues in exceptional circumstances, 24 the petitioner in this case was
THREE THOUSAND FORTY PESOS (₱23,040.00). unable to establish any such exceptional circumstance.

In Criminal Case No. 18886, Leopoldo E. Oani is hereby sentenced to suffer Indeed, the Court assiduously reviewed the records and found no justification
an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH, as for the modification, much less the reversal of the decision of the trial court.
minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS, as maximum, and to suffer perpetual
disqualification from public office. Also, he is hereby ordered to restitute the The petitioner avers that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of violating
amount of SEVENTY-THREE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SEVENTY- Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 for the purchase of the fire extinguishers
EIGHT PESOS AND SEVENTY-NINE CENTAVOS (₱73,878.79) to the without any public bidding. He maintains that since Powerline was the
treasurer of the Panabo National High School. exclusive manufacturer of the fire extinguishers and had not designated any
dealer or subdealer of its products as evidenced by the Certification of
Cunanan,25 he was justified in dispensing with a public bidding and to Finally, accused Oani failed to present proof that "no suitable substitute can
purchase the fire extinguishers on a negotiated basis with Powerline. be obtained elsewhere at more advantageous terms to the government," as
thus, required by COA Circular 78-84, series of 1978.
The petitioner is wrong.
Indeed, as it turned out, not only was there another manufacturer and refiller
COA Circular No. 78-84 dated August 1, 1978, provides that negotiated of similar type of fire extinguisher and dry chemical used in it in Davao City,
contracts may be entered into where any of the following conditions exist: but more importantly, Systems Products Industries, which was registered and
accredited with the DTI, as evidenced by the said certification of Syvelyn J.
Tan, Regional Director, Region XI, DTI, was selling identical items at
1. Whenever the supplies are urgently needed to meet an emergency which
₱2,700.00 each, as shown by the re-canvass form dated March 13, 1990.
may involve the loss of, or danger to life and/or property;
Crediting to this the 10% allowance authorized under COA Circular No. 85-
55, the total per unit cost is ₱2,970.00. Subtracting this figure from the unit
2. Whenever the supplies to be used in connection with a project or activity cost stated in the Disbursement voucher, which is ₱5,530.00, we get a
which cannot be delayed without causing detriment to the public service; difference of ₱2,560.00, which could have been saved had accused Oani
conducted bidding or canvass, and purchased the nine (9) units of fire
3. Whenever the materials are sold by an exclusive distributor or extinguishers from Systems Products Industries. Consequently, in failing to
manufacturer who does not have subdealers selling at lower prices and for observe the requirements in government purchase, or at least, the diligence
which no suitable substitute can be obtained elsewhere at more which a similarly situated reasonable person would have taken, accused
advantageous terms to the government; Oani caused the Panabo High School and the government to suffer a total
amount of ₱23,040.00, in Criminal Case No. 18885. 27
4. Whenever the supplies under procurement have been unsuccessfully
placed on bid for at least two consecutive times, either due to lack of bidders To extricate himself from administrative and criminal liabilities for his acts and
or the offers received in each instance equipment, the purchase of nine (9) omissions, the petitioner adduced in evidence a Certification purportedly
units fire extinguishers were exhorbitant or non-confirming to specifications; dated "January 1988," that Cunanan was the sole manufacturer/dealer of the
fire extinguishers and had not designated a sub-dealer of his products.
5. In cases where it is apparent that the requisition of the needed supplies However, as declared by the trial court, this certification, which the petitioner
through negotiated purchase is most advantageous to the government as adduced in evidence, exposed his travesty of foisting a falsified document as
determined by the head of agency; evidence, a felony under the last paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised
Penal Code.28 The Certification reads:
6. Whenever the purchase is made from an agency of the government;
January 1988
26
7. Whenever the purchase is made from a foreign government.
CERTIFICATION
None of the foregoing conditions existed when the petitioner purchased the
fire extinguishers on a negotiated basis from Powerline. As Licensed Manufacturer and Exclusive Distributor

The petitioner did not require Cunanan to submit any certification from the TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Department of Trade and Industry that he was the exclusive distributor or
manufacturer of fire extinguishers. Neither did he require Cunanan to certify THIS IS TO CERTIFY that I, MR. FRANCISCO R. CUNANAN, of legal age,
or execute an affidavit that no subdealer had been designated to sell the said Filipino, Proprietor of Powerline Manufacturing Industry, with business
product at a lower price. The petitioner failed to ascertain whether a suitable address located at Km. 5, Carnation St., Buhangin, Davao City, is a duly-
substitute could be obtained elsewhere, under terms more advantageous to licensed Manufacturer and Exclusive Distributor of POWERLINE Fire
the government. It turned out that as declared by the trial court, another Extinguishers, do hereby certify and attest:
business enterprise, Systems Products Industries, was selling the same
brand and specifications at only ₱2,900.00 per unit.
1. THAT, I am the owner and chairman of Powerline Manufacturing Industry Accused Oani submitted for the purpose a Certification dated 10 July 1988
engaged in manufacturing POWERLINE brand fire extinguishers. issued by the Panabo Fire Station, Panabo, Davao and the Certification
dated January 1988, issued by a certain Francisco R. Cunanan, proprietor of
2. THAT, I have not appointed or authorized any dealer, subdealer and Powerline, that the latter is an exclusive distributor of the purchased fire
distributor to promote and sell our major line product, the POWERLINE fire extinguishers and that no subdealer was appointed to sell the same.
extinguishers in Mindanao Area or any parts/ area in the Philippines.
After a careful evaluation of the respective evidences submitted by the
3. THAT, I have in my possession all legal documents proving (sic) my parties on this issue, the Court finds for the People and brushes aside as
Company is the only authorized and duly-licensed manufacturer and incredible the claims of the defense, particularly of the accused Oani. It
exclusive distributor of POWERLINE fire extinguishers brand. appears that the theory of the accused that bidding and canvass may be
dispensed with in view of the exclusiveness of Powerline in the manufacture
and distribution of the purchased fire extinguishers, finds no leg to stand on,
4. THAT, I am executing this certification in (sic) pursuant to Article 7, Section
at the least, or a mere afterthought, at the most. The penultimate paragraph
442 of the Government Auditing Rules & Regulations (GAAM Volume I)
of the said certification of Powerline proprietor, Francisco R. Cunanan,
under COA Circular No. 91-368 governing the procurement from Duly-
states,
licensed Manufacturers and Exclusive Distributors.

"THAT, I am executing this Certification pursuant to Article 7, section 442 of

5FURTHERMORE, I am executing this certification for whatever legal
the Government Auditing Rules & Regulations (GAAM Volume I under COA
purposes it may serve our firm and the undersigned.
Circular No. 91-368 governing the procurement from Duly Licensed
Manufacturers and Exclusive Distributors)."
Powerline Manufacturing Industry
Indeed, the GAAM was implemented by COA Circular No. 91-368. The latter,
By: which was issued on December 19, 1991, provided in the last paragraph
thereof that the GAAM was to take effect on January 1, 1992. The glaring
(Sgd.) inconsistency in the said Certification is that at the time it was issued, i.e.,
on January 1988, the GAAM was not yet in existence. Hence, contrary to the
FRANCISCO R. CUNANAN testimony of accused Oani, the Certification of Mr. Cunanan must have been
issued only after December 19, 1991, the date of issuance of COA Circular
Manufacturer29 No. 91-368, and necessarily, after the publication of the special audit Report
(Exhibit "B").
The Certification is dated "January 1988," making it appear that it had been
issued before the subject fire extinguishers were purchased on June 27, …
1989. However, Cunanan could not have executed the Certification in
January 1988 because paragraph 4 thereof indicates that it was issued Further, had the said certification been the basis of accused Oani in
pursuant to "COA Circular No. 91-368." It bears stressing that COA Circular approving the negotiated purchase, he could have easily presented the same
No. 91-368 was issued only on December 19, 1991, long after Cunanan to the team in the course of their investigation. But quite to the contrary, it
signed the Certification. In fine, Cunanan could not possibly have issued a was not even mentioned in the "management comment" portion of the
certification pursuant to an administrative circular which did not as yet exist. Report, which states:
Hence, no such certification was issued on June 27, 1989, the most plausible
explanation being that it was executed and signed by Cunanan only after "Management Comments:"
December 19, 1991. Besides, the petitioner never submitted the certification
when the auditing team conducted its investigation. If the certification was "When the Principal of the Panabo High School was made to comment on
indeed issued as early as January 1988, the petitioner should have submitted this particular finding, he submitted a written justification that the purchase of
the same to the auditing team. The trial court saw through the petitioner’s the fire extinguishers was made due to the persuasion of the Resident
chicanery and declared in its decision: Auditor assigned in that agency. As per his letter, he contended that the
purchase of the said equipment was done only and after being recommended The significance of the testimony and affidavit of state witness Edilberto
by the Resident Auditor." Lacdao regarding the purchase of the sound system, can hardly be ignored.
As property custodian and teacher of Panabo High School before and during
… the purchase and delivery of the sound system, subject of the Sales Invoice
dated December 29, 1989 in the amount of ₱35,690.00, his personal
knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the acquisition cannot be
The records are bereft of even the slightest suggestion of any ill-motive on
doubted, there being no showing to the contrary. Thus, the portion of his
the part of the team, which would justify Us to suspect that the members of
Affidavit dated March 10, 1990, which was the basis of his testimony, states:
the team maliciously omitted to consider such an important document
constituting the defense of the accused. Thus,
"That I and Mr. Paculangan, teacher, Panabo High School, Panabo, Davao
prepared the RIV for the following:
…

a. 1 unit amplifier 200 watts

Otherwise stated, accused Oani cannot have Us believe that Exhibit "2,"
which made reference to COA Circular No. 91-368 issued only on December
19, 1991, was already existing at the time the nine (9) fire extinguishers were b. 2 units electric bell
bought way back in 1989. Now, in the absence of a certification of
"exclusivity," it would be grossly negligent, if not naivete on the part of c. 1 unit trumpa-loudspeaker
accused Oani, to rely on the verbal representations of the Powerline
Manufacturer. Besides, this certification was an indispensable documentary d. 2 units megaphone
support in the approval of the disbursement voucher considering that the
transaction was a mere exception to the general requirement of bidding and e. 1 unit tape deck"
canvass.30
"That I gave the filled-up RIV and canvass forms to Mr. Antonio Moraleda of
On the purchase of the stereo component and school and office supplies, we ASM Enterprises who happened to be in school, thinking that he will give us
agree with the trial court’s ruling that based on the evidence, the Bids and the quotation of the items;"
Awards Committee failed to conduct any canvass and public bidding as
mandated by law:
"That the RIV was changed as what had been previously prepared and that
the delivered items found in the revised RIV were the following:
On the matter before Us, accused Oani testified that the bidding committee
was chaired by him and some instances co-chaired by Mr. Domingo
Bugtungan, with Mrs. Sayoma and Mr. Campang as members. Further, a. 1 unit sound research SR 100 A 200 Watts
during the opening of the bids, the suppliers were present. A cursory
examination of the various Invitations to Bid, which were used as bid forms, b. 1 unit sound research 6 mic mixer
the Canvass Forms, the existence of which were admitted by both accused
Oani and Roa, reveals that indeed, the signatures of the bidding committee c. 2 units L 2" 3-way speaker system
members, other than that of accused Oani, do not appear. As correctly
observed by the team in their Report, this was "unusual." The affixing d. 1 unit Radio Cassette Recorder
of signatures by the committee members are not mere ceremonial acts but
proofs of authenticity and marks [of] regularity. The absence of such
e. 1 unit Phono Magnetic
signatures not only in some, but in ALL the Invitations to Bid and Canvass
Forms indicate something more than mere honest and unintentional
omissions. These uniform omissions collectively suggest a pattern of scheme f. 2 units microphone and microphone stand with holder
tainted with ulterior motives, and altogether doubts the authenticity of the
supposed bidding or canvass. g. 3 units electrical bell 10" in diameter" x x x
"That I personally signed the RIV accepting the equipment." (Italics supplied) "Thus, the participation of non-bona fide dealers in the transactions of the
agency was allowed through the simulated canvass. This was further
Probative weight may be accorded to these declarations for its candidness confirmed by personnel involved in the procurement system of the agency
and straightforwardness. In addition, there is no showing in the record that when they claimed during the exit Conference that usually they gave the
from the time of its execution, until he testified thereon, Edilberto Lacdao was Request and Issue Voucher (RIV) to a certain dealer and the same dealer
harboring ill-feeling or ulterior motives against both or either of the accused. should be the one to process the documents needed for the purchase. This
This explains the absence of the signatures of the other members of the procedure was facilitated with the influence of some officials of the agency
committee on bids and strongly supports the findings of the special audit who are clothed with the power to decide over and above the same involving
team that a simulated bidding and canvass took place, at least in the the MOOE funds of the agency. These officials were definitely and
purchase of sound system. In this case, what appears to have transpired was particularly identified in the affidavits executed by the designated accountable
that the RIVs containing the specific items to be purchased, were prepared personnel in the agency which are made as appendices to this report."
by the property officer, who then [gave] them to the favored suppliers,
together with blank canvass forms. The suppliers would then return the RIVs "Furthermore, per inquiry made by the team, two business establishments
and the canvass forms to the property officer, which by then, have already particularly the ASM Enterprises and the Red Lion Marketing in Davao City
been filled up with inflated quotations by other enterprises showing the who were often made as the winning bidders of the rigged and/or simulated
favored suppliers as having quoted the lowest prices. What follows is a canvasses/biddings and had mostly supplied the agencies’ needs for office
matter of clerical documentation to make it appear that bidding and canvass and sound equipment, supplies and materials, were not dealers of such line
was validly conducted. In the case of the sound system, it was even the commodities. This was validated in one of our unexpected visits to their
supplier, ASM Enterprises which modified the contents of the RIV. This very establishments where we had observed that there were no stocks and/or
same inference may be made from the testimony of Edilberto Lacdao on displays of such commodities or merchandise as what had been delivered to
cross-examination, that he could not remember Panabo High School having the agency."
conducted bidding or canvass from 1984 to 1989.
"Per observation, the general outside and inside appearance of these two
In consciously allowing the suppliers to violate the requirements of bidding establishments are: Red Lion Marketing portrays an ordinary office while
and canvass, accused Oani brazenly undermined the objective of the ASM Enterprises appears as an ordinary residential house and yet these
process, namely, "To protect the public interest by giving the public the best establishments were considered by management in the canvassing of prices
possible advantage thru open competition." Hence, not only did he act in a for the procurement of equipment, supplies and materials. The team could
"wantonly careless manner" but also in an unspeakable "breach of duty in a not find any valid reason why management failed to consider in the
flagrant and palpable" way. In full contemplation of the law, his acts canvassing of prices known establishments in the main streets of Davao
constitute gross inexcusable negligence. City, and those who are distinctly identified to be dealing with the sound and
office equipment, supplies and materials."
As occasioned by the lack of bidding and canvass, unqualified and non-bona
fide entities that only served as brokers, gained entry and participation to the "Likewise, certification issued by the Business Bureau, Davao City (See
transaction. Not only did this burden the government with additional costs, as Appendix 2) showed that the ASM Enterprises and Red Lion Marketing
a result, but also exposed it to unnecessary risks and disadvantages. declared capitalization of ₱20,000.00 and ₱40,000.00 in 1988, respectively,
Firsthand investigation and audit conducted by the COA auditors revealed as against the contracts they entered into with the government which is
the following: invariably more than their capitalization. Red Lion could also be declared a
non-bona fide dealer on the ground of non-payment of the business taxes for
"The overpricing of purchases was obviously the result of exaggerated or the year 1989, thereby disproving their license to operate for that year."
inflated price quotations made by non-bona fide dealers or ‘middlemen’ of (Italics supplied)
equipment, supplies and materials of which the agency had contracted with.
By using non-existing firms or establishment who were made to appear in the Accused Oani and Roa did not dispute the foregoing findings of the team,
records as the competing bidders with higher quoted prices than those much less present rebuttal evidence. Instead, they elicited the stipulation
offered by the non-bona fide dealers, it had paved the way for those from the prosecution "that the purchased equipment, supplies and other
unscrupulous bidders to win the bidding. This is the plain and flagrant materials were delivered to the Panabo High School," which the prosecution
simulation and manipulation of canvass to the detriment of the government." readily admitted during the pre-trial. The fact that the subject inventories have
been delivered would have been a potent defense of the accused in the In Danville Maritime, Inc. v. Commission on Audit,33 the Court emphasized
instant case had the purchases not resulted into other forms of injuries to the that –
government – which brings us into the matter of overpricing. 31
… By its very nature and characteristic, a competitive public bidding aims to
As against the findings of the trial court supported by the evidence on record, protect the public interest by giving the public the best possible advantages
the petitioner offered nothing but his barren testimony. The petitioner also thru open competition. Another self-evident purpose of public bidding is to
failed to offer any evidence except his bare denial to the following findings of avoid or preclude suspicion of favoritism and anomalies in the execution of
the trial court: public contracts. Public bidding of government contracts and for disposition of
government assets have the same purpose and objectives. Their only
In the purchase of the sound system, covered by the purchase order dated difference, if at all, is that in the public bidding for public contracts the award
December 28, 1989, signed by accused Oani, the unit price of a "microphone is generally given to the lowest bidder while in the disposition of government
stand with holder" is ₱2,295.00. The same could have been bought from the assets the award is to the highest bidder.34
suppliers participating in the re-canvass anywhere from ₱195.00 to ₱804.00,
enabling the government to save by more than 50%. Similarly, a "10 in. In a public bidding, there must be competition that is legitimate, fair and
diameter electronic bell" was bought from ASM Marketing for ₱525.00 per honest. The three principles of a public bidding are the offer to the public; an
unit, compared to the selling prices of participating suppliers in the re- opportunity for competition; and a basis for exact comparison of bids. 35 A
canvass, ranging from ₱185.00 to ₱245.00 only, showing more than 50% contract granted without the competitive bidding required by law is void, and
difference. the party to whom it is awarded cannot benefit from it. 36

In the acquisition of various office supplies and equipment by Panabo High In the present case, the petitioner purchased the fire extinguishers and office
School from Red Lion Marketing in the total amount of ₱111,912.35, as and school supplies without the benefit of a public bidding, in gross and
shown in the undated purchase order issued by accused Oani and the evident bad faith, resulting in the considerable overpricing of the fire
corresponding Sales Invoice of Red Lion Marketing dated March 10, 1989 extinguishers and the supplies, to the gross prejudice of the government.
the price of one steel safe was ₱11,600.00. After the re-canvass, it was
discovered that similar items may be bought from reputable suppliers in In sum then, the decision of the trial court is in accord with the law and the
Davao City from ₱7,800.00 to ₱8,620.00 only. Likewise, a unit of "steel evidence.
cabinet combination four drawers" purchased from Red Lion Marketing for
₱11,000.00 was sold by reputable suppliers anywhere from ₱5,000.00 to IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. Cost against
₱6,000.00 only. Again, a "steel cabinet four drawers," sold for ₱4,400.00 by the petitioner.
Red Lion, was quoted by bona fide suppliers from ₱2,250.00 to ₱2,750.00.
This rate of overpricing very well applies to other items in the said purchase
order and sales invoice. SO ORDERED.

In the subsequent purchase of various school supplies in the total amount of Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
₱37,686.00 on or about December 26, 1989 again, from ASM Enterprises,
enumerated in its Sales Invoice dated December 22, 1989, we find further
inflated prices. Thus, while the 500 pieces of "long brown folder" were sold by
ASM Enterprises at ₱2.25 each, other reputable suppliers in Davao City were
selling the same from ₱1.50 to ₱1.90 each, as of March 21, 1990. In the
same vein, ASM Enterprises sold 300 boxes of "Venus Yellow Enamel
Chalk" to Panabo High School for ₱28.50 per box. After the re-canvass, it
was found out that the same item may be bought for ₱25.00 per box. Again,
ASM Enterprises sold to Panabo High School 10 dozens of "Max Staple Wire
No. 10" for ₱79.80 per dozen, while other suppliers were selling them at
₱37.00 to ₱39.00 per dozen, for a difference of more than 50%. 32
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 88017             January 21, 1991

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LO HO WING alias PETER LO, LIM CHENG HUAT alias ANTONIO LIM
and REYNALDO TIA y SANTIAGO, defendants. LO HO
WING alias PETER LO, defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Segundo M. Gloria, Jr. for defendant-appellant.

GANCAYCO, J.:

This case involves the unlawful transport of metamphetamine, a regulated

drug under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. One of its derivatives is
metamphetamine hydrochloride, notoriously known in street parlance as
"shabu" or "poor man's cocaine."

Appellant Peter Lo, together with co-accused Lim Cheng Huat alias Antonio

Lim and Reynaldo Tia, were charged with a violation of Section 15, Article III
of the aforementioned statute otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972, before Branch 114 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. Only
appellant and co-accused Lim Cheng Huat were convicted. They were
sentenced to suffer life imprisonment, to pay a fine of P25,000.00 each, and
to pay the costs. Their co-accused Reynaldo Tia was discharged as a state
witness. The pertinent portion of the information reads as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of October, 1987, in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, without authority of law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously deliver, dispatch or transport 56
teabags of Metamphetamine, a regulated drug.
 Contrary to law.1 the cans of tea in his hotel room. That evening, Tia went to appellant's room
to talk to him. Upon entering, he saw two other men with appellant. One was
The antecedent facts of the case as found by the trial court are as follows: fixing the tea bags, while the other was burning substance on a piece of
aluminum foil using a cigarette lighter. Appellant joined the second man and
sniffed the smoke emitted by the burning substance. Tia asked the latter
In July 1987, the Special Operations Group, a unit of the Criminal
what they would be bringing back to the Philippines. He was informed that
Investigation Service (CIS) of the Philippine Constabulary (PC), received a tip
their cargo consisted of Chinese drugs. Tia stayed in the room for about
from one of its informers about an organized group engaged in the
twenty minutes before going back to his room to sleep.
importation of illegal drugs, smuggling of contraband goods, and gunrunning.
After an evaluation of the information thus received, a project codenamed
"OPLAN SHARON 887" was created in order to bust the suspected The next day, October 6,1987, the two returned to Manila via a China Airlines
syndicate. flight. Appellant had with him his red traveling bag with wheels. Before
departing from Guangzhou however, customs examiners inspected their
luggage. The tin cans of tea were brought out from the traveling bag of
As part of the operations, the recruitment of confidential men and "deep
appellant. The contents of the cans were not closely examined, and appellant
penetration agents' was carried out to infiltrate the crime syndicate. One of
was cleared along with Tia.
those recruited was the discharged accused, Reynaldo Tia (hereinafter
referred to as Tia).
The plane landed at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), then
named Manila International Airport, on schedule. Lim met the newly-arrived
Tia was introduced to his co-accused Lim Cheng Huat (hereinafter referred to
pair at the arrival area. Lim talked to appellant, while Tia, upon being
as Lim) by another confidential agent named George on August 3, 1987. Lim
instructed, looked after their luggage. After Lim and appellant finished their
expressed a desire to hire a male travelling companion for his business nips
conversation, the latter hailed a taxicab. Appellant and Tia boarded the
abroad. Tia offered his services and was hired.
taxicab after putting their luggage inside the back compartment of the
vehicle. Lim followed in another taxi cab.
Lim and Tia met anew on several occasions to make arrangements for a trip
to China. In the course of those meetings, Tia was introduced to Peter Lo
Meanwhile, a team composed of six operatives headed by Captain Palmera
(hereinafter referred to as appellant), whom Tia found out to be the person he
was formed to act on the tip given by Tia. On the expected date of arrival, the
was to accompany to China in lieu of Lim.
team proceeded to the NAIA. Captain Palmera notified the Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) Detachment at the airport for coordination. After a
As a "deep penetration agent," Tia regularly submitted reports of his briefing, the operatives were ordered to take strategic positions around the
undercover activities on the suspected criminal syndicate. Meanwhile, the arrival area. Two operatives stationed just outside the arrival area were the
officer-in-charge of OPLAN SHARON 887, Captain Luisito Palmera, filed with first ones to spot the suspects emerging therefrom. Word was passed on to
his superiors the reports submitted to him, and officially informed the the other members of the team that the suspects were in sight. Appellant was
Dangerous Drugs Board of Tia's activities. pulling along his red traveling bag while Tia was carrying a shoulder bag. The
operatives also spotted Lim meeting their quarry.
On October 4, 1987, appellant and Tia left for Hongkong on board a
Philippine Airlines flight. Before they departed, Tia was able to telephone Upon seeing appellant and Tia leave the airport, the operatives who first
Captain Palmera to inform him of their expected date of return to the spotted them followed them. Along Imelda Avenue, the car of the operatives
Philippines as declared in his round-trip plane ticket-October 6, 1987 at two overtook the taxicab ridden by appellant and Tia and cut into its path forcing
o'clock in the afternoon. the taxi driver to stop his vehicle. Meanwhile, the other taxicab carrying Lim
sped away in an attempt to escape. The operatives disembarked from their
The day after they arrived in Hongkong, Tia and appellant boarded a train car, approached the taxicab, and asked the driver to open the baggage
bound for Guangzhou, in the People's Republic of China. Upon arriving compartment. Three pieces of luggage were retrieved from the back
there, they checked in at a hotel, and rested for a few hours. The pair compartment of the vehicle. The operatives requested from the suspects
thereafter went to a local store where appellant purchased six (6) tin cans of permission to search their luggage. A tin can of tea was taken out of the red
tea. Tia saw the paper tea bags when the cans were opened for examination traveling bag owned by appellant. Sgt. Roberto Cayabyab, one of the
during the purchase. Afterwards, they returned to the hotel. Appellant kept operatives, pried the lid open, pulled out a paper tea bag from the can and
pressed it in the middle to feel its contents. Some crystalline white powder III.
resembling crushed alum came out of the bag. The sergeant then opened the
tea bag and examined its contents more closely. Suspecting the crystalline THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISCHARGING REYNALDO TIA TO
powder to be a dangerous drug, he had the three traveling bags opened for TESTIFY FOR THE PROSECUTION.2
inspection. From the red traveling bag, a total of six (6) tin cans were found,
including the one previously opened. Nothing else of consequence was We affirm.
recovered from the other bags. Tia and appellant were taken to the CIS
Headquarters in Quezon City for questioning.
Anent the first assignment of error, appellant contends that the warrantless
search and seizure made against the accused is illegal for being violative of
Meanwhile, the second taxicab was eventually overtaken by two other Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. He reasons that the PC-CIS officers
operatives on Retiro Street, Quezon City. Lim was likewise apprehended and concerned could very well have procured a search warrant since they had
brought to the CIS Headquarters for interrogation. been informed of the date and time of a arrival of the accused at the NAIA
well ahead of time, specifically two (2) days in advance. The fact that the
During the investigation of the case, the six tin cans recovered from the search and seizure in question were made on a moving vehicle, appellant
traveling bag of appellant were opened and examined. They contained a total argues, does not automatically make the warrantless search herein fall within
of fifty-six (56) paper tea bags with white crystalline powder inside instead of the coverage of the well-known exception to the rule of the necessity of a
tea leaves. valid warrant to effect a search because, as aforementioned, the anti-
narcotics agents had both time and opportunity to secure a search warrant.
The tea bag opened by Sgt. Cayabyab during the search and seizure was
sent to the PC-INP Crime Laboratory for preliminary examination. Tests The contentions are without merit. As correctly averred by appellee, that
conducted on a sample of the crystalline powder inside the tea bag yielded a search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute
positive result that the specimen submitted was metamphetamine. Samples rule. There are at least three (3) well-recognized exceptions thereto. As set
from each of the fifty-six (56) tea bags were similarly tested. The tests were forth in the case of Manipon, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,3 these are: [1] a search
also positive for metamphetamine. Hence, the three suspects were indicted. incidental to an arrest, [2] a search of a moving vehicle, and [3] seizure of
evidence in plain view (emphasis supplied). The circumstances of the case
In rendering a judgment of conviction, the trial court gave full credence to the clearly show that the search in question was made as regards a moving
testimonies of the government anti-narcotics operatives, to whom the said vehicle. Therefore, a valid warrant was not necessary to effect the search on
court applied the well-settled presumption of regularity in the performance of appellant and his co-accused.
official duties.
In this connection, We cite with approval the averment of the Solicitor
Appellant now assigns three errors alleged to have been committed by the General, as contained in the appellee's brief, that the rules governing search
trial court, namely: and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving
vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so
I. considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and
persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing
judge—a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE SEARCH
smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport
AND SEIZURE ON THE ACCUSED AS ILLEGAL.
contraband from one place to another with impunity. 4
II.
We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the
ground that "it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must
OF DELIVERING, DISPATCHING OR TRANSPORTING be sought."5
METAMPHETAMINE, A REGULATED DRUG.
In the instant case, it was firmly established from the factual findings of the The situation in the instant case is one where the transport of a prohibited
trial court that the authorities had reasonable ground to believe that appellant drug was interrupted by the search and arrest of the accused. Interruption
would attempt to bring in contraband and transport it within the country. The necessarily infers that an act had already been commenced. Otherwise,
belief was based on intelligence reports gathered from surveillance activities there would be nothing to interrupt.
on the suspected syndicate, of which appellant was touted to be a member.
Aside from this, they were also certain as to the expected date and time of Therefore, considering the foregoing, since the information included the acts
arrival of the accused from China. But such knowledge was clearly of delivery, dispatch or transport, proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
insufficient to enable them to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a commission of any of the acts so included is sufficient for conviction under
search warrant. Still and all, the important thing is that there was probable Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in such
a case. Moreover, the act of transporting a prohibited drug is a malum
prohibitum because it is punished as an offense under a special law. It is a
The second assignment of error is likewise lacking in merit. Appellant was wrong because it is prohibited by law. Without the law punishing the act, it
charged and convicted under Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, cannot be considered a wrong. As such, the mere commission of said act is
as amended, which reads: what constitutes the offense punished and suffices to validly charge and
convict an individual caught committing the act so punished, regardless of
The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from criminal intent.7
twenty thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, dispose, deliver, As to the third assigned error, appellant contests the discharge of accused
transport or distribute any regulated drug (emphasis supplied). Reynaldo Tia to testify for the prosecution on the ground that there was no
necessity for the same. Appellant argues that deep penetration agents such
The information charged the accused of delivering, transporting or as Tia "have to take risks and accept the consequences of their
dispatching fifty-six (56) tea bags containing metamphetamine, a regulated actions."8 The argument is devoid of merit. The discharge of accused Tia was
drug. The conjunction "or' was used, thereby implying that the accused were based on Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, which reads in part:
being charged of the three specified acts in the alternative. Appellant argues
that he cannot be convicted of "delivery" because the term connotes a source Sec. 9. Discharge of the accused to be state witness. — When two
and a recipient, the latter being absent under the facts of the case. It is also or more persons are jointly charged with the commission of any
argued that "dispatching' cannot apply either since appellant never sent off or offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case,  the
disposed of drugs. As for "transporting," appellant contends that he cannot court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with
also be held liable therefor because the act of transporting necessarily their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state . . .
requires a point of destination, which again is non- existent under the given (emphasis supplied).
facts.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the discharge of an accused
The contentions are futile attempts to strain the meaning of the operative acts is left to the sound discretion of the lower court.1âwphi1 The trial court has
of which appellant and his co-accused were charged in relation to the facts of the exclusive responsibility to see that the conditions prescribed by the rule
the case. There is no doubt that law enforcers caught appellant and his co- exist.9 In the instant case, appellant does not allege that any of the conditions
accused in flagrante delicto of transporting a prohibited drug. The term for the discharge had not been met by the prosecution. Therefore, the
"transport" is defined as "to carry or convey from one place to another." 6 The discharge, as ordered by the trial court, stands.
operative words in the definition are "to carry or convey." The fact that there
is actual conveyance suffices to support a finding that the act of transporting Finally, appellant alleges that the testimony of Sgt. Roberto Cayabyab
was committed. It is immaterial whether or not the place of destination is regarding the facts surrounding the commission of the offense proves that
reached. Furthermore, the argument of appellant gives rise to the illogical the discharge of accused Tia is unnecessary. The allegation is baseless.
conclusion that he and his co- accused did not intend to bring the Appellant himself admits that the sergeant's testimony corroborates the
metamphetamine anywhere, i.e. they had no place of destination. testimony of the discharged accused. The fact of corroboration of the
testimonies bolsters the validity of the questioned discharge precisely
because paragraph (a) of the aforequoted rule on discharge requires that the
testimony be substantially corroborated in its material points. The
corroborative testimony of the PC-CIS operative does not debunk the claim
of the prosecution that there is absolute necessity for the testimony of
accused Tia.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto and

the appeal is thereby DISMISSED. No costs.
Republic of the Philippines
SO ORDERED. SUPREME COURT
Manila
Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 196966               October 23, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
MICHAEL MAONGCO y YUMONDA and PHANS BANDALI y
SIMPAL, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

On appeal is the Decision1 dated September 6, 2010 of the Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03505, which affirmed in toto the Decision 2 dated
June 11, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court RTC), Branch 82, Quezon City, in
Criminal Case Nos. Q-04-127731-32, finding accused-appellants Michael Y.
Maongco Maongco) and Phans S. Bandali Bandali) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

Accused-appellants were separately charged for illegally dispensing,

delivering, transporting, distributing, or acting as brokers of dangerous drugs
under the following amended Informations:

[Criminal Case No. Q-04-127731]

The undersigned accuses MICHAEL MAONGCO y YUMONDA for Violation

of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002), committed as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of June, 2004 in Quezon City, Philippines, the Based on a tip from a confidential informant, the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs of
said accused, not being authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport the Navotas City Police conducted a special operation on June 18, 2004,
or distribute any dangerous drug, did, then and there willfully and unlawfully which resulted in the arrest of a certain Alvin Carpio (Carpio) for illegal
dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the said transaction, possession of dangerous drugs and seizure from Carpio’s possession of 15
four point fifty (4.50) grams of Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a heat-sealed plastic sachets containing shabu . When questioned by the
dangerous drug.3 police, Carpio admitted that the shabu came from accused-appellant
Maongco. Consequently, the police planned an operation to apprehend
[Criminal Case No. Q-04-127732] accused-appellant Maongco and formed a team for this purpose, composed
of PO1 Arugay, PO2 Ong, PO2 Geoffrey Huertas (Huertas), and PO1 Jesus
del Fierro (Del Fierro).
The undersigned accuses PHANS BANDALI y SIMPAL for Violation of
Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002), committed as follows: On June 19, 2004, after coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA), the police team was briefed about the operation. The police
team allowed Carpio to talk to accused-appellant Maongco on the cellphone
That on or about the 19th day of June, 2004 in Quezon City, Philippines, the
to arrange for a sale transaction of shabu. At around 10:30 in the morning,
said accused, not being authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport
the police team, accompanied and guided by Carpio, proceeded to the
or distribute any dangerous drug, did, then and there willfully and unlawfully
vicinity of Quezon corner Roces Avenues in Quezon City frequented by
dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the said transaction,
accused-appellant Maongco. PO1 Arugay, PO2 Ong, and Carpio rode a taxi,
four point forty-five (4.45) grams of Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a
while PO1 Del Fierro and PO2 Huertas followed in an owner-type jeep.
dangerous drug.4
Carpio spotted accused-appellant Maongco at a waiting shed and pointed
out the latter to the police. PO2 Arugay alighted from the taxi and
When arraigned on September 13, 2004, both accused-appellants pleaded approached accused-appellant Maongco. PO2 Arugay introduced himself to
not guilty.5 accused-appellant Maongco as Carpio’s cousin, and claimed that Carpio was
sick and could not be there personally. PO2 Arugay then asked from
During trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Police Officer (PO) accused-appellant Maongco for Carpio’s order of " dalawang bulto."
1 Dominador Arugay (Arugay)6 and PO2 Vener Ong (Ong), 7 who arrested Accused-appellant Maongco drew out from his pocket a sachet of shabu and
accused-appellants. The testimonies of Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Erickson showed it to PO2 Arugay. When PO2 Arugay got hold of the sachet of
Calabocal (Calabocal),8 the forensic chemist, and Senior Police Officer shabu , he immediately revealed that he was a police officer, arrested
(SPO) 1 Adonis Sugui (Sugui), 9 the post investigating officer, were dispensed accused-appellant Maongco, and apprised the latter of his constitutional
with after the defense agreed to a stipulation of the substance of the two rights.
witnesses’ testimonies, but with the qualification that said witnesses had no
personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding accused-appellants’ When the police team questioned accused-appellant Maongco as to the
arrest and the source of the plastic sachets of shabu. other " bulto " of shabu Carpio had ordered, accussed-appellant disclosed
that the same was in the possession of accused-appellant Bandali, who was
The object and documentary evidence of the prosecution, all admitted by the then at Jollibee Pantranco branch along Quezon Avenue. The police team,
RTC,10 consisted of the Request for Laboratory Examination; 11 an Improvised with Carpio and accused-appellant Maongco, went to the said restaurant
Envelope containing the plastic sachets of suspected methamphetamine where accused-appellant Maongco identified accused-appellant Bandali to
hydrochloride, more popularly known as shabu; 12 P/Insp. Calabocal’s the police team as the one wearing a blue shirt. PO2 Ong approached
Chemistry Report No. D-360-04;13 P/Insp. Calabocal’s Certification14 stating accused-appellant Bandali and demanded from the latter the other half of the
that the contents of the plastic sachets tested positive for methamphetamine drugs ordered. Accused-appellant Bandali voluntarily handed over a sachet
hydrochloride; PO1 Arugay’s Sinumpaang Salaysay; 15 PO2 Ong’s of shabu to PO2 Ong. Thereafter, PO2 Ong apprised accused-appellant
Sinumpaang Salaysay;16 and the Referral of the case to the Prosecutor’s Bandali of his constitutional rights and arrested him.
Office of Quezon City.17
The police team first brought accused-appellants to the East Avenue Medical
The prosecution’s evidence presented the following version of the events Center for medical examination to prove that accused-appellants sustained
leading to accused-appellants’ arrests. no physical injuries during their apprehension. Afterwards, the police team
brought accused-appellants to the police station in Navotas City. At the police THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
station, PO1 Arugay marked the sachet of shabu from accused-appellant APPELLANTS DESPITE THE FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE
Maongco with the initials "MMY," while PO2 Ong marked the sachet of shabu "OBJECTIVE TEST" IN BUY-BUST OPERATIONS.
from accused-appellant Bandali with the initials "PBS." PO1 Arugay and PO2
Ong turned over the two sachets of shabu to the custody of PO1 Del Fierro III
and SPO1 Sugui. The sachets of shabu were then inventoried, photographed
in the presence of accused-appellants, and submitted for laboratory THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE PRESUMPTION OF
examination. REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTY BY THE
POLICE OFFICERS DESPITE THE PATENT IRREGULARITIES IN THE
P/Insp. Calabocal received the sachets of shabu for chemical analysis. BUY-BUST OPERATION.
P/Insp. Calabocal’s examination revealed that the contents of the sachets
marked "MMY" and "PBS" weighed 4.50 grams and 4.45 grams, respectively, IV
and both tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
When the defense’s turn to present evidence came, the accused-appellants APPELLANTS DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE
took the witness stand.18 Accused-appellants asserted that they did not know THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.21
each other prior to their arrests and they were illegally arrested, extorted for
money, physically beaten, and framed-up by the police.
Plaintiff-appellee countered in its Brief22 that:
On June 11, 2008, the RTC promulgated its Decision finding accused-
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegally selling shabu, I.
penalized under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, to wit:
THE COURT A QUO PROPERLY ADMITTED THE SHABU IN EVIDENCE.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding
accused MICHAEL MAONGCO y YUMONDA, accused in Ciminal Case No. II.
Q-04-127731 and PHANS BANDALI y SIMPAL, accused in Ciminal Case No.
Q-04-127732, both guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violations of Section 5, THERE WAS A LEGITIMATE "BUY-BUST" OPERATION IN THE CASE AT
Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Accordingly, they are hereby sentenced to suffer BAR WHICH RESULTED IN THE LAWFUL ARREST, PROSECUTION AND
the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and each to pay a fine in the amount of CONVICTION OF APPELLANTS.
Five Hundred Thousand (₱500,000.00) Pesos.19
III.
Accused-appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals. In their
Brief,20 accused-appellants imputed the following errors on the part of the THE COURT A QUO PROPERLY FOUND APPELLANTS GUILTY BEYOND
RTC: REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED.23

I In its Decision dated September 6, 2010, the Court of Appeals found no

palpable error in the judgment of conviction rendered by the RTC against
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND accused-appellants and rejected accused-appellants’ argument that the
CREDENCE TO THE PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE NOTWITHSTANDING prosecution failed to establish the factual details constituting the essential
ITS FAILURE TO PROVE THE IDENTITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE elements of an illegal sale of dangerous drugs. According to the appellate
SHABU ALLEGEDLY SEIZED. court, Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 penalizes not only those
who sell dangerous drugs, but also those who "trade, administer, dispense,
II deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
dangerous drug," without being authorized by law. In this case, the
prosecution was able to prove with moral certainty that accused-appellants
were caught in the act of illegally delivering, giving away to another, or Q. After that, you immediately arrested him?
distributing sachets of shabu. In the end, the Court of Appeals decreed:
A. Yes, sir. I first asked my order of shabu.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The
assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 82 Q. In your affidavit, you testified that you asked one "bulto" of shabu?
dated June 11, 2008 convicting appellants for violation of Section 5, Article II
of Republic Act No. 9165 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.24 A. More or less five grams of shabu, sir.

Hence, this appeal. Q. Did the accused ask any in exchange of that shabu?

Since accused-appellants had opted not to file any supplemental briefs, the A. No, sir.
Court considers the same issues and arguments raised by accused-
appellants before the Court of Appeals.
Q. Immediately, you arrested him already?
Accused-appellants stress that for a judgment of conviction for the illegal sale
of dangerous drugs, the identities of the buyer and seller, the delivery of the A. After I got my order from him, I introduced myself as policeman, sir.
drugs, and the payment in consideration thereof, must all be duly proven.
However, accused-appellants lament that in their case, the prosecution failed COURT:
to establish by evidence these essential elements of the alleged sale of
shabu. Accused-appellants add that the prosecution was also unable to show Who gave you that one "bulto" of shabu?
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized shabu had been
preserved in accordance with Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules of A. I have the money but he did not ask it from me, your Honor.
Republic Act No. 9165. Accused-appellants point out that PO1 Arugay did
not mention the time and place of the marking of the sachet of shabu
Q. Was there any arrangement between you and Maongco as to how much
purportedly sold to him by accused-appellant Maongco; while PO2 Ong
this one "bulto" cost? A. Alvin and Maongco were the ones who talked.
admitted that he marked the sachet of shabu he received from accused-
appellant Bandali only at the police station. Both PO1 Arugay and PO2 Ong
merely provided an obscure account of the marking of the sachets of shabu, xxxx
falling short of the statutory requirement that the marking of the seized drugs
be made immediately after seizure and confiscation. Q. Meaning to say, it was Maongco and Alvin who talked in Quezon Avenue?

The appeal is partly meritorious. A. They talked over the cellphone.

In the case of accused-appellant Maongco, the Court finds that the RTC and xxxx
the Court of Appeals both erred in convicting him in Criminal Case No. Q-04-
127731 for the illegal sale of shabu under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act Q. But you did not hear the conversation?
No. 9165. The evidence on record does not support accused-appellant
Maongco’s conviction for said crime, especially considering the following A. No, sir.25 (Emphases supplied.)
answers of prosecution witness PO1 Arugay during the latter’s cross-
examination, practically admitting the lack of consideration/payment for the
sachet of shabu: Inarguably, consideration/payment is one of the essential elements of illegal
sale of dangerous drugs, without which, accused-appellant Maongco’s
conviction for said crime cannot stand. Nonetheless, accused-appellant
Q. What did you tell Michael Maongco? Maongco is still not absolved of criminal liability.

A. I introduced myself as the cousin of Alvin, sir.

A review of the Information in Criminal Case No. Q-04-127731 readily reveals (ii) Sell. – Any act of giving away any dangerous drug and/or controlled
that accused-appellant Maongco was not actually charged with illegal sale of precursor and essential chemical whether for money or any other
shabu. Said Information specifically alleged that accused-appellant Maongco consideration.
"willfully and unlawfully dispensed, delivered, transported, distributed or
acted as broker" in the transaction involving 4.50 grams of shabu. These acts (jj) Trading. – Transactions involving the illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs
are likewise punishable under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165. and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals using electronic
devices such as, but not limited to, text messages, e-mail, mobile or
Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 provides: landlines, two-way radios, internet, instant messengers and chat rooms or
acting as a broker in any of such transactions whether for money or any other
SECTION 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, consideration in violation of this Act. (Emphasis supplied.)
Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals. – The penalty of life imprisonment to As for the illegal delivery of dangerous drugs, it must be proven that (1) the
death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) to accused passed on possession of a dangerous drug to another, personally or
Ten million pesos (₱10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, otherwise, and by any means; (2) such delivery is not authorized by law; and
unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give (3) the accused knowingly made the delivery. Worthy of note is that the
away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous delivery may be committed even without consideration.
drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity
and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. It is not disputed that accused-appellant Maongco, who was working as a taxi
(Emphasis supplied.) driver at the time of his arrest, 26 had no authority under the law to deliver any
dangerous drug. The existence of the two other elements was established by
Several of the acts enumerated in the foregoing provision have been PO1 Arugay’s testimony that provided the following details:
explicitly defined under Article I, Section 3 of the same statute, viz:
FISCAL ANTERO:
Section 3. Definitions. As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
Q. Why did you arrest this certain Alvin?
(a) Administer. – Any act of introducing any dangerous drug into the body of
any person, with or without his/her knowledge, by injection, inhalation, A. For violation of R.A. 9165, sir.
ingestion or other means, or of committing any act of indispensable
assistance to a person in administering a dangerous drug to himself/herself Q. What happened when you arrested this alias Alvin?
unless administered by a duly licensed practitioner for purposes of
medication.
A. We investigated on where the shabu he was selling came from.
xxxx
Q. What was the result of your inquiry as to the source of the shabu?
(k) Deliver. – Any act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another,
personally or otherwise, and by any means, with or without consideration. A. We learned that the source came from a certain Michael, sir.

xxxx Q. When you found out that the source came from a certain Michael, what
did you do, Mr. Witness?
(m) Dispense. – Any act of giving away, selling or distributing medicine or
any dangerous drug with or without the use of prescription. A. We formed a team and we made a Pre-Operation Report, sir.

xxxx Q. Aside from mentioning about the source as Michael, what are the other
details?
A. No more, sir. On June 19, 2004 at about 10:30 a.m., our group was A. He was pointed by Alvin, sir. I alighted from the taxi.
dispatched in Quezon Avenue corner Roces Avenue.
Q. What was his reaction when you approached him?
xxxx
A. He was a bit surprised, sir.
Q. What happened when you arrived in that area?
Q. What did you tell Michael Maongco?
A. We went to the place where Michael is always staying and when he
arrived he was pointed by Alvin, sir. A. I introduced myself as the cousin of Alvin, sir.

Q. What did you do when Alvin pointed to Michael? Q. After that, you immediately arrested him?

A. I pretended to be the cousin of Alvin who was going to get the order. A. Yes, sir. I first asked my order my shabu.

Q. What happened when you approached this Michael? Q. In your Affidavit, you testified that you asked one "bulto" of shabu?

A. I asked from him my order of "dalawang bulto" and he asked me who am I A. More or less five grams of shabu, sir.27 (Emphases supplied.)
and I told him that I am the cousin of Alvin and that Alvin cannot come
because he was sick, sir. There was a prior arrangement between Carpio and accused-appellant
Maongco. When PO1 Arugay appeared for his purportedly indisposed
Q. What happened after you said that? cousin, Carpio, and asked for his order of shabu, accused-appellant
Maongco immediately understood what PO1 Arugay meant. Accused-
A. I asked from him my order and then he took something out from his pocket appellant Maongco took out a sachet of shabu from his pocket and handed
and he showed it to me. It was a shabu, sir. over possession of said sachet to PO1 Arugay.

Q. What happened next? Based on the charges against accused-appellant Maongco and the evidence
presented by the prosecution, accused-appellant Maongco is guilty beyond
A. After I got the order we arrested Michael, sir. reasonable doubt of illegal delivery of shabu under Article II, Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 9165.
xxxx
For the same reasons cited in the preceding paragraphs, the RTC and the
Court of Appeals also erred in convicting accused-appellant Bandali for the
ATTY. BARTOLOME:
crime of illegal sale of shabu in Criminal Case No. Q-04-127732.
Q. What was Maongco doing at that time?
The Information against accused-appellant Bandali, same as that against
accused-appellant Maongco, charged him with "willfully and unlawfully
A. He was staying in a waiting shed along Quezon Avenue, sir. dispensing, delivering, transporting, distributing or acting as broker" in the
transaction involving 4.45 grams of shabu . However, unlike accused-
Q. What was he doing there? appellant Maongco, accused-appellant Bandali cannot be convicted for illegal
delivery of shabu under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, given
A. He was waiting for somebody, sir. that the circumstances surrounding the arrest of the latter were radically
different from those of the former.
Q. Immediately you approached Maongco?
PO2 Ong testified:
Q. How did this Arugay arrest this Michael? A. Yes, your Honor.

A. I was only a back-up of Arugay, sir. Q. When you demanded the production of what?

Q. What did you see, if any? A. One (1) bulto of shabu, your Honor.

A. I saw that he recovered one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet, sir. PROS. ANTERO:

Q. He recovered it from whom? Q. Why do you know that he was Bandali?

A. From Michael Maongco, sir. A. Because Michael Maongco was pointing to him that he was Phans
Bandali, sir.
xxxx
Q. Was Michael with you when you went to that Jollibee?
Q. What happened when this man was arrested by Arugay?
A. Yes, sir.
A. We looked for the other "bulto" because according to Michael there were
two and it was in the possession of Phans, sir. Q. What happened when you demanded from Bandali this shabu?

THE COURT: A. He voluntarily put out the shabu, sir.

Q. Where did you look for him? Q. What happened next, Mr. Witness?

A. At Jollibee, Pantranco, your Honor. A. I told him of his violation and his rights, sir. 28 PO2 Ong further confirmed
during his cross-examination:
xxxx
Q. Now, Mr. Witness, you mentioned a while ago that you arrested Phans
Q. Did you find him in Jollibee? Bandali inside Jollibee, Pantranco.1avvphi1 Is that correct?

A. Yes, your Honor, because according to Michael Maongco he was wearing A. Yes, sir.
blue T-shirt.
Q. And you did not buy from him a shabu, Mr. Witness?
Q. What did you do when you found him at Jollibee?
A. No, sir.
A. I went near him and asked him to put out the other shabu in his
possession, your Honor. Q. You just demanded from him a plastic sachet?

Q. You yourself? A. Yes, sir.29 (Emphases supplied.)

A. My companions were just there, your Honor. In accused-appellant Bandali’s case, it cannot be said that he knowingly
passed on the sachet of shabu in his possession to PO2 Ong. PO2 Ong
Q. You yourself approached him? approached accused-appellant Bandali as a police officer, absent any
pretense, and demanded that the latter bring out the other sachet of shabu.
Accused-appellant Bandali’s voluntary production of the sachet of shabu in Well-settled in jurisprudence that the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs
his possession was in subservience to PO2 Ong’s authority. PO2 Ong then necessarily includes the crime of illegal possession of dangerous
acquired the sachet of shabu from accused-appellant Bandali by seizure, not drugs.33 The same ruling may also be applied to the other acts penalized
by delivery. Even if there may be doubt as to whether or not accused- under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 because for the accused
appellant Bandali was actually aware at that moment that PO2 Ong was a to be able to trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another,
police officer, the ambiguity would still be resolved in accused-appellant distribute, dispatch in transit, or transport any dangerous drug, he must
Bandali’s favor. necessarily be in possession of said drugs.

This does not mean though that accused-appellant Bandali goes scot-free. At the outset of the trial, both parties had admitted the laboratory results
The evidence for the prosecution did establish that accused-appellant showing that the contents of the two sachets tested positive for shabu,
Bandali committed illegal possession of dangerous drugs, penalized under although accused-appellants contest the identity and integrity of the sachets
Article II, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165. and contents actually tested since the chain of custody of the same was not
satisfactorily established in accordance with Republic Act No. 9165 and its
For the prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs to prosper, the implementing rules.
following essential elements must be proven, namely: (1) the accused is in
possession of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) The Court disagrees with accused-appellants as the police officers had
such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and substantially complied with the chain of custody rule under Section 21(a) of
consciously possess the said drug. 30 Accused-appellant Maongco informed the Implementing Rules of Republic Act No. 9165. The Court had previously
the police officers that the other sachet of shabu was in the possession of held that in dangerous drugs cases, the failure of the police officers to make
accused-appellant Bandali. Accused-appellant Bandali herein was in a physical inventory, to photograph, and to mark the seized drugs at the
possession of the sachet of shabu as he was sitting at Jollibee Pantranco place of arrest do not render said drugs inadmissible in evidence or
branch and was approached by PO2 Ong. Hence, accused-appellant Bandali automatically impair the integrity of the chain of custody of the same. 34 The
was able to immediately produce and surrender the said sachet upon Court had further clarified, in relation to the requirement of marking the drugs
demand by PO2 Ong. Accused-appellant Bandali, admittedly jobless at the "immediately after seizure and confiscation," that the marking may be
time of his arrest,31 did not have any authority to possess shabu. And as to undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest for as long
the last element, the rule is settled that possession of dangerous drugs as it is done in the presence of the accused and that what is of utmost
constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi, which is importance is the preservation of its integrity and evidentiary value. 35
sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation
of such possession.32 The Court finds no fault on the part of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals
in giving more weight and credence to the testimonies of the police officers
But can accused-appellant Bandali be convicted for illegal possession of vis-à-vis those of the accused-appellants. Questions as to the credibility of
dangerous drugs under Article II, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 when witnesses are matters best left to the appreciation of the trial court because
he was charged with illegal dispensation, delivery, transportation, distribution of its unique opportunity of having observed that elusive and incommunicable
or acting as broker of dangerous drugs under Article II, Section 5 of the same evidence of the witnesses’ deportment on the stand while testifying, which
statute? The Court answers in the affirmative. opportunity is denied to the reviewing tribunal.36

Rule 120, Section 4 of the Rules of Court governs situations where there is a Moreover, accused-appellants’ uncorroborated defenses of denial and claims
variance between the crime charged and the crime proved, to wit: of frame-up cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti. The
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. – When testimonies of police officers who caught the accused-appellants in flagrante
there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information delicto are usually credited with more weight and credence, in the absence of
and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily evidence that they have been inspired by an improper or ill motive, than the
includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense defenses of denial and frame-up of an accused which have been invariably
proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged viewed with disfavor for it can easily be concocted. In order to prosper, the
which is included in the offense proved. defenses of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing
evidence,37 which accused-appellants failed to present in this case.
Lastly, the Court determines the proper penalties to be imposed upon TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
accused-appellants.1âwphi1 Associate Justice

Under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, the penalties for the
illegal delivery of dangerous drugs, regardless of the quantity thereof, shall
be life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (₱10,000,000.00).
Hence, accused-appellant Maongco, for his illegal delivery of shabu in Republic of the Philippines
Criminal Case No. Q-04-127731, is sentenced to life imprisonment and SUPREME COURT
ordered to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00). Manila

Article II, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 prescribes the penalty, for SECOND DIVISION
possession of less than five grams of dangerous drugs, of imprisonment of
 
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, plus a fine ranging
G.R. No. 94337 January 27, 1993
from Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00) to Four Hundred
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
Thousand Pesos (₱400,000.00). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
vs.
the maximum term shall not exceed the maximum fixed by law and the
UTOH LAKIBUL y DAUD, accused-appellant.
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term as prescribed by the same
law. Resultantly, accused-appellant Bandali, for his illegal possession of 4.45 The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
grams of shabu in Criminal Case No. Q-04-127732, is sentenced to Pablo R. Barnera for accused-appellant.
imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as the minimum term, to
twenty (20) years, as the maximum term, and ordered to pay a fine of Four CAMPOS, JR., J.:
Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱400,000.00).
This is an appeal interposed by the accused Utoh Lakibul y Daud from the
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision Is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS decision ** of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, 9th Judicial
to read as follows: Region, Branch 12, in Criminal Case No. 9002 finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, and sentencing him to suffer
1. In Criminal Case No. Q-04-127731, accused-appellant MICHAEL
the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00 without
YUMONDA MAONGCO is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
of illegal delivery of shabu penalized under Article II, Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 9165, and is sentenced to LIFE IMPRISONMENT
and ordered to pay a FINE of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos On November 8, 1988, the Assistant City Fiscal filed an information charging
(₱500,000.00); and the accused with violation of Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act
committed as follows:
2. In Criminal Case No. Q-04-127732, accused-appellant PHANS
SIMP AL BAND ALI is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of That on or about November 8, 1988, in the City of
illegal possession of shabu with a net weight of 4.45 grams, Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
penalized under Article II, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165, and Honorable Court, the
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of IMPRISONMENT of twelve (12) above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then
years and one (1) day, as the minimum term, to twenty (20) years, as and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell to PO2
the maximum term, and ordered to pay a FINE of Four Hundred Manuel S. Alarcon two (2) wrappers containing dried
Thousand Pesos (₱400,000.00). marijuana, knowing same to be a prohibited drug.

SO ORDERED. CONTRARY TO LAW.1

On December 27, 1988, the accused, assisted by his counsel, pleaded "not two (2) five peso bills to be used in the buy-bust operation.
Guilty" to the Information:2 Said five peso bills bore the serial numbers JD 426621 and
JM 36075 (Exhs. "E" and "F", respectively) [p.4, ibid].
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision on May 14, 1990
finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, the The three-man team then proceeded to lower Calarian on
dispositive portion of which reads: board a tricycle. Upon arrival in the area and from a distance
of about ten (10) meters, TSgt. Dalumpines pinpointed the
WHEREFORE, finding accused UTOH LAKIBUL y DAUD suspected pusher to PO2 Alarcon. Thus, PO2 Alarcon
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, he is approached the suspect and told the latter of the former's
sentenced to serve LIFE IMPRISONMENT pursuant to desire to buy P10.00 worth of marijuana. The suspect
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425, as amended, and produced from his pocket two (2) newspaper wrapped
to pay Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos fine without articles. PO2 Alarcon examined the contents of said
subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment thereof due newspaper wrapped articles and when he was satisfied that
to insolvency. it contained marijuana, he gave the two (2) five peso bills to
the suspect.
SO ORDERED.3
The entrapment having been completed, PO2 Alarcon gave
the
The antecedent facts as culled by the Solicitor General are as follows:
pre-arranged signal by putting his hand over his head and
scratched [sic] the same. Immediately, TSgt. Dalumpines
On November 6, 1988, NARCOM Agent TSgt. Generoso rushed up to the suspect and placed him under arrest. PO2
Dalumpines received information about the presence of a Alarcon turned over the two (2) newspaper wrapped
drug pusher at Lower Calarian, Zamboanga City. Major marijuana to TSgt. Dalumpines and later brought the suspect
Cabayacruz, Officer-In-Charge of the NARCOM then to the NARCOM Office for investigation where he identified
instructed surveillance. himself as UTOH LAKIBUL. The two (2) five peso bills were
recovered from appellant after a body search (pp. 17-23, tsn,
Thereafter, TSgt. Dalumpines and SSgt. Elmer Dedicatoria April 18, 1989).
proceeded to Lower Calarian, near the mini-fish market, to
conduct their surveillance. Thereat, they saw several Laboratory tests conducted (Exh. "C") confirmed that the two
teenagers going to the suspected pusher (p. 3, tsn, May 12, (2) newspaper wrapped articles (Exh. "B-1" and "B-2") sold
1989). by appellant to PO2 Alarcon was marijuana (p. 4, tsn, March
16, 1989).4
On the following day, November 7, 1988, the two (2)
NARCOM agents proceeded to the same place where they The accused, on the other hand, had a different version of the events that
again observed several teenager going to the suspected transpired on that day. His testimony was summarized by the trial judge as
drug pusher (pp. 3-4, ibid). follows:

On November 8, 1988, TSgt. Dalumpines informed Major Utoh Lakibul, who gave his age as 23, said he was a fish
Cabayacruz of the results of their surveillance and right there vendor at Lower Calarian in small market there. On
and then decided to conduct a buy-bust operation. November 6, 7 and 8, 1988, he was selling fish in this place.
Nobody approached him or talked to him on November 6
A three (3) man team was formed to conduct the buy-bust and 7, 1988. But on November 8, 1988, about 8:30 in the
operation composed of TSgt. Dalumpines as the team morning, somebody called him. Though he did not know the
leader, SSgt. Dedicatoria and Petty Officer II (PO2) Manuel person, he went and approached him. When he did so two
S. Alarcon, Sr. as the poseur-buyer. After a short briefing, persons, dressed in civilian clothes, grabbed him and told
TSgt. Dalumpines got from TSgt. Mohammed Sali Mihasun
 him to go with them to their office. Utoh Lakibul said he IN RELYING ON THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES
refused, even made a bodily motion to get away from the two FOR THE PROSECUTION INSTEAD OF WEIGHING THE
persons. Somebody else went near him, telling Utoh Lakibul EVIDENCES ADDUCED DURING THE TRIAL IN FAVOR
that if he did not go with them something would happen to OF ACCUSED/APPELLANT.
him. So Utoh Lakibul became afraid and went with the three
men — who took him aboard a tricycle to their office. In the The accused contends that the trial court erred in allowing the marking of
office, Lakibul was asked about his name and age. He was Exhibit "F" considering that the serial numbers on the two five-peso bills were
shown marijuana taken from the pocket of the arresting different from that presented by the prosecution witness. We do not agree. A
officer and money, also taken from the pocket of the same reading of the stenographic notes showed that there was no mistake as to
arresting officer. He was told that the marijuana and money the identity of the marked bills presented by the prosecution. The testimony
(bill) were the evidence against him. Lakibul denied and said of PO2 Alarcon is reproduced as follows:
he did not know anything about it. Nothing had been taken
from his pocket or body. After about 20 minutes, four Q Do you remember these two P5 bill (sic)
persons took him downtown to the City Fiscal's Office. In the that was (sic) given to you by TSgt.
City Fiscal's Office, he was asked if the marijuana and Dalumpines?
money belonged to him and he said he did not know about it.
He was not given any lawyer but he was not made to sign
any document. From the City Fiscal's Office, Utoh Lakibul A Yes.
said he was brought to the City Jail. At the time the three
persons arrested him while he was selling fish there were Q How well (sic) you know that that was the
people who saw him. two P5 bill (sic)?

On cross-examination, Utoh Lakibul said that the marijuana shown to him A By its (sic) serial number.
was the same one he had seen in court (inside two newspaper wrappers).
There was no commotion when the three persons arrested him. But people Q Do you remember the serial number?
saw him being arrested; but none of them did anything to help him (TSN,
September 26, 1989, pp. 1-8).5 A Yes.

The accused appealed from the judgment of conviction, assigning the Q Please tell us.
following errors6 allegedly committed by the trial court, to wit:
A The one P5 bill bearing SN JM 0360, I
I mean JM 36075.

IN BASING ITS DECISION CONVICTING THE Q You are sure of that?

ACCUSED/APPELANT ON EXHIBIT "F" OF THE
PROSECUTION.
A Yes.
II
Q How about the other one?
IN NOT BELIEVING THE TESTIMONY OF
A JD 426621.
ACCUSED/APPELLANT AS CORROBORATED BY HIS
THREE WITNESSES.
Q I have here two P5 bills, with SN 360765
and the other one JD 426621, is this (sic)
III
the one (sic) you mentioned?
 A Yes. We agree with the findings of the trial court when it gave more credence to
the prosecution's evidence, thus:
FISCAL CAJAYON:
The issues is, then, one of credibility (sic) and as the Court
Your Honor, please, I would like to request stated earlier, it gives credit to the government witnesses
that P5 bill bearing SN JD 426621 be and not to Defense witnesses. First, the Court saw how
marked as our Exhibit "E", your Honor. these witnesses testify (sic) and believes (sic) in the sincerity
of the government witnesses, their truthfulness and in the
manner they testified. Second, Defense witnesses were
COURT:
long-time neighbors of Utoh Lakibul and his mother. They
testified on the request of Lakibul's mother. Third is that, the
Mark it. Court cannot believe that the sound "Pssst" is loud enough
to attract the attention of persons some meters away.
FISCAL CAJAYON: Especially, of persons who were engaged in some activity,
like buying. Fourth reason is that, the testimonies of the
Q How about the other one, what Serial No. witnesses are more elaborate than that of the accused
was it it (sic)? himself. For instance, the accused himself did not state he
was called by the "Pssst" sound; he did not say that his co-
A JM 36075. fish vendor, Apna Labbay, had touched his shoulder to
indicate to him he was being called by the three persons. In
fact, accused did not mention that Apna Labbay was one of
Q I have here P5 bill bearing SN 36075, is
those selling fish near his fish table. Then, not one of
this the one?
Defense witnesses — not even accused himself — ascribed
any evil or ulterior motive as to why NARCOM agents, who
A Yes. did not know the accused until two days of surveillance and
the day of the buy-bust operation would just arrest him
FISCAL CAJAYON: without reason. There was no previous misunderstanding or
trouble between accused and the NARCOM men; neither did
I also request, your Honor, the other P5 bill any of the NARCOM men involved intimate to accused they
with SN JM 360765 be marked as Exhibit wanted any money or anything from accused. There are no
"F".7 substantive defects in (sic) Prosecution (sic) testimonial
evidence that may entitle accused to acquittal based on
Besides, even without the money to buy the marijuana so long as the police reasonable doubt.10
officer went through the motion as a buyer and his offer was accepted by the
appellant and the marijuana delivered to police officer, the crime was As to the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution
consummated by the delivery of the goods.8 witnesses as contained in the appellant's Brief, We do not find them
substantial enough to impair the essential veracity of their narration that the
The second and third assignment of errors imputed by the accused to the accused was caught in flagrante selling marijuana during the buy-bust
trial court turn on the issue of credibility. It is well-settled that the findings of operation conducted by the NARCOM agents.
the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight on
appeal "as it is in a better position to decide the question of credibility, having WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the trial court's findings, the
seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their behavior and decision of the Court a quo  is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
manner of testifying. The impression of the trial court on the matter is binding
upon the Supreme Court unless there appears a grave abuse of discretion or SO ORDERED.
obvious misapprehension of facts". 9 In the case at bar, We find no reason to
deviate from the general rule.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 179940             April 23, 2008

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
NORBERTO DEL MONTE y GAPAY @ OBET, accused-appellant.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Assailed before Us is the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 02070 dated 28 May 2007 which affirmed with modification the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78,
in Criminal Case No. 3437-M-02, finding accused-appellant Norberto del
Monte, a.k.a. Obet, guilty of violation of Section 5, 3 Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165, otherwise known as "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002."

On 11 December 2002, accused-appellant was charged with Violation of

Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The accusatory portion of the
information reads:

That on or about the 10th day of December 2002, in the municipality

of Baliuag, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without authority of law and legal justification, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, trade, deliver, give away,
dispatch in transit and transport dangerous drug consisting of one (1)
 heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet of Methylamphetamine bought from appellant was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
Hydrochloride weighing 0.290 gram.4 dangerous drug.

The case was raffled to Branch 78 of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan and The testimony of Nellson Cruz Sta. Maria, Forensic Chemical Officer who
docketed as Criminal Case No. 3437-M-02. examined the substance bought from appellant, was dispensed after both
prosecution and defense stipulated that the witness will merely testify on the
When arraigned on 20 January 2003, appellant, assisted by counsel de fact that the drugs subject matter of this case was forwarded to their office for
oficio, pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charge. 5 On 17 February 2003, the pre-trial laboratory examination and that laboratory examination was indeed
conference was concluded.6 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. conducted and the result was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. 11

The prosecution presented as its lone witness PO1 Gaudencio M. Tolentino, For the defense, the appellant took the witness stand, together with his
Jr., the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation conducted against appellant, common-law wife, Amelia Mendoza; and nephew, Alejandro Lim.
and a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) assigned with the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Regional Office 3/Special From their collective testimonies, the defense version goes like this:
Enforcement Unit (SEU) stationed at the Field Office, Barangay Tarcan,
Baliuag, Bulacan. On 10 December 2002, appellant was sleeping in his sister’s house in
Poblacion Dike when a commotion woke him up. His nephew, Alejandro Lim,
The version of the prosecution is as follows: was shouting because the latter, together with appellant’s common-law wife,
Amelia Mendoza, and a niece, was being punched and kicked by several
On 10 December 2002, at around 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, a confidential police officers. When appellant tried to pacify the policemen and ask them
informant went to the office of the PDEA SEU in Barangay Tarcan, Baliuag, why they were beating up his common-law wife and other relatives, the
Bulacan and reported that appellant was selling shabu. Upon receipt of said policemen arrested him, mauled him, punched him on the chest, slapped him
information, a briefing on a buy-bust operation against appellant was and hit him with a palo-palo. He sustained swollen face, lips and tooth. His
conducted. The team was composed of SPO2 Hashim S. Maung, as team common-law wife was likewise hit on the chest with the palo-palo.
leader, PO1 Gaudencio Tolentino, Jr. as the poseur-buyer, and PO1 Antonio
Barreras as back-up operative. After the briefing, the team, together with the The policemen then took appellant and his common-law wife to a house
confidential informant, proceeded to Poblacion Dike for the execution of the located in the middle of a field where the former demanded P15,000.00 for
buy-bust operation. their liberty. The next day, appellant was brought to the police station.

When the team arrived at appellant’s place, they saw the appellant standing Amelia Mendoza identified PO1 Tolentino and PO1 Barreras as the police
alone in front of the gate. The informant and PO1 Tolentino approached officers who manhandled them and who demanded P15,000.00 so that she
appellant. The informant introduced PO1 Tolentino to appellant as his friend, and appellant could go home. The following day at 6:00 a.m., she said her
saying "Barkada ko, user." PO1 Tolentino gave appellant P300.00 consisting child and cousin arrived with the P15,000.00. She was released but appellant
of three marked P100 bills.7 The bills were marked with "GT JR," PO1 was detained. She does not know why the police officers filed this case
Tolentino’s initials. Upon receiving the P300.00, appellant took out a plastic against appellant. What she knows is that they were asking money from
sachet from his pocket and handed it over to PO1 Tolentino. As a pre- them.
arranged signal, PO1 Tolentino lit a cigarette signifying that the sale had
been consummated. PO1 Barreras arrived, arrested appellant and recovered Alejandro Lim merely corroborated the testimonies of appellant and Amelia
from the latter the marked money. Mendoza.

The white crystalline substance8 in the plastic sachet which was sold to PO1 On 8 March 2004, the trial court rendered its decision convicting appellant of
Tolentino was forwarded to PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office 3, Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, and sentenced him
Malolos, Bulacan, for laboratory examination to determine the presence of to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P5,000,000.00. The dispostive
the any dangerous drug. The request for laboratory examination was signed portion of the decision reads:
by SPO2 Maung.9 Per Chemistry Report No. D-728-2002,10 the substance
 WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, this Court hereby finds days from notice. Both appellant and appellee opted not to file a
accused Norberto del Monte y Gapay @ Obet GUILTY beyond supplemental brief on the ground they had exhaustively argued all the
reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 5, Art. II of relevant issues in their respective briefs and the filing of a supplemental brief
R.A. 9165 and sentences him to suffer the penalty of LIFE would only contain a repetition of the arguments already discussed therein.
IMPRISONMENT and a fine of P5,000,000.00. With cost.
Appellant makes a lone assignment of error:
The drugs subject matter of this case is hereby ordered forfeited in
favor of the government. The Branch of this Court is directed to turn THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
over the same to the Dangerous Drugs Board within ten (10) days ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED
from receipt hereof for proper disposal thereof.12 DESPITE THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE AGAINST
HIM FOR FAILURE OF THE ARRESTING OFFICERS TO COMPLY
The trial court found the lone testimony of PO1 Gaudencio M. Tolentino, Jr. WITH SECTION 21 OF R.A. 9165.20
to be credible and straightforward. It established the fact that appellant was
caught selling shabu during an entrapment operation conducted on 10 Appellant anchors his appeal on the arresting policemen’s failure to strictly
December 2002. Appellant was identified as the person from whom PO1 comply with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. He claims that pictures of
Tolentino bought P300.00 worth of shabu as confirmed by Chemistry Report him together with the alleged confiscated shabu were not taken immediately
No. D-728-2002. On the other hand, the trial court was not convinced by upon his arrest as shown by the testimony of the lone prosecution witness.
appellant’s defense of frame-up and denial. Appellant failed to substantiate He adds that PO1 Tolentino and PO1 Antonio Barreras, the police officers
his claims that he was merely sleeping and was awakened by the screams of who had initial custody of the drug allegedly seized and confiscated, did not
his relatives who were being mauled by the police officers. conduct a physical inventory of the same in his presence as shown by their
joint affidavit of arrest. Their failure to abide by said section casts doubt on
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 10 March 2004. 13 With the filing thereof, both his arrest and the admissibility of the evidence adduced against him.
the trial court directed the immediate transmittal of the entire records of the
case to us.14 However, pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo,15 the case At the outset, it must be stated that appellant raised the police officers’
was remanded to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and alleged non-compliance with Section 21 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 for the
disposition.16 first time on appeal. This, he cannot do. It is too late in the day for him to do
so. In People v. Sta. Maria22  in which the very same issue was raised, we
On 28 May 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision but ruled:
reduced the fine imposed on appellant to P500,000.00. It disposed of the
case as follows: The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds.
However, whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the decision dated involved in the buy-bust operation in this case from complying with
March 8, 2004 of the RTC, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant did not question
Case No. 3437-M-02, finding accused-appellant Norberto del Monte during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II, the police officers’ alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of
Republic Act No. 9165, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before the trial court but
life imprisonment is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the were instead raised for the first time on appeal. In no instance
amount of fine imposed upon him is reduced from P5,000,000.00 did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were
to P500,000.00.17 lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their
integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be
A Notice of Appeal having been timely filed by appellant, the Court of raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the
Appeals forwarded the records of the case to us for further review. 18 court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form
of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the
question for the first time on appeal. (Emphases supplied.)
In our Resolution19 dated 10 December 2007, the parties were notified that
they may file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired, within 30
In People v. Pringas,23 we explained that non-compliance with Section 21 will buyer positively identified appellant as the seller of the shabu. Per Chemistry
not render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from Report No. D-728-2002 of Forensic Chemical Officer Nellson Cruz Sta.
him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the Maria, the substance, weighing 0.290 gram, which was bought by PO1
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as the same would be Tolentino from appellant in consideration of P300.00, was examined and
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the found to be methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).
case at bar, appellant never questioned the custody and disposition of the
drug that was taken from him. In fact, he stipulated that the drug subject In the case before us, we find the testimony of the poseur-buyer, together
matter of this case was forwarded to PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office with the dangerous drug taken from appellant, more than sufficient to prove
3, Malolos, Bulacan for laboratory examination which examination gave the crime charged. Considering that this Court has access only to the cold
positive result for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. We and impersonal records of the proceedings, it generally relies upon the
thus find the integrity and the evidentiary value of the drug seized from assessment of the trial court, which had the distinct advantage of observing
appellant not to have been compromised. the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses during trial. It is a fundamental
rule that findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and which
We would like to add that non-compliance with Section 21 of said law, involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross
particularly the making of the inventory and the photographing of the drugs misapprehension of facts and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported
confiscated and/or seized, will not render the drugs inadmissible in evidence. conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The reason for this is that
Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses
when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of
For evidence to be inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which forbids testifying during the trial.26
its reception. If there is no such law or rule, the evidence must be admitted
subject only to the evidentiary weight that will accorded it by the courts. One The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are
example is that provided in Section 31 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court sustained by the Court of Appeals. 27 Finding no compelling reason to depart
wherein a party producing a document as genuine which has been altered from the findings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, we affirm
and appears to be altered after its execution, in a part material to the their findings.
question in dispute, must account for the alteration. His failure to do so shall
make the document inadmissible in evidence. This is clearly provided for in Appellant denies selling shabu to the poseur-buyer insisting that he was
the rules. framed, the evidence against him being "planted," and that the police officers
were exacting P15,000.00 from him.
We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will
bring about the non-admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that appellant was the subject
to non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue of a buy-bust operation. Having been caught in flagrante delicto, his identity
therefore, if there is non-compliance with said section, is not of admissibility, as seller of the shabu can no longer be doubted. Against the positive
but of weight – evidentiary merit or probative value – to be given the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellant’s plain denial of the
evidence. The weight to be given by the courts on said evidence depends on offenses charged, unsubstantiated by any credible and convincing evidence,
the circumstances obtaining in each case. must simply fail.28 Frame-up, like alibi, is generally viewed with caution by this
Court, because it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. Moreover, it is a
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are (1) common and standard line of defense in prosecutions of violations of the
the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) Dangerous Drugs Act.29 For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. 24 What is material to clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that government
the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the officials have performed their duties in a regular and proper manner. 30 This,
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court appellant failed to do. The presumption remained unrebutted because the
of evidence of corpus delicti.25 defense failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the police
officers did not properly perform their duty or that they were inspired by an
All these elements have been shown in the instant case. The prosecution improper motive.
clearly showed that the sale of the drugs actually happened and that
the shabu subject of the sale was brought and identified in court. The poseur
The presentation of his common-law wife, Amelia Mendoza, and his nephew, away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
Alejandro Lim, to support his claims fails to sway. We find both witnesses not dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy
to be credible. Their testimonies are suspect and cannot be given credence regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker
without clear and convincing evidence. Their claims, as well as that of in any of such transactions.
appellant, that they were maltreated and suffered injuries remain
unsubstantiated. As found by the trial court: Under said law, the sale of any dangerous drug, regardless of its quantity
and purity, is punishable by life imprisonment to death and a fine
The accused, on the other hand, in an effort to exculpate himself of P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00. For selling 0.290 gram of shabu to PO1
from liability raised the defense of frame-up. He alleged that at the Tolentino, and there being no modifying circumstance alleged in the
time of the alleged buy bust he was merely sleeping at the house of information, the trial court, as sustained by the Court of Appeals, correctly
his sister. That he was awakened by the yells and screams of his imposed the penalty of life imprisonment in accordance with Article 63(2) 33 of
relatives as they were being mauled by the police officers. However, the Revised Penal Code.
this Court is not convinced. Accused failed to substantiate these
claims of maltreatment even in the face of his wife’s and nephew’s As regards the fine to be imposed on appellant, the trial court pegged the fine
testimony. No evidence was presented to prove the same other than at P5,000,000.00 which the Court of Appeals reduced to P500,000.00. Both
their self-serving claims.31 amounts are within the range provided for by law but the amount imposed by
the Court of Appeals, considering the quantity of the drugs involved, is more
Moreover, we agree with the observation of the Office of the Solicitor General appropriate.
that the witnesses for the defense cannot even agree on what time the
arresting policemen allegedly arrived in their house. It explained: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02070 dated 28
To elaborate, appellant testified that it was 3 o’clock in the afternoon May 2007, sustaining the conviction of appellant Norberto Del Monte, a.k.a.
of December 10, 2002 when he was roused from his sleep by the Obet, for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, is
policemen who barged into the house of his sister (TSN, July 7, hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
2003, p. 2). His common-law wife, however, testified that it was 10-
11 o’clock in the morning when the policemen came to the house SO ORDERED.
(TSN, Oct. 13, 2003, p. 6). On the other hand, Alejandro Lim testified
that he went to sleep at 11 o’clock in the morning and it was 10 MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
o’clock in the morning when the policemen arrived (TSN, Feb.2, Associate Justice
2004, p. 6). He thus tried to depict an absurd situation that the
policemen arrived first before he went to sleep with appellant. 32

Having established beyond reasonable doubt all the elements constituting

the illegal sale of drugs, we are constrained to uphold appellant’s conviction.

The sale of shabu is penalized under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165. Said section reads:

SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery,

Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. – The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 173804             December 10, 2008

ELPIDIO BONDAD, JR., Y BURAC, appellant,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Elpidio Bondad, Jr., y Burac (appellant) was charged before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City1 for violation of Section 5, paragraph 2(3),
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165) or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, allegedly committed as follows: 2

That on or about the 29 th day of January 2004, in the City of

Marikina, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
 knowingly sell to poseur buyer 0.02 gram of Methamphetamine The buy-bust team, together with the confidential informant, proceeded to 3
Hydrochloride (shabu) contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent C’s billiard hall at the corner of M. Cruz St. and Bonifacio Avenue in
plastic sachet, a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited Barangka, Marikina City. On entering the hall, the confidential informant
law.3 (Underscoring supplied) pointed to appellant who was then holding a cue stick beside the billiard table
as the alias "Jun." The confidential informant approached appellant and
He was likewise charged for violation of Section 11, par. 2(3), Article II also talked to him. Within minutes, appellant approached PO2 Dano and asked
of R.A. No. 9165, allegedly committed as follows: him if he wanted to buy shabu, to which PO2 Dano answered "piso lang."
Appellant at once took out a "Vicks" container from his right front
pocket5 which, when opened, yielded heat-sealed plastic sachets containing
That on or about the 29 th day of January 2004, in the City of
substances suspected to be shabu. From the container, appellant drew out
Marikina, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
one sachet in exchange for which PO2 Dano gave the marked one hundred
Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law to
peso bill. At that instant, PO2 Dano removed his cap.
possess or otherwise use any dangerous drugs, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession direct
custody and control 0.04 gram of white crystalline substance As the back-up police officers were closing-in, PO2 Dano grabbed appellant’s
contained in two (2) heat-sealed plastic sachets which gave positive arm, identified himself, and apprised appellant of his constitutional rights.
result to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), which Upon PO2 Dano’s order, appellant returned the buy-bust money, handed the
is a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited "Vicks" container, and gave his name as Elpidio Burac Bondad, Jr.
law.4 (Underscoring supplied)
Still at the place of arrest, PO2 Dano placed the markings "EBB-ED
The cases were lodged at Branch 272 of the RTC of Marikina. BUYBUST 01/29/04" on the substance-filled sachet sold to him, and "EBB-
ED, POS 1 and 2, 01/29/04" on the sachets that remained inside the "Vicks"
container.
From the evidence for the prosecution, particularly the testimony of its
principal witness PO2 Edwin Dano and its documentary evidence, the
following version is culled: The buy-bust team thereupon brought appellant and the seized items to the
Marikina City Police Station where a memorandum dated January 29,
20046 was prepared by P/Sr. Insp. Chief Haveria, Jr., addressed to the Chief
At around 7:05 p.m. of January 29, 2004, while PO2 Ferdinand Brubio, PO1
of the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory Office, requesting for the
Christopher Anos, and PO1 Roberto Muega were at the Station Anti Illegal
conduct of laboratory examination on the seized items to determine the
Drug Special Operations Task Force (SAIDSOTF), Office of the Marikina City
presence of dangerous drugs and their weight. PO2 Dano also requested
Police Station, PO2 Nelson Arribay arrived together with a confidential
that appellant be subjected to a drug test.7
informant. The confidential informant reported, among other things, about the
rampant sale of shabu in a billiard hall along Bonifacio Avenue, Barangka,
Marikina City and named a certain alias "Jun" as the vendor. The following day or on January 30, 2004, at 3:00 P.M., upon receipt of three
sachets, a laboratory examination was conducted thereon by Police Senior
Inspector Annalee R. Forro, Forensic Chemical Officer of the Eastern Police
The Chief of the SAIDSOTF, P/Sr. Insp. Ramchrisen Haveria, Jr., at once
District Crime Laboratory Office, who, in Physical Science Report No. D-
formed a buy-bust team composed of, among others, PO2 Ramiel Soriano
0094-04E8, recorded, among other things, the specimen submitted, her
and PO2 Dano who was designated as the poseur-buyer. PO2 Dano was
findings and conclusion as follows:
given a one hundred peso bill bearing Serial No. Q487945 to be used as
buy-bust money. It was agreed that PO2 Dano’s removal of his cap would
signal that the buy-bust was consummated. SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:

The conduct of a buy-bust operation was recorded in the police blotter and Three (3) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets with
was coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) which markings marked as A through C respectively, each
gave it control number NOC-012904-28. containing white crystalline substance with following
recorded net weights and markings:
 A = 0.02 gram "EBB-ED BUYBUST 01/29/04" Finding for the prosecution, the trial court convicted appellant in both
charges, disposing as follows:
B = 0.02 gram "EBB-ED POSS 1 01/29/04"
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds the
C = 0.02 gram "EBB-ED POSS 2 01/29/04" accused ELPIDIO BONDAD, JR. y BURAC guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Violation of Sec. 11 par. 2(3), Art. II of R.A.
9165 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a
x-x-x x-x-x x-x-x
period of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY and to pay the
fine of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PhP300,000.00) as
F I N D I N G S: x x x provided for in Sec. 11 par. 2(3), Art. II of RA 9165. The accused is
likewise found guilty of the crime of Violation of Sec. 5 Art. II of RA
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated 9165 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE
specimen gave POSITIVE result to the tests IMPRISONMENT and fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. (PhP500,00.00) pursuant to Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165 the
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) is ordered confiscated in
x-x-x x-x-x x-x-x favor of the government for proper destruction by the proper agency.

C O N C L U S I O N: SO ORDERED.11 (Underscoring supplied)

Specimens A through C contain Methamphetamine By Decision of February 8, 2006, 12 the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. 9 (Italics and emphasis in court’s decision with modification, disposing as follows:
the original)
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appeal is
Denying the charges against him, appellant, a former police officer, claimed DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision is
that he was framed up and gave the following version: AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
On January 29, 2004, while he was playing inside 3 C’s billiard hall, PO2 twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to thirteen (13)
Brubio, whom he knew was a policeman, entered the billiard hall. After years, as maximum and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand
greeting PO2 Brubio in Bicolano, he continued playing but PO2 Brubio Pesos (P300,000.00).
suddenly handcuffed him and asked him "Sumama ka muna." Another
person who was at his back pushed him out of the billiard hall in the course SO ORDERED.13 (Underscoring supplied)
of which he felt PO2 Brubio reaching his (appellant’s) right front
pocket,10 drawing him to restrain the hand of PO2 Brubio, telling him "pera ko Specifically with respect to the charge of possession of shabu, the appellate
yan!" court held:

Aware that his son was inside the billiard hall, appellant summoned and The evidence for the prosecution fully proved beyond reasonable
handed him his wallet containing P2,000. PO2 Brubio, however, took the doubt the elements necessary to successfully prosecute a case for
wallet from his son, telling him "Huwag ka makialam dito." He was then made illegal possession of a prohibited drug, namely, (a) the accused is in
to board a car and taken to the Office of the SAIDSOTF at the police station. possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or a
regulated drug, (b) such possession is not authorized by law and (c)
Appellant’s defense was corroborated by his son Christian Jeffrey C. the accused freely and consciously possessed said drug.
Bondad, and Roberto U. Mata who was a "spotter" (referee) at the billiard hall
at the time appellant was arrested. Under Section 11, Par. 2 [3] of R.A. 9165, the mere act of
possessing any dangerous drug consummates the crime. There is no
doubt that the charge of illegal possession of shabu was proven
 beyond reasonable doubt since the accused-appellant knowingly (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control
possessed plastic sachets with white crystalline granules, without of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
legal authority at the time he was caught during the buy-bust confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
operation. The white crystalline granules found in his possession, same in the presence of the accused or the persons/s from
upon laboratory examination, were positively identified whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
as methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous representative or counsel, a representative from the media
drug.14 (Italics in the original, underscoring supplied) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, appellant faulting the inventory and be given a copy thereof ; x x x (Emphasis
appellate court: and underscoring supplied)

I. . . . IN CONVICTING [HIM] OF THE CRIME[S] CHARGED ON Appellant claims that no physical inventory and photographing of the drugs
THE BASIS OF THE LONE TESTIMONY OF THE POSEUR BUYER took place. A reading of the testimony of the poseur-buyer, PO2 Dano indeed
AS AGAINST THE CORROBORATED STATEMENTS OF THE confirms appellant’s claim, viz:
ACCUSED AND HIS WITNESSES;
Atty. Puentebella:
II. . . . IN ADMITTING THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION
DESPITE CLEAR VIOLATION OF SECTION 21 (1) OF R.A. 9165; When you brought him to the police, it was there that the
items taken from him were inventoried, is it not?
III. . . . IN COMPLETELY DISREGARDING THE CLEAR EVIDENCE
ON THE EXISTENCE OF IRREGULARITY IN THE Witness:
PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS BY POLICE
OFFICER/S IN THE CONDUCT OF THE BUY BUST We did not make inventory because we simply brought the evidence
OPERATIONS.15 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) confiscated.

As the resolution of the second assignment of error is determinative of xxxx

whether there is still necessity of segueing to the first and third assignments
of error, it shall early on be passed upon. Atty. Puentebella:

Appellant claims that there was failure to follow the requirements of Sec. 21 You also did not take photographs of the items taken from
of R.A. No. 9165, hence, it compromised the integrity and evidentiary value the accused?
of the allegedly seized items.
Witness:
Sec. 21 of R.A. No 9165 provides:
Yes, sir.
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Atty. Puentebella:
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, And you know for a fact that under the new drugs law, this is
plant sources or dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and a requirement for the apprehending team to do, is it not?
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and or surrendered, for Pros. Gapuzan:
proper disposition in the following manner:
 Counsel is asking for a conclusion of law. I will object. apprehending officer/team. Its non-compliance will not render an
accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
Court: inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the
same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence
Witness may answer the question.
of the accused.17 (Citation omitted, emphasis, italics and
underscoring supplied)
Witness:
The Court’s pronouncement in Pringas is based on the provision of Section
Yes, sir. 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations18 of R.A. No. 9165, viz:

xxxx x x x Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements

under justifiable grounds, as long as the  integrity and evidentiary
Atty. Puentebella: value of the seized items are properly preserved  by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
So it is very clear now Mr. Witness that at the time you seizures of and custody over said items; (Emphasis and
apprehended the accused, you did not make an inventory underscoring supplied)
in the presence of the accused nor you did not [ sic]
make a photograph of the items seized in the presence In the present case, by PO2 Dano’s claim, he immediately marked the seized
of the accused, an elective official, a representative from the items which were brought to the Crime Laboratory for examination. By his
Department of Justice, or the media, that’s very clear? admission, however, he did not conduct an inventory of the items seized.
Worse, no photograph of the items was taken. There was thus failure to
Witness: faithfully follow the requirements of the law.

Yes, sir. Parenthetically, unlike in Pringas, the defense in the present case questioned
early on, during the cross examination of PO2 Dano, the failure of the
Atty. Puentebella: apprehending officers to comply with the inventory and photographing
requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 19, despite PO2 Dano’s
awareness of such requirements. And the defense raised it again during the
Since you did not make any inventory, it follows that you did
offer of evidence by the prosecution, thus:
not require them to sign your inventory as required by law?
Atty. Puentebella:
Witness:
xxxx
Yes, sir.16 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Exhibits "B" which is the brown envelope, "B-1", "B-2" and "B-3" are
Clearly then, the apprehending police officers failed to comply with the
objected to for being product of irregular functions of police and
above-quoted provision of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
therefore fruit of poisonous thinking [sic] and they are not admissible
and they were not photographed in the presence of the accused
People v. Pringas holds, however: as provided for by Sec. 21, par.1, R.A. 9165;20 (emphasis supplied)

Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 IN FINE, as the failure to comply with the aforesaid requirements of the law
is not fatal as long as there is  justifiable ground therefor, and as compromised the identity of the items seized, which is the corpus delicti of
long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the each of the crimes charged against appellant,21 his acquittal is in order.
confiscated/seized items, are properly preserved by the
This leaves it unnecessary to still dwell on the first and third assignments of
error.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision

is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and appellant, Elpidio Bondad Jr., y Burac,
is ACQUITED of the crimes charged.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of

Corrections, Muntinlupa City who is directed to cause the immediate release
of appellant unless he is being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform
this Court of action taken within ten (10) days from notice hereof.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice