EN BANC 

DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ G.R. No. 141524

FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO,

LOLITO VICTORIANO, JACOB

OBANIA AND DOMINGO ' Present :

CABACUNGAN ,

Petitioners, DAVIDE, JR., C.J.

PUNO,

PANGANIBAN,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

CARPIO,

- v e r s u s' - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES,

CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO and
GARCIA, JJ.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS

OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO ,

namely : FE, CORAZON, JOSEFA,

SALVADOR and CARMEN, all

surnamed DEL MUNDO, LAND BANK

OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON.

ANTONIO N. ROSALES, Presiding

Judge, Branch 43, Regional Trial

Court, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro,

Respondents . Promulgated :

September 14, 2005

x-----------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N 

CORONA, J.:

Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito Victoriano, Jacob Obania
and Domingo Cabacungan filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or
reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 43, of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of
Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo, namely, Fe, Corazon,
Josefa, Salvador and Carmen.

In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both petitioners and respondents) filed various
motions with the trial court. Among these were: (1) the motion filed by petitioners to declare
the respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest Development in default
and (2) the motions to dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the
Philippines, respectively.

In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by public respondent Judge Antonio N.
Rosales, resolved the foregoing motions as follows: (1) the petitioners' motion to declare
respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development in default was granted for
their failure to file an answer, but denied as against the respondent heirs of del Mundo because
the substituted service of summons on them was improper; (2) the Land Bank's motion to
dismiss for lack of cause of action was denied because there were hypothetical admissions and
matters that could be determined only after trial, and (3) the motion to dismiss filed by
respondent heirs of del Mundo, based on prescription, was also denied because there were
factual matters that could be determined only after trial. [1]
The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to
dismiss on the ground that the trial court could very well resolve the issue of prescription from
the bare allegations of the complaint itself without waiting for the trial proper.

In an order [2] dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint on the
ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the
order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15 th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed
a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing
the motion for reconsideration [3] which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later,
on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal [4] and paid the appeal fees on August 3,
1998.

On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight
days late. [5] This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998. [6]

Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals.

In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal.
They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998
since this' was' the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for
reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had
elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal. [7]

On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-
day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received
the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the
order was the 'final order appealable under the Rules. It held further: 

Perforce the petitioners' tardy appeal was correctly dismissed for the
(P)erfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the manner
prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal
requirement is fatal and effectively renders the judgment final and executory. [8]
 

 
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision. This was denied
by the Court of Appeals on January 6, 2000.

In this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules, petitioners ascribe the following
errors allegedly committed by the appellate court:  

I
 
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS'
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS AND IN AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF
THE HON. JUDGE ANTONIO N. ROSALES WHICH DISMISSED THE PETITIONERS'
APPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. C-36 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43,
ROXAS, ORIENTAL MINDORO, EVEN AFTER THE PETITIONERS HAD PAID THE
APPEAL DOCKET FEES.
 
II
 
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN RULING AND
AFFIRMING THE DECISION OR ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT HON. ANTONIO M.
ROSALES THAT PETITIONERS' APPEAL WAS FILED OUT OF TIME WHEN
PETITIONERS RECEIVED THE LAST OR FINAL ORDER OF THE COURT ON JULY 22,
1998 AND FILED THEIR NOTICE OF APPEAL ON JULY 27, 1998 AND PAID THE
APPEAL DOCKET FEE ON AUGUST 3, 1998.
 
III
 
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
WORDS 'FINAL ORDER IN SECTION 3, RULE 41, OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE WILL REFER TO THE [FIRST] ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE HON.
ANTONIO M. MORALES DATED FEBRUARY 12, 1998 INSTEAD OF THE LAST AND
FINAL ORDER DATED JULY 1, 1998 COPY OF WHICH WAS RECEIVED BY
PETITIONERS THROUGH COUNSEL ON JULY 22, 1998.
 
IV.
 
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
DECISION IN THE CASE OF DENSO, INC. V. IAC, 148 SCRA 280, IS APPLICABLE IN
THE INSTANT CASE THEREBY IGNORING THE PECULIAR FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE AND THE FACT THAT THE SAID DECISION WAS
RENDERED PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE. [9]

 
The foregoing issues essentially revolve around the period within which petitioners should have
filed their notice of appeal.

First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is
merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with
the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the
requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to
appeal. [10] The period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural rules. BP 129, [11] as
amended, provides:

Sec. 39. Appeals. ' The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days
counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or
decision appealed from. Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases, the
period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of judgment
appealed from. x x x

Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: 

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken within fifteen
(15) days from the notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where
a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a
record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice of judgment or final
order.
 
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed. (emphasis supplied)

Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment
or final order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case,
leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits
which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights
and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an
action. [12]

As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
reconsideration should be construed as the 'final order, not the February 12, 1998 order which
dismissed their complaint. Since they received their copy of the denial of their motion for
reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day reglementary period to appeal had not yet
lapsed when they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998.

What therefore should be deemed as the 'final order, receipt of which triggers the start of the
15-day reglementary period to appeal ' the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or
the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the MR?

In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., [13] the trial court declared
petitioner Quelnan non-suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the
order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was
filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received another
order, this time dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was
likewise dismissed ― for having been filed out of time.

The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after the dismissal of
his complaint since this was the final order that was appealable under the Rules. We reversed
the trial court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order
of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues
raised there.

This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et
al. [14] where we again considered the order denying petitioner Apuyan's motion for
reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.

Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners' view that the order dated July 1,
1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.

We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start of the 15-day reglementary
period to appeal, did petitioners in fact file their notice of appeal on time?

Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of judgment or final order to
appeal the decision of the trial court. On the 15 th day of the original appeal period (March 18,
1998), petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but instead opted to file a motion for
reconsideration. According to the trial court, the MR only interrupted the running of the 15-day
appeal period. [15] It ruled that petitioners, having filed their MR on the last day of the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal upon
receipt of the notice of denial of their MR. Petitioners, however, argue that they were entitled
under the Rules to a fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the 'final order or the order
dismissing their motion for reconsideration.

In Quelnan and Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of

the trial court. We ruled there that they only had the remaining time of the 15-day appeal
period to file the notice of appeal. We consistently applied this rule in similar
cases, [16] premised on the long-settled doctrine that the perfection of an appeal in the
manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional. [17] The rule is also founded on deep-seated considerations of public policy and
sound practice that, at risk of occasional error, the judgments and awards of courts must
become final at some definite time fixed by law. [18]

Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court read:

Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. ' Appeal maybe taken by serving upon the adverse
party and filing with the trial court within thirty (30) days from notice of order
or judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal. The
time during which a motion to set aside the judgment or order or for new trial
has been pending shall be deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy the
requirements of Rule 37.
 
But where such motion has been filed during office hours of the last day of the
period herein provided, the appeal must be perfected within the day following
that in which the party appealing received notice of the denial of said
motion. [19] (emphasis supplied)

According to the foregoing provision, the appeal period previously consisted of 30 days. BP 129,
however, reduced this appeal period to 15 days. In the deliberations of the Committee on
Judicial Reorganization [20] that drafted BP 129, the raison d etre behind the amendment was
to shorten the period of appeal [21] and enhance the efficiency and dispensation of justice. We
have since required strict observance of this reglementary period of appeal. Seldom have we
condoned late filing of notices of appeal, [22] and only in very exceptional instances to better
serve the ends of justice.

In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v. Municipality of

Libmanan, [23] however, we declared that appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and
the rules of procedure should not be applied rigidly. This Court has on occasion advised the
lower courts to be cautious about not depriving a party of the right to appeal and that every
party litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of
his cause, free from the constraint of technicalities.

In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals, [24] we stated that, as a rule, periods which require litigants
to do certain acts must be followed unless, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the
filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice. There, we condoned the
delay incurred by the appealing party due to strong considerations of fairness and justice.

In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, we have
not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application
of the Rules. In those situations where technicalities were dispensed with, our decisions were
not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. But we hasten to
add that in those rare cases where procedural rules were not stringently applied, there always
existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the
courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of
procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just
and proper disposition of his cause. [25]

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. [26] It has the sole
prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive
process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the
Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, [27] 43 [28] and 45, [29] the Court allows extensions of
time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These
extensions may consist of 15 days or more.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity
to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within
which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. [30]

Henceforth, this 'fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the
Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the
Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies [31] to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the
Supreme Court. [32] The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be
counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration
(whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of
15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for
reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules
which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final
order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word 'or signifies disassociation and
independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in
which it ordinarily implies. [33] Hence, the use of 'or in the above provision supposes that the
notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days
from notice of the 'final order, which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order
denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.

Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the
appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of
appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still
applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion
for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the
assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize
and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have
judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice
fairly.

In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal
period should be counted ' from receipt of notice of judgment (March 3, 1998) or from receipt
of notice of 'final order appealed from (July 22, 1998).

To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt
of the Regional Trial Court's decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the 'final
order') denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-
day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final
and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.

Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the
order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal
was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed. [34]

 
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the applicability of Denso (Philippines), Inc. v. IAC [35] since
the Court of Appeals never even referred to it in its assailed decision.

WHEREFORE , the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision of the Court of

Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the records of this case be remanded to the
Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-2352            July 26, 1910

ELADIO ALONSO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TOMAS VILLAMOR, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Ledesma, Sumulong and Quintos, for appellants.

J. C. Knudson, for appellee.

MORELAND, J.:

This is an action brought to recover of the defendants the value of certain articles taken
from a Roman Catholic Church located in the municipality of Placer, and the rental
value of the church and its appurtenances, including the church cemetery, from the 11th
day of December, 1901, until the month of April, 1904. After hearing the evidence, the
court below gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P1,581, with interest at
6 per cent from the date of the judgment. The said sum of P1,581 was made up of two
items, one of which, P741, was for the value of the articles taken from the church, and
the other, P840, the rental value of the premises during the occupations by defendants.
From this judgment the defendants appealed to this court.

It appears that the defendants were on the 11th day of December, 1901, members of
the municipal board of the municipality of Placer, and that they on that date addressed
to the plaintiff in this case, who was the priest in charge of the church, its appurtenances
and contents, the following letter:

          PLACER, 11th December, 1901.

R. P. ELADIO ALONSO, Benedicto, Suriago.

 ESTEEMED PADRE: After saluting you, we take the liberty of writing you that in
the municipality of which we have charged we have received an order from the
provincial fiscal, dated the 5th instant, which says: "The cemeteries, convents,
and the other buildings erected on land belonging to the town at the expense of
the town and preserved by it belong to the town, and for this reason the
municipality is under the obligation of administering them and of collecting the
revenues therefrom, and for this reason we notify you that from this date all of the
revenues and products therefrom must be turned into the treasury of the
municipality in order that the people may properly preserve them.

In the same way we notify you that the image of St. Vicente which is now in the
church, as it is an image donated to the people by its owner, by virtue of said
order is also the property of said people, and therefore the alms which are given
it by the devotees thereof must be also turned into the municipal treasury for the
proper preservation of the church and for other necessary purposes. We hope
that you will view in the proper light and that you will deliver to the bearer of this
letter the key of the alms box of the said image in order that we may comply with
our obligation in conformity with the dispositions of said order.

We beg to remain as always by your spiritual sons. Q. B. S. M.

(Signed) ANDRES OJEDA.

TOMAS VILLAMOR.

ANDRES CALINAUAN.

BERNARDINO TANDOY.

EUSEBIO LIRIO.

ELEUTERIO MONDAYA.

MAXIMO DELOLA.

SEGUNDO BECERRO.

ONOFRE ELIMANCE.

On the 13th of December, 1901, the defendants took possession of the church and its
appurtenances, and also of all of the personal property contained therein. The plaintiff,
as priest of the church and the person in charge thereof, protested against the
occupation thereof by the defendants, but his protests received no consideration, and
he was summarily removed from possession of the church, its appurtenances and
contents.
The only defense presented by the defendants, except the one that the plaintiff was not
the real party in interest, was that the church and other buildings had been erected by
funds voluntarily contributed by the people of that municipality, and that the articles
within the church had been purchased with funds raised in like manner, and that,
therefore, the municipality was the owner thereof.

The question as to the ownership of the church and its appurtenances, including the
convent and cemetery, was before this court on the 23rd day of September, 1908, in an
action entitled "The Roman Catholic Apostolic Church against the municipality of
Placer."1 Substantially the same facts were presented on the part of the defendants in
that case as are presented by the defendants in this. The question there litigated was
the claim upon the part of the municipality of ownership of said church and its
appurtenances on the ground that according to Spanish law the Roman Catholic
Apostolic Church was not the owner of such property, having only the use thereof for
ordinary ecclesiastical and religious purposes, and that the true owner thereof was the
municipality or the State by reason of the contributions by them, or by the people, of the
land and of the funds with which the buildings were constructed or repaired. The court
decided in that case that the claim of the defendants was not well founded and that the
property belonged to the Roman Catholic Church. The same question was discussed
and decided in the case of Barlin vs. Ramirez (7 Phil. Rep., 41), and the case of The
Municipality of Ponce vs. Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in Porto Rico (28 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 737, 6 Off. Gaz., 1213).

We have made a careful examination of the record and the evidence in this case and
we have no doubt that the property sued for was, at the time it was taken by the
defendants, the property of the Roman Catholic Church, and that the seizure of the
same and occupation of the church and its appurtenances by the defendants were
wrongful and illegal. We are also convinced, from such examination, that the
conclusions of the court below as to the value of the articles taken by the defendants
and of the rent of the church for the time of its illegal occupation by the defendants were
correct and proper. While some objection was made on appeal by counsel for the
defendants that the value of the articles taken and of the rent of the church and its
appurtenances had not been proved by competent evidence, no objection to the
introduction of the evidence of value was made at the trial and we can not consider that
question raised for the first time here.

We have carefully examined the assignments of error made by counsel for defendants
on this appeal. We find none of them well founded. The only one which deserves
especial attention at our hands is the one wherein the defendants assert that the court
below erred in permitting the action to be brought and continued in the name of the
plaintiff instead of in the name of the bishop of the diocese within which the church was
located, or in the name of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, as the real party in
interest.

It is undoubted the bishop of the diocese or the Roman Catholic Apostic Church itself is
the real party in interest. The plaintiff personally has no interest in the cause of action.
Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that every action must be
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. The plaintiff is not such party.

Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, however, provides:

SEC. 110. Amendments in general. — The court shall, in furtherance of justice,

and on such terms, if any, as may be proper, allow a party to amend any
pleading or proceeding and at any stage of the action, in either the Court of First
Instance or the Supreme Court, by adding or striking out the name of any party,
either plaintiff or defendant, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or
a mistaken or inadequate allegation or description in any other respect so that
the actual merits of the controversy may speedily be determined, without regard
to technicalities, and in the most expeditious, and inexpensive manner. The court
may also, upon like terms, allow an answer or other pleading to be made after
the time limited by the rules of the court for filing the same. Orders of the court
upon the matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in
court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.

Section 503 of the same code provides:

SEC. 503. Judgment not to be reversed on technical grounds. — No judgment

shall be reversed on formal or technical grounds, or for such error as has not
prejudiced the real rights of the excepting party.

We are confident under these provisions that this court has full power, apart from that
power and authority which is inherent, to amend the process, pleadings, proceedings,
and decision in this case by substituting, as party plaintiff, the real party in interest. Not
only are we confident that we may do so, but we are convinced that we should do so.
Such an amendment does not constitute, really a change in the identity of the parties.
The plaintiff asserts in his complaint, and maintains that assertion all through the record,
that he is engaged in the prosecution of this case, not for himself, but for the bishop of
the diocese—not by his own right, but by right of another. He seeks merely to do for the
bishop what the bishop might do for himself. His own personality is not involved. His
own rights are not presented. He claims no interest whatever in the litigation. He seeks
only the welfare of the great church whose servant he is. Gladly permits his identity to
be wholly swallowed up in that of his superior. The substitution, then, of the name of the
bishop of the diocese, or the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, for that of Padre
Alonso, as party plaintiff, is not in reality the substitution of one identity for another, of
one party for another, but is simply to make the form express the substance. The
substance is there. It appears all through the proceedings. No one is deceived for an
instant as to whose interest are at stake. The form of its expression is alone defective.
The substitution, then, is not substantial but formal. Defect in mere form can not
possibly so long as the substantial is clearly evident. Form is a method of speech used
to express substance and make it clearly appear. It is the means by which the
substance reveals itself. If the form be faulty and still the substance shows plainly
through no, harm can come by making the form accurately expressive of the substance.
No one has been misled by the error in the name of the party plaintiff. If we should by
reason of this error send this back for amendment and new trial, there would be on the
retrial the same complaint, the same answer, the same defense, the same interests, the
same witnesses, and the same evidence. The name of the plaintiff would constitute the
only difference between the old trial and the new. In our judgment there is not enough in
a name to justify such action.

There is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings, their forms or contents. Their
sole purpose is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending
parties. They were created, not to hinder and delay, but to facilitate and promote, the
administration of justice. They do not constitute the thing itself, which courts are always
striving to secure to litigants. They are designed as the means best adapted to obtain
that thing. In other words, they are a means to an end. When they lose the character of
the one and become the other, the administration of justice is at fault and courts are
correspondingly remiss in the performance of their obvious duty.

The error in this case is purely technical. To take advantage of it for other purposes than
to cure it, does not appeal to a fair sense of justice. Its presentation as fatal to the
plaintiff's case smacks of skill rather than right. A litigation is not a game of technicalities
in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and
position, entraps and destroys the other. It is, rather, a contest in which each contending
party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as
wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure,
asks that justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a
rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it desserts its proper office as an aid to justice and
becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from
courts. There should be no vested rights in technicalities. No litigant should be permitted
to challenge a record of a court of these Islands for defect of form when his substantial
rights have not been prejudiced thereby.

In ordering this substitution, we are in accord with the best judicial thought.
(McKeighan vs. Hopkins, 19 Neb., 33; Dixon vs. Dixon, 19 Ia., 512; Hodges vs. Kimball,
49 Ia., 577; Sanger vs. Newton, 134 Mass., 308; George vs. Reed, 101 Mass., 378;
Bowden vs. Burnham, 59 Fed. Rep., 752; Phipps and Co. vs. Hurlburt, 70 Fed. Rep.,
202; McDonal vs. State, 101 Fed. Rep., 171; Morford vs. Diffenbocker, 20 N. W., 600;
Costelo vs. Costelo vs. Crowell, 134 Mass., 280; Whitaker vs. Pope, 2 Woods, 463,
Fed. Cas. no. 17528; Miller vs. Pollock, 99 Pa. St., 202; Wilson vs. Presbyterian
Church, 56 Ga., 554; Wood vs. Circuit Judge, 84 Mich., 521; Insurance Co, vs. Mueller,
77 Ill., 22; Farman vs. Doyle, 128 Mich., 696; Union Bank vs. Mott, 19 How. Pr., 114; R.
R. Co. vs. Gibson, 4 Ohio St., 145; Hume vs. Kelly, 28 Oreg., 398.)

It is therefore, ordered and decreed that the process, pleadings, proceedings and
decision in this action be, and the same are hereby, amended by substituting the
Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the place and stead of Eladio Alonso as party
plaintiff, that the complaint be considered as though originally filed by the Catholic
Church, the answer thereto made, the decision rendered and all proceedings in this
case had, as if the said institution which Father Eladio Alonso undertook to represent
were the party plaintiff, and that said decision of the court below, so amended, is
affirmed, without special finding as to the costs.

G.R. No. 197582               June 29, 2015

JULIE S. SUMBILLA, Petitioner,
vs.
MATRIX FINANCE CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, petitioner Julie S. Sumbilla seeks the liberal application of
procedural rules to correct the penalty imposed in the Decision1 dated January 14, 2009
of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City, Branch 67, in Criminal Case Nos.
321169 to 321174 which had already attained finality in view of petitioner's failure to
timely file an appeal.

The antecedent facts are not disputed.

Petitioner obtained a cash loan . from respondent Matrix Finance Corporation. As partial
payment for her loan, petitioner issued Philippine Business Bank Check Nos. 0032863
to 0032868. The six checks have a uniform face value of ₱6,667.00 each.

Upon maturity, the six checks were presented by respondent to the drawee bank for
payment. However, all the checks were dishonored on the ground that they were drawn
against a closed account.

Petitioner's refusal to heed the demand letter of respondent for the payment of the face
value of the dishonored checks culminated in her indictment for six counts of violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22). The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
321169 to 321174, and were raffled off to Branch 67, MeTC of Makati.

In a Decision dated January 14, 2009, the MeTC found petitioner criminally and civilly
liable for the issuance of the six rubber checks. For each count of violation of BP 22
involving a check with a face value of ₱6,667.00, the MeTC meted petitioner a penalty
of fine amounting to ₱80,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment. Her civil liability for the
six consolidated cases was computed in the total amount of ₱40,002.00. The fallo of the
decision provides:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment finding accused Julie S. Sumbilla GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of six counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22. For
each count, she is sentenced to pay n. fine of ₱80,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of non-payment. She is likewise ORDERED to indemnify private complainant
Matrix Finance Corporation the total amount of ₱40,002.00 plus 12% annual legal
interest from September 21, 2002 until full payment.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.2 (Emphasis and underscoring added.)

Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal, petitioner opted to file a Motion for

Reconsideration3 before the MeTC. The Motion was denied in the Order4 dated April 17,
2009 being a pleading barred under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. The
MeTC further noted that the prohibited motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner
will not suspend the running of the period to perfect an appeal.

Subsequently, the Notice of Appeal filed by petitioner was also denied for having been
filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period.

With the denial5 of her Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying her appeal,
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari6 under Rule 65 of the Rules which was docketed
as SCA No. 09-1125 and raffled off to Branch 61, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City.

Ruling that the MeTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in denying the Notice of
Appeal filed by petitioner, the RTC dismissed7 the petition for certiorari. The Motion for
Reconsideration8 filed by petitioner met the same fate of dismissal.9

Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for
review10 under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. The CA, however, ruled that an ordinary
appeal under Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court is the correct remedy under
the circumstances because the RTC rendered the decision in the petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.11

On July 27, 2011, after she received a copy of the June 28, 2011 Resolution12 of the CA
denying her Motion for Reconsideration,13 petitioner filed a motion for extension of time
to file the instant petition.14

On August 11, 2011, petitioner filed her Petition for Review on Certiorari15 within the
period of extension granted in our Resolution16 dated September 7, 2011. She ascribed
to the CA a sole error:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR

CERTIORARI ON TECHNICALITY AND NOT EXERCISING ITS POSITIVE DUTY OF
GIVING DUE IMPORTANCE ON THE SUBSTANTIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER DESPITE A CLEAR PRESENCE OF SUCH
VIOLATION OF LAW AS DEFINED BY PETITIONER IN HER PETITION WHICH
COULD HAVE MERIT A FULL DECISION BY A HIGHER COURT.17

Petitioner acknowledged18 the procedural lapse of filing a petition for certiorari under

Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead of an ordinary appeal before the CA. She also
fully grasped19 the effects of her erroneous filing of the Motion for Reconsideration to
challenge the MeTC Decision finding her guilty of six counts of violation of BP 22.
Knowing that her conviction had already attained finality, petitioner seeks the relaxation
of the rules of procedure so that the alleged erroneous penalty imposed by the MeTC
can be modified to make it in accord with existing law and jurisprudence.

Respondent countered that the right to appeal being a mere statutory privilege can only
be exercised in accordance with the rules, and the lost appeal cannot be resurrected
through the present remedial recourse of a petition for review on certiorari.

The main issue to be resolved is whether the penalty imposed in the MeTC Decision
dated January 14, 2009, which is already final and executory, may still be modified.

The petition is meritorious.

Petitioner does not dispute the finality of the Decision dated January 14, 2009 in
Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174 rendered by the MeTC, finding her guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of six counts of violation of BP 22. For every count of violation of BP
22 involving a check with a face value of ₱6,667.00, petitioner was meted a penalty of
fine of PS0,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment. She assails
the penalty for being out of the range of the penalty prescribed in Section 1 of BP 22,
and the subsidiary imprisonment to be violative of Administrative Circular Nos. 12-2000
and 13-2001, and the holdings in Vaca v. Court of Appeals.20 Petitioner asserted that
the maximum penalty of fine that can be imposed against her in each count of violation
of BP 22 is double the amount of the face value of the dishonored check only or
₱13,334.00. The fine of PS0,000.00 for each count is thus excessive. She further
implied that the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment contravened Section 20 of Article
III of the Constitution which proscribes imprisonment as a punishment for not paying a
debt.

Section 1 of BP 22 provides:

SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes or draws and
issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more
than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of
the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two hundred thousand pesos, or both
such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The court may thus impose any of the following alternative penalties against an accused
found criminally liable for violating BP 22: (1) imprisonment of not less than 30 days, but
not more than one year; or (2) a fine of not less or more than double the amount of the
check, and shall in no case exceed ₱200,000.00; or (3) both such fine and
imprisonment. The discretion to impose a single (imprisonment or fine) or conjunctive
(fine and imprisonment) penalty pertains to the court.

If fine alone is the penalty imposed, the maximum shall be double the amount of the
face value of the rubber check which in no case should exceed ₱200,000.00.

Here, the face value of each of the six checks that bounced is ₱6,667.00. Under Section
1 of BP 22, the maximum penalty of fine that can be imposed on petitioner is only 1!
13,334.00, or the amount double the face value of each check. Indubitably, the MeTC
meted the petitioner a penalty of fine way beyond the maximum limits prescribed under
Section 1 of BP 22. The fine of ₱80,000.00 is more than 11 times the amount of the
face value of each check that was dishonored.

Instead of using as basis the face value of each check (₱6,667.00), the MeTC
incorrectly computed the amount of fine using the total face value of the six checks
(₱40,002.00). The same error occurred in Abarquez v. Court of Appeals,21 where we
modified the penalty of fine imposed in one of the consolidated cases therein (Criminal
Case No. D-8137) to only double the amount of the face value of the subject check.

Unfortunately, in the present case, the MeTC Decision is already final and executory
after petitioner failed to timely file a Notice of Appeal. Under the doctrine of finality and
immutability of judgments, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law, and whether it will be made by
the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.22 Upon finality of the
judgment, the Court loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same.23

Nonetheless, the immutability of final judgments is not a hard and fast rule. The Court
has the power and prerogative to suspend its own rules and to exempt a case from their
operation if and when justice requires it.24 After all, procedural rules were conceived to
aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent application of the rules would hinder rather
than serve the demands of substantial justice, the former must yield to the latter,25 as
specifically mandated under Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 2. Construction. - These rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their
object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action and proceeding.
Consequently final and executory judgments were reversed when the interest of
substantial justice is at stake and where special and compelling reasons called for such
actions.26 In Barnes v. Judge Padilla,27 we declared as follows:

x x x a final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or
be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land.

However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice
considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable
to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack
of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other
party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always
be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend or
even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this
Court itself had already declared to be final.

The judgment of conviction was already final in Rigor v. The Superintendent, New
Bilibid Prison28 when the Court corrected the minimum and maximum periods of the
indeterminate sentence imposed on the accused which exceeded the period of the
imposable penalty. The correction was made in the interest of justice and only for the
penalty imposed against petitioner to be in accordance with law and nothing else.29

Both People v. Gatward,30 and People v. Barro31 cited the duty and inherent power of
the Court to correct the erroneous penalties meted on the accused in a final and
executory judgments, and make it conform to the penalty prescribed by law.

The interest of justice and the duty and inherent power of the Court were the reasons
anchored upon in Estrada v. People32 in ruling that it is befitting to modify the penalty
imposed on petitioner even though the notice of appeal was belatedly filed.

In Almuete v. People,33 the penalty imposed upon the petitioner which is outside the
range of the penalty prescribed by law was duly corrected even if it was already final on
the ground of substantial justice, thus:

In this case, it cannot be gainsaid that what is involved is the life and liberty of
petitioner.1awp++i1 If his penalty of imprisonment remains uncorrected, it would be not
conformable with law and he would be made to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 18
years, 2 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 40 years of reclusion
perpetua, as maximum, which is outside the range of the penalty prescribed by law.
Contrast this to the proper imposable penalty the minimum of which should only be
within the range of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years of prision correccional, while
the maximum should only be anywhere between 11 years, 8 months and 1 day of
prision mayor to 13 years of reclusion temporal. Substantial justice demands that we
suspend our Rules in this case. "It is always within the power of the court to suspend its
own [R]ules or except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of
justice require. x x x Indeed, when there is a strong showing that a grave miscarriage of
justice would result from the strict application of the Rules, this Court will not hesitate to
relax the same in the interest of substantial justice." Suspending the Rules is justified
"where there exist strong compelling reasons, such as serving the ends of justice and
preventing a miscarriage thereof." After all, the Court's "primordial and most important
duty is to render justice x x x."34 All the accused in Almuete v. People,35 People v.
Barro,36 Estrada v. People,37 and Rigor v. The Superintendent, New Bilibid
Prison,38 failed to perfect their appeal on their respective judgments of conviction, but
the Court corrected the penalties imposed, notwithstanding the finality of the decisions
because they were outside the range of penalty prescribed by law. There is, thus, no
reason to deprive the petitioner in the present case of the relief afforded the accused in
the cited cases. Verily, a sentence which imposes upon the defendant in a criminal
prosecution a penalty in excess of the maximum which the court is authorized by law to
impose for the offense for which the defendant was convicted, is void for want or excess
of jurisdiction as to the excess.39

Here, the penalty imposed is obviously out of range of that prescribed in Section 1 of BP
22. Moreover, since the term of the subsidiary imprisonment is based on the total
amount of the fine or one day for each amount equivalent to the highest minimum wage
rate prevailing in the Philippines at the time of the rendition of judgment of conviction by
the trial court,40 if petitioner is insolvent, she will suffer a longer prison sentence.
Substantial justice dictates that the penalty of fine meted on the petitioner be
accordingly corrected within the maximum limits prescribed under Section 1 of BP 22.
Hence, the penalty of fine of ₱80,000.00 meted on petitioner in Criminal Case Nos.
321169 to 321174 for each count of violation of BP 22 is corrected to double the face
value of each rubber check involved or ₱13,334.00 only.

Anent the alleged violation of Vaca v. Court of Appeals,41 and Administrative Circular

No. 12-200042 that supposedly limited to fine the imposable penalty for violation of BP
22, and without any subsidiary imprisonment, suffice it to quote the clarifications in
Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, issued on February 14, 2001:

x x x queries have been made regarding the authority of Judges to

1. Impose the penalty of imprisonment for violations of Batas Pambansa Big. 22;
and

2. Impose subsidiary imprisonment in the event that the accused, who is found
guilty of violating the provisions of B. P Big. 2 2, is unable to pay the fine which
he is sentenced to pay considering that Administrative Circular No. 12-2000
adopted the rulings in Eduardo Vaca v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 131714, 16
November 1998, 298 SCRA 656) and Rosa Lim v. People of the Philippines
 (G.R. No. 130038, 18 September 2000) as a policy of the Supreme Court on the
matter of the imposition of penalties for violations of B. P Big. 22, without
mentioning whether subsidiary imprisonment could be resorted to in case of the
accused's inability to pay the fine.

The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove
imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the
application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Big. 22.

The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for
violators of B.P. Big. 22. Neither does it defeat the legislative intent behind the law.

Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the

application of the penal provisions of B.P. Big. 22 such that where the circumstances of
both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact
without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the
more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether the
circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge.
Should the Judge decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty,
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not be deemed a hindrance.

It is, therefore, understood that

1 . Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as an alternative

penalty for violations of B.P Big. 22;

xxxx

3. Should only a fine be imposed and tile accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no
legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary
imprisonment.

x x x x43 (Italics in the original; emphasis added)

In like manner, the issue of whether BP 22 violates Section 20 of Article III of the
Constitution which proscribes imprisonment as a punishment for not paying a debt was
already settled in the negative in Lozano v. Martinez.44 Pertinent portions of the
Decision in the Lozano case read:

Has BP 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt? x x

x

The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment.1âwphi1 It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes.
The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the
law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and
putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the
practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against
property, but an offense against public order.

xxxx

In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not
repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.45 (Emphasis
added) WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. In the interest of justice, the Decision
dated January 14, 2009 of Branch 67, Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City in Criminal
Case Nos. 321169 to 321174 is MODIFIED.

Accused Julie S. Sumbilla is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of six
counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22, and is sentenced to pay a FINE of
THIRTEEN THOUSAND AND THREE HUNDRED THIRTY-FOUR PESOS
(₱13,334.00) for each count, and to indemnify private complainant Matrix Finance
Corporation the total amount of ₱40,002.00 plus 6% interest per annum from
September 21, 2002 until full payment.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 198172

REGULUS DEVELOPMENT, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
ANTONIO DELA CRUZ, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Regulus Development,

Inc. (petitioner) to challenge the November 23, 2010 Decision1 and August 10, 2011
resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 105290. CA Associate
Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. penned the rulings, concurred in by Associate Justices
Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Fiorito S. Macalino.

ANTECEDENT FACTS

The petitioner is the owner of an apartment (San Juan Apartments) located at San Juan

Street, Pasay City. Antonio dela Cruz (respondent) leased two units (Unit 2002-A and
Unit 2002-B) of the San Juan Apartments in 1993 and 1994. The contract of lease for
each of the two units similarly provides a lease period of one (1) month, subject to
automatic renewals, unless terminated by the petitioner upon written notice.

The petitioner sent the respondent a letter to terminate the lease of the two subject
units. Due to the respondent’s refusal to vacate the units, the petitioner filed a
complaint3 for ejectment before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Pasay City,
Manila, on May 1, 2001.

The MTC resolved the case in the petitioner’s favor and ordered the respondent
to vacate the premises, and pay the rentals due until the respondent actually
complies.4

The respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Pending appeal, the
respondent consigned the monthly rentals to the RTC due to the petitioner’s refusal to
receive the rentals.

The RTC affirmed5 the decision of the MTC in toto and denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by the respondent.

CA-G.R. SP No. 69504: Dismissal of Ejectment Case

In a Petition for Review filed by the respondent, the CA reversed the lower courts’
decisions and dismissed the ejectment case.6 On March 19, 2003, the dismissal of
the case became final and executory.7

Orders dated July 25, 2003 and November 28, 2003 for payment of rentals due
under lease contracts

The petitioner filed a motion (to withdraw funds deposited by the defendant-appellant as
lessee)8 praying for the withdrawal of the rentals consigned by the respondent with the
RTC.

In an order dated July 25, 2003,9 the RTC granted the petitioner’s motion. The RTC
explained that the effect of the complaint’s dismissal would mean that there was no
complaint filed at all. The petitioner, however, is entitled to the amount of rentals for the
use and occupation of the subject units, as provided in the executed contracts of lease
and on the basis of justice and equity.

The court denied the respondent’s motion for reconsideration10 in an order dated
November 28, 2003.11

On the petitioner’s motion, the RTC issued a writ of execution on December 18, 2003,
to cause the enforcement of its order dated July 25, 2003.12

CA-G.R. SP No. 81277: Affirmed RTC Orders

The respondent filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA to assail the
RTC Orders dated July 25, 2003 and November 28, 2003 (RTC orders), which granted
the petitioner’s motion to withdraw funds.

The CA dismissed13 the petition and held that the assailed RTC Orders were issued
pursuant to its equity jurisdiction, in accordance with Section 5, Rule 39,14 and Rules
515 and 616 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court. The respondent’s motion for
reconsideration was similarly denied.

G.R. SP No. 171429: Affirmed CA Ruling on RTC Orders

The respondent filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court to assail the
decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 81277. In a resolution dated June 7, 2006,17 we
denied the petition for insufficiency in form and for failure to show any reversible error
committed by the CA.

Our resolution became final and executory and an entry of judgment18 was issued.

Execution of RTC Orders

The petitioner returned to the RTC and moved for the issuance of a writ of execution to
allow it to proceed against the supersedeas bond the respondent posted, representing
rentals for the leased properties from May 2001 to October 2001, and to withdraw the
lease payments deposited by respondent from November 2001 until August 2003.19 The
RTC granted the motion.20

The RTC issued an Alias Writ of Execution21 dated April 26, 2007, allowing the
withdrawal of the rental deposits and the value of the supersedeas bond.

The petitioner claimed that the withdrawn deposits, supersedeas bond, and payments

directly made by the respondent to the petitioner, were insufficient to cover rentals due
for the period of May 2001 to May 2004. Hence, the petitioner filed a manifestation and
motion22 dated October 23, 2007, praying that the RTC levy upon the respondent’s
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 136829 to satisfy the
judgment credit.

The RTC granted the petitioner’s motion in an order dated June 30, 2008.23 The
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the RTC in an order
dated August 26, 2008.24

CA-G.R. SP No. 105290: Assailed the levy of the respondent’s property

On October 3, 2008, the respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari25 with
application for issuance of a temporary restraining order. The petition sought to nullify
and set aside the orders of the RTC directing the levy of the respondent’s real property.
The CA dismissed the petition. Thereafter, the respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration26 dated November 3, 2008.

Pursuant to the order dated June 30, 2008, a public auction for the respondent’s
property covered by TCT No. 136829 was held on November 4, 2008,27 where the
petitioner was declared highest bidder. Subsequently, the Certificate of Sale28 in favor of
the petitioner was registered.

Meanwhile, on January 7, 2010, the respondent redeemed the property with the RTC
Clerk of Court, paying the equivalent of the petitioner’s bid price with legal interest. The
petitioner filed a motion to release funds29 for the release of the redemption price paid.
The RTC granted30 the motion.

On February 12, 2010, the respondent filed a manifestation and motion31 before the CA
to withdraw the petition for the reason that the redemption of the property and release of
the price paid rendered the petition moot and academic.

Thereafter, the petitioner received the CA decision dated November 23, 2010, which
reversed and set aside the orders of the RTC directing the levy of the respondent’s
property. The CA held that while the approval of the petitioner’s motion to withdraw the
consigned rentals and the posted supersedeas bond was within the RTC’s jurisdiction,
the RTC had no jurisdiction to levy on the respondent’s real property.

The CA explained that the approval of the levy on the respondent’s real property could
not be considered as a case pending appeal, because the decision of the MTC had
already become final and executory. As such, the matter of execution of the judgment
lies with the MTC where the complaint for ejectment was originally filed and presented.

The CA ordered the RTC to remand the case to the MTC for execution. The petitioner
filed its motion for reconsideration which was denied32 by the CA.

THE PETITION

The petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari to challenge the CA
ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 105290 which held that the RTC had no jurisdiction to levy on
the respondent’s real property.

The petitioner argues: first, that the RTC’s release of the consigned rentals and levy
were ordered in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction; second, that the respondent’s
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 105290 was already moot and academic with the conduct of
the auction sale and redemption of the respondent’s real property; third, that the petition
in CAG. R. SP No. 105290 should have been dismissed outright for lack of signature
under oath on the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping.

The respondent duly filed its comment33 and refuted the petitioner’s arguments. On
the first argument, respondent merely reiterated the CA’s conclusion that the RTC had
no jurisdiction to order the levy on respondent’s real property as it no longer falls under
the allowed execution pending appeal. On the second argument, the respondent
contended that the levy on execution and sale at public auction were null and void,
hence the CA decision is not moot and academic. On the third argument, the
respondent simply argued that it was too late to raise the alleged formal defect as an
issue.

THE ISSUE

The petitioner poses the core issue of whether the RTC had jurisdiction to levy on the
respondent’s real property.

OUR RULING

We grant the petition.

Procedural issue: Lack of notarial seal on the Verification and Certification

against Forum Shopping is not fatal to the petition.

The petitioner alleged that the assailed CA petition should have been dismissed since
the notary public failed to affix his seal on the attached Verification and Certification
against Forum Shopping.

We cannot uphold the petitioner’s argument.

The lack of notarial seal in the notarial certificate34 is a defect in a document that is
required to be executed under oath.

Nevertheless, a defect in the verification does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
defective. The court may order its submission or correction, or act on the pleading if the
attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served.35

Noncompliance or a defect in a certification against forum shopping, unlike in the case

of a verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction,
unless the covering Rule is relaxed on the ground of "substantial compliance" or based
on the presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons."36 Although the
submission of a certificate against forum shopping is deemed obligatory, it is not
however jurisdictional.37

In the present case, the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping were in
fact submitted. An examination of these documents shows that the notary public’s
signature and stamp were duly affixed. Except for the notarial seal, all the requirements
for the verification and certification documents were complied with.
The rule is that courts should not be unduly strict on procedural lapses that do not really
impair the proper administration of justice. The higher objective of procedural rules is to
ensure that the substantive rights of the parties are protected. Litigations should, as
much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. Every party-
litigant must be afforded ample opportunity for the proper and just determination of his
case, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities.38

The CA correctly refused to dismiss and instead gave due course to the petition as it
substantially complied with the requirements on the Verification and Certification against
Forum Shopping.

An issue on jurisdiction prevents the petition from becoming "moot and

academic."

The petitioner claims that the assailed CA petition should have been dismissed because
the subsequent redemption of the property by the respondent and the release of the
price paid to the petitioner rendered the case moot and academic.

A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a

justiciable controversy because of supervening events, rendering the adjudication of the
case or the resolution of the issue without any practical use or value.39 Courts generally
decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness except
when, among others, the case is capable of repetition yet evades judicial review.40

The CA found that there is an issue on whether the RTC had jurisdiction to issue the
orders directing the levy of the respondent’s property. The issue on jurisdiction is a
justiciable controversy that prevented the assailed CA petition from becoming moot and
academic.

It is well-settled in jurisprudence that jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be

conferred or waived by the parties. "Even on appeal and even if the reviewing parties
did not raise the issue of jurisdiction, the reviewing court is not precluded from ruling
that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the case."41

Even assuming that the case has been rendered moot due to the respondent’s
redemption of the property, the CA may still entertain the jurisdictional issue since it
poses a situation capable of repetition yet evading judicial review.

Under this perspective, the CA correctly exercised its jurisdiction over the petition.

Equity jurisdiction versus appellate jurisdiction of the RTC

The appellate jurisdiction of courts is conferred by law. The appellate court acquires
jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties when an appeal is perfected.42
On the other hand, equity jurisdiction aims to provide complete justice in cases where a
court of law is unable to adapt its judgments to the special circumstances of a case
because of a resulting legal inflexibility when the law is applied to a given situation. The
purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction, among others, is to prevent unjust
enrichment and to ensure restitution.43

The RTC orders which allowed the withdrawal of the deposited funds for the use and
occupation of the subject units were issued pursuant to the RTC’s equity jurisdiction, as
the CA held in the petition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 81277.

The RTC’s equity jurisdiction is separate and distinct from its appellate jurisdiction on
the ejectment case. The RTC could not have issued its orders in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction since there was nothing more to execute on the dismissed
ejectment case. As the RTC orders explained, the dismissal of the ejectment case
effectively and completely blotted out and cancelled the complaint. Hence, the RTC
orders were clearly issued in the exercise of the RTC’s equity jurisdiction, not on the
basis of its appellate jurisdiction.

This Court takes judicial notice44 that the validity of the RTC Orders has been upheld in
a separate petition before this Court, under G.R. SP No. 171429 entitled Antonio Dela
Cruz v. Regulus Development, Inc.

The levy of real property was ordered by the RTC in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction.

The levy of the respondent’s property was made pursuant to the RTC orders issued in
the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, independent of the ejectment case originally filed
with the MTC.

An examination of the RTC order dated June 30, 2008, directing the levy of the
respondent’s real property shows that it was based on the RTC order dated July 25,
2003. The levy of the respondent’s property was issued to satisfy the amounts due
under the lease contracts, and not as a result of the decision in the ejectment case.

The CA erred when it concluded that the RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction in the
ejectment case when it directed the levy of the respondent’s property.

Furthermore, the order to levy on the respondent’s real property was consistent with the
first writ of execution issued by the RTC on December 18, 2003, to implement the RTC
orders. The writ of execution states that:

xxx In case of [sic] sufficient personal property of the defendant cannot be found
whereof to satisfy the amount of the said judgment, you are directed to levy [on] the
real property of said defendant and to sell the same or so much thereof in the
manner provided by law for the satisfaction of the said judgment and to make
return of your proceedings together with this Writ within sixty (60) days from receipt
hereof. (emphasis supplied)

The subsequent order of the RTC to levy on the respondent’s property was merely a
reiteration and an enforcement of the original writ of execution issued.1âwphi1

Since the order of levy is clearly rooted on the RTC Orders, the only question that
needs to be resolved is which court has jurisdiction to order the execution of the RTC
orders.

The RTC, as the court of origin, has jurisdiction to order the levy of the
respondent's real property.

Execution shall be applied for in the court of origin, in accordance with Section 1,45 Rule
39 of the Rules of Court.

The court of origin with respect to the assailed RTC orders is the court which issued
these orders. The RTC is the court with jurisdiction to order the execution of the issued
RTC orders.

Hence, the petitioner correctly moved for the issuance of the writ of execution and levy
of the respondent's real property before the RTC as the court of origin.

WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition for review on certiorari. The decision

dated November 23, 2010, and the resolution dated August 10, 2011, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 105290 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
orders dated June 30, 2008, and August 26, 2008, of Branch 108 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City, are hereby REINSTATED. Costs against respondent Antonio dela
Cruz.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 139596             January 24, 2006

CHARLES CU-UNJIENG, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and UNI0N BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

By this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Charles Cu-Unjieng seeks the reversal
of the following issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 8177-B-
UDK, entitled Charles Cu-Unjieng, plaintiff-appellant vs. Union Bank of the Philippines,
et al., defendants-appellees, to wit:

1. Resolution1 dated May 10,1999, dismissing, for non-payment of docket and

other lawful fees, petitioner’s appeal from an earlier decision of the Regional Trial
Court at Malolos, Bulacan which dismissed his complaint for specific
performance and damages against respondent Union Bank of the Philippines
and others; and

2. Resolution2 dated July 30, 1999 which denied petitioner’s Motion for

Reconsideration and ordered expunged the appeal brief thereto attached.

The facts:

Respondent Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) is the owner of a parcel of agricultural
land with an area of 218,769 square meters situated in Barangay Sta. Maria, San
Miguel, Bulacan and registered in its name under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
TC-1062 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan.

Sometime in January 1994, UBP caused the posting on the bulletin boards of its branch
offices of a three-page list of acquired realty assets available for sale to interested
parties. Included in said list was the aforementioned parcel of land, offered to be sold
for P2,200,000.00.

Petitioner, through a letter3 dated April 11, 1994 and addressed to Joselito P. Valera,
manager of UBP’s Acquired Assets Department, offered to buy the subject property for
a lesser amount of P2,078,305.50, payable as follows: 50% as down payment with the
balance to be paid in equal monthly installments over a period of two (2) years.
Petitioner explained that his offer for an amount lesser than UBP’s asking price was on
account of five (5) tenants occupying the subject land who were allegedly
demanding P500,000.00 to voluntarily vacate the same.

As proof of his interest to buy the property, petitioner tendered PCIB Check No. 565827
for P103,915.27, purportedly representing 10% of the 50% down payment as earnest
money or deposit. UBP acknowledged receipt thereof by way of Union Bank Receipt
No. 495081 dated April 11, 1994.

On August 30, 1994, petitioner wrote a follow-up letter to UBP inquiring on the status of
his offer to buy the subject premises.4

Via a reply-letter dated August 31, 1994, the manager of UBP’s Acquired Assets
Department advised petitioner that his offer to purchase is yet to be acted upon
because the bank was still awaiting the opinion of its legal division regarding the sale of
"CARPable" agricultural assets acquired by the bank.5

As it turned out, UBP rejected petitioner’s offer as shown by the fact that in another
letter6 dated December 19, 1994, the bank informed petitioner that his offer could not be
favorably acted upon on account of the legal division’s opinion that sales of lands
covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law without prior Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) approval are considered null and void. Accordingly, UBP
advised petitioner to pick up the refund of his P103,915.27 "earnest money" at the
bank’s disbursing unit.

Unable to accept UBP’s rejection of his offer, petitioner, through counsel, made a formal
demand7 for the bank to comply with its obligation to transfer and deliver the title of the
subject property to him by executing the proper deed of conveyance, under the terms
and conditions set forth in his April 11, 1994 offer.

Responding thereto, UBP, thru its counsel, Atty. Luzano, in a letter8 dated July 19,
1995, reiterated the bank’s rejection of petitioner’s offer as "the land
being carpable could only be disposed of by the bank either thru Voluntary Offer to Sell
(VOS) or compulsory acquisition, the procedure of which is outlined in Sec. 16" of
Republic Act (RA) No. 6657.

It was against the foregoing backdrop of events that, on February 6, 1997, in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Malolos, Bulacan, petitioner filed his complaint9 in this
case for Specific Performance and Damages against UBP, impleading as co-defendant
in the suit the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. Docketed as Civil Case No. 80-M-97 and
raffled to Branch 9 of the court, the complaint principally sought UBP’s compliance with
an alleged perfected contract of sale between it and petitioner relative to the parcel of
land in question. More specifically, the complaint prays for a judgment ordering UBP to:

a) accept payments from the plaintiff [petitioner] for the sale of the Property in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the letter dated 11 April 1994;

b) execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the Property covered by TCT No. TC
1062 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Bulacan upon the plaintiff’s full
payment of the amount of Two Million Seventy Eight Thousand Three Hundred
Five & 50/100 (P2,078,305.50), failing in which, the deputy sheriff should be
 ordered to execute such deed and the Registry of Deeds to cancel the title of the
Bank and issue a new one in favor of the plaintiff;

c) pay plaintiff the sum of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as moral
damages;

d) pay plaintiff the sum of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as

exemplary damages;

e) pay plaintiff the sum of Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00) as

attorney’s fees; and

f) pay the costs of the suit.

Other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises, are likewise respectfully prayed for.

After due proceedings, the trial court, in a decision dated September 1, 1998,10 upon a
finding that no perfected contract of sale transpired between the parties, dismissed
petitioner’s complaint for lack of sufficient cause of action, thus:

WHEREFORE, on the basis of the evidence adduced and the laws/jurisprudence

applicable thereon, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint in the
above entitled case for want of sufficient cause of action as well as the defendant’s
counterclaim for damages and attorney’s fees for lack of proof to warrant the same.

However, defendant Union Bank of the Philippines is ordered to reimburse plaintiff

Charles Cu-Unjieng the amount of P103,915.27 representing the face value of PCIBank
Check No. 565827 tendered by the latter to the former as purported "earnest money",
with interest thereon at the prevailing rates of interest periodically bestowed by UBP to
its savings depositors from April 11, 1994, through the succeeding years, and until the
full amount thereof shall have been delivered to the plaintiff.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

With his motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed with the trial
court a Notice of Appeal11 therein making known that he is taking an appeal from the
adverse decision to the CA. Acting thereon, the trial court issued an Order12 directing
the elevation of the records of the case to the CA, whereat petitioner’s appeal was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 8177-B-UDK.

As things would have it, in the herein first assailed Resolution dated May 10, 1999, the
CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal for nonpayment of the required docket and other
lawful appeal fees, to wit:
For failure of the appellant [petitioner] to pay the docket and other lawful fees (Sec. 4,
Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), the Court Resolved to DISMISS the appeal
pursuant to Sec. 1(c), Rule 50 of the same Rule.

SO ORDERED.13

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, attaching thereto his appellant’s brief.
However, in a subsequent Resolution dated July 30, 1999,14 the appellate court
denied the motion and even expunged from the record the appellant’s brief thereto
attached:

Acting on the motion of the plaintiff-appellant [petitioner] for a reconsideration of the

Resolution of May 10, 1999, which dismissed the appeal for the reason stated therein,
and considering the opposition interposed thereto by defendant-appellee [respondent]
Union Bank of the Philippines and it appearing that the filing of the notice of appeal of
November 5, 1988, was not accompanied by the full and correct payment of the
corresponding appellate court docket and other lawful fees, and for such tardiness of
more than four (4) months, the Court resolved to DENY the motion for reconsideration
and the attached brief thereto ordered EXPUNGED.

In Pedrosa vs. Hill, 257 SCRA 373, the Supreme Court, citing Rodillas vs. Commission
on Elections (245 SCRA 702 aptly said:

xxx the mere filing of the notice of appeal was not enough. It should be accompanied by
the payment of the correct amount of appeal fee. In other words, the payment of the full
amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In
both original and appellate cases, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case only
upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees. Well-rooted is the principle that
perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory
but also jurisdictional and failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and
executory, and deprives the appellate court or body of jurisdiction to alter the final
judgment much less to entertain the appeal. This requirement of an appeal fee is by no
means a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an essential requirement without
which the decision appealed from would become final and executory, as if no appeal
was filed at all.

SO ORDERED.

Undaunted, petitioner is now with us via the present recourse seeking a relaxation of

procedural rules and ultimately the reversal and setting aside of the assailed twin
resolutions of the appellate court.

Petitioner would have the Court view his failure to pay the appeal docket fees on time
as a non-fatal lapse, or a non-jurisdictional defect which the CA should have ignored in
order to attain substantial justice. Further, petitioner passes the blame to the RTC clerk
of court who allegedly made the erroneous computation of docket fees.
We are not persuaded.

Doctrinally entrenched is the pronouncement that the right to appeal is merely statutory
and a party seeking to avail of that right must comply with the statute or rules.15

Rule 41, Section 4, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. – Within the period for taking an
appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or
final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful
fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together
with the original record or the record on appeal.

Well-settled is the rule that payment of the docket and other legal fees within the
prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional,16 noncompliance with which is
fatal to an appeal. For, to stress, appeal is not a matter of right, but a mere statutory
privilege.17

An ordinary appeal from a decision or final order of the RTC to the CA must be made
within fifteen (15) days from notice.18 And within this period, the full amount of the
appellate court docket and other lawful fees must be paid to the clerk of the court which
rendered the judgment or final order appealed from.

Time and again, this Court has consistently held that full payment of docket fees within
the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such
payment, the appeal is not perfected and the appellate court does not acquire
jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, thereby rendering the decision sought to be
appealed final and executory.19

For sure, nonpayment of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees within the
reglementary period as provided under Section 4, Rule 41, supra, is a ground for the
dismissal of an appeal under Section 1(c) of Rule 50, to wit:

SECTION 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal.- An appeal may be dismissed by the

Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:

xxx xxx xxx

c. Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees as provided in section
4 of Rule 41; xxx

This Court has invariably sustained the CA’s dismissal on technical grounds under the
aforequoted provision unless considerations of equity and substantial justice present
cogent reasons to hold otherwise. True, the rules may be relaxed but only for
persuasive and weighty reasons, to relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with
his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure.20 So it is that in La Salette College
vs. Victor Pilotin,21 we held:

Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of payment of appellate

docket fees, we also recognize that its strict application is qualified by the following: first,
failure to pay those fees within the reglementary period allows only discretionary, not
automatic, dismissal; second, such power should be used by the court in conjunction
with its exercise of sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair
play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in consideration of all attendant
circumstances

Then, too, in Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) vs. Mangubat,22 we
held that late payment of docket fees may be admitted when the party showed
willingness to abide by the Rules by immediately paying the required
fees. Mactan, however, cannot be a source of comfort for herein petitioner. For there,
the appellate docket fees were paid six (6) days after the timely filing of the notice of
appeal. Unlike in Mactan, payment of the appellate docket fees in this case was
effected by petitioner only after four (4) months following the expiration of the
reglementary period to take an appeal.

With the reality obtaining in this case that payment of the appellate docket fees was
belatedly made four (4) months after the lapse of the period for appeal, it appears clear
to us that the CA did not acquire jurisdiction over petitioner’s appeal except to order its
dismissal,23 as it rightfully did. Thus, the September 1, 1998 decision of the RTC has
passed to the realm of finality and became executory by operation of law.

We must emphasize that invocation of substantial justice is not a magical incantation

that will automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. Rules of
procedure are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance
may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantive rights. Like all rules, they are
required to be followed. So it must be here.

WHEREFORE, petition is DENIED and the assailed resolutions dated May 10,1999 and
July 30, 1999 of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 105294 February 26, 1997

PACITA DAVID-CHAN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and PHIL.

RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., Respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

In pleading for an easement of right of way, petitioner correctly cites the

requirements of law but fails to provide factual support to show her
entitlement thereto. Since findings of facts by the Court of Appeals affirming
those of the trial court are binding on the Supreme Court, the petition must
thus fail. Even petitioner's plea for equity becomes unavailing because resort
to equity is possible only in the absence, and never in contravention, of
statutory law.

The petition assails the Decision 1 of respondent Court 2 promulgated on April

30, 1992. The Decision of respondent Court affirmed the decision dated July
26, 1989, of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch
44, in Civil Case No. 8049. The dispositive portion of the affirmed decision of
the trial court reads: 3

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, and finding plaintiff's

petition to be without merit, the same is, as it is hereby ordered dismissed
with costs against plaintiff.

On defendant's (Singian) counterclaim, the same is, as it is hereby

dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

The Facts

On September 29, 1987, petitioner filed with the trial court an amended
petition with prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction, seeking to stop
private respondent from fencing its property and depriving her of access to
the highway. Petitioner alleged that her property, consisting of around 635
square meters, situated in Del Pilar, San Fernando, Pampanga and covered
by TCT No. 57596-R, was delineated on its northern and western sides by
various business establishments. Adjoining her property along its southern
boundary was the land of the Pineda family, while along the east-
northeastern boundary, and lying between her property and the MacArthur
Highway, was another lot with an area of approximately 161 square meters
owned by private respondent. In short, petitioner's lot was almost
completely surrounded by other immovables and cut off from the highway.
Her only access to the highway was a very small opening measuring two feet
four inches wide through the aforementioned property of private respondent.
Petitioner believed she was entitled to a wider compulsory easement of right
of way through the said property of private respondent. The prospective
subservient estate was a portion of a bigger lot consisting of 7,239 square
meters and covered by TCT No. 163033-R, which was formerly owned by the
Singian Brothers Corporation hereinafter referred to as ("Singian Brothers")
and was sold to private respondent without the knowledge and consent of
petitioner, who was thereby allegedly prevented from exercising her right of
pre-emption or right of redemption. Petitioner alleged that private
respondent was about to complete the construction of its concrete fence on
the said lot which would result in depriving petitioner of the only available
right of way, and that therefore, she was constrained to petition the trial
court to enjoin private respondent from fencing said lot. The petition likewise
prayed that judgment be rendered ordering private respondent to sell to
petitioner the subject lot and to pay the damages, attorney's fees and cost
of suit.

Private respondent denied the allegations of petitioner. The parents and

relatives of petitioner were never tenants or lessees of the former owner,
Singian Brothers; rather, they were found to be illegally occupying the
property as ruled by the MTC-San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 1, in Civil
Case No. 4865. The dispositive portion the judgment of ejectment reads: 4

WHEREFORE, defendants Eduardo Mangune, Pacita David-Chan and Primo

David including their agents/representatives and, any and all persons given
access by them to the disputed premises claiming any right under them, are
hereby ordered to immediately vacate the area in question, remove all the
improvements that they have constructed thereon; to pay the plaintiff
corporation jointly and severally the sum of P2,000.00 pesos - as Attorney's
fees and the costs of this suit.

The case against defendants Loida Makabali and Helen Hermidia is hereby
dismissed as the action has become moot.

The defendants' counterclaim, Pacita David-Chan and Eduardo Mangune is

hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

Hence the former owners were not obliged to inform petitioner of the sale.
The land sold by the Singian Brothers was free from all liens and
encumbrances as stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale. Private respondent
was not selling the 161 square-meter lot because it needed the property.
Also, petitioner had another access to the highway without passing through
the lot in question.
The Singian Brothers were impleaded in the trial court. In their answer, they
alleged that they did not authorize anyone to receive rentals for the disputed
lot. As their affirmative and special defenses, Defendant Singian Brothers
averred that the complaint of petitioner stated no cause of action because,
being apparent and discontinuous, the right of way cannot be acquired by
prescription. Petitioner was not a tenant of the Singian Brothers; therefore
she was not entitled to a right of pre-emption or right of redemption. Finally,
petitioner had another access to the National Highway which, however, she
closed during the pendency of the case at the trial court when she extended
the construction of her fence. 5

The Issues

Failing to obtain relief at both the trial and respondent courts, petitioner now
submits the following issues for consideration of this Court:

I. In its reaffirmation of the lower court's decision, the Court of Appeals

missed to temper with human compassion of the Art. 649 and 650 of the
New Civil Code of the Phil. which requires the presence of four requisites for
a compulsory easement of way. 6

II. (The) Court (of Appeals) had used in its decision all technical and legal
niceties to favor respondents, violating time-honored and deeply-rooted
Filipino values. 7

III. With due respect, the Court (of Appeals) erred in deciding this case in
favor of the respondent despite the facts existing at the background. 8

IV. The Court (of Appeals) erred in stating that petitioner had an outlet
measuring two (2) feet and four (4) inches to the national highway without
passing through respondent's property as per the commissioner's report. 9

In her Memorandum 10 dated February 26, 1993, petitioner alleges only one

issue:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a legal easement of right of way over

that portion of the property of respondent Rabbit?

On the other hand, private respondent raises two issues: 11

1. Is the petitioner entitled to an easement of right of way from the private

respondents?
2. Should she be granted her desire for a right of way by way
of "pakikisama" and "pakikipagkapwa-tao"?

After deliberating on the various submissions of the parties, the Court holds
that the issues can be condensed into two, as follows:

(1) Is petitioner legally entitled to a right of way through private

respondent's property?

(2) In any event, is she entitled to such easement through the recognition
and application of the Filipino values of pakikisama and pakikipagkapwa-
tao?

The Court's Ruling

The petition is devoid of merit.

First Issue: Requisites of an Easement of Right of Way

Citing Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, 12 petitioner submits that "the
owner of an estate may claim a compulsory right of way only after he (or
she) has established the existence of four requisites, namely: (1) the estate
is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate out-let to a
public highway; (2) proper indemnity is paid; (3) the isolation is not due to
the proprietor's own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least
prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent with this rule,
where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest. 13

While petitioner may be correct in her theoretical reading of Articles 649 and
650, she nevertheless failed to show sufficient factual evidence to satisfy
their requirements. Evaluating her evidence, respondent Court ruled that
petitioner is not "without adequate outlet to a public highway" as follows: 14

1. Let it be stressed that it was plaintiff who built a concrete fence on the
southern boundary of her property to separate it from the property of the
Pineda family. Worse, during the pendency of the case, she closed the 28-
inch clearance which she could use as a means to reach the National
Highway without passing through the property of defendant. If plaintiff
wants a bigger opening, then she can always destroy a portion of the
concrete fence which she erected and pass through the property of the
Pineda family which, as shown on the attached sketch on the
Commissioner's Report, has an open space on the southern boundary of
plaintiff's land.
2. Plaintiff maintains that once the Pineda family (fences) off their lot,
plaintiff has no more way to the National Highway.

Plaintiff's apprehensions are without basis. The Pineda family could no longer
fence off their property because plaintiff (had) already constructed a fence to
separate the two properties. And even granting that the Pineda family would
eventually fence off their land, then plaintiff could ask for an easement of
right of way from the Pineda family.

The appellate court likewise found that petitioner failed to satisfy the third
requirement because she caused her own isolation by closing her access
through the Pineda property, thus: 15

1. Worthy of note is the fact that it was plaintiff who built a fence to
separate her property from that of the Pineda family on the southern
boundary. And she even closed the small opening causing her property to be
isolated and losing one access to the National Highway. Plaintiff thus failed
to meet the third requisite for the grant of an easement of right of way. As
held by the Hon. Supreme Court in the case of Francisco vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 52,.534-535:

"The evidence is, therefore, persuasively to the effect that the private
respondent had been granted an adequate access to the public highway
(Parada Road) through the adjacent estate of Epifania Dila even as he was
trying to negotiate a satisfactory agreement with petitioner Francisco for
another passageway through the latters' property. If at the time he filed suit
against the petitioner, such access (through the property of Epifania Dila)
could no longer be used, it was because he himself had closed it off by
erecting a stone wall on his lot at the point where the passageway began for
no reason to which the record can attest except to demonstrate the isolation
of his property alleged in his complaint. But the law makes it amply clear
that an owner cannot. as respondent has done. by his own act isolate his
property from a public highway and then claim an easement of way through
an adjacent estate. The third of the cited requisites; that the claimant of a
right of way has not himself procured the isolation of his property had not
been met-indeed the respondent had actually brought about the contrary
condition and thereby vitiated his claim to such an easement. It will not do
to assert that use of the passageway through Lot 860-B was difficult or
inconvenient, the evidence being to the contrary and that it was wide
enough to be traversable by even a truck, and also because it has been held
that mere inconvenience attending the use of an existing right of way does
not justify a claim for a similar easement in an alternative location."
(Emphasis ours)
The Court of Appeals also ruled that petitioner failed to prove she made a
valid tender of the proper indemnity, to wit: 16

2. The second requisite - that there was payment of the proper indemnity
was likewise not met by the plaintiff. Plaintiffs complaint contained no
averment that demand for the easement of right of way had been made
after payment of the proper indemnity. There was no showing that plaintiff
ever made a tender of payment of the proper indemnity for the right of way.
As the lower court said, "The fact that plaintiff prays that defendant Rabbit
be ordered to sell to her the disputed premises hardly satisfies the requisite
regarding the payment of the proper indemnity."

The questions of whether (1) petitioner has another adequate outlet to the
public highway, or (2) she caused her own isolation, or (3) she made, in
fact, a tender of the proper indemnity are all issues of facts which this Court
has no authority to rule upon. 17 The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. 18

It is doctrinal that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals upholding those

of the trial court are binding upon this Court. 19 While there are exceptions
to this rule, 20 petitioner has not convinced us that this case falls under one
of them.

Second Issue: Application of Traditional Filipino Values

Perhaps sensing the inadequacy of her legal arguments, petitioner who

claims to be an "ordinary housewife (with) . . . meager resources" pleads
that "those who have less in life should have more in law" and that the Court
should apply the Filipino values of pakikisama and pakikipag-kapwa-tao in
resolving the case.

Such appeal of petitioner is based on equity which has been aptly described
as "justice outside legality." However, equity is applied only in the absence
of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. 21 As
found by respondent Court, petitioner is not legally entitled to a right of way
on the property of private respondent. Thus, such equitable arguments
cannot prevail over the legal findings.

There are rigorous standards to be complied with by owners of the dominant

estate before they may be granted with easement of right of way. These
standards must be strictly complied with because easement is a burden on
the property of another. Before such inconvenience may be imposed by the
Court, applicants must prove that they deserve judicial intervention on the
basis of law, and certainly not when their isolation is caused by their own
acts. In the latter case, they decide their detachment and must bear the
consequences of such choice.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED and the

Decision dated April 30, 1992, of the respondent Court is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.