Stephanie Bergbauer

Explaining
European
Identity
Formation
Citizens’ Attachment from Maastricht
Treaty to Crisis
Explaining European Identity Formation
Stephanie Bergbauer

Explaining European Identity

Formation
Citizens’ Attachment from Maastricht
Treaty to Crisis
Stephanie Bergbauer
European Central Bank
Frankfurt am Main, Germany

Dissertation at Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, Germany

ISBN 978-3-319-67707-1 ISBN 978-3-319-67708-8 (eBook)
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Preface

The emergence of a common identity among Europeans has been the subject of
intellectual debates ever since the beginnings of the European integration project.
As the European Union is establishing ever closer political and economic ties
between member states, this book takes a closer look at the affective bonds between
the Union and its citizens.
The idea for this project sprang from my own experience with and through the
European integration process. European unification gave me the freedom to study,
work, live, and make friends throughout Europe. Whereas my experiences abroad
gave me a strong sense of being European, this enthusiasm is not always shared by
the general public. When I started this project, Europe was still recovering from the
worst financial and economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The
ensuing drop in citizens’ trust in European and national institutions and the resur-
gence of nationalist tones in the debate over European integration reinforced my
interest in the sociocultural foundations of the European project. How strong are
feelings of belonging together as Europeans among citizens in the member states
today? Do Europeans share a common ‘we-feeling’ that can serve as a source of
solidarity towards other Europeans in times of crisis? And what does it take for
citizens to develop such a collective European identity? These are the questions at
the core of this book. The analysis was completed before the referendum on EU
membership in the United Kingdom, yet its findings already indicate that feelings of
belonging to Europe are notably less developed in the British society than else-
where on the continent. At the same time, this book provides advice to
policymakers how to strengthen citizens’ affective ties to Europe as a counter-
weight to Eurosceptic voices that can be heard also in other EU member states.
I am grateful to Edeltraud Roller for her extensive comments, constructive
criticism, and support throughout this book project. Colleagues at the University
of Mainz as well as friends and family in Mainz, Europe, and beyond provided
helpful comments and encouragement at various stages of the book. Dieter Fuchs
first helped me structure my thinking about EU attitudes long before the start of this

v
vi Preface

project. All remaining errors are my own. The views expressed in this book are
those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the
European Central Bank.

Frankfurt am Main, Germany Stephanie Bergbauer

Contents

1 The Relevance of a Common European Identity Among the

Citizens of Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Research Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 Outline of the Theoretical Model for Explaining Individual
Identification with Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Research Design, Data, and Methods of Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4 Overview of the Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2 Conceptualising European Identification and Mechanisms of European
Identity Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.1 Conceptualising Individual Identification with Europe and Collective
European Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.1.1 The Concept of Individual Identification with Europe . . . . 16
2.1.2 The Configuration of Multiple Identities in the European
Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.1.3 The Concept of Collective European Identity . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2 Mechanisms of Individual Identification with Europe . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.2.1 Exposure to Europe-Related Information and Individual
Identification with Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.2.2 Europe-Related Experience and Individual Identification
with Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.2.3 Ways of European and National Identification
Compared . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3 The Sources of European Identity: A Theoretical Model for
Explaining Individual Identification with Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.1 Theoretical Foundations for an Explanatory Model of Individual
Identification with Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.2 A Model for Explaining Individual Identification with Europe . . . 46

vii
viii Contents

3.2.1 Citizens’ Access to Europe-Related Information and

Europe-Related Experience and Individual Identification with
Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2.2 Individual-Level Determinants of Individual Identification
with Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.2.3 Country-Level Determinants of Individual Identification
with Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.2.4 Interaction Effects Between Individual- and Country-Level
Determinants of Individual Identification with Europe . . . . 65
3.3 The Impact of EU Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe
2004/2007 and the Onset of the Financial and Economic
Crisis 2008 on Individual Identification with Europe . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.3.1 Consequences of Eastward Enlargement 2004/2007
and the Onset of the Financial and Economic Crisis 2008
for the EU and the Member States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.3.2 General Implications of Eastward Enlargement and the
Crisis for Individual Identification with Europe . . . . . . . . . 78
3.3.3 Financial and Economic Crisis and Individual Identification
with Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.4 Summary of the Explanatory Model of European Identification . . . 87
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4 The Development of Citizens’ Identification with Europe from
Maastricht to the Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.1 Data and Operationalisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.2 The Development of Citizens’ Identification with Europe
1992–2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.3 The Prevalence of Multiple European and National Identifications
Among EU Citizens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.4 EU Enlargement and the Economic and Financial Crisis
and Levels of European Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.4.1 EU Enlargement to CEE and Citizens’ Identification with
Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.4.2 The Financial and Economic Crisis and Citizens’
Identification with Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
4.5 The Emergence of a Collective European Identity? . . . . . . . . . . . 128
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5 The Salience of European and National Identity for Political Parties
in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.1 Conceptualising Party Emphasis on European and National
Community and Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.2 Data and Operationalisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
5.3 The Salience of European and National Community and Identity in
National Party Discourse 1979–2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
Contents ix

5.4 EU Enlargement and the Economic and Financial Crisis and the
Salience of European and National Community and Identity in
National Party Discourse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
5.5 Identity as an Issue of Party Contestation Over EU Integration . . . 153
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the
Crisis on Feelings of European Identity Among EU Citizens . . . . . . . . 161
6.1 Research Design and Methods of Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
6.2 Data and Operationalisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
6.3 The Determinants of Citizens’ Identification with Europe
2000–2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
6.3.1 Between and Within Country Variation in Individual
European Identification 2000–2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
6.3.2 Explaining Individual European Identification
2000–2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
6.3.3 EU Enlargement and the Financial and Economic Crisis
and Citizens’ Identification with Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
6.4 Sources and Mechanisms of Citizens’ Identification with Europe
After Enlargement and the Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
7 The State of European Identity After the Crisis: Implications for
Research and Policymaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
7.1 Taking Stock of Citizens’ Identification with Europe from the
Maastricht Treaty to Eastward Enlargement and the Crisis . . . . . . 239
7.2 European Identity and EU Legitimacy After Maastricht . . . . . . . . 244
7.3 The State of European Identity After the Crisis and Implications
for Policymaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
7.4 Suggestions for Further Research on Individual Identification
with Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
Chapter 1
The Relevance of a Common European
Identity Among the Citizens of Europe

Why do some people see themselves as Europeans while others do not? Under
which conditions do people feel attached to Europe? What does it take for citizens
in the EU member states to consider themselves part of the wider community of
Europeans? In short: What makes people identify with Europe? These are the
questions at the core of the present analysis. It concentrates on the subjective
dimension of European identity, i.e. citizens’ identification with Europe rather
than the contents or ‘essential nature’ of European identity. Broadly defined,
identification with Europe denotes citizens’ self-description as European and their
attachment to Europe and other Europeans. European identification thus differs
conceptually and empirically from EU support, which refers to positive or negative
orientations towards the EU institutions and/or further steps in EU integration
(Beaudonnet and Di Mauro 2012; Boomgaarden et al. 2011; Fuchs 2011; Kuhn
2015).
By concentrating on a common European identity among citizens in the EU
member states, this book addresses both old and new questions in the history of
European integration. In fact, European identity has been the subject of intellectual
debates ever since the beginnings of European integration in the 1950s (Cerutti
2001; Stråth 2002). Early theorists of European integration had already pointed to
the importance of mutual trust, loyalty, and a common ‘we-feeling’ among ordinary
citizens for achieving further steps in European integration (Deutsch 1953a, b;
Deutsch et al. 1957; Haas 1958). At the governmental level, the importance of a
European identity was first recognised in 1973 when the heads of state and
government of the European Communities adopted a declaration on European
identity to strengthen cohesion among member states and affirm Europe’s place
in the world. It defined as fundamental elements of a European identity ‘the
principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice [. . .]
and of respect for human rights’ (European Commission 1974, p. 492). This first
attempt at establishing a common European identity from above was followed by
intentional European identity politics led by the European Commission in the 1980s
(Stråth 2002).

© Springer International Publishing AG 2018 1

S. Bergbauer, Explaining European Identity Formation,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67708-8_1
2 1 The Relevance of a Common European Identity Among the Citizens of Europe

Questions of identity received renewed interest after the adoption of the Treaty
on European Union, also known as Maastricht Treaty, in 1992. As the European
Communities developed into a fully-fledged political system at the European level,
scholars started debating if and how decision-making by EU institutions can be
democratically legitimated and whether European democracy requires a European
demos with a strong collective identity (see e.g. Beetham and Lord 1998; Cederman
2001; Cerutti 2003; Decker 2002; Habermas 2001, 2004; Kaina 2009; Kielmansegg
2003; Offe 1998; Scharpf 2009; Zürn 2000).
In the post-Maastricht area, European integration took on a new quality: EU
competences were successively extended to policy areas once at the core of national
sovereignty, e.g. the control over national borders and the national currency;
majority voting became the ordinary voting procedure in the EU Council, with
the potential to force national governments to implement EU legislation they
initially opposed; and EU policies had increasingly redistributive consequences,
redirecting financial resources towards poorer regions and creating net contributors
and net beneficiaries of EU funding among the member states. As a result, sources
from which the EU previously derived legitimacy, notably common gains in
economic welfare, securing peace in Europe, and an indirect legitimation of
EU-level decision-making through the involvement of democratically elected
national governments, appeared no longer sufficient. Instead, the legitimacy of
the EU was now seen to depend on the development of a strong European identity
among the mass public in the EU member states (Beetham and Lord 1998; Fuchs
2011; Habermas 2004; Kaina 2009).
The EU’s enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in 2004/20071 and
the financial and economic crisis the EU experienced from 2008 onwards2 gave
new impetus to scholarly and political debates on a common European identity. The
accession of twelve new member states required institutional reforms that revived
the debate over democratic deficits in the EU and the importance of a collective
European identity for the legitimacy of EU decision-making. At the same time,
enlargement was seen to add to the EU’s cultural heterogeneity and scholars
questioned whether the different historic trajectories and social and political expe-
riences of ‘old’ Western European member states and new CEE members would be

1
Eastern enlargement took place in two stages, with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia joining the EU in 2004, and
Bulgaria and Romania joining in 2007. For simplicity, both stages are summarised as Eastern
enlargement 2004/2007. The member states that were part of the EU before 2004 will also be
termed the EU15 or ‘old’ EU member states, while the terms ‘CEE member states’ or ‘new’ EU
member states will refer to the group of countries that joined the EU in 2004/2007.
2
The term ‘financial and economic crisis’ serves as an umbrella term for the interlocking crises—a
banking crisis, a crisis of the real economy, and a sovereign debt crisis—that have affected EU
member states since 2007/2008. For detailed accounts of the financial, economic, and sovereign-
debt crises in the EU, see e.g. Copsey (2015, esp. Chap. 1), Illing (2013), Lane (2012), and
Shambaugh (2012).
1 The Relevance of a Common European Identity Among the Citizens of Europe 3

an obstacle to the emergence of a common European identity (Delhey 2007; Fuchs

and Klingemann 2002; Gerhards 2005).
The financial and economic crisis brought a new urgency to the question of a
collective European identity as it laid bare the interdependencies between European
economies. To avoid sovereign defaults in the Eurozone and save the common
currency, the Eurogroup agreed on extensive financial rescue mechanisms. Member
states facing sovereign insolvency had to accept interventions by EU institutions
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and implement fiscal austerity mea-
sures in exchange for financial aids. For the creditor states, on the other hand, the
rescue funds implied considerable risks for national budgets in the case of default.
While citizens in the deficit countries protested austerity programmes required by
the troika of European Commission, European Central Bank, and IMF, rescue
mechanisms and financial guarantees were equally contested in the creditor coun-
tries. As citizens were presented with successive and ever extended ‘rescue pack-
ages’ for which ‘there is no alternative’,3 sentiments of distrust and opposition to
further bailouts became more widespread,4 cumulating in the question: ‘Why
should “we” pay for “them”?’ (Offe 2013, p. 599; emphasis in the original).
The question why Europeans should stand by each other financially epitomises
the relevance of a collective European identity and a common ‘we-feeling’ among
Europeans. Fritz Scharpf estimates that the solidarity required in the crisis might
have to equal the West-East transfers after German unification (Scharpf 2015).
Intra-European redistributions of this amount, however, are hard to justify unless
there is a sense of moral obligation via-a-vis the deficit countries and an under-
standing that measures to save the common currency are not a matter of ‘altruistic
donations’ by the creditor states, but a matter of solidarity in its proper sense,
meaning ‘to do not what “is good for you” but “what is good for all of us”’, in the
words of Claus Offe (Offe 2013, p. 559; emphasis in the original). Citizens’
acceptance of European measures of solidarity such as the financial guarantees
given to member states facing sovereign default is seen to depend on a shared
identity, a feeling of belonging together as Europeans, which serves as a source for
feelings of loyalty and moral obligation towards other Europeans (Offe 2013;
Scharpf 2015). That is, a collective European identity is considered necessary for

3
Exemplary for this line of argumentation is German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s speech before
the Bundestag in Mai 2010: Referring to the recently agreed financial rescue measures for Greece,
Merkel holds that, in order to safeguard the stability of the Euro system as a whole, there was ‘no
reasonable alternative’ to providing financial assistance to Greece. She then goes on to argue that
the Monetary Union was a ‘community of fate’; at stake was no less than ‘preserving and proving
the European idea’. In this way, bailout measures become a ‘historic task’ because ‘if the Euro
fails, Europe fails’ (Deutscher Bundestag 2010).
4
In Germany, for example, opinion polls repeatedly found a majority of respondents opposed to
further bailouts and debt cuts (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 2010a, b, 2011a, b, c, 2012a, b).
Similarly, public opinion in France and Britain opposed financial assistance to other EU member
states between 2010 and 2012 (Bloomberg News 2011; PewResearchCenter 2012, 2013).
4 1 The Relevance of a Common European Identity Among the Citizens of Europe

further steps to uphold the monetary union and further economic and political
integration at the EU level in general.
The remainder of this introductory chapter gives an overview of the research
strategy guiding the analysis. It introduces the research questions at the core of the
present work (Sect. 1.1), outlines the theoretical model for explaining individual
identification with Europe (Sect. 1.2), and presents the research design, data, and
methods of the empirical analysis (Sect. 1.3). The introduction concludes with an
outline of the remaining chapters of the book (Sect. 1.4).

1.1 Research Questions

At the core of the present analysis is the question why individuals identify with
Europe. Empirically, identification with Europe is a fairly widespread phenomenon
by now: a majority of EU citizens see themselves (also) as Europeans, feel attached
to Europe, and are proud to be European (Citrin and Sides 2004a, b; Fuchs et al.
2009; Fuchs and Schneider 2011; Risse 2010). Yet the proportion of citizens
identifying with Europe has hardly changed over time. In 1982, the first year the
Eurobarometer asked citizens about their feelings of European citizenship, 52% of
respondents indicated they sometimes or often thought of themselves as citizens of
Europe (Commission of the European Communities 1982), compared to 59% of
respondents who felt they were a citizen of the EU in autumn 2013 (European
Commission 2013). That is, over a 30-year period of European integration that
included actions with considerable symbolic power for a ‘ever closer union among
the peoples of Europe’—e.g. the free movement of persons on the Single European
Market, the abolishment of physical borders between EU member states, and the
introduction of the common currency—the share of citizens identifying as
Europeans has hardly changed.
Substantial differences in citizens’ identification with Europe also persist
between EU member states (Bellucci et al. 2012; Citrin and Sides 2004b; Fuchs
et al. 2009; Fuchs and Schneider 2011). While in autumn 2013 73% of Germans and
65% of Italians felt they were citizens of the EU only 42% of respondents in the UK
shared this feeling (Commission of the European Communities 1982; European
Commission 2013).
To address the overarching puzzle why some Europeans identify more readily
with Europe than others and how we can explain differences between member
states in this regard, this book formulates three sets of research questions. They
address both the general trends in European identity over the past two decades as
well as the specific effects of eastward enlargement and the crisis on citizens’
identification with Europe.
A first set of questions takes stock of the levels and development of European
identification among EU citizens from 1992 to 2013:
1.1 Research Questions 5

• How has citizens’ identification with Europe developed since the adoption of the
Maastricht Treaty 1992?
• How widespread are multiple national and European identifications in the EU
population?
• Which changes in levels and development of European identification do we
observe in response to the EU’s enlargement to CEE in 2004/2007 and the onset
of the financial and economic crisis in late 2008?
A second set of questions addresses the salience of European identity in party
discourse. The aim is to assess whether national political parties provide citizens
with arguments related to national and European identity:
• How salient are issues of European and national identity among political parties
in the EU member states?
• How has the salience of identity issues in party discourse evolved between 1979
and 2014?
• Which changes do we see in party emphasis on European identity in response to
the EU’s eastward enlargement 2004/2007 and the onset of the financial and
economic crisis in 2008?
A third and final set of questions turns to the explanation of citizens’ identifica-
tion with Europe. These address the determinants of European identification at
individual and country level:
• Which individual- and country-level factors influence individual identification
with Europe?
• How do individual attributes interact with country-level characteristics to influ-
ence European identification?
• Which changes do we observe in the determinants of European identification
over time?
An additional question addresses the impact of the EU’s enlargement to Central
and Eastern Europe in 2004/2007 and the onset of the financial and economic crisis
in late 2008:
• Do we observe changes in the determinants of European identification that can
be traced back to the EU’s enlargement to CEE in 2004/2007 and the onset of the
financial and economic crisis in 2008?
The following section outlines how the analysis proceeds conceptually to answer
these questions and describes the theoretical model for explaining individual
identification with Europe.
6 1 The Relevance of a Common European Identity Among the Citizens of Europe

1.2 Outline of the Theoretical Model for Explaining

Individual Identification with Europe

The theoretical model for explaining individual identification with Europe devel-
oped in this book is rooted in theories of identity formation in social psychology on
the one hand and theories of public opinion formation and EU public opinion
research on the other.
Drawing on social psychological approaches to identity, individual identification
with Europe is defined as citizens’ self-categorisation as European together with
their evaluations of their membership in the European collective and their affective
attachment to Europe and other Europeans. Social identity theories also provide
the starting point for conceptualising mechanisms of European identity formation at
the individual level. Based on the idea that group identifications depend on indi-
viduals’ exposure to ‘persuasive communications’ on the one hand and their ‘public
behaviour as group members’ (Turner et al. 1987, p. 53) on the other, the theoretical
model proposes two mechanisms of how citizens come to identify with Europe.
First, an information-based way of European identification. In this logic, citizens’
identification with Europe is rooted in exposure to elite messages and communica-
tions establishing the European community as a relevant category for self-
representation. Second, an experience-based way of European identification. In
this logic, citizens’ identification with Europe is rooted in direct encounters
between EU citizens and their personal experience of EU integration.
Proceeding from the idea that Europe-related information and Europe-related
experiences are at the root of citizens’ identification with Europe, the theoretical
model assumes that individual identification with Europe will depend on
(a) citizens’ access to such information and (b) their opportunities to come into
personal contact with other Europeans and the way they experience EU integration
in their daily lives. The factors that determine individuals’ access to EU-related
information and their opportunities for European contacts and experiences should
then also influence individuals’ propensity to identify with Europe.
Information about Europe, the European community, and its shared norms and
values may come from political elites, the mass media, or personal acquaintances.
Citizens’ access to such information is considered to depend on the supply of
EU-related information in form of elite messages and personal communications
on the one hand and citizens’ attentiveness to such messages as well as their
cognitive resources and competences to process these messages on the other.
Europe-related experiences comprise citizens’ personal interactions with other
Europeans, their experience with the repercussions of EU integration in the national
political context, as well as the national historical experiences and narratives of EU
integration that citizens are exposed to within their home societies and learn in
socialisation processes. Citizens’ opportunities for Europe-related experiences are
considered to depend on their personal and professional background as well as the
macrosocial context in which they live. In sum, individual attributes and pre-
dispositions as well as characteristics of the national context are presumed to
1.3 Research Design, Data, and Methods of Analysis 7

influence citizens’ access to and opportunities for Europe-related information and

experiences, and, therefore, should be included as explanatory factors in a model of
individual identification with Europe.
From these general assumptions regarding the formation of European identifi-
cations among citizens in the member states, the book proceeds to develop a
theoretical model for explaining individual identification with Europe. The explan-
atory model combines the idea of information- and experience-based mechanisms
of European identification with insights from research on public opinion formation
and attitudes towards EU integration. The final model combines three sets of
individual-level and three sets of country-level determinants in a multilevel
model of European identification. At the individual level, identification with Europe
is expected to depend on citizens’ political awareness, attitudes towards the
European and national community, and personal transnational experiences. At
the country level, identification with Europe is expected to depend on party
messages related to the European and national community, member states’ eco-
nomic position and degree of integration in the EU and global markets, and the
ethnocultural composition of member state societies.
The theoretical model of individual identification with Europe represents an
integrated model that seeks to explain individual identification with Europe across
all EU member states and periods of European integration without being restricted
to a particular political, geographic, or historical context. Empirically, it will be
applied to the analysis of citizens’ identification with Europe after Maastricht and
guide the explanatory analysis of citizens’ identification with Europe over the
period 2000 to 2012.

1.3 Research Design, Data, and Methods of Analysis

The present work places itself in the field of EU public opinion research and, more
specifically, research on the emergence of European identity among citizens in the
EU member states. Empirically, it explores levels and development as well as the
determinants of individual identification with Europe from the adoption of the
Maastricht treaty in 1992 until 2013, five years after the onset of the financial and
economic crisis that has affected the EU and its member states since late 2008. By
analysing citizens’ identification with Europe over more than two decades, this
book contributes to our understanding of long-term trends in European identifica-
tion at the citizen level and helps answer questions about the consequences of major
steps in the EU integration process on individual attitudes towards Europe.
The period under analysis in fact comprises a number of key events in the EU
integration process. In 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht established the European
Union, which marked the beginning of a fully-fledged political system at the
European level. Other key developments falling into the period of analysis are the
EU’s enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe in 2004/2007 and the onset of the
financial and economic crisis in 2008. Eastward enlargement and the financial and
8 1 The Relevance of a Common European Identity Among the Citizens of Europe

economic crisis, followed by sovereign debt crises in a number of member states,

are turning points in the integration process. They have had significant financial,
political, and social consequences for the EU as a whole as well as for individual
member states and initiated extensive debates over the future course of EU
integration.
The present work explores the consequences of these key moments in EU
integration for citizens’ identification with Europe, develops hypotheses about
potential changes in the determinants of European identification in response to
these two events, and tests these hypotheses in empirical analysis. The inferences
we can draw from this analysis reach beyond the immediate impact of enlargement
and the economic crisis. Eastward enlargement and the economic crisis can be
considered test cases for EU integration in that they resulted in a greater
politicisation and polarisation of the EU (Hutter and Grande 2014; Rauh and
Zürn 2014; Risse 2015). Concurrently, they made the costs of EU integration
more visible to citizens in the member states. Future steps towards a closer political
union, stronger European economic governance, or the accession of new EU
member states are likely to trigger similar processes of politicisation and contesta-
tion. Drawing on the examples of enlargement and the economic crisis, we are able
to theorise more generally about the development of a European we-feeling as EU
integration progresses and becomes more politicised. In this regard, the present
analysis enhances our understanding of the effects of major steps in EU integration
on citizens’ attitudes towards Europe and the EU.
The empirical analysis of citizens’ identification with Europe proceeds in three
steps, employing uni- and multivariate methods of analysis to provide new insights
into the strength and sources of European identification among the EU mass public.
The descriptive analysis of European identification, first, presents levels and
development of citizens’ identification with Europe between 1992 and 2013 for the
EU aggregate and individual member states. Particular attention is given to the
consequences of the EU’s eastward enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe in
2004/2007 and the onset of the financial and economic crisis starting in 2008. The
descriptive analysis draws on public opinion data from 42 Eurobarometer
(EB) waves conducted between March/April 1992 and November 2013.
The analysis of party emphasis on issues of European and national community
and identity, second, draws on data from national party manifestos for European
parliament (EP) elections to assess the salience of issues related to the European
and national community and identity at the party level between 1979 and 2014. To
this end, it tracks the share of manifesto statements dedicated to questions of
European and national community and identity compared to the total number of
arguments in a party manifesto over seven EP election campaigns. Data on national
party manifestos for EP elections from 1979 to 2009 is provided by the
Euromanifestos Project (EMP) at the Mannheim Centre for European Social
Research (MZES). The analysis of the EMP data for 1979–2009 is supplemented
by excerpts from party manifestos for the most recent EP election in spring 2014,
for which EMP data was not yet available at time of writing.
1.4 Overview of the Book 9

The third part of the empirical analysis subjects the previously developed
theoretical model of individual identification with Europe to empirical testing. It
employs linear hierarchical regression models combining individual- and country-
level data to study variation in identification with Europe across individuals and EU
member states. By testing the model at several time points between the years 2000
and 2012, it provides insights in the stability of the determinants of European
identification over different periods in the EU integration process. Depending on
the period under investigation, the analysis includes either the EU15 or the EU27
member states. Individual level data come from seven EB surveys conducted
between 2000 and 2012.5 Country level data mainly come from Eurostat,
supplemented by data from the EU Commission, the Euromanifestos Project
(EMP) at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES), the IMF,
and the Worldbank.

1.4 Overview of the Book

The remainder of this book is divided in six chapters. Chapter 2 defines the concept
of individual identification with Europe as the central construct of interest for the
present work. Individual identification with Europe is considered to comprise
cognitive, affective, and evaluative components and allow for identification with
multiple social groups, leading to a discussion of the relation between European
identification and national identification as the most important ‘rival’ identification
in the context of European integration. The chapter derives two mechanisms of
individual identification with Europe: first, an information-based way of European
identification assuming that citizens will identify with Europe to the extent that they
receive information about the community of Europeans from political elites, the
media and credible others; second, a contact- and experience based way of
European identification assuming that citizens will identify with Europe to the
extent that they personally interact with other Europeans and/or European institu-
tions. Again, European and national identifications are juxtaposed to illustrate
parallels and differences in the formation of both types of attachments and highlight
the particularities in the development of European identification.
Chapter 3 takes these two mechanisms as a starting point for developing a
theoretical model of individual identification with Europe. The model explains
citizens’ identification with Europe by factors shaping either citizens’ access to
Europe-related information or their opportunities for personal experiences with
other Europeans and EU politics. It argues that access to Europe-related informa-
tion and personal European experiences depend on individual attributes, on the one
hand, and the national context in which citizens live on the other. Accordingly, the

5
EB 54.1 (Nov/Dec 2000), EB 60.1. (Nov/Dec 2003), EB 62.0 (Oct/Nov 2004), EB 65.2 (March/
May 2006), EB 67.2 (April/May 2007), EB 73.3 (March/April 2010), EB 77.3 (May 2012).
10 1 The Relevance of a Common European Identity Among the Citizens of Europe

model includes both individual attributes and country characteristics as explanatory

factors of individual identification with Europe and develops hypotheses for both
sets of variables. Additional hypotheses address the consequences of the EU’s
enlargement to CEE in 2004/2007 and the onset of the financial and economic
crisis in 2008 for the determinants of European identification.
Chapter 4 traces the development of citizens’ identification with Europe from
Maastricht to the crisis. Drawing on survey data from the Eurobarometer, it tracks
individual identification with Europe in the EU aggregate and at the member state
level between 1992 and 2013, allowing conclusions regarding the emergence of a
collective European identity in the EU public. The empirical evidence shows that a
collective European identity has developed in the EU public alongside national
identities, with a majority of citizens seeing themselves (also) as European and
expressing attachments to the European community. While European identity
cannot match national identities in extent or intensity, multiple collective identities
are a reality for EU citizens by now. As regards the consequences of the EU’s
enlargement and the financial and economic crisis, we observe a slight increase in
citizens’ identification with Europe after the 2004 accession round. In the case of
the crisis, negative effects appear to accumulate over time, gradually weakening of
citizens’ affective ties to the European community.
Chapter 5 examines the salience of European and national identity issues for
political parties across Europe between 1979 and 2014. It draws on data from
national party manifestos for European parliament elections to explore to what
extent parties provide citizens with arguments and considerations about the
European community, a common European identity, and the consequences of
European integration for the national community and national identity. The analysis
of party manifestos shows that parties dedicate sizeable shares of their election
programmes to identity-related issues. Identity issues become more salient for
parties in the context of the EU’s enlargement 2004. Under the impression of the
financial and economic crisis, in contrast, parties’ attention initially shifts away
from questions of identity in the 2009 EP campaign. Yet, excerpts from the 2014 EP
election manifestos provide some evidence that economic issues and identity issues
become more closely linked to each other as the crisis continued.
Chapter 6 turns to explaining European identification and the impact of enlarge-
ment and the crisis on feelings of European identity among EU citizens. It starts by
outlining the research design, specifies a set of hierarchical linear regression models
predicting individuals’ identification with Europe from individual- and country-
level predictors, and introduces operationalisations of the dependent and indepen-
dent variables at the individual and country level. The subsequent statistical
analysis shows that individual identification with Europe is influenced mainly by
individual-level determinants while country-level characteristics have only limited
effects on European identification. The findings show stable individual-level effects
on European identification over the years. At the country level, economic aspects
and redistributive considerations become more relevant for European identification
in the wake of enlargement and the crisis.
References 11

Chapter 7 summarises the state of European identity after the crisis and impli-
cations for research and policymaking. It revisits the initial question why people
identify with Europe and summarises the central findings of the analysis. From
there, it proceeds to discuss the implications of the present work for theorising
European identity formation and the conclusions we can draw from these findings
with regard to the state of European identity and its role in EU legitimacy after
Maastricht. Finally, it points out strategies for policymakers interested in strength-
ening a common European identity among EU citizens and shows possible paths for
further research on individual identification with Europe.

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Chapter 2
Conceptualising European Identification
and Mechanisms of European Identity
Formation

This chapter specifies the concept of individual identification with Europe as the
central construct of interest of the present analysis and clarifies the mechanisms
through which citizens come to identify with Europe (Sect. 2.1). These
conceptualisations provide the starting point for the theoretical model for
explaining individual identification with Europe developed in subsequent chapters
of this book.
Drawing on social psychological theories of identity, individual identification
with Europe is defined in the following as citizens’ self-categorisation as European,
which comprises cognitive, affective, and evaluative components (Sect. 2.1.1). It is
assumed that individuals (can) identify with multiple social groups, which leads to a
discussion of the relation between citizens’ European identification and national
identification, the most pertinent ‘rival’ identification in the context of European
integration (Sect. 2.1.2). A further distinction is made between identification with
Europe as an individual-level characteristic denoting citizens’ self-categorisation
as European and collective European identity as the shared ‘sense of community’
among European citizens, which is a characteristic of the European community at
the macro level of analysis (Sect. 2.1.3). By clearly separating between the two
concepts, the present work aims at more conceptual clarity in research on EU public
opinion, which often uses the terms ‘European identity’, ‘EU identity’, ‘collective
European identity’, or ‘identification with Europe’ interchangeably.
Building once more on insights from identity research in social psychology, the
second part of the chapter clarifies the mechanisms presumed to underlie citizens’
identification with Europe (Sect. 2.2). Two ways of individual identification with
Europe are introduced: first, an information-based way of European identification
built on the assumption that citizens will identify with Europe to the extent that they
receive information about the community of Europeans from the media and cred-
ible others (Sect. 2.2.1); second, a contact- and experience-based way of European
identification built on the assumption that citizens will identify with Europe to the
extent that they personally interact with other Europeans and/or European institu-
tions (Sect. 2.2.2). Again, European and national identifications are juxtaposed to

© Springer International Publishing AG 2018 15

S. Bergbauer, Explaining European Identity Formation,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67708-8_2
16 2 Conceptualising European Identification and Mechanisms of European. . .

illustrate parallels and differences in the formation of both types of attachments and
highlight the particularities in the development of European identification (Sect.
2.2.3). Compared to national identification, European identification is presumed to
have a stronger cognitive component and develop predominantly via an
information-based way of identity building.

2.1 Conceptualising Individual Identification with Europe

and Collective European Identity

The present section introduces the concept of individual identification with Europe
that will guide the subsequent empirical analysis. The term ‘European identifica-
tion’ will refer to citizens’ self-categorisation as European as opposed to ‘collective
European identity’, which is used to describe a shared sense of community among
EU citizens at the group-level. European identification is understood to comprise
cognitive as well as affective and evaluative components, and does not exclude
identification with other social collectives, in particular the national community.
The following sections define the concept of individual identification with
Europe (Sect. 2.1.1) and discuss the relation between identification with Europe
and other collective identifications in the context of EU integration, notably citi-
zens’ identification with the national community (Sect. 2.1.2). A final sub-section
maps out the relationship between identification as an individual attribute and
collective identity as a group-level attribute (Sect. 2.1.3).

2.1.1 The Concept of Individual Identification with Europe

The starting point for defining citizens’ identification with Europe are concepts of
social identity developed in the framework of Social Identity Theory and its
derivative Self-Categorization Theory (Tajfel 1974, 1981, 1982; Tajfel and Turner
1979; Turner 1985; Turner et al. 1987).
Social Identity Theory (SIT) and Self-Categorization Theory (SCT) understand
social identity as the perception of self as part of a larger group or social collective
which provides a link between the individual and the group(s) to which he or she
belongs (Brewer 2001; Hogg and Abrams 1988). Accordingly, social identity is
defined as ‘that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowl-
edge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and
emotional significance attached to that membership’ (Tajfel 1981, p. 255).
Tajfel’s definition of social identity has several implications. It underlines that
the merely nominal allocation of individuals to a collective by outsiders, typically
based on externally observable attributes such as race, gender, or nationality, does
not suffice for the emergence of social identity. Rather, identification with social
2.1 Conceptualising Individual Identification with Europe and Collective. . . 17

groups is an individual psychological attribute which results from subjective claims

to group membership and a person’s acknowledgement and acceptance of her
membership in a social group as self-defining (Ashmore et al. 2004). What is
more, conceptualising social identity as an individual psychological attribute also
implies that identification is a continuous variable that may vary between individ-
uals and/or within individuals over time (David and Bar-Tal 2009).
Definitions of social identity in the tradition of SIT and SCT further emphasise
that identification with social groups is a phenomenon that comprises cognitive as
well as evaluative and affective aspects. Social identities are thus premised, first, on
cognitive processes of in-group/out-group categorisation and self-categorisation
as a member of the in-group. Self-categorisation is the most basic process under-
lying social identity and a precondition for other dimensions of identification
(Ashmore et al. 2004). In-group/out-group categorisations result from the percep-
tion of similarities and differences between individuals and the cognitive grouping
of oneself and others as similar in contrast to other persons who do not share the
common feature(s) of the in-group. Self-categorisation is assumed to follow the
principle of meta-contrast; that is, individuals will categorise themselves as mem-
bers of the in-group to the extent that they perceive differences between themselves
and members of the in-group as less than differences between themselves and
members of other groups (Turner et al. 1987).
Besides cognitive processes of in-group/out-group categorisation, social identi-
ties, second, imply evaluation and social comparisons. Social groups and group
memberships carry positive or negative value for the self because they are associ-
ated with specific value connotations. These value connotations result from pro-
cesses of social comparison between the in-group and relevant out-groups; the more
favourably a social group compares to other groups, the more positively connoted
the social identity associated with this group, and the higher the prestige of group
membership. Vice versa, negative evaluations relative to other social groups lead to
negative social identities and low prestige (Hogg et al. 1995; Tajfel and Turner
1986; Thoits and Virshup 1997). To the extent that individuals have internalised
their membership in a particular group as part of their self-concept, positive group
evaluations will increase their personal self-esteem; negative evaluations, on the
other hand, should lead group members to either leave the group or try to enhance
its prestige because individuals generally try to uphold a positive self-concept
(Tajfel and Turner 1986).
Third, social identities comprise affective components and emotional attach-
ments. Individual group members are considered to develop feelings of love, care,
and concern for the group because group membership provides them with reasons
for positive self-esteem and personal value. These affective attachments are
expected to give rise to a sense of loyalty and obligation toward the group that
leads its members to subordinate their individual goals to the goals of the larger
group (Brewer and Silver 2000; Herrmann and Brewer 2004; Lilli 1998; Thoits and
Virshup 1997). Group loyalty and the perceived ‘identity of interests in terms of the
needs, goals and motives associated with ingroup membership’ (Turner et al. 1987,
18 2 Conceptualising European Identification and Mechanisms of European. . .

p. 65), in turn, increase group cohesion and facilitate co-operation between group
members.
Based on social psychological approaches to identity, we can thus define indi-
vidual identification with Europe as follows: Individual identification with Europe
refers to citizens’ self-categorisation as European together with their evaluations of
their membership in the European collective and their affective attachment to
Europe and other Europeans.
Defining individual social identity as a phenomenon comprising cognitive as
well as evaluative and affective aspects does not imply that all three aspects must be
present or equally pronounced for all members of the in-group at all times (David
and Bar-Tal 2009). Empirical research in social psychology in fact shows that the
different dimensions of identification are not necessarily correlated and the rela-
tionship between them is likely to vary as a function of the particular social identity
in question, the characteristics of the subject population under analysis, and the
social context in which individual subjects operate (Ashmore et al. 2004; David and
Bar-Tal 2009). Applying these insights to European identity, we may thus speculate
that identification with Europe has stronger cognitive and weaker emotional com-
ponents than, e.g. national identities; likewise, the relative strength of the different
components of European identification may well vary between citizens and EU
member states, with, e.g. the French feeling emotionally attached to Europe while
the British identify as European primarily because they recognize their country’s
membership in the EU and their own legal status as EU citizens; finally, differences
in member states’ national political context could lead to differences in the strength
of European identifications among EU citizens, for example if eurosceptical polit-
ical parties are present in some countries and not in others.
Social psychological approaches to identity tend to remain on an abstract level
regarding the dimension(s) along which in-group/out-group categorisation ought to
take place for social identity to emerge; for example, Turner et al. (1987, p. 45) state
rather generally that in-group/out-group categorisations underlying social identities
are ‘based on social similarities and differences between human beings that define
one as a member of certain social groups and not others (e.g. ‘American’, ‘female’,
‘black’, ‘student’, ‘working class’)’. Yet the question which similarities individuals
need to perceive in order to develop strong ties to a collective is particularly
pertinent in the case of large-scale political communities such as modern nation-
states and the European Union. With regard to Europe, two opposing views emerge
from the discussion of the preconditions and similarities deemed necessary for the
development of a common European identity.
On the one hand, proponents of ‘essentialist’ or ‘culturalist’ approaches discuss
the emergence of a common European identity against the background of national
identity building. In this view, national identities always (also) build on cultural
roots; the national community is seen as bound together by common historic
experiences, myths, symbols, and traditions (see, e.g. Anderson 1991; Smith
1991). National identities are considered the product of long historical processes
in which the national community has acquired common memories, values, and
traditions. This shared heritage unites members of a nation internally and
2.1 Conceptualising Individual Identification with Europe and Collective. . . 19

demarcates them from other communities. Compared to the long-term processes of

identity building in the national realm, the outlooks for a common European
identity appear bleak. In effect, ‘essentialists’ argue that a common European
identity cannot build on such cultural bonds because unlike nation-states, the
European Union is ‘not a “community of communication”, barely a “community
of memory”, and only to a very limited degree a “community of experience”’
(Kielmansegg 2003, p. 58; author’s translation). The few commonalities that exist
among Europeans are deemed too weak for individuals to develop strong affective
ties to Europe and the community of Europeans.
Other authors take a more positive stance, maintaining that a shared political
culture and shared political practices can provide a basis for European identifica-
tion (Cerutti 2003; Fuchs 2000; Habermas 2001, 2004; Meyer 2004). Furio Cerutti
argues that European traditions overlap with regard to norms of solidarity and social
cohesion, forming a European social model that unites Europeans and sets them
apart from countries with more individualistic orientations (Cerutti 2003). Follow-
ing this line of reasoning, the perception of shared social and political values
together with the experience of common participation in European politics will
lead citizens in the member states to identify with Europe and their fellow
Europeans.
Ultimately, it remains an open empirical question, which similarities citizens in
the member states perceive among Europeans and whether these similarities are
substantial enough for citizens to not only acknowledge their legal status as an EU
citizen, but also develop affective ties to Europe and the community of Europeans.
As it is, it seems plausible to assume that most citizens in the EU member states are
aware of the European Union and their country’s membership therein, and, on this
basis, will self-categorise as European. As regards the perception of further—more
substantial—similarities among Europeans, the (scarce) empirical evidence indi-
cates that citizens in fact base their identification with Europe on the perception of
both political and cultural ties among Europeans. Pichler (2008, 2009) finds that EU
citizens explain their feelings of ‘being European’ with shared rights and duties
related to EU citizenship as well as shared membership in a common European
civilisation and society1; Fuchs and Schneider (2011) find that Europeans predom-
inantly see democratic values at the base of a European identity.2 While more

1
The exact question wording of the item analysed by Pichler and included in Eurobaromenter 57.2
(2002) reads, ‘Different things or feelings are crucial to people in their sense of belonging to
Europe. To what extent do you agree with the following statement: I feel European because I share
with my fellow Europeans . . .?’ Respondents were given fourteen options, which could be rated on
a scale from 1 ‘strongly agree’ to 4 ‘strongly disagree’ (for details on question wording and coding,
see Pichler 2008, pp. 414–415 and p. 420). Given that the item explicitly prompts respondents to
think about what they share with their fellow Europeans, the indicator appears a valid measure for
perceived similarities among Europeans.
2
The exact question wording of the item analysed by Fuchs and Schneider and included in
Eurobaromenter 71 (2009) reads, ‘In your opinion, which of the following are the two most
important elements that go to make up a European identity?’ Respondents were given seven
options from which they could select two (for details, see Fuchs and Schneider 2011). Unlike the
20 2 Conceptualising European Identification and Mechanisms of European. . .

research is needed to clarify the substantial bases that citizens perceive as under-
lying European identification, these findings nevertheless indicate that citizens in
the member states have developed some idea of what they have in common with
their fellow Europeans. These perceived similarities should not only reinforce
citizens’ cognitive-based self-categorisation as European, but also support the
formation of positive evaluations of and affective ties to Europe and their fellow
Europeans.

2.1.2 The Configuration of Multiple Identities

in the European Context

The question which similarities citizens perceive among Europeans and whether
these similarities are substantial enough to foster a European ‘we-feeling’ that can
fulfil functions similar to those of national identities touches on a further conceptual
and empirical issue in European identity formation. What is the relation between
European identifications and citizens’ identification with other collectives, most
importantly identification with the national community?
Collective national identities are thought to develop in long historical processes
and to be deeply rooted in the collective memory and national history of a country
(Anderson 1991; Fuchs 2011; Smith 1991). National identities thus become embed-
ded in institutions and political culture and therefore prove relatively resistant to
change; symbols like the national flag, the national anthem, or national holidays
serve as constant reminders of the national community and its unique myths and
traditions (Risse 2010; Risse and Engelmann-Martin 2002). At the individual level,
national identity is typically acquired through childhood socialisation and persua-
sive communications (Herrmann and Brewer 2004; Turner et al. 1987), so that
national attachments should constitute rather deeply rooted and stable orientations.
As a result, national identifications will likely persist alongside potential European
identifications, raising questions about the relationship between citizens’ identifi-
cation with the nation and their identification with Europe and about the
conceptualisation of multiple identities more generally.
Social psychological approaches to identity explicitly allow for the existence of
multiple social identities. Multiple social identifications are assumed to co-exist
within a hierarchical system of self-categorisations. In this system, self-
categorisations form at different levels of abstraction and each social category is
included within the next-highest category (Turner et al. 1987). Which identification

indicator used by Pichler, this item does not refer to respondents’ personal feeling as European nor
does it incite respondents to think about shared identity elements that Europeans have in common.
Therefore, the indicator should at best be considered an indirect measure of perceived similarities
among Europeans (Fuchs and Schneider 2011). Nevertheless, it provides some additional infor-
mation about citizens’ perceptions of the foundations of European identity.
2.1 Conceptualising Individual Identification with Europe and Collective. . . 21

becomes salient at a given moment is expected to depend on the characteristics of

both the person and the situation. It may vary across different social contexts as well
as over time (Ashmore et al. 2004; David and Bar-Tal 2009; Turner et al. 1987).
Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory thereby more or less implic-
itly assume that in any given situation only one social identity—the most salient
one—will have consequences for individuals’ attitudes and behaviour (cf. Turner
et al. 1987, especially Chap. 6). Accordingly, SIT and SCT would expect citizens to
identify with both the national community and with Europe as the superordinate and
more inclusive level; because national and European identifications are expected to
become salient at different times, individuals should be able to juggle both alle-
giances without greater difficulties.
The idea that different social identities become salient for individuals at different
times and in different situations—and therefore do not pose problems of conflicting
loyalties—may indeed apply to social groups and identities that are clearly demar-
cated from each other in terms of membership and/or function. For example, a
person’s belonging to and identification with a political movement has little con-
nection or overlap with her belonging to and identification with her sports team,
and, therefore, should not lead to situations in which she is forced to decide to be
loyal to one group or the other. It seems questionable, however, whether the
assumption of separate group memberships and allegiances also holds for large-
scale social categories with overlapping memberships and potentially opposing
demands for allegiance, e.g. nation, ethnicity, and social class (Brewer 2001;
Cinnirella 1996).
National and European identities are a case in point: Within the European system
of multi-level governance, competences and responsibilities are not always clearly
allocated to either the member states or the EU; both levels claim sovereignty and
decision-making authority. In this regard, national and European identity both refer
to the political realm, yet involve overlapping political communities with poten-
tially conflicting loyalties and allegiances. Consider for example the situation of a
German citizen whose identification with the national community may lead her to
oppose further German financial assistance to other EU member states while her
identification with Europe implies loyalty to EU member states in difficulty and
should lead her to support further assistance.
The example of the German European indicates that conceptualising national
and European identities as separate or independent social identities is theoretically
and empirically unrewarding. More appropriate appear conceptualisations of
national and European identifications as interrelated or interdependent. These
allow for mutual influences and overlaps between the national and European
level and in principle can take two forms: on the one hand, we can think of multiple
identifications as conflicting and in competition; on the other hand, we can assume
concordance between different levels of identification (Westle 2003).
In a conflict model of multiple identifications, national and European identifica-
tions are conceived as competing and adversarial. In this view, the ideas and criteria
underlying identification with the nation and the related affects and evaluations
exclude feelings of belonging to the wider community of Europeans. Strong
22 2 Conceptualising European Identification and Mechanisms of European. . .

national attachments should therefore depress citizens’ identification with Europe;

by the same token, citizens’ identification with Europe can only develop at the
expense of national identification—I can either be a committed Brit or a committed
European, but my identification with the latter will necessarily weaken my loyalty
to the former and vice versa.
Models assuming concordance of multiple identifications, in contrast, conceive
of national and European identifications as complementary; citizens are expected to
combine and reconcile their national and European attachments without further
problem. An example is the concept of ‘nested identities’, which considers that
multiple identifications are ordered hierarchically; in this perspective, the national
community and identity are subsumed (‘nested’) in the next-larger and more
encompassing European community and identity (Diez Medrano and Gutiérrez
2001; Herrmann and Brewer 2004; Risse 2010). Accordingly, citizens who identify
with the nation should also identify with Europe, although it remains unclear
whether strong identifications with lower levels goes together with stronger or
weaker identifications with higher-order communities (Diez Medrano and Gutiér-
rez 2001). Similarly, Risse’s ‘marble cake model of multiple identities’ (Risse
2004, 2010) holds that national and European identities are compatible, but con-
ceptualises national and European identifications as intertwined rather than hierar-
chically ordered. That is, multiple identities are seen to ‘influence each other, mesh
and blend into each other’ (Risse 2004, pp. 251–252) so that citizens’ identification
with Europe becomes part of and inseparable from identification with the national
community and vice versa. In this perspective, shared understandings of member-
ship in the national group also contain elements of ‘Europeanness’ so that the
common interest and experience of the national group are perceived to be
connected to Europe and the community of Europeans—I cannot be a loyal German
without being a loyal European.
The present analysis follows concepts that assume interdependence between
multiple social identifications. Accordingly, it conceptualises national and
European identifications as interrelated and mutually influencing. As the present
work seeks to explain citizens’ identification with Europe, the empirical analysis
will concentrate on the effects of national identifications on European identifica-
tions and not further explore potential reverse effects of European on national
identification.

2.1.3 The Concept of Collective European Identity

The conceptual discussion so far has focused on the individual-level processes

underlying social identity in terms of individuals’ self-categorisation as belonging
to a particular group and the evaluative and affective consequences associated with
group membership. In contrast, the functions and outcomes associated with social
identities—which are often the reason for studying identification in the first place—
are typically situated at the macro-societal level. These include, for example the
2.1 Conceptualising Individual Identification with Europe and Collective. . . 23

role ascribed to collective identities in achieving and maintaining system integra-

tion, political legitimacy, regime support and regime stability as well as social
mobilisation and collective action. Analyses of European identity in particular tend
to adopt a functional perspective, which considers the emergence of a collective
identity among Europeans a prerequisite for legitimising the European polity and
solving the EU’s democratic deficit (see, e.g. Cerutti 2003, 2008; and Introduction).
Given that the analytical value of the concept of European identity thus lies at
the macro level, the present subsection will focus on the shift from the micro- to the
macro level of analysis and discuss how individual identification is related to the
collective identity of social groups and the functions of collective identity at the
macro-societal level. A review of the literature on collective identities reveals two
approaches to conceptualising collective identities and the relationship between
collective identity as an aggregate characteristic and identification with a social
group as a characteristic of individual group members. On the one hand, we find
approaches to collective identity based in social psychology, which trace collective
identities back to the prevalence of group identifications among the members of a
society; on the other hand, we find sociological approaches to collective identity,
which conceptualise collective identity as an aggregate characteristic from the
outset on. These two research traditions have different implications for the empir-
ical assessment of collective identities in the European context.
Among social psychological approaches to collective identity, David and
Bar-Tal (2009) suggest a distinction between identification at the micro-
sociopsychological level and collective identity at the macro-sociopsychological
level in order to clarify the relationship between individual and group levels of
identity. Identification is defined as the process by which individuals self-categorise
as belonging to a group together with the cognitive, emotional, and motivational
consequences associated with group membership. Collective identity, in contrast,
refers to the joint awareness and recognition by group members that they share
membership in and identification with the same group; it is defined as ‘a situation in
which individuals in a society identify with the collective and are aware that other
members identify with this collective as well’ (David and Bar-Tal 2009, p. 361;
emphasis in the original).
David and Bar-Tal’s definition of collective identity has two central elements:
individuals’ identification with the group and their awareness of other group
members’ identification with the collective. By tracing collective identity back to
the prevalence of individual group identifications among the members of a society,
their definition provides a link between identification as an individual psychological
attribute and collective identity as a characteristic of the group at the macrosocietal
level. The second part of the definition, i.e. group members’ awareness of their
shared identification with the group, is more demanding. In David and Bar-Tal’s
understanding, collective identity exists only when group members identify with
and attach emotional value to the group, and, at the same time, are conscious that
other members of the group hold similar feelings and beliefs. This mutual aware-
ness of group identification is considered a precondition for the cognitive, emo-
tional, and behavioural consequences associated with collective identities at the
24 2 Conceptualising European Identification and Mechanisms of European. . .

macrosocial level. In particular, it is considered necessary for collective

mobilisation and coordinated activity that serves the benefit of the group, even
against individual members’ interests. The idea is that the more group members are
aware that not only they identify with the group, but that others share this feeling of
belonging and the values and emotions associated with group membership, the
greater group cohesiveness, and the greater individual members’ willingness to
make sacrifices for the group as a whole. Conceptually, introducing shared aware-
ness of group membership as a second definitional element of collective identity
thus helps bridge the gap between individual group identification and the functions
associated with collective identity at the group level.
The second approach to conceptualising collective identity draws on sociolog-
ical concepts of collective identity in the tradition of David Easton’s ‘we-feeling’ or
‘sense of community’ (Easton 1965, p. 185). Whereas social psychological
approaches start from individual identifications to construct group-level measures
of identity, sociological conceptualisations in the tradition of Easton conceive of
collective identity as an aggregate characteristic; from the outset on, the main focus
is on the functions of collective identity at the macrosocial level. Easton restricts his
analysis to the collective identity of political communities, i.e. groups of persons
who are bound together by their participation in common political structures and
processes. ‘Sense of community’ refers to the affective ties among the members of a
political community; it ‘consists of the feeling of belonging together as a group
which, because it shares a political structure, also shares a political fate’ (Easton
1965, p. 185). The ‘we-feeling’ of a community thus indicates the degree of
political cohesion and solidarity among the members of a political community; a
strong sense of community is considered to foster mutual sympathy and loyalty,
which, in turn, provide resources for collective action and constitute a source of
support for common political structures, the acceptance of collectively binding
decisions, and participation in the decision-making process. In other words, if
citizens feel they belong together as a political community, they should show
solidarity with their fellow community members and be in favour of common
political structures for regulating their political matters.
The definition of collective identity as, respectively, joint awareness of group
membership and identification (David/Bar-Tal) or common we-feeling (Easton)
also has implications for the operationalisation and empirical assessment of collec-
tive identities. Even if collective identity is considered a characteristic at the group
level, it ultimately rests on individual psychological attributes and processes (Fuchs
2011). Therefore, individual members’ identification with and feelings of belonging
to the community ought to be the starting point for constructing an empirical
measure of collective identity. Applied to the case of European identity, this
means that a collective European identity can be constructed from citizens’ indi-
vidual identification with Europe. Based on the conceptual considerations above,
we can define collective European identity in the following operational terms: A
collective European identity will be the stronger, the higher the number of EU
citizens who identify with Europe, the stronger citizens’ identification with Europe,
and the more citizens are aware of other citizens’ identification with Europe.
2.2 Mechanisms of Individual Identification with Europe 25

Methodologically, the shift from individual identification at the micro level to

the collective identity of a community at the macro level can be achieved via the
related mechanisms of aggregation and distribution (Fuchs 2011). Thus, we can
construct an empirical measure of a collective European identity by aggregating
citizens’ individual identifications with Europe and determine how European iden-
tifications are distributed among the EU population; the proportion of citizens
identifying as European, either in the European Union as a whole or within
individual member states, then serves as a measure of the strength of the macro-
level phenomenon of a collective European identity. It can be compared across
(different configurations of) EU member states and/or over time.
A measure of European identity based on the aggregate share of citizens’
identification with Europe, however, can only be indicative of the strength of a
collective European identity in terms of its extensity, i.e. the total number of
citizens identifying with Europe, and its intensity, i.e. the strength of citizens’
European attachments (Fuchs 2011); it does not allow conclusions about the extent
to which citizens share awareness of their mutual identification with Europe. A
measure of shared awareness would require that citizens not only know of their own
identification, but also know whether their fellow citizens across the EU identify or
not with Europe. While citizens may well be familiar with their friends’ and
family’s attitudes toward Europe, the EU as a whole is far too large a community
for citizens to personally know all other members of the community and be aware of
their European identifications. Hence, a measure of joint awareness can only build
on citizens’ subjective perception of others’ feelings and beliefs towards the
European community and the assumptions they hold regarding the prevalence of
European identifications in the EU population. In light of these problems, the
present analysis will focus on the strength of a collective European identity in
terms of the share of citizens’ identifying with Europe together with the intensity of
these attachments; it will not further pursue the aspect of shared awareness.

2.2 Mechanisms of Individual Identification with Europe

Having defined the concept of individual identification with Europe, the remainder
of this chapter will discuss how citizens develop collective identifications. By
specifying the conditions under which we should expect citizens to identify with
Europe, it provides the basis for the theoretical model explaining European iden-
tification at the individual level presented in Chap. 3. Drawing again on identity
research in social psychology, it starts by illustrating the general mechanisms
presumed to underlie the formation of group identifications. In a second step,
these ideas are applied to the emergence of group identifications in Europe.
Citizens’ identification as European is expected to develop via two mechanisms:
first, an information-based way of European identification; second, an experience-
based way of European identification. These are discussed in turn.
26 2 Conceptualising European Identification and Mechanisms of European. . .

Social psychological approaches to identity assume that in case of large-scale,

preformed social categories such as gender, nation, or race, i.e. categories to which
people belong by birth rather than by choice, the internalisation of in-group/out-
group categorisations underlying social identities follows general mechanisms of
attitude change and social influence (Turner et al. 1987). Thus, Turner and his
colleagues hypothesise that individuals will internalise group memberships and
self-identify as a member of some preformed social category under one of two
conditions, namely ‘(1) simply as a result of persuasive communications from
credible, prestigious, or attractive others (or in the terms of the present theory,
from others with whom they identify), and (2) on the basis of public behaviour as
group members leading to private self-attitude change’ (Turner et al. 1987, p. 53).
Implicitly, both explanations trace group identifications back to the prominence
of the group in the lives and minds of group members and to factors—persuasive
messages on the one hand, personal contacts and direct experiences on the other—
which have the potential to make group membership (more) meaningful for the
individual. These explanations thus seize on the notion of salience, the central
determinant of group identification in social psychology (Hogg et al. 1995; Turner
et al. 1987). While individuals are assumed to identify with multiple social cate-
gories, social-psychologists argue that whether a particular self-categorisation
becomes cognitively dominant for individuals in a given situation, and, as a result,
has immediate consequences for their attitudes and behaviour, depends on the
salience of the respective category in that situation. The more accessible a social
category, and the better the perceived fit between self and the defining character-
istics of the social group, the more individuals will self-categorise as group mem-
bers (Turner et al. 1987). In other words, individuals are expected to affirm their
identification with a collective to the extent that the latter is present in citizens’
minds as a relevant category for self-categorisation (Castano 2004).
Two basic mechanisms of group identification emerge from the discussion of
collective identification formation and identity change in social psychology: on the
one hand, we can trace individual group identification back to individuals’ exposure
to persuasive messages—‘persuasive communications’ in Turner’s et al. terms—
about the meaning and importance of the group, similarities among group members,
and the group’s shared identity; on the other hand, we can trace identification back
to the personal experiences individuals make in their capacity as a member of a
collective—i.e. when and if they ‘publicly behave as group members’ in Turner’s
et al. terms.
These general reflections on the formation of group identifications can now be
applied to citizens’ identification with Europe, resulting in two ways of how EU
citizens may come to identify with Europe: first, identification based on exposure to
Europe-related information; second, identification based on personal contacts and
direct experiences with the European community and other Europeans. Citizens
who receive more information about Europe and other Europeans and/or have more
personal experience with the EU and citizens from other member states are
expected to be more aware of the European community and the commonalities
they share with other Europeans. As a result, they should also identify more readily
2.2 Mechanisms of Individual Identification with Europe 27

with Europe than citizens who receive less information about Europe and/or have
less personal experience with other Europeans and the consequences of EU
integration.3
The following subsections discuss these two mechanisms of European identifi-
cation and clarify which type of messages and information on the one hand and
personal contacts and experience on the other are expected to affect citizens’
propensity to identify with Europe. The discussion starts by specifying aspects of
‘exposure to Europe-related information’ and its relation to European identification
(Sect. 2.2.1); a second sub-section discusses different dimensions of Europe-related
experiences and opportunities for citizens to gain such experience and how these
may affect European identification (Sect. 2.2.2). Tying in with the earlier discussion
on multiple identifications in the European context, special attention will be given
to the comparison between European identification and national identification
(Sect. 2.2.3).

2.2.1 Exposure to Europe-Related Information

and Individual Identification with Europe

The notion of information-based identification with Europe builds on the idea of

persuasive messages as a source of group identification. The central assumption is
that exposure to messages and information establishing the European community as
an object of identification and a relevant group for citizens’ self-description is at the
root of European identification. Citizens are expected to identify with Europe to the
extent that they receive messages and information about the community of
Europeans and thus are reminded of their own status as European and the commu-
nalities they share with other Europeans. In short, more information about the

3
It is of course possible that citizens who receive more information about and/or have more
personal contacts with other Europeans not only learn more about what they have in common with
other Europeans, but also what sets them apart. In this way, Europe-related information and
experiences may have reverse effects, leading to less rather than more identification with Europe
among EU citizens. Either way, however, the presumed underlying mechanism remains the same:
more information/more experience leads to changes in identification.
The theories of social identity formation in social psychology on which the idea of information-
and experience-based identification builds almost exclusively presume a positive association
between group salience and group identification. In line with these approaches, I initially focus
on positive effects of Europe-related information and experience on citizens’ identification with
Europe. However, the in-depth discussion of the two mechanisms of European identification in the
following subsections as well as the empirical analysis of European identification in later chapters
will take into account both positive and negative effects of more Europe-related information and
experience on citizens’ propensity to identify with Europe.
28 2 Conceptualising European Identification and Mechanisms of European. . .

European community is expected to increase the salience of the European group in

citizens’ minds and thus affect citizens’ identification with Europe.4
The notion that identification with Europe is fostered by better information and
persuasive messages about the European community and a common European
identity ties in with general theories of opinion formation and models of mass
communication that see messages by political elites at the root of public opinion
formation and opinion change (Kinder 1998; Mutz et al. 1996; Zaller 1992). The
notion of elite effects and mass communication as a source of public opinion has
also been taken up in the European context. Empirical analyses confirm the
influence of political parties (de Vries and Edwards 2009; Gabel and Scheve
2007a, b; Maier et al. 2012; Ray 2003) and the mass media (Azrout et al. 2012;
de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2006; Schuck and de Vreese 2011) on attitudes
towards the EU and European integration. The notion of an information-based
mechanism of attitude formation towards the EU is further supported by research
on EU support showing that citizens who are better informed about the EU also hold
more positive attitudes towards EU-level policy making (Clark and Hellwig 2012).
Citizens’ exposure to information about Europe can vary along two dimen-
sions—supply of Europe-related information and demand for such information.
From these, we can derive more specific determinants of citizens’ identification
with Europe.
From a supply-side perspective, exposure to Europe-related information
depends on the extent to which citizens are provided with arguments and consid-
erations that refer to the European Union and, more specifically, the community of
Europeans, its shared norms and values, and the meaning of a shared European ‘we-
feeling’. Sources of such information can either be political elites who disseminate
Europe-related arguments and considerations via the mass media; or other citizens
who transmit Europe-related arguments in personal communication.
From a demand-side perspective, exposure to Europe-related information
depends on the extent to which citizens are aware of elite messages and personal
communications regarding the European Union and the community of Europeans.
Awareness of Europe-related information, in turn, is considered to depend on, first,
citizens’ attentiveness to such information, i.e. their interest in and motivation to
receive elite messages and personal communications; and, second, on citizens’

4
As regards the direction of the effect of Europe-related information on European identification, in
principle, both positive and negative effects seem plausible. A priori, the present analysis postu-
lates that more information about Europe and the European community leads to changes in
citizens’ propensity to identify with Europe. Based on the existing empirical record, which largely
finds a positive association between information-related indicators such as media exposure,
political interest and engagement in political discussions, or factual knowledge of EU politics
on European identification (e.g. Bellucci et al. 2012; Diez Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001; Duchesne
and Frognier 1995), the following discussion concentrates on positive effects of citizens’ exposure
to Europe-related information on European identification. Nonetheless, the theoretical model
developed in Chap. 3 will include hypotheses for both negative and positive effects of
information-related indicators on individual identification with Europe.
2.2 Mechanisms of Individual Identification with Europe 29

capability to receive such information, i.e. their cognitive resources and compe-
tence to process elite messages and personal communications they are exposed to.
The notion that exposure to information is a two-dimensional phenomenon leads
to two sets of explanatory factors expected to affect individuals’ identification with
Europe: on the one hand, factors related to the provision of information by third
parties, i.e. attributes of elite messages and/or personal communications about the
community of Europeans; on the other hand, factors related to the processing of
information by the individual, i.e. attributes of the individual receiving elite and
personal messages about Europe.
As regards factors related to the provision of Europe-related information, a first
determinant is the intensity or amount of elite messages and personal communica-
tions about the European community that individuals are exposed to, i.e. how
salient Europe-related messages are in public or private debates. A second deter-
minant is the content or direction of elite messages and personal communications,
i.e. to what extent Europe-related messages promote a European we-feeling. The
more salient Europe-related messages are and the more these messages paint a
positive picture of the European community, the more citizens should identify with
Europe.5
As regards explanatory factors related to the processing of Europe-related
information, a first determinant is citizens’ interest in politics and, in particular,
their interest in European politics (motivation); a second determinant is citizens’
cognitive resources, most often assessed in terms of their level of education
(competence). Again, the more citizens are interested in (European) politics and
the better their cognitive competences, the more we would expect them to identify
with Europe.

2.2.2 Europe-Related Experience and Individual

Identification with Europe

The second path to European identification is thought to be experience-based. It

builds on the idea of personal contacts and direct experiences as a source of group
identification. Accordingly, citizens’ identification with Europe ought to be rooted
in direct encounters with other EU citizens and the personal experience of being
part of the European community. Citizens are expected to identify with Europe to
the extent that they interact face-to-face with other Europeans and/or experience the
consequences of EU policies in their daily lives. Thus, they are in a position to
perceive directly what Europeans have in common in terms of shared experiences,
norms, and values. As in the case of more information about the European com-
munity, more experience with other Europeans and the awareness of the

5
Vice versa, if citizens predominantly receive negative messages about the European community,
we should expect them to identify less with Europe.
30 2 Conceptualising European Identification and Mechanisms of European. . .

consequences of EU integration are expected to increase the salience of the

European group in citizens’ minds, resulting in an increase in citizens’ identification
with Europe.6
The notion of a positive effect of personal contacts with other Europeans on
citizens’ identification with Europe ties in with theories of intergroup relations
which expect increased intergroup contact to reduce intergroup bias and conflicts
between social groups (Allport 1954; Amir 1969; Dovidio et al. 2003; Pettigrew
1998). Empirical work in this research tradition shows that increased contacts and
personal acquaintances between members of different social groups change group
members’ perceptions; rather than perceiving the different groups as separate
entities, they start to see a single, more inclusive group and develop a common
in-group identity (Gaertner et al. 1993, 1994, 1996). In the European context, the
relevance of personal contacts for a common identity is emphasised by work in the
tradition of Deutsch’s transactionalist approach. Deutsch considered transnational
communications and cross-border networks as crucial for promoting a common
identity and trust among Europeans (Deutsch 1953; Deutsch et al. 1957). Recent
empirical analyses confirm that individuals with more transnational contacts are
indeed more supportive of European integration and more likely to identify as
European (Kuhn 2011, 2012a, b, 2015).
The notion of an experience-based way of European identification holds that
citizens will identify with Europe to the extent that they come into contact with
other Europeans and/or European institutions and directly perceive the conse-
quences of EU integration and European communalities in their daily lives. Such
Europe-related experiences can take different forms, depending on the immediacy
of contacts and interactions between citizens and other Europeans and/or European
institutions they imply. Three types of experiences are discussed in the following
individual personal contacts and direct interactions with other EU citizens; citi-
zens’ experience with the repercussions of EU integration in the national political
context; and member states’ national historical experiences and ‘narratives’ of EU
integration to which citizens are exposed within their home societies.
In a narrow sense, first, Europe-related experience signifies an individual’s
personal contacts and direct interactions with other Europeans, e.g. when working
or living abroad and socialising with other Europeans for private or professional
reasons. This is the most immediate form of experience related to the European
community in that it implies face-to-face contacts with other EU citizens. Direct
personal contacts are thought to facilitate the perception of communalities among
Europeans, which, in turn, should foster a common European we-feeling. Empiri-
cally, such changes in perception due to increased contact with citizens from other

6
As in the case of Europe-related information, it cannot be excluded that Europe-related experi-
ence actually has the reverse effect, leading to a de- rather than increase in European identification.
The focus on positive effects of Europe-related experiences on citizens’ identification with Europe
is again based on the existing empirical record, which has repeatedly shown a positive association
between citizens’ experience with other Europeans and their propensity to identify with Europe
(e.g. Braun and Müller 2012; Kuhn 2012b, 2015; Recchi 2008; Rother and Nebe 2009).
2.2 Mechanisms of Individual Identification with Europe 31

EU member states have been observed among Erasmus exchange students, for
example, who report a better understanding of the host country and an increased
sense of belonging to a European cultural space after their year abroad (King and
Ruiz-Gelices 2003).
To what extent citizens engage in personal exchanges with other EU citizens is
expected to depend on their personal background and professional environment.
That is, the degree of personal contacts and direct interactions with other Europeans
is a form of Europe-related experience that varies at the individual level and across
EU citizens. In this regard, this first category of Europe-related experience differs
from two categories of experience discussed in the following, namely the domestic
consequences of EU integration and national histories and ‘narratives’ of EU
integration. Both are forms of Europe-related experiences that are tied to the
national political context in which citizens live and, therefore, vary at the country
level and across EU member states, but are constant for citizens within the same
member state.
In a broader sense, second, Europe-related experience is seen to include citizens’
experience with the repercussions of EU integration in the national political
context and the consequences of EU integration for their home country. For
example, the free movement of goods, capital, services, and labour, the abolition
of border controls within the Schengen area, or the introduction of the euro as a
common currency let citizens experience the consequences of EU integration
without necessarily coming into direct contact with other Europeans. Likewise, a
country’s relative economic strength within the EU, its net contribution to the EU
budget or the degree of a country’s integration in the European market are corre-
lates of EU integration that citizens are confronted with in their national context.
Even though they do not imply personal contacts with other Europeans, these are
occasions where EU citizens gain Europe-related experience and get an idea of
what it means to be part of the European community. In this sense, citizens’
exposure to EU policies and the implications of their country’s integration in the
EU can be thought of as a form of everyday experience related to Europe that is
likely to shape their perceptions of the European community and, eventually, their
propensity to identify with Europe.
The assumption that experience with the consequences of EU integration in the
domestic context shapes European identification needs to be qualified with regard
to the nature of experiences, however. Thus, we should expect citizens to identify
more with Europe, the more positively they assess the consequences of EU inte-
gration in the national context. Vice versa, negative perceptions of the conse-
quences of EU integration are likely to depress citizens’ identification with
Europe. To give an example from the economic realm, we may expect citizens
from net recipient countries of EU funding to identify more with Europe than
citizens from net contributor countries assuming that the former will hold a more
positive image of Europe and redistribution among EU member states than the
latter.
Third, we can think of Europe-related experiences as the historical experiences
and ‘narrative’ of EU integration that citizens are exposed to within their home
32 2 Conceptualising European Identification and Mechanisms of European. . .

society and that they learn as part of socialisation processes. This conveyed or
indirectly acquired form of Europe-related experience corresponds to what Fuchs
terms ‘collective memory’. Collective memories provide information about a
country’s history, become incorporated in national symbols, writings, and monu-
ments, and are internalised by the individual citizen during socialisation (cf. Fuchs
2011, p. 49). The relevant societal memories with regard to Europe are interpreta-
tions of a member country’s historical approach to EU integration—its ‘European
history’. These are transmitted to citizens in socialisation processes and become
manifest at the individual level in the form of particular attitudes towards Europe,
the national community, and the role of one’s own country in EU integration. For
example, we may expect that EU integration and EU membership as well as the
question of who belongs or should belong to the community of Europeans are
discussed differently depending on the time and circumstances under which a
country joined the EU. Thus, the topic of EU unification as a means to secure
peace on the continent may be stronger in the six EU founding states whereas
economic connotations may dominate in member states which joined later on; in
contrast, in the Central and Eastern European member states that joined the EU in
2004/2007, EU accession will likely be interpreted first and foremost as part of (re-)
integration with the West after communism. Likewise, we may expect that different
historical trajectories lead to different conceptions of the relationship between the
nation and Europe. Risse’s (2010) analysis of national identity constructions indeed
shows that the relation between national identity and Europe is discussed in very
different terms in different member states. For example, European integration and
EU membership were incorporated in the image of a ‘modern Germany’ after
World War II; in contrast, the debate in the UK has traditionally sought to support
the idea of a unique English or British identity that ought not be affected by British
EU accession and European integration (Risse 2010). These particular national
perceptions of European integration and the relation between the nation and Europe
can be thought of as a society’s ‘collective experience’ with Europe and the
EU. Individual citizens are exposed to member state-specific collective experiences
through the way European affairs are framed in the domestic context, e.g. in public
discourse, the national education system, or the national media. In this sense,
national cultures work as a filter through which citizens perceive the EU and
European integration. As a result, some aspects of European integration may be
equally important across all EU member countries whereas others become salient
only in some member states (Diez Medrano 2003). Qualitative research on citizens’
perceptions of European integration by Diez Medrano (2003) confirms that partic-
ular national understandings and representations of European integration are also
reflected at the individual level. For example, Germans are found to interpret
European integration as a chance for reconciliation after WWII while British
citizens are more concerned with the consequences of European integration for
national sovereignty and identity (Diez Medrano 2003, esp. Chap. 2).
To sum up, particular national understandings of Europe imply neither direct
contacts with other EU citizens nor concrete experiences with EU policies in
citizens’ daily lives. Nevertheless, they can be thought of as a form of experience
2.2 Mechanisms of Individual Identification with Europe 33

with the European community in that they transmit particular perceptions of Europe
and the European community. These perceptions, in turn, translate into particular
understandings of European integration at the individual level that are likely to
affect citizens’ propensity to identify as European. Again, how national perceptions
of European integration and their reflections at the individual level affect citizens’
European identifications will likely vary depending on the nature and focus of these
perceptions. For example, we may expect that citizens who predominantly conceive
of European integration as an opportunity for positive change in their home
country, be it in terms of reconciliation (e.g. Germany after WWII),
democratisation (e.g. Spain after Franco), or modernisation and economic progress
(e.g. Eastern Europe after 1989/1990), will generally hold a more positive image of
Europe and more likely identify as European. In contrast, citizens who perceive
European integration first and foremost as a threat to the national community and its
sovereignty should identify less with Europe.
If we assume that experiences with the European community are at the basis of
citizens’ European identifications, their propensity to identify as European should
vary with the opportunities they have to gain such experiences. Two sources of
opportunities for Europe-related experiences can be distinguished: on the one hand,
opportunities for Europe-related experiences may arise from individuals’ personal
background and their professional position; on the other hand, such opportunities
may arise from the macrosocial context in which citizens live. Individual and
macrosocial context do not provide for all three forms of Europe-related experi-
ences alike, however. Thus, personal background and professional environment
will likely determine the extent to which citizens directly interact with other
Europeans; likewise, particular perceptions of European integration that were
internalised in socialisation processes are attributes at the individual level. The
macrosocial context citizens live in, on the other hand, conditions both the extent of
citizens’ opportunities for personal contacts with other Europeans and the extent
and nature of citizens’ everyday experiences with EU policies and the domestic
consequences of European integration.

2.2.3 Ways of European and National Identification

Compared

To summarise the argument so far, Europeans are expected to identify with Europe
to the extent that they perceive Europe as a salient category for self-identification;
the salience of the European category for the individual citizen is presumed to
depend on the information about Europe and the European community they are
exposed to and the degree of their personal experience with other Europeans and the
consequences of EU integration in the domestic context. The present section will
juxtapose the mechanisms presumed to underlie European identification with the
development of citizens’ attachments to their national community. The aim is to
34 2 Conceptualising European Identification and Mechanisms of European. . .

show that we should expect the formation of European identification to differ

fundamentally from how citizens come to identify with their national community.
While individuals are socialised into the shared beliefs underlying national identity
from an early age on and constantly (re-)experience institutionalised forms of
national identity and solidarity, citizens’ identification with Europe will rely mainly
on cognitive processes and the information citizens receive and the knowledge they
have of the EU and the European community.
National identities are typically thought to be ‘deeply rooted’, ‘profound’ col-
lective identities (Fuchs 2011, p. 41). They stem from common historic experiences
and strong common beliefs, and, for some, also from substantial commonalities
such as shared ethnicity, religious affiliation, or cultural affinity, which translate
into feelings of togetherness and solidarity among the members of a nation (Fuchs
2011; Kantner 2006). Individuals are socialised into the shared beliefs underlying
national identity from an early age on and constantly (re-)experience these shared
values and beliefs as the latter have become institutionalised, for example in the
constitution, in national welfare state regimes, or particular national views on
foreign and defence policy. Political and social institutions also provide opportu-
nities for shared experiences and shared social norms, e.g. through participation in
general elections, enrolment in the education system, or during military and com-
munity service (see Herrmann and Brewer 2004 for a discussion of how political
institutions shape collective identities). National citizens also regularly experience
institutionalised forms of solidarity among the members of the national community,
e.g. in the form of redistributive social policies. Finally, even if national commu-
nities remain ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson 1991) in that members of the
national community do not personally know the majority of their fellow-nationals,
they still directly interact with a significant number of them on a regular basis. The
expectation is that such constant direct experiences with other nationals, with the
institutions representing the community’s shared values, and with institutionalised
forms of solidarity strengthen an individual’s emotional attachment to the national
community.
The situation is fundamentally different in the case of European identity. Not
only does the EU lack the common historical experiences and cultural cohesion
underlying national identities, there are also few occasions for citizens in the
member states to experience European values through EU policies or interact
directly with European institutions and other EU citizens.
In effect, there is no European constitution, which could serve as a point of
reference for shared European values; likewise, most EU policies remain regulative
in nature. Thus, they do not involve the same type of moral issues or value-laden
questions as some of the policy areas under national jurisdiction and, as a result,
provide fewer opportunities for emotional attachment (see Kantner 2006 for a
discussion of the problems of integrating highly value-laden policy areas at the
EU level). An example would be national welfare regimes or security politics.
Research on national identities shows that citizens see their country’s social
security system as a reason for national pride and identification with the national
level; likewise, the military is cited as a source of national pride (Evans and Kelley
2.2 Mechanisms of Individual Identification with Europe 35

2002; Hjerm 1998). The EU, in contrast, has little competences in these highly
sensitive policy areas and thus cannot rely on them as a reference point for a
common European identity.
What is more, although the EU has far-reaching competences in numerous
(other) policy fields, EU legislation and policy programmes are implemented in
the member states not by EU institutions, but by their national counterparts, and EU
representatives are rarely present in the member states. This division of labour
between the European and the national level leaves few occasions for citizens to
interact directly with European actors.
Apart from elections to the European Parliament, there are also few
institutionalised opportunities for experiences that are shared by citizens across
EU member states. Similarly, tangible forms of pan-European solidarity are typi-
cally restricted to small parts of the EU population, such as subsidies for farmers or
the Structural and Cohesion funds for poorer regions within EU member states. At
the citizen level, personal contacts between citizens from different EU member
states are restricted to small parts of the EU population and primarily occur among
the young, the highly educated, and those in higher-status occupations (see descrip-
tive results in Fligstein 2008; Kuhn 2011, 2012b, 2015).
The expectation is that in the absence of direct personal experiences with EU
representatives and citizens from other member states, the greater part of EU
citizens will develop European identifications based on information about the
European community they receive from third parties and the way they experience
the consequences of European integration in the domestic context. For the same
reason, we may expect that European identification has a stronger cognitive than
affective component; citizens will probably be aware of their home country’s
membership in the EU and geographical location on the European continent and,
therefore, self-categorise as European, yet without necessarily showing strong
emotional attachments to Europe and their fellow Europeans.
The characteristics that are assumed to distinguish the formation of European
identification in the mass public from identification with the national community—
low salience of European issues and few personal interactions with other Europeans
in citizens’ everyday lives, reliance on third-party information, and a stronger
cognitive component—also have implications for the explanation of citizens’
identification with Europe. An explanatory model of European identification must
take into account that, for a large part of EU citizens, Europe as the object of
identification has little relevance and few are familiar with European affairs and/or
other Europeans. What is more, we need to account for the fact that, for most
citizens, experience with Europe takes place in the national political context; that is,
citizens gain experience with Europe not by interacting directly with EU institu-
tions or other Europeans, but by experiencing the consequences of European
integration in their home country. In this manner, characteristics of the national
political context are likely to shape how citizens perceive and evaluate the EU
integration process and ought to be taken into account in the explanation of
European identification.
36 2 Conceptualising European Identification and Mechanisms of European. . .

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R. D. Ashmore & J. Lee (Eds.), Self and identity. Fundamental issues (pp. 106–133).
New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Turner, J. C. (1985). Social-categorization and the self-concept: A social cognitive theory of group
behaviour. In E. J. Lawler (Ed.), Advances in group processes: Theory and reseach (Vol. 2, pp.
77–122). Greenwich: JAI Press.
Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). Rediscovering
the social group. A self-categorization theory. Oxford/New York: Basil Blackwell.
Westle, B. (2003). Europäische Identifikation im Spannungsfeld regionaler und nationaler
Identitäten. Theoretische Überlegungen und empirische Befunde. Politische
Vierteljahresschrift, 44(4), 453–482.
Zaller, J. (1992). The nature and origins of mass opinion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chapter 3
The Sources of European Identity: A
Theoretical Model for Explaining Individual
Identification with Europe

Chapter 2 developed the idea that Europe must be perceived as a tangible category
for self-categorisation in order for citizens to identify as European. Citizens with
better access to information about Europe and/or better opportunities for every day
experiences with citizens from other EU member states should be more aware of the
commonalities shared by Europeans and have a clearer idea of membership in the
European community. As a result, they should more readily identify as European
than citizens who have only little knowledge about Europe and/or experience with
the EU and other Europeans.1 Based on these considerations, two mechanisms
underlying citizens’ identification with Europe have been suggested: The first is
information-based and assumes that exposure to elite messages and communica-
tions establishing the European community as an object of identification and a
relevant category for self-representation is at the root of citizens’ European iden-
tification. Citizens are expected to identify with Europe to the extent that they
receive information about the community of Europeans and thus become aware of
its shared norms and values as well as the meaning and importance of a shared
European ‘we-feeling’. The second is experience-based and considers that direct
encounters with other EU citizens and the personal experience of being part of the
European community are at the root of citizens’ European identification. Citizens
are expected to identify with Europe to the extent that they interact with other
Europeans and/or European institutions and directly perceive what Europeans have
in common in terms of shared experiences, norms, and values.
The present chapter takes these two mechanisms as a starting point for devel-
oping a theoretical model of individual identification with Europe among EU
citizens. Building on the idea of information- and experience-based identification,
the model starts out from the assumption that citizens’ propensity to identify with

1
As previously discussed, reverse effects are equally possible, with better informed citizens and
those with more experience with other Europeans and EU integration identifying less with Europe.
The theoretical model of European identification with Europe accounts for both positive and
negative effects by developing alternative hypotheses for empirical analysis.

© Springer International Publishing AG 2018 41

S. Bergbauer, Explaining European Identity Formation,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67708-8_3
42 3 The Sources of European Identity: A Theoretical Model for Explaining. . .

Europe will depend on their access to Europe-related information on the one hand
and the opportunities they have for personal contacts with other Europeans and the
way they experience EU integration on the other. Accordingly, the theoretical
model explains citizens’ identification with Europe by factors that shape either
citizens’ access to Europe-related information or their opportunities for personal
experiences with other Europeans and EU politics. The degree of citizens’ access to
information about Europe and opportunities for personal contacts among Europeans
is considered to depend on, first, citizens’ individual attributes and predispositions,
and, second, the national context in which citizens live. Therefore, the model
includes both individual attributes and predispositions and contextual attributes at
the member state level as explanatory factors of individual identification with
Europe.
The resulting explanatory model systematically links conceptualisations of
group identity and the formation of group identifications in social psychology to
explanatory factors of European identification deduced from (EU) public opinion
research. It provides a comprehensive framework for analysing European identifi-
cation in the mass public that aims at explaining individual identification with
Europe across all EU member states and periods of European integration without
being restricted to a particular political, geographical, or historical context. It will
be applied to the explanation of European identification in the mass public after
Maastricht with a particular view to two decisive periods in the recent history of
European integration: the EU’s enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe in 2004/
2007 and the financial and economic crisis that has affected the EU and its member
states since late 2008.
Eastward enlargement and the financial and economic crisis, followed by sov-
ereign debt crises in a number of member states, are turning points in the integration
process in that they had significant financial, political, and social consequences for
the EU as a whole as well as for individual member states, and initiated extensive
debates over the future course of EU integration. The present analysis theoretically
and empirically explores how these key moments in the EU integration process
have affected citizens’ identification with the European community. The inferences
we can draw from this analysis for the development of European identification in
the mass public reach beyond the immediate impact of these two events. Eastward
enlargement and the economic crisis can be considered test cases in the EU
integration process. They made the costs of EU integration more visible to citizens
in the member states and resulted in a greater politicisation and polarisation of the
EU (Hutter and Grande 2014; Rauh and Zürn 2014; Risse 2015). Future steps
towards a closer political union, a stronger European economic governance, or
the accession of new EU member states are likely to trigger similar processes of
politicisation and contestation. The examples of enlargement and the economic
crisis thus allow us to theorise more generally about the development of a European
we-feeling as EU integration becomes more politicised.
The remainder of the present chapter is divided in three main parts. Section 3.1
presents the conceptual foundations of the theoretical model of European identifi-
cation. Section 3.2 builds on these foundations to develop a theoretical model for
3.1 Theoretical Foundations for an Explanatory Model of Individual. . . 43

explaining individual European identification that links individual- and country-

level determinants of citizens’ identification with Europe to the information- and
experience-based mechanisms of European identification deduced in Chap. 2. The
final section explores the impact of EU enlargement to CEE and the financial and
economic crisis on individual identification with Europe (Sect. 3.3). This last part
discusses in detail how turning points in the EU integration process affect citizens’
identification with Europe and which changes in the determinants of European
identification we expect in response to EU enlargement 2004/2007 and the onset of
the financial and economic crisis in 2008.

3.1 Theoretical Foundations for an Explanatory Model

of Individual Identification with Europe

The present section presents the conceptual foundations for the explanatory model
of individual identification with Europe developed in the following. These are in
particular John Zaller’s work on the nature and origins of mass opinion (Zaller
1992), and Dieter Fuchs’ model of mass opinion towards the EU and European
identity, which adapts Zaller’s insights to the formation of attitudes in the context of
European integration (Fuchs 2011).
John Zaller’s Model of the Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion In his 1992
study on ‘The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion’, John Zaller explores how
individuals form political preferences; in particular, preferences and attitudes
towards objects and events which are beyond their immediate experience and full
personal understanding. His central conjecture is that political attitudes are a
function of, on the one hand, information carried in elite discourse and, on the
other hand, the degree of individuals’ attention to this information together with
individuals’ political values and predispositions mediating their reaction to elite
information.
The starting point of Zaller’s theory of public opinion formation are messages by
political elites that individuals receive and convert into political opinions. Zaller
distinguishes two types of messages carried in elite discourse. On the one hand,
persuasive messages which are ‘arguments or images providing reasons for taking a
position or point of view’ (Zaller 1992, p. 41); if accepted by the individual, these
may be used as a consideration when forming an opinion about a political issue. On
the other hand, cueing messages which ‘consist of “contextual information” about
the ideological or partisan implications of a persuasive message’ (Zaller 1992,
p. 42); this information allows individuals to evaluate the persuasive messages
they receive in light of their own political predispositions and respond critically to
these messages.
The extent to which individuals are exposed to and receive messages by political
elites is considered to be a function of their level of political awareness (cognitive
engagement); whether individuals accept or reject a particular elite message is
44 3 The Sources of European Identity: A Theoretical Model for Explaining. . .

considered to depend on their (pre-existing) political dispositions and the availabil-

ity of contextual information enabling them to correctly perceive the relationship
between the arguments they receive from political elites and their own values,
interests, and experiences. When asked to give an opinion statement, individuals
sample from the pool of elite arguments and considerations they have previously
encountered and base their opinion on the most accessible considerations, i.e. those
considerations which have been thought about most recently and, therefore, are still
at the top of people’s minds.
Zaller’s conceptualisation of the processes underlying public opinion formation
are the starting point for the explanatory model of individual identification with
Europe developed in this book. Although Zaller is predominantly concerned with
public opinion and electoral choice in U.S. legislative and presidential elections, he
presents his work as a general model of the formation of political preferences. As
such, it applies to a wide range of problems in research on public opinion and
political behaviour (cf. Zaller 1992, p. 1), and also lends itself to the study of public
opinion towards the EU and the formation of European identification among EU
citizens. In fact, Zaller tailors his model to public opinion formation in situations
where citizens have little first-hand experience with the matter or object in question,
lack a full understanding of the event, and, therefore, rely on leadership cues and the
information they receive from political elites to form an opinion (cf. Zaller 1992,
p. 14). The EU appears to present a prime example of such an obscure and far
removed object; in effect, the majority of the EU population has little knowledge of
EU affairs (Maier and Bathelt 2013; Westle and Johann 2010), feels ill-informed
about EU politics, and relies on the mass media to gather information about the EU
and its policies (European Commission 2011b, 2012b). Against this background,
Zaller’s model of the construction of public opinion appears to be an adequate
theoretical basis for the analysis of EU public opinion and the development of
citizens’ identification with Europe.
Dieter Fuchs’ Model of the Construction of Mass Opinion Towards the EU
and European Identity Fuchs (2011) takes up the notion of public opinion
formation under conditions of low salience and develops a model of the construc-
tion of mass opinion towards the EU and European identity that takes Zaller’s
model as its theoretical basis. In Fuchs’ model of EU mass opinion, the individual
orientations to be explained are ‘support for the EU’ and ‘European identity’. The
central explanatory factors at the individual level are respondents’ level of political
awareness, considered to affect the degree of exposure to elite messages, and
respondents’ political predispositions, considered to regulate the acceptance or
rejection of elite arguments. At the system level, the focus is on the discourse of
political elites, considered the central determinant of the degree of citizens’ expo-
sure to political communications. For Fuchs, the relevant elite messages for atti-
tudes towards Europe and the EU stem from party contestation over EU integration
and the politicisation of European questions in party discourse (Fuchs 2011, p. 47).
Fuchs introduces a number of modifications to adapt Zaller’s original model to
the analysis of EU public opinion. First, Fuchs includes ‘framing messages’ as an
3.1 Theoretical Foundations for an Explanatory Model of Individual. . . 45

additional type of elite message to which citizens are exposed to. Framing messages
are considered interpretative or ideational packages that convey a specific defini-
tion, causal interpretation, or evaluation of a problem (see the definitions by
Entman (1993) and Polletta and Ho (2006) cited in Fuchs 2011). Furthermore,
Fuchs argues that political awareness should not be considered in isolation, but is
itself determined by respondents’ interest in politics and their level of education.
Accordingly, he adds ‘motivation’ (general political interest) and ‘competence’
(level of education) as predictors of individual political awareness. He further
points to the relevance of everyday experiences for political choices and prefer-
ences as demonstrated in electoral research and hypothesised by socialisation
models of identity change. Accordingly, Fuchs extends Zaller’s model by including
citizens’ ‘everyday experiences’ as additional determinant of the acceptance or
rejection of elite messages and thus independent source of opinion formation at the
individual level.
At the system level, Fuchs extends Zaller’s original model by including ‘critical
events’, political institutions, and ‘collective memory’ as additional contextual
influences affecting the structure and content of elite messages as well as individ-
uals’ political predispositions. All three context characteristics are expected to have
a particular bearing on attitudes towards the EU.
Critical events are defined by Fuchs as events with substantial consequences for
national societies that lead to significant changes in elite positions and individual
political preferences (cf. Fuchs 2011, p. 48). The financial and economic crisis may
present such a watershed moment for European societies in that it led to significant
shifts in economic, financial, and monetary policies at both the EU and the national
level, sometimes with drastic consequences for national societies, as the examples
of austerity programmes in Greece and elsewhere show.
Political institutions, in turn, affect elite messages and individual predispositions
by shaping the structure of national political conflict as well as citizens’ expecta-
tions towards the political system. For example, types and degree of national
welfare regimes, national party systems, and electoral context have all been
shown to systematically influence citizens’ attitudes towards the EU and EU
integration (see the analyses by, e.g. de Vries and Edwards 2009; Hooghe and
Marks 2005; Ray 2003; Steenbergen et al. 2007).
Collective memory, finally, is defined by Fuchs as the substance and structure of
political conflict in a country together with the political predispositions of its
citizens, both determined by national history (cf. Fuchs 2011, p. 49). A country’s
collective memory becomes manifest in its national symbols, monuments, writings,
and other iconic representations, and provides a pool of references and information
about a country’s history. Citizens internalise these references in socialisation
processes and political elites can draw on them to mobilise public opinion and
provide a particular interpretation of issues of public debate. As regards elements of
collective memory related to European integration, research on national identity
constructions and national perceptions of European integration shows that there are
indeed country-specific understandings and representations of the EU and EU
integration. These can be traced back to member states’ different historical
46 3 The Sources of European Identity: A Theoretical Model for Explaining. . .

trajectories and are empirically observable both among national elites (see,
e.g. Risse 2010; Risse and Engelmann-Martin 2002) and ordinary citizens (see,
e.g. Diez Medrano 2003) in the member states.
Fuchs’ model of the construction of EU public opinion provides the starting
point for the explanatory model of individual identification with Europe developed
in the remainder of this chapter. The next step is to apply the general premises of
Fuchs’ model to the analysis of citizens’ identification with Europe. This adaptation
requires adjustments in two regards.
First, we need to discuss how the general constructs that Fuchs introduces as
determinants of EU mass opinion can be adapted to the specific case of explaining
European identification. Which are the relevant individual political predispositions
and everyday experiences likely to affect citizens’ identification with Europe?
Likewise, which issues must be politicised in elite discourse so that we can expect
elite messages to influence citizens’ identification with Europe? In short, we need to
replace general concepts of opinion formation with specific predictors of European
identification.
Second, we need to discuss whether additional explanatory factors ought to be
added to the model to account for the specific conditions of the formation of
European identification. This also requires a discussion of how Fuchs’ model of
the construction of mass opinion towards the EU and European identity can be
aligned with the idea that identification with Europe develops along two distinct
paths, either through information about the EU and the community of Europeans or
through personal contacts and experience with other Europeans. Section 3.2 will
take up these questions and develop a theoretical model for explaining individual
identification with Europe. While taking Fuchs’ work as a starting point, the
theoretical framework for explaining European identification modifies his model
in such a way as to adapt it to the particular case of individual identification with
Europe and deduct empirically falsifiable hypotheses about the sources of individ-
ual identification with Europe.

3.2 A Model for Explaining Individual Identification

with Europe

The remainder of this chapter develops the theoretical model for explaining indi-
vidual identification with Europe that will form the basis of the empirical analysis
of European identification in the EU mass public. The presentation of the model
starts with an overview of the theoretical assumptions underlying the model of
European identification (Sect. 3.2.1). The subsequent sections discuss the explan-
atory variables and the theoretical expectations regarding the relationship between
explanatory variables and citizens’ identification with Europe in detail (Sects. 3.2.2,
3.2.3, and 3.2.4).
3.2 A Model for Explaining Individual Identification with Europe 47

3.2.1 Citizens’ Access to Europe-Related Information

and Europe-Related Experience and Individual
Identification with Europe

The following introduction outlines the explanatory model of European identifica-

tion developed in the remainder of this chapter. It seeks to clarify how information-
and experienced-based processes of European identification deduced from Social
Identity Theory can be linked to specific individual- and country-level characteris-
tics in order to build a comprehensive theoretical model of citizens’ identification
with Europe that can be subjected to empirical analysis.
Individual identification with Europe has previously been defined as citizens’
self-categorisation as European together with their evaluation of their membership
in the European collective and their affective attachment to Europe. Drawing on
social identity theories in social psychology, we deduced two mechanisms of
identity formation presumed to underlie individual identification with Europe.
Citizens are expected to come to identify with Europe through exposure to infor-
mation about Europe and the community of Europeans and personal contacts with
other Europeans and the experience of EU integration in their daily lives. Conse-
quently, individual identification with Europe should depend, on the one hand, on
the opportunities and abilities citizens have to receive and process information
about Europe, and, on the other hand, on citizens’ opportunities to come in personal
contact with other Europeans and the way they experience the consequences of EU
integration in their everyday lives.
The extent of citizens’ access to information about Europe and personal encoun-
ters with other Europeans as well as the way citizens experience the consequences
of EU integration in their daily lives are considered to be influenced by both
citizens’ individual attributes and predispositions and characteristics of the
national context in which citizens live. To concretise these individual- and
country-level influences, I make use of the explanatory factors proposed by Zaller
(1992) and Fuchs (2011) and allocate these to either of the two mechanisms of
European identification, adding further determinants where appropriate.
At the individual level, Zaller and Fuchs suggest political awareness, political
predispositions, and everyday experiences as relevant factors for influencing public
opinion and attitudes towards the EU and European identity. These general con-
cepts are adapted to the analysis of European identification in the following way:
Political awareness is extended to include general political interest, interest in
European politics, and knowledge of EU politics; the aim is to capture not only
citizens’ general interest in political affairs, but also their attention to and knowl-
edge of politics at the European level as the primary object of identification and
reference point for feelings of European identity.
Political predispositions considered relevant for European identification are
citizens’ attitudes towards the European and the national community. These include
citizens’ conception of Europe and the European community in terms of a shared
cultural heritage and/or common political fate as opposed to a means to individual
48 3 The Sources of European Identity: A Theoretical Model for Explaining. . .

benefits; the degree of national identification; and citizens’ conception of national

community, i.e. whether they conceive of membership in their national community
as universalistic (based on the belief in common political values) or particularistic
(based on a common cultural ancestry, ethnicity, language, or religion).
Finally, as regards everyday experiences, I assume that the relevant experiences
for European identification are instances in which citizens interact with their
counterparts in other EU member states. Accordingly, personal transnational
experiences in the form of private and professional contacts and interactions with
other Europeans, either across EU member state borders or within the home
country, are included as a further predictor of identification with Europe at the
individual level.
At the country level, Zaller and Fuchs both focus on the role of political elites
and elite messages in public opinion formation. Building on this idea, I argue that
the elite messages most likely to affect citizens’ identification with Europe are party
messages related to issues of European identity and the European community on the
one hand and party messages related to issues of national identity and the national
community on the other. Accordingly, a first set of country-level predictors
included in the model of European identification are party messages related to
the European and national community, i.e. the degree to which national political
parties either emphasise communalities among Europeans and shared European
values and traditions or point to the distinctiveness of the national community and
invoke a strong national identity. Thus, party messages represent a measure of
Europe-related information and, more particularly, information about the European
and national community that citizens receive within the national political context.
Expanding on Zaller and Fuchs, I include two additional sets of country-level
predictors in the model of European identification. The first are member states’
economic position and degree of integration in the EU and global markets, which
refers to member states’ membership in the Eurozone, net contribution to the EU
budget, and share in international trade. These measures represent proxies for how
citizens experience the economic dimension of European integration and its con-
sequences for the national economy.
Second, I include measures of member state societies’ ethnocultural composi-
tion as additional country-level predictors. Ethnocultural composition thereby
refers to the overall share of foreigners and the share of EU nationals living in a
country as a measure of member states’ cultural heterogeneity and diversity of the
national population. These are considered proxies for the likelihood of personal
contacts between foreign (EU) nationals and the native population.
Figure 3.1 provides an overview of the individual- and country-level predictors
included in the model of individual identification with Europe. Country-level pre-
dictors are displayed in the upper half of the figure; individual-level predictors are
displayed in the bottom half. Shaded boxes indicate predictors allocated to an
experienced-based mechanism of European identification.
Having introduced the individual- and country-level determinants of European
identification included in the explanatory model, the next step is to clarify whether
and how these relate to the idea of information- and experience-based ways of
 Party messages on European
Party messages related to community
European and national
Party messages on national
community community

Eurozone membership
Economic position and
integration in EU and Net contribution to EU budget

Country level
global markets
Share in international trade

Ethnocultural composition Share of EU nationals in national

and international social population
integration
Share of immigrants in national
population
Individual
identification
General political interest with Europe

Political awareness Interest in EU politics

Knowledge of EU politics
3.2 A Model for Explaining Individual Identification with Europe

Conception of European community

Attitudes toward European National identification

and national community

Individual level
Conception of national community

Transnational practices

Personal transnational Personal transnational background

experiences
Individual transnational human capital
49

Fig. 3.1 Explanatory model of individual identification with Europe (without interaction effects)
50 3 The Sources of European Identity: A Theoretical Model for Explaining. . .

identification with Europe. The aim is to show how approaches to European

identification that draw on social psychology on the one hand and research in the
field of public opinion formation on the other can be linked in order to develop a
comprehensive theoretical framework for explaining individual identification with
Europe.
Starting with individual-level determinants of European identification, political
awareness, in the form of citizens’ knowledge of and their attention to (European)
politics, clearly points to an information-based way of identification. The assump-
tion is that political awareness influences how likely citizens are to receive infor-
mation about Europe and the European community on which European
identification may build.
Citizens’ attitudes towards the European and the national community as well as
personal transnational experience, in contrast, are associated with an experience-
based way of identification.
Starting with the latter, personal transnational experiences provide a direct
measure of Europe-related experience: private and professional contacts and inter-
actions with citizens from other member state, either across member state borders
or within the home country, represent a very direct form of experience with the
European community. This experience is thought to facilitate the perception of
communalities among Europeans, which, in turn, should affect citizens’ likelihood
to identify with Europe.
Attitudes towards the European and the national community, on the other hand,
represent measures of indirect experiences with the European community or expe-
riences with the European community once removed. Over the course of their lives,
citizens are exposed to particular national perceptions of European integration—the
‘collective memory’ of a country’s European history—passed on in socialisation
processes, via the education system, and in the mass media. They also experience
EU policies and the consequences of EU integration at the national level and in their
everyday lives, e.g. in the form of open borders, the common currency, or
EU-funded infrastructural projects. Likewise, citizens acquire conceptions of
national identity and national community in socialisation processes; over the course
of life, these conceptions are reinforced through experiences with other members of
the national community and social and political institutions embodying the
community’s shared values and beliefs (cf. Chap. 2). While these experiences do
not necessarily imply personal contacts with other Europeans, they still constitute a
form of experience with Europe expected to shape citizens’ outlook on the
European and the national community and their perception of the relation between
the national and the European level. These attitudes, in turn, are expected to
influence citizens’ feelings of belonging to Europe.
As regards the allocation of country-level determinants to different paths of
European identification, party messages related to the European and national
community are assumed to affect European identification via an information-
based process. In effect, party messages about the European community, a common
European identity, and its relation to the national level provide a direct measure of
the extent and type of Europe-related information that citizens are exposed to. This
3.2 A Model for Explaining Individual Identification with Europe 51

is also the case for party messages about the national community: by emphasising
the nation, its unique values and traditions, and a national way of life, parties
implicitly or explicitly invoke the distinctiveness of the national community, thus
underlining differences rather than communalities among Europeans. In this regard,
party messages about the national community, too, represent a form of Europe-
related information. Overall, party messages thus represent the supply side of an
information-based path of European identification: they provide citizens with
arguments and considerations about Europe, the European community, and the
relation between the national and the European level, which, in turn, should
influence citizens’ propensity to identify with Europe.
Member states’ economic position and degree of integration in the EU and
global markets as well as member state societies’ ethnocultural composition, on the
other hand, are considered to affect European identification via an experience-based
process of identification.
As regards member states’ economic position and degree of economic integra-
tion, the idea is that indicators of a country’s economic strength and degree of
integration in the European market such as its net contribution to the EU budget,
membership in the Eurozone, or share in trade represent corollaries of EU integra-
tion that citizens experience in the domestic context; either directly because they
use the euro as the common currency or are employed in trade-dependent indus-
tries, or indirectly, in that contributions to the EU budget and trade dependency
represent aspects that are relatively frequently communicated and discussed in the
national political debate and mass media, not only in relation to EU integration, but
also in the wider debate on the state of the national economy. Moreover, economies
that are more open and more export-oriented industries also provide more oppor-
tunities for citizens to meet personally with citizens from other EU member states
for professional reasons, thus increasing the chance for everyday experiences with
other Europeans.
A similar argument applies to the relation between member states’ ethnocultural
composition and citizens’ propensity to identify with Europe. The idea is that
indicators of sociocultural diversity such as the share of EU nationals living in a
country and the overall share of immigrants in a country’s population provide
proxies for citizens’ opportunities to interact with non-nationals and make the
kind of everyday experiences and personal encounters expected to influence iden-
tification with Europe. Based on these considerations, measures of member states’
ethnocultural diversity are associated with an experience-based process of
European identification.
The following subsections discuss the different sets of explanatory variables of
European identification in detail and derive hypotheses for empirical analysis. I will
develop, first, an individual-level model of identification with Europe (Sect. 3.2.2);
in a second step, I will add explanatory factors at the country level to the individual-
level model to build a multilevel model of European identity (Sect. 3.2.3). Third, I
will discuss how individual predispositions such as political interest and identifi-
cation with the nation mediate the effect of country characteristics on citizens’
propensity to identify with Europe and specify potential interaction effects between
52 3 The Sources of European Identity: A Theoretical Model for Explaining. . .

individual- and country-level determinants (Sect. 3.2.4). The final part of this
chapter discusses the impact of EU enlargement to CEE and the financial and
economic crisis on individual identification with Europe (Sect. 3.3). To explore
whether and how the bases of citizens’ identification with Europe change at key
moments in the integration process, the EU’s eastward enlargement 2004/2007 and
the onset of the financial and economic crisis in 2008 are taken as test cases for the
general model. Thus, a final set of hypotheses addresses potential changes in the
determinants of European identification under the impact of enlargement and
economic turmoil in the EU member states. The aim is to explore theoretically
and empirically how turning points in the integration process affect citizens’
identification with Europe and contribute to our understanding of the development
of EU public opinion in light of substantial changes in the composition of EU
member countries and changing economic relations between EU member states.

3.2.2 Individual-Level Determinants of Individual

Identification with Europe

The explanatory model of individual identification with Europe developed in the

following includes three categories of individual-level variables expected to affect
the formation of European identification among EU citizens: political awareness,
attitudes toward the European and national community, and personal transnational
experiences.

3.2.2.1 Political Awareness

Political awareness, understood as individuals’ cognitive engagement with politics

(cf. Zaller 1992, p. 43), is associated with an information-based process of
European identification in that it influences the likelihood of citizens’ exposure to
information about Europe and the European community. The concept of political
awareness comprises two components, political interest on the one hand and
political knowledge on the other, which are adjusted to the European context.
Given that individual identification with Europe refers to an object of identification
that is located outside the national political context, we may expect that what affects
identification with Europe is not so much or not only individuals’ interest in and
knowledge of national politics or politics in general, but their interest in and
knowledge of European politics. Assuming that citizens who are generally more
interested in politics will also be more likely to pick up news and information on the
EU, even if they do not take a specific interest in European affairs in the first place,
both general political interest and interest in European politics are included as
predictors of individual identification with Europe. Furthermore, the individual-
3.2 A Model for Explaining Individual Identification with Europe 53

level model includes knowledge of European politics as a predictor of European

identification.
As regards the direction of the expected effect, both positive and negative effects
on European identification seem plausible. On the one hand, we may expect that the
more interested people are in politics and issues of European integration and the
more knowledgeable about the EU, the more likely they are to identify with Europe.
If people are familiar with and interested in European politics, they should have a
better understanding of the workings of the EU system, and, therefore, be less likely
to perceive European integration as a threat; they should also be more aware of the
potential benefits of European integration, be it for them personally, their country,
or Europe as a whole, and have a better grasp of the relevance of European
integration for their everyday lives. Empirically, this line of reasoning is supported
by analyses of European identification that find positive effects of consumption of
international news (Diez Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001), general political interest,
and knowledge of EU politics on identification with Europe (Bellucci et al. 2012;
Duchesne and Frognier 1995; Scharkow and Vogelgesang 2010). Furthermore,
there is evidence from research on EU support that citizens who are better informed
about the EU indeed hold more positive views of policy making at the EU-level
(Clark and Hellwig 2012). The above considerations and the existing empirical
evidence lead to three hypotheses predicting positive effects of political interest and
political knowledge on European identification:
H1a: The more interested individuals are in politics, the more they identify with
Europe.
H2a: The more interested individuals are in EU politics, the more they identify with
Europe.
H3a: The more knowledgeable individuals are of the EU and EU integration, the
more they identify with Europe.
The alternative hypothesis expects that those who are more familiar with
European politics are less likely to identify with Europe. Negative information
effects are likely if greater knowledge of and interest in European affairs also makes
citizens more aware of the potential risks and downsides of European integration; as
a result, the community of Europeans may no longer be perceived as an object of
positive identification and citizens will become less likely to identify with Europe.
Again, three empirically testable hypotheses are formulated:
H1b: The more interested individuals are in politics, the less they identify with
Europe.
H2b: The more interested individuals are in EU politics, the less they identify with
Europe.
H3b: The more knowledgeable individuals are of the EU and EU integration, the
less they identify with Europe.
Negative effects of knowledge and political interest on European identification
appear particularly plausible at times when EU topics gain in attention and become
more politicised in domestic debates. The economic and financial crisis affecting
54 3 The Sources of European Identity: A Theoretical Model for Explaining. . .

the EU over the past years represents such a period of politicisation and polarisation
of EU integration (Hutter and Grande 2014; Hutter and Kerscher 2014; Risse 2015).
The financial and economic turmoil of the past years has made apparent the strong
financial and economic interdependencies among EU member states. It showed that
EU integration can have redistributive consequences creating winners and losers of
integration. In such periods of crisis, greater knowledge of and interest in EU affairs
also implies greater awareness of the risks and potential negative consequences of
EU integration. As a result, we may expect negative effects on European identifi-
cation. Likewise, we may expect that negative effects of knowledge and political
interest on European identity are stronger among citizens in member states hit
hardest by the crisis, in particular in countries where national governments imposed
austerity measures in order to comply with conditions for EU financial aids,
e.g. Greece or Portugal. To account for such variation in the effects of political
awareness, subsequent sections will discuss interaction effects between individual
political interest and characteristics of the national context.

3.2.2.2 Attitudes Towards European and National Community

Attitudes towards the European and the national community represent a second set
of individual-level determinants of citizens’ identification with Europe. Resulting
from socialisation processes and citizens’ experiences with European integration on
the one hand and the national community and national institutions on the other, they
are associated with an experience-based process of European identification.
Two sets of predispositions appear particularly relevant in the context of
European identification: attitudes towards the European community as reflected
in citizens’ conception of Europe and the European community, and attitudes
towards the national community, understood here as comprising citizens’ identifi-
cation with the nation and their conception of national community.
Conceptions of Europe and European Community Regarding, first, conceptions
of Europe and the European community as predictor of European identification, we
may assume that citizens’ identification with Europe also depends on their notion of
the substantive contents of a common European identity and the meaning they
ascribe to Europe.
Conceptual analyses of European identity and European community often dis-
tinguish between civic (or political) conceptions of community on the one hand and
cultural conceptions of community on the other (see e.g. Bruter 2004, 2005; Cerutti
2003; Delanty 2002; Schlenker 2013). Civic conceptions of European community
emphasise the universalistic values of democracy, human rights, and civil liberties
underlying European unification and uniting Europeans in a common political
project. Cultural conceptions of European community, in contrast, emphasise a
common European cultural heritage defined by, inter alia, a Greco-Roman legacy,
Humanism, the experience of Reformation and Enlightenment, and religious roots
in Christianity.
3.2 A Model for Explaining Individual Identification with Europe 55

The distinction made here with regard to citizens’ conceptions of Europe and the
European community differs from the above distinction between civic and cultural
conceptions of community. The focus is not on whether citizens see political or
cultural communalities as the foundation of the community of Europeans; rather,
different conceptions of European community are distinguished based on whether
citizens conceive of Europe and European integration as a common endeavour—
based on either a common culture or a common political fate—or as a means for
individual material benefits.
Citizens who feel that a common culture and common history is at the basis of
European integration evidently see Europe as a cultural sphere and perceive
sociocultural communalities among Europeans across EU member states. Given
the crucial role that the perception of such commonalities plays for collective
identity formation, these citizens should be more likely to identify with Europe.
A similar argument applies to citizens for whom European integration primarily
signifies peace and democracy. These ideals invoke a shared political fate that
provides a basis for the development of a common we-feeling and collective
identity. Therefore, we should expect citizens who associate Europe with the ideals
of peace and democracy to be more likely to identify with Europe.
In contrast, citizens who think of Europe primarily in terms of entrepreneurship
or the freedom to travel, study, and work across the EU appear to associate Europe
mainly with individual benefits. Perceptions of individual benefits of integration,
however, do not imply strong sociocultural ties, a community of fate, or a common
political project among Europeans on which a common European identity may
build. Therefore, we should expect citizens for whom Europe signifies primarily
individual benefits to be less likely to identify with Europe.
The following two hypotheses summarise these expectations:
H4a: The more individuals associate Europe with a common cultural heritage and/or
a common political fate, the more they identify with Europe.
H4b: The more individuals associate Europe with individual benefits, the less they
identify with Europe.
National Identification and Conceptions of National Community A second set
of individual predispositions expected to affect European identification are attitudes
towards the national community. These include, on the one hand, the strength of
national identification, and, on the other hand, citizens’ conception of national
identity and the criteria for inclusion in the national community.
As regards the relation between national identification and identification with
Europe, the theoretical discussion and empirical evidence so far remain inconclu-
sive. Conceptually, we can think of national and European identifications as either
conflicting or complementary, leading us to expect national attachments to be either
negatively or positively related to attachments to Europe (cf. Chap. 2; see also
discussion in, e.g. Fuchs et al. 2009; Herrmann and Brewer 2004; Risse 2010;
Westle 2003, 2012). Empirically, the majority of analyses find positive effects of
national identification on identification with Europe although the strength and
direction of these effects vary between EU member states (see results in,
56 3 The Sources of European Identity: A Theoretical Model for Explaining. . .

e.g. Citrin and Sides 2004; Duchesne and Frognier 1995, 2008; Fuchs et al. 2009;
Westle 2003, 2012). In light of the on-going conceptual discussion and conflicting
empirical evidence, alternative hypotheses will assess the influence of national
attachments on citizens’ identification with Europe.
On the one hand, we may expect that the more citizens identify with the nation,
the more they will identify with Europe. Drawing on research in social psychology,
the assumption here is that individuals hold multiple identities which correspond to
different levels of abstraction and become salient in different situations (Brewer
2001; Turner 1987). Accordingly, national and European attachments either should
be uncorrelated or even reinforce each other. This may be the case if citizens
believe that their country plays an important role in or has a lot to gain from
European integration, or if they feel that being European is an integral part of the
national identity (cf. the discussion on the Europeanisation of national identities in
Risse 2001, 2010).
On the other hand, we can hypothesise that the more citizens identify with the
nation, the less they will identify with Europe. The underlying assumption is that
citizens who feel strongly attached to the nation are also more concerned with
national sovereignty and integrity and thus more likely to perceive Europe and
European integration as a threat to the nation state, national culture, and national
traditions (McLaren 2002). As a result, we should expect these citizens to see
European identity as conflicting with their national identity and, hence, identify
less or not at all with Europe.
H5a: The more individuals identify with the nation, the more they identify with
Europe.
H5b: The more individuals identify with the nation, the less they identify with
Europe.
Whether citizens perceive their national identity as compatible or conflicting
with European identity will likely depend on how these issues are debated in the
domestic context. For example, we may expect that in Germany—where European
integration and EU membership were incorporated in the image of a ‘modern
Germany’ after the Second World War (Risse 2010)—citizens tend to perceive
national and European identifications as compatible. In Britain, in contrast, the idea
of a unique English or British identity has traditionally been stronger (Risse 2010).
As a result, citizens are more likely to perceive national and European identifica-
tions as conflicting.
Likewise, we may expect that the relationship between national and European
identifications changes in response to the widening and deepening of European
integration over time. Thus, concerns for the cultural integrity of the national
community and the threat posed by European integration may have been less
eminent in the EU12 or EU15, uniting culturally relatively homogeneous Western
European countries. This homogeneity has shown cracks since the accession of the
new CEE member states; it appears to erode even further with the potential
enlargement of the EU to Southeast Europe and the Balkans. Similarly, as long as
European integration mainly aimed for the completion of the common market,
3.2 A Model for Explaining Individual Identification with Europe 57

transfers of national sovereignty to the EU appeared controllable. As the EU has

started to pursue greater political unity and, in the context of the economic crisis,
has pushed for economic oversight by Brussels and financial redistribution between
member states, concerns for national sovereignty have resurged. These renewed
concerns for national community and sovereignty may also influence the relation-
ship between national and European identification. Section 3.3 will discuss such
variation in the effects of national identification on citizens’ identification with
Europe in more detail, focussing on the consequences of eastward enlargement and
the economic crisis for the relation between attachment to the nation and attach-
ment to Europe.
Other than the strength of national attachments, citizens’ conception of national
community is expected to influence their propensity to identify with Europe.
Research on nationalism, national identity, and conceptions of community distin-
guishes between two main types of nation and national community (Anderson
1991; Brubaker 1992). On the one hand, a particularistic or cultural type
(Kulturnation), which defines membership in the national community based on
criteria such as common ancestry, ethnicity, language, and religion; i.e. criteria
which imply a sharp demarcation from outsiders and make membership in the
national community highly exclusive. On the other hand, a universalistic or volun-
tary type (Staatsnation), which defines membership in the national community
based on criteria such as the common belief in democratic values, individual rights,
and civil liberties; i.e. criteria which, in principle, open up membership in the
national community to anyone adhering to these values and, therefore, make
membership in the national community highly inclusive (for more extensive dis-
cussions, see Guinaudeau 2011; Schlenker-Fischer 2009, 2011).
Different conceptions of national community appear more or less compatible
with European identification. While particularistic definitions of national commu-
nity based on shared cultural traits seem to exclude identification with other
political communities, value-based universalistic conceptions of community are
seen to allow for identification with higher-level communities such as the European
community (Guinaudeau 2011; Schlenker-Fischer 2011). Empirically, these expec-
tations have been confirmed by Fuchs et al. (2009) who find that exclusive defini-
tions of national community indeed depress citizens’ attachment to Europe.
Based on these considerations and prior empirical findings, we can hypothesise
that citizens for whom membership in the national community primarily depends
on cultural affinity and a common ethnic and religious heritage are less likely to
identify with Europe than citizens for whom membership in the national commu-
nity primarily depends on shared political values.
H6a: The more individuals associate membership in the national community with
common political values, the more they identify with Europe.
H6b: The more individuals identify associate membership in the national commu-
nity with a common ethnic and religious heritage, the less they identify with
Europe.
58 3 The Sources of European Identity: A Theoretical Model for Explaining. . .

3.2.2.3 Personal Transnational Experiences

Personal transnational experiences are a third set of individual-level determinants

of European identification. These experiences comprise citizens’ encounters with
other Europeans in the form of private and professional contacts and interactions,
either across EU member state borders or within the home country. Personal
transnational experiences thus correspond to Fuchs’ concept of ‘everyday experi-
ences’ as a determinant of EU public opinion (Fuchs 2011), and are associated with
an experience-based process of European identification.
Transactionalist theories of European identity formation have pointed to the role
of personal contacts and interactions for community building from early on in the
European integration process (Deutsch 1953a, b; Deutsch et al. 1957). I draw on
these theories as well as recent approaches to European identity formation in this
tradition (cf. Büttner and Mau 2010; Fligstein 2008; Kuhn 2011, 2012, 2015;
Recchi 2012; Sigalas 2010) to develop hypotheses regarding the influence of
personal experiences with other Europeans for citizens’ propensity to identify
with Europe.
Frequent personal contacts with citizens from other EU countries are expected to
have a positive impact on European identification because the more citizens interact
cross-nationally, the more they should become aware of the values, interests, and
experiences they share with other EU citizens. Eventually, this process should lead
citizens to see themselves (also) as Europeans and develop feelings of belonging to
Europe (Büttner and Mau 2010; Fligstein 2008; Kuhn 2011, 2012, 2015; Recchi
2012; Sigalas 2010). Besides citizens’ active involvement with other Europeans,
holding dual citizenship as well as possessing the necessary skills and competences
to live and work abroad, e.g. foreign language skills, are considered to foster
European identification (Kuhn 2011).
Previous empirical analyses largely confirm the expected positive effect of
transnational interactions and experience on European identifications. Thus, fre-
quent cross-border trips and contacts with other Europeans haven been shown to
increase the probability of identification with Europe (Kuhn 2015; Mau et al. 2008);
intra-European migrants and those holding foreign citizenship are significantly
more likely to identify with Europe than citizens who stayed in their country of
origin (Braun and Müller 2012; Kuhn 2012; Recchi 2008; Rother and Nebe 2009);
and individuals with more transnational human capital have been found to more
readily identify with Europe (Diez Medrano 2014; Fligstein 2008; Green 2007;
Kuhn 2015).
Accordingly, I expect positive effects of transnational practices, transnational
background, and transnational human capital on citizens’ propensity to identify
with Europe as the following hypotheses suggest:
H7: The more individuals engage in transnational practices involving other
Europeans in their daily lives, the more they identify with Europe.
H8: Individuals with a personal transnational background identify more with
Europe than individuals without a transnational background.
3.2 A Model for Explaining Individual Identification with Europe 59

H9: The more transnational human capital individuals possess, the more they
identify with Europe.
By tracing systematically how citizens’ attitudes and experiences come to
influence their propensity to identify with Europe, the explanatory model developed
so far contributes to our understanding of the individual-level processes underlying
European identification. The next step is to go beyond individual-level influences
on European identification and explore how member state characteristics affect
citizens’ identification with Europe. The following section will extend the
individual-level model to the country level and develop a multi-level framework
of individual identification with Europe.

3.2.3 Country-Level Determinants of Individual

Identification with Europe

On several occasions, the discussion of individual-level determinants of European

identification pointed out that the influence of individual characteristics will also
depend on the context in which citizens are socialised, absorb information about
Europe, and experience the consequences of EU integration in their daily lives. In
effect, the empirically observed country-differences in aggregate levels of
European identification (see, e.g. results in Fuchs and Schneider 2011; Kaina
2009) appear too great to be explained by differences in individual characteristics
alone, underlining the need to add characteristics of the national context in which
citizens live to the explanatory framework of European identification. Against this
background, the present section explores the impact of country characteristics on
citizens’ identification with Europe. The aim is to illustrate how political, eco-
nomic, and social conditions within EU member states influence citizens’ propen-
sity to identify with Europe in addition to individual attitudes and experiences.
Three sets of country-level characteristics are added to the explanatory model of
European identification to capture the political, economic, and social conditions in
which citizens form orientations towards Europe. These are, first, party messages
related to the European and national community, i.e. the degree to which national
political parties either emphasise communalities among Europeans and shared
European values and traditions, or point to the distinctiveness of the national
community and invoke a strong national identity. Second, member states’ economic
position and degree of integration in the EU and global markets, as reflected in
member states’ membership in the Eurozone, net contributions to the EU budget,
and share in international trade. Third, member state societies’ ethnocultural
composition serves as a proxy for the density of transnational relations and personal
contacts between foreign nationals and the native population.
The choice of the three sets of country characteristics as additional determinants
of individual identification with Europe is motivated as follows: Messages by
national political parties, countries’ macroeconomic strength, and societies’
60 3 The Sources of European Identity: A Theoretical Model for Explaining. . .

ethnocultural characteristics are country-level attributes to which citizens are

exposed in their daily lives, without much effort or initiative by citizens. At the
same time, these country characteristics provide citizens with information and
experiences likely to affect their attitudes towards Europe and European identifi-
cation: because they convey a certain picture of Europe, make the European
community more or less salient in the national political debate, or offer opportuni-
ties for citizens to interact with other Europeans. In other words, these character-
istics regulate the nature and amount of Europe-related information citizens receive
and shape the way citizens experience EU integration in their everyday lives.

3.2.3.1 Party Messages Related to the European and National

Community

The first country-level characteristic expected to influence European identification

are party messages related to the European and national community. Party mes-
sages are associated with an information-based process of European identification
as these messages provide citizens with arguments about Europe and the European
community and/or the implications of European integration for the national
community.
Analyses of party systems in the member states find national party competition
over European integration to be structured along two dimensions: first, an economic
dimension arising from the opposition between market liberalism and market
regulation; second, a political-cultural dimension arising from the opposition
between national sovereignty and supranational governance on the one hand and
between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values on the
other (Bornschier 2011; Hix 1999; Hooghe and Marks 2009; Hooghe et al. 2002,
2004; Kriesi 2007, 2010; Kriesi et al. 2006). At its core, this second dimension
revolves around conflicts over the role of community in an increasingly integrated
European Union, which has established a new supranational political community
with extensive decision-making competences while reducing the autonomy of the
national community (Bornschier 2011).
Research on party competition over European integration has explored both
parties’ position on European integration (e.g. Arnold et al. 2012; Helbling and
Tresch 2011; Marks et al. 2002, 2006, 2007; Marks and Wilson 2000; Ray 1999,
2007; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2010; Whitefield et al. 2007) and the salience
parties attach to EU integration (e.g. Netjes and Binnema 2007; Pennings 2006;
Spoon 2012; Steenbergen and Scott 2004). Furthermore, there is evidence that party
positions on EU integration and the salience of EU integration in national party
systems affect public opinion towards European integration (e.g. Carrubba 2001; de
Vries and Arnold 2011; de Vries and Edwards 2009; Franklin et al. 1994; Gabel and
Scheve 2007b; Hellstr€om 2008; Hooghe and Marks 2004, 2005; Netjes and
Edwards 2005; Ray 2003; Steenbergen et al. 2007); likewise, previous analyses
indicate that party positions mediate the relation between national identity and EU
3.2 A Model for Explaining Individual Identification with Europe 61

support (e.g. de Vries and Edwards 2009; Gabel and Scheve 2007a, b; Hooghe and
Marks 2005; Maier et al. 2012; Ray 2003; Steenbergen et al. 2007).
I build on these analyses by including party messages as a country-level deter-
minant in the explanatory model of European identification. In contrast to previous
analyses, however, I do not focus on the effects of parties’ overall position on EU
integration or the overall salience of EU integration in national political conflict,
but the specific salience of issues related to the European and national community
in the national party discourse. The assumption is that in order to affect identifica-
tion with Europe, it is not enough for parties to emphasise European integration in
general or economic terms, e.g. by voicing their support for or opposition to further
political integration or a European economic government, because these general or
economic questions are relatively far removed from questions of identity and
community. Rather, parties need to address the role of community and identity in
an increasingly integrated Europe in a direct way, allowing the public to connect
party messages to their own feelings of belonging. Therefore, the present analysis
will employ more fine-grained measures of party emphasis on European and
national community. These include, on the one hand, references to the European
community, its members, and the values, interests, and experiences which are
shared by Europeans and may thus form the basis for collective identity building
at the European level; on the other hand, references to the national community
which, for most citizens, remains the primary level of identification, and, at the
same time, represents the political community most directly affected by the wid-
ening and deepening of European integration.
I expect a positive effect on European identification if national political parties
invoke the wider community of Europeans and emphasise common European
values, interests, and experiences as well as a distinct European way of life. In
this way, parties contribute to citizens’ awareness of what they have in common
with other Europeans, even in the absence of personal experiences with citizens
from other member states. Vice versa, I expect negative effects of party messages
on European identification if national political elites predominantly invoke the
national community and national identity and emphasise the distinctiveness of the
national community based on unique national values, interests, traditions, and
experiences. As more emphasis is put on the national community, citizens will
likely become more aware of the potential threats the EU poses to the integrity of
the national community and the national way of life, making them more likely to
perceive European identity as conflicting with their national identity. These con-
siderations lead to two hypotheses regarding the effect of party messages on
European and national community and identity on individuals’ propensity to
identify with Europe:
H10: The more political parties in a country address issues of European community
and identity in the national political debate, the more individuals from this
country identify with Europe.
62 3 The Sources of European Identity: A Theoretical Model for Explaining. . .

H11: The more political parties in a country address issues of national community
and identity in the national political debate, the less individuals from this country
identify with Europe.
While differences in the national party discourse are expected to explain some of
the variation in individual European identification across EU member states, party
messages are unlikely to affect all citizens within a member state in the same way.
For example, citizens who are politically more interested and pay greater attention
to (European) politics have greater chances to receive party messages that invoke
issues of community and collective identity. That is, individuals’ degree of political
awareness mediates the effect of party messages on European identification. Like-
wise, we may expect that individuals’ predispositions with regard to the national
community mediate the effect of party messages. Individuals who feel strongly
attached to the nation may respond differently to party messages invoking the
national community than individuals with a weaker sense of national identity.
Section 3.2.4 discusses such interaction effects between party messages and indi-
vidual attributes and predispositions in detail.

3.2.3.2 Economic Position and Degree of Integration in the EU

and Global Markets

The second set of country-level determinants included in the model of European

identification refers to member countries’ economic position and degree of inte-
gration in the European and global markets, as measured by member states’
membership in the Eurozone, net contributions to the EU budget, and share in
international trade. These measures represent proxies for how citizens experience
the economic dimension of European integration and its consequences for the
national economy in their everyday lives and, therefore, are associated with an
experience-based process of identification with Europe.
In effect, European integration has long been a predominantly economic project,
focused on completing the Single European Market, based on the free movement of
goods, capital, services, and labour, a Europe-wide competition policy, and the euro
as the common currency. Accordingly, public debates over European integration in
the member countries—as assessed by media coverage of EU integration and the
salience of European issues in national political competition—have largely centred
on economic aspects of EU integration (de Vreese 2003; Diez Medrano 2003; Diez
Medrano and Gray 2010; Koopmans and Erbe 2004; Koopmans et al. 2010;
Koopmans and Pfetsch 2006; Peter et al. 2003). Qualitative analyses of how
citizens conceive of European integration indicate that the dominance of economic
aspects in the political debate is mirrored at the individual level. While people offer
a variety of arguments to clarify their attitudes towards the EU and European
integration, they tend to converge on themes related to the common market and
economic integration (Diez Medrano 2003).
3.2 A Model for Explaining Individual Identification with Europe 63

Given the dominance of economic aspects in both public debate and represen-
tations of European integration among EU citizens, it seems plausible to assume
that individuals’ identification with Europe will be influenced by how they experi-
ence the economic dimension of EU integration.
Membership in the Eurozone is expected to have a positive effect on citizens’
identification with Europe. Using the euro as the common currency is a daily
reminder for citizens that they are members of the European community; the euro
also lets citizens directly experience tangible benefits of economic integration at the
EU level, for example by reducing the need to exchange money abroad and
facilitating cross-border shopping.
Regarding the impact of EU budget contributions, I hypothesise that citizens
from net recipient countries of EU funding will identify more with Europe than
citizens from net contributor countries to the EU budget. Citizens from net recipient
countries are expected to have a more positive image of Europe because they are
more likely to experience the benefits of EU funding for their home country, e.g. in
form of EU-funded infrastructural projects. This should result in a higher propen-
sity to identify as European. Vice versa, citizens from net contributor countries
should have a more negative image of Europe because of the financial cost their
country incurs by contributing more to the EU budget than what it gets back in EU
funding. As a result, we should expect citizens from net contributing member states
to identify less with Europe.
Likewise, citizens from countries with a more open economy (in terms of shares
of exports and imports in GDP) are expected to identify more with Europe than
citizens from economically less integrated countries because their country benefits
disproportionally from the common market. The perception of benefits should lead
to positive outlooks on EU integration, and, in turn, to a higher propensity to
identify with Europe. What is more, greater trade openness also provides more
opportunities for citizens to interact personally with other Europeans and
non-nationals, e.g. because a higher share of the population is employed in the
exporting industry and has professional contacts abroad, which are expected to
foster identification with Europe.
Empirically, analyses in the field of ‘horizontal Europeanisation’ confirm a
positive effect of a country’s degree of economic integration on the prevalence of
transnationalist activities in its population (Kuhn 2015; Mau and Mewes 2012). In
contrast, few analyses so far have directly assessed the effect of economic factors
on European identification among EU citizens. Among these, Isernia’s et al. study
of aggregate levels of European identification finds higher levels of identification in
net recipient countries of EU funding than in net contributor countries. Likewise,
levels of identification with Europe are shown to be higher in member states with
higher shares of intra-EU trade (Isernia et al. 2012; Kuhn 2015). Based on the above
considerations and the empirical record so far, the following hypotheses summarise
the expected effects of different economic indicators on individuals’ identification
with Europe:
64 3 The Sources of European Identity: A Theoretical Model for Explaining. . .

H12: Individuals from Eurozone member states identify more with Europe than
individuals from member states outside the Eurozone.
H13: Individuals from net contributor countries of EU funds identify less with
Europe than individuals from net recipient countries of EU funds.
H14: The more economically integrated a country in the European and global
markets, the more individuals from this country identify with Europe.
As in the case of party messages, we should expect the effect of economic
indicators on European identification to vary by individual dispositions.
Section 3.2.4 will discuss such interaction effects between measures of economic
integration and individual political interest on the one hand and between economic
measures and national identification on the other.

3.2.3.3 Ethnocultural Composition of Member State Societies

The ethnocultural composition of member state societies represents a third set of

country-level determinants in the model of individual identification with Europe.
Member states’ ethnocultural composition refers to member states’ cultural hetero-
geneity and diversity of the national population in terms of the share of EU
nationals and the total share of foreigners living in a country. Both measures
represent proxies for citizens’ opportunities to interact with non-nationals and
thus make the kind of experiences that influence identification with Europe;
accordingly, they are associated with an experience-based process of identification
with Europe.
As regards the share of EU citizens in the national population, I assume that with
more citizens from other EU member states living in a country, national citizens
have more chances to interact personally with other Europeans. These personal
contacts and interactions are expected to make citizens more aware of the com-
monalities they share with citizens from other EU member states and create a sense
of togetherness as Europeans which, ultimately, should result in a higher propensity
to identify with Europe (Mau and Mewes 2013). Accordingly, the corresponding
hypothesis expects a positive correlation between the share of EU nationals in a
country and citizens’ propensity to identify with Europe.
H15: The higher the share of EU nationals in a country, the more individuals from
this country identify with Europe.
Regarding the impact of the overall share of immigrants in a country on citizens’
propensity to identify with Europe, alternative expectations seem plausible. In line
with the above argumentation, we may expect that higher overall numbers of
non-nationals living in a country, regardless of their country of origin, give citizens
more opportunities to interact with non-nationals and perceive commonalities
between themselves and foreigners. These experiences should make citizens gen-
erally more cosmopolitan in their outlooks and thus more inclined to identify with
supranational communities.
3.2 A Model for Explaining Individual Identification with Europe 65

On the other hand, we may expect negative effects of higher shares of immi-
grants on citizens’ identification with Europe. In this view, higher numbers of
immigrants in a country increase the chances that national citizens perceive nega-
tive effects of more open borders. Higher shares of immigrants may thus lead to
greater fears of a loss of national traditions and identity as well as fears of economic
disadvantages and increased competition on the national labour market. Given the
important role of European integration for the opening of national borders and
markets, citizens are likely to project such fears on the European Union and, as a
result, identify less with Europe.
Two alternative hypotheses capture the diverging theoretical considerations
regarding the effect of overall immigrant shares on European identifications
among citizen in the member states:
H16a: The higher the overall share of immigrants in a country, the more individuals
from this country identify with Europe.
H16b: The higher the overall share of immigrants in a country, the less individuals
from this country identify with Europe.
As in the case of other country-level predictors, the effect of sociocultural
indicators on individual identification with Europe is likely to vary across individ-
uals; in particular, we should expect a mediating effect of citizens’ attachment to
the nation on the relation between immigrant shares and individual identification
with Europe. Section 3.2.4 will discuss such interaction effects between individual
attributes and predispositions and share of (EU) immigrants in the national popu-
lation on citizens’ identification with Europe.

3.2.4 Interaction Effects Between Individual- and

Country-Level Determinants of Individual
Identification with Europe

The presentation of the explanatory model of individual identification with Europe

thus far has concentrated on direct effects of individual- and country-level charac-
teristics on European identification. Yet there is reason to assume that country
characteristics do not affect all citizens within a member state in the same way.
Individual predispositions and characteristics are likely to mediate the effect of
country-level determinants on individual identification with Europe.2 Therefore,

2
A second source of heterogeneity in the formation of European identification may spring from
developments at the European level. That is, while singular events and changes in the process of
European integration over time a priori affect all EU member states, citizens within member states
may still perceive and experience these changes and events in different ways, depending on
differences in member states’ political, economic, or social characteristics. Section 3.3 will discuss
this second source of variation in European identification by exploring variation in the determi-
nants of European identification by member state, first, in response to the EU’s eastward enlarge-
ment 2004/2007, and, second, the wake of the economic and financial crisis starting in 2008.
66 3 The Sources of European Identity: A Theoretical Model for Explaining. . .

the following section discusses interaction effects between individual- and country-
level determinants of European identification among EU citizens. The focus lies on
mediating effects of, first, political interest and, second, national identification on
the effects of country-level determinants on European identification. In technical
terms, I include interaction terms between country-level predictors and political
interest and between country-level predictors and national identification in the
explanatory model of individual identification with Europe.
Political interest is included as a mediator variable of the effect of country
characteristics on individual European identification to account for differences in
the attention people pay to party messages and the national economic environment.
In this regard, the model of European identification follows longstanding research
traditions in public opinion studies that point to political awareness and sophisti-
cation as the main causes of differences in opinion formation and attitude structures
among individuals (Bartle 2000; Converse 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996;
Kinder 2006; Luskin 1987, 1990; Sniderman et al. 1991; Zaller 1990, 1992).
Political interest not only influences individuals’ knowledge and awareness of
political affairs (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Kriesi 2005; Luskin 1990), but
also mediates the impact of elite messages (Zaller 1992), party campaigns (Kriesi
2005, 2012), and the media (Chong and Druckman 2007; Krosnick and Brannon
1993; McGuire 1985; Valentino and Nardis 2013) on individual attitudes and vote
choice. These findings also hold for the EU context: interest in politics affects
individuals’ knowledge of European affairs (Maier and Bathelt 2013; Westle and
Johann 2010), and mediates the effect of party messages (Gabel and Scheve 2007b;
Slothuus and de Vreese 2010) and the mass media (de Vreese 2007; de Vreese and
Boomgaarden 2006b, c; Scharkow and Vogelgesang 2010) on attitudes towards the
EU and European integration.
Besides political interest, the explanatory model of European identification
includes national identification as a second variable mediating the effect of country
characteristics on individual European identification. Individual national identifi-
cation is interacted with member state characteristics in order to account for
differences in peoples’ perception and evaluation of party messages, their country’s
contribution to the EU budget as well as the share of immigrants living in their
country that are due to differences in how strongly they identify with the national
community. As in the case of political interest, the choice of national identification
as a moderator variable is motivated by the theoretical and empirical insights of the
(EU) public opinion literature.
Research on belief systems and processes of opinion formation points to the role
of affect for political reasoning, arguing that people often rely on their likes and
dislikes of social groups when forming political opinions (Converse 1964; Kinder
2003, 2006; Sniderman et al. 1991). For Donald Kinder, public opinion is thus
shaped ‘in powerful ways by the feelings citizens harbor toward the social groups
they see as the principle beneficiaries (or victims) of the policy’ (Kinder 2003,
p.18). Empirically, this research shows that group-centrism and ethno-centrist
orientations shape attitudes towards, e.g. foreign and security policy (Kam and
3.2 A Model for Explaining Individual Identification with Europe 67

Kinder 2007; Kinder 2003), the welfare state (Kinder and Kam 2010), and immi-
gration (Citrin et al. 1990; Kinder 2003).
The literature on EU public opinion has incorporated these ideas, pointing to the
role of national identity as a short cut or ‘cue’ for citizens when forming attitudes
towards the EU and European integration. Hooghe and Marks expect citizens to
rely on feelings of identity in situations where they lack the knowledge and
resources to determine their (economic) interests in relation to EU issues, but
have a clear idea of the implications for the national community (cf. Hooghe and
Marks 2009, pp. 10, 13). Analyses of EU support have tested these propositions
using the concept of ‘exclusive national identity’, which differentiates between
citizens who identify exclusively with the nation and citizens who hold multiple
identities. Exclusive national identifications have been shown to mediate the effect
of elite division over EU integration (Hooghe and Marks 2005); the influence of
party messages, in particular, the effects of campaigns by extreme right-wing
parties (de Vries and Edwards 2009); and the impact of net transfer payments
from the EU (Garry and Tilley 2009).The following sections discuss in detail
how political interest and national identification interact with country-level char-
acteristics to influence European identification among EU citizens.

3.2.4.1 Cross-Level Interactions with Political Interest

Country-level characteristics such as the discourse of political elites or the depen-

dence of the national economy on European and global markets can only affect
citizens’ identification with Europe to the extent that the latter actually pay attention
to party messages and have some understanding of the information they are exposed
to. Given the well-known differences in citizens’ attention to politics (van Deth
1991; van Deth and Elff 2004), we should expect the effect of macrosocial
characteristics to vary across individuals depending on their level of political
interest. To account for this individual-level variation in political interest and
exposure to Europe-related messages and information, the explanatory model of
European identification includes interaction terms between individuals’ interest in
politics and country-level determinants.
To recall, Sect. 3.2.3 discussed three sets of country-level characteristics likely
to affect citizens’ identification with Europe, namely party messages on issues of
national and European community, member states’ economic position and degree
of integration in European and world markets, and the ethnocultural make-up of
member state societies. I assume that individual political interest will first and
foremost mediate the effect of party messages, of member states’ status as net
contributors to the EU budget, and of the degree of integration in European and
global markets. Party messages and macroeconomic indicators like trade openness
will only be effective in shaping citizens’ orientations toward Europe if citizens
actually perceive these messages and are aware of the economic dimension of
European integration and its effects for the national economy. This requires a
certain level of attention to current affairs on the part of the citizens, as they are
68 3 The Sources of European Identity: A Theoretical Model for Explaining. . .

unlikely to be personally approached by political elites or consult data on the

situation of the national economy independently.
In the case of the euro as the common currency as well as immigration rates, in
contrast, the causal mechanism is expected to work via personal experiences and
direct contacts. Citizens use the euro on a daily basis; if more EU immigrants live in
a country, citizens have greater chances to interact with non-nationals and make the
kind of experience expected to shape attitudes towards Europe and European
identification. To the extent that these experiences are considered part of citizens’
everyday lives, they occur independently of citizens’ engagement with politics and
should not be mediated by individuals’ level of political interest.
Based on these considerations, we can hypothesise that the more politically
interested individuals are, the more party messages on national and European
community and identity they will receive, and the more these messages will affect
their identification with Europe. In technical terms, there should be a positive
interaction effect of political interest and party messages on European identification
as proposed by the following hypothesis:
H17: The more interested individuals are in politics, the stronger the relationship
between party messages and individual identification with Europe.
A priori, the mediating effect of political interest should occur independently of
the contents of party messages. We can further specify the direction of the effect by
taking into account whether national political elites emphasise the European com-
munity and issues related to a common European identity or the national commu-
nity and issues related to national identity. On the one hand, we can assume that
political interest reinforces the previously expected positive influence of party
messages emphasising the European community and a common European way of
life on identification with Europe (cf. H10). Hence, we should observe a positive
interaction effect of political interest and party messages on European community
and identity. Vice versa, the previously expected negative effect of party messages
emphasising national identity on European identification (cf. H11) should be
reinforced among politically more interested individuals. That is, we should
observe a negative interaction effect of political interest and party messages on
national community and identity. The following two hypotheses summarise these
expectations:
H17a: The more interested individuals are in politics, the stronger the positive
relationship between party messages on issues of European community and
individual identification with Europe.
H17b: The more interested individuals are in politics, the stronger the negative
relationship between party messages on issues of national community and
identity and individual identification with Europe.
In a similar vein, we can expect interaction effects between political interest and
measures of economic integration on individual identification with Europe. The
politically more interested should also have a better understanding of the economic
dimension of European integration and its effects for the national economy than
3.2 A Model for Explaining Individual Identification with Europe 69

their less interested peers. Therefore, they should be more likely to take into
account economic considerations when forming an opinion about Europe and
European identification. As a result, a country’s net contributions to the EU budget
and its degree of integration in European and global markets should have a greater
influence on identification with Europe among citizens with greater interest in
political affairs.
H18: The more interested individuals are in politics, the stronger the effect of
member states’ status as a net contributor country of EU funds on individual
identification with Europe.
H19: The more interested individuals are in politics, the stronger the effect of
member states’ degree of integration in the European and global markets on
individual identification with Europe.

3.2.4.2 Cross-Level Interactions with National Identification

The second variable expected to mediate the effect of country-level characteristics

on individual European identification is citizens’ identification with the national
community. National attachments are interacted with party messages related to the
European and national community, member states’ contribution to the EU budget,
and the share of immigrants in the national population. In this way, the model
accounts for differences in how citizens perceive and evaluate these country
characteristics depending on the strength of their national attachments. As in the
case of political interest, the choice of national identification as an intervening
variable builds on insights from research on public opinion formation as well as the
EU public opinion literature.
The expectation is that citizens’ attachments to the national group will colour
their assessment of the political, social, and economic consequences of European
integration for the national community. Citizens who identify strongly with the
nation are likely to be more concerned with the integrity and the traditions of the
national community, and, therefore, react differently to the consequences of
European integration for their country than citizens who feel only weakly attached
to the national level. For example, people who feel strongly attached to the nation
have been shown to hold more negative views on immigration (Curtis 2014) and
thus will likely react more negatively to higher shares of immigrants in the national
population than their less attached peers.
I expect that national attachments mediate in particular the effect of member
state characteristics that have direct social and financial implications for the
national community. As is argued in the following, this is foremost the case for
party messages emphasising the national and European community and identity,
national contributions to the EU budget, and increased ethnocultural diversity in the
national society.
Party messages related to questions of national and European community and
identity directly invoke questions of community and belonging at the national and
70 3 The Sources of European Identity: A Theoretical Model for Explaining. . .

European level. I expect that citizens with strong national identifications respond
more strongly to these messages because they are more sensitive to threats to the
national community and its values and traditions than citizens who identify only
weakly with the nation. As a result, we should see national identification mediate
the effect of identity-related party messages on individual identification with
Europe. In technical terms, there should be a positive interaction effect of national
identification and party messages, as the following hypothesis states:
H20: The more individuals identify with the nation, the stronger the relationship
between party messages and individual identification with Europe.
More specifically, we may expect that people who feel strongly attached to the
nation are particularly perceptible to party messages emphasising the national
community. In this case, the previously expected negative effect of party messages
focussing on national community and identity (cf. H11) should be reinforced among
citizens with strong national identifications. Hence, we should find a negative
interaction effect of national identification and party messages on national com-
munity and identity. The following hypothesis reflects this expectation:
H20a: The more individuals identify with the nation, the stronger the negative
relationship between party messages on issues of national community and
individual identification with Europe.
Similar effects seem plausible for the interplay between national identification
and national contributions to the EU budget. The assumption is that individuals
who identify strongly with the nation evaluate their country’s status as a net
recipient or net contributor of EU funding differently than individuals who identify
less with the national level. Member states’ contributions to the EU budget are a
clear indicator of the economic consequences of EU integration and, in particular,
the potential costs of EU integration for the nation state. Therefore, we should
expect strong national attachments to reinforce the expected negative effects of
member states’ status as net contributors to the EU budget on citizens’ identification
with Europe. Thus, there should be a negative interaction effect of national iden-
tification and member states’ status as a net contributor to the EU budget as the
following hypothesis proposes:
H21: The more individuals identify with the nation, the stronger the negative
relationship between member states’ status as a net contributor country to EU
funding and individual identification with Europe.
Finally, the model includes interaction effects between national identification
and member states’ ethnocultural composition. The expectation is that people who
identify strongly with the nation are more likely to perceive the ethnocultural
diversity that comes with open borders as a threat to the national community and,
as a result, evaluate European integration more critically and identify less with
Europe. Hence, I expect individual national identification to intensify potential
negative effects of international social integration and immigration on European
identification as the following hypothesis states:
3.3 The Impact of EU Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe 2004/2007 and. . . 71

H22: The more individuals identify with the nation, the greater the negative effect of
member states’ overall share of immigrants on their propensity to identify with
Europe.
The costs and benefits to the national community are les apparent in case of the
other country-level determinants included in the model of European identification.
For example, the immediate financial or social costs and benefits of more openness
to trade or membership in the Eurozone are hard to pinpoint.3 Therefore, citizens’
evaluation of these two country characteristics should be less influenced by their
attachment to the national community and the model does not include interaction
effects for these characteristics.

3.3 The Impact of EU Enlargement to Central and Eastern

Europe 2004/2007 and the Onset of the Financial
and Economic Crisis 2008 on Individual Identification
with Europe

The explanatory model developed so far has presented a general model of European
identification that aims at explaining citizens’ identification with Europe across EU
member states and over different periods in the EU integration process. The
remainder of this chapter takes the general model as a starting point for discussing
the implications of two turning points in the integration process for the development
of European identification. The aim is to explore whether and how the bases of
citizens’ identification with Europe change at key moments in the integration
process. These turning points are, first, the accession of Central and Eastern
European member states in 2004/2007, and, second, the onset of the financial and
economic crisis in 2008. These events are considered turning points in the integra-
tion process in that they have caused extensive debates among political elites and in
the mass media, resulting in shifts in elite positions on EU integration as well as
changes at the level of public opinion.
The accession of Central and Eastern European member states and the financial
and economic crisis, followed by sovereign debt crises in a number of EU member
states, have affected both the EU and individual member states in significant ways.
To give a few examples: In financial terms, eastward enlargement provoked a
re-allocation of EU structural and cohesion funds from old to new member states
after 2004, whereas the crisis led to the introduction of extensive credit lines for
over-indebted Eurozone countries after 2008. Politically, the accession of ten new
member states in 2004 required a change in voting weights in the Council and led to

3
The financial and economic interdependencies between Eurozone countries became clearer after
the onset of the crisis. These changes and their implications for the effects or Eurozone member-
ship on European identification are discussed in Sect. 3.3.3.
72 3 The Sources of European Identity: A Theoretical Model for Explaining. . .

new majorities within the EU institutions, while, in the wake of the crisis, we
observed a shift in decision-making back to member state governments. Finally,
both the opening of borders to the East and the crisis stimulated labour migration
within the EU, from new to old member states after the 2004/2007 enlargement
rounds, and, since 2008, from southern European member states in economic crisis
to economically thriving countries in north-western Europe.
Given the impact of enlargement and the crisis on the EU and its member states
and the debate these events have raised, we may expect consequences for citizens’
feelings of belonging to Europe, too. This is even more so, as enlargement and the
crisis have brought about changes with a particular bearing on collective identifi-
cations and feelings of belonging together as Europeans. For example, the
re-allocation of financial funds to Eastern Europe and southern European member
states following enlargement and the crisis invoke principles of solidarity and
loyalty that are closely linked to feelings of community and collective identifica-
tion. Likewise, labour migration leads to social changes in member state societies—
both in the host and the sending countries—which have implications for definitions
of (national) community and thus may affect collective identifications. Finally, the
debates over enlargement and the crisis have been marked by a strong presence of
populist right-wing parties that promote the primacy of national interests and the
national community, thus also raising questions of solidarity and identity
(Bornschier 2011).
The present work argues that the EU’s enlargement in 2004/2007 as well as the
economic and financial crisis starting in late 2008 have led to an increase in
heterogeneity among EU member states and made political, economic, and social
differences between EU member states more visible to the general public. Concur-
rently, we observe an increase in the salience of EU affairs in domestic politics and
an increased politicisation and controversy over questions of EU integration (Hutter
and Grande 2014; Hutter and Kerscher 2014; Rauh and Zürn 2014). The heightened
visibility of member state differences and greater salience of EU affairs in national
debates implies that the environment in which citizens receive Europe-related
information and make Europe-related experiences have changed with enlargement
and the crisis. As the salience of EU affairs increases, citizens have better and easier
access to information about the EU and about the implications of EU integration for
their home country; at the same time, trends like the influx of workers and students
from Eastern Europe and southern member states give citizens a direct experience
of the consequences of European integration. All the while, the changes brought
about by enlargement and the crisis vary between EU member states. For example,
enlargement required adjustments foremost from the newly accessing member
states—the adoption of the acquis communautaire—while the economic and social
consequences of the crisis have been by far more disruptive in countries like Greece
or Spain than Germany or Poland. Depending on their country of origin, citizens
thus differ in their experience of enlargement and the crisis.
To begin with, the developments in EU integration related to enlargement and
the crisis suggest changes in the level of citizens’ identification with Europe. On the
one hand, we may expect citizens’ attachment to Europe to increase as measures of
3.3 The Impact of EU Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe 2004/2007 and. . . 73

European wide solidarity become more visible. On the other hand, citizens may
identify less with Europe if the mutual obligations and interdependencies that come
with increased integration at the European level become more perceptible in the
domestic context.
What is more, we may also expect changes in the determinants of European
identification. By raising questions about the future borders of Europe and the EU’s
capacity to integrate new member states (in the case of enlargement) and testing
member states’ financial solidarity and willingness to cooperate in severe economic
crisis (in the case of the financial and economic crisis), enlargement and the crisis
have led to an increased politicisation of European integration (Hutter and Grande
2014; Hutter and Kerscher 2014; Rauh and Zürn 2014; Risse 2015). The economic
and financial crisis in particular has brought questions of European integration into
national political debates as recent election campaigns and analyses of parliamen-
tary debates in EU member states show (Auel and H€oing 2014; Miklin 2014;
Puntscher Riekmann and Wydra 2013; Rauh and Zürn 2014; Wendler 2014).
Compared to pre-enlargement and pre-crisis periods, the EU has played a more
prominent role in public debate in the member states. This rise in the salience of EU
affairs in national debates implies that the environment in which citizens receive
Europe-related information and make Europe-related experiences has changed. As
a result of these changes in citizens’ access to Europe-related information and in the
way they experience Europe in their everyday lives, the importance of different
determinants for citizens’ identification with Europe may also have changed in the
course of enlargement and the crisis. In particular, we may expect changes in the
effects of political interest and national identification on European identification
due to the greater salience of European affairs in national political debates. Among
the country-level predictors, the influence of macroeconomic indicators on citi-
zens’ propensity to identify with Europe can be expected to have changed as a result
of the financial and economic crisis compared to pre-crisis periods.
The following section will briefly outline the consequences of enlargement and
the crisis for the EU and its member states and show how both events have
increased differences between EU member states and the salience of EU affairs
in domestic debates (Sect. 3.3.1). The remainder of the chapter will draw on this
discussion to develop hypotheses regarding, first, changes in the effect of macro-
economic indicators on European identification (Sect. 3.3.2) and, second, variation
in the effects of political interest and national identification on citizens’ propensity
to identify with Europe in response to enlargement and the crisis (Sect. 3.3.3).

3.3.1 Consequences of Eastward Enlargement 2004/2007

and the Onset of the Financial and Economic Crisis
2008 for the EU and the Member States

Preparations for EU enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe started as early as

1993 when the European Council agreed that ‘the associated countries in Central
74 3 The Sources of European Identity: A Theoretical Model for Explaining. . .

and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union’
(European Council 1993, p. 13) and concluded with the accession of Cyprus, the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and
Slovenia in May 2004 and Bulgaria and Romania in January 2007 (for a detailed
account of the 2004/2007 enlargement round, see Nugent 2004a; O’Brennan 2006,
esp. Chaps. 2–4).
With 10þ2 new member states joining at once, the EU’s enlargement to Central
and Eastern Europe in 2004/2007 has been the single biggest enlargement round in
the history of the EU.4 It nearly doubled the number of EU member states and
increased the EU’s population and its territory by about one-third of its previous
size. Eastward enlargement thereby led to a noticeable increase in political, eco-
nomic, and social heterogeneity among member states. Politically, the majority of
the 12 new member states had been part of the Eastern bloc until 1989/1990 and
consequently had experienced a very different historical trajectory than the ‘old’
EU15 member states, both before and after the fall of the Iron Curtain.
Economically, enlargement further increased existing disparities within the
EU. GDP per capita levels were substantially lower in the new member states
than in the EU15, with the average per capita income in the CEE countries reaching
no more than 50% of the EU15 average.5 Likewise, labour market conditions in
CEE differed widely from those in the EU15, with markedly lower labour produc-
tivity, high structural unemployment and overall higher unemployment, particu-
larly among the young and the long-term unemployed (European Commission
2006).6 Lower income levels in the CEE member states were accompanied by
lower expenditure for social protection (in share of GDP), although the share of
population at risk of poverty (measured against the national income distribution)
was rather similar in old and new member states (European Commission 2006).7
To accommodate the new member states and help them catch up economically,
the EU introduced both institutional and policy reforms. At the institutional level,
reforms included a re-weighting of votes and reorganisation of decision rules in the
Council, a higher number of MEPs and a reallocation of seats between member

4
Prior to Eastern enlargement, no more than three countries had joined the EU at the same time.
5
The ten new member states joining the EU in 2004 added only about 5% to the EU’s GDP
(at current prices). At the time of accession, only Cyprus and Slovenia reached comparable or
higher per capita income levels than the least affluent EU15 member states Greece and Portugal.
Per capita income in the new member states ranged from about 43% of the EU15 average in Latvia
to about 78% in Cyprus. For a detailed account of GDP/capita and comparison of old and new
member states, see European Commission (2006).
6
In 2004, the average labour productivity in the new member states was less than two thirds of the
EU15 level. Employment rates stood at 56% in the new member states versus 65% in the EU15,
while total unemployment was 13% in CEE and 8% in the EU15. For a detailed account of labour
productivity and employment and unemployment rates in old and new member states, see
European Commission (2006).
7
Shares of population at risk of poverty ranged from less than 10% in the Czech Republic,
Luxemburg, and Slovenia to more than 20% in Greece, Ireland, and Portugal (European Com-
mission 2006).
3.3 The Impact of EU Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe 2004/2007 and. . . 75

states in the Parliament, as well as changes in the size and composition of the
Commission (see Nugent 2004b; O’Brennan 2006; Phinnemore 2004 for more
information on the unfolding of the 2004/2007 enlargement rounds and the insti-
tutional changes at the EU level).
At the policy level, the weaker macroeconomic performance in terms of
competiveness, per capita income, and employment led to a reallocation of EU
structural and cohesion funds to CEE countries after 2004. With the exception of
Cyprus, all CEE member states have been net receivers of EU transfers since 2004/
2007. The new member states in Eastern Europe have received a majority of EU
structural funds since the EU’s budget reform in 2007. In contrast, the share
allocated to the ‘old’ EU15 member states has decreased by about one quarter
compared to pre-enlargement levels (European Commission 2009b; Lequesne
2012).8
The significance of the 2004/2007 enlargement round resonated in heightened
media attention during the accession period. Confirming earlier reports of an
increase in EU coverage at key moments of EU integration such as EU summits
or treaty negotiations (de Vreese 2001, 2003; de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2006a;
Peter and de Vreese 2004), the visibility of the EU in the media intensified during
the enlargement period 2004 (Boomgaarden et al. 2010; van Noije 2010;
Vliegenthart et al. 2008). Researchers found the press to take a predominantly
national perspective and focus on the economic consequences of enlargement, in
particular labour migration and the effects of enlargement on national labour
markets (Dursun-Ozkanca 2011; Inthorn 2006; Light and Young 2009; van Noije
2010). These findings indicate that the salience of EU affairs indeed increased as a
result of enlargement; what is more, the consequences of enlargement for national
economies and national labour markets featured prominently in the debate.
The subsequent sections discuss the implications of enlargement and the poten-
tial consequences of heightened media attention and new concerns for national
economies for the determinants of citizens’ identification with Europe. Before that,
I briefly recapitulate the financial and economic crisis and its consequences for the
EU and its member states.
To summarise broadly, the financial and economic crisis set off in 2007 with the
collapse of the US subprime mortgage market, which triggered banking crises in
both the US and Europe and cumulated in the bankruptcy of the US investment
bank Lehman Brothers in September 2008. The financial crisis of 2007/2008
subsequently triggered a global economic crisis, resulting in the ‘great recession’
of 2009. All EU member states except Poland saw a decline in GDP in 2009; by the
following year, the economy had recovered in some member states while others
continued to register negative growth rates (European Commission 2011a). In
2010, the economic crisis evolved into sovereign debt crises in a number of EU
member states, most notably Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. In these

8
See European Commission (2009b) for a detailed account of types and volume of EU transfers
allocated to old and new member states after enlargement.
76 3 The Sources of European Identity: A Theoretical Model for Explaining. . .

countries, the economic, social, and political consequences of the crisis have been
far more disruptive than in member states like Germany, which emerged quickly
from the 2008/2009 recession.
The EU’s initial response to the crisis included an agreement to inject up to
2 trillion euros in the European banking sector to end the banking crisis in the short
term (October 2008) together with a fiscal stimulus package (December 2008). To
contain the sovereign debt crises developing in Southern Europe, member states
further agreed on financial support for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and other
Eurozone countries, most importantly bilateral loans to Greece (May 2010) in
exchange for economic austerity policies monitored by the so-called ‘troika’ of
IMF, European Commission, and European Central Bank. Finally, member states
agreed on the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and the
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) as temporary rescue mechanisms,
followed by the (permanent) European Stability Mechanism (ESM) authorised to
lend up to 500 billion euros to Eurozone members in financial difficulties.
In order to refinance their debt on capital markets and/or receive financial
assistance from the EU and the IMF, the most highly indebted member states
implemented fiscal austerity programmes, agreed to significant reductions of public
budget deficits over relatively short time periods, and imposed structural reforms.
In most cases, fiscal austerity programmes combined substantial cuts in public
expenditure, in particular in social security provisions, pensions, and jobs and
wages in the public sector, with a rise in indirect taxes (Armingeon and Baccaro
2012; Theodoropoulou and Watt 2011). Both measures tend to affect
disproportionally lower income groups, resulting in an increased risk of poverty
and social exclusion. In the context of generally weak economies, the adverse social
consequences of cuts in public expenditure were further reinforced by declining
incomes and high levels of unemployment, in particular among young people
(Bieling 2012; Leschke et al. 2012).
In many of the most affected member states, the economic downturn not only
had severe social consequences, but also triggered political and governmental
crises. Austerity policies were met with social protests, mass demonstrations, and
general strikes, e.g. in Greece and Spain in 2010/2011 and in Portugal in 2012.
Analyses of public opinion data show significant declines in trust in national
governments and EU institutions in the wake of the crisis (Armingeon and Ceka
2014; Clements et al. 2014; di Mauro 2014; Roth et al. 2013, 2014) as well as a
general erosion of citizens’ satisfaction with democracy, most notably in the
countries hit hardest by the crisis (Armingeon and Guthmann 2014).
At the European level, the EU’s reaction to the economic and financial crisis has
largely been negotiated and decided by the heads of state and government meeting
in the European Council, in smaller configurations, or bilaterally. The crisis has
thus led to a reinforcement of the role of national governments in EU integration
and, in particular, the European Council, vis-a-vis the Council and other EU
institutions (Bickerton et al. 2015; Dinan 2012, 2013a; Hodson and Puetter 2013;
Puetter 2012).
3.3 The Impact of EU Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe 2004/2007 and. . . 77

Apart from ad-hoc rescue mechanisms, the crisis also led to long-term policy
reforms in the field of European fiscal and economic governance. These included
the reinforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact and extended fiscal coordination
among member states, a reinforcement of the measures of corrective action avail-
able to the Commission, minimum requirements for national budgetary frame-
works, and a new macroeconomic imbalance procedure.9
Similar to enlargement, the economic and financial crisis further led to a rise in
the salience of EU integration in the member states (Hutter and Grande 2014;
Hutter and Kerscher 2014; Meijers 2013). Media analyses reveal that nationally
centred perspectives have dominated the news coverage of the crisis (Gottschalck
2011/2012; Katsourides 2014; Mazzoni and Barbieri 2014).
To summarise, the EU’s enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe in 2004/
2007 and the onset of the financial and economic crisis in 2008 thus led to three
major changes to the environment in which citizens receive Europe-related infor-
mation and make Europe-related experiences. First, enlargement and the crisis led
to an increase in the political, economic, and social heterogeneity among EU
member states; second, they initiated extensive institutional and policy reforms at
the EU level; third, they triggered a rise in the salience of EU affairs in national
debates.
The remainder of this chapter will explore how the consequences of enlargement
and the crisis at the EU and national levels affect the sources of citizens’ identifi-
cation with Europe. Since both enlargement and the crisis led to an increase in
economic and social differences between EU member states as well as in the
salience of EU affairs at the national level, we may initially expect that the two
events also lead to similar changes in the determinants of European identification.
Accordingly, the discussion starts with the general implications of enlargement and
the crisis for the determinants of individual identification with Europe (Sect. 3.3.2).
The focus of this section is on changes in the effects of political interest and national
identification on individual identification with Europe that should occur equally in
response to enlargement and in response to the crisis.
Yet even though we observe similar trends in the consequences of CEE enlarge-
ment and the financial and economic crisis, the two events differ in the degree and
severity of their effects on member state societies and economies. Compared to
enlargement, the crisis had far more disruptive consequences, e.g. in terms of
prolonged declines in economic growth, high levels of unemployment, social pro-
tests, and governmental crises. Citizens directly witnessed these distortions in their
daily lives and their immediate environment. In this way, the crisis also more
fundamentally changed the way in which citizens experience the economic dimen-
sions of European integration than the accession of the new CEE member states did.
To account for the more disruptive consequences of the crisis compared to

9
See e.g. Caporaso et al. (2015) and Ioannou et al. (2015) for more detailed summaries of the
integrative steps taken in response to the crisis.
78 3 The Sources of European Identity: A Theoretical Model for Explaining. . .

enlargement, a second section concentrates on the particular consequences of the

economic crisis for sources of European identification (Sect. 3.3.3).

3.3.2 General Implications of Eastward Enlargement

and the Crisis for Individual Identification with Europe

The EU’s enlargement and the economic and financial crisis starting in late 2008
led to an increase in heterogeneity within the Union, making political, economic,
and social differences between EU member states more visible to the general
public. At the same time, we observe an increase in the salience of EU affairs in
domestic politics and greater politicisation and controversy over questions of EU
integration (Hutter and Grande 2014; Hutter and Kerscher 2014; Rauh and Zürn
2014). The economic and financial crisis in particular has turned European integra-
tion into a salient issue in national election campaigns and parliamentary debates in
the member states (Auel and H€oing 2014; Miklin 2014; Puntscher Riekmann and
Wydra 2013; Rauh and Zürn 2014; Wendler 2014).
This rise in the salience of EU integration at the national level means that the
environment in which citizens receive Europe-related information and make
Europe-related experiences has changed. As a result, we may expect changes in
the importance of different determinants of citizens’ identification with Europe, too.
In particular, the greater salience of EU integration may affect the importance of
political interest for European identification, as both the highly politically inter-
ested and the less interested have better access to information about Europe. The
revived debate over national interests and financial redistribution between member
states in connection with enlargement and the crisis, in turn, may affect the
relevance of national identification for European identification, as citizens recon-
sider the consequences of European integration for their country and the national
community. The following sections discuss these propositions in more detail.

3.3.2.1 Variation in the Effects of Political Interest in Response

to Eastward Enlargement and the Crisis

Analyses of national and international news coverage show that both Eastern
enlargement and the economic and financial crisis have reverberated in national
political debates and the mass media (see, e.g. Boomgaarden et al. 2010; Cross and
Ma 2013; Schuck et al. 2011). We observe a rise in the salience of EU integration in
the member states in relation to the two events, in particular after the onset of the
crisis in 2008 (Hutter and Grande 2014; Hutter and Kerscher 2014; Meijers 2013;
Vliegenthart et al. 2008).
The rise in the salience of EU topics in the context of enlargement and the crisis
implies that citizens gain better access to Europe-related information during these
3.3 The Impact of EU Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe 2004/2007 and. . . 79

periods. On the one hand, citizens are likely to receive more information about
Europe because, as the mass media devote more time and space to EU integration,
they provide a greater amount of information to their audience. On the other hand,
more citizens are likely to receive information about Europe because, as media that
previously paid little attention to EU integration start covering EU-topics, they
provide EU-related information to new audiences. In short, the heightened media
attention given to the EU during enlargement and the crisis suggest that more
information about Europe is available to citizens during these periods.
The wider availability of Europe-related information also has implications for
the importance of political interest as a determinant of European identification. Two
contradictory scenarios seem plausible. On the one hand, the greater salience of
European affairs at key moments like EU enlargement and the crisis implies that the
politically interested have even more chances to inform themselves about Europe in
these periods; on the other hand, the less interested, too, are able to access
information about Europe relatively easily at such critical moments in the integra-
tion process.
In the first case, we should expect the ‘knowledge gap’ between the politically
interested and their less interested peers to widen as the salience of EU integration
increases during enlargement and the crisis. As a result, political interest should
become more important as a determinant of European identification, i.e. the effect
of political interest on individual identification with Europe should increase.
In the second case, we should expect the ‘knowledge gap’ between the politi-
cally interested and their less interested peers to shrink as the salience of EU
integration increases. As a result, political interest should become less influential
as a determinant of European identification, i.e. the effect of political interest on
individual identification with Europe should decrease.
The (scant) empirical record on changes in the effects of political interest under
varying conditions of salience and media coverage is mixed: Zaller finds for the
U.S. context that as message intensity grows, attitude change also occurs among
respondents at lower levels of political awareness (Zaller 1992, Chap. 8). In
contrast, Semetko et al. (2003) find for the European case that under conditions
of intense media coverage of EU affairs, for example around EU summits and treaty
negotiations, attitude change is more likely among politically more attentive
respondents. Finally, de Vreese and Boomgaarden (2006a) find no significant
differences in the effect of political sophistication on support for EU enlargement
for different levels of news coverage of EU affairs.
From a theoretical point of view, both increases and decreases in the effect of
political interest on European identification appear plausible. Given Semetko
et al.’s (2003) results regarding effects of EU summits and treaty negotiations,
the present analysis proposes that political interest becomes more important as a
determinant of EU attitudes at key moments of EU integration. That is, the effect of
political interest on citizens’ identification with Europe should increase during the
enlargement period and after the onset of the financial and economic crisis com-
pared to more low-key periods in the integration process. The following hypothesis
captures this expectation:
80 3 The Sources of European Identity: A Theoretical Model for Explaining. . .

H23: The effect of political interest on individual identification with Europe

increases with the accession of the new member states from Central and Eastern
Europe in 2004/2007 and the onset of the financial and economic crisis in 2008.

3.3.2.2 Variation in the Effects of National Identification in Response

to Eastward Enlargement and the Crisis

The second determinant expected to have stronger effects during the enlargement
and crisis periods compared to ‘normal’ times of EU integration is national
identification. Enlargement and the crisis increased political, economic, and social
differences between EU member states, reviving conflicts over member states’
national interests and the overall objectives of European integration. The accession
of new member states from Central and Eastern Europe in 2004/2007 was a first
instance that brought to the fore diverging national interests and seemingly jeopar-
dized the integrity of the national community. Commentaries and analyses of
enlargement centred primarily on the economic implications of the accession of
the new member states. In many (old) member states, the enlargement process
triggered debates over issues of immigration, social security benefits for EU
migrants, and risks of social dumping and relocation of production lines to CEE
countries (see the findings on news coverage of eastward enlargement by
e.g. Dursun-Ozkanca 2011; Inthorn 2006; Light and Young 2009; van Noije 2010).
Even if these debates focussed on economic aspects of enlargement, they likely
raised concerns for national identity and the well-being of the national community,
too. Bornschier (2011), for example, shows that fears of a loss of national identity
are associated with economic fears of EU integration, in particular fears of a demise
of the national welfare state. At the party level, debates over enlargement were
accompanied by the emergence of populist right-wing parties promoting
traditionalist-communitarian values and the primacy of the national community
while rejecting EU integration and the EU’s interference in national politics
(Bornschier 2011). Analyses of political conflict show that cultural issues—immi-
gration, cultural diversity, the defence of national traditions and sovereignty,
national identity and a national way of life—generally have become more salient
in recent years (Bornschier 2010; Hutter and Grande 2014; Kriesi et al. 2006; Stoll
2010).
Like the accession of new member states from CEE, the financial and economic
crisis and the EU’s reaction to it made apparent conflicts between member states’
national interests. Across the EU, the crisis and the financial guarantee mechanisms
set up to rescue heavily indebted member states10 sparked vivid debates over
questions of national (financial) sovereignty, solidarity between EU member states,
and the costs of integration in terms of fiscal and monetary autonomy (Hutter and

10
Between November 2008 and July 2012, bailout programmes were initiated for Cyprus, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, and Spain.
3.3 The Impact of EU Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe 2004/2007 and. . . 81

Kerscher 2014; Mazzoni and Barbieri 2014; Schmidt 2014). Media analyses show
that, in both debtor and creditor countries, accounts of the crisis predominantly
adopted a national perspective, focussing on the (negative) consequences of the
crisis for the national economy and setting up an opposition between ‘good’ and
‘bad’, fiscally responsible and irresponsible, member states (Mazzoni and Barbieri
2014; Picard 2015). Even those political actors who were supportive of the bailout
measures rarely framed their support in terms of solidarity among EU member
states, but rather referred to (national) economic interests (Closa and Maatsch 2014;
Schmidt 2014).
Like the debate over enlargement, the controversy over the origins of the crisis
and appropriate response mechanisms not only raised economic questions, but also
pointed to the wider implications of economic and political integration in terms of
national sovereignty and the costs of integration for the nation state and its citizens.
The expectation is that against this background, national attachments and concerns
for the national community have become more important for citizens’ feelings of
belonging to Europe. Empirically, this assumption is supported by analyses of
euroscepticism in the mass public that show a growing influence of national
attachments on attitudes towards the EU between 2007 and 2010 (Serricchio
et al. 2013).
To summarise, both the accession of new member states from CEE and the onset
of the economic and financial crisis have revived controversies over national
interests, national sovereignty, and the well-being of the national community in a
more integrated EU. As a result, I expect a growing influence of national attach-
ments on citizens’ propensity to identify with Europe:
H24: The effect of national identification on individual identification with Europe
increases after the accession of the new member states from Central and Eastern
Europe in 2004/2007 and the onset of the financial and economic crisis in 2008.

3.3.3 Financial and Economic Crisis and Individual

Identification with Europe

The overview of the consequences of Eastward enlargement and the financial and
economic crisis for the EU and its member states showed that both enlargement and
the crisis increased political, economic, and social differences between EU member
countries. Compared to enlargement, however, the financial and economic crisis
had far more disruptive consequences for member state societies and economies,
e.g. in terms of prolonged declines in economic growth, high levels of unemploy-
ment, or social protests and governmental crises. In this regard, member state
citizens presumably felt the social and economic consequences of the crisis far
more directly in their everyday lives than the consequences of enlargement.
82 3 The Sources of European Identity: A Theoretical Model for Explaining. . .

Likewise, the role of the EU and the consequences of economic integration were
more visibly to citizens in the crisis. The spread of sovereign debt crises made
apparent spill-over effects within economic and monetary union; EU summits held
to find a coordinated response to the crisis and provide financial rescue measures to
indebted member states were highly publicised; and by making financial aid
conditional on austerity measures, the EU appeared to intervene directly in member
states’ fiscal and economic policy.
Against this background, this book argues that the crisis had implications for
citizens’ identification with Europe that go beyond the general consequences of the
increase in political, economic, and social differences between EU member states
and the increased politicisation of the EU at the member state level discussed
above. Two developments appear to set the financial and economic crisis apart
from earlier turning points in the EU integration process: first, the enduring
controversy over the EU’s response to the crisis that politicised the EU and
polarised the debate over EU integration; second, the dominance of economic
issues, both in the debate over EU integration and at the national level, which
fundamentally changed the way in which citizens experience the economic dimen-
sions of European integration. The implications of these developments for
European identification and its determinants are discussed in turn in the following

3.3.3.1 Controversy over EU Integration in the Crisis and Effects

of Political Interest on Individual Identification with Europe

The previous section argued that as the salience of EU integration in national

political debates and the mass media has risen with Eastern enlargement and the
financial and economic crisis, more information about Europe becomes available
for citizens and they can more easily access this information. I expected that
politically interested citizens disproportionally benefit from the greater amount of
and easier access to EU-information. As a result, we should see a widening gap in
EU knowledge and familiarity with EU affairs between politically more and less
interested citizens as the salience of EU integration increases; in consequence, the
effect of political interest on European identification should also increase (cf. H23).
Yet compared to previous periods in the integration process, the financial and
economic crisis has not only increased the salience of EU affairs, but also generated
substantial and persistent controversy among EU leaders that resonated widely in
the media (Dinan 2012, 2013a, b; Puetter 2012). EU integration issues have become
increasingly politicised in national election campaigns and party positions over EU
integration became more polarised over the course of the crisis (Hutter and Grande
2014; Hutter and Kerscher 2014; Risse 2015). In this regard, the crisis appears to
represent a turning point in the degree of polarisation of EU events, changing the
context in which citizens receive information about Europe and leading to a higher
degree of conflict in Europe-related messages. The higher degree of polarisation, in
3.3 The Impact of EU Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe 2004/2007 and. . . 83

turn, is expected to mitigate the effects of political interest on citizens’ propensity to

identify with Europe, with political interest becoming less important for European
identification in the course of the crisis.
In fact, Semetko et al. (2003) hypothesise that politically less interested and less
attentive citizens respond foremost to media reporting on scandalous or conflict-
ridden events. That is, politically less interested citizens are considered to pay
attention to increased media coverage mainly if the media cover conflict-ridden
events. In this case, they will benefit from the greater availability of political
information due to heightened media attention, receive more political communica-
tions, and, in this sense, become more alike to their politically more interested
peers. As a result, the differences between more and less politically interested
citizens with regard to attitude change should diminish.
Semetko et al.’s (2003) considerations regarding the type of event and the degree
of polarisation implied by the events covered are instructive for the present anal-
ysis. Until recently, key EU events like EU summits and treaty negotiations have
indeed been characterised by consensual decision-making and relative broad agree-
ment among European leaders across member states and ideological lines
(Bickerton et al. 2015; Hodson and Puetter 2013; Puetter 2012). The ongoing
financial and economic crisis, on the contrary, has generated substantial contro-
versy among EU leaders, resonating widely in the media (Dinan 2012, 2013a, b;
Puetter 2012). Analyses of electoral campaigns within EU member states, too, show
that EU integration issues have become more politicised and party positions over
EU integration more polarised over the course of the crisis (Hutter and Grande
2014; Hutter and Kerscher 2014).
In this regard, the crisis appears to represent a turning point in the degree of
polarisation of EU events and correspond to the type of conflict-ridden event that
Semetko et al. hypothesise to have a greater effect on politically less attentive
citizens. That is, before the crisis, high salience of issues of EU integration typically
meant intensive coverage of consensus among EU leaders and a focus on the
agreements reached among EU member states. After the onset of the crisis, high
salience of issues of EU integration typically implies intensive coverage of conflict
among EU leaders and controversy over financial assistance for debt-ridden mem-
ber states and the need for further economic and political integration.
In line with Semetko et al. (2003), we should expect that the ongoing contro-
versy over the causes and responses to the crisis have led also those citizens to
consume political information who ordinarily show little interest in political affairs.
As a result, differences between politically more and less interested citizens should
diminish and the effect of political interest on citizens’ identification with Europe
should decrease rather than increase after the onset of the crisis in 2008. Therefore,
an alternative hypothesis to H23 formulated above proposes that the effect of
political interest on European identification decreases in response to the financial
and economic crisis:
H25: The effect of political interest on individual identification with Europe
decreases after the onset of the financial and economic crisis in 2008.
84 3 The Sources of European Identity: A Theoretical Model for Explaining. . .

3.3.3.2 Effects of Economic Indicators in the Crisis

Having explored the potential consequences of an increased degree of conflict and

polarisation over EU integration for European identification, we now turn to the
question how the dominance of economic issues over the past years will likely
affect the development of individual identification with Europe.
As a basic principle, we can expect economic factors to become more important
as determinants of European identification during the crisis. Looking at some of the
most important indicators of macroeconomic performance, the crisis was felt across
the EU: apart from Poland and Slovakia, all EU member states experienced
recessions at some point after the onset of the crisis; likewise, unemployment
rates increased in all member states in 2008/2009 (European Commission 2009a,
2012a). Even if citizens were not personally affected by lay-offs or insolvency, they
could witness the consequences of the crisis in their everyday lives, be it in terms of
rising unemployment, cuts in public spending, higher job insecurity, social protests,
falling interest rates on private savings, or credit defaults and unfinished construc-
tion projects. In this regard, citizens across the EU experienced the effects of the
crisis, not only in the most heavily affected member states like Spain or Greece, but
also in those member states that emerged relatively quickly from economic down-
turn, like Germany or Poland. Election studies indeed confirm that the economic
crisis has been among the most important issues for voters in recent years, with
economic issues featuring even higher on voters’ agenda in the countries hit hardest
by the crisis (Singer 2013).
The crisis further had a clearly European dimension. Due to the high market
integration within the EU, the mutual importance of EU member states as trading
partners and, especially, the interdependencies within the monetary union, eco-
nomic decline and risks of credit default in one member state could not be contained
to national economies, but spread to other member states, too. Concurrently, the EU
and its institutions were highly visible actors in the crisis. The European Council,
the Eurogroup, the EU Commission, and the ECB in particular played prominent
roles, working together, first to end the banking crisis in late 2008, later to establish
financial rescue mechanisms for member states experiencing sovereign debt crises
and monitor the implementation of austerity policies in the most highly indebted
member states. In this way, there was a connection to be made for citizens between
the consequences of the crisis they felt at the national level and the causes, actors,
and policy responses to the crisis at the EU level.
In short, the crisis fundamentally changed the way in which citizens experience
the economic dimension of European integration. It brought to the fore the risks of
financial and economic interdependencies in terms of spill-over effects and citizens
directly experienced adverse economic effects. What is more, given the length of
the crisis and the interdependencies between European economies, these negative
experiences accumulated over the years and were not necessarily contained to the
actual recession period of the national economy. Germany is a case in point:
3.3 The Impact of EU Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe 2004/2007 and. . . 85

although the German economy emerged quickly from the recession and unemploy-
ment rates have actually declined since 2010, the crisis has dominated the political
debate over the past years.
The expectation is that the sustained experience of the crisis and the association
of the crisis with the European level also have consequences for how macroeco-
nomic indicators affect citizens’ identification with Europe. The general expecta-
tion is that economic considerations have come to play a more important role for
citizens when forming attitudes towards Europe. Consequently, we should observe
an increase in the effect of economic factors on European identification since the
onset of the crisis as the following hypothesis proposes. In particular, one would
expect macroeconomic indicators such as unemployment rates, but also redistrib-
utive considerations in terms of net contributions to the EU budget to gain impor-
tance as economic conditions worsened in the crisis:
H26: The effect of economic factors on individual identification with Europe
increases after the onset of the financial and economic crisis.
Although the financial crisis of late 2008 and the ensuing crisis of the real
economy hit the entire EU, individual EU member states were affected to different
degrees and in different manners. The economic, social, and political consequences
of the crisis were particularly severe in member states where the crisis of the real
economy triggered sovereign debt crises, notably Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and
Spain. In exchange for financial assistance from the EU and the IMF, these
countries agreed to austerity programmes, budget cuts, and structural reforms. In
the context of generally weak economies, cuts in public expenditure, including
social security, pension, jobs, and wages in the public sector, resulted in a growing
risk of poverty, declining incomes, and high levels of unemployment (Armingeon
and Baccaro 2012; Bieling 2012; Leschke et al. 2012; Theodoropoulou and Watt
2011).
At the public opinion level, we observe a general erosion of trust in national
governments and EU institutions in the wake of the crisis (Armingeon and Ceka
2014; Clements et al. 2014; di Mauro 2014; Roth et al. 2013, 2014). This decline
was particularly pronounced in the countries hit hardest by the crisis (Armingeon
and Guthmann 2014). Presumably, the erosion of trust in the EU in connection with
the crisis also has effects for citizens’ propensity to identify with Europe, resulting
in a decline in European identification as economic conditions worsen in a country:
H27: The worse the economic effects of the financial and economic crisis in a
country, the less citizens from this country identify with Europe.
The negative effects of economic decline on European identification will likely
be reinforced in member states that received conditional financial aids by the EU
and IMF. We can expect a ‘blame effect’, with citizens attributing economic
hardship in their country to the EU and the austerity measures imposed by the EU
and IMF in exchange for financial help. Citizens in Greece, Spain, and Portugal
very clearly made the connection between the dire social conditions in their
countries and the EU’s role in imposing national austerity programmes and budget
86 3 The Sources of European Identity: A Theoretical Model for Explaining. . .

cuts. Mass demonstrations and general strikes not only protested national govern-
ments, but also the troika and its influence on national economic and financial
policy (BBC News 2010). Hence, I expect citizens in countries under IMF/EU
conditionality to identify less with Europe than citizens in other EU member states:
H28: Citizens from member states under EU/IMF conditionality identify less with
Europe than citizens from other EU member states.
Finally, we may expect differences in the effects of the crisis between member
states in and outside the Eurozone. Although both groups of member states expe-
rienced economic downturns, Eurozone countries were particularly affected by the
risks of sovereign defaults, which put in danger the monetary union as a whole.
What is more, the Eurozone member states bore the brunt of bilateral loans and
financial guarantees under the framework of the different financial stability mech-
anisms. While in the debtor countries there was controversy over the conditions for
financial assistance in terms of austerity programmes, in the creditor countries, too,
the financial guarantees met with criticism, both among political elites and the
public.11 In this regard, the risks of greater market integration became even clearer
in the Eurozone than in other EU countries. Against this background, we may
expect that the previously hypothesised positive effect of membership in the
Eurozone is reversed in the crisis period. Accordingly, the following hypothesis
expects a negative effect of Eurozone membership on European identification in the
crisis:
H29: After the onset of the financial and economic crisis, individuals from Eurozone
member states identify less with Europe than individuals from member states
outside the Eurozone.

3.3.3.3 National Identification and the Effects of Economic Indicators

in the Crisis

The above discussion showed that, within the EU, we can distinguish two groups of
countries that were particularly affected by the financial and economic crisis. On
the one hand, the member states at risk of sovereign default, which had to agree to
austerity programmes in exchange for financial aid by the EU and IMF; on the other
hand, the Eurozone member states, which were particularly affected as the risks of
sovereign default spread among Eurozone members and required substantial

11
By way of example: In Germany, the ESM was challenged in Constitutional Court, most notably
by MPs from the government coalition, while public opinion polls showed a clear majority of
respondents opposed to bailout payments (see results reported in Bechtel et al. 2014;
Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 2010a, b, 2011a, b, c, 2012a, b). In France, too, public opinion polls
found a majority to oppose further bailout measures for Greece (Bloomberg News 2011). In
Slovakia, parliament initially rejected the expansion of EFSF whereas in Finland, parliament
only reluctantly agreed to expand the EFSF.
3.4 Summary of the Explanatory Model of European Identification 87

financial guarantees. Accordingly, the previous section hypothesised negative

effects of EU/IMF conditionality and Eurozone membership on citizens’ identifi-
cation with Europe in the crisis period.
In addition to these general effects of EU/IMF conditionality and Eurozone
membership, we may expect that citizens within these countries differ in their
perception and reaction to austerity measures and financial assistance programmes
to other member states. We know from analyses of media coverage and political
speeches that in both, countries under EU/IMF conditionality and countries pro-
viding financial guarantees via the European rescue mechanisms, accounts of the
crisis predominantly adopted a national perspective. The debate focussed largely on
the (negative) consequences of the crisis for the national economy, juxtaposing
‘good’ and ‘bad’, fiscally responsible and irresponsible member states (Mazzoni
and Barbieri 2014; Picard 2015). Even those political actors who were supportive of
bailout measures tended to frame their support in terms of (national) economic
interests (Closa and Maatsch 2014; Schmidt 2014). The expectation is that citizens
who feel strongly attached to their national community are particularly concerned
by the negative effects of austerity programmes required by the EU/IMF
(in countries receiving financial aids) and the amount of financial guarantees
given to member states in crisis (in the Eurozone creditor states). As a result, we
should see the effect of EU/IMF conditionality and Eurozone membership on
European identification vary by citizens’ level of national identification as the
following hypotheses propose:
H30: In member states receiving conditional financial aid from the EU/IMF, the
more individuals identify with the nation, the less they identify with Europe.
H31: In Eurozone member states, the more individuals identify with the nation, the
less they identify with Europe.

3.4 Summary of the Explanatory Model of European

Identification

The present chapter developed a theoretical model of individual identification with

Europe among EU citizens. At its core is the idea that citizens’ identification with
Europe draws on two general sources—Europe-related information on the one hand
and Europe-related personal experiences on the other. Building on this idea, the
theoretical model explains citizens’ identification with Europe by individual- and
country-level factors shaping either citizens’ access to Europe-related information
or their opportunities for personal experiences with other Europeans and EU
politics.
88 3 The Sources of European Identity: A Theoretical Model for Explaining. . .

To identify the relevant individual- and country-level attributes and predisposi-

tions likely to shape citizens’ access to Europe-related information and personal
contacts with other Europeans, and thus their propensity to identify with Europe,
the theoretical discussion drew on previous research on public opinion and attitudes
towards European integration, notably Zaller’s work on ‘The Nature and Origins of
Mass Opinion’ (Zaller 1992) and its adaption to EU public opinion by Fuchs (2011).
The final model combines three sets of individual-level and three sets of country-
level determinants in a multilevel framework of European identification. At the
individual level, identification with Europe is expected to depend on citizens’
political awareness, attitudes towards the European and national community, and
personal transnational experiences. At the country level, identification with Europe
is expected to depend on national party messages related to the European and
national community, member states’ economic position and degree of integration
in the EU and global markets, and the ethnocultural composition of member state
societies. Furthermore, I expect interaction effects between individual- and
country-level determinants on citizens’ identification with Europe. Table 3.1 sum-
marises the theoretical expectations developed for each set of determinants.
The explanatory model of individual identification with Europe provides an
integrated framework for analysis that seeks to explain European identification
among EU citizens across all EU member states and periods of European integra-
tion without being restricted to a particular political, geographical, or historical
context. In a second step, the general model was adapted for two decisive periods in
the EU integration process, namely the EU’s enlargement to Central and Eastern
Europe in 2004/2007 and the onset of the financial and economic crisis in 2008. In
this way, the present analysis explores not only general determinants of European
identification, but also the implications of key moments in the integration process
for the development of European identification in the mass public. Hypotheses with
regard to the expected effects of enlargement and the crisis on individual identifi-
cation with Europe are summarised in the bottom part of Table 3.1.
The following empirical analysis proceeds in three steps. In a first step, it
examines the evolution of individual identification with Europe in the EU aggregate
and the member states over the period 1992–2013. In a second step, it examines to
what extent parties emphasise issues related to the European and national commu-
nity and their respective collective identities in European election campaigns in the
years 1979 to 2009. Finally, the theoretical model of individual identification with
Europe developed in the present chapter is tested for the period 2000–2012 to
clarify the effects of individual- and country-level determinants on European
identification in the mass public.
3.4 Summary of the Explanatory Model of European Identification 89

Table 3.1 Summary of hypotheses of determinants of individual identification with Europe

Hypotheses
Individual level
Political awareness
H1a The more interested individuals are in politics, the more they identify with Europe.
H1b The more interested individuals are in politics, the less they identify with Europe.
H2a The more interested individuals are in EU politics, the more they identify with Europe.
H2b The more interested individuals are in EU politics, the less they identify with Europe.
H3a The more knowledgeable individuals are of the EU and EU integration, the more they
identify with Europe.
H3b The more knowledgeable individuals are of the EU and EU integration, the less they
identify with Europe.
Attitudes towards European and national community
H4a The more individuals associate Europe with a common cultural heritage and/or a com-
mon political fate, the more they identify with Europe.
H4b The more individuals associate Europe with individual benefits, the less they identify
with Europe.
H5a The more individuals identify with the nation, the more they identify with Europe.
H5b The more individuals identify with the nation, the less they identify with Europe.
H6a The more individuals associate membership in the national community with common
political values, the more they identify with Europe.
H6b The more individuals identify associate membership in the national community with a
common ethnic and religious heritage, the less they identify with Europe.
Personal transnational experiences
H7 The more individuals engage in transnational practices involving other Europeans in their
daily lives, the more they identify with Europe.
H8 Individuals with a personal transnational background identify more with Europe than
individuals without a transnational background.
H9 The more transnational human capital individuals possess, the more they identify with
Europe.
Country level
Party messages related to the European and national community
H10 The more political parties in a country address issues of European community and
identity in the national political debate, the more individuals from this country identify
with Europe.
H11 The more political parties in a country address issues of national community and identity
in the national political debate, the less individuals from this country identify with
Europe.
Economic position and degree of integration in the EU and global markets
H12 Individuals from Eurozone member states identify more with Europe than individuals
from member states outside the Eurozone.
H13 Individuals from net contributor countries of EU funds identify less with Europe than
individuals from net recipient countries of EU funds.
H14 The more economically integrated a country in the European and global markets, the
more individuals from this country identify with Europe.
(continued)
90 3 The Sources of European Identity: A Theoretical Model for Explaining. . .

Table 3.1 (continued)

Hypotheses
Ethnocultural composition of member state societies
H15 The higher the share of EU nationals in a country, the more individuals from this country
identify with Europe.
H16a The higher the overall share of immigrants in a country, the more individuals from this
country identify with Europe.
H16b The higher the overall share of immigrants in a country, the less individuals from this
country identify with Europe.
Interaction effects between individual- and country-level determinants
Interaction with political interest
H17 The more interested individuals are in politics, the stronger the relationship between party
messages and individual identification with Europe.
H17a The more interested individuals are in politics, the stronger the positive relationship
between party messages on issues of European community and individual identification
with Europe.
H17b The more interested individuals are in politics, the stronger the negative relationship
between party messages on issues of national community and identity and individual
identification with Europe.
H18 The more interested individuals are in politics, the stronger the effect of member states’
status as a net contributor country of EU funds on individual identification with Europe.
H19 The more interested individuals are in politics, the stronger the effect of member states’
degree of integration in the European and global markets on individual identification with
Europe.
Interaction with national identification
H20 The more individuals identify with the nation, the stronger the relationship between party
messages and individual identification with Europe.
H20a The more individuals identify with the nation, the stronger the negative relationship
between party messages on issues of national community and individual identification
with Europe.
H21 The more individuals identify with the nation, the stronger the negative relationship
between member states’ status as a net contributor country to EU funding and individual
identification with Europe.
H22 The more individuals identify with the nation, the greater the negative effect of member
states’ overall share of immigrants on their propensity to identify with Europe.
Impact of enlargement and the crisis on individual identification with Europe
General implications of enlargement and the crisis
H23 The effect of political interest on individual identification with Europe increases after
Eastward enlargement and the onset of the financial and economic crisis in 2008.
H24 The effect of national identification on individual identification with Europe increases
after Eastward enlargement and the onset of the financial and economic crisis in 2008.
Economic crisis and individual identification with Europe
H25 The effect of political interest on individual identification with Europe decreases after the
onset of the financial and economic crisis in 2008.
H26 The effect of economic factors on individual identification with Europe increases after the
onset of the financial and economic crisis.
H27 The worse the economic effects of the financial and economic crisis in a country, the less
citizens from this country identify with Europe.
(continued)
References 91

Table 3.1 (continued)

Hypotheses
H28 Individuals from member states under EU/IMF conditionality identify less with Europe
than individuals from other EU member states.
H29 After the onset of the financial and economic crisis, individuals from Eurozone member
states identify less with Europe than individuals from member states outside the
Eurozone.
Interaction with national identification in the crisis
H30 In member states receiving conditional financial aid from the EU/IMF, the more indi-
viduals identify with the nation, the less they identify with Europe.
H31 In Eurozone member states, the more individuals identify with the nation, the less they
identify with Europe

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Chapter 4
The Development of Citizens’ Identification
with Europe from Maastricht to the Crisis

The present chapter presents the descriptive evidence on levels and development of
citizens’ identification with Europe as the central phenomenon of interest of this
book. Drawing on survey data from the Eurobarometer, it provides information on
the prevalence of European identifications in the mass public and draws conclu-
sions about the emergence of a collective European identity among EU citizens. To
this end, the following analysis explores the evolution of individual identification
with Europe in the EU aggregate and the EU member states over the period
1992–2013. Three questions guide the descriptive analysis of European
identification:
• How widespread is European identification among citizens in the EU member
states and which trends do we observe in European identification over the
1992–2013 period?
• How widespread are multiple national and European identifications in the EU
population and do national and European identifications appear compatible or
conflicting in a framework of multiple collective identifications?
• How has citizens’ identification with Europe responded to the EU’s enlargement
to Central and Eastern Europe in 2004/2007 and the onset of the financial and
economic crisis in late 2008?
Based on the previous conceptual discussion of individual European identifica-
tion (cf. Chap. 2), the analysis explores cognitive, evaluative, and affective aspects
of identification with Europe. These are operationalised by, first, citizens’ self-
categorisation as European (cognitive identification); second, citizens’ pride in
being European (evaluative identification); and third, citizens’ attachment to
Europe/the European Union (affective identification).
The empirical evidence shows that a collective European identity has developed
in the EU public alongside collective national identities, with a majority of citizens
seeing themselves (also) as European and expressing attachments to the European
community. While European identity cannot match national identities in extent or
intensity, multiple collective identities are a reality for EU citizens by now. The

© Springer International Publishing AG 2018 101

S. Bergbauer, Explaining European Identity Formation,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67708-8_4
102 4 The Development of Citizens’ Identification with Europe from. . .

time series for European identification show a slight increase in citizens’ identifi-
cation with Europe following the accession of new Central and Eastern European
member states in 2004; in contrast, attachments to the European Union (moder-
ately) decrease in the aftermath of the financial and economic crisis, especially in
the Eurozone and in some of the countries hit hardest by the crisis. Rather than
causing a sudden drop in European identification, the negative effects of the crisis
appear to accumulate over time, gradually weakening citizens’ affective ties to the
European community.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows: A first section presents the
database for the descriptive analysis and explains the choice of indicators used to
operationalise the concept of individual European identification (Sect. 4.1). The
subsequent sections present the empirical findings, starting with levels and devel-
opment of European identification in the EU over the 1992–2013 (Sect. 4.2) and the
prevalence of multiple identifications with the European and the national commu-
nity (Sect. 4.3). The subsequent section concentrates on the consequences of the
EU’s enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe in 2004/2007 and the onset of the
financial and economic crisis in late 2008 for citizens’ identification with Europe
(Sect. 4.4). A final section draws conclusions with regard to the emergence of a
collective European identity among the EU citizens (Sect. 4.5).

4.1 Data and Operationalisation

To assess levels and development of citizens’ identification with Europe, the

present study relies on survey data from 42 Eurobarometer (EB) waves conducted
between March/April 1992 and November 20131 (see Table 4.2 in the appendix for
a full list of EB waves used in the descriptive analysis). EB surveys are represen-
tative samples of the populations of the EU member states aged 15 and over
(nationals and non-nationals, but EU citizens), with each survey consisting of
approximately 1000 face-to-face interviews per country.2 The combined dataset
for the descriptive analysis comprises around 731,000 individuals, sampled in the
then current EU member states at 38 time points, with between 13,000 and 27,000
individuals sampled per time point.

1
Conducted on behalf of the European Commission, the Eurobarometer surveys have been
monitoring public opinion in the then current EC/EU member countries since 1973. Standard
EB surveys are conducted at least twice a year, including attitudes towards European unification,
institutions, and policies; measurements for general socio-political orientations; and respondent
and household demographics. For more information on the EB and EB methodology, see www.ec.
europa.eu/public_opinion. Primary data and related documentation were obtained from the GESIS
Data Archive for the Social Sciences at www.gesis.org
2
Approximately 1500 interviews in Germany with separate samples for East (500) and West
(1000); 1300 in the UK with separate samples for Great Britain (1000) and Northern Ireland (300);
and 500 in Cyprus, Luxemburg, and Malta.
4.1 Data and Operationalisation 103

Individual identification with Europe has previously been defined as citizens’

self-categorisation as European together with their evaluations of their membership
in the European collective and their affective attachment to Europe and other
Europeans (cf. Chap. 2). The three components of European identification
contained in the definition—self-categorisation, evaluation, and attachment—are
measured by three different indicators, assessing, respectively, citizens’ self-
categorisation as European, citizens’ pride in being European, and citizens’
attachment to Europe/the European Union. All three indicators represent standard
measures of European identity in survey-based public opinion research and have
been widely used in previous analyses of European identification (see, e.g. Bellucci
et al. 2012; Caporaso and Kim 2009; Citrin and Sides 2004; Duchesne and Frognier
2008; Fuchs et al. 2009; Fuchs and Schneider 2011; Isernia et al. 2012; Kaina 2009;
Pichler 2008; Risse 2010).
Citizens’ self-categorisation as European is operationalised by the question: “In
the near future, do you see yourself as . . .? [Nationality] only; [Nationality] and
European; European and [Nationality]; European only;” This question has been
used widely in analyses of citizens’ identification with Europe, in particular to
operationalise concepts of exclusive and inclusive national identity (see, e.g. de
Vries and van Kersbergen 2007; Fuchs et al. 2009; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Risse
2010). The item is recoded into a binary variable distinguishing between respon-
dents who identify only with the nation (seeing themselves as ‘nationality only’ in
the near future) and respondents who show some form of European identification
(other response categories). Respondents indicating ‘don’t know’ or ‘none’ spon-
taneously and those refusing to answer are omitted from the analysis.
Citizens’ pride in being European is operationalised by the question “And would
you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, not at all proud to be
European?” As a measure of citizens’ esteem for their status as European,
European pride implies a positive evaluation of the group of Europeans and can
thus be used to operationalise evaluative aspects of European identification. This
operationalisation follows research on national identification that uses measures of
pride to assess in-group evaluation and interprets national pride as a generalised
positive evaluation of the nation (Blank and Schmidt 2003; Mummendey et al.
2001). The pride item is recoded so that higher values indicate stronger pride in
being European. For comparison, levels of European pride are presented alongside
levels of national pride.3 To visualise the development of pride over time, European
and national pride are collapsed into binary variables distinguishing between
respondents reporting to be not at all/not very proud to be European/[NATIONAL-
ITY] and respondents reporting to be fairly/very proud to be European/[NATION-
ALITY]. Respondents indicating ‘don’t know’ and those refusing to answer are
omitted from the analysis. Due to data limitations, we can track levels of European
pride only for the years 2000 to 2006.

3
National pride is assessed by the following item: ‘Would you say you are very proud, fairly proud,
not very proud, not at all proud to be [NATIONALITY]?’
104 4 The Development of Citizens’ Identification with Europe from. . .

Citizens’ attachment to Europe, third, is measured by the question “People may

feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their
country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to. . . Europe. Very
attached, fairly attached, not very attached, not at all attached.”. Starting with EB
67.2 (April/March 2007), the wording of the item changed and the question
thereafter refers to ‘the European Union’ instead of ‘Europe’.4 Therefore, I analyse
citizens’ attachment to Europe for the years 1995 to 2007 and citizens’ attachment
to the European Union for the period 2007 to 2013.
Referring to respondents’ attachment to Europe/the European Union, this item
emphasises affective aspects of European identification. Attachment to Europe is
one of the most frequently used indicators of identification with Europe and has
been found to be the most appropriate measure of European identification in survey
research (Sinnott 2006). Unlike the item assessing respondents’ self-description as
national and/or European, the attachment item does not force respondents to rank-
order national and European identifications, but allows them to express equally
strong attachments to multiple levels of community. Hence, we are able to directly
compare levels and strength of respondents’ attachment to the national and the
European level and draw conclusions regarding the relative importance of
European identification compared to national attachments.
The attachment item is recoded so that higher values indicate stronger attach-
ment to Europe/the European Union. To compare attachment to Europe/the
European Union to attachment to the national level, the following analysis shows
levels of attachment to Europe/the European Union alongside levels of attachment
to one’s own country.5 To visualise the development of attachment over time, all
three items, attachment to the Europe, attachment to the European Union, and
respondents’ attachment to their own country, are collapsed into binary variables,
distinguishing between respondents reporting to be very attached/fairly attached
and respondents reporting to be not very attached/not at all attached. Respondents
indicating ‘don’t know’ or refusing to answer are omitted from the analysis.

4
The exact question wording for attachment to the European Union is: People may feel different
degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country or the European
Union. Please tell me how attached you feel to. . .the European Union. Very attached, fairly
attached, not very attached, not at all attached.
5
Attachment to one’s own country is assessed by the same item as attachment to Europe/the
European Union. The exact question wording is ‘People may feel different degrees of attachment
to their town or village, to their region, to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached
you feel to. . .[COUNTRY]. Very attached, fairly attached, not very attached, not at all attached.’
4.2 The Development of Citizens’ Identification with Europe 1992–2013 105

4.2 The Development of Citizens’ Identification

with Europe 1992–2013

The first research question to be explored addresses the level and development of
citizens’ identification with Europe over time. How widespread are European
identifications among EU citizens and which trends do we observe in citizens’
identification with Europe over the years 1992–2013? To answer these questions,
the following section tracks citizens’ identification with Europe in terms of their
self-categorisation as European, European pride, and attachment to Europe and the
European Union. The aim is to give a general overview of the long-term trends in
citizens’ identification with Europe in the EU member states. Subsequent sections
will discuss in more detail to what extent citizens have developed multiple identi-
fications with both the European and national level and how enlargement and the
crisis have affected levels of European identification in the member states. All
figures and tables are based on the weighted6 aggregate of EU member states at the
time or on weighted aggregates of selected groups of member countries, e.g. the
EU6, CEE member states, or Eurozone countries. Vertical lines in the figures
indicate the years 2004 and 2008 to ease interpretation with regard to developments
in European identification after EU enlargement to CEE and the onset of the
financial and economic crisis.
The Development of Citizens’ Self-Categorisation as European 1992–
2013 Starting with citizens’ self-categorisation as European, a first question to be
explored is whether citizens’ actively allocate themselves to the European commu-
nity and thus show a form of cognitive identification with Europe. Figure 4.1
depicts the percentage of respondents describing themselves also as European as
opposed to respondents seeing themselves only as members of the national group in
the near future.
Over the entire period under analysis, a majority of EU citizens see themselves
(also) as Europeans. That is, EU citizens have consistently shown a form of
cognitive identification with the group of Europeans over the past two decades.
Levels of self-categorisation prove remarkably stable over time, with the percent-
age of citizens identifying (also) as European vacillating between 52% (autumn
1996/spring 2010) and 66% (autumn 1994). Nonetheless, we also observe a con-
siderable proportion of citizens who continue to describe themselves only by their
nationality. For these citizens, European and national identification appear not to go
together at all, given that the indicator explicitly offers the choice to identify as both
national and European.

6
The descriptive analyses of the EU aggregate as well as sub-groups of EU member states
(e.g. EU6, new CEE member states, Eurozone countries) employs population size weighting
based on the Eurobarometer’s ‘European weights’, which adjust each national sample in propor-
tion to its share in the total EU population (aged 15 and over) or within different groupings of EU
member states. The European population size weights also include post-stratification weighting
factors for each sample (minimum sex, age, region, size of locality).
106 4 The Development of Citizens’ Identification with Europe from. . .

Fig. 4.1 Self-Categorisation as European in the EU Aggregate 1992–2013

The overall trends mask important differences in European identification among

EU member states. Figure 4.2 displays levels and development of self-
categorisation as European and exclusive national identification by EU member
state. In a first group of countries a majority of respondents consistently identifies
(also) as European. This is the case notably in France, Luxembourg, Malta, the
Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, and Spain, West Germany since the late 1990s, and
Italy except for a brief time span in the early 2000s. In a second group of countries
the proportion of respondents identifying (also) as European and the proportion of
respondents identifying only by their nationality vacillate around the 50% mark.
This group includes notably Austria, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland,
and Portugal. In these countries, roughly half of respondents identify (also) with
Europe while the other half identify only by their nationality. In a third, smaller
group of countries a majority of respondents consistently identifies only by their
nationality. This is the case notably in Great Britain and, to a lesser extent, in
Lithuania.
For the most part, the observed differences in levels of European identification
between EU member states appear to reflect long-standing traditions in countries’
relations to the EU. Thus, the dominance of exclusive national identifications in
Great Britain appears to reflect the view of Europe as ‘the other’ prevailing in
British identity discourses since the 1950s (Risse 2010). On the other hand, we find
the greatest proportions of respondents identifying (also) as European in the six
founding member states of the EC/EU. In these countries, political elites and mass
 4.2 The Development of Citizens’ Identification with Europe 1992–2013

Fig. 4.2 Self-Categorisation as European in the EU Member States 1992–2013

107
108 4 The Development of Citizens’ Identification with Europe from. . .

publics have traditionally been supportive of the European project and citizens have
the longest experience with EU integration.
The Development of Citizens’ Pride in Being European 2000–2006 Levels of
European pride confirm the picture of citizens’ identification with Europe so far. As
Fig. 4.3 shows, citizens’ pride in being European remains stable over time, increas-
ing slightly from 68% in early 2000 to 72% in autumn 2004 and 75% in autumn
2006, the last year the pride indicator was included in the Eurobarometer. Levels of
European pride remain lower than levels of national pride, with just under 90% of
respondents claiming to be proud to be [NATIONALITY] in all years under
analysis.
The findings for the EU aggregate are largely replicated at the member state
level as the overview of European and national pride in the member states in
Fig. 4.4 shows. With the exception of Great Britain, more than 60% of respondents
in all EU member states say they are fairly or very proud to be European; in most
countries, levels of European pride even exceed the 70%-mark. As in the EU
aggregate, levels of European pride remain relatively stable over the years
2000–2006, with levels of national pride being considerably higher than levels of
European pride.
The gap in levels of European and national pride differs by member state. At one
extreme, we find Greece and Great Britain where high levels of national pride are
combined with comparatively low levels of European pride. At the other end, we
find Italy and Luxembourg and, to a lesser degree Spain, with comparatively high

Fig. 4.3 European and National Pride in the EU Aggregate 2000–2006

4.2 The Development of Citizens’ Identification with Europe 1992–2013 109

Fig. 4.4 European and National pride in the EU Member States 2000–2006

levels of both national and European pride. Levels of national pride are noticeably
lower in Germany, reflecting a long-standing reluctance among Germans to express
nationalist sentiments in light of the country’s history; the lower level of national
pride in Belgium appears to reflect the cleavage between Walloon and Flemish
parts of the country and the strong regional identities in the two parts, which may
suppress pride in being Belgian.
The Development of Citizens’ Attachment to Europe and the EU 1992–
2013 Turning to citizens’ affective ties to Europe and the community of
Europeans and their attachment to European and the European Union, we observe
similar trends as in the case of citizens’ self-categorisation as European and pride in
being European.
Figure 4.5 depicts the percentage of respondents indicating to be fairly or very
attached to Europe/the European Union alongside the percentage of respondents
indicating to be fairly or very attached to their country.
From the late 1990s onwards, a majority of respondents consistently feel fairly
or very attached to Europe; by the year 2007, when the question for respondents’
attachment to Europe was last included in the Eurobarometer survey, the proportion
of respondents claiming attachment to Europe had risen to two thirds. Levels of
attachment drop considerably if respondents are asked to indicate their attachment
to the European Union, although 40–50% of respondents still feel fairly or very
attached to the EU over the period under analysis. EU citizens thus appear to have
developed stable affective ties to both Europe as the wider region and the European
Union as a more narrowly defined political and economic system.
110 4 The Development of Citizens’ Identification with Europe from. . .

Fig. 4.5 Attachment to Europe/the European Union in the EU Aggregate 1995–2013

Levels of attachment to Europe/the European Union remain far behind respon-

dents’ attachment to their own country, however. As the uppermost line in Fig. 4.5
shows, over the entire period under analysis, around 90% of respondents claim to be
fairly or very attached to their country. The gap between national and European
attachment initially shrank, but widened again in recent years as respondents were
asked to indicate their attachment to the European Union. What is more, in nearly
all years under analysis, more than half of respondents claim to be ‘very attached’ to
their country, whereas at most a fifth claim to be ‘very attached’ to Europe and no
more than a tenth feel ‘very attached’ to the European Union.
The overall trends in attachment to Europe/the European Union are widely
reflected at the member state level. As Fig. 4.6 shows, national attachments exceed
attachment to Europe and the European Union in all member states. Likewise,
levels of attachment to Europe generally exceed levels of attachment to the
European Union. The upward trend in attachment to Europe which we observed
in the EU aggregate from the 1990s onwards is also manifest in most of the member
states. Unlike in the case of self-categorisation as European, levels of attachment to
Europe are not necessarily higher in the six EC/EU founding states than in countries
that joined the EC/EU later in the integration process. Thus, we find about the same
or greater proportions of respondents feeling fairly or very attached to Europe in
countries like Denmark, Finland, or Sweden as in France, Italy, or the Netherlands.
Some interesting patterns emerge regarding the differences in levels of attach-
ment to Europe and the European Union at the member state level. Although
attachment to Europe generally exceeds attachment to the European Union, the
 4.2 The Development of Citizens’ Identification with Europe 1992–2013

Fig. 4.6 Attachment to Europe/the European Union in the EU Member States 1995–2013
111
112 4 The Development of Citizens’ Identification with Europe from. . .

gap between the two differs widely between member states. In a number of coun-
tries, such as France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and the Baltic states, attach-
ment to the EU closely traces attachment to Europe. In a second group of countries,
notably Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, as well as Spain in the 1990s and early
2000s, we observe a large gap between attachment to Europe and attachment to the
European Union. Thus, in spring 2006, the last time attachment to Europe and
attachment to the European Union were sampled together in a Eurobarometer
survey, the difference in attachment was less than five percentage points in Cyprus,
Italy, Spain, and Slovenia, but twenty and more in Denmark, Finland, the Nether-
lands, Slovakia, and Sweden.7 These differences do not appear to be related to
differences in length of EU membership nor do they divide small and large countries
or Western and Eastern European member states. Rather, they suggest that citizens
across the EU associate very different meanings with the term ‘Europe’.
Thus, the comparatively small gap between attachment to Europe and attach-
ment to the EU in countries like Italy or Slovenia appears to indicate that citizens in
these countries largely equate ‘Europe’ with the ‘EU’ and/or have developed
positive affections to both. As a result, we observe similar levels of attachment
regardless of whether respondents are asked to indicate their attachment to Europe
or the EU.
In contrast, the large gap in levels of attachment to Europe and the European
Union in, e.g. the Nordic countries or the Netherlands, appears to indicate that
citizens in these countries differentiate between ‘Europe’, possibly understood as a
cultural sphere or geographical entity, and the EU as a supranational political
system and that citizens differ in their affection towards the two objects. Given
the comparatively high levels of attachment to Europe, citizens in Sweden or
Finland do not seem generally averse to developing affective ties to the European
level (as seems to be the case for Great Britain, for example, where both levels of
attachment to Europe and to the EU are low compared to other EU member states).
They appear sceptical towards the European Union, however, as expressed in the
lower levels of attachment to the EU. Apparently, the EU has only been partially
successful in superimposing itself as the primary meaning of ‘Europe’ and securing
positive affections by its citizens.
Recapitulating our findings so far, we see that a majority of citizens has come to
identify with Europe over the past two decades. This is true for all three dimensions
of European identification described in the conceptual discussion of individual
European identity, i.e. cognitive identification in the form of self-allocation to the
European collective, positive evaluations of group membership in the form of
European pride, and affective identification in the form of attachment to Europe/
the European Union. We can take these results as evidence that EU citizens have
indeed started to develop a common European identity.

7
It should be underlined that EB 65.2 from March/May 2006 employed a split survey design;
hence, we cannot compare respondents individually, but only aggregate response behaviour to the
two attachment items.
4.3 The Prevalence of Multiple European and National Identifications Among EU. . . 113

Nonetheless, we find levels of European identification to lag behind levels of

national identification over the whole period under analysis. The persistent gap between
national and European attachments indicates that for considerable shares of EU citizens,
the national community remains an important—and for some the only—object of
collective identification. Against this background, the question of multiple collective
identifications becomes crucial. Based on the empirical evidence so far, the European
Union will not be able to supplant national identification with European identification,
at least not in the near future. To guarantee the legitimacy of the EU and EU decision
making, it will therefore be necessary that European identification grows alongside
national identification. The following section will explore the relationship between
national and European identification in more detail. The objective is to determine
whether citizens perceive identification with the two levels as compatible or conflicting
and how widespread multiple identifications are among the EU population.

4.3 The Prevalence of Multiple European and National

Identifications Among EU Citizens

The evidence regarding citizens’ identification with Europe presented so far indicates
that citizens have developed stable ties to the European community, but the level and
intensity of European identifications fall behind those of identification with the
national community. This finding raises questions about the relationship between
European and national identifications. Are the two forms of collective identification
compatible or conflicting? Do citizens discriminate between the two, identifying with
either the European or the national level? Or do citizens combine European and
national identifications in the form of multiple collective identifications?
We previously observed that a majority of respondents in the EU describe them-
selves not only by their nationality, but (also) as European. While we find a less
uniform picture at the member state level, in the majority of member states more than
half of respondents still see themselves (also) as European. Overall, EU citizens thus
appear to combine belongings to the national and the European level relatively easily.
Nonetheless, citizens’ self-categorisation as European may be a weak test of the
strength of multiple identifications in the EU context. Replies to the question for
whether respondents ‘see themselves’ (also) as Europeans may well be based on a
primarily geographic or legal understanding of being European, i.e. based on the
location of one’s home country on the European continent and its membership in
the EU. To fulfil the functions ascribed to a common European identity at the
macrosocial level, however, citizens’ affective ties to the European level may
ultimately be more important than their (cognitive) self-allocation to the
European collective. Feelings of attachment are more closely related to the sense
of solidarity and obligation to the European community that makes majority
decisions and redistributive measures legitimate in the eyes of the citizens. There-
fore, the prevalence of multiple affective identifications with the national and the
114 4 The Development of Citizens’ Identification with Europe from. . .

European community in the EU population may be more informative for the role of
a common European identity in securing legitimacy and support for the European
project than citizens’ self-description as European.
To explore multiple affective ties to Europe and the nation among EU citizens,
we can cross-tabulate attachment to Europe/the European Union and attachment to
country. Following the typology of collective identities proposed by Fuchs and
Schneider (2011, p.79).
Table 4.1 provides percentages for four combinations of attachment to the national
and European level: respondents who feel attached to both their country and Europe/
the European Union (‘multiple identification’); respondents who feel attached only to
their country (‘national identification only’); respondents who feel attached only to
Europe/the European Union (‘European identification only’); and respondents who
feel attached to neither their country nor Europe/the European Union (‘no collective
identification’). The upper half of shows cross-tabulations between respondents’
attachment to their country and to Europe, the lower half of Table 4.1 shows combi-
nations of respondents’ attachment to their country and the European Union.
As we can see from the percentages in the column ‘multiple identification’, in all
years under analysis, a substantial proportion of respondents feel attached to both
the national and the European level. In this regard, the comparatively higher levels
of national attachment we previously observed do not necessarily imply that
citizens find European and national ties incompatible. Rather, multiple collective
attachments are the norm for important parts of the EU population.
These rather positive findings need to be qualified, however. First, significant
numbers of respondents continue to feel attached only to the national level. What is
more, we find important differences in the extent of multiple attachments
depending on whether respondents are asked to indicate their attachment to Europe
or the European Union. Finally, we observe divergent trends in multiple identifi-
cations and exclusive national attachments over time.
Concentrating first on the period 1995 to 2007 and multiple identifications with
Europe and the home country (upper half of Table 4.1), we see the percentage of
respondents with only national attachments decline significantly over time. While in
1995, nearly half of respondents feel attached only to their country, the number has
fallen to just over a quarter by 2007. In contrast, the share of respondents feeling
attached to both Europe and their country rises from just over 40% in 1995 to nearly
65% in 2007. The increase in multiple identifications between 2003 and 2004 can be
partially explained by the greater prevalence of multiple attachments to Europe and
the home country in the new CEE member states. Nonetheless, we observe a general
upward trend in multiple identifications from the late 1990s to the mid-2000s.
Turning to the lower half of Table 4.1 and multiple identifications with the
European Union and the home country, we observe significantly lower levels of
multiple identifications and higher shares of respondents with only national attach-
ments. What is more, unlike in the case of multiple attachments to Europe and the
home country, the share of respondents with multiple identifications increases only
intermittently. Multiple attachments to the European Union and the home country
peak in spring 2007 and spring 2010, the only times when more than 50% of
4.3 The Prevalence of Multiple European and National Identifications Among EU. . . 115

Table 4.1 Multiple Identification with Europe/the European Union and [OUR COUNTRY]
1995–2013
Multiple identification with Europe/EU and [COUNTRY] in the EU aggregate (%)
National European
Multiple identification identification No collective
EB no. Month Year identification only only identification
Multiple identification with Europe and [OUR COUNTRY]
EB May/June 1995 41.0 48.8 2.8 7.5
43.1bis
EB 51 March– 1999 56.2 33.6 2.4 7.8
May
EB November/ 2000 58.2 31.0 2.2 8.6
54.1 December
EB October/ 2003 57.5 34.2 2.4 6.0
60.1 November
EB 62 October/ 2004 66.0 26.2 2.7 5.1
November
EB May/June 2005 64.2 26.7 2.8 6.2
63.4
EB March/ 2006 61.0 29.3 3.2 6.4
65.2 May
EB February/ 2007 64.6 26.1 3.1 6.1
67.1 March
Multiple identification with the EU and [OUR COUNTRY]
EB April/May 1995 42.1 47.6 2.4 7.8
43.1bis
EB January/ 2002 40.0 49.4 1.7 9.0
56.3 February
EB October/ 2002 44.9 45.1 1.7 8.3
58.1 November
EB March/ 2006 49.9 40.7 2.0 7.4
65.2 May
EB April/ 2007 52.0 39.4 2.7 5.9
67.2 March
EB September/ 2007 48.4 42.7 2.3 6.6
68.1 November
EB March/ 2010 52.2 41.3 1.6 4.9
73.3 April
(continued)
116 4 The Development of Citizens’ Identification with Europe from. . .

Table 4.1 (continued)

Multiple identification with Europe/EU and [COUNTRY] in the EU aggregate (%)
National European
Multiple identification identification No collective
EB no. Month Year identification only only identification
EB May 2012 45.1 45.9 1.8 7.3
77.3
EB November 2013 44.7 46.2 2.1 7.0
80.1
Question wording: People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to
their region, to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to. . . Europe/The
European Union/[OUR COUNTRY]
Note: Typology of identifications based on Fuchs/Schneider (2011), Table 3.7, p.80; Figures are
percentages of respondents based on the weighted aggregate of EU member states at the time.
Attachment variables are dichotomised by merging the categories ‘very attached’/‘fairly attached’
and ‘not very attached’/‘not attached at all’ and cross-tabulated to construct four types of
identifications:
Multiple identification: percentage of respondents feeling fairly or very attached to both country
and Europe/the EU;
National identification only: percentage of respondents feeling fairly or very attached to country
and not attached to Europe/the EU;
European identification only: percentage of respondents feeling fairly or very attached to Europe/
the EU and not attached to country;
No collective identification: percentage of respondents feeling neither attached to Europe/the EU
nor to their country;
Source: Eurobarometer, own calculations

respondents feel fairly or very attached to both the national and the European level.
We observe the opposite trend in exclusive national attachments: after a temporary
drop in early 2007, the share of respondents who feel fairly or very attached only to
their home country has risen continually.
The considerable differences in levels of multiple collective identifications
depending on whether we examine attachments to Europe or the European Union
echo our previous findings with regard to differences in levels of attachment to
Europe and the European Union. Citizens in the member states are generally less
inclined to develop affective ties to the EU than to Europe, and this tendency is also
reflected in the lower prevalence of multiple identifications with the EU and the
home country.
The different trends in multiple attachments involving Europe on the one hand
and the European Union on the other may (also) be a function of different sampling
periods. We observe the highest levels of multiple identifications with Europe and
the home country in the mid- to late-2000s, i.e. the post-enlargement period, when
public opinion was generally more positively inclined towards European integra-
tion (Sanders et al. 2012; Tóka et al. 2012). On the other hand, attachments to the
European Union were sampled mainly in the late 2000s and after the onset of the
financial and economic crisis when the EU generally faced more criticism. There-
fore, the findings from EB 65.2 sampled March/May 2006, which included
4.4 EU Enlargement and the Economic and Financial Crisis and Levels of. . . 117

indicators of both respondents’ attachment to Europe and their attachment to the

European Union in a split sample design, are particularly informative. In spring
2006, 61% of respondents felt attached to both Europe and their home country, but
only about 50% felt attached to the EU and their home country. That is, even in
times of relative calm in the EU integration process, considerably fewer respon-
dents held multiple attachments to the EU and the national level than to Europe and
the national level. While many citizens appear to see feelings of attachments to
Europe as compatible with feelings of attachment to their home country, they
continue to choose between the European Union and their home country.
Presumably, the differences in multiple attachments to country and Europe/the
EU are due to differences in how citizens perceive the relationship between
‘Europe’ and the home country on the one hand and the European Union and the
home country on the other. If ‘Europe’ is understood as referring to the continent or
the cultural area, there is little potential for conflicts or rivalry between Europe and
the home country as, by definition, all EU member countries are part of the
European continent and a European cultural sphere. As a result, respondents
probably feel no need to choose between the two, affirming their attachment to
both Europe and their home country. The European Union, in contrast, is more
likely to be perceived as rival to the nation state as it intervenes directly in national
politics and competes for sovereignty with the national political system. Against
this background, respondents may feel compelled to choose between the EU and
their home country rather than affirm simultaneous attachments to their home
country and the EU.
The relative lack of multiple attachments to the EU and the home country seems
problematic with regard to the role of affective ties for Europe-wide solidarity and
the legitimacy of EU decision-making. As EU integration more and more implies
redistributive measures and majority decisions creating (perceived) winners and
losers among the EU member states, the EU becomes more dependent on affective
sources to legitimise its policies. Yet over the past two decades, multiple attach-
ments to the European Union and the home country have hardly increased and even
declined in recent years as interdependencies and mutual obligations between EU
member states have become more apparent in the context of the economic crisis. It
appears that in situations of conflicts of interest between the national and the
European level, citizens still opt for the national level, limiting their affections to
their home country and the national community.

4.4 EU Enlargement and the Economic and Financial

Crisis and Levels of European Identification

Having explored the general trends in citizens’ identification with Europe, the
remainder of this chapter will concentrate on the consequences of the EU’s
enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe in 2004/2007 and the onset of the
financial and economic crisis in late 2008 for citizens’ identification with Europe.
118 4 The Development of Citizens’ Identification with Europe from. . .

Levels of European identification are likely to vary between member states due
to country-specific experiences with EU integration. Member states joined the EU
at different times and against different historical backgrounds. EU enlargement to
Central and Eastern Europe and the financial and economic crisis are instances that
affected member states in different ways and to different degrees, potentially
resulting in different trends in European identification among national publics. To
examine these expectations empirically, I distinguish groups of EU member states
by length of membership (EU6, EU15, and EU27), countries’ pre-accession history
(EU15 vs. CEE), and their role in the recent economic crisis (countries at risk of
sovereign default; debtor vs. creditor countries; Eurozone vs. non-Eurozone mem-
ber states). The analysis will be limited to citizens’ self-categorisation as European
and attachment to Europe and the European Union, as no data on European pride is
available for the second half of the 2000s.

4.4.1 EU Enlargement to CEE and Citizens’ Identification

with Europe

As regards developments in European identification in the context of EU enlarge-

ment to Central and Eastern Europe, we observe only minor fluctuations in the EU
aggregate in response to the 2004/2007 accession rounds. The share of respondents
describing themselves (also) as European (self-categorisation as European)
decreases slightly: standing at 59% in 2002 (2 years before enlargement), it falls
to 55% in 2007 when Bulgaria and Romania accessed the EU (cf. Fig. 4.1).
Attachment to Europe, on the other hand, temporally peaks in the immediate
aftermath of enlargement 2004 (cf. Fig. 4.5). The proportion of respondents feeling
fairly or very attached to Europe increases from around 60% in autumn 2003 to
about 69% in autumn 2004 and drops back to 64% in spring 2006. The temporal
increase suggests a positive effect of enlargement on citizens’ attachment to
Europe, but also is part of a longer upward trend in European attachment starting
in the 1990s. A similar increase is visible in citizens’ attachment to the EU in the
2000s, starting from a relatively low 42% in early 2002 to 52% in spring 2006 and
55% in spring 2007. European pride, finally, does not fluctuate much during the
accession period, either (cf. Fig. 4.3). The proportion of respondents’ indicating to
be fairly or very proud to be European raises temporarily from 68% in autumn 2003
to 72% in autumn 2004, but falls back to 69% in autumn 2005.
Overall, enlargement appears to have caused only minor changes in European
identification in the EU population as a whole, but there may be differences
between the so-called ‘old’ member states (EU6, EU15) and the ‘new’ member
states from Central and Eastern Europe. For example, we may expect identification
with Europe to be stronger in the old member states because citizens in these
countries have had more time to become accustomed to the European Union and
experience European integration. Such socialisation effects should lead to higher
4.4 EU Enlargement and the Economic and Financial Crisis and Levels of. . . 119

levels of European identification in the EU15 member states than in the CEE
countries (and higher levels of identification in the six EU founding countries
than the rest of the EU member states). On the other hand, we may expect ‘salience
effects’ in the CEE countries whereby the prominent role that the EU played in
these countries during the accession period leads to higher levels of identification in
the aftermath of enlargement.
The trends in European identification by country group only partly confirm these
expectations.
Figures 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9 compare levels of self-categorisation as European and
attachment to Europe/the EU in the EU6, the EU15, the CEE member states, and the
EU aggregate.
Overall, we find similar trends in citizens’ self-categorisation as European and
European attachment in old and new EU member states, although different country
groups start out at different levels of European identification. This is the case for
both self-categorisation as European and attachment to Europe/the European
Union.
Levels of self-categorisation with Europe are initially lower in the CEE member
states than in the ‘old EU’, whereby the gap in identification is larger between the
EU6 and the CEE countries than between the EU15 and the CEE member states.
After an initial peak in the CEE countries just after accession 2004, we observe
similar developments in citizens’ self-categorisation as European in the old and the
new member states (cf. Fig. 4.7). The shares of respondents seeing themselves
(also) as European in the old EU15 and the new CEE member state thus move in

Fig. 4.7 Self-Categorisation as European in Groups of EU Member States 1992–2013

120 4 The Development of Citizens’ Identification with Europe from. . .

Fig. 4.8 Attachment to Europe in Groups of EU Member States 1995–2007

Fig. 4.9 Attachment to the European Union in Groups of EU Member States

4.4 EU Enlargement and the Economic and Financial Crisis and Levels of. . . 121

parallel in the late 2000s. In 2012/2013, levels of self-categorisation as European in

the old and the new member states converge, as European self-categorisation levels
off in the old member states.
The picture is reversed in the case of attachment to Europe. We observe higher
levels of attachment to Europe in the new member states in the immediate aftermath
of enlargement; these gradually approach the lower levels of European attachment
observed in the old EU15 member states (cf. Fig. 4.8). The differences in attach-
ment between old and new member states persist after 2007, as the indicator
changes from attachment to Europe to attachment to the European Union. Levels
of attachment to the European Union, too, remain slightly higher in the CEE
member states than the EU15 in the entire period under analysis (cf. Fig. 4.9).
The findings with regard to the development of European self-categorisation and
European attachments in the EU6/EU15 member states and the new member states
in Central and Eastern Europe in the aftermath of enlargement allow for different
interpretations. On the one hand, the lower levels of self-categorisation as European
among citizens in the new CEE member states compared to the EU6/EU15 provide
support for hypotheses associating differences in levels of identification with
Europe with the length of countries’ membership in the EU. In this reading, the
higher shares of respondents describing themselves (also) as European in the EU6
compared to the EU15 and in the EU15 compared to the CEE countries are due to
socialisation effects. Citizens in the member states that joined the EU earlier in the
process have had more time to experience European integration and internalise their
status as European. Citizens in the new member states, in contrast, only gradually
come to acknowledge their new status as an EU citizen and describe themselves as
European.
On the other hand, the persistent gap in self-categorisation as European and
European attachment between the EU6 and the EU aggregate as well as the
comparatively high levels of European attachment in the CEE member states
indicate that socialisation effects alone cannot fully explain differences in
European identification. Other than length of EU membership and familiarity
with EU politics there appear to be reasons that are specific to certain groups of
member states and may explain the observed differences in European identification.
The initially high levels of attachment with Europe in the CEE member states,
compared to the EU6 and the EU15, may be an expression of the generally rather
pro-European mood in these countries during the accession period (Herzog and
Tucker 2010; Wagner 2012). What is more, the history of these countries as former
members of the Eastern bloc may add to citizens’ attachment to Europe. After the
fall of the Iron Curtain and the rapprochement with Western Europe, citizens in the
CEE countries may have been all the keener to affirm their belonging to Europe
(as opposed to their former membership in the Eastern Bloc and ties to Russia),
resulting in the higher levels of attachment to Europe we observe in the CEE
member states after 2004.
122 4 The Development of Citizens’ Identification with Europe from. . .

4.4.2 The Financial and Economic Crisis and Citizens’

Identification with Europe

Having explored identification with Europe in the aftermath of the EU’s enlarge-
ment to CEE in 2004/2007, we now turn to the consequences of the financial and
economic crisis for European identification. The analysis will focus on citizens’
self-categorisation as European and their attachment to the European Union as
these are the only items available for the post-2008 period.
Starting with developments in the EU aggregate, we find only moderate shifts in
European identification after the onset of the crisis in late 2008. Levels of citizens’
self-categorisation as European initially decrease slightly from 55% of respondents
seeing themselves (also) as European in early 2007 to 52% in May 2010, but rise
again over the following years, reaching 61% in spring 2013 (cf. Fig. 4.1). Aggre-
gate attachment to the European Union also remains relatively stable during the
crisis. In late 2007, just over 50% of respondents feel fairly or very attached to the
European Union. This proportion grows to 54% in spring 2010, and then falls again
to just below 47% in November 2013 (cf. Fig. 4.5).
While the crisis thus appears to have had only minor effects on European
identification in the EU population as a whole, the aggregate levels may mask
differences in identification between member states that were more or less affected
by the crisis. Among the EU member states that experienced the most substantial
consequences of the crisis are, on the one hand, the member countries of the
Eurozone,8 and, on the other, the countries at risk of sovereign default9 in the
aftermath of the global recession and, in some cases, receiving conditional financial
aid from the EU/IMF.
While the global financial and economic crisis of 2008/2009 initially hit all EU
member states, several Eurozone member states experienced sovereign debt crises,
putting pressure on the currency area as a whole. Eurozone member states also
provided extensive financial guarantees to countries in sovereign debt crises via
bilateral loans and the various financial stability mechanisms agreed at EU level. In
this regard, economic interdependencies became even more evident within the
Eurozone. As a result, we may expect citizens in the Eurozone to become more
sceptical and levels of European identification to decrease among Eurozone citizens
as the crisis continued.

8
Eurozone member states in the years 2007 to 2013 include Austria, Belgium, Cyprus (from 2008),
Estland (from 2011), Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta (from
2008), the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia (from 2009), Slovenia, and Spain.
9
These are Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, and Spain. Apart
from Italy, all of these countries received funding from one of the European financial assistance
programmes and/or bilateral loans from Eurozone partners at some point between 2008 and 2013.
Italy is included among the crisis countries as it has commonly been grouped together with Greece,
Ireland, Portugal, and Spain—the so-called ‘GIIPS’ group—based on these countries’ economic
vulnerability in terms of e.g. debt-to-GDP rations, government bond yields, and current account
and trade imbalances.
4.4 EU Enlargement and the Economic and Financial Crisis and Levels of. . . 123

Likewise, the countries facing sovereign debt crises in the aftermath of the
financial and economic crisis experienced more severe economic, social, and
political distortions than other EU member states. These countries have seen the
strongest decrease in the erosion of trust in national and EU institutions in the wake
of the crisis (Armingeon and Guthmann 2014) and we may well expect a decline in
levels of European identification, too.
Again, the trends in European identification for different country groups only
partly confirm our expectations. Figure 4.10 displays self-categorisation as
European in and outside the Eurozone between 2007 and 2013 and Fig. 4.12
shows levels of self-categorisation for the countries risking sovereign defaults
after 2008.
Figure 4.11 show levels of attachment to the European Union for the same
groups of EU member states.
Starting with the Eurozone, we see the trend observed for the EU aggregate
repeated in the Eurozone, both with regard to citizens’ self-categorisation as
European and their attachment to the European Union. Levels of self-categorisation
as European slightly decrease in the Eurozone in the early crisis years, but increase
again after 2010 (cf. the solid line in Fig. 4.10). The trend in self-categorisation as
European observed for the Eurozone countries differs little from the trends
observed outside the Eurozone; however, the Eurozone-outsiders start out from
considerably lower levels of European self-categorisation (62% in the Eurozone
vs. 48% outside the Eurozone in 2007).

Fig. 4.10 Self-Categorisation as European and Exclusive National Identification in the Eurozone
2007–2013
124 4 The Development of Citizens’ Identification with Europe from. . .

Fig. 4.11 Attachment to the European Union in the Eurozone 2007–2013

The pattern observed in the EU aggregate is repeated for the Eurozone also in the
case of citizens’ attachment to the European Union. Levels of attachment to the
European Union rise slightly between 2007 and 2010 and fall again until 2013
(cf. Fig. 4.11). The trend in the Eurozone differs from the trend observed for
member states outside the Eurozone. While attachment to the EU in the Eurozone
temporally peaks in 2010, it remains stable outside the Eurozone over the crisis
period. Levels of attachment to the home country, on the other hand, are virtually
the same in and outside the Eurozone, with very little variation over time.
Turning now to levels and development in European identification in the mem-
ber states at risk of sovereign default after 2008, we find more divergence from the
general trends observed for the EU aggregate. As regards citizens’ self-
categorisation as European in the member states most affected by the crisis,
there are no uniform trends in the shares of respondents identifying (also) as
European. As Fig. 4.12 shows, the member states experiencing sovereign debt
crises after 2010 started out with very different levels of European identification
in 2007. We observe variation in levels of European identification in response to the
debt crises in all of these countries, yet to different degrees and in different
directions. Thus, in Hungary, Latvia, and Spain, levels of self-categorisation as
European remain largely unchanged, with small increases after 2010. In contrast,
we observe noticeable increases in the number of respondents identifying (also) as
European after 2010 in Greece, Portugal, Romania, and, above all, in Italy, although
levels of European identification tend to decrease again in these countries in 2013.
 4.4 EU Enlargement and the Economic and Financial Crisis and Levels of. . .

Fig. 4.12 Self-Categorisation as European and Exclusive National identification in the Crisis Countries 2007–2013
125
126 4 The Development of Citizens’ Identification with Europe from. . .

In Cyprus and Ireland, finally, we observe a decline in levels of self-categorisation

as European from 2012 onwards.
The relative stability in respondents’ attachments to the EU that we observed in
the EU aggregate in the aftermath of the crisis also largely holds for the member
states hit hardest by the crisis.
Figure 4.13 shows levels of attachment for the countries that experienced
sovereign debt crises after 2010. We observe a notable and comparatively sharp
fall in EU attachments after 2010 only in Italy; in the rest of the crisis countries,
attachment to the EU remains more or less stable, with a more gradual decrease in
Greece after 2010 and a gradual increase in Latvia from 2008 onwards.
To sum up our findings so far, we cannot confirm expectations of a general
decrease in European identification in the Eurozone and the crisis countries after
2008. The trends we observe in the level of European self-categorisation point
upward rather than downward, even as risks of sovereign defaults in a number of
Eurozone member states became evident from 2010 onwards. Likewise, we find
only scattered evidence for a general decline in levels of attachment to the
European Union in the wake of the financial and economic crisis. Although
fewer respondents express attachment to the EU after 2010, in particular in the
Eurozone and some of the countries hit hardest by the crisis, the decrease in EU
attachment is moderate in most cases.
A number of reasons may explain this relative resilience of European identifi-
cations in the crisis. First, the increase in the level of European self-categorisation
between 2010 and 2013 in the EU aggregate and the Eurozone, as well as in some
crisis countries, may reflect the high salience of EU affairs at the time. In this
regard, the crisis may have alerted citizens to their status as a European and made
them more likely to affirm their belonging to the European community. In a similar
vein, the social and economic distortions caused by the crisis in member states like
Greece, Spain, or Portugal and the media coverage of these events across the EU
and in particular in the Eurozone may have led to an increase in feelings of
compassion and solidarity among the member state populations that also led to
higher levels of self-categorisation as European and/or prevented declines in levels
of attachment to the EU. Finally, we might suspect that under the impression of a
potential break-up of the Eurozone or even the European Union, citizens respond
differently to the stimulus of the self-categorisation item than before and the
question whether they see themselves as European ‘in the near future’. As an effect
of the crisis and the discussions about a break-up of the Union, the self-
categorisation item might not only tap into citizens’ cognitive identification with
Europe, but also their hopes and expectations regarding their country’s future
within the EU. In this case, the observed increase in the number of Europeans
identifying as European after 2010 may reflect not only a heightened sense of
European identification, but also citizens’ preference for remaining in the EU
despite of the crisis.
4.4 EU Enlargement and the Economic and Financial Crisis and Levels of. . . 127

Fig. 4.13 Attachment to the European Union in the Crisis Countries 2007–2013
128 4 The Development of Citizens’ Identification with Europe from. . .

4.5 The Emergence of a Collective European Identity?

Three questions stood at the beginning of this chapter. We were interested in how
widespread European identification is among citizens in the EU member states and
which trends we observe in European identification over the 1992–2013 period;
whether citizens have developed multiple identifications with both the European
and the national collective; and how citizens’ identification with Europe responded
to Eastward enlargement and the financial and economic crisis. The objective was
to explore and describe aggregate levels and development of citizens’ identification
with Europe that would allow inferences regarding the strength of a collective
European identity as a macro-level phenomenon.
As regards general trends in European identification in the EU population, we
find a majority of respondents in the EU claiming some form of identification with
the European community. Europeans identify cognitively with Europe, describing
themselves (also) as European; they show affective identification with Europe,
affirming their attachment to Europe/the European Union; and they hold positive
evaluations of the European collective, expressing pride in being European. The
findings for the EU aggregate also widely hold for individual member states.
We further find substantial proportions of respondents holding multiple collec-
tive identifications to the national and the European community. Not only do
respondents in their majority describe themselves by both their nationality and
being European, but they also feel attached to both the national and the European
level. Multiple collective attachments thus appear the norm for important parts of
the EU population.
Concerning the impact of the EU’s enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe
and the financial and economic crisis on citizens’ identification with Europe, we
find no dramatic shifts in levels of European identification in response to enlarge-
ment and the crisis in the EU aggregate. In fact, the proportions of respondents
describing themselves (also) as European and those feeling attached to Europe/the
European Union increase only slightly after the 2004 accession round. While the
EU15 and the new member states from CEE start out from different levels of
European identification at the time of accession, the trends we observe in the
aftermath of enlargement are largely similar in old and new member states.
Likewise, there is no major decline in European identification after the onset of
the financial and economic crisis. We observe an upward rather than downward
trend in the number of respondents seeing themselves (also) as European in
response to the financial and economic crisis, in particular after the risks of
sovereign defaults in the Eurozone became more and more apparent after 2010.
Attachments to the European Union decrease over the same period, especially in the
Eurozone and some of the countries hit hardest by the crisis; however, the decline is
moderate in most cases. Rather than causing a sudden and steep drop in European
identification, the negative effects of the crisis appear to accumulate over time,
resulting in a gradual weakening of citizens’ affective ties to Europe as the crisis
wears on.
4.5 The Emergence of a Collective European Identity? 129

Which conclusions can we draw from these findings with regard to the emer-
gence of a collective European identity? To recall, the previous conceptual discus-
sion of European identity and individual identification with Europe proposed that a
collective European identity will be the stronger, the greater the number of EU
citizens identifying with Europe (extensity), and the more intense citizens’ identi-
fication with Europe (intensity) (cf. Chap. 2).
By these standards, a collective European identity has emerged among EU
citizens. More than 50% of respondents see themselves (also) as Europeans and
similar proportions feel attached to the European level. This collective European
identity has developed alongside rather than in opposition to collective national
identities. Although European identity cannot match national identities in extent or
intensity, multiple collective identities are a reality in the European Union by now.
Collective European identity has also proven remarkably resilient in light of two
decisive moments in the EU integration process, the EU’s enlargement to Central
and Eastern Europe in 2004/2007 and the onset of the financial and economic crisis
in late 2008, followed by sovereign debt crises in a number of member states. The
stability of European identity in the crisis in particular appears to indicate that the
sense of community among Europeans is stronger than expected and may serve as a
source for legitimising EU policies and support for European solutions to the crisis.
These rather positive conclusions with regard to the emergence of a collective
European identity need to be qualified, however. First, the extent of collective
European identity clearly exceeds its intensity. While substantial proportions of
EU citizens identify with the European collective, their identification is often
moderate in degree. Only small proportions describe themselves only (or first) as
Europeans and few feel very attached to the European level. In this regard,
European identity falls clearly behind national identities, which can build on
intense attachments by large parts of the national public.
What is more, we still observe distinct national patterns in collective European
identity. European identity is particularly strong in the six EU founding countries.
Great Britain, on the other hand, continues to display some of the lowest levels of
European identification in the EU. Forty years after EC/EU accession, a collective
European identity is still merely nascent in the British public. While the British case
may be extreme, it shows that the emergence of a collective European identity is by
no means only a matter of time and socialisation into European practices as
expected by early theorists of European community building (Deutsch et al.
1957; Haas 1958).
Most importantly, the strength of European identity varies depending on the
collective object of identification. Collective European identity is strong if ‘Europe’
is the reference point. It is noticeable weaker in both extent and intensity if the
reference point is the European Union. It seems that while Europeans have devel-
oped a common we-feeling as inhabitants of the same geographical or cultural
sphere, they still lack a common we-feeling as members of the same political
community. In this sense, there now is a robust collective European identity,
whereas a strong collective European Union identity is yet to emerge.
130 4 The Development of Citizens’ Identification with Europe from. . .

Appendix

Table 4.2 Eurobarometer surveys used for descriptive analysis

EB no. Month of survey Year of survey Countries included Sample size
EB 37 March/April 1992 EU 12 13,082
EB 40 October/November 1993 EU 12 13,073
EB 42 November/December 1994 EU 12 13,063
EB 43.1 April/May 1995 EU 15 16,166
EB 43.1bis May/June 1995 EU 15 16,300
EB 44.1 November/December 1995 EU 15 16,346
EB 46 October/November 1996 EU 15 16,248
EB 47.1 March/April 1997 EU 15 16,154
EB 49 April/May 1998 EU 15 16,165
EB 50 October/November 1998 EU 15 16,155
EB 51 March/May 1999 EU 15 16,179
EB 52 October/November 1999 EU 15 16,071
EB 53 April/May 2000 EU 15 16,078
EB 54.1 November/December 2000 EU 15 16,067
EB 56.2 October/November 2001 EU 15 15,939
EB 56.3 January/February 2002 EU 15 16,038
EB 57.1 March/May 2002 EU 15 16,012
EB 58.1 October/November 2002 EU 15 16,074
EB 59.1 March/April 2003 EU 15 16,307
EB 60.1 October/November 2003 EU 15 16,082
EB 61 February/March 2004 EU 15 16,216
EB 62 October/November 2004 EU 25 26,807
EB 63.4 May/June 2005 EU 25 26,823
EB 64.2 October/November 2005 EU 25 26,925
EB 65.2 March/May 2006 EU 25 26,665
EB 66.1 September/October 2006 EU 25 26,647
EB 67.1 February/March 2007 EU 27 26,746
EB 67.2 April/March 2007 EU 27 26,717
EB 68.1 September/November 2007 EU 27 26,768
EB 73.3 March/April 2010 EU 27 26,602
EB 73.4 May 2010 EU 27 26,641
EB 76.4 December 2011 EU 27 26,693
EB 77.3 May 2012 EU 27 26,637
EB 78.2 November/December 2012 EU 27 26,739
EB 79.3 May 2013 EU 27 26,605
EB 80.1 November 2013 EU 27 26,829
Total 730,659
Note: EU 12: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Neth-
erlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom; EU 15: EU12 þ Austria, Finland, Sweden; EU 25:
EU15 þ Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slvakia,
Slovenia; EU 27: EU25 þ Bulgaria, Romania
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Chapter 5
The Salience of European and National
Identity for Political Parties in Europe

The theoretical model developed in Chap. 3 introduced party messages related to

the European and national community as a country-level determinant of citizens’
identification with Europe. Party messages are expected to influence European
identification in the mass public to the extent that they provide citizens with
arguments and considerations about the European community, a common
European identity, and the consequences of European integration for the national
community and identity. Depending on whether parties emphasise a common
feeling of belonging together as Europeans or a strong sense of national identity,
party messages should either reinforce or diminish feelings of European identifica-
tion among national publics.
This chapter takes a closer look at the messages parties disseminate to the public
with regard to a common European identity on the one hand and the national
community and national identity on the other. It explores conceptually and empir-
ically how parties emphasise issues related to the European and national commu-
nity and their respective collective identities. To assess long-term trends in party
emphasis on issues of identity, the analysis includes national parties’ election
manifestos for all seven European parliament elections to date, from the first
popular EP elections in 1979 to the latest EP election campaign in 2014. Three
questions guide the analysis:
• How salient are issues of European and national community and identity among
political parties in the EU member states?
• How has the salience of issues of European and national community and identity
developed between the first popular election to the European Parliament in 1979
and the latest EP election campaign 2014?
• Do we see variation in party emphasis on community and identity in response to
the EU’s eastward enlargement 2004 and/or the onset of the financial and
economic crisis in 2008?
Conceptually, the analysis of party manifestos builds on research on party
competition over EU integration that explores whether EU integration leads to

© Springer International Publishing AG 2018 133

S. Bergbauer, Explaining European Identity Formation,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67708-8_5
134 5 The Salience of European and National Identity for Political Parties in Europe

new structural conflicts with potential for political exploitation or links to existing
dimensions of political conflict in the domestic context (Hix 1999; Kriesi 2007,
2010; Marks and Steenbergen 2004; Marks and Wilson 2000). These analyses show
that European integration not only pits opponents and defenders of economic
liberalization against each other, but also creates tensions between cultural liberal-
ists and advocates of national culture and sovereignty (Bornschier 2011; Gabel and
Hix 2004; Hooghe et al. 2002, 2004). This line of reasoning ties in with research
that sees EU integration as part of a larger process of globalization and
denationalisation which leads to intensified economic, political, and cultural com-
petition between and within nation-states (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008). The conflict
over Europe thus has an economic and a political-cultural dimension. While the
former revolves around questions of redistribution and market regulation, the latter
is centred on tensions between traditionalist values and cultural and social liberal-
ism, ethnocentrism, and immigration (Bornschier 2011). As EU integration widens
and deepens, cultural issues are expected to gain importance for political contesta-
tion (Hooghe et al. 2002; Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008).
As regards the contents of party discourse on European integration, previous
research has focussed on parties’ framing of EU integration (e.g. Helbling et al.
2010), euro-critical party messages (e.g. Statham and Koopmans 2009), and refer-
ences to specific policy areas and issues of European integration such as the
European Constitution, the free movement of people on the common market, or
the common agricultural policy (e.g. Arnold and Pennings 2009; Pennings 2006;
Whitefield and Rohrschneider 2009; Wüst 2009). By contrast, the specific salience
of issues of European and national community in party discourse on European
integration has not yet been subject to systematic empirical analysis.1
The lack of empirical studies contrasts with the importance attributed to identity
issues in the theoretical debate on party contestation over EU integration (see
e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2009; Kriesi 2009; Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008). The present
work seeks to fill this gap by providing a systematic analysis of the salience that
national political parties attach to issues related to European and national commu-
nity and identity. Previous research has mostly concentrated on how political
parties emphasise national identity to dispute EU integration and, in particular,
on the role of radical right-wing parties in this regard (de Vries and Edwards 2009;
Halikiopoulou et al. 2012, 2013; Netjes and Edwards 2005). By contrast, the
following analysis will explore party emphasis on both European and national
community and identity, for parties across the ideological spectrum.
In so doing, it adds to the literature on party positioning and party competition
over European integration in several ways. First, analysing party emphasis on

1
The exception is the study by Silke Adam and Michaela Maier on ‘National parties as politicizers
of EU integration? Party campaign communication in the run-up to the 2009 European Parliament
elections’ (Adam and Maier 2011), which examines the salience of an identity cleavage in party
contestation over EU integration in the 2009 European election campaign. However, their analysis
is restricted to six countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and the
UK) and one election campaign, using parties’ televised advertisements as a data source.
5.1 Conceptualising Party Emphasis on European and National Community and Identity 135

European and national community and identity simultaneously allows us to assess

the relative importance parties attach to issues of European community and identity
compared to the attention given to the national community and national identity.
Thus, we are able to explore whether parties actively promote a supranational
political community or whether they remain centred on the national level when
discussing issues of community and identity.
Concurrently, the focus on issues of European and national community and
identity in party discourse allows us to assess claims of an increasing politicisation
of identity by national political parties (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Kriesi 2009). By
tracking party emphasis on issues related to European and national community over
time, we are able to determine whether the salience of identity issues in the political
debate over European integration has indeed increased in response to the widening
and deepening of European integration.
Furthermore, by exploring party emphasis on European and national community
in domestic political debates, we are able to assess whether the politicisation of
identity issues is more or less pronounced in some member states than in others.
While potential country-differences in the salience of issues of community and
identity in national party discourses are instructive in their own right, they also
allow further inferences with regard to role of political parties in citizens’ identi-
fication with Europe.
The remainder of this chapter starts by outlining an operational concept of party
emphasis on issues of national and European community and identity (Sect. 5.1)
and develops a measure for inferring party emphasis on European and national
community from parties’ election programmes (Sect. 5.2). Subsequently, it presents
the empirical evidence on the salience of national and European identity issues in
EP election manifestos for the period 1979–2014, starting with a general overview
of the salience of European and national identity issues in EP election campaigns
between 1979 and 2014 period (Sect. 5.3), followed by an assessment of the
consequences of the EU’s enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe in 2004/
2007 and the onset of the financial and economic crisis in late 2008 for the salience
of identity issues in party manifestos (Sect. 5.4). A final section reviews the role
of identity as an issue in party contestation over EU integration after the crisis
(Sect. 5.5).

5.1 Conceptualising Party Emphasis on European

and National Community and Identity

Previous chapters hypothesised that because few citizens interact with other
Europeans on a daily basis and have the opportunity to experience communalities
among Europeans in direct interactions, citizens need to be reminded of their own
status as European through elite messages that emphasise the community of
Europeans, its shared norms and values, and the meaning of a common European
‘we-feeling’ (cf. Chap. 2). The present chapter concentrates on the role of political
136 5 The Salience of European and National Identity for Political Parties in Europe

parties in this regard and the question how and to what degree parties emphasise
issues of European and national community and identity in political campaigns and
public debates.
The salience of party messages on European and national community and
identity refers to the emphasis parties attach to issues of national and European
identity relative to other political issues. It can be inferred from the amount of
resources (in terms of speech time, manifesto length etc.) parties devote to the
distinctive properties and membership criteria of the national or European commu-
nity compared to the resources devoted to other political issues.
Accordingly, the salience of European community and identity in party dis-
course is the higher, the more parties emphasise the community of Europeans as a
group with distinctive shared interests and experiences; the more parties refer to a
‘European way of life’ and principles common to the European population; and the
more they insist on the distinctiveness of the European group and a common
‘Europeanness’ that demarcates Europeans from non-Europeans.
Vice versa, the salience of national community and identity in party discourse is
the higher, the more parties emphasise the distinctive interests and experiences of
the national community; the more parties refer to a national way of life and
traditions common to the national community; and the more they insist on the
uniqueness of the national community, which sets the nation apart as a group and
makes national attachments appear incompatible with European identity.

5.2 Data and Operationalisation

Party emphasis on issues of European and national community and identity will be
analysed using national party manifestos for European parliament (EP) elections in
the EU member states2 from 1979 to 2014. Data on national party manifestos for EP

2
To account for the high degree of internal fragmentation and regionalisation of party systems in
Belgium and the UK, party manifestos are analysed separately for Flanders and Wallonia and for
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, respectively. See de Winter et al. (2006) on the fragmentation
of the Belgian party system and Webb (2000) for the distinctiveness of the party system in
Northern Ireland compared to the rest of the UK. In both Belgium and the UK, the respective
regional party systems have been found to be structured along different dimensions of party
competition (left-right in Wallonia vs. ethnocentrism and political alienation in Flanders; left-
right in Great Britain vs. Irish nationalism/loyalty to Britain in Northern Ireland). These differ-
ences may have consequences for the salience of identity issues in national party manifestos,
which might be overlooked if parties were aggregated at the national rather than the regional level.
In analysing Flanders and Wallonia and Northern Ireland as separate cases, I follow the EMP’s
coding scheme for the years 1979 to 2004, which codes Belgium-Flanders/Belgium-Wallonia and
Great Britain/Northern Ireland as separate cases at the country level. The EMP country identifi-
cation variable changes in 2009, now coding Belgium rather than Belgium-Flanders/Belgium-
Wallonia and UK rather than Great Britain/Northern Ireland. To ensure comparability over time, I
recoded and separated the categories Belgium and UK into Belgium-Flanders and Belgium-
Wallonia and Great Britain and Northern Ireland, respectively, based on parties’ country codes
in previous years.
5.2 Data and Operationalisation 137

elections from 1979 to 2009 is provided by the Euromanifestos Project (EMP) at the
Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES).3 The EMP codes man-
ifestos of all parties represented in the European parliament at least once. Overall,
the data set used for the present analysis includes information on 730 manifestos
issued by 287 national parties in the run-up to seven EP elections from 1979 to
2009.4 The analysis of the EMP data for the years 1979 to 2009 will be
supplemented by excerpts from national party manifestos for the most recent EP
election in spring 2014, for which EMP data was not yet available at the time of
writing.
Due to different EU accession dates, the number of member states and national
parties under analysis varies over the period under analysis. The great majority of
countries in the EMP data set has seen at least two elections to the European
Parliament, fifteen countries have held at least three EP elections, and eight of the
EU27 countries have participated in all EP elections since 1979 (see Table 5.2 in the
appendix for a complete list of member states and number of manifestos under
analysis in each year).
Manifesto data lends itself in particular to examining party positions on specific
issues over time. First, because manifestos are devised in extensive debate and
usually ratified by party conventions, these documents are authoritative and repre-
sentative of party policy at the time of publication (Budge 1987). Second, because
parties issue new manifestos ahead of each election, party positions can be com-
pared not only at any one election but also from one election cycle to another. The
potential for cross-temporal analyses is one of the major advantages of manifesto
data over expert surveys, which typically capture more long-standing ideological
positions and appear less suited to observing dynamics in party positioning
(McDonald and Mendes 2001). Given the prominent argument in the literature
whereby parties’ attempts to politicise identity issues in relation with European
integration have increased in recent years (Hooghe and Marks 2009), such a
diachronic design appears particularly suited for the purpose of the present analysis.

3
The EMP maintains the approach first developed by the Manifesto Research Group (MRG; Budge
1987; Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006) in coding the number of arguments parties
devote to different issues in their electoral programmes. It deviates from the original MRG
framework by coding the direction of arguments, i.e. whether parties adopt a pro- or contra-
position on the issue in question, and includes additional coding categories for European issues.
The EMP coding scheme is ‘mirrored’ for different levels of government to determine whether a
statement has an explicit focus on the party’s country (national level), Europe or the EU/EC
(supra-national level), or neither as the relevant political arena/actor. Overall, it contains 170 cod-
ing categories grouped into seven major policy domains. For more information on the EMP, see
the project homepage at http://www.ees-homepage.net (accessed on 01 April 2015). For the
1979–2004 manifesto studies see the documentation by Braun et al. (n.d.), Wüst and Schmitt
(2007), and Wüst and Volkens (2003). For the 2009 manifesto study, see the documentation by
Braun et al. (2010).
4
By-elections in new member states, i.e. first elections after a country joined the EU such as in
Sweden in 1995, have been omitted from the analysis.
138 5 The Salience of European and National Identity for Political Parties in Europe

The salience of party messages on European and national community and

identity has previously been defined as the emphasis parties attach to issues of
European and national community and identity relative to other political issues.
Accordingly, the salience of European and national identity in party discourse will
be measured as the share (in percentages) of a party’s manifesto dedicated to
questions of European and national community and identity. Table 5.1 provides a
complete list of coding categories used to operationalise party emphasis on
European community and identity (upper half of Table 5.1) and party emphasis
on national community and identity (lower half of Table 5.1), respectively. For
example, appeals to European solidarity, references to a unique European way of
life, and calls for cultural integration within in the European community are treated
as indicators of party emphasis on European community and identity. In contrast,
appeals to nationalism, demands to retain the national way of life within the EC/EU,
and characterisations of the national community as a culturally homogeneous group
are treated as indicators of party emphasis on national community and identity.
Three measures of salience are constructed, assessing overall party emphasis on
issues of community and identity, party emphasis on issues of European commu-
nity and identity, and party emphasis on issues of national community and identity
respectively. The measure ‘total identity salience’ thus refers to the overall propor-
tion of statements devoted to the 17 coding categories listed in Table 5.1 in a party
manifesto. Analogously, the salience of European identity (‘European identity
salience’) is measured by the proportion of statements devoted to the codes
reflecting European identity issues (items listed in the upper half of Table 5.1);
finally, the salience of national identity (‘national identity salience’) is measured by
the proportion of manifesto statements devoted to codes reflecting national identity
issues (items listed in the bottom half of Table 5.1). In addition, a subtractive score
(‘net European identity’) is calculated to assess whether statements on European or
national identity are dominant in party manifestos. It is defined by the proportion of
manifesto statements dedicated to European identity issues minus the proportion of
statements dedicated to national identity issues.

5.3 The Salience of European and National Community

and Identity in National Party Discourse 1979–2014

The analysis of EP election manifestos covers both the general salience of identity
issues in party discourse and the specific salience of issues related to European and
national identity. It starts with an overview of the salience of identity issues in the
EU aggregate, followed by an analysis of party emphasis on identity issues in the
EU member states. A subsequent section discusses potential effects of the EU’s
enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe in 2004/2007 and the onset of the
financial and economic crisis in late 2008 on the salience of identity issues at the
party level.
5.3 The Salience of European and National Community and Identity in National. . . 139

Table 5.1 Constructs and indicators of party positioning on national and European identity
EMP EMP Political
Var # EMP code domain level Direction Code description
European identity
p2_601 European way of Fabric of Europe Positive Appeals to European way
life society of life, the Occident, or
Western Civilisation
p1_602 National way of Fabric of National Negative Opposition to patriotism/
life society nationalism
p2_606 Social harmony in Fabric of Europe Positive Appeals for a common
EU society effort and solidarity in
Europe, the EC/EU
p2_608 Multiculturalism Fabric of Europe Negative Support for enforcement
in EU society or encouragement of cul-
tural integration in
Europe, the EC/EU
p2_302 Decentralization Political Europe Negative Support for more unitary,
of EU System centralized Europe; sup-
port for more
Europeanization in polit-
ical and administrative
procedures
p2_3021 Transfer of power Political Europe Positive Support for transfer of
to EU System power and competences
to the EC/EU
p2_203 Constitutionalism Freedom Europe Positive Support for (specified
in EU and aspects of) the constitu-
democracy tion; Emphasis on the
need for an European
constitution
p2_607 Multiculturalism Fabric of Europe Positive Support for cultural
in EU society diversity, communalism,
cultural plurality in
Europe, the EC/EU
National identity
p1_601 National way of Fabric of National Positive Appeals to patriotism/
life society nationalism; support for
established national ideas
p2_602 European way of Fabric of Europe Negative Opposition to a European
life society way of life, the Occident,
or Western Civilisation
p2_6021 Retaining national Fabric of Europe Positive Emphasis on need to
way of life in society retain national way of life
Europe and national cultures in
Europe or the EC/EU
p1_606 Social harmony in Fabric of National Positive Appeals for national
country society effort and solidarity in
manifesto country
p1_608 Multiculturalism Fabric of National Negative Support for enforcement
in country society or encouragement of
(continued)
140 5 The Salience of European and National Identity for Political Parties in Europe

Table 5.1 (continued)

EMP EMP Political
Var # EMP code domain level Direction Code description
cultural integration in
manifesto country
p2_301 Decentralization Political Europe Positive Support for less unitary
of EU System Europe and more
national autonomy; sup-
port for keeping up local
customs and symbols
p2_3011 Transfer of power Political Europe Negative Opposition to transfer of
to EU System power and competences
to the EC/EU; regret for
the loss of power and
sovereignty of the nation-
state
p2_204 Constitutionalism Freedom Europe Negative Opposition to (specified
in EU and aspects of) the constitu-
democracy tion; No need for an
European constitution
p1_607 Multiculturalism Fabric of National Positive Support for cultural
in country society diversity, communalism,
cultural plurality in man-
ifesto country
Note: Notations and descriptions of codes follow the original Euromanifesto coding instructions
(Braun et al. 2010, n.d.). EMP Var # refers to the variable label of the respective code in the
Euromanifesto dataset; EMP code refers to the name of the coding category as indicated in the
Euromanifesto coding scheme; EMP Domain refers to the policy domain in which a coding
category falls; political level indicates whether the code has an explicit focus on the party’s
country or Europe/the EC/EU as political protagonist or political arena; direction indicates
whether the coded statements have a positive or negative connotation with regard to the coding
category; code description corresponds to the description of coding categories provided in the
Euromanifesto coding scheme

Extant research shows an increase in the overall salience of European issues in

party discourse over the course of EU integration (Pennings 2006; Ray 1999;
Steenbergen and Scott 2004). It shows that parties increasingly address not only
EU integration as such, but also the consequences of EU integration for national
politics and national customs and traditions (Binder and Wüst 2004; Wüst and
Schmitt 2007). These findings give reason to expect that parties will put more
emphasis on issues of national community and identity, the more EU integration
proceeds and the more EU competencies extend to areas such as monetary policy or
immigration and asylum that are closely linked to concepts of national community
and identity.
On the other hand, the most visible signs of EU integration such as the common
currency and the abolition of border controls also lay bare the growing
interdependence among EU member states. By now, the European Community
has emerged as a genuine political community with common external borders and
5.3 The Salience of European and National Community and Identity in National. . . 141

common symbols such as the European passport and the European flag.
Emphasising common European values and a common European heritage is a
way for parties to provide a normative rationale for the European project that
goes beyond arguments based on pure cost-benefit calculations. Promoting a
collective European identity can provide the necessary underpinning for the form
of political integration that the EU has embarked on since Maastricht. In this logic,
we should expect an increase in the salience of issues related to European commu-
nity and identity in response to the widening and deepening of EU integration.
In short, the question is whether the growing impact of EU policies at the
national level has consequences for how national parties address European integra-
tion in their election campaigns. Have parties put more emphasis on issues of
national community and identity as EU integration proceeds and takes over core
competences of the nation state? Or have parties responded to the widening and
deepening of EU integration by emphasising the European community and a
common European heritage so as to provide a normative rationale for the form of
political integration that the EU has embarked on since Maastricht?
Figure 5.1 plots aggregate shares of identity issues in party manifestos over time
(see Table 5.3 in the appendix for mean shares of identity issues per member state).
A first look at the data reveals that identity is not a minor issue in party campaigns.
On average, parties in the EU27 dedicate about 9% of their EP election programmes
to issues of identity, a higher share than for many other policy domains, including
social justice, agricultural policies, and environmental protection (see results in

Fig. 5.1 Salience of identity issues in party manifestos 1979–2009

142 5 The Salience of European and National Identity for Political Parties in Europe

Wüst 2009; Wüst and Schmitt 2007). We also find some evidence for an increase in
the salience of identity issues in response to the widening and deepening of
European integration. Between 1984 and 1994, i.e. the decade when the Maastricht
treaty was negotiated and came into force, the total share of identity issues in party
manifestos increased by about three percentage points; identity shares reached a
high of 10.8% in 2004 when the EP election campaign coincided with eastward
enlargement.
National and European identity are about equally salient in party manifestos;
both become more salient from 1989 onwards. The increase in salience is slightly
more pronounced for national identity in the 1994 and 2004 campaigns, i.e. just
after the entry into force of the Maastricht treaty and the accession of the new
member states from Central and Eastern Europe. On the other hand, parties appear
quick to shift attention away from questions of identity when other issues become
more pressing: identity issues were least salient in 2009 when the economic and
financial crisis dominated the agenda.
Turning to the salience of identity issues within EU member states, Figs. 5.2 and
5.3 rank member states by average shares of party manifestos dedicated to issues of
European and national identity. Starting with party emphasis on a common
European identity and community, we can distinguish three groups of member
states (cf. Fig. 5.2). In a first group of member states comprised of Bulgaria, Great
Britain, Ireland, Northern Ireland, Latvia, Greece, Estonia, Sweden, and Cyprus,
political parties devote little space to European identity, with less than 3% of party

Fig. 5.2 Average salience of European identity issues by member state

5.3 The Salience of European and National Community and Identity in National. . . 143

Fig. 5.3 Average salience of national identity issues by member state

manifestos dedicated to issues of European community and identity. In a second

group of member states, parties pay moderate attention to questions of European
community and identity, with between 3% and 5% of party manifestos addressing
these issues (Portugal, Denmark, Lithuania, France, Germany, Belgium-Wallonia,
Romania, Finland, and the Netherlands). Finally, in a third group of member states,
issues of European identity and community take up more than 5% of party mani-
festos (Czech Republic, Italy, Hungary, Luxembourg, Spain, Belgium-Flanders,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Austria, Poland, and Malta).
Malta, and to a lesser extent Bulgaria, are the clear outliers at the two extremes
of the spectrum. In Malta, the high overall share of European identity issues
(11.8%) is due mainly to the 2009 EP election campaign, when national parties
dedicated nearly 20% of their manifestos to issues of European community and
identity. In Bulgaria, on the other hand, parties dedicated less than 1% of their
manifestos to issues of European community and identity; however, this share is
based on only one EP election campaign (2009), which was generally dominated by
the financial and economic crisis.
As regards party emphasis on national community and identity, we can again
distinguish three groups of member states (cf. Fig. 5.3). At the low end, we find
Bulgaria and Austria, where issues of national community and identity make up less
than 2% of national parties’ EP election manifestos. In a second group, comprising
the majority of EU member states, parties dedicate between 3% and 6% of election
manifestos to the national community. At the extreme end, we find Latvia, Poland,
144 5 The Salience of European and National Identity for Political Parties in Europe

and Northern Ireland, where 9–10% of arguments in EP election manifestos address

issues of national community and identity.
With European identity shares ranging between approximately 1% and 12% and
national identity shares ranging between approximately 1% and 10%, we find a
considerable degree of variation in party emphasis between EU member states. The
rank orders of member states in terms of European and national identity salience at
the party level further shows that party emphasis on national identity issues does not
necessarily come at the expense of issues of European identity, and vice versa.
Comparing shares of national and European identity issues for individual member
states, we observe significant differences between member states with regard to the
relative importance of national and European identity issues in party discourse (see
also Table 5.3 in the appendix).
In a first group of countries, most notably Poland, but to a lesser extent also
Hungary, Slovakia, Luxembourg, and the Czech Republic, parties dedicate a
considerable amount of their manifestos to both, European and national identity
issues. In contrast, in a second group of countries, neither European nor national
identity issues feature prominently in party discourse. This is the case notably in
Bulgaria, but also in Cyprus and Ireland. Between the two extremes, we find
countries like Germany, Lithuania, or the Netherlands, where both European and
national identity issues are emphasised to moderate extent. Finally, there are the
member states in which either European or national identity issues are dominant in
party discourse. Thus, in Malta, Austria, Slovenia, and Italy, parties emphasise
issues related to a common European identity and community up to three times as
much as they emphasise issues related to national identity and community. In
contrast, in Northern Ireland, Latvia, and Great Britain, national identity issues
feature more than three times as often in party discourse than European identity
issues. To a lesser extent, issues of national identity and community are also
dominant in Estonia, Sweden, and Denmark (see the net European identity shares
listed in the rightmost column of Table 5.3 in the appendix).
National patterns of party emphasis on issues of identity and community—and,
by implication, member state differences in the relevance of national and European
identity issues—remain relatively stable over time. As a result, we find diverging
trends in the salience of identity issues at the member state level. Figure 5.4 plots
shares of party manifestos dedicated to national and European identity issues as
well as the total share of identity issues in party manifestos for the EU member
states between 1979 and 2009. While parties in Northern Ireland and Luxembourg
have consistently emphasised issues of community and identity, party emphasis on
identity issues has been moderate in Germany and the Netherlands. Parties in
Ireland as well as in Greece have put only limited emphasis on issues of identity
over the last three decades. In a number of member states, notable in the new
member states in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in Austria, Ireland,
Portugal, and Spain, party emphasis on questions of identity and community
peaks in 2004. Malta is the exception, registering far higher shares of identity
issues in 2009 than in 2004. In Denmark, Great Britain, Italy, and, to a lesser extent
in France and Germany, we observe a gradual increase in parties’ attention to
5.3 The Salience of European and National Community and Identity in National. . . 145

Fig. 5.4 Salience of identity issues in party manifestos by member state, 1979–2009
146 5 The Salience of European and National Identity for Political Parties in Europe

identity issues. In Luxembourg and in Belgium-Wallonia, in contrast, we observe a

gradual decline in party emphasis on identity issues since the late 1990s.
What is more, the relative dominance of either national or European identity
issues in party manifestos changes little over time. That is, parties in the member
states consistently emphasise either national identity issues over European identity
issues, or European identity issues over national identity issues, or emphasise both
to the same degree. Figure 5.5 visualises the relative importance of European and
national identity issues by plotting net shares of European identity issues in party
manifestos by member state over time. Depending on the relative dominance of
European and national identity issues in party discourse and the developments in
net shares of European identity over time, four distinct patterns emerge.
In a first group of member states, parties consistently put more emphasis on
issues of European identity and community than on issues of national identity and
community. This is the case in Austria, Belgium, notably in the Flemish part of the
country, Malta, and to a lesser extent, in Italy and Slovenia. In a second group of
member states, parties dominantly address issues of national identity and commu-
nity in their manifestos over the entire period under analysis. This is notably the
case in Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and, to a lesser extent, in Denmark and
Sweden. In a third group of member states, parties consistently dedicate about equal
shares of election manifestos to European and national identity and community.
This is the case in countries like Bulgaria, Cyprus, Germany, Lithuania, and
Slovakia. In a fourth set of member states, the relative importance of national and
European identity in party manifestos changes from one election cycle to the next.
We observe such dynamics in Greece, Luxembourg, Poland, Finland, and France.
Country differences in party emphasis on issues of European and national
identity and community do not correspond to commonly invoked differences
between EU member states, e.g. in terms of accession date, size, or location in
Eastern or Western Europe. Apart from Italy and Flanders, European identity is not
particularly salient for parties from the six EU funding member states; on the other
hand, European identity issues are dominant in Austria, which did not join the EU
until 1995. Identity issues are relatively salient in the 2004 election campaign in
some of the CEE member states; yet with the exception of Poland and Latvia, levels
of identity shares in party manifestos observed in Eastern Europe are similar to
those observed in some of the Western European countries and fall again in the
2009 election campaign.
To sum up the results of the analysis so far, national and European identity and
community have been salient issues in party discourse over the whole period under
analysis, accounting for up to 10% of manifesto arguments. Patterns of party
emphasis on issues of identity vary between member states, both with regard to
the extent to which parties emphasise identity issues and with regard to whether
parties put more emphasis on European identity or national identity or emphasise
both to the same degree. Finally, national patterns of party emphasis on identity
issues change little over time and do not confirm to commonly invoked differences
between EU member states in terms of length of membership, size, or geographical
location. The following section will discuss to what extent the differences we
 5.3 The Salience of European and National Community and Identity in National. . .

Fig. 5.5 The relative importance of European and national identity issues in national party discourse
147
148 5 The Salience of European and National Identity for Political Parties in Europe

observe in the salience of identity issues over time and between member states can
be explained by the EU’s enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe in 2004/2007
and the onset of the financial and economic crisis in late 2008.

5.4 EU Enlargement and the Economic and Financial

Crisis and the Salience of European and National
Community and Identity in National Party Discourse

While we find no uniform trend in levels and developments of party emphasis on

European and national identity, can some of the differences we observe between
member states and/or over time be related to the EU’s enlargement to Central and
Eastern Europe or the financial and economic crisis?
Starting with the EU enlargement in 2004/2007, we see a peak in the salience of
identity issues in party manifestos in a few of the old EU15 member states, notably
in Austria, the Flemish part of Belgium, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain (cf. Fig. 5.4).
Only in Austria, however, is the spike in identity salience driven by an increase in
parties’ emphasis on questions of European identity and community. In all of the
other countries, issues of identity and community become overall more salient
because parties put more emphasis on national identity and community. Issues of
identity are also prominent in the 2004 election manifestos in a number of the new
CEE member states, in particular in Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia
(cf. Fig. 5.4). As in the EU15 member states, the salience of identity issues in these
countries is mainly driven by parties’ emphasis on national identity and commu-
nity; Slovenia is the only country among the new members from CEE in which
parties put considerably more emphasis on European identity than national identity
in the 2004 campaign.
With few exceptions, parties thus did not respond to the accession of ten new
member states by putting more emphasis on a common European community,
neither in the old nor in the new member states. Increases in the salience of identity
issues in the 2004 EP election campaign were mainly due to increased emphasis on
national identity and community. One possible explanation of the dominance of the
national community we observe in party discourse in both old and new member
states may be the framing of domestic debates on enlargement that shaped the
political context of the 2004 EP election campaign. We know from media analyses
that the coverage of the EU’s enlargement to CEE in the member states predom-
inantly focussed on the domestic consequences of enlargement, in particular the
effects on national labour markets (Dursun-Ozkanca 2011; Inthorn 2006; Light and
Young 2009; van Noije 2010). Although enlargement had already been formally
completed by the time of the 2004 EP elections,5 a closer look at the 2004

5
The ten new member states from CEE officially joined the EU on 01 May 2004; the 2004 EP
elections were held between 10 and 13 June 2004.
5.4 EU Enlargement and the Economic and Financial Crisis and the Salience of. . . 149

manifestos6 shows that parties still addressed the consequences of enlargement in

the election campaign. In Germany, for example, all major parties apart from the
PDS opened their election programmes with references to the 2004 enlargement
round; all linked the accession of new Central and Eastern European member states
to new opportunities for the German export economy (cf. BÜNDNIS 90/DIE
GRÜNEN 2004; CDU 2004; FDP 2004; SPD 2004). Likewise, the French UMP
not only considered enlargement a victory of the EU and its values, but also pointed
to France’s large potential on the enlarged Common Market (UMP 2004). In
Austria, the ÖVP claimed that ‘Austria benefits most of all from enlargement—
more than any other EU member country’7 (ÖVP 2004, p. 6; own translation) while
in Ireland, Fianna Fáil declared that ‘as a country, we have nothing to fear from the
enlargement of the European Union’ (Fianna Fail 2004, p. 6). This cursory over-
view of the election manifestos indicates that national perspectives on enlargement
apparently dominated the 2004 campaign; this may also party explain the higher
shares of national identity issues observed in party manifestos.
What is more, in most countries, the rise in the salience of identity issues in party
manifestos in the 2004 campaign appears to have been a singular peak rather than a
sustained increase. In the majority of countries, identity shares fall again in 2009, in
particular in the new CEE member states. It cannot be ascertained, however,
whether the decrease in identity salience in 2009 reflects a levelling-off of the
effects of enlargement or rather the onset of the financial and economic crisis,
which may have redirected parties’ attention to issues other than identity and
community.
Turning to the 2009 election campaign and changes in party emphasis on
identity that can be related to the economic and financial crisis, we thus see a
decrease in the salience of identity issues in party manifestos in all EU member
states but Malta and Greece (cf. Fig. 5.4). As might have been expected, parties’
attention shifted away from questions of identity and community and towards
economic issues under the impression of the financial and economic crisis (see
also the findings on the dominant issues in the 2009 EP election campaing by Adam
and Maier 2011; Bachl and Brettschneider 2011; Brunsbach et al. 2011). What is
more, the shift away from issues of identity and community is rather uniform across
the EU. We see the salience of identity issues decline in all but two member states
and apparently independent of differences between member states, not only in
terms of size, location, or length of membership, but also in terms of macroeco-
nomic characteristics such as Eurozone membership and trade dependency. Unlike
in the context of enlargement 2004 when parties increasingly addressed concerns
for the national community and the consequences of enlargement for national

6
The election manifestos for the EP elections 2004 and 2009 quoted in the following were
retrieved from the Euromanifestos Project website at MZES, accessible via http://www.mzes.
uni-mannheim.de/projekte/manifestos/ (accessed on 06 April 2015). Manifestos for the 2014
elections were retrieved from the parties’ respective websites.
7
‘Österreich profitiert am meisten von der Erweiterung – mehr als jeder andere
Mitgliedsstaat.‘(ÖVP 2004, p. 6).
150 5 The Salience of European and National Identity for Political Parties in Europe

economies and societies, parties apparently did not (yet) link economic issues to
identity issues in 2009. The fact that parties focussed on economic issues in 2009,
while disregarding the identity- and community-dimension, may well reflect the
scope and progression of the crisis at the time. Concurrently, we may expect that
parties started to link economic and identity issues more closely as the crisis
continued and changed from a financial and economic crisis into a sovereign debt
crisis in the Eurozone, requiring extensive financial transfers between member
states.
In fact, at the time of the European election campaign in spring 2009,8 the crisis
was still a crisis of the financial sector and the real economy. By mid-2009, all EU
member states except Poland and Slovakia were or had been in recession in the
previous months; fears of a sovereign debt crisis, on the other hand, did not emerge
until the end of 2009/beginning of 2010.9 As a result, when addressing economic
issues and the crisis in the campaign, parties predominantly emphasised the need
for investments to stimulate the economy and the need for stricter financial regu-
lation and oversight of the banking system. An overview of the 2009 manifestos
shows that parties across the board expressed such demands. To cite a few, on the
left, there were calls for a ‘strong European stimulus for growth and employment to
overcome the crisis and its consequences’ (SPÖ 2009); a ‘real stimulus package’
(PS 2009); more national and European investments in the field of innovation,
research, and development, a European pact for labour, and stricter financial
regulation at the European and international level (SPD 2009); as well as a
‘European investment policy for development’, stronger coordination of economic
policy and stimulus packages among member states as well as ‘new rules for the
international financial system’ (Partito Democratico 2009). On the right, parties
demanded ‘clear regulations for secure financial markets’ and European funding for
small and medium-size enterprises (ÖVP 2009); ‘common actions for massive
innovation and investment for industries in difficulty’ (UMP 2009); a reform of
international financial markets, including increased transparency and accountabil-
ity, better regulation, and the reform of international economic and financial
institutions (CDU 2009); and a ‘redesign of the international financial system’
(PDL 2009). On the other hand, we observe no references to measures of
European financial solidarity or aids to individual member states in crisis that
might be substantiated by invoking a common European community and identity.
By the time of the next European election campaign in spring 2014, the crisis
had evolved into a sovereign debt crisis in several member states; the EU and the
Eurogroup had agreed on extensive financial rescue mechanisms, leading to wide-
spread and long-lasting controversy within and between member states; under

8
The 2009 EP elections were held between 4 and 7 June 2009.
9
The beginning of the European debt crisis is often dated back to autumn/winter 2009 when Greek
Prime Minister George Papandreou had to revise the estimate of the government budget deficit for
2009 from the previous estimate of 6.7% to 12.7% of GDP. This was followed by the downgrade of
Greek bond ratings by major rating agencies and a general decline of investor confidence in the
Greek economy (Illing 2013; Nelson et al. 2010).
5.4 EU Enlargement and the Economic and Financial Crisis and the Salience of. . . 151

pressure from the EU and the IMF, member states at the risk of sovereign default
had implemented austerity programmes and structural reforms in exchange for
financial aids; and economic and social disparities between member states had
increased as national economies recovered at different speed after the 2008/2009
recession. The crisis and in particular the need for bilateral loans and common
financial rescue mechanisms revived debates over member states’ mutual obliga-
tions, financial solidarity within the EU, and the costs of saving the common
currency. In this regard, it not only raised economic questions, but also laid bare
the consequences of increased economic and political integration in terms of
national (financial) sovereignty and the risk of financial and economic interdepen-
dencies for national economies, national finances, and, ultimately, citizens and
taxpayers in the member states. In short, as the crisis continued and required
financial redistribution between member states, it increasingly raised questions
regarding the sovereignty of the national community on the one hand and the
strength of solidarity and loyalty within the wider European community on the
other. Against this background, we may expect that issues of identity and commu-
nity again played a greater role in the 2014 EP election campaign than in the 2009
campaign.
While manifesto data for the 2014 campaign was not available at the time of
writing, a cursory overview of party manifestos for the 2014 EP elections indicates
that parties indeed started to link economic issues to issues of solidarity and
community in the 2014 campaign. Unlike in 2009, when parties across the board
called for investments and financial regulations, in 2014, parties on the left and the
right of the political spectrum appeared more divided with regard to the level of
community—national or European—they addressed and appealed to. The left thus
emphasised the wider European community and a common European responsibility
to overcome the crisis whereas the right was more concerned with the national
community and member states’ individual responsibility to emerge from the crisis,
as the German case exemplifies.
In fact, German Social Democrats highlighted their vision of a ‘European
Germany, not a German Europe’, underlining that the country cannot do well
unless its European neighbours do well and rejecting the idea of Germany ‘going
it alone’ (SPD 2014). The Greens pushed this point even further, arguing that
‘Europe has become part of our identity just as Germany, their region, city or
community for many are [part of their identity]’. Calling for reliable, coordinated,
and sustainable politics to avoid fission within the EU, they warned against letting
‘break apart what belongs together’ (BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN 2014). On the
right, in contrast, Christian Democrats advertised ‘solidarity in exchange for solid-
ity’, stressing their solidarity with the European partners while underlining that
‘member states are themselves responsible’ for overcoming the crisis (CDU 2014).
The CSU put it more bluntly, calling on ‘our European neighbours to make an effort
and become more competitive’ rather than blame Germany for its economic
performance, because ‘you cannot strengthen the weak by weakening the strong’.
Financial aids are only to be granted to member states in crisis in return for
structural reforms (CSU 2014). Unsurprisingly, the sentiment that European
152 5 The Salience of European and National Identity for Political Parties in Europe

integration must not come at the expense of the national level was even more
commonplace among the eurosceptic AfD who demanded ‘courage for Germany’
and a greater say in the European institutions to avoid further decisions to
Germany’s disadvantage (AfD 2014).
While parties did not directly refer to national identity or the national way of life,
at least on the right, concerns for the (financial) well-being of the national commu-
nity appear to have become more prevalent in party discourse, which often also
implies pitting national interests against European-wide solidarity. On the left, on
the other hand, parties seemed eager to avoid this impression by promoting a sense
of ‘being in this together’ as Europeans that transcends national (financial) interests
and appeals to European-wide responsibility and solidarity. In this regard, issues of
identity and community indeed seem to have become more salient again as the
crisis continued and eventually required extensive intra-European transfers.
The above examples from party manifestos are of course restricted to the
German case. Given Germany’s position as the main creditor and its role in the
negotiations over bailout measures, German parties may be more prone to empha-
sise the financial responsibilities of the crisis countries and the need for reforms in
exchange for financial aids than their counterparts in other member states. Analyses
of national media coverage and national parliamentary debates, however, show that
juxtapositions between fiscally responsible and irresponsibly member states and
references to (national) economic interests rather than appeals to European soli-
darity were common in other member states, too (Closa and Maatsch 2014;
Mazzoni and Barbieri 2014; Picard 2015; Schmidt 2014). The German findings
may thus well be representative for parties in other EU member countries, in
particular in other creditor countries. Overall, there is reason to assume that in the
course of the crisis parties have started to link economic issues to identity issues,
making issues of community and identity again more salient in party discourse than
in previous years.
We can sum up the findings with regard to the effects of EU enlargement and the
financial and economic crisis on the salience of issues of European and national
community and identity in party manifestos as follows: Identity issues became
more salient in a number of EU member states, both in the old EU15 and in CEE in
the 2004 EP election campaign, which took place in the context of the EU’s
enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe. This rise in the salience of identity
issues in party manifestos was driven mainly by parties’ emphasis on issues of
national identity and community; a cursory overview of party manifestos further
indicates that parties promoted national perspectives on Eastward enlargement in
their election programmes. Under the impression of the financial and economic
crisis, parties’ attention shifted away from question of identity and community,
leading to a decline in the salience of identity issues in almost all member states in
2009. As the crisis continued, turning from a crisis of the financial sector and the
real economy into a sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, and EU member states
agreed to extensive financial guarantees to countries at risk of sovereign default,
economic issues appear to have become more closely linked to identity issues
again. In effect, excerpts from German party manifestos indicate that parties put
5.5 Identity as an Issue of Party Contestation Over EU Integration 153

more emphasis on (divergent) national interests and national responsibilities on the

one hand and European-wide solidarity on the other in 2014 EP election campaign
than in previous years. In this regard, the crisis may have led to a renewed increase
in the salience of European and national community issues in party discourse.

5.5 Identity as an Issue of Party Contestation Over EU

Integration

The present chapter set out to explore the prevalence of issues related to European
community and a common European identity on the one hand and the national
community and common national identity on the other in party discourse in the
member states. The aim was to gain a better understanding of party messages
related to the European and national community as one of the main country-level
determinants in the explanatory model of individual identification with Europe and
contribute to the literature on the contents of party competition over European
integration.
The salience of party messages on European and national community and
identity was conceptualised as the share of issues of national and European identity
relative to other political issues in parties’ election manifestos. The empirical
analysis examined the salience of issues related to European and national commu-
nity and identity in national parties’ election manifestos for seven European
parliament elections between 1979 and 2014. It confirmed that identity is not a
minor issue for political parties, with parties across the board dedicating sizeable
shares of their election programmes to identity-related issues. Parties address not
only concerns for national community and national identity, but equally emphasise
the wider community of Europeans and a collective European identity. Thus,
national and European identity and community have been salient issues in party
discourse over the whole period under analysis, accounting for up to 10% of
manifesto arguments. We find patterns of party emphasis on issues of identity to
vary between member states, but remain relatively stable over time. Identity issues
became more salient in party manifestos in the context of enlargement in the 2004
EP election campaign, mostly due to a rise in party emphasis on issues related to
national identity and community. Under the impression of the financial and eco-
nomic crisis, parties’ attention shifted away from question of identity and commu-
nity, leading to a decline in the salience of identity issues in almost all member
states in 2009. Excerpts from party manifestos for the 2014 EP elections, however,
seem to indicate that economic issues have become more closely linked to identity
issues again as the crisis continued.
Which conclusions do these findings allow, first with regard to the contents of
party contestation over European integration and claims of an increasing
politicisation of identity issues in party competition, and, second, with regard to
154 5 The Salience of European and National Identity for Political Parties in Europe

the role of party messages on European and national identity for citizens’ identifi-
cation with Europe?
Starting with claims of an increasing politicisation of identity by national
political parties, we find only moderate support for a general rise in party emphasis
on identity issues in response to the widening and deepening of EU integration.
While we observe increases in parties’ emphasis on issues of national community
and national identity in individual member states, the European-wide peak in
identity salience is limited to the 2004 EP election campaign; in almost all member
states, the salience of identity issues dropped considerably in 2009.
Nonetheless, the findings for the three most recent EP elections campaigns
(2004, 2009, and 2014) are instructive with regard to party mobilisation on identity
issues. First or all, we observe an almost uniform increase in party emphasis on
identity issues—and issues of national identity and community in particular—in the
context of enlargement 2004, i.e. at a time when the European Union became
culturally and economically more heterogeneous and differences between member
states became more apparent. In this regard, party manifestos appear to reflect
national debates on enlargement, which centred largely on the costs and benefits of
enlargement for national societies and economies. After the drop in identity
salience in 2009, a first overview of party manifestos for the 2014 EP elections
gives reason to assume that issues of identity and community have become more
important again in the last EP election campaign, i.e. at a time when the debate over
the crisis had moved from stimulus packages and financial regulations to bailouts
for highly indebted member states and European financial rescue mechanisms.
The excerpts from the 2014 manifestos show that depending on their position on
the political spectrum parties do not only focus on the national level and the costs of
intra-European transfers for the national community, but also appeal to feelings of
belonging together as Europeans in order to defend bailout measures and European-
wide rescue mechanisms. The claim that identity becomes more important as EU
integration has more and more redistributive consequences thus also seems to find
support at the party level, with parties emphasising both national and European
identity in their election programmes.
Apart from inferences about the importance of identity issues in party contesta-
tion over European integration, the analysis of party manifestos also allows some
conclusions concerning the development of a collective European identity among
citizens in the member states. As a preliminary step to testing the effect of party
messages on citizens’ identification with Europe in statistical analysis in Chap. 6,
we can compare the results of the descriptive analyses of individual identification
with Europe (cf. Chap. 5) with the above results of the analysis of party manifestos.
This gives a first impression of the relationship between identity salience at the
party level and collective identifications among citizens in the member states.
Contrasting shares of identity issues in national party manifestos and citizens’
identification with Europe by member state, we find parallels between identity
shares at the party and the individual level. For example, parties in both parts of
the UK predominantly emphasised issues of national identity and community over
the whole period under analysis, while paying little attention to issues of European
Appendix 155

identity and community. This tendency is mirrored at the citizen level where we
find some of the highest shares of respondents identifying exclusively with the
nation in Great Britain and Northern Ireland. In contrast, in countries like Germany,
Italy, France, or Luxembourg where higher shares of respondents identify (also) as
Europeans, we also find parties to emphasise European and national identity and
community more equally and vice versa. Overall, levels and development of
national and European identity at the party and the citizen level thus appear to
follow similar rather than divergent trends. Simply comparing levels and develop-
ment of identity salience at the party level and collective identification at the
individual level of course cannot determine whether parties influence individual
identification or, on the contrary, parties respond to trends in public opinion by
emphasising issues that are salient in public debates in their manifestos. The
following explanatory analysis of individual identification with Europe will assess
the effect of parties’ emphasis on identity issues on European identification at the
individual level.

Appendix

Table 5.2 Number of EP election manifestos by year and member state 1979–2009
No. of party manifestos by year and member state
Year of election
1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 Total
Austria 5 6 6 17
Belgium-Flanders 4 5 6 6 6 7 8 42
Belgium-Wallonia 2 3 3 3 5 5 5 26
Bulgaria 6 6
Cyprus 5 4 9
Czech Republic 7 6 13
Denmark 8 6 7 9 10 8 8 56
Estonia 6 5 11
Finland 7 7 8 22
France 3 2 4 8 11 20 9 57
Germany 5 5 6 7 7 7 7 44
Great Britain 2 4 5 7 7 8 8 41
Greece 2 1 2 6 6 6 23
Hungary 4 5 9
Ireland 3 1 3 5 5 5 8 30
Italy 1 1 2 8 13 15 10 50
Latvia 7 7 14
Lithuania 10 8 18
Luxembourg 3 3 4 4 4 5 4 27
(continued)
156 5 The Salience of European and National Identity for Political Parties in Europe

Table 5.2 (continued)

No. of party manifestos by year and member state
Year of election
1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 Total
Malta 2 2 4
Netherlands 6 6 8 7 7 9 8 51
Northern Ireland 1 3 3 3 3 4 3 20
Poland 8 6 14
Portugal 3 5 5 4 5 22
Romania 6 6
Slovakia 9 6 15
Slovenia 5 6 11
Spain 8 11 6 13 10 48
Sweden 7 8 9 24
Total 38 41 63 85 114 200 189 730

Table 5.3 Average shares of identity issues in EP election manifestos by member state
Mean share of identity issues in party manifestos in %
Total National European Net European
Austria 8.1 1.7 6.4 4.7
Belgium-Flanders 10.5 4.4 6.1 1.7
Belgium-Wallonia 7.2 2.8 4.4 1.6
Bulgaria 1.8 1.0 0.7 0.3
Cyprus 5.7 2.9 2.8 0.1
Czech Republic 10.4 5.0 5.4 0.4
Denmark 9.8 6.2 3.6 2.6
Estonia 8.7 6.3 2.5 3.8
Finland 9.4 5.0 4.3 0.7
France 9.0 5.1 3.8 1.3
Germany 8.2 4.3 3.9 0.4
Great Britain 7.6 6.0 1.6 4.4
Greece 6.3 3.8 2.4 1.4
Hungary 11.6 6.1 5.5 0.6
Ireland 5.4 3.2 2.2 1.0
Italy 8.7 3.2 5.4 2.2
Latvia 11.4 9.0 2.3 6.7
Lithuania 7.6 3.9 3.7 0.2
Luxembourg 11.1 5.4 5.7 0.3
Malta 15.5 3.6 11.8 8.2
Netherlands 9.5 4.7 4.8 0.1
Northern Ireland 12.6 10.3 2.3 8.0
Poland 17.5 10.1 7.4 2.7
(continued)
References 157

Table 5.3 (continued)

Mean share of identity issues in party manifestos in %
Total National European Net European
Portugal 8.1 4.4 3.7 0.7
Romania 7.5 3.0 4.5 1.5
Slovakia 11.7 5.5 6.3 0.8
Slovenia 9.4 2.8 6.6 3.8
Spain 10.5 4.8 5.7 0.9
Sweden 8.1 5.5 2.6 2.9
Total 9.1 4.9 4.3 0.6
Note: Entries are average shares of arguments coded as identity issues (see text and variable list in
table) relative to the total number of arguments coded per year and country over the period under
analysis. ‘total’ refers to the total share of identity issues in a campaign; ‘national’ refers to
national identity issues; ‘European’ refers to European identity issues; net European refers to the
shares of European identity issues minus shares of national identity issues
Source: Euromanifestos 1979–2009, own calculations

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Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung (MZES).
Chapter 6
Explaining European Identification: The
Impact of Enlargement and the Crisis
on Feelings of European Identity Among EU
Citizens

The present chapter turns to the explanation of individual identification with

Europe. It subjects the theoretical model of individual identification with Europe
developed in Chap. 3 to empirical testing to provide evidence on the determinants
of individual identification with Europe. The empirical study employs a cross-
sectional design that analyses identification with Europe among citizens in the
EU member states at seven occasions between 2000 and 2012. The period under
analysis includes two key moments in the recent history of EU integration, namely
the EU’s enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe in 2004/2007 and the financial
and economic crisis starting in late 2008. By spanning a time horizon of over a
decade, this research design enables us to examine general trends in the determi-
nants of European identification over the course of EU integration. Furthermore, by
estimating separate regression models before and after Eastern enlargement and
before and after the onset of crisis, we are able to assess how turning points in the
EU integration process affect the sources of European identification at the citizen
level.
The statistical analysis shows that individual identification with Europe is
influenced mainly by individual-level determinants while country-level character-
istics have only limited effects on European identification. The effects of
individual-level determinants on European identification remain stable over time.
Among the country-level determinants, economic aspects and redistributive con-
siderations become more relevant for European identification in the wake of
enlargement and the crisis.
The remainder of this chapter introduces the research design and methods of
analysis (Sect. 6.1) as well as the data and indicators used to operationalise the
dependent and independent variables (Sect. 6.2). The subsequent sections present
the findings of the statistical analysis (Sect. 6.3) and draw conclusions with regard
to the sources and mechanisms of citizens’ identification with Europe after enlarge-
ment and the crisis (Sect. 6.4).

© Springer International Publishing AG 2018 161

S. Bergbauer, Explaining European Identity Formation,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67708-8_6
162 6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .

6.1 Research Design and Methods of Analysis

The present work relies on a cross-sectional design that analyses individual iden-
tification with Europe in the EU member states at seven time points between winter
2000 and spring 2012.1 The comparatively long period under analysis in a first
instance allows conclusions about general tendencies in the determinants of
European identification and the stability of these determinants over time and as
the EU integration process evolves. What is more, the period under analysis
includes two turning points in EU integration in recent years, namely the EU’s
enlargement to CEE in 2004/2007 and the onset of the financial and economic crisis
in late 2008. Hence, we are able to assess not only the general trends in the
determinants of European identification over time, but also their stability or vari-
ation in response to major events in the EU integration process.
To assess potential changes in the determinants of citizens’ European identifi-
cation in response to EU enlargement, separate models are estimated for
November/December 2000, October/November 2003, October/November 2004,
and March/May 2006. These reflect different stages in the accession process,
namely a pre-accession stage (winter 2000) in which membership negotiations
were under way; the actual accession stage (autumn 2003 and 2004) stretching
from spring 2003 when the accession treaty with the candidate states was signed2 to
their official accession to the EU on 01 May 2004; finally, a post-accession stage
(spring 2006). Using the year 2000 as a benchmark, this research design allows us
to study whether the determinants of citizens’ identification with Europe have
changed in strength and/or direction in relation to the accession of CEE countries.
Furthermore, by including 2006 as an additional point of analysis, we are able to
assess whether eastward enlargement is associated with long-term changes in the
determinants of European identification or whether changes in the determinants are
restricted to the period immediately before and after the accession of the ten new
member states in 2004.
To assess potential changes in the determinants of European identification in
response to the onset of the financial and economic crisis, separate models are
estimated for April/May 2007, March/April 2010, and May 2012. Spring 2007
serves as the benchmark year against which we can assess changes in the determi-
nants of European identification over the course of the crisis. Although the US
housing and subprime market contracted as early as 2007, and, in Europe, Hungary,
Ireland, and Italy had already experienced recessions in 2007,3 the starting date of

1
Winter 2000, autumn 2003, autumn 2004, spring 2006, spring 2007, spring 2010, and
spring 2012.
2
The Treaty of Accession between the EU and the ten new member states to join the EU in 2004
was signed in Athens, Greece, on April 16th, 2003.
3
Recession is defined here as a quarter-on-quarter contraction of real GDP for at least two
consecutive quarters. By this definition, Hungary was in recession in the first and second quarters
of 2007, Ireland in the second and third quarters of 2007, and Italy in the third and fourth quarters
6.1 Research Design and Methods of Analysis 163

the global financial and economic crisis is typically equated with the default of the
US bank Lehmann Brothers in September 2008 and the ensuing breakdown of the
inter-bank loan market (European Commission 2009). Therefore, it seems reason-
able to assume that the public only became aware of the crisis in late 2008, enabling
us to take spring 2007 as the benchmark year representing the pre-crisis period (see
Hobolt and Leblonde 2014 for a similar operationalisation of pre-crisis and crisis
periods).
March/April 2010, in contrast, coincides with a period of increased tension and
acute crisis in the EU. In effect, by spring 2010, the financial crisis of 2007/2008
and the global recession of 2008/2009 had given rise to fears of sovereign debt
crises in a number of Eurozone member states. In March 2010, Eurogroup govern-
ments had offered financial support mechanisms to Greece, which the Greek
government officially requested to activate in April. On 02 May 2010, the Eurozone
finance ministers and the IMF agreed on a € 110 billion loan package to Greece,
conditional on austerity measures including wage freezes and pension cuts in the
public sector, tax rises, and an increase of the retirement age. The negotiations over
the Greek bailout were accompanied by intense debates both in the creditor
countries and in Greece, where austerity measures drew considerable social
protests.4
By spring 2012, the economic and financial situation in the EU member coun-
tries had greatly diversified: Of the 27 EU member states, seven5 were still in
recession in the second quarter 2012 whereas Germany had seen its economy grow
since 2010 and Poland had never gone into recession at all. Likewise, unemploy-
ment rates in the second quarter 2012 ranged from 4% in Luxemburg to 24% in
Spain; while Germany had seen unemployment fall since late 2009, unemployment
rates continued to rise in the EU as a whole throughout 2010/2012, most notably in
Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain (OECD 2014b).
Thus, the three years of analysis represent very different stages in the financial
and economic crisis: first, a pre-crisis period in 2007; second, a period of tension
and economic and financial turmoil throughout the EU and in particular in the
Eurozone in early 2010; third, a period of economic diversification in which some
member states were recovering from the crisis and others still experienced eco-
nomic difficulty. In this way, the research design allows us to examine whether the
factors explaining citizens’ identification with Europe change in times of severe
crisis; in particular, we are able to assess whether macroeconomic indicators

of 2007. For quarterly growth rates of real GDP and changes over previous quarter see the OECD
National Accounts Statistics database (OECD 2014a).
4
After protest marches in Athens and Thessaloniki on 01 May 2010, a nation-wide strike against
the proposed austerity measures took place in Greece on 05 May 2010, drawing an estimated
100,000 people in Athens alone. Three people died in violent clashes between protesters and the
police on 05 May (BBC News 2010a, b). Mass protests and violent riots erupted again in response
to further austerity measures in 2011 and 2012 (BBC News 2011, 2012).
5
Czech Republic, Greece Hungary, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain (OECD 2014a).
164 6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .

become more important for citizens’ feelings of belonging to Europe as economic

conditions worsen.
To test the hypotheses derived from the explanatory model of European identi-
fication outlined in Chap. 3, the empirical analysis employs hierarchical linear
regression models predicting individual identification with Europe from individual-
and country-level predictors.6 The model specification follows the two-stage model
formulation suggested by Raudenbush and Bryk (2002). Thus, models are specified
in two separate stages for level 1 and level 2 and distinguishing between level 1 and
level 2 covariates, with observations on level 1 (individual level), i.e. EU citizens,
nested within level-2 units (country level), i.e. the EU member states.
The general two-level model is defined at level 1 by

Y ij ¼ β0j þ β1j X1ij þ β2j X2ij þ . . . þ βQj XQij þ r ij ð6:1Þ

where i indexes level-1 units and j indexes level-2 units, β0j is the level-1 intercept,
β1j through βQj denote the effects of level-1 predictors, X1ij through XQij denote
level-1 predictor variables, and rij denotes the individual-level error, which is
assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of zero and a constant level-1
variance, σ 2.The subscript j for the intercept and slopes of the level-1 predictors
indicates that each level-2 unit has a unique intercept and unique slopes which can
be modelled using predictors at level-2.
At level 2, the general model is defined by

βqj ¼ γ q0 þ γ q1 W1j þ γ q2 W2j þ . . . þ γ qSq WSqj þ uqj ð6:2Þ

where γ q0 is the level-2 intercept, γ q1 through γ qSq denote the effects of the level-2
predictors, W1j through WQj denote level-2 predictor variables, and uqj denotes the
level-2 errors whereby the random components uqj, q ¼ 0. . .Q, are assumed to be
multivariate normal, each with a mean of zero and some variance, Var(uqj)¼ τqq.
Setting the coefficients for the level-1 and level-2 predictors to zero yields a
random intercept only model. Referred to as the empty model (M0), this model
allows us to assess the relative importance of each level for variation in respon-
dents’ identification with Europe. It is defined by

M0 : EU identificationij ¼ γ 00 þ u0j þ r ij ð6:3Þ

6
There is a vast literature on the analysis of hierarchical data in social and political research, refering
to multilevel/hierarchical models under a variety of terms, including multilevel linear models,
hierarchical linear models, mixed-effects models, random-effects models, or random-coefficient
regression models. The present analysis follows the notation and development of the multilevel
model in Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) and Steenbergen and Jones (2002). Multilevel and hierar-
chical models are referred to interchangeably in the following. Technically, multilevel modelling is
the more encompassing term in that the general multilevel framework also allows for non-nested
models, i.e. data structures where units at level 1 are nested within level-2 units without a clear
ordering or hierarchy between the two levels (cf. the discussion in Gelman and Hill 2006, p. 2).
6.1 Research Design and Methods of Analysis 165

where γ 00 denotes the grand mean of European identification, u0j captures between-
country variation, and rij captures between-individual variation. The level-2 resid-
ual u0j can be viewed as representing country-differences due to member state
characteristics not accounted for in the model whereas the level-1 residual rij rep-
resents the random deviation of respondent i’s degree of European identification
from country j’s mean identification with Europe.
The random intercept only model specified above is extended stepwise to
include predictor variables at the individual and country level. Adding predictors
at the individual level yields a random intercept model with individual-level
covariates (M1).
Recall that at the individual level, the explanatory model of European identifi-
cation includes three main sets of explanatory factors, each comprising several
predictor variables (abbreviations for the predictors are in parentheses). These are,
first, political awareness, including general political interest (int), interest in EU
politics (EU int), knowledge of EU politics (EU know); second, attitudes toward the
European and national community, including respondents’ conception of European
community (EU comm), national identification (nat id), and conception of national
community (nat comm); and, third, personal transnational experiences, including
transnational practices (transprac), personal transnational background (transback),
and transnational human capital (transcap). In addition to these, the model includes
control variables for gender (gender), age (age), type of community (commun),
education (edu), occupation (occ), and respondents’ national and personal eco-
nomic expectations (nat_eco; pers_eco). Substituting the individual-level predic-
tors in the level-1 equation and constraining the level-2 predictors again to zero
yields the single-equation expression for the random intercept model with
individual-level covariates (M1):

M1 : EU identificationij
¼ γ 00 þ γ 10 intij þ γ 20 EUintij þ γ 30 EUknowij þ γ 40 EUcommij
þ γ 50 nat idij þ γ 60 nat commij þ γ 70 transpracij þ γ 80 transback ij
þ γ 90 transcapij þ γ 100 gender ij þ γ 110 ageij þ γ 120 communij
þ γ 130 eduij þ γ 140 occij þ γ 150 nat ecoij þ γ 160 pers ecoij þ r ij þ u0j ð6:4Þ

In the next step, the model is extended to include predictor variables at the
country level, yielding a random intercept model with individual- and country-level
covariates (M2). Recall that at the country level, the explanatory model of European
identification includes three sets of explanatory factors, again each comprising
several predictor variables (abbreviations for the predictors in parentheses). These
are, first, party messages related to European and national community, including
party messages on European community (EU party) and party messages on national
community (nat party); second, member states’ economic position and integration
in European and global markets, including euro zone membership (Euro), member
166 6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .

states’ net contribution to EU budget (budget), and member states’ share in inter-
national trade (trade); third, member states’ ethnocultural composition and inter-
national social integration, including the share of EU nationals in the national
population (EU imm) and the overall share of immigrants in the national population
(imm). In addition to these, the model includes measures for unemployment
(unemploy) and EU/IMF conditionality (IMF) for the crisis period 2008–2012.
The country-level predictors are used to model the level-1 intercept β0j . , yielding
the following level-2 equation:

β0j ¼ γ 00 þ γ 01 EU partyj þ γ 02 nat partyj þ γ 03 Euroj þ γ 04 budgetj

þ γ 05 tradej þ γ 06 EU immj þ γ 07 immj þ γ 08 unemployj þ γ 09 IMFj
þ u0j ð6:5Þ

In the single-equation expression, the random intercept model with individual-

and country-level predictors becomes:

M2 : EU identificationij
¼ γ 00 þ γ 10 intij þ γ 20 EUintij þ γ 30 EUknowij þ γ 40 EUcommij
þ γ 50 nat id ij þ γ 60 nat commij þ γ 70 transpracij þ γ 80 transbackij
þ γ 90 transcapij þ γ 100 gender ij þ γ 110 ageij þ γ 120 communij
þ γ 130 eduij þ γ 140 occij þ γ 150 nat ecoij þ γ 160 pers ecoij
þ γ 01 EU partyj þ γ 02 nat partyj þ γ 03 Euroj þ γ 04 budgetj þ γ 05 tradej
þ γ 06 EU immj þ γ 07 immj þ γ 08 unemployj þ γ 09 IMFj þ u0j þ r ij ð6:6Þ

The random intercept model with individual- and country-level covariates

constitutes the core model for the following analysis. It assumes that intercepts
vary across EU member states as a function of country-level characteristics, but
holds the slopes of the individual-level predictors fixed across EU member states. In
addition to these fixed-effects models, a number of random coefficient models with
cross-level interactions (M3) are estimated. In these models, the slopes of (some of)
the individual-level predictors are no longer fixed across EU member states, but
variability in the level-1 slopes is modelled explicitly as a function of level-2
characteristics. As a result, the combined multilevel model includes cross-level
interaction terms between individual- and country-level predictor variables.
The inclusion of random coefficients for some of the individual-level predictors
is based on the theoretical expectations developed in the previous chapter. Recall
that the explanatory model of European identification included a number of cross-
level interactions. Specifically, the theoretical discussion suggested interaction
effects between individual political interest and party messages on European and
national community, between individual political interest and member states’ status
6.1 Research Design and Methods of Analysis 167

as net recipient of EU funding, and between individual political interest and

member states’ shares in international trade (see hypotheses H17 to H19 formulated
in Chap. 3). Furthermore, I hypothesised interaction effects between individual
national identification and party messages on European and national community,
between individual national identification and member states’ status as net recipient
of EU funding, and between individual national identification and member states’
share of immigrants (see hypotheses H20 to H22). Finally, during the financial and
economic crisis, I expected interaction effects between individual national identi-
fication and EU/IMF conditionality and Eurozone membership, respectively (see
hypotheses H30 and H31). Model equations for random coefficient models with
cross-level interactions can be found in the appendix.
All models are estimated in Stata 13, using Stata’s mixed command for
multilevel mixed-effects linear regression. Models are fitted using maximum like-
lihood (ML). Data sets and country samples have been chosen to maximise the
number of countries/level-2 units for multilevel modelling while being limited by
the number of EU member states at the time. As a result, the number of level-1
(n) and level-2 units (N) varies by period of analysis. The analysis is restricted to the
EU15 member states (N ¼ 15) for the years 2000 and 2003, and to the EU25
member states (N ¼ 25) for the years 2004 and 2006.7 The number of individual
observations under analysis in this period ranges from n ¼ 12,128 (2006)8 to
n ¼ 24,221 (2004). For the years 2007 to 2012, the analysis includes the EU27
member states (N ¼ 27).9 The number of individual observations under analysis in
this period ranges from 25,964 (2007) to 26,144 (2012). Due to data limitations not
all models can be estimated using the full set of predictors at the individual- and/or
country-level in all years. Whenever possible, missing indicators are replaced by
functional equivalents to ensure the comparability of models over time.

7
There is an ongoing discussion in the literature regarding the number of level-1 units j and level-
2 units J needed to fit a multilevel model (see, e.g. Bryan and Jenkins 2015; Maas and Hox 2005;
Paccagnella 2011; Snijders 2005; Stegmueller 2013). Maximum likelihood estimation requires
sufficiently large sample sizes at both levels to produce accurate estimates and associated standard
errors, raising questions of the acceptable lower limit for the number of level-2 units in particular.
Simulation studies show, however, that individual-level estimates remain robust even for small
numbers of level-2 units (N < 15) and level-2 estimates tend to biased only to a limited degree for
level-2 samples of 15 and more (Maas and Hox 2005; Stegmueller 2013). Based on these findings,
it seems justified to estimate multilevel models even for the smaller set of the EU15 member states.
8
The relatively small n for 2006 is due to the split-ballot design of EB 65.2; only half of the sample
was given the item used to operationalise the dependent variable European identification.
9
The changes in country sample included in the analysis in different years raises questions with
regard to the assessment of changes in the determinants of European identification in response to
enlargement. To exclude that observed changes in the determinants are due to systematic differ-
ences in European identification between old and new member states, separate models for the
EU15 and the CEE member states were estimated for the years 2004 and 2006 as well as the period
2007 to 2012 in the addition to the pooled models for the EU25/EU27. No significant differences
appeared between the EU15 and the CEE group in terms of effect size and direction of effects.
168 6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .

6.2 Data and Operationalisation

The analysis of European identification among the EU member state populations

combines individual- and country-level data in a multilevel framework. Individual-
level data come from seven EB surveys conducted between 2000 and 2012.10 All
Eurobarometer datasets were retrieved online from the ZACAT provided by
GESIS—Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences. Country-level data mainly
come from the Eurostat database, supplemented by data from the EU Commission,
the Euromanifestos Project (EMP) at the Mannheim Centre for European Social
Research (MZES), the IMF, and the Worldbank. Given the comparatively long time
span under analysis, identical indicators are not available for all theoretical con-
cepts for all years under analysis and functionally equivalent indicators are used
wherever possible.
Operationalisation of the Dependent Variable The dependent variable
European identification is operationalised by citizens’ attachment to Europe for
the years 2000 to 2006 and citizens’ attachment to the European Union for the years
2007 to 2012. Both items have been recoded so that higher values indicate greater
attachment to Europe/the European Union. The recoded dependent variable has
four categories, ranging from 0 ¼ ‘not at all attached’ to 3 ¼ ‘very attached’.
Respondents indicating ‘don’t know’ have been omitted from the analysis (see
Table 6.4 in the appendix for descriptive statistics for the dependent variable).
Operationalisation of the Independent Variables Measures and indicators for
explanatory variables at individual and country level are discussed in the following.
All items have been recoded so that positive regression coefficients indicate a
positive effect of the respective explanatory factor on European identification as
the dependent variable. Respondents indicating ‘don’t know’ and those refusing to
reply have been omitted from the analysis (see Table 6.5 in the appendix for
descriptive statistics for the dependent variable).
Operationalisation of Explanatory Variables at the Individual Level Indepen-
dent variables at the individual level comprise respondents’ general political inter-
est (int), interest in European politics (EU int), and knowledge of European politics
(EU know); attitudes towards the European and national community, including
respondents’ conception of European and national community (EU comm, nat
comm) and degree of national identification (nat id); and personal transnational
experiences, including measures for respondents’ transnational practices
(transprac), transnational background (transback), and transnational human capital
(transcap).
Respondents’ general political interest (int) is operationalised by the frequency
of political discussions. Interest in European politics (EU int) is measured by

10
EB 54.1 (Nov/Dec 2000), EB 60.1. (Nov/Dec 2003), EB 62.0 (Oct/Nov 2004), EB 65.2 (March/
May 2006), EB 67.2 (April/May 2007), EB 73.3 (March/April 2010), EB 77.3 (May 2012).
6.2 Data and Operationalisation 169

respondents’ self-reported interest in politics and economics in other EU countries

(in 2003) and the frequency of discussions on European political matters (2012).
Respondents’ knowledge of European politics (EU know) is measured by respon-
dents’ factual knowledge of EU politics in 2004, 2006, and 2012, and by respon-
dents’ awareness of the main EU institutions in 2000, 2003, and 2007. There are no
items available for either respondents’ objective knowledge of European politics or
their awareness of major EU institutions in EB 77.3 (2010).
Respondents’ conception of the European community (EU comm) is measured
based on a question asking respondents to indicate what the EU means to them
personally. With the exception of EB 54.1 (2000), the respective item is available
for all years under analysis. Respondents could choose multiple answers from a list
of EU meanings, including peace, economic prosperity, democracy, social protec-
tion, freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the EU, cultural diversity,
stronger say in the world, euro, unemployment, bureaucracy, waste of money, loss
of cultural identity, more crime, an not enough control at external borders. The
resulting nominal variable EU comm has three categories: ‘common political
project’ if respondents chose one or more of the options attributed to an under-
standing of Europe as a common political project (i.e. peace, democracy, social
protection) and none of the other options; ‘individual benefits’ if respondents chose
one or more of the options attributed to an understanding of Europe as individual
benefits (i.e. economic prosperity, freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in
the EU) and none of the other options; and ‘other’ if respondents chose any of the
other options (‘other’ as reference category).
National identification (nat id) is measured by respondents’ attachment to their
country. It is available for all years under analysis. The discussion of the relation
between respondents’ conception of the national community and their propensity to
identify with Europe in the theoretical section suggested differences between
citizens who see their national community primarily based on cultural affinity
and a common ethnic and religious heritage and citizens who display a civic
understanding of national community built on common political values and
acquired traits and behaviours. Only EB 73.3 (2010) includes an item that allows
testing this proposition. A binary variable (nat comm) indicating a conception of the
national community as built on a common cultural heritage is constructed from a
question asking respondents to choose the three most important characteristics to be
(NATIONALITY) from a list of characteristics, including being Christian, sharing
(NATIONALITY) cultural traditions, being born in (COUNTRY), having at least
one (NATIONALITY) parents, feeling (NATIONALITY), mastering (COUNTRY
LANGUAGE), exercising citizens’ rights, for example voting in (OUR COUN-
TRY), having been brought up in (OUR COUNTRY), and being active in any
association or organization in (OUR COUNTRY). Among these options, ‘to be a
Christian’, ‘to share (NATIONALITY) cultural traditions’, and ‘to have at least one
(NATIONALITY) parent’ best reflect a cultural understanding of national commu-
nity. Thus, nat comm takes the value 1 if respondents chose at least two of the three
cultural items as most important characteristic to be (NATIONALITY) and a value
of 0 if otherwise. The concept of personal transnational experiences, finally,
170 6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .

comprises three predictor variables, namely transnational practices involving other

Europeans, personal transnational background, and individual transnational human
capital. The frequency of respondents’ transnational practices (transprac) is mea-
sured by EB items that assess respondents’ opportunities to personally interact with
other Europeans in their private or professional lives, for example trough long-term
stays abroad for work or study or partners and close friends from other than the
home country. Due to data limitations, respondents’ transnational practices can
only be explored for 2010 and 2012. For both years, additive indices are constructed
from questions assessing the frequency of respondents’ interactions with other
Europeans for private or professional reasons, with higher values indicating more
transnational contacts.
Respondents’ personal transnational background (transback) is understood as
having a European family background, assuming that respondents have more
opportunities to interact with other Europeans—the mechanism presumed to under-
lie European identification—if they have family in other EU member states
(as opposed to coming from an immigrant background outside the EU). Transna-
tional background is captured by dummy variable that takes the value 1 if either
respondents themselves or at least one parent have been born in another EU
member state. Respondents indicating ‘don’t know’ and those refusing to answer
have been omitted from the analysis. The indicator for transnational background is
available for all years except 2000, 2003, and 2012.
Respondents’ transnational capital (capital) refers to the skills that enable
citizens to interact directly with other Europeans. It is operationalised by items
assessing respondents’ foreign language skills, based on the assumption that mean-
ingful interaction with other Europeans requires a common basis for communica-
tion (Gerhards 2010). Transnational capital is measured by an index of respondents’
self-reported language skills and readiness to follow news from other countries,
with higher values indicating greater (use of) foreign language skills. This index is
available for the years 2010 and 2012.
Operationalisation of Explanatory Variables at the Country Level At the
country level, the general explanatory model of European identification comprises
three sets of explanatory variables: party messages related to the European and
national community (EU party, nat party); member states’ economic position and
degree of integration in the EU and global markets in terms of Eurozone member-
ship (Euro), net contributions to the EU budget (budget), and share of trade in GDP
(trade); and member states’ ethnocultural diversity as assessed by the share of
(EU) foreigners in the national population (EU imm, imm). The discussion of the
impact of the financial and economic crisis on citizens’ identification with Europe
further expected adverse economic conditions in a country as well as EU/IMF
conditionality to affect European identification during the crisis. To assess these
hypotheses, the model includes member states’ level of unemployment (unemploy)
as well as a measure for receiving conditional financial aid from the EU/IMF (IMF)
as additional predictors at the country level. With the exception of the binary
variables ‘Eurozone membership’, ‘net contributing country to the EU budget’
6.2 Data and Operationalisation 171

and ‘EU/IMF conditionality’ as well as the measures for the salience of identity
issues in party manifestos (EU party, nat party), all country-level predictors are
centred around their respective grand means.11
The salience of messages related to the European and the national community in
national party discourse is operationalised using the measures of party emphasis on
issues related to European and national community developed in Chap. 5. These
measures are based on the share (in %) of a national party’s European election
manifesto dedicated to questions of European and national community and identity.
The variable EU party captures the salience of European identity in party discourse;
it corresponds to the proportion of manifesto statements referring to issues of
European community and identity. The variable nat party, in contrast, captures
the salience of national identity in party discourse; it corresponds to the proportion
of manifesto statements referring to issues of national community and identity.
Both variables range from 0 to 100 with 0 meaning that parties did not refer to
issues of European/national community in their manifesto at all and 100 meaning
that all manifesto statements were dedicated to issues of European/national com-
munity. Data on national party manifestos for EP elections come from the
Euromanifestos Project (EMP) at the Mannheim Centre for European Social
Research (MZES). They are available for 2004 only as 2004 is the only European
election year covered by the analysis.
Eurozone membership (Euro) is a binary variable taking the value 1 if member
states have adopted the euro as the common currency and the value 0 if otherwise.
The variable Euro is first included in the model in 2003, after the introduction of the
euro as a physical currency on 01 January 2002. Given that the focus here is on the
common currency as a means for citizens’ direct experience of European integra-
tion, it seems reasonably to take 2002 as the starting date, even though the euro had
already been introduced as accounting currency in 1999.
Member states’ net contribution to the EU budget is operationalised by the
so-called operating budgetary balance, which corresponds to the difference
between the expenditures allocated to each member state by the EU and member

11
Centring the country-level predictors around their respective grand mean eases interpretation of
the regression coefficients and helps avoid nonsensical results if a value of 0 is essentially
meaningless for the predictor variables. For example, while the variables trade and unemployment
theoretically could take a value of zero, no EU member state has zero imports/exports or zero
unemployment (see also the descriptive statistics for the independent variables in Table 6.5 in the
appendix). By centring the country-level predictors around their grand means, we can interpret
regression coefficients as predicted changes in European identification for one-unit changes in the
respective independent variable with e.g. trade shares and unemployment rates held at their
average values in the data rather than at levels zero, which do not occur empirically. In the case
of party messages, in contrast, zero is a meaningful value insofar as we can imagine parties not
addressing issues of identity at all in their election manifestos. Centring also eases the interpre-
tation of cross-level interaction terms. Thus, for an interaction term in the form of a product wjxij,
the main effect of X is to be interpreted as the effect of X if W ¼ 0 (while the main effect of W is to
be interpreted as the effect of W for cases with X ¼ 0). See also the discussion of centring choices
in Raudenbush and Bryk (2002, pp. 31–35).
172 6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .

states’ payments to the EU budget.12 A dummy variable budget is created taking the
value 1 if member states are net contributor countries of EU transfers and the value
0 if countries are net recipient of EU transfers. Data on member states’ operating
budgetary balance come from the European Commission’s EU budget 2012 finan-
cial report (European Commission 2013) that includes information on net EU
transfers for the whole period under analysis.
The explanatory model of European identification further hypothesised individ-
uals from member states that are economically more integrated the European and
global markets to identify more with Europe. The variable trade measures the sum
of exports and imports of goods and services as a share of member states’ gross
domestic product. Data for trade as a share of GDP come from the Worldbank’s
World Development Indicators database (Worldbank 2015) and are available for
the entire period under analysis.
Besides measures of party discourse and macroeconomic indicators, the
ethnocultural composition of member state societies is included as a country-level
determinant of individual identification with Europe. Member states’ ethnocultural
composition is operationalised using the share of foreigners in the domestic popu-
lation. Two variables are included: First, the share of EU migrants13 (in%) living in
a member state (EU imm), and second, the overall share of immigrants14 (in%) in
member states’ populations (imm). Both are calculated based on population on 1st
January of a given year. Data for both measures come from the Eurostat database
(EUROSTAT 2014a). Data for the share of EU migrants are available from 2004
onwards; data on the overall share of immigrant are available for all years under
analysis.
To assess the effects of the financial and economic crisis on individual identifi-
cation with Europe, the models include measures for member states’ unemployment
rates (unemploy) and, for the crisis period 2010/2012, a dummy variable (IMF) for
whether or not member states received financial aids by the IMF/EU conditional on
structural and economic reforms. Unemployment is measured by member states’
annual average unemployment rate defined as the number of people unemployed as
a percentage of the labour force.15 Data on unemployment rates come from the
Eurostat database (EUROSTAT 2014c) and are available for all years under

12
The operating expenditures received by member states exclude administrative expenditures,
e.g. for the maintenance of EU institutions. For more information on member states expenditures
and payments and the calculation of member states’ operating budgetary balances, see the EU
budget 2012 financial report (European Commission 2013, pp. 109–111).
13
EU migrants refer to the number of foreigners coming from countries that were EU member
states at the time, i.e. the EU15 in 2000, EU25 in 2004, EU27 in 2010 etc.
14
Immigrants are defined as persons holding citizenship other than that of their country of
residence.
15
Eurostat defines the labour force as the total number of people employed and unemployed
whereby unemployed refers to all persons aged 15 to 74 (16 to 74 in Spain, Italy, and the UK) who
were not employed during the reference week, had actively sought work during the past 4 weeks
and were ready to begin working immediately or within two weeks (EUROSTAT 2014b).
6.3 The Determinants of Citizens’ Identification with Europe 2000–2012 173

analysis.16 The binary variable IMF indicates whether member states have been
under EU/IMF conditionality since the onset of the financial and economic crisis.
Since the EU and the IMF worked side by side in providing joint loan packages and
monitoring the implementation of macroeconomic reforms in creditor countries,
EU and IMF influence are captured by the same variable. The operationalisation of
EU/IMF conditionality follows (Armingeon and Ceka 2014) who define IMF
conditionality ‘as having agreed to any active lending arrangement according to
IMF records’ such as a Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) or Extended Fund Facility
(EFF)’ (Armingeon and Ceka 2014, p. 91). Under these agreements, countries
receive financial aids conditional on the implementation of macroeconomic and
structural policies. Since the onset of the financial and economic crisis in late 2008,
six EU member states (Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal, and Romania)
have signed lending agreements with the IMF. The variable IMF takes the value
1 for member states under EU/IMF conditionality in the year under analysis and the
value 0 otherwise. Data on IMF lending agreements come from the IMF Monitoring
of Fund Arrangement (MONA) database (IMF 2015).
Control Variables In addition to the individual- and country-level predictors
discussed above, the empirical model includes a number of control variables. At
the individual level, these include respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics
(gender, age, type of community, level of education, occupation) and their expec-
tations with regard to their personal financial situation and the situation of the
national economy in the year to come. At the country level, the empirical model
includes control variables for member states’ level of unemployment to account for
the influence of the general economic situation and potential negative effects of
worsening economic conditions on attitudes towards Europe and European
integration.17

6.3 The Determinants of Citizens’ Identification

with Europe 2000–2012

At the core of this book is the question why people identify with Europe. The
remainder of this chapter seeks to reply to this question by presenting the empirical
evidence on the sources of citizens’ identification with Europe. To this end, the

16
While national unemployment rates are introduced as an indicator for how hard member states
were hit by the economic crisis after 2008, all models include the variable for unemployment in
order to control for the influence of the general state of the national economy on citizens’
identification with Europe.
17
Another obvious choice would be to control for member states in Central and Eastern Europe,
which joined the EU in 2004/2007. However, CEE membership highly correlates with some of the
other country-level predictors, in particular net contributions to the EU budget and Eurozone
membership. To avoid multicollinearity among the predictors, no additional control variable is
included for CEE member states.
174 6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .

results of the multilevel analysis of individual identification with Europe are

presented in three steps.
A first part examines how much of the variation observed in individual identi-
fication with Europe lies between individuals and how much lies between EU
member states (Sect. 6.3.1). In technical terms, this section presents the results of
the empty or random intercept only models for the different years of analysis, which
partition the total variance in European identification into between- and within-
country variances.
A second section turns to the question which individual and which contextual
attributes shape European identification (Sect. 6.3.2). It explores the effects of
individual attributes and dispositions on the one hand and member state character-
istics on the other on citizens’ identification with Europe, presenting estimates for
individual- and country-level determinants for different points in time between
2000 and 2012. The aim of this section is to provide general conclusions with
regard to the sources of European identification at the citizen level and provide
insights into long-term trends in the determinants of individual identification with
Europe over time.
A third and final section turns to the implications of EU enlargement and the
financial and economic crisis for the sources of citizens’ identification with Europe
(Sect. 6.3.3). Starting with enlargement, it explores changes in the individual- and
country-level determinants of European identification that can be traced back to the
EU’s enlargement to CEE and the onset of the financial and economic crisis. The
aim of this section is to draw conclusions with regard to the stability of European
identification and its determinants at key moments in the EU integration process.
The focus is on changes in the importance of different explanations of individual
European identification as we observe fundamental changes in EU membership and
the salience of EU politics in public debates.

6.3.1 Between and Within Country Variation in Individual

European Identification 2000–2012

The random intercept only models provide information on the overall level of
identification with Europe in the member states in the years 2000 to 2012 and the
degree of variation in European identification between and within EU countries.
Table 6.1 presents parameter estimates for each year under analysis, including the
intercept, which gives the grand mean of European identification; the variance
components τ00 and σ 2 , which represent the between-country variability (τ00) and
the within-country variability (σ 2) in European identification; and the intraclass
correlation coefficient (ICC), which indicates the fraction of the total variability in
individual identification with Europe that is due to the member state level. Standard
errors are in parentheses. Note that the deviance statistic defined as 2 times the
log-likelihood, as well as the Aikake information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian
Table 6.1 Variance components and intraclass correlation 2000–2012
2000 2003 2004 2006 2007 2010 2012
Year Attachment to Europe Attachment to the European Union
Intercept 1.73*** 1.70*** 1.80*** 1.70*** 1.50*** 1.45*** 1.39***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03)
Variance components
Country level τ00 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Individual level σ 2 0.73 0.67 0.66 0.72 0.74 0.70 0.70
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ICC 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.04
Deviance 39,279.46 38,330.15 58,880.592 30,555.72 66,098.248 64,697.886 64,847.44
AIC 39,285.46 38,336.15 58,886.59 30,561.72 66,104.25 64,703.89 64,853.44
BIC 39,308.41 38,359.13 58,910.88 30,583.93 66,128.74 64,728.38 64,877.95
No. of groups (N) 15 15 25 25 27 27 27
No. of individuals (n) 15,515 15,6683 24,221 12,128 25,964 25,990 26,144
Note: Figures are estimates from multilevel regression analyses with random intercept only, standard errors in parentheses. The question wording of the
dependent variable ‘identification with Europe’ changes in 2007 due to changes in the EB survey questionnaire. In the years 2000 to 2006, the item refers to the
6.3 The Determinants of Citizens’ Identification with Europe 2000–2012

strength of respondents’ attachment to Europe, from 2007 onwards the item refers to the strength of respondents’ attachment to the European Union. The
relatively smaller n for 2006 is due to the split-ballot design of EB 65.2.
***p  0.001; **p  0.01; *p  0.05; {p  0.1.
Source: Eurobarometer, own calculations.
175
176 6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .

information criterion (BIC) are given for completeness and further reference only;
they cannot be compared across models fitted to different data sets.
Starting with the intercepts, we can assess the mean level of identification with
Europe across all member states and individual respondents. The estimates for the
intercepts can be interpreted as the expected value of European identification for a
random citizen in a randomly drawn EU member state. With values around the
midpoint of the European identification scale,18 the point estimates for the inter-
cepts indicate an overall moderate attachment to Europe among respondents in all
years under analysis. As observed in the descriptive part of the analysis, mean
levels of identification are slightly higher for respondents’ ‘attachment to Europe’
than for ‘attachment to the European Union’.
Other than the mean level of European identification, we are interested in how
much of the variation in individual identification with Europe lies between EU
member states and how much lies between individuals. Unsurprisingly with public
opinion data, we find that differences in European identification are greater for
respondents within the same EU member state than between EU member states.
Depending on the year under analysis, the estimates for the variance components
τ00 and σ 2 yield intraclass correlation coefficients ρ between 0.04 and 0.10. That is,
the country level accounts for 4–10% of the variance in respondents’ identification
with Europe whereas the major part of variation in European identification lies at
the individual level.19 Nonetheless, the ICC ratios reported here provide evidence
of nesting within EU member states that warrants further investigation.

6.3.2 Explaining Individual European Identification

2000–2012

Which factors explain the variation in European identification that we observe at

both the individual and the member state level? The following section presents the
empirical evidence on the determinants of European identification among EU
citizens based on the results of the multilevel analysis. Tables 6.2 and 6.3 report
parameter estimates, standard errors, and variance components for hierarchical
linear models with maximum likelihood estimation for the different years under
analysis. The result tables further include the deviance as well as the AIC and BIC
as measures of fit. R2 gives the proportional reduction of error for predicting an
individual outcome as proposed by Snijders and Boskers (1994, 2011). Results for
the years 2000 to 2006 are reported in Table 6.2 and results for the years 2007 to

18
Recall that identification with Europe is measured on a 4-point scale ranging from 0 (not at all
attached to Europe/the European Union) to 3 (very attached to Europe/the European Union).
19
The ICC ratios reported here are consistent with previous studies of EU public opinion. Few
studies report intraclass correlation coefficients. An overview of analyses of EU support shows
ICC ratios of between 4% (Braun and Tausendpfund 2013) and 16% (Brinegar and Jolly 2005).
Table 6.2 Individual- and country-level determinants of individual identification with Europe 2000–2006
Multilevel analysis of individual identification with Europe (attachment to Europe)
2000 2003 2004 2006
Year M1 M2 M1a M1b M2 M1 M2a2 M2a2 M2b2 M2b2 M1 M2a M2b
Intercept 0.32*** 0.29*** 0.31*** 0.28*** 0.32* 0.45*** 0.30{ 0.11 0.19 0.16 0.37*** 0.24** 0.24***
(0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.16) (0.06) (0.17) (0.11) (0.14) (0.12) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Individual-level predictors
Gender (male) 0.03* 0.03* 0.00 0.04** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age 0.00{ 0.00{ 0.00{ 0.00* 0.00{ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Community (ref.: rural)
Small town – – 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Large town – – 0.03 0.01 0.03{ 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Education 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Occupation (ref.: other)
Student 0.00 0.00 0.07** 0.04 0.07* 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Manager 0.04 0.04 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 0.06* 0.06* 0.06*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Nat. economic 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16***
expect.: worse (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
6.3 The Determinants of Citizens’ Identification with Europe 2000–2012

Pers. economic 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.07** 0.07** 0.07**
expect.: worse (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Political 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12***
interest (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
European – – 0.23*** – – – – – – – –
political (0.01)
interest
177

(continued)
Table 6.2 (continued)
178

Multilevel analysis of individual identification with Europe (attachment to Europe)

2000 2003 2004 2006
Year M1 M2 M1a M1b M2 M1 M2a2 M2a2 M2b2 M2b2 M1 M2a M2b
EU knowledge 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.04*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
EU Conception (ref.: other)
Common – – 0.07** 0.04 0.07* 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22***
political (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
project
Individual – – 0.06 0.06* 0.06 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12***
benefits (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
National 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.36*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.36***
identification (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Transnational 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15***
background (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Country-level predictors
Party messages
% national – – 0.00 0.02 – –
identity (0.02) (0.02)
% European – – 0.05** 0.04* – –
identity (0.03) (0.02)
Eurozone – 0.07 0.09 0.01 0.14 0.04 0.05 0.08
(0.14) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10)
Net paying EU 0.06 0.06 0.17 0.13 0.18{ 0.16 0.24* 0.23*
transfers (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10)
Trade 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00** 0.00{ 0.00{ 0.00**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
EU – – 0.01 0.00 0.01
immigration (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Total 0.01 0.00 0.02** 0.01 0.01
immigration (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .
Unemployment 0.00 0.06* 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06** 0.05**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Variance components
Country level 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.04
τ00 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Individual 0.62 0.62 0.59 0.56 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.62 0.62 0.62
level σ 2 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Deviance 36,377.34 36,374.04 35,639.62 34,851.68 35,633.32 54,224.92 54,220.82 54,213.86 54,214.36 54,212.1 28,338.57 28,326.6 28,323.16
AIC 36,403.33 36,408.04 35,637.63 34,885.36 35,677.33 54,260.92 54,268.82 54,261.86 54,262.36 54,260.1 28,374.57 28,372.6 28,369.15
BIC 36,502.66 36,537.93 35,803.58 35,015.28 35,845.5 54,406.27 54,462.62 54,455.66 54,456.16 54,443.9 28,507.54 28,542.5 28,539.05
R2 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.12 0.15 0.17
No. of groups 15 15 15 15 15 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
(N)
No. of individ- 15,377 15,377 15,434 15,398 15,434 23,740 23,740 23,740 23,740 23,740 11,932 11,932 11,932
uals (n)
Note: Figures are estimates from linear hierarchical regression models with random intercept (ML estimation). Standard errors in parentheses. ***p  0.001;
**p  0.01; *p  0.05; {p  0.1.
6.3 The Determinants of Citizens’ Identification with Europe 2000–2012
179
Table 6.3 Individual- and country-level determinants of individual identification with Europe 2007–2012
180

Multilevel analysis of individual identification with Europe (attachment to the European Union)
2007 2010 2012
Year M1 M2a M2b M1 M2a M2b M1a M1b M2a M2a
Intercept 0.29*** 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.41*** 0.23* 0.21* 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.25** 0.21**
(0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08)
Individual-level predictors
Gender (male) 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Community (ref.: rural)
Small town 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02{ 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Large town 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.02 0.02{ 0.02{ 0.02{
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Education 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Occupation (ref.: other)
Student 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Manager 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.06** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.03{ 0.03{ 0.03{ 0.03{
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
National economic expect.: 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16***
worse (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Personal economic expect.: 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.08*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11***
worse (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Political interest 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** – – – 0.02*** 0.02** 0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .
European political interest – – – – – – 0.09***
(0.01)
EU knowledge 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** – – – 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.10***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
EU Conception (ref.: other)
Common political project 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** – – – 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Individual benefits 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* – – – 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.09***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
National identification 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Conception of national 0.01 0.01 0.01
community (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Transnational practices – – – 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.10***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Transnational capital – – – 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Transnational background 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.07** 0.07** 0.07** – – – –
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Country-level predictors
Eurozone 0.05 0.07 0.15 0.18{ 0.08 0.07
(0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08)
Net paying EU transfers 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.28* 0.18
6.3 The Determinants of Citizens’ Identification with Europe 2000–2012

(0.09) (0.08) (0.13) (0.13) (0.20) (0.13)

Trade 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
EU immigration 0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Total immigration 0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
181

(continued)
Table 6.3 (continued)
182

Multilevel analysis of individual identification with Europe (attachment to the European Union)
2007 2010 2012
Year M1 M2a M2b M1 M2a M2b M1a M1b M2a M2a
Unemployment 0.05** 0.05** 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
IMF conditionality – – 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.00
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11)
Variance components
Country level τ00 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Individual level σ 2 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Deviance 61,296.52 61,285.04 61,286.14 59,048.62 59,027.2 59,026.66 60,005.68 59,997.5 60,000.6 60,002.66
AIC 61,332.51 61,331.04 61,332.13 59,080.62 59,071.21 59,070.67 60,043.68 59,812.04 60,050.59 60,052.66
BIC 61,478.95 61,518.15 61,519.24 59,210.41 59,249.68 59,249.13 60,198.6 59,966.93 60,254.43 60,256.5
R2 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13
No. of groups (N) 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
No. of individuals (n) 25,217 25,217 25,217 24,641 24,641 24,641 25,687 25,644 25,687 25,687
Note: Figures are estimates from linear hierarchical regression models with random intercept, standard errors in parentheses. ***p  0.001; **p  0.01;
*p  0.05; {p  0.1.
6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .
6.3 The Determinants of Citizens’ Identification with Europe 2000–2012 183

2012 are reported in Table 6.3. Building on the empty model reported in Table 6.1,
the models are constructed stepwise, adding, first, explanatory variables at the
individual level, and, second, explanatory variables at the country level. Finally,
cross-level interactions are added.20 Estimates for random coefficient models with
cross-level interactions for the years 2000 to 2012 are reported in the appendix.
To avoid collinearity among predictor variables, separate models have been
estimated for predictors that are highly correlated at either the individual or the
country level. At the individual level, ‘general political interest’ and ‘interest in
European politics’ have been included separately in models with individual-level
predictors in 2003 and 2012 (the only years for which indicators for both constructs
are available). To increase comparability across models, all further analyses are
limited to ‘general political interest’ as this is the more widely available indicator.
Likewise, given the overlap in the measurement of ‘total share of immigrants’ and
‘share of EU immigrants’, these measures have been entered in separate models.
Again, to increase comparability across models, all further analyses include only
the total share of immigrants (shares of EU immigrants are only available from
2004). Finally, to avoid collinearity between measures of party messages on
national and European identity issues, respectively, these have been entered sepa-
rately in the models for 2004.21
The following discussion of the empirical results seeks to draw general conclu-
sions with regard to the determinants of individual identification with Europe
among EU citizens over the past decade. The presentation proceeds in a stepwise
way, examining, first, evidence for individual-level influences on European identi-
fication, moving on to country-level influences, and, finally, interaction effects
between individual- and country-level predictors on respondents’ identification
with Europe.

20
The model notation in the results tables follows the notation developed previously. That is,
column M1 reports results for random intercept models with individual-level covariates; column
M2 reports results for random intercept models with individual- and country-level covariates, and
column M3 reports results for random coefficient models with cross-level interactions. Additional
subscripts a, b etc. indicate alternative model specifications to avoid collinearity between pre-
dictors. For example, in 2003, column M1a reports results for the random intercept model including
political interest as an individual-level predictor while column M1b reports results for the random
intercept model including European political interest as an individual-level predictor.
21
Issues of multicollinearity in multilevel modelling and the impact of multicollinearity on
parameter estimates and standard errors in multilevel regression analyses are rarely discussed in
the literature (for exceptions, see Kreft and de Leeuw 1998; Kubitschek and Hallinan 1999; Shieh
and Fouladi 2003). Kubitschek and Hallinan (1999) find the standard errors of parameter estimates
to increase with multicollinearity between level 1 predictors; Shieh and Fouladi (2003) examine
the effects of varying degrees of correlations between level-1 predictors, finding moderate bias in
the standard errors of the parameter estimates as well as the variance-covariance components at
level 2 for correlations >0.7. Kreft and de Leeuw (1998) illustrate that multicollinearity compli-
cates the interpretation of multilevel model coefficients, in particular the interpretation of cross-
level interactions. To minimise the risk of multicollinearity, I examined correlations among level-
1 and level-2 predictors for all years under analysis. Correlations among predictors do not exceed
0.5; in the great majority of cases, correlations are smaller than 0.2.
184 6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .

6.3.2.1 Individual-Level Determinants of Citizens’ Identification

with Europe 2000–2012

The theoretical discussion derived three sets of explanatory variables at the indi-
vidual level: political awareness, attitudes towards the European and the national
community, and personal transnational experiences. The statistical analysis pro-
vides support for all three sets of hypotheses.
Starting with indicators of political awareness, both general political interest and
interest in European politics as well as respondents’ knowledge of the EU and
European politics positively affect European identification in all years under anal-
ysis. We find empirical support for hypotheses predicting a positive association
between respondents’ political awareness and their propensity to identify with
Europe (H1a, H2a, and H3a); the alternative hypotheses H1b, H2b and H3b can be
rejected.
Attitudes towards the European and the national community also have positive
effects on European identification. From 2004 onwards, respondents who conceive
of the European community as a common political project are consistently more
likely to identify with Europe. Surprisingly, respondents who conceive of the
European community primarily as a means for individual benefits, too, tend to
identify more with Europe than respondents who hold other conceptions of Europe,
although the effect is considerably smaller than the effect of perceiving Europe as a
common political project. While we thus find evidence in support of hypothesis H4a
expecting positive effects of a conception of Europe as a common political project,
we can reject hypothesis H4b predicting a negative effect of conceiving of Europe as
a means for individual benefits.
Furthermore, national identification has consistent and substantially important
positive effects on European identification in all years under analysis. Respondents
who identify more strongly with their national community also feel more attached
to Europe. There is strong support for hypothesis H5a, which predicted a positive
association between identifications at different levels of community. The alterna-
tive hypothesis H5b is rejected. Citizens’ conception of the national community,
finally, has no significant effect on citizens’ propensity to identify with Europe,
disconfirming hypotheses H6a and H6b.
Personal transnational experiences, finally, also have the theoretically expected
positive effect on identification with Europe. Transnational practices, a transna-
tional family background, and higher levels of transnational capital all increase
respondents’ likelihood to identify with Europe. All three hypotheses referring to
individual transnational experiences (H7, H8, and H9) are supported by the empir-
ical evidence.
Among the individual-level controls, only respondents’ economic outlooks—
and, to a lesser degree, their level of education—consistently affect respondents’
identification with Europe in statistically and substantially significant ways. While
pessimistic economic outlooks, both with regard to the national economy and the
6.3 The Determinants of Citizens’ Identification with Europe 2000–2012 185

personal financial situation, depress respondents’ propensity to identify with

Europe, education has the expected positive impact on European identification.
To summarise, at the individual level, identification with Europe draws on
cognitive and affective sources as well as on direct experiences of European
integration in the form of personal contacts with other Europeans. These results
support the concepts of information- and experience-based mechanisms of
European identification as proposed in the theoretical section of the analysis.
To the extent that respondents’ cognitive involvement with European politics
strengthens their affective ties to Europe, an information-based way of European
identification is substantiated. Respondents with greater interest in politics and
especially those with a greater interest in European affairs and greater knowledge
of EU politics feel more attached to Europe and the European Union than their less
interested peers. In this way, more and better information about Europe and the EU
appear to have the hypothesised beneficial effects for European identification.
Concerning experienced-based ways of European identification, on the other
hand, both indirect and direct forms of experience with European integration and
other Europeans seem to strengthen respondents’ attachment to Europe and the
European Union.
In fact, if we consider attitudes towards the European and national community
the outcome of socialisation processes, we can think of these attitudes as experience
with European integration at one remove; the empirical evidence shows that such
attitudes indeed positively affect identification with the European level: Respon-
dents’ conception of Europe as a common political project has the expected positive
effect on European identification. Even more important are affective ties to the
national community: the more respondents feel attached to their country, the more
they identify with the European level.
In this manner, European identification appears to be a matter of socialisation
within the national community—not only in terms of conveying a certain image of
Europe as a democratic political community, but even more so in providing citizens
with the experience of belonging to a large-scale political community. National
communities constitute ‘imagined communities’ in the sense of Anderson (Ander-
son 1991): citizens develop feelings of belonging together as a community and
believe in the solidarity and cooperation of the other members of the community
even if they personally interact only with a small fraction of their fellow nationals.
In this way, the experience with the national political community prepares citizens
for cooperation within the community of Europeans, which is a larger version of an
‘imagined community’. Presumably, citizens who have positive experiences with
belonging together and cooperating with strangers within the national community
generalise from this experience and extend it to the European level, resulting in the
positive association between national and European attachments.
The idea that respondents extrapolate from experiences in their immediate
environment to the wider community of Europeans also finds support when we
look at direct experiences with other Europeans. Respondents with a European
family background identify significantly more with Europe than their peers. Other
forms of transnational practices, including the skills enabling respondents to
186 6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .

interact with other Europeans, have positive effects on European identification, too.
Transactionalist theories of European identity formation dating back to Deutsch and
the very beginnings of the European community (Deutsch 1953a, b; Deutsch et al.
1957) thus are still relevant for the development of European identification today.
The more people are personally involved with other Europeans—be it through
family and friends at home or through working and/or studying abroad—, the
more likely they are to develop attachments to the European level.
We also observe that the effects of the individual predictors change little whether
the dependent variable is measured by respondents’ ‘attachment to Europe’ (2000
to 2006) or their ‘attachment to the European Union’ (2007 to 2012). Political
awareness, national identification, and a European family background are among
the most important predictors of European identification, independent of the
operationalisation of the dependent variable.
It is interesting to note, however, that national identification has a stronger effect
on respondents’ attachment to Europe than on attachment to the European Union.
This suggests that the European Union can rely only to a limited extent on affective
sources and people’s general propensity to identify with large-scale communities.
Respondents appear more ready to generalise from positive feelings towards their
own country to ‘Europe’ than to the EU. Presumably, these differences are due to
the different prompts given by the two items. While the term ‘Europe’ leaves open
whether it refers to Europe as a geographical or cultural region or the EU institu-
tional system, the stimulus ‘EU’ is unambiguous; respondents are asked to indicate
their attachment to the political system of the EU. Duchesne and Frognier
(Duchesne and Frognier 2008) suggest that such differences in the question word-
ing trigger different processes of dual identification with Europe and the nation. For
them, identification with large-scale collectives relies on two processes: people’s
natural tendency to identify with abstract groups and their propensity to identify
with the specific group in question that is defined, for example, by a specific
territory or a political community. Duchesne and Forgnier hypothesise that national
and European identification are cumulative and positively related if questions
primarily tap into respondents’ general disposition to identify with collectives. In
contrast, national and European identification should be in competition and nega-
tively related if questions tap into respondents’ disposition to identify with distinct
territorial or political communities presented and perceived as rivals. This second,
competitive relationship may be manifest in the weaker (albeit still positive)
association between national identification and ‘attachment to the European
Union’. In fact, the stimulus ‘European Union’ refers to a distinct political regime
that is rival to and competes with the nation state for sovereignty. On the other hand,
the stimulus ‘Europe’ remains undefined. In this way, it may appeal primarily to
respondents’ general tendency to identify with large-scale groups rather than
compel them to arbitrate between the national and the European level. The result
is the stronger positive association between national identification and ‘attachment
to Europe’.
6.3 The Determinants of Citizens’ Identification with Europe 2000–2012 187

6.3.2.2 Country-Level Determinants of Citizens’ Identification

with Europe 2000–2012

Having explored the individual sources of European identification, we now turn to

the influence of the member state level on respondents’ propensity to identify with
Europe. The theoretical discussion expected three sets of member state character-
istics to influence European identification among EU citizens: party messages
related to the European and national community; macroeconomic indicators; and
the ethnocultural composition of member state societies. The empirical findings
support these expectations only to a limited extent.
The degree of party emphasis on issues of European and national identity has
only small positive effects on respondents’ identification with Europe. Party data
from EP election manifestos is available only for 2004. In this year, only the
regression coefficient for party emphasis on European identity and community
reaches statistical significance at conventional levels. This finding supports hypoth-
esis H10, which expected a positive association between party emphasis on
European identity and European identification at the individual level, but the effect
is small in substantial terms.
It is interesting to note in this regard that the coefficient for party emphasis on
national identity issues, too, has a positive sign. Although we should be careful not
to overstate the effect given the small effect size and the lack of statistical
significance at conventional levels, this finding suggests that, unlike theoretically
expected (cf. H11), party emphasis on national identity issues encourages rather
than impedes European identification. Apparently, similar mechanisms are at work
at the individual and the member state level: just as respondents who identify more
with their country tend to identify more with Europe, respondents living in coun-
tries where parties put more emphasis on issues of national community and identity
are more likely to identify with Europe. One explanation for this counterintuitive
finding might be that in contexts where questions of community and identity are
generally more salient, citizens are more conscious of their own collective identi-
fications and affiliations with political communities at different levels. As a result,
they may also be more aware of their European belongings. Parties may also embed
issues of national identity within a generally supportive discourse of EU integra-
tion, thus establishing a positive link between national identity and Europe that may
be reflected in the positive sign for party emphasis on national identity.
Turning now to member states’ economic position and degree of integration in
European and global markets as the second set of country-level characteristics
expected to influence European identification at the individual level, we find little
empirical support for the theoretically proposed associations.
The coefficient for Eurozone membership has the expected positive sign in most
years, but is statistically significant (at the 10%-level) only in 2010. Hypothesis H12
expecting respondents from Eurozone countries to identify more with Europe than
respondents from outside the Eurozone thus finds limited support.
188 6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .

The findings for member states’ status as net contributors or net recipients of EU
funding are more ambiguous: In the years 2000 to 2006, respondents from net
paying countries to the EU budget identified more with Europe than respondents
from net recipient countries; in the years 2007 to 2012, respondents from net paying
countries identified less with Europe than respondents from net recipient countries.
The strongest positive effect of net contributions to the EU budget on European
identification occurs in 2006; the strongest negative effect of member states’ status
as a net contributor to the EU budget in 2012. Overall, there is only partial support
for hypothesis H13, which proposed a negative association between net contribu-
tions to the EU budget and European identifications.
We should be careful not to overstate these findings considering that only the
coefficients for 2006 and 2012 reach conventional levels of statistical significance.
Nonetheless, the change in the direction of the effect of net contributions to the EU
budget after 2006 warrants further discussion. A number of explanations seem
plausible.
First, we note that the change in the direction of the effect coincides with the
change in the operationalisation of the dependent variable from ‘attachment to
Europe’ to ‘attachment to the European Union’. Perhaps economic considerations
are less important for respondents when prompted to think about their attachment to
‘Europe’ than when asked to indicate their attachment to the ‘European Union’.
People may tend to understand ‘Europe’ as a geographical or cultural sphere, to
which one belongs for other reasons (location, cultural affinity in terms of language
and religion etc.) than economic benefits. In contrast, the cue ‘European Union’
may evoke connotations of the Common Market and supranational government,
which are more likely to be evaluated based on performance and economic costs/
benefit calculations. In this case, a negative balance of national contributions to the
EU budget should depress respondents’ identification with Europe as the findings
for the years 2007 to 2012 seem to indicate. What is more, in the years 2000 to
2006, the group of net paying member states largely corresponds to the EU
founding member states such as Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, and the
Netherlands, where levels of support for European integration are traditionally
high. Hence, the positive effect of net contributions to the EU budget on
European identification between 2000 and 2006 may in fact reflect the overall
positive outlook on Europe in the net paying countries at the time.
Alternatively, we might interpret the change in the direction of the effect as a
long-term consequence of EU enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe. While
the new CEE member states lagged behind in economic development and produc-
tivity, they also offered cheap labour and opportunities for the relocation of
production lines from high-wage member states in Western Europe. The accession
of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 intensified the debate over labour migration from
CEE to the ‘old’ EU15 member states. These implications of enlargement may have
taken some time to sink in among the public of the EU15. In this regard, the change
in the direction of the effect of the budget variable may reflect a higher awareness of
the negative consequences of enlargement in the old member states, which, in the
6.3 The Determinants of Citizens’ Identification with Europe 2000–2012 189

majority, were also net contributors to the EU budget (all new CEE member states
except Cyprus have been net receivers of EU funding since EU accession).
Finally, the change in the direction of the effect of net payments to the EU
budget, and, in particular, the increase in the effect size for 2012, may be attributed
to the onset of the financial and economic crisis in late 2008 and the continuing
controversy among member states over the ‘right’ financial and economic policy
responses. By May 2012, the EU had seen over two years of intense discussions
over financial assistance to member states in crisis (the Eurozone members first
agreed on providing bilateral loans to Greece in April 2010) and the need for
structural reforms in economically lagging countries. Questions of financial soli-
darity, redistribution, debt cuts, potential defaults etc. were highly salient in both
debtor and creditor countries at the time (cf. the findings by Kontochristou and
Mascha 2014; Mazzoni and Barbieri 2014). The length and intensity of the debate
over adequate measures to overcome the crisis likely made citizens aware of the
stakes of economic integration and greater interdependencies. This effect may have
been compounded by the overlap between the group of member states making net
payments to the EU budget and those member states providing the highest credit
lines to countries in financial and economic difficulties. Against this background,
the negative sign and increased size of the coefficient of the budget variable in 2012
may reflect the heightened awareness of the costs of economic integration among
citizens in the contributor countries.
Greater trade openness does not appear to influence European identification in
any meaningful way given the minuscule effect size and lack of statistical signif-
icance. Accordingly, hypothesis H14, which assumed a positive effect of global
economic integration on European identification, is rejected.
Similarly, the findings with regard to member states’ ethnocultural composition
provide only limited support for the theoretical expectations. In most of the years
under analysis, neither the share of EU immigrants nor the overall share of
immigrants in a country affect European identification in substantially and/or
statistically significant ways. Furthermore, the effects are not consistent over
time. While the coefficients for both total immigration shares and share of EU
migrants in a country have negative signs from 2003 to 2006, the direction of the
effects changes in the years 2007 to 2012. All in all, the findings with regard to
member state societies’ ethnocultural composition at best provide scant support for
hypothesis H16b predicting a negative association between total immigration shares
and European identification (coefficients for total immigration are negative and
statistically significant at the 5% level in 2004); none of the other hypotheses (H15,
H16a) is supported by the empirical evidence.
As regards country-level controls, unemployment does not significantly affect
European identification, either, with the partial exception of 2003 and 2006/2007.
In these years, we observe small positive effects for unemployment, meaning that
respondents from member states with higher levels of unemployment were slightly
more likely to identify with Europe.
Taken together, member states’ political, economic, and social characteristics
influence individual identification with Europe only to a limited degree. While the
190 6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .

empirical evidence for the individual-level determinants supported both informa-

tion- and experience-based ways of identification with Europe, the findings for the
country-level determinants are less convincing. Neither party-messages related to
the European and national community as a source for Europe-related information
nor member states’ economic position and degree of integration in the EU and
global markets and their ethnocultural composition as sources of Europe-related
experiences have a significant influence on respondents’ identification with Europe.
Several reasons may explain the limited influence of country-level characteris-
tics on respondents’ identification with Europe. As regards the (non)-effect of party
messages, party-level data was only available for the year 2004. Analyses of media
coverage show that the 2004 EP election campaign had only moderate visibility in
the news, trailing behind domestic and social policies as well as sports and
economic issues (de Vreese et al. 2006). More generally, news coverage of the
EU is often dominated by economic topics (Peter et al. 2003; Schuck et al. 2011)
and in 2004, the EU’s enlargement to CEE played a prominent role in EU coverage.
Against this background, we may assume that parties’ messages with regard to the
European and national community did not reach citizens, because they fell behind
other topics in EU news coverage and/or citizens concentrated on more salient
topics of EU integration.
With regard to member states’ economic position and degree of integration in
the EU and global markets, it is possible that citizens perceive the euro mainly as an
everyday item rather than a symbol of European integration and, therefore, do not
relate their experience with the common currency to their membership in the
European community. Likewise, trade shares and member state contributions to
the EU budget may have too little salience in citizens’ everyday lives to matter for
attitudes towards EU integration. In this regard, it is interesting to note that member
states’ net contributions to the EU budget have significant effects on European
identification in 2006 and 2012. In these years, questions of financial redistributions
and economic differences between EU member states became more salient in the
context of EU enlargement and the financial and economic crisis. Public debates in
the member states often centred on the national perspective (see the findings by
e.g. Dursun-Ozkanca 2011; Gottschalck 2011/2012; Inthorn 2006; Katsourides
2014; Light and Young 2009; Mazzoni and Barbieri 2014; van Noije 2010). It
appears that the domestic consequences of European integration do not matter per
se, but need to be made salient for citizens to consider them when forming attitudes
towards the European community.
This finding also has consequences for how we conceive of the mechanism
underlying the relationship between macroeconomic indicators and citizens’ iden-
tification with Europe. Initially, macroeconomic conditions and member states’
economic position within the EU were considered indicators for how citizens
experience EU integration in their everyday lives. Yet the finding that member
states’ contributions to the EU budget significantly affect European identification
only at times of high salience of economic issues in the domestic debates indicates
that the underlying mechanism may be information- rather than experience-based.
That is, citizens’ propensity to identify with Europe appears to depend less on living
6.3 The Determinants of Citizens’ Identification with Europe 2000–2012 191

in a net contributor or net recipient member state, but on the amount of informa-
tion—and probably the degree of controversy—about member states’ economic
contribution to the EU that citizens encounter in the domestic context.
Finally, the limited effects of (EU) immigration rates on respondents’ identifi-
cation with Europe appear to indicate that aggregate shares of foreigners living in a
country are only a poor proxy for actual personal interactions between national and
foreign citizens. Furthermore, national immigration shares may be too crude a
measure for citizens’ opportunities to interact with non-nationals in their daily
lives as migrant populations typically vary at the regional and local level. That is,
opportunities to meet foreigners may be limited to citizens living in certain areas
and we would need local rather than national immigration shares to test the effects
of immigration levels on European attitudes in a more satisfactory way.

6.3.2.3 Interaction Effects Between Individual- and Country-Level

Determinants of Citizens’ Identification with Europe 2000–2012

Although few of the country-level determinants proved to have direct effects on

European identification, we may still suspect that member state characteristics
influence identification with Europe mediated through respondents’ individual
attributes and predispositions. For example, while party messages may not have a
significant impact on European identification in general, they may still prove
influential among the most politically interested respondents.
The theoretical discussion suggested two sets of such interaction effects:
between individual political interest and member state characteristics on the one
hand and between national identification and member state characteristics on the
other. The remainder of this section presents the empirical findings on interaction
effects between country-level predictors and political interest and national identi-
fication, respectively. Parameter estimates, standard errors, and variance compo-
nents for the models with random coefficients and cross-level interactions can be
found in Tables 6.6, 6.7, 6.8, 6.9, 6.10, 6.11, 6.12 in the appendix.
Starting with the empirical findings for political interest, we find no evidence
that respondents at different levels of political interest differ with regard to the
effects of country characteristics on European identification. The analyses for 2004
show no effect of political interest on the relationship between party messages and
European identifications (cf. Table 6.8). That is, neither hypothesis H17 nor hypoth-
eses H17a and H17b find empirical support.
Likewise, neither the relationship between member states’ net contributions to
the EU budget and individual European identification nor the relationship between
member states’ trade openness and individual European identification depend on
respondents’ level of political interest. The coefficients for the interaction terms are
substantially small and statistically insignificant in all years under analysis
(cf. Tables 6.6, 6.7, 6.8, 6.9, 6.10, 6.11, 6.12 in the appendix). We therefore reject
both hypotheses H18 and H19.
192 6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .

Respondents at different levels of national identification, too, appear to differ

only to limited extent with regard to the effects of country characteristics on
European identification. Starting with the interaction between national identifica-
tion and party emphasis on identity issues in 2004, we find no substantially or
statistically significant effects for the interaction term (cf. Table 6.8 in the appen-
dix). The effect of party messages does not increase among respondents with
stronger attachments to the national level; accordingly, hypotheses H20 and H20a
are rejected.
Turning to the other cross-level interactions involving national identification, we
find a substantially and statistically significant interaction effect of national iden-
tification and member states’ net contributions to the EU budget only in 2004
(cf. Table 6.8 in the appendix). The coefficient for the interaction term has the
expected negative sign. However, the effects of the constitutive terms national
identification and net contributions to the EU budget remain positive and substan-
tially significant. The differences in the size of the coefficients of the interaction and
constitutive terms and the opposite signs of theses coefficients imply that the
positive effect of national identification on European identification is smaller in
net contributing countries, but remains positive nonetheless. That is, even in net
contributing countries to the EU budget, respondents who identify more with the
national level also identify more with Europe.
A look at the marginal effects of national identification in net contributing and
net recipient countries helps clarify the relationship between national and European
identification in the two country groups. The marginal effects of national identifi-
cation can be thought of as the slope of national identification conditional on
whether respondents live in a member state that is a net contributor to the EU
budget or a member state that is a net recipient of EU funding.
Figure 6.1 visualises the slopes of national identifications for the two groups of
countries, graphing predicted European identification over the range of national
identification in net recipient and net contributing member states. Straight lines
show predictive margins of national identification in net recipient and net contrib-
uting member states to the EU budget. Vertical lines give 95% confidence intervals.
Predictive margins are based on Model M3b reported in Table 6.8 in the appendix.
The slopes of national identification are positive in both net recipient and net
contributing countries. That is, in both country groups, respondents who identify
more with their country also identify more with Europe. Nonetheless, the slope for
national identification is steeper in net recipient countries of EU funding than in net
contributing countries to the EU budget. That is, an increase in national identifica-
tion leads to a greater increase in European identification among respondents in net
recipient countries than among those in net contributor countries to the EU budget.
The confidence intervals around the two slopes indicate that the differences in
European identification between respondents in net recipient and net contributing
member are statistically significant at all but the highest level of national identifi-
cation, at which confidence intervals overlap.
Taken together, these results provide partial support for hypothesis H21, which
expected a stronger negative relationship between net EU budget contributions and
European identification among individuals who identify more with the nation. In
6.3 The Determinants of Citizens’ Identification with Europe 2000–2012 193

2.5
Predicted Identification with Europe
2
1.5
1

Net recipient country of EU budget

Net contributor country of EU budget
.5

ry
ll

y
ta

er

irl

ve
tv

fa
ta

no
no

Attachment to [COUNTRY]

Fig. 6.1 Predicted European identification in net contributing and net recipient countries of EU
funding over range of national identification 2004

fact, the effect of living in a net contributing member state on identification with
Europe is positive rather than negative and remains positive even for those respon-
dents who identify most with their own country. However, the effect of net EU
budget contributions on European identification is weaker among respondents with
stronger national attachments (cf. Fig. 6.1). In this sense, we can think of strong
national attachment as dampening the positive effect of living in a net contributor
country to the EU budget, even if they do not reverse the effect.
We should further note that the direction of the effect of the interaction between
national identification and net payments to the EU budget changes over the years.
While the coefficient for the interaction term has a positive sign until 2003
(cf. Tables 6.6 and 6.7 in the appendix), the sign changes in 2004 and remains
negative until 2007 (cf. Tables 6.8, 6.9, 6.10 in the appendix); in 2010 and 2012, it
is again positive (cf. Tables 6.11, and 6.12 in the appendix). The timing of these
changes suggests a relation to the EU’s enlargement to CEE and the onset of the
financial and economic crisis, which had significant consequences for the distribu-
tion of funds within the EU and raised questions of financial redistribution between
EU member states. Section 6.3.3 below will further explore this line of interpreta-
tion and discuss the changing effects of the interaction between national identifi-
cation and net payments to the EU budget in light of the EU’s enlargement to CEE
and the onset of the economic and financial crisis.
The final hypothesis involving interaction effects between national identification
and country-level predictors suggested that member states’ overall shares of immi-
grants have a stronger negative effect on European identification among respon-
dents who identify more with the national level (cf. H22). This hypothesis is rejected
194 6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .

given that we observe no substantially or statistically significant interaction effects

between national identification and total immigration rates in any of the years under
analysis (cf. Tables 6.6, 6.7, 6.8, 6.9, 6.10, 6.11, 6.12 in the appendix).
To sum up the findings with regard to the cross-level interactions, we find only
limited empirical evidence that the effects of member state characteristics on
identification with Europe depend on respondents’ degree of political interest or
their attachment to the home country. Several reasons may explain this (non-)result.
The lack of evidence of mediating effects of political interest allows two
interpretations. On the one hand, the lack of differences in the effect of member
state characteristics between respondents at different levels of political interest may
indicate that even the most interested are fairly ignorant of party communications or
their home country’s economic position within the EU and/or do not draw on this
information when forming attachments to the European level. From a more opti-
mistic point of view, we may interpret the lack of differences between respondents
at different levels of political interest as a sign that the highly interested do not
necessarily have an advantage over their less interested peers when it comes to
party messages or the basic facts of the national economy.
The findings for mediating effects of national identification provide some evi-
dence that citizens draw on group sentiments when evaluating the domestic conse-
quences of European integration. As expected, national attachments are particularly
important if EU integration has direct financial implications for the national com-
munity, as in the case of member states’ net contributions to the EU budget. We
further observe a time-dependency in the mediating effects of national attachments.
National attachments became important for the effect of member state characteris-
tics on European identification at a time when (economic) differences and questions
of redistribution between member states became more salient because of the
accession of Eastern European countries to the EU.
These findings resonate with previous work that consider economic- and
identity-approaches not as competing explanations of EU attitudes, but point to
interdependencies between the two (Garry and Tilley 2009). In this view, the effects
of national identity on European attitudes are conditional on the national economic
context, with national attachments becoming more important for European attitudes
as economic competition intensifies. The following section will further pursue this
line of analysis. It investigates changes in the determinants of individual identifi-
cation in response to EU enlargement to CEE and the onset of the financial and
economic crisis, i.e. two events that exposed economic differences within the EU
and led to financial redistributions between EU member states.

6.3.3 EU Enlargement and the Financial and Economic

Crisis and Citizens’ Identification with Europe

Having explored European identification in general, we now turn to the implica-

tions of EU enlargement and the financial and economic crisis for the development
6.3 The Determinants of Citizens’ Identification with Europe 2000–2012 195

of individual identification with Europe. Do the determinants of citizens’ identifi-

cation with Europe change in response to these key moments in the integration
process? Which factors become more or less important for European identification
against the background of enlargement and the crisis? Starting with enlargement,
the following section discusses shifts in the determinants of European identification
that can be traced back to the EU’s enlargement to CEE in 2004/2007 and the onset
of the financial and economic crisis in late 2008. As before, the discussion will
centre first on individual-level determinants of European identification, and, sub-
sequently, turn to country-level determinants and cross-level interactions.

6.3.3.1 The Impact of EU Enlargement on Citizens’ Identification

with Europe

Chapter 3 outlined the consequences of the 2004/2007 enlargement rounds for the
EU and its member states. Most importantly, the EU’s eastward enlargement
increased economic disparities among EU member states as GDP per capita and
income levels were substantially lower in the new member states. Enlargement
further led to institutional and policy reforms at the EU level and increased the
salience of EU integration issues in national media and public debates, at least for
the immediate accession period in spring 2004. In light of the increased attention to
EU affairs and the redistributive consequences of enlargement, the theoretical
discussion expected changes in the importance of both political interest and
national identification for citizens’ propensity to identify with Europe
(cf. hypotheses H23 and H24).
The overview of the regression coefficients for the years 2000 to 2006 listed in
Table 6.2 does not reveal dramatic shifts in the individual-level determinants of
European identification over the 2000 to 2006 period. We observe moderate
increases in the effect sizes of political interest and objective knowledge of EU
politics between 2004 and 2006; likewise, there is a small increase in the coefficient
for national identification in 2004. Finally, while respondents’ conception of
Europe as a common political project was negatively related to European identifi-
cation in 2003, it has a positive effect from 2004 onwards. The change in the
direction and size of the effect in 2004 appears to indicate that citizens embraced
representations of the EU as a guarantor of freedom and democracy in Europe
prominent in the context of the accession of the new democracies in Eastern Europe
(Nugent 2004).
The increase in the (positive) effect of political interest and EU knowledge on
European identification supports claims whereby the greater salience of the EU due
to enlargement has contributed to a widening ‘knowledge gap’ between politically
interested and less interested citizens. The politically interested appear to benefit
disproportionally from the heightened media attention to the EU in the context of
enlargement. Better information and knowledge of EU affairs, in turn, positively
affect people’s likelihood to identify with Europe. In this regard, the empirical
findings support hypothesis H23, which expected an increase in the importance of
196 6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .

political interest as a predictor of European identification in relation to the acces-

sion of new member states from Central and Eastern Europe.
As regards the effects of national attachments on European identification, we
find only partial evidence of an increasing importance of national identities in the
context of enlargement. While national attachments have stronger effects in 2004
compared to 2003 and 2006, these effects do not reach the pre-enlargement level of
2000, and the 2004 increase in the regression coefficient is small in substantial
terms.22 Hence hypothesis H24, which predicted an increase in the effect of national
identification in response to enlargement, is only partly supported by the empirical
analysis. What is more, national identification has a positive effect on European
attachments throughout the accession period. At first sight, eastward enlargement
thus does not appear to have stirred widespread concerns for the national commu-
nity, which would translate into a generally negative association between national
and European identifications.
Among the country-level predictors, we observe notable changes in effect size
during and after the enlargement period only for the coefficient of net contributions
to the EU budget. Between 2000 and 2006, living in a net contributing member state
is positively related to respondents’ identification with Europe; from 2007 onwards,
the effect is reversed. While we need to be careful not to overstate these findings
given that only the coefficient for 2004 reaches conventional levels of statistical
significance, these findings still warrant some discussion.
In a first instance, redistributive concerns do not appear to have become more
important for European attachments, even as poorer CEE countries joined the
Union. This is evident in the positive effects of net EU budget contributions on
European identification throughout the immediate pre- and post-enlargement period
(2003–2006). Living in a net paying member state to the EU budget only starts to
have negative effects on European identification in 2007, as indicated by the change
in the sign of the coefficient in this year.
As has been pointed out before, the change in the sign of the coefficient in 2007
could be due to changes in the operationalisation of the dependent variable from
‘attachment to Europe’ to ‘attachment to the European Union’ in 2007. Alterna-
tively, we may see here a long-term effect of the 2004 enlargement round and the
impact of the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. The redistributive
consequences of enlargement as well as the consequences for national labour
markets (increased competition at home, as Eastern Europeans entered labour
markets in the EU15; threats of relocations from the EU15 to low-wage countries
in Eastern Europe) may have taken some time for citizens in the EU15 to absorb.
The debate over (labour) immigration and wage-dumping by opening the EU15
labour markets to Eastern Europeans was also revived in the context of the

22
Note that only the results for the years 2000 and 2003 on the one hand and for 2004 and 2006 on
the other are directly comparable as the analyses for 2000/2003 and 2004/2006 rely on different
country samples (EU15 for 2000/2003 and EU25 for 2004/2006). Separate analyses for the EU15
and the new CEE member states for 2004/2006 show largely similar effects as the analyses for the
pooled sample of the EU25.
6.3 The Determinants of Citizens’ Identification with Europe 2000–2012 197

accession of Bulgaria and Romania in early 2007. Hence, the change in the
direction of the budget variable after 2007 may be a sign of heightened awareness
to redistributive issues in the old member states, which for the most part were also
net contributors to the EU budget in this period.
If the change in the direction of the effect of the EU budget variable indeed
reflects concerns with regard to enlargement among respondents in the net paying
member states, we may expect that these concerns are even more prevalent among
respondents with strong attachments to the national level. We can explore this
hypothesis by examining the interaction between national identification and net EU
budget contributions and its effect on respondents’ identification with Europe.
The cross-level interaction between national identification and member states’
net budgetary contributions is statistically significant only in 2004 (cf. Table 6.8 in
the appendix). Nonetheless, a look at the behaviour of the interaction term and its
constituent terms over the years may prove informative and allows some specula-
tion regarding changes in the relationship between national identification, EU
transfers, and European identification in response to the EU’s enlargement to
Central and Eastern Europe. We observe that in the years prior to enlargement,
i.e. 2000 and 2003, the coefficient for EU transfers has a negative sign
(cf. Tables 6.6 and 6.7 in the appendix), while the coefficients for both national
identification and the interaction term have positive signs. After enlargement,
i.e. from 2004 to 2007, the sign of the coefficients change: while the coefficients
for both constituent terms now have a positive sign, the interaction term takes a
negative sign (cf. Tables 6.8 and 6.9 in the appendix). How can we interpret these
changes in substantive terms?
We already discussed the interaction effect between national identification and
EU budgetary contributions on respondents’ identification with Europe for the year
2004 (cf. Sect. 6.3.2.3). We found that national identification increased European
identification in both net recipients and net paying member states to the EU budget,
but the positive effect of national identification on European identification smaller
in net paying member states (cf. Fig. 6.1). In the years 2006 and 2007, the signs for
the regression coefficients are the same as in 2004 (positive signs for the constitu-
tive terms of the interaction, negative sign for the interaction term). Hence, similar
dynamics seem to be at work in 2004, 2006, and 2007. In the post-enlargement
period, national identification has a positive effect on European identification in
both net recipient and net contributing member states, but the effect is smaller in net
contributing member states than in the net recipient member states.
Prior to enlargement, in contrast, the relationship between national identification
and European identification in net recipient and net contributing member states to
the EU budget seems to have been the reverse. In 2000 and 2003, national
identification also has a positive effect on European identification in both net
recipient and net contributing member states, but in these years, the effect of
national identification on European identification is larger in net contributing
member states compared to the net recipient member states.
While we should be careful not to overstate these findings given the lack of
statistical significance of the regression coefficients in some years, they still seem to
198 6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .

point to changes in the effects of national identification conditional on respondents

living in net recipient or net paying member stats of EU transfers that can be traced
back to EU enlargement. How can we explain the weakening of national identifi-
cation as a source of European identification in the net paying member states to the
EU budget after enlargement?
The above finding seem to indicate that respondents drew different conclusions
from their country’s net payments to the EU budget with regard to European
identification before and after the accession of the new CEE member states.
Presumably, respondents’ perception of the costs and benefits of the European
project and their consequences for the national level changed with enlargement.
In effect, media reports on enlargement took a predominantly national perspec-
tive, focussing in particular on questions of migration and the effects of enlarge-
ment on national labour markets (Dursun-Ozkanca 2011; Inthorn 2006; Light and
Young 2009; van Noije 2010). Furthermore, the enlargement period coincides with
a general trend whereby cultural issues such as immigration, cultural diversity, and
the defence of national traditions and sovereignty, national identity, and a national
way of life have become more salient in political conflict (Bornschier 2010; Hutter
and Grande 2014; Kriesi et al. 2006; Stoll 2010). At the party level, we see the
emergence of populist right-wing parties that promote traditionalist-communitarian
values and the primacy of the national community and national sovereignty over
decision-making at EU level (Bornschier 2011).
We may speculate that respondents in the net paying countries to the EU budget
were more responsive to arguments about the cost of enlargement and potential
threats to the national community and weighed these more when forming opinions
towards Europe than their peers in net recipient countries of EU transfers. As a
result, we see the positive effect of national identification diminish in these coun-
tries compared to the net recipient countries. This interpretation also ties in with the
proposition by Duchesne and Frognier (Duchesne and Frognier 2008) whereby
national identification depresses rather than increases identification with Europe if
respondents perceive the national and European communities as rivals and arbitrate
between the two. Given the relative homogeneity of the old EU15 member states,
there was little reason for citizens to perceive the national and the European level as
rivals. This changed with the accession of the new CEE member states. For citizens
in the EU15 (which corresponds widely to the group of net paying member states
after 2004), EU integration and the new, enlarged European community may now
have posed threats to the national community in terms of labour competition,
immigration and cultural homogeneity etc. Therefore, respondents in the net paying
member states who strongly identify with their country may have started to identify
less with Europe after enlargement than in the pre-enlargement period. As a result,
after enlargement, the relationship between national and European identification
becomes weaker in the net contributing member states to the EU budget than in the
net recipient countries.
Taken together, the empirical findings with regard to the consequences of EU
enlargement for the sources of European identification allow for several
conclusions:
6.3 The Determinants of Citizens’ Identification with Europe 2000–2012 199

As regards the role of individual attributes and predispositions for European

identification, enlargement appears to have had only minor consequences. If any-
thing, enlargement appears to have contributed to the ‘knowledge gap’ between
politically interested and less interested citizens as political interest has become a
more important predictor of European identification in the aftermath of
enlargement.
More importantly, EU enlargement appears to have made redistributive consid-
erations more relevant for respondents’ identification with Europe. The (positive)
effect of member states’ status as a net payer to the EU budget increases over time;
it is strongest right after the accession of the ten new CEE member states in 2004
and changes in direction in 2007. In this regard, the present analysis supports claims
whereby economic competition and issues of financial redistribution between EU
member states have become more relevant for citizens’ attitudes towards Europe as
EU integration widens and deepens (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007; Garry and Tilley
2015). Unlike what might have been expected, however, net EU transfer payments
have a positive effect on European identification throughout the first round of
Eastward enlargement (2000–2006). A country’s net budget contributions only
start to have negative effects on respondents’ identification with Europe from
2007 on. This may be interpreted as a long-term effect the 2004 enlargement
and/or the effect of the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in January 2007,
which revived debates over negative consequences of enlargement on national
labour markets and immigration.
Finally, we find enlargement to modify the relationship between national and
European identification in net recipient and net contributing countries to the EU
budget. National and European identification are positively related in net recipient
and net paying member states both before and after enlargement. Yet prior to
enlargement, i.e. in 2000 and 2003, the positive influence of national identification
on European identification is larger in net contributing than in net recipient
member states while after enlargement, i.e. from 2004 onwards, it is larger in net
recipient than in net contributing member states. In this regard, arguments about the
cost of enlargement and the economic and cultural threats it poses to the national
community appear to have caught on more in the net paying member states.
These findings are in line with previous work that found the effect of macro-
economic factors on European attitudes to be conditioned by national identity
(Garry and Tilley 2009). The present work adds to this research by showing that
the relationship between national identity, macroeconomic factors, and attitudes
towards the EU are not static, but change over time as EU integration progresses
and the composition of EU membership and economic relations between EU
member states evolve.
Against this background, a closer investigation of the consequences of the
financial and economic crisis for the determinants of European identification is
all the more interesting, given that the crisis exposed economic differences between
EU member states and led to extensive debates over financial redistributions within
the EU. The following section will discuss changes in the determinants of European
identification in relation to the financial and economic crisis that started in late
200 6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .

2008, exploring in particular changes in the effects of macroeconomic factors on

individual identification with Europe.

6.3.3.2 The Impact of the Financial and Economic Crisis on Citizens’

Identification with Europe

The overview of the financial and economic crisis and its consequences for the EU
and the member states in Chap. 3 showed that the crisis increased economic
disparities within the EU, most notably between member states that experienced
sovereign debt crises, e.g. Greece or Portugal, and member states that emerged
comparatively quickly from the recession, e.g. Germany. At the same time, debates
over member states’ mutual obligations and financial interdependence intensified
and EU issues became more and more salient in national political debates. In light
of these developments, a number of theoretical expectations addressed potential
changes in the effects of individual- and country-level determinants of European
identification in relation the crisis. A number of hypotheses predicted changes in the
importance of political interest (H23, H25), national identification (H24), and mac-
roeconomic factors (H26, H27) as predictors of European identification and a decline
in European identification among respondents from member states under EU/IMF
conditionality (H28) and Eurozone member states (H29) during the crisis. The
negative effects of EU/IMF conditionality and Eurozone membership should be
especially pronounced among respondents with strong attachments to the national
level (H30, H31).
Taking 2007 as the base year, the remainder of this section will assess to what
extent the empirical evidence supports the theoretical expectations regarding the
impact of the financial and economic crisis on the determinants of individual
identification with Europe. It starts by discussing the individual-level determinants,
proceeds to potential changes in the effects of member states’ macroeconomic
situation on European identification, and finally looks into interaction effects
between national identification and macroeconomic conditions on European
identification.
The overview of the models for the years 2007 to 2012 summarised in Table 6.3
reveals no major changes in the regression coefficients for the individual-level
determinants between the pre-crisis year 2007 and the crisis years 2010 and 2012.
We observe a minor decrease in the effects of political interest, which provides
some empirical support for hypothesis H25 expecting political interest to have less
influence on European identification after the onset of the financial and economic
crisis. (Vice versa, this finding disproves hypothesis H23, which expected the effect
of political interest on European identification to increase as EU issues gain in
salience in the context of the crisis.) Likewise, respondents’ knowledge of EU
politics became slightly less influential between 2007 and 2012. We also find the
effect of respondents’ conception of the EU as a common political project to
decrease slightly between 2007 and 2012 whereas perceiving the EU mainly as
providing individual benefits had stronger (positive) effects on respondents’
6.3 The Determinants of Citizens’ Identification with Europe 2000–2012 201

identification with Europe in 2012 than in 2007. National identification remained

one of the strongest predictors throughout the crisis years; its effect on European
identification slightly increased between 2007 and 2010, but goes back to its 2007
level in 2012. Hypothesis H24 predicting a growing importance of national attach-
ments for European attachments in the context of the crisis thus cannot be
confirmed.
Among the individual-level control variables, we note a small decrease in the
effects of respondents’ level of education while differences in European identifi-
cation between students, managers, and respondents in other professions become
statistically and substantially insignificant in 2012. Finally, the effects of respon-
dents’ evaluations of the national economy slightly decrease after the onset of the
crisis; the effects of respondents’ evaluation of their personal finances remain
virtually unchanged before and after the onset of the crisis.
The smaller effect of political interest together with the reduced effects of
educational levels and EU knowledge allow for two interpretations. On the one
hand, the smaller effects of political interest and education may indicate that as the
EU became more politicised and the debate over EU integration became more
polarised, citizens’ motivation (political interest) and abilities (education) to inform
themselves about the EU became less important for forming an opinion towards the
EU. As media coverage of EU issues increased in the crisis, even the politically less
aware had easy access to EU-related information and, given the high level of
controversy over the EU in the crisis, positions on EU integration were more easily
discernible. As a result, we see the differences between more and less politically
aware respondents diminish as the crisis continues.
On the other hand, the smaller effects of political interest and education on
European identification may indicate that, during the crisis, respondents with more
interest in and better knowledge of EU affairs became more aware of the risks of
EU integration, and, consequently, less inclined to identify with Europe. In this
regard, they may have become more alike to their politically less aware peers,
resulting in the observed decrease in the differences in European identification
between more and less politically aware respondents.
The findings for respondents’ occupation point in the same direction: As issues
of EU integration become highly salient and polarised, differences in European
identification between students, managers, and other professions disappear. It
seems that the greater salience of EU integration at the domestic level helps
respondents in other professions to compensate disadvantages vis-a-vis managers
and students in terms of education, access to EU-related information, or opportu-
nities to interact with other Europeans abroad and at home.
Turning to country-level determinants of European identification, we observe
changes for a number of the macroeconomic predictors, notably Eurozone mem-
bership and net contributions to the EU budget. Both become more important as
determinants of European identification in the crisis years. In this regard, the
models for 2010 and 2012 provide some empirical evidence for the expectation
that economic indicators become more important for identification with Europe
after the onset of the financial and economic crisis (cf. H26).
202 6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .

Unlike expected, however, economic decline does not negatively affect

European identification (cf. H27), at least not if we take national unemployment
rates as a proxy for the adverse economic effects of the crisis in the member states.
In fact, while higher unemployment rates are positively related to European iden-
tification in 2007, they no longer have significant effects in 2010 and 2012. The
findings for EU/IMF conditionality point in the same direction. We do not observe
substantially or statistically significant differences in European identification
between respondents from member states receiving conditional aid from the
EU/IMF and respondents from other EU member states. Hypothesis H28 proposing
a negative effect of EU/IMF conditionality on European identification is therefore
rejected.
These findings seem counterintuitive, especially for the countries under EU/IMF
conditionality. The EU played a prominent role in imposing austerity programmes
in exchange for financial aids and it should be relatively easy for citizens to make a
connection between the negative consequences of austerity measures for their
societies, e.g. in terms of social security, public spending, and pension levels, and
the EU as (one of) the initiator(s) of these programmes. In the absence of significant
negative effects of EU/IMF conditionality on European identification, we may
speculate that respondents from member states under EU/IMF conditionality did
not so much blame the EU for the economic and social distortions in their country,
but understood the need for structural reforms and appreciated the financial aids
preventing national bankruptcy. It may also be that the expected ‘blame effect’
whereby the EU’s role in imposing austerity measures weakens European attach-
ments occurred only among certain subsets of the populations in the member states
receiving conditional financial aids. This hypothesis is explored below when
discussing interactions effects between political interest and national identification
and macroeconomic predictors.
The findings for membership in the Eurozone, too, run counter to theoretical
expectations. We do not see a reversal of the (positive) effects of Eurozone
membership on European identification after the onset of the crisis as proposed
by hypothesis H29. Throughout 2010 and 2012, Eurozone membership has a
positive effect on respondents’ identification with Europe (although only the coef-
ficient for 2010 approaches conventional levels of statistical significance). The
strongest effect actually occurs in 2010 (significant at the 10% level), i.e. the year
the Eurogroup first agreed on bilateral loans and financial stability mechanisms to
save member states in sovereign debt crisis.23 That is, respondents from Eurozone
countries became more attached to the EU at a time of high saliency of EU affairs
and intense controversy over financial rescue measures at the European level. We

23
Note that EB 77.3 was in the field in March/April 2010, i.e. during the period when the
Eurogroup first negotiated bilateral loans for Greece. Greece officially requested to activate
international financial support mechanisms on 23 April 2010; the formal agreement with the
IMF was approved on 02 May 2010. The European Council, the Eurogroup, and ECOFIN, together
with the IMF, the ECB and the European Commission, had been discussing the Greek financial
situation at various meetings in the months leading up to the formal agreement.
6.3 The Determinants of Citizens’ Identification with Europe 2000–2012 203

may interpret this as a sign that arguments regarding the need for a European
solution to the sovereign debt crises in the Eurozone had the intended effects.
What is more, respondents in Eurozone countries presumably felt more directly
affected by the crisis and the risk of a break-up of the Eurozone than respondents
outside the Eurozone. This feeling of being personally affected may have translated
into a feeling of ‘being in this together’, which in turn may have strengthened
attachments to the European level.
Finally, we observe that the negative effects of member states’ status as net
contributors to the EU budget become stronger (and statistically significant) as the
crisis continues. Over time, calculations in terms of financial costs and benefits
appear to become more important for respondents when considering their attach-
ment to Europe. By 2012, the EU had seen more than three years of intense debate
over the appropriate response to the economic crisis and, in particular, financial
rescue mechanisms to support member states experiencing sovereign debt crises. It
also had become clear by then that member states receiving bilateral loans and
credits through the various European financial stability measures, Greece in partic-
ular, would not be able to repay their debts in the short-run and that some creditors
would not be repaid in full.24 In short, we can assume that, by 2012, respondents in
the net contributor countries, which were also the countries providing the largest
bilateral loans and financial guarantees, had come to understand the financial risks
of bailouts for national budgets and the potential costs incurred by their home
country. The greater awareness of financial costs and benefits seems to be reflected
in the stronger negative effect of net contributions to the EU budget on respondents’
identification with Europe. In this regard, redistributive issues and cost/benefit
calculations appear to have gained relevance over the course of the crisis.
Overall, we thus find some evidence that macroeconomic indicators became
more important for individual identification with Europe as the crisis continued.
Nonetheless, some of the empirical findings appear counterintuitive. In particular,
the lack of influence of EU/IMF conditionality on European identification as well as
the persistent positive effect of the Eurozone dummy in the crisis years is intriguing.
Perhaps the overall positive effects of Eurozone membership in the crisis mask
differences between subgroups of respondents at different levels of national iden-
tification within Eurozone member states (cf. H31). Similarly, we may expect
interaction effects between national identification and EU/IMF conditionality on
European identification (cf. H30). To assess these hypotheses, the remainder of this
section will explore interaction effects between national identification and EU/IMF
conditionality and Eurozone membership, respectively.
The results for the models including cross-level interaction terms for the years
2007 to 2012 are listed in Tables 6.10, 6.11, 6.12 in the appendix. Starting with the
interaction between national identification and EU/IMF conditionality, we find the
expected negative sign for the coefficient of the interaction term in both 2010 and

24
In October 2011, private creditors holding Greek government bonds agreed to a 50% ‘haircut’,
converting their existing bonds into new loans (Euro Summit 2011; Gow 2011).
204 6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .

2012 (cf. Tables 6.11 and 6.12 in the appendix; no EU member state received
financial aids from the EU/IMF in 2007); the effect is statistically significant at the
10% level in 2012. However, the coefficients of the constitutive terms national
identification and EU/IMF conditionality remain positive and substantially
significant.
Let’s explore the results for 2012 in more detail, looking at the slopes of national
identification in countries receiving conditional aids from the EU/IMF and those
not under EU/IMF conditionality. Figure 6.2 visualises the differences in the effects
of national identification in the two groups of member states, graphing predicted
European identification over the range of national identification separately for
member states under EU/IMF conditionality and other member states. Straight
lines show predictive margins of national identification in countries receiving
conditional aid from the EU/IMF and countries not under EU/IMF conditionality.
Vertical lines give 95% confidence intervals. Predictive margins are based on
Model M3f reported in Table 6.12 in the appendix.
We see that while the slope of national identification is positive regardless of
EU/IMF conditionality, it is flatter in countries receiving conditional financial aids
from the EU/IMF. That is, national identification has a positive effect in both
groups of countries, but the effect is smaller in countries under EU/IMF condition-
ality. The confidence intervals around the two slopes indicate that the differences in
European identification between respondents in the two country groups are statis-
tically significant at the 95%-level only for respondents who are not at all attached
to their home country; confidence intervals overlap at higher levels of national
identification. Taken together, these findings only partially support hypothesis H30,

Fig. 6.2 Predicted European identification in countries with and without EU/IMF conditionality
over range of national identification 2012
6.3 The Determinants of Citizens’ Identification with Europe 2000–2012 205

which expected a negative relationship between national identification and

European identification in member states under EU/IMF conditionality. Although
we do not find a negative relationship between national and European identification
in these countries, the relationship is still weaker than in countries not under
EU/IMF conditionality. That is, the (positive) effect of national identification is
reduced among respondents from countries receiving conditional financial aids
from the EU/IMF.
Turning to the interaction of national identification and Eurozone membership in
the period 2007 to 2012, we find similar dynamics at work both before and after the
onset of the crisis. The interaction term between national identification and
Eurozone membership has a positive sign and is statistically significant in all
three years; the coefficient for the constituent term for national identification also
remains statistically significant and positive throughout the crisis years while the
coefficient for Eurozone membership is negative in all years (albeit it reaches
statistical significance only in 2012). Compared to 2007, the size of the coefficient
for the interaction term and national identification remain more or less stable
whereas the coefficient for Eurozone membership decreases in 2010, but increases
again in 2012 (cf. Tables 6.10, 6.11, 6.12 in the appendix). Given that the signs of
the coefficients for the interaction and the constituent terms do not change, it
appears that the crisis did not alter the fundamentals of the relationship between
national identification, Eurozone membership, and European identification.
We can explore this relationship further by examining the results for 2012 in
more detail. Figure 6.3 plots predicted European identification over the range of
national identification for Eurozone and non-Eurozone member countries. Straight

Fig. 6.3 Predicted European identification in and outside the Eurozone over range of national
identification 2012
206 6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .

lines show predictive margins of national identification for member states in and
outside the Eurozone. Vertical lines give 95% confidence intervals. Predictive
margins are based on Model M3f reported in Table 6.12 in the appendix. The
ascending slopes for national identification for both Eurozone member states and
member states outside the Eurozone indicates that national identification is posi-
tively related to European identification in and outside the Eurozone. The slope is
steeper for Eurozone countries (grey line), indicating that the effect of national
identification is stronger for respondents in the Eurozone than outside (although
confidence intervals overlap). This finding clearly rejects hypothesis H31, which
expected national identification to be negatively related to European identification
in the Eurozone countries after the onset of the crisis.
To sum up, the sources of European identification appear to have changed only
to limited degree over the course of the financial and economic crisis. The statistical
analysis shows only minor changes in the regression coefficients for the individual-
level determinants between 2007 and the crisis years 2010 and 2012. Among the
country-level determinants, we observe changes in the effects of macroeconomic
predictors. However, these changes often run counter to theoretical expectations.
Thus, adverse economic conditions—as expressed by rising unemployment rates
and/or the need for financial aid by the EU/IMF—appear to lead respondents to
identify more rather than less with Europe. Likewise, respondents from Eurozone
countries continue to identify more with Europe than their peers outside the
Eurozone throughout the crisis. Only member states’ net budgetary contributions
prove to have the expected negative effect on respondents’ identification with
Europe in the crisis years.
As during the enlargement period, we find national identification to mediate the
effect of economic predictors on respondents’ identification with Europe. In par-
ticular, the relationship between national identification and European identification
differs by member states’ status as an EU/IMF debtor country and by Eurozone
membership. National identification is always positively related to European iden-
tification, but the strength of the association differs between the four groups of
countries (creditor vs. debtor countries and Eurozone ins and outs). In the case of
EU/IMF conditionality, the positive effect of national identification on European
identification is stronger in the countries not under EU/IMF conditionality. In the
case of Eurozone membership, the positive effect of national identification on
European identification is stronger in countries inside the Eurozone.
If we compare the findings for the interactions between national identification
and EU/IMF conditionality and Eurozone membership, respectively, it appears that
the relationship between national identification and adverse economic conditions—
as represented in the crisis by EU/IMF conditionality and Eurozone membership—
does not necessarily run in the same direction. Rather, it seems itself to depend on
member state context.
In effect, one could argue that, in the crisis years, both EU/IMF conditionality
and Eurozone membership epitomise the risks of greater economic and financial
interdependencies. In the case of the countries receiving conditional financial aids
by the EU/IMF, the downsides for citizens are clear: the austerity programmes and
6.3 The Determinants of Citizens’ Identification with Europe 2000–2012 207

demands for structural reforms attached to financial support measures led to cuts in
pensions and social security systems, rising poverty levels, and generally dire
economic and social conditions in the countries under EU/IMF conditionality. In
the course of the crisis, Eurozone membership, too, signified risks for member state
economies, given the threats of sovereign defaults of some Eurozone member states
and the extensive financial guarantees agreed within the Eurozone. Against this
background, we would assume that respondents with the strongest attachments to
the national community are also the most critical of EU/IMF conditionality and
their country’s membership in the Eurozone. This should lead respondents with
strong national ties in countries under EU/IMF conditionality and the Eurozone to
identify less with Europe; we should observe weaker effects of national identifica-
tion on European identification in these countries compared to countries not under
EU/IMF conditionality and/or outside the Eurozone. Empirically, however, this
expectation is confirmed only in case of EU/IMF conditionality; we find the
(positive) effect of national identification to be smaller in countries receiving
financial aids from the EU/IMF compared to those not under EU/IMF conditionality
(cf. Fig. 6.2).
In case of Eurozone membership, in contrast, national identification has stronger
(positive) effects on European identification inside rather than outside the Eurozone
(cf. Fig. 6.3). It seems that the relationship between national identification and
European identification under adverse economic conditions depends on context.
This could be explained by framing effects and the representations of the economic
risks of EU integration in the respective national political contexts.
There is reason to believe that in the countries under EU/IMF conditionality,
political elites and media focussed on the negative consequences of austerity
measures for the population and the national economy, and the role of external
actors, in particular the troika, in imposing austerity programmes on national
governments and societies. Analyses of the Greek case, for example, find evidence
that political leaders tended to place part of the blame on external actors such as the
EU and the IMF (Vasilopoulou et al. 2014) whereas the media concentrated more
and more on the suffering of ordinary citizens, ‘capitalizing on people’s fear,
insecurity and despair’ (Kouki 2014, p. 19).
In the Eurozone, on the other hand, the dominant discourse may well be
summarised by German Chancellor Merkel’s dictum that ‘if the Euro fails, Europe
fails’ and that by protecting the common monetary union, national governments
first and foremost protected the wealth of the national population.25 In effect, media
analyses in the Eurozone show that bailout measures and financial guarantees to
save member states at risk of sovereign default were often framed as being in the
national interest and necessary to prevent the breakup of the Eurozone as a whole,

25
See e.g. Angela Merkel’s defense of the first bailout measures for Greece before the Bundestag
on 19 May 2010: ‘Wir helfen Griechenland, weil wir so der Stabilität unserer gemeinsamen
Währung insgesamt helfen. Wir sch€ utzen das Geld der B€ urgerinnen und B€ urger unseres
Landes—nicht mehr und nicht weniger ist der Auftrag der Bundesregierung genauso wie des
Hohen Hauses hier.’ (Deutscher Bundestag 2010, p. 4125; emphasis added).
208 6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .

which would have severe consequences for the respective national economy (see,
e.g. the findings by Bickes et al. 2014; Drewski 2015; Vaara 2014).
If citizens in the two groups of countries—member states under EU/IMF con-
ditionality on the one hand, Eurozone on the other—subscribed to the respective
argumentation, this could explain the differentiated effects of national identification
in countries under EU/IMF conditionality and the Eurozone.
In sum, the findings presented here indicate that adverse economic conditions
with a clear European dimension do not automatically lead to anti-European
reflexes, not even among respondents who identify strongly with the nation. Rather,
the tension between the wellbeing of the national community and the role of the EU
must be made salient. This appears to have happened in the countries under
EU/IMF conditionality, but less so in the Eurozone.

6.4 Sources and Mechanisms of Citizens’ Identification

with Europe After Enlargement and the Crisis

The present chapter set out to provide empirical evidence on the determinants of
individual identification with Europe that help explain European identification in
the mass public. To this end, I subjected the previously developed theoretical model
of individual identification with Europe to empirical testing. The analysis pursued
two objectives. First, we were interested in the individual and country-level char-
acteristics that generally shape European identification and the larger trends we
observe in these determinants over time. Second, we were interested in the conse-
quences of the EU’s enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe and the onset of the
financial and economic crisis for the determinants of European identification.
To answer these questions, the empirical analysis employed linear hierarchical
regression models combining individual- and country-level data. Separate models
were estimated for four occasions before and after the EU’s enlargement to Central
and Eastern Europe in 2004 and three occasions before and during the economic
and financial crisis starting in 2008. With each of these occasions reflecting
different stages in the enlargement process and the financial and economic crisis,
we were able to assess changes in the determinants of European identification at key
moments in the EU integration process.
Starting with the overall trends in the determinants of European identification,
the empirical results can be summarised as follows: At the individual level,
identification with Europe is influenced by cognitive factors as well as experiences
related to the national and European community. Political interest, interest in
European politics, and knowledge about the EU are among the strongest
individual-level predictors of European identification. Likewise, national identifi-
cation and personal transnational experiences have a significant positive influence
on European identification. Country-level characteristics, on the other hand, influ-
ence European identification only to a limited degree. Only member states’ net
6.4 Sources and Mechanisms of Citizens’ Identification with Europe After. . . 209

contributions to the EU budget significantly affect identification with Europe in the

period under analysis. Finally, the analysis of the cross-level interactions finds only
weak support for a moderating effect of political interest and national identification.
The influence of member states characteristics does not differ by respondents’ level
of political interest. In contrast, there is some evidence of interaction effects
between national attachments and the domestic consequences of European integra-
tion. In effect, we find the relationship between national and European identifica-
tion to depend on member states’ status as a net payer to the EU budget, at least in
some years under analysis.
Which conclusions can we draw from these findings with regard to the general
mechanisms underlying individual identification with Europe among citizens in the
member states?
To recall, the theoretical discussion suggested two mechanisms by which citi-
zens come to identify with Europe. First, an information-based way of European
identification proposing that citizens identify with Europe to the extent that they
have access and receive information related to Europe and the European commu-
nity, thus becoming aware of shared European norms and values underlying a
common European ‘we-feeling’. Second, an experience-based way of European
identification proposing that citizens identify with Europe to the extent that they
come in personal contact with other Europeans and thus directly perceive what
Europeans have in common in terms of shared experiences, norms, and values.
The empirical evidence provides support for both ways of identifying with
Europe. The persistent positive effects of cognitive-based determinants such as
political interest and EU knowledge confirm the idea of an information-based
mechanism whereby the development of European identification among EU citi-
zens depends on their access to Europe-related information and their capabilities
and motivation to process this information. On the other hand, the positive effects
of national identification and personal transnational experience support notions of
an experience-based mechanism whereby the development of European identifica-
tion depends on citizens’ experience with large-scale political collectives,
socialisation processes within the national context, and personal contacts with
other Europeans. All in all, the empirical analysis confirmed that European identi-
fication draws on different sources, which, to some degree, appear mutually
exchangeable. Not every citizen may have the resources and opportunities to
come into personal contact with other Europeans; however, high awareness of
EU affairs and a positive relationship to the national community can at least partly
compensate for the lack of transnational experiences as a source of European
identification.
The influence of cognitive mobilisation and national attachments on citizens’
identification with Europe underlines the relevance of the second research objective
of the present analysis, namely to explore changes in the determinants of individual
European identification at key moments in the EU integration process. These were,
first, the accession of Central and Eastern European member states in 2004/2007
and, second, the onset of the financial and economic crisis in late 2008. Both EU
enlargement to CEE and the financial and economic crisis led to a rise in the
210 6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .

salience of EU integration at the domestic level and increased political, social, and,
in particular, economic diversity within the EU. Debates over member states’
mutual obligations and interdependencies resulting from European integration,
already prominent in the context of enlargement, intensified in the course of the
financial and economic crisis. The greater salience of EU integration and the
revived debate over national interests and financial redistributions between EU
member states imply that the environment in which citizens receive Europe-related
information and make Europe-related experiences changed with enlargement and
the crisis.
The theoretical discussion expected changes in the influence of cognitive factors
on European identification as citizen have better access to Europe-related informa-
tion when issues of EU integration become more salient domestically; it also
predicted changes in the importance of national identification and macroeconomic
factors for identification with Europe as citizens experience more competition
between EU member states and national (economic) interests are pitted against
each other in the context of enlargement and the crisis.
Empirically, we observe no major shifts in the individual-level determinants
over the accession period and the course of the financial and economic crisis.
Neither political interest as an indicator of cognitive mobilisation nor national
identification become significantly more or less important for European identifica-
tion as new member states from CEE enter the EU and EU member states experi-
ence economic and financial turmoil in the crisis. As regards country-level
predictors, we observe changes in the effects of member states’ status as a net
contributor to the EU budget, and, for the crisis years, Eurozone membership. In
this respect, enlargement and the crisis indeed seem to have increased the relevance
of economic aspects and redistributive considerations for citizens’ identification
with Europe. Finally, we find interaction effects between national identification and
macroeconomic factors on European identification. Other than expected, however,
strong national ties still are positively related to European identification even under
adverse economic conditions.
These findings allow inferences about the broader implications of key develop-
ments in the EU integration process for citizens’ identification with Europe. First,
the empirical results point to a remarkable stability in the determinants of European
identification even as the EU and its member states experience significant trans-
formations, be it in terms of EU membership or worsening economic conditions. At
the individual level in particular, European identification appears to draw on
relatively stable dispositions such as national attachments, which do not vary
significantly in the short term. What is more, strong national ties continue to
strengthen rather than weaken citizens’ attachments to Europe even as member
states’ political, social, and economic interests and positions become more diverse,
and competition for EU funding intensifies. This seems a rather promising result, in
particular with regard to a further widening and deepening of European integration.
On the other hand, macroeconomic factors have become more relevant for
European attachments over time, in particular those with a clear EU-dimension
such as Eurozone membership, EU budgetary contributions, and EU/IMF
Appendix 211

conditionality of financial aids. Key developments at the EU level, in particular in

the context of the crisis, thus seem to reverberate at the citizen level, too.
How macroeconomic conditions affect European identification, however,
depends on citizens’ relation to their own national community and the domestic
context. This is another important finding of the present analysis: the effects of
adverse economic conditions, especially among citizens with the strongest national
attachments, depend on the domestic context and, presumably, on how develop-
ments at the EU level and their impact on the national level are framed
domestically.
That is, even if EU integration gains in salience and EU actors and institutions
figure as prominently as they did in the crisis, the national context in which citizens
experience EU integration remains central. This leaves a crucial role for national
political actors and the national media. While key events in EU integration like
eastward enlargement and the financial and economic crisis have the potential to
change the bases of European identification, it depends on the interpretation of
these events in the domestic context whether such key moments in the integration
process ultimately lead to a strengthening or weakening of citizens’ identification
with Europe.

Appendix

Single-Equation Expressions for Random Coefficient Models

with Cross-Level Interactions

Interaction of individual political interest and party messages on European

community

European identificationij ¼ γ 00 þ γ 10 intij þ γ 20 EUintij þ γ 30 EUknowij

þ γ 40 EUcommij þ γ 50 nat id ij þ γ 60 nat commij
þ γ 70 transpracij þ γ 80 transbackij þ γ 90 transcapij
þ γ 100 gender ij þ γ 110 ageij þ γ 120 eduij þ γ 130 communij
þ γ 140 occij þ γ 150 nat ecoij þ γ 160 pers ecoij
þ γ 01 EU partyj þ γ 02 EU partyj þ γ 03 Euroj
þ γ 04 budgetj þ γ 05 tradej þ γ 06 EU immj þ γ 07 immj
þ γ 08 unemployj þ γ 09 IMFj þ γ 11 EU partyj ∗ intij
þ u1j intij þ u0j þ r ij

Interaction of individual political interest and party messages on national

community
212 6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .

European identificationij ¼ γ 00 þ γ 10 intij þ γ 20 EUintij þ γ 30 EUknowij

þ γ 40 EUcommij þ γ 50 nat id ij þ γ 60 nat commij
þ γ 70 transpracij þ γ 80 transbackij þ γ 90 transcapij
þ γ 100 gender ij þ γ 110 ageij þ γ 120 eduij þ γ 130 communij
þ γ 140 occij þ γ 150 nat ecoij þ γ 160 pers ecoij
þ γ 01 EU partyj þ γ 02 nat partyj þ γ 03 Euroj
þ γ 04 budgetj þ γ 05 tradej þ γ 06 EU immj þ γ 07 immj
þ γ 08 unemployj þ γ 09 IMFj þ γ 11 nat partyj ∗ intij
þ u1j intij þ u0j þ r ij

Interaction of individual political interest and member states’ status as net

recipient of EU funding

European identificationij ¼ γ 00 þ γ 10 intij þ γ 20 EUintij þ γ 30 EUknowij

þ γ 40 EUcommij þ γ 50 nat id ij þ γ 60 nat commij
þ γ 70 transpracij þ γ 80 transbackij þ γ 90 transcapij
þ γ 100 gender ij þ γ 110 ageij þ γ 120 eduij þ γ 130 communij
þ γ 140 occij þ γ 150 nat ecoij þ γ 160 pers ecoij
þ γ 01 EU partyj þ γ 02 nat partyj þ γ 03 Euroj
þ γ 04 budgetj þ γ 05 tradej þ γ 06 EU immj þ γ 07 immj
þ γ 08 unemployj þ γ 09 IMFj þ γ 13 budgetj ∗ intij
þ u1j intij þ u0j þ r ij

Interaction of individual political interest and member states’ share in interna-

tional trade

European identificationij ¼ γ 00 þ γ 10 intij þ γ 20 EUintij þ γ 30 EUknowij

þ γ 40 EUcommij þ γ 50 nat id ij þ γ 60 nat commij
þ γ 70 transpracij þ γ 80 transbackij þ γ 90 transcapij
þ γ 100 gender ij þ γ 110 ageij þ γ 120 eduij þ γ 130 communij
þ γ 140 occij þ γ 150 nat ecoij þ γ 160 pers ecoij
þ γ 01 EU partyj þ γ 02 nat partyj þ γ 03 Euroj
þ γ 04 budgetj þ γ 05 tradej þ γ 06 EU immj þ γ 07 immj
þ γ 08 unemployj þ γ 09 IMFj þ γ 15 tradej ∗ intij þ u1j intij
þ u0j þ r ij
Appendix 213

Interaction of individual national identification and of party messages on

European community

European identificationij ¼ γ 00 þ γ 10 intij þ γ 20 EUintij þ γ 30 EUknowij

þ γ 40 EUcommij þ γ 50 nat id ij þ γ 60 nat commij
þ γ 70 transpracij þ γ 80 transbackij þ γ 90 transcapij
þ γ 100 gender ij þ γ 110 ageij þ γ 120 eduij þ γ 130 communij
þ γ 140 occij þ γ 150 nat ecoij þ γ 160 pers ecoij
þ γ 01 EU partyj þ γ 02 nat partyj þ γ 03 Euroj
þ γ 04 budgetj þ γ 05 tradej þ γ 06 EU immj þ γ 07 immj
þ γ 08 unemployj þ γ 09 IMFj þ γ 51 EU partyj ∗ nat idij
þ u1j nat id ij þ u0j þ r ij

Interaction of individual national identification and salience of party messages

on national community

European identificationij ¼ γ 00 þ γ 10 intij þ γ 20 EUintij þ γ 30 EUknowij

þ γ 40 EUcommij þ γ 50 nat id ij þ γ 60 nat commij
þ γ 70 transpracij þ γ 80 transbackij þ γ 90 transcapij
þ γ 100 gender ij þ γ 110 ageij þ γ 120 eduij þ γ 130 communij
þ γ 140 occij þ γ 150 nat ecoij þ γ 160 pers ecoij
þ γ 01 EU partyj þ γ 02 nat partyj þ γ 03 Euroj
þ γ 04 budgetj þ γ 05 tradej þ γ 06 EU immj þ γ 07 immj
þ γ 08 unemployj þ γ 09 IMFj þ γ 52 nat partyj ∗ nat id ij
þ u1j nat id ij þ u0j þ r ij

Interaction of individual national identification and status as net recipient of EU

funding

European identificationij ¼ γ 00 þ γ 10 intij þ γ 20 EUintij þ γ 30 EUknowij

þ γ 40 EUcommij þ γ 50 nat id ij þ γ 60 nat commij
þ γ 70 transpracij þ γ 80 transbackij þ γ 90 transcapij
þ γ 100 gender ij þ γ 110 ageij þ γ 120 eduij þ γ 130 communij
þ γ 140 occij þ γ 150 nat ecoij þ γ 160 pers ecoij
þ γ 01 EU partyj þ γ 02 nat partyj þ γ 03 Euroj
þ γ 04 budgetj þ γ 05 tradej þ γ 06 EU immj þ γ 07 immj
þ γ 08 unemployj þ γ 09 IMFj þ γ 53 budgetj ∗ nat id ij
þ u1j nat id ij þ u0j þ r ij
214 6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .

Interaction of individual national identification and share of immigrants

European identificationij ¼ γ 00 þ γ 10 intij þ γ 20 EUintij þ γ 30 EUknowij

þ γ 40 EUcommij þ γ 50 nat id ij þ γ 60 nat commij
þ γ 70 transpracij þ γ 80 transbackij þ γ 90 transcapij
þ γ 100 gender ij þ γ 110 ageij þ γ 120 eduij þ γ 130 communij
þ γ 140 occij þ γ 150 nat ecoij þ γ 160 pers ecoij
þ γ 01 EU partyj þ γ 02 nat partyj þ γ 03 Euroj
þ γ 04 budgetj þ γ 05 tradej þ γ 06 EU immj þ γ 07 immj
þ γ 08 unemployj þ γ 09 IMFj þ γ 57 immj ∗ nat id ij
þ u1j nat id ij þ u0j þ r ij

Interaction of individual national identification and EU/IMF conditionality

European identificationij ¼ γ 00 þ γ 10 intij þ γ 20 EUintij þ γ 30 EUknowij

þ γ 40 EUcommij þ γ 50 nat id ij þ γ 60 nat commij
þ γ 70 transpracij þ γ 80 transbackij þ γ 90 transcapij
þ γ 100 gender ij þ γ 110 ageij þ γ 120 eduij þ γ 130 communij
þ γ 140 occij þ γ 150 nat ecoij þ γ 160 pers ecoij
þ γ 01 EU partyj þ γ 02 nat partyj þ γ 03 Euroj
þ γ 04 budgetj þ γ 05 tradej þ γ 06 EU immj þ γ 07 immj
þ γ 08 unemployj þ γ 09 IMFj þ γ 59 IMFj ∗ nat id ij
þ u1j nat id ij þ u0j þ r ij

Interaction of individual national identification and euro zone membership

European identificationij ¼ γ 00 þ γ 10 intij þ γ 20 EUintij þ γ 30 EUknowij

þ γ 40 EUcommij þ γ 50 nat id ij þ γ 60 nat commij
þ γ 70 transpracij þ γ 80 transbackij þ γ 90 transcapij
þ γ 100 gender ij þ γ 110 ageij þ γ 120 eduij þ γ 130 communij
þ γ 140 occij þ γ 150 nat ecoij þ γ 160 pers ecoij
þ γ 01 EU partyj þ γ 02 nat partyj þ γ 03 Euroj
þ γ 04 budgetj þ γ 05 tradej þ γ 06 EU immj þ γ 07 immj
þ γ 08 unemployj þ γ 09 IMFj þ γ 53 Euroj ∗ nat idij
þ u1j nat id ij þ u0j þ r ij
 Appendix

Table 6.4 Descriptive statistics for individual identification with Europe by year
Attachment to Europe/the European Union
Year Range Min Max Mean s.d. no. of ‘don’t knows’
2000 0–3 0 3 1.71 0.88 552
2003 0–3 0 3 1.69 0.85 399
2004 0–3 0 3 1.81 0.85 570
2006 0–3 0 3 1.71 0.92 280
2007 0–3 0 3 1.49 0.88 753
2010 0–3 0 3 1.44 0.87 612
2012 0–3 0 3 1.38 0.85 493
Question wording 2000–2006: ‘People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country or to Europe. Please
tell me how attached you feel to. . .Europe. Very attached, fairly attached, not very attached, not at all attached.’
Question wording 2007–2012: ‘People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country or the Europe Union.
Please tell me how attached you feel to. . .the European Union. Very attached, fairly attached, not very attached, not at all attached.’
Note: Higher values indicate more intense attachment to Europe/the European Union. ‘No. of ‘don’t knows’ refers to the number of respondents having
answered ‘don’t know’ spontaneously to the above questions
215
Table 6.5 Descriptive statistics for independent variables
216

Descriptive statistics for the independent variables by year of analysis

2000 2003 2004 2006
Min/
Range Min/Max Mean s.d. Min/Max Mean s.d. Max Mean s.d. Min/Max Mean s.d.
Individual level predictors
Political interest 0–2 0/2 0.83 0.64 0/2 0.85 0.64 0/2 0.89 0.64 0/2 0.88 0.64
European political 0–3 0/3 1.39 0.86
interest
EU knowledge 0–3/0-5a 0/5 3.92 1.44 0/5 3.99 1.40 0/3 1.62 1.02 0/3 1.43 0.94
Conception of Europe
Other 0–1 0/1 0.90 0.30 0/1 0.93 0.26 0/1 0.92 0.28
Common political 0–1 0/1 0.07 0.25 0/1 0.03 0.17 0/1 0.03 0.18
project
Individual benefits 0–1 0/1 0.04 0.19 0/1 0.04 0.21 0/1 0.05 0.22
National identification 0–3 0/3 2.41 0.70 0/3 2.48 0.66 0/3 2.54 0.65 0/3 2.49 0.67
European background 0–1 0/1 0.06 0.24 0/1 0.06 0.24
Individual level controls
Gender (male) 0–1 0/1 0.48 0.50 0/1 0.48 0.50 0/1 0.44 0.50 0/1 0.43 0.50
Age 15–99 15/99 44.63 17.92 15/95 45.13 18.27 15/97 47.22 18.20 15/95 47.73 18.29
Type of community (ref.: rural/village)
Rural 0–1 0/1 0.33 0.47 0/1 0.36 0.48 0/1 0.37 0.48
Small town 0–1 0/1 0.39 0.49 0/1 0.37 0.48 0/1 0.37 0.48
Large town 0–1 0/1 0.28 0.45 0/1 0.27 0.44 0/1 0.26 0.44
Education 0–3 1/3 2.01 0.75 1/3 2.03 0.75 3 2.07 0.74 0/3 2.04 0.75
Occupation
Other 0–1 0/1 0.81 0.39 0/1 0.82 0.39 0/1 0.81 0.39 0/1 0.81 0.39
Student 0–1 0/1 0.10 0.30 0/1 0.10 0.30 0/1 0.08 0.28 0/1 0.09 0.28
6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .
 Manager 0–1 0/1 0.09 0.29 0/1 0.09 0.28 0/1 0.11 0.31 0/1 0.10 0.30
National eco. Expect.: 0–1 0/1 0.24 0.42 0/1 0.43 0.50 0/1 0.39 0.49 0/1 0.32 0.47
worse
Appendix

Personal eco. Expect.: 0–1 0/1 0.12 0.32 0/1 0.18 0.39 0/1 0.21 0.41 0/1 0.18 0.38
worse
Country level predictors
Party messages
Over all identity 0–100 4.99/ 11.96 3.70
shares 23.71
EU identity shares 0–100 1.87/ 5.60 2.56
11.23
National identity 0–100 1.20/ 6.37 3.39
shares 15.71
Eurozone 0–1 0/1 0.79 0.50 0/1 0.49 0.50 0/1 0.49 0.50
Net paying EU 0–1 0/1 0.56 0.50 0/1 0.75 0.50 0/1 0.46 0.50 0/1 0.46 0.50
transfers
Trade Open- 52.60/ 93.84 51.95 48.30/ 85.67 44.75 49.7/ 101.60 43.84 55.10/ 111.02 46.69
ended 279.00 250.20 280.50 309.00
EU Immigration rate 0–100 0/33.00 2.25 4.81 0/33.00 2.20 4.69
Total immigration 0–100 1.70/ 6.30 6.40 2.00/ 9.61 9.99 0.10/ 6.66 6.94 0.10/ 6.48 6.95
35.80 38.10 39.00 40.80
Unemployment rate 0–100 2.20/ 6.80 2.84 3.80/ 7.29 2.32 4.50/ 8.81 3.85 3.90/ 7.46 2.48
11.70 11.40 19.10 13.90
(continued)
217
Table 6.5 (continued)
218

2007 2010 2012

Range Min/Max Mean s.d. Min/Max Mean s.d. Min/Max Mean s.d.
Individual level predictors
Political interest 0–2 0/2 0.88 0.64 0/2 1.00 0.67
European political interest 0–2 0/2 0.81 0.66
EU knowledge 0–3 0/3 2.33 1.01 0/3 2.00 0.95
Conception of Europe
Other 0–1 0/1 0.91 0.29 0/1 0.91 0.29
Common political project 0–1 0/1 0.04 0.19 0/1 0.03 0.18
Individual benefits 0–1 0/1 0.06 0.23 0/1 0.06 0.24
National identification 0–3 0/3 2.54 0.65 0/3 2.55 0.63 0/3 2.48 0.68
Conception of national community 0–1 0/1 0.09 0.28
Transnational practices 0–8/0-6b 0/8 1.38 1.62 0/6 1.61 1.61
European background 0–1 0/1 0.06 0.24 0/1 0.07 0.25
Transnational capital 0–2/0-4c 0/2 0.85 0.79 0/4 1.43 1.55
Individual level controls
Gender (male) 0–1 0/1 0.43 0.50 0/1 0.46 0.50 0/1 0.46 0.50
Age 15–99 15/98 47.69 18.23 15/97 47.97 18.20 15/98 48.66 18.15
Type of community
Rural/village 0–1 0/1 0.37 0.48 0/1 0.36 0.48 0/1 0.35 0.48
Small town 0–1 0/1 0.36 0.48 0/1 0.35 0.48 0/1 0.38 0.48
Large town 0–1 0/1 0.27 0.44 0/1 0.28 0.45 0/1 0.27 0.45
Education 0–3 0/3 2.07 0.73 0/3 2.10 0.72 0/3 2.13 0.72
Occupation
Other 0–1 0/1 0.81 0.40 0/1 0.82 0.38 0/1 0.82 0.38
Student 0–1 0/1 0.09 0.28 0/1 0.08 0.27 0/1 0.08 0.27
Manager 0–1 0/1 0.11 0.31 0/1 0.09 0.29 0/1 0.10 0.30
6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .
National economic expect.: worse 0–1 0/1 0.28 0.45 0/1 0.36 0.48
Personal economic expect.: worse 0–1 0/1 0.17 0.37 0/1 0.09 0.29 0/1 0.22 0.41
Appendix

Country level predictors

Eurozone 0–1 0/1 0.49 0.50 0/1 0.57 0.50 0/1 0.61 0.50
Net paying EU transfers 0–1 0/1 0.45 0.50 0/1 0.43 0.50 0/1 0.45 0.50
Trade Open-ended 55.50/319.50 112.09 47.64 53.30/10.80 111.11 48.58 57.10/325.50 120.78 52.96
EU Immigration rate 0–100 0/35.90 2.59 5.14 0/37.10 2.94 5.37 0/37.90 3.13 5.45
Total immigration 0–100 0.10/41.60 6.71 6.96 0/43.00 7.19 6.91 0.10/43.80 7.43 7.00
Unemployment rate 0–100 3.60/11.20 6.50 1.96 4.40/20.10 10.24 4.31 4.30/25.00 10.62 5.09
IMF conditionality 0–1 0/1 0.19 0.39 0/1 0.15 0.36
Note:
a
The range for EU knowledge is 0–5 in 2000 and 2003, and 0–3 in the other years under analysis
b
The range for transnational practices is 0–8 in 2010 and 0–6 in 2012
c
The range for transnational capital is 0–2 in 2010 and 0–4 in 2012
219
220 6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .

Table 6.6 Cross-level interaction effects for individual identification with Europe (2000)
Cross-level interaction effects for individual identification with Europe 2000
M3a M3b M3c M3d
Intercept 0.28** 0.30*** 0.36*** 0.34***
(0.05) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07)
Individual level predictors
Gender (male) 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age 0.00{ 0.00 0.00{ 0.00{
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Occupation (ref.: other)
Student 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Manager 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
National economic expect.: worse 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Personal economic expect.: worse 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Political interest 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
EU knowledge 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
National identification 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.42*** 0.44***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)
Country level predictors
Net paying EU transfers 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.01
(0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09)
Trade 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Total immigration 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Unemployment rate 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Cross-level interactions
Pol interest  Net paying EU transfer 0.04
(0.03)
Pol interest  Trade 0.00
(0.00)
Nat ident  Net paying EU transfers 0.05
(0.04)
Nat ident  total immigration 0.00
(0.00)
(continued)
Appendix 221

Table 6.6 (continued)

Cross-level interaction effects for individual identification with Europe 2000
M3a M3b M3c M3d
Variance components
Country level τ00 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Individual level σ 2 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Var (pol interest/nat ident) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Cov(pol interest/nat ident, constant) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
2  Log Likelihood 36,367.92 36,366.88 36,311.94 36,312.48
AIC 36,407.91 36,406.87 36,351.94 36,352.48
BIC 36,560.72 36,559.69 36,504.75 36,505.3
R2 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
No. of groups (N) 15 15 15 15
No. of individuals (n) 15,377 15,377 15,377 15,377
Note: Figures are estimates from linear hierarchical regression models with random coefficients
and cross level interactions. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p  0.001; **p  0.01; *p  0.05;
{p  0.1

Table 6.7 Cross-level interaction effects for individual identification with Europe (2003)
Cross-level interaction effects for individual identification with Europe 2003
M3a M3b M3c M3d M3e
Intercept 0.39* 0.37* 0.45*** 0.40*** 0.44**
(0.19) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14)
Individual level predictors
Gender (male) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age 0.00{ 0.00{ 0.00{ 0.00{ 0.00{
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Type of community (ref.: rural/village)
Small town 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Large town 0.03{ 0.03 0.03{ 0.03{ 0.03{
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Education 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Occupation (ref.: other)
Student 0.07* 0.07* 0.07* 0.07* 0.07*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Manager 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
(continued)
222 6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .

Table 6.7 (continued)

Cross-level interaction effects for individual identification with Europe 2003
M3a M3b M3c M3d M3e
National economic expect.: 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09***
worse (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Personal economic expect.: 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16***
worse (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Political interest 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
EU knowledge 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Conception of Europe (ref.: other)
Common political project 0.07* 0.07* 0.07* 0.07** 0.07**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Individual benefits 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
National identification 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.32*** 0.37*** 0.33***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05)
Country level predictors
Eurozone 0.13 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.13
(0.17) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13)
Net paying EU transfers 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.05 0.05
(0.13) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08)
Trade 0.00* 0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Total immigration 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Unemployment rate 0.05 0.05* 0.05** 0.05** 0.05**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Cross-level interactions
Pol interest  Net paying EU 0.00
transfer (0.02)
Pol interest  Trade 0.00
(0.00)
Nat ident  Net paying EU 0.06
transfers (0.05)
Nat ident  total immigration 0.00
(0.00)
Nat ident  Eurozone 0.05
(0.06)
(continued)
Appendix 223

Table 6.7 (continued)

Cross-level interaction effects for individual identification with Europe 2003
M3a M3b M3c M3d M3e
Variance components
Country level τ00 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Individual level σ 2 0.59 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.58
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Var (pol interest/nat ident) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Cov(pol interest/nat ident, 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
constant) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
2  Log Likelihood 35,772.26 35,630.6 35,556.58 35,557.5 35,557.14
AIC 35,822.26 35,672.61 35,606.57 35,607.51 35,607.13
BIC 36,013.37 35,833.14 35,797.68 35,798.61 35,798.24
R2 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12
No. of groups (N) 15 15 15 15 15
No. of individuals (n) 15,434 15,434 15,434 15,434 15,434
Note: Figures are estimates from linear hierarchical regression models with random coefficients
and cross level interactions. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p  0.001; **p  0.01; *p  0.05;
{p  0.1
Table 6.8 Cross-level interaction effects for individual identification with Europe (2004)
224

Cross-level interaction effects for individual identification with Europe 2004

M3a M3b M3c M3d M3e M3f M3g M3h M3i M3j
Intercept 0.03 0.19 0.14 0.02 0.04 0.15 0.13 0.02 0.07 0.06
(0.18) (0.15) (0.13) (0.16) (0.16) (0.14) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Individual level predictors
Gender (male) 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Community (ref.: rural)
Small town 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Large town 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Education 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Occupation (ref.: other)
Student 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 0.05*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Manager 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
National econ expect.: 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13***
worse (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Personal econ expect.: 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13***
worse (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Political interest 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.10***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .
EU knowledge 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Concept of EU (ref.: other)
Appendix

Common political 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14***
project (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Individual benefits 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
National identification 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.33*** 0.42*** 0.45*** 0.40*** 0.41***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Transnational background 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Country level predictors
Party messages
% overall identity 0.03* 0.02* 0.02* 0.01 0.02* 0.02* 0.02*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
% national identity 0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.01)
% European identity 0.04{
(0.02)
Eurozone 0.18* 0.20* 0.11 0.18* 0.18* 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.03
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
Net paying EU transfers 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.16 0.12 0.23*** 0.34*** 0.41*** 0.32*** 0.32***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06)
Trade 0.00** 0.00** 0.00* 0.00** 0.00** 0.00{ 0.00* 0.00{ 0.00{ 0.00{
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Total immigration 0.02** 0.02* 0.01 0.02** 0.02** 0.01* 0.01** 0.01* 0.01* 0.01*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Unemployment rate 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
(continued)
225
Table 6.8 (continued)
226

Cross-level interaction effects for individual identification with Europe 2004

M3a M3b M3c M3d M3e M3f M3g M3h M3i M3j
Cross-level interactions
Pol interest  party mes- 0.00
sages (total id %) (0.00)
Pol interest  party mes- 0.00
sages (nat id %) (0.00)
Pol interest  party mes- 0.00
sages (EU id %) (0.00)
Pol interest  Net paying 0.02
EU transfer (0.02)
Pol interest  Trade 0.00
(0.00)
Nat ident  party messages 0.01
(total id %) (0.01)
Nat ident  party messages 0.00
(nat id %) (0.01)
Nat ident  Net paying EU 0.09*
transfers (0.04)
Nat ident  total 0.00
immigration (0.00)
Nat ident  Eurozone 0.01
(0.05)
Variance components
Country level τ00 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Individual level σ 2 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .
Var (pol interest/nat ident) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Cov(pol interest/nat ident,
Appendix

0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
cons) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
2  Log Likelihood 54,191.58 54,194.88 54,192.6 54,191.84 54,192.26 54,014.82 54,016.54 54,011.82 54,015.74 54,015.72
AIC 54,245.57 54,248.89 54,246.59 54,245.84 54,246.26 54,068.81 54,070.55 54,065.82 54,069.74 54,069.71
BIC 54,463.59 54,466.91 54,464.62 54,463.86 54,464.28 54,286.83 54,288.57 54,283.84 54,287.76 54,287.74
R2 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
No. of groups (N) 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
No. of individuals (n) 23,740 23,740 23,740 23,740 23,740 23,740 23,740 23,740 23,740 23,740
Note: Figures are estimates from linear hierarchical regression models with random coefficients and cross level interactions. Standard errors in parentheses.
***p  0.001; **p  0.01; *p  0.05; {p  0.1
227
228 6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .

Table 6.9 Cross-level interaction effects for individual identification with Europe (2006)
Cross-level interaction effects for individual identification with Europe 2006
M3a M3b M3c M3d M3e
Intercept 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.27***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Individual level predictors
Gender (male) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Type of community (ref.: rural/village)
Small town 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Large town 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06** 0.06** 0.06**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Education 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Occupation (ref.: other)
Student 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Manager 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.06*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
National economic expect.: 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16***
worse (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Personal economic expect.: 0.07** 0.07** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07***
worse (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Political interest 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
EU knowledge 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Conception of Europe (ref.: other)
Common political project 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Individual benefits 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
National identification 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.36***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Transnational background 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Country level predictors
Eurozone 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05
(0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11)
Net paying EU transfers 0.25* 0.23* 0.19{ 0.18* 0.18*
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.07) (0.07)
Trade 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 0.00** 0.00**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(continued)
Appendix 229

Table 6.9 (continued)

Cross-level interaction effects for individual identification with Europe 2006
M3a M3b M3c M3d M3e
Total immigration 0.01* 0.01* 0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Unemployment rate 0.05** 0.05** 0.02{ 0.02{ 0.02{
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Cross- level interactions
Pol interest  Net paying EU 0.02
transfer (0.03)
Pol interest  Trade 0.00*
(0.00)
Nat ident  Net paying EU 0.01
transfers (0.06)
Nat ident  total immigration 0.00
(0.00)
Nat ident  Eurozone 0.00
(0.06)
Variance components
Country level τ00 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Individual level σ 2 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Var (pol interest/nat ident) 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Cov(pol interest/nat ident, 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02
constant) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
2  Log Likelihood 28,316.58 28,313.38 28,198.2 28,198 28,198.26
AIC 28,368.57 28,365.37 28,250.23 28,249.99 28,250.26
BIC 28,560.63 28,557.44 28,442.3 28,442.05 28,442.33
R2 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
No. of groups (N) 25 25 25 25 25
No. of individuals (n) 11,932 11,932 11,932 11,932 11,932
Note: Figures are estimates from linear hierarchical regression models with random coefficients
and cross level interactions. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p  0.001; **p  0.01; *p  0.05;
{p  0.1
230 6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .

Table 6.10 Cross-level interaction effects for individual identification with Europe (2007)
Cross-level interaction effects for individual identification with Europe 2007
M3a M3b M3c M3d M3e
Intercept 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.29*** 0.33*** 0.39***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Individual level predictors
Gender (male) 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Type of community (ref.: rural/village)
Small town 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Large town 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Education 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Occupation (ref.: other)
Student 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Manager 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
National economic expect.: 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20***
worse (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Personal economic expect.: 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10***
worse (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Political interest 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
EU knowledge 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Conception of Europe (ref.: other)
Common political project 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Individual benefits 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 0.05*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
National identification 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.28*** 0.25*** 0.21***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
European background 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Country level predictors
Eurozone 0.10 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.14
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10)
Net paying EU transfers 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.01 0.01
(0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07)
Trade 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Total immigration 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
(continued)
Appendix 231

Table 6.10 (continued)

Cross-level interaction effects for individual identification with Europe 2007
M3a M3b M3c M3d M3e
Unemployment rate 0.06** 0.06** 0.04* 0.04* 0.04*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Cross-level interactions
Pol interest  Net paying EU 0.00
transfer (0.02)
Pol interest  Trade 0.00
(0.00)
Nat ident  Net paying EU 0.06
transfers (0.04)
Nat ident  total immigration 0.00
(0.00)
Nat ident  Eurozone 0.07{
(0.04)
Variance components
Country level τ00 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Individual level σ 2 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Var (pol interest/nat ident) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Cov(pol interest/nat ident, 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02
constant) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
2  Log Likelihood 61,275.42 61,274.88 61,172.56 61,174.28 61,174.28
AIC 61,327.42 61,326.88 61,224.56 61,226.29 61,226.29
BIC 61,538.93 61,538.4 61,436.08 61,437.81 61,437.81
R2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
No. of groups (N) 27 27 27 27 27
No. of individuals (n) 25,217 25,217 25,217 25,217 25,217
Note: Figures are estimates from linear hierarchical regression models with random coefficients
and cross level interactions. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p  0.001; **p  0.01; *p  0.05;
{p  0.1.
232 6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .

Table 6.11 Cross-level interaction effects for individual identification with Europe (2010)
Cross-level interaction effects for individual identification with Europe 2010
M3a M3b M3c M3d M3e M3f M3g
Intercept 0.17 0.23* 0.24* 0.29** 0.28** 0.27** 0.33***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Individual level predictors
Gender (male) 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Type of community (ref.: rural/village)
Small town 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02* 0.02* 0.02*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Large town 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Education 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Occupation (ref.: other)
Student 0.07* 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.06*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Manager 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Personal eco- 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18***
nomic expect.: (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
worse
National 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.29*** 0.24***
identification (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
Conception of 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
national (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
community
Transnational 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06***
practices (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Transnational 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08***
capital (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Transnational 0.06** 0.06** 0.07** 0.06** 0.06** 0.06** 0.06**
background (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Eurozone 0.16{ 0.16{ 0.16{ 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.03
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Net paying EU 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03
transfers (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Trade 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Total 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
immigration (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Unemployment 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
rate (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
IMF 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.13 0.11 0.19 0.13
conditionality (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.12)
Cross-level interactions
Education  Net 0.04
paying EU (0.02)
transfer
(continued)
Appendix 233

Table 6.11 (continued)

Cross-level interaction effects for individual identification with Europe 2010
M3a M3b M3c M3d M3e M3f M3g
Education  0.00
Trade (0.00)
Education  0.02
IMF (0.03)
Nat ident  Net 0.01
paying EU (0.04)
transfers
Nat ident  total 0.00
immigration (0.00)
Nat ident  IMF 0.05
(0.05)
Nat ident  0.08*
Eurozone (0.03)
Variance components
Country level 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
τ00 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Individual level 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64
σ2 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Var (education/ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
nat ident) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Cov(education/ 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
nat ident, (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
constant)
2  Log 58,973.18 58,975.66 58,975.44 58,952.58 58,951.88 58,951.34 58,948
Likelihood
AIC 59,023.18 59,025.67 59,025.44 59,002.57 59,001.87 59,001.34 58,998.01
BIC 59,225.99 59,228.47 59,228.25 59,205.38 59,204.68 59,204.14 59,200.81
R2 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
No. of groups 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
(N)
No. of individ- 24,641 24,641 24,641 24,641 24,641 24,641 24,641
uals (n)
Note: Figures are estimates from linear hierarchical regression models with random coefficients
and cross level interactions. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p  0.001; **p  0.01; *p  0.05;
{p  0.1
234 6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .

Table 6.12 Cross-level interaction effects for individual identification with Europe (2012)
Cross-level interaction effects for individual identification with Europe 2012
M3a M3b M3c M3d M3e M3f M3g
Intercept 0.23** 0.23** 0.23** 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.20** 0.27***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Individual level predictors
Gender (male) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Community (ref.: rural)
Small town 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Large town 0.02{ 0.02{ 0.02{ 0.02{ 0.02{ 0.02{ 0.02{
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Education 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Occupation (ref.: other)
Student 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Manager 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
National eco- 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16***
nomic expect.: (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
worse
Personal eco- 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11***
nomic expect.: (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
worse
Political interest 0.02* 0.02** 0.02** 0.03*** 0.03** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
EU knowledge 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
EU Conception (ref.: other)
Common 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22***
political project (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Individual 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09***
benefits (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
National 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.27*** 0.20***
identification (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Transnational 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09***
contacts (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Transnational 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02***
capital (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Country level predictors
Eurozone 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.16*
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Net paying EU 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00
transfers (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
Trade 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Total immigra- 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
tion rate (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
(continued)
Appendix 235

Table 6.12 (continued)

Cross-level interaction effects for individual identification with Europe 2012
M3a M3b M3c M3d M3e M3f M3g
Unemployment 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
rate (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
IMF 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.18{ 0.18{ 0.29** 0.18{
conditionality (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09)
Cross-level interactions
Pol interest  0.02
Net paying EU (0.02)
transfer
Pol interest  0.00
Trade (0.00)
Pol interest  0.02
IMF (0.03)
Nat ident  Net 0.03
paying EU (0.04)
transfers
Nat ident  total 0.00
immigration (0.00)
Nat ident  IMF 0.10{
(0.06)
Nat ident  0.08*
Eurozone (0.04)
Variance components
Country level 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
τ00 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Individual level 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60
σ2 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Var (pol inter- 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
est/nat ident) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Cov(pol interest/ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
nat ident, (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
constant)
2  Log 59,994.84 59,994.88 59,994.86 59,851.56 59,848.64 59,849.26 59,847.92
Likelihood
AIC 60,050.48 60, 60, 59,907.56 59,904.63 59,905.26 59,903.92
050.88 050.85
BIC 60,278.78 60,279.19 60,279.16 60,135.87 60,132.94 60,133.56 60,132.23
R2 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
No. of groups 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
(N)
No. of individ- 25,687 25,687 25,687 25,687 25,687 25,687 25,687
uals (n)
Note: Figures are estimates from linear hierarchical regression models with random coefficients
and cross level interactions. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p  0.001; **p  0.01; *p  0.05;
{p  0.1
236 6 Explaining European Identification: The Impact of Enlargement and the. . .

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Chapter 7
The State of European Identity After
the Crisis: Implications for Research
and Policymaking

A common identity of Europeans has long been a concern for scholars of European
integration and European policymakers alike. Despite the importance attributed to
the emergence of European identity among EU citizens for the legitimacy and long-
term survival of the EU, the individuals seeing themselves as ‘Europeans’ and the
processes leading them to identify with Europe have received less attention.
Empirically, European identification is widespread among the EU population
today. If asked about their European allegiances, a majority of EU citizens express
some form of identification with the European level. Yet although important steps
towards an ‘ever closer union’ among Europeans have been completed at the
institutional level—Europeans can now move freely between member states, rarely
need to show their passport at national borders, and pay with the same currency in
large parts of the EU—, the share of citizens identifying with Europe has hardly
changed over the past decades. Based on this observation, the present study set out
from the basic question: Why do people identify with Europe?

7.1 Taking Stock of Citizens’ Identification with Europe

from the Maastricht Treaty to Eastward Enlargement
and the Crisis

Empirically, this book took stock of levels and development of citizens’ identifi-
cation with Europe and its determinants from the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty
1992 to the EU’s enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe in 2004/2007 and the
financial and economic crisis that has been affecting the EU and its member states
since late 2008.
It started by describing levels and development of European identification
among EU citizens from 1992, the year the Maastricht Treaty was signed, until
2013, when the financial and economic crisis of 2008/2009 had turned into a

© Springer International Publishing AG 2018 239

S. Bergbauer, Explaining European Identity Formation,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67708-8_7
240 7 The State of European Identity After the Crisis: Implications for Research. . .

sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone. Exploring changes in European identification

over the past two decades, it provided an update on the strength and development of
European identification among EU citizens in recent years and in particular since
the EU’s enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe in 2004/2007 and the onset of
the financial and economic crisis in late 2008. The empirical evidence showed that
identification with Europe is a widespread phenomenon among EU citizens by now.
The majority of EU citizens see themselves as Europeans, express attachment to
Europe and the European Union, and are proud to be European. Neither the EU’s
enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe nor the financial and economic crisis led
to dramatic shifts in citizens’ identification with Europe. Levels of European
identification increased slightly after the 2004 accession round and although the
new CEE member states started out from lower levels of European identification
than the EU15 in 2004, they have since shown largely similar trends in identifica-
tion. After the onset of the financial and economic crisis in late 2008, more rather
than less respondents saw themselves (also) as Europeans. In contrast, affective
attachments to the European Union decreased over the same period, especially in
the Eurozone and in some of the member states hit hardest by the crisis. Rather than
causing a sudden drop, the crisis thus appears to have resulted in a gradual
weakening of citizens’ affective ties to Europe.
Large parts of the EU population hold multiple identifications, identifying with
the national and the European community at the same time. They describe them-
selves as nationals and Europeans and feel attached to both the national and the
European level. The number of citizens with multiple identifications has remained
fairly stable over the two decades under analysis. Neither the EU’s enlargement to
CEE nor the onset of the crisis led to a rise in national identifications to the
detriment of European identifications; rather, citizens continued to identify as
both nationals and Europeans even as the EU became more heterogeneous and
economic conditions worsened. This seems remarkable especially in the case of the
economic and financial crisis, which sparked vivid debates over mutual obligations
within the EU and made apparent conflicts of (financial) interest between member
states. Media accounts of the EU’s response to the crisis often took the form of
‘good’ vs. ‘bad’ member states and reported widely on controversies among
national governments over financial rescue measures (Dinan 2012, 2013a, b;
Mazzoni and Barbieri 2014; Puetter 2012). The tendency of posing national against
European interests did not catch on at the citizen level. Unlike what might have
been expected, there was no generalised upsurge of exclusive national identifica-
tions during the crisis years.
In a second step, the empirical analysis turned to the party level and examined
the salience of European identity issues among national political parties from 1979
to 2014. It tackled the question whether parties’ emphasis on European identity
issues changed over the course of EU integration and in response to the EU’s
eastward enlargement 2004/2007 and the onset of the financial and economic crisis
in 2008. In this way, it provided information on a theoretically important influence
on European attitudes—namely messages and communications by political elites—
that had not been examined with a view to European identification so far. The
7.1 Taking Stock of Citizens’ Identification with Europe from the. . . 241

analysis of party manifestos showed that European identity is not a minor issue for
national political parties, either. Across the EU, parties dedicate sizeable shares of
their election programmes to identity-related issues, which account for up to 10% of
manifesto arguments. In the 2004 EP election campaign that took place in the
context of CEE enlargement, identity issues became more salient in manifestos as
parties put more emphasis on issues of national identity and community. In contrast,
the salience of identity issues decreased in almost all member states in the 2009
campaign as parties’ attention shifted to economic issues in the wake of the
financial and economic crisis of 2008/2009. Manifesto excerpts from the most
recent EP election campaign in 2014 indicate a renewed emphasis on identity. It
seems that parties started to link economic issues more closely to identity issues in
their campaign as the crisis turned from a crisis of the financial system and the real
economy into a sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone that required extensive
financial rescue measures and increased controversies over member states’ obliga-
tions for mutual support and (financial) solidarity.
Comparing the salience of European identity at the citizen and the party level,
we observed similar trends. European identity is widespread at the citizen level in
member states like Germany, Italy, France, or Luxembourg and political parties in
these countries, too, tend to emphasise a common European identity and commu-
nity alongside issues of national identity and community. In contrast, in the UK,
European identity is comparatively weak at the citizen level and political parties
devote little attention to issues of European identity. The member-state specific
patterns remain relatively stable over time. At least to some extent, the measures of
European identity at the citizen and the party level thus seem to reproduce the
general relevance of questions of identity and community in member state societies
rather than short-time concerns in public opinion and party strategies in a given
campaign. In a way, there appears to be a third variable at work that influences the
relevance of European and national identity at both the citizen and the party level.
We may think of this ‘third variable’ as the national ‘European’ political culture or
national ‘collective memory’ of European integration that comprises country-
specific narratives of European integration, member states’ historical approaches
to European integration, and their relationship to the European Union. This ‘col-
lective memory’ with regard to Europe and the EU is transmitted to citizens in
socialisation processes, but also structures political debates and the discourse of
political elites and could thus explain the parallels in the importance of European
and national identities among national populations and political parties.
The third part of the empirical analysis turned to explanation of citizens’
identification with Europe. It provided evidence on the factors influencing individ-
ual identification with Europe and changes in the determinants of European iden-
tification in the period 2000 to 2012. It was particularly interested in changes in the
sources of European identification over time and in response to the EU’s enlarge-
ment to CEE 2004/2007 and the onset of the financial and economic crisis in late
2008. The statistical analysis found individual identification with Europe to depend
on individual-level attributes rather than country-level characteristics in all years
under analysis.
242 7 The State of European Identity After the Crisis: Implications for Research. . .

At the individual level, political interest, interest in European politics, and

knowledge about the EU were among the strongest predictors of European identi-
fication; likewise, national identification and personal transnational experiences
had strong positive effects on European identification. EU citizens identify with
Europe because they are interested in and familiar with (European) politics,
because they identify strongly with their home country, and because they have
family and friends abroad or otherwise engage in trans-border activities. The more
citizens are cognitively and practically engaged with Europe—by discussing
European politics with friends and relatives and following the European and
international news, by socialising with people from other EU member states,
e.g. because they attend school abroad, study at a foreign university, or work
outside their home country—the more see themselves as Europeans and develop
affective ties to Europe.
At the country level, only member states’ net contributions to the EU budget had
significant effects on European identification in the period under analysis. Until the
late 2000s, citizens from countries that paid more into the EU budget than they got
out, i.e. the net payers of EU transfers, identified more with Europe; since the onset
of the financial and economic crisis in 2008, this effect has been reversed. As the
crisis evolved into a sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, citizens in the net payer
states—which also gave the largest financial guarantees—appear to have become
more critical. Now, they identify less with Europe than their peers in the net
recipient countries of EU funding.
The analysis also tested whether the effects of country-level determinants
depend on respondents’ degree of political interest or the strength of their national
attachments. The influence of member state characteristics did not differ by respon-
dents’ level of political interest. For example, party messages on issues of European
and national community and identity had similar effects among citizens claiming to
be highly interested in political affairs and those with little interest in politics.
Neither did citizens in the net paying member states identify more or less with
Europe if they were more interested in politics. This non-finding may be interpreted
as the result of a generalised obliviousness to party communications and the
national costs of EU integration; in a more optimistic view, it may also indicate
that the ‘knowledge gap’ between the highly interested and those with little interest
in politics is less significant than expected.
National attachments, on the other hand, appeared to have different effects on
European identification in different domestic contexts and under different eco-
nomic conditions. In particular, we found interaction effects between citizens’
national identification and economic indicators such as member states’ contribu-
tions to the EU budget, Eurozone membership, and whether or not member states
received conditional financial aids from the EU/IMF. In most cases, however, the
results ran counter to theoretical expectations. First of all, national identification
positively affected European identification in all groups of member states, whether
or not they were net contributors to the EU budget, members of the Eurozone, or
under EU/IMF conditionality. Intuitively, we might have expected citizens’ with
strong national attachments to be more critical of their country’s contributions to
7.1 Taking Stock of Citizens’ Identification with Europe from the. . . 243

the EU budget, the loss of monetary sovereignty in the Eurozone, or interventions

by EU and IMF, resulting in negative or at least weaker effects of national
identification on European identification in these country groups. Empirically,
this is not always the case. Until 2003, national identification had stronger (positive)
effects on European identification in net contributing rather than in net recipient
countries of EU transfers; only from 2004 onwards have citizens with strong
national attachments in net paying member states identified less with Europe than
their peers in net recipient member states. Living inside or outside the Eurozone
only starts to matter for the relationship between national and European identifica-
tion in the late 2000s; yet even in the crisis, we find that national identifications
have stronger positive effects on European identification within the Eurozone than
outside. In countries under EU/IMF conditionality, finally, we find the expected
relationship between national identification, adverse economic conditions, and
European identification. National identification has smaller effects on European
identification in countries under EU/IMF conditionality than in other member
states. That is, respondents who feel strongly attached to the nation and who
experienced austerity programmes as conditions of financial aids by the EU and
IMF identify less with Europe than their peers with equally strong national attach-
ments, but living in countries not under EU/IMF conditionality. Still, even in
countries under EU/IMF conditionality, national identification remains positively
related to identification with Europe.
As regards changes in the sources of European identification related to the EU’s
enlargement to CEE in 2004/2007 and the onset of the financial and economic crisis
in late 2008, no major shifts in the individual-level determinants took place over the
accession period or in the course of crisis. Neither political interest nor national
identification had significantly more or less influence on citizens’ propensity to
identify with Europe as new member states from CEE entered the EU and EU
member states experienced economic and financial turmoil in the crisis. At the
country level, we found changes in the effects of member states’ status as a net
contributor to the EU budget in the wake of enlargement and the crisis; likewise, the
effect of Eurozone membership increased during the crisis years. Until 2006,
citizens in net paying member states identified more with Europe; after 2007,
citizens in net paying member states identified less with Europe than their peers
from net recipient member states. This effect intensified as the crisis continued.
Citizens in the Eurozone always tended to identify more with Europe than citizens
form countries outside the monetary union, yet in the crisis years, and in particular
in 2010 at the height of the discussion over a Greek bail-out, the difference between
those living within the Eurozone and those living outside the Eurozone became
even more pronounced. In this respect, enlargement and the crisis indeed seem to
have increased the relevance of economic aspects and redistributive considerations
for citizens’ identification with the European level.
Finally, we find interaction effects between national identification and EU/IMF
conditionality and Eurozone membership. National identification remains posi-
tively related to European identification both in countries receiving and not receiv-
ing conditional financial aids from the EU/IMF and as well as inside and outside the
244 7 The State of European Identity After the Crisis: Implications for Research. . .

Eurozone. Still, the positive influence of national identification is reduced in

countries under EU/IMF conditionality. In contrast, it is stronger within the
Eurozone than outside the monetary union. That is, although in the crisis, both
EU/IMF conditionality and Eurozone membership seem to represent the risks of
economic and financial interdependencies, strong national attachments have differ-
ent consequences for European identification in the two country groups. Hence, the
relationship between national identification and European identification under
adverse economic conditions seems to depend on context and the way the crisis
was represented domestically. In countries receiving conditional financial aids from
the EU/IMF, Greece in particular, the domestic debate focussed on the negative
consequences of austerity measures for the population and the national economy,
and the role of external actors, in particular the troika, in imposing austerity
programmes on national governments and societies (Kouki 2014, p. 19;
Vasilopoulou et al. 2014). In the Eurozone, on the other hand, the focus was on
the need to save the common currency in the interest of the national economy (see
e.g. findings by Bickes et al. 2014; Drewski 2015; Vaara 2014). Citizens seem to
have adopted these argumentations at least so some extent, leading to the observed
differences in the effects of national identification on European identification in
countries under EU/IMF conditionality and the Eurozone. Overall, the findings
presented here indicate that even if adverse economic conditions have a clear
European dimension, they do not automatically lead to anti-European reflexes,
not even among respondents who identify strongly with the national level. Rather,
the tension between the wellbeing of the national community and the role of the EU
must be made salient.

7.2 European Identity and EU Legitimacy After

Maastricht

The evidence on European identification presented in this book also has implica-
tions for the debate on the legitimacy of the EU and a future widening and
deepening of EU integration. From a functional perspective, the emergence of a
collective European identity among citizens in the member states is a crucial
precondition for citizens to accept majority decisions and redistributive policies
at the EU level (Beetham and Lord 1998; Fuchs 2011; Herrmann and Brewer 2004;
Offe 1998; Zürn 2000). At first sight, the empirical findings allow a rather positive
outlook on the development of a European identity among the member state
populations. More than half of those surveyed saw themselves (also) as European
and similar proportions felt attached to the European level between 1992 and 2013.
Large parts of the EU population hold multiple identifications, expressing attach-
ments to both the national and the European level. These are signs of an emergent
collective identity among Europeans.
7.2 European Identity and EU Legitimacy After Maastricht 245

European identity has also proven remarkably stable in critical periods of EU

integration such as the accession of twelve new member states from Central and
Eastern Europe in 2004/2007 and the onset of the financial and economic crisis in
late 2008. The resilience of European identity in the crisis in particular seems
encouraging. In this perspective, the sense of community among Europeans appears
already stronger than expected and may thus provide legitimacy to EU policies and
European solutions to the crisis.
This rather positive outlook on the state of European identity requires some
qualifications, however. First, the extent of collective European identity exceeds its
intensity. While European identification is widespread among EU citizens, it often
remains moderate in degree. Few citizens see themselves only as Europeans or feel
very attached to the European level. In this regard, European identity falls clearly
behind national identities, which build on intense attachments by large parts of the
national public. Second, European identity follows distinct national patterns. We
find consistently high levels of European identity in countries like Germany and
Italy while European identification remains a minority phenomenon in Britain.
Third, the strength of European identity varies depending on the collective object
of identification. Collective European identity is strong if ‘Europe’ is the reference
point, but noticeable weaker in extent and intensity if the reference point is the
European Union. Apparently, Europeans have developed a common we-feeling as
inhabitants of the same geographical or cultural sphere, yet still lack a common
we-feeling as members of the same political community. A robust collective
European identity thus faces a comparatively weaker collective European Union
identity.
This last finding in particular seems crucial for the question of EU legitimacy.
The requirements put on a collective European identity are high. A common
European identity is seen as a means for legitimising the European polity that can
remedy deficits in EU democracy, and strengthen solidarity and loyalty among EU
member states and their populations. It becomes all the more important as output-
oriented forms of EU legitimacy, e.g. based on the effectiveness and generalised
welfare gains of the common market, become less persuasive (Cerutti 2008; Cerutti
and Lucarelli 2008; Scharpf 2015). The financial and economic crisis and the
measures taken by the EU to avoid sovereign defaults in the Eurozone have raised
the stakes further. The extent of fiscal transfers between member states requires
unprecedented levels of solidarity and mutual obligation within the EU and among
citizens in the member states. The crisis thus calls for a common we-feeling as EU
citizens, i.e. as members of an overarching political system that is threatened by the
crisis (rather than a we-feeling as Europeans in the sense of inhabitants of the same
continent or cultural sphere, which will persist regardless of the outcome of the
crisis). In Easton’s terms, citizens in the member states need to develop a feeling of
belonging together as members of a political community, as ‘a group which,
because it shares a political structure, also shares a political fate’ (Easton 1965,
p. 185). It is unclear, however, whether the observed levels of identification with the
EU fulfil these requirements and provide the necessary degree of political cohesion
246 7 The State of European Identity After the Crisis: Implications for Research. . .

and solidarity to legitimate (further) intra-European redistribution and financial

transfers.
National political actors are likely to play a crucial role in this regard. As the
financial and economic crisis continued, EU affairs became more salient and more
politicised in domestic political debates and national elections campaigns (Auel and
H€oing 2014; Hutter and Grande 2014; Hutter and Kerscher 2014; Miklin 2014;
Puntscher Riekmann and Wydra 2013; Rauh and Zürn 2014; Risse 2015; Wendler
2014). Across the EU, the crisis and in particular the financial guaranteed to
member states at risk of sovereign default sparked vivid debates over questions of
national (financial) sovereignty, solidarity between EU member states, and the costs
of integration in terms of fiscal and monetary autonomy (Hutter and Kerscher 2014;
Mazzoni and Barbieri 2014; Schmidt 2014). In debtor and creditor countries alike,
however, accounts of the crisis adopted a national perspective, focussing on the
(negative) consequences of the crisis for the national economy and setting up an
opposition between ‘good’ and ‘bad’, fiscally responsible and irresponsible, mem-
ber states (Mazzoni and Barbieri 2014). Even political actors supporting the bailout
measures rarely framed their support in terms of intra-European solidarity, but
referred to (national) economic interests that were best served by giving financial
guarantees to member states in financial difficulty (Closa and Maatsch 2014;
Schmidt 2014). The evidence presented in this book with regard to the recent EP
election campaigns echoes these findings. As the crisis turned from a crisis of the
real economy into a sovereign debt crisis requiring financial rescue measures and
intra-European transfers, parties appeared to link economic issues more closely to
issues of solidarity and community. Especially on the right, we found parties pitting
national interests against European-wide solidarity. Rather than appealing to a
feeling of ‘being in this together’ as Europeans, political actors appear to have
responded to the crisis by emphasising national (economic) interests over
intra-European solidarity. This tendency is likely to continue given the ongoing
controversy over financial aids for Greece or the debate over proper measures to
boost the economy in the Eurozone, which equally reveals diverging interests
between member states. At the citizen level, these debates are likely to reinforce
concerns for the national (economic) well-being and the cost of EU integration for
the national community. Such concerns risk to weaken ties to the European level
and thus run counter to the development of a strong collective identity as EU
citizens that would be needed to legitimise a further widening and deepening of
EU integration.

7.3 The State of European Identity After the Crisis

and Implications for Policymaking

Which are the implications of the present findings for policymakers and practi-
tioners? The EU has long tried to encourage the formation of a common European
identity among EU citizens through active identity politics (Stråth 2002). Among its
7.3 The State of European Identity After the Crisis and Implications for. . . 247

most prominent programmes is the Erasmus exchange programme in higher edu-

cation, which has recently been transformed into the Erasmusþ programme for
education, training, youth and sport covering exchange programmes for students in
secondary and higher education as well as vocational training.
The findings presented by this book suggest that such efforts to bring Europeans
together are steps in the right direction. The positive effects of personal transna-
tional experiences on citizens’ identification with Europe we observed in all years
under analysis support notions of an experience-based formation of European
identification whereby personal contacts with other Europeans foster citizens’
identification with the European community.
We further found that a high awareness of EU affairs can at least partly
compensate for a lack of personal transnational contacts as a source of European
identification as not all EU citizens may have the resources and opportunities
necessary for transnational activities and personal interactions with other
Europeans. With European identification thus drawing on different—and to some
degree complementary—sources, policy programmes aimed at strengthening a
common identity among Europeans could pursue different strategies: On the one
hand, policymakers could create further opportunities for direct exchanges between
Europeans. Given that transnational experiences are highly stratified by socio-
economic status, with the highly educated and those in managerial positions
being significantly more likely to engage in transnational exchanges (Fligstein
2008; Kuhn 2015), exchange programmes should target in particular citizens in
non-academic professions and those at lower levels of education. These could take
the form of work exchanges for apprentices and students in vocational training or
non-professional exchange programmes, for example in the form of twinning towns
across Europe, which allow transnational contacts outside the workplace and
educational systems as well as for older age groups.
Still, even if intra-European exchange programmes are substantially extended
and succeed in creating contacts between previously not transnationally active
citizens, they will never reach entire member state populations. Complementary
to exchanges programmes, a second line of action could stimulate citizens’ interest
in and improve their knowledge of European politics, e.g. through teaching and
information campaigns about European politics and the EU institutions. In this way,
policymakers could work towards strengthening European identity along an
information-based way of identification. Concrete measures in this regard could
be to work closely with member state authorities to implement EU topics in national
curricula in primary and secondary education or invest in the EU’s local informa-
tion and documentation centres in the member states. By actively providing
EU-related information and hosting EU-focused events, the latter could thus take
on a role in educating the public about EU affairs similar to that of the German
federal and regional agencies for civic education in providing political information
at the national level. From this vantage point, we may also welcome the recent
efforts by the candidates for the Commission presidency to conduct a truly
pan-European EP election campaign, which sought to draw public attention to the
European level and the EU institutions.
248 7 The State of European Identity After the Crisis: Implications for Research. . .

7.4 Suggestions for Further Research on Individual

Identification with Europe

Drawing on the findings of this book, further research on individual identification

with Europe could go in three main directions. First, it could carry forward the
conceptual discussion of individual identification with Europe and its
operationalisation, exploring in more depth citizens’ understanding of the terms
‘Europe’ or ‘the European Union’ in survey items to improve the measurement of
European identification in the mass public. Second, future contributions could add
to the explanation of European identification in the mass public by examining
theoretically and empirically the role of the mass media for citizens’ identification
with Europe. Third, research on European identification should continue to analyse
levels and determinants of European identification in times of economic crisis
beyond the timeframe of this book.
How could researchers carry forward the conceptualisation and
operationalisation of European identification in future analyses of European iden-
tity? The present work conceptualised European identification as citizens’ self-
categorisation as European together with their evaluations of their membership in
the European collective and affective attachments to Europe and other Europeans.
Ideally, researchers could rely on indicators referring to ‘the Europeans’ as collec-
tive object of identification to operationalise European identification in empirical
analyses. However, most available public opinion surveys, the Eurobarometer in
particular, do not include items referring to ‘the Europeans’; rather, survey items
refer to ‘Europe’, the ‘European Union’, or ‘EU citizenship’. This was also the case
for the present analysis. In the absence of indicators of respondents’ relationship to
‘the Europeans’, it relied on respondents’ ‘attachments to Europe’ to operationalise
affective identification with the European level; due to changes in the
Eurobarometer questionnaires, the operationalisation changed from ‘feelings of
attachment to Europe’ to ‘feelings of attachment to the European Union’ during
the period of analysis. Yet there remains some ambiguity as to what people feel
attached to when affirming their attachment to Europe/the European Union. Do
respondents associate different meanings with ‘Europe’ on the one hand and ‘the
European Union’ on the other? Or has the EU succeeded in superimposing itself as
the primary understanding of ‘Europe’? Do respondents equate the terms Europe/
the European Union with the collective of Europeans and/or EU citizens? Does the
reference to the European Union really tap respondents’ attachment to the European
community or rather their evaluation of the EU, its institutions, and policies? And
do respondents’ understandings of Europe/the European Union differ by member
state?
Answers to these questions would allow a validation of how the concept of
European identification has been measured so far and inform the interpretation of
empirical results. For example, a better understanding of the meanings citizens
associate with ‘Europe’ on the one hand and ‘the European Union’ on the other
could help explain the differences we observe in levels of attachments to Europe
7.4 Suggestions for Further Research on Individual Identification with Europe 249

and the European Union and, in particular, the observed country differences in the
gap between attachment to Europe and attachment to the European Union. Large-n
survey instruments and quantitative research can only provide limited information
on respondents’ understanding of ‘Europe’ or the ‘European Union’. Qualitative
research could provide further insights by using in-depth interviews to get a better
grasp on response behaviour in the context of EU integration research. Such
analyses could tie in with previous qualitative work pointing to the heterogeneity
of citizens’ understanding of ‘Europe’, ‘European identity’, or ‘being European’
(Diez Medrano 2003, 2010; Duchesne 2010). At the theoretical level, the inquiry
into citizens’ understanding of ‘Europe’ ought to be accompanied by a discussion of
the implications of the different objects of identification—Europe on the one hand,
the European Union on the other—for conceptualisations of European identification
rooted in social psychology. Social psychological approaches to identity are pri-
marily concerned with identification with ‘social groups’ or ‘social categories’ such
as gender, nation, or race. Conceptually, future research ought to discuss more
thoroughly, why ‘Europe’/the ‘European Union’, too, represent social categories of
this type. An in-depth analysis of citizens’ understanding of different stimuli—
Europe, the European Union, the Europeans etc.—could inform this discussion by
clarifying whether, empirically, citizens perceive Europe indeed as a social group
or rather as a geographic region, cultural sphere, or something else entirely.
A second question for further research could be the role of the mass media in
citizens’ identification with Europe. The present analysis only implicitly took into
account media effects on European identification, assuming for example that party
manifesto contents are disseminated via the mass media or that the increased media
attention to EU affairs in the course of the crisis gave citizens easier access to
EU-related information. Experimental research by Michael Bruter and Sarah Har-
rison suggests that EU-related news and the tone of EU coverage indeed affect
citizens’ identification with Europe (Bruter 2009; Harrison and Bruter 2015). Media
effects are a well-known phenomenon in public opinion research (McGuire 1985;
Zaller 1992). In the context of EU integration studies, media coverage of EU affairs
has been shown to affect attitudes towards EU integration in general (de Vreese
2007; Scharkow and Vogelgesang 2010; Semetko et al. 2003; Vliegenthart et al.
2008), support for EU enlargement (Azrout et al. 2012; de Vreese and
Boomgaarden 2006), and voting decisions in EU referenda (Hobolt 2009; Schuck
and de Vreese 2011). So far, however, no large-n comparative study has systemat-
ically assessed the role of the media in citizens’ identification with Europe.1
Conceptually, research on media effects on European identification could tie in
with the idea of information-based identification introduced by this book. Citizens
regularly cite the mass media as their primary source for news on European political
matters and information about the EU, its institutions, and policies (European

1
The analyses by Bruter (2009) and Harrison and Bruter (2015) are based on data from the period
1999–2003 and include only six member states (Belgium, France, Germany, Portugal, Sweden,
and the UK).
250 7 The State of European Identity After the Crisis: Implications for Research. . .

Commission 2013). The mass media are thus an important factor on the supply side
of EU-related information, regulating citizens’ access to information about EU
affairs and the type of information they receive about EU affairs. Researchers
could introduce the amount and tone of media coverage of EU integration as an
additional country-level determinant in an explanatory model of individual identi-
fication with Europe.
Third, future research should assess what is next for European identity. This
book presented evidence on levels and development of European identification until
November 2013. It last assessed the determinants of individual identification with
Europe in spring 2012. Future work ought to explore the development of European
identification among EU citizens beyond the period of analysis of the present work
and examine the long-term effects of economic decline on citizens’ identification
with Europe. There is reason to assume that negative effects of the crisis on
citizens’ attitudes towards EU integration accumulate over time, leading to a
gradual weakening of citizens’ ties to the European level. By extending the time
series presented in this book, future research could draw more solid conclusions
with regard to the long-term consequences of economic crisis and heightened
controversy over EU integration for citizens’ identification with Europe. This
should include time series for both the EU aggregate and individual member states
to assess whether the ongoing crisis has resulted in diverging trends in European
identification among EU member states.
Beyond describing the evolution of European identity over the course of the
crisis, future research should also reassess the determinants of European identifi-
cation among EU citizens. The present work found macroeconomic indicators to
become more relevant for citizens’ identification with Europe as the crisis contin-
ued; it also showed that the effects of national identification on European identifi-
cation depend on (economic) context. Since 2012, economic disparities in the EU
have further increased while controversies over the best way to consolidate national
finances and stimulate economic growth have intensified, especially in the
Eurozone. Are these developments reflected in changes in the determinants of
European identification? Have macroeconomic predictors become yet more impor-
tant? Does national identification still have a positive influence on European
identification, despite growing conflicts over member states’ national interests?
More explanatory analyses of European identification could help answer these
questions and thus allow conclusions about the sources of European identification
and their stability in times of crisis.
Besides the evolution of collective European identity among EU citizens in the
crisis, political parties and their role in making identity issues salient in national
political debates also warrant further analysis. In particular, future contributions
could reassess the role of political parties in the formation of individual identifica-
tion with Europe. A more thorough analysis of the 2014 EP election manifestos
could help establish to what extent parties have started to link identity issues more
closely to economic issues as the crisis brought to the fore diverging (economic)
interests between member states. The present analysis only found weak effects of
party messages on citizens’ identification with Europe when assessing the influence
References 251

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could match parties with their respective supporters, using party-specific rather than
national salience scores as an explanatory variable of European identification. This
would allow an assessment of whether parties succeed in influencing their own
supporters when emphasising issues of European and national identity in their
campaigns.

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