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Dta of Pc-9/A Wing Main Spar With Miss-Drill Damage: Stuart Cogan Senior Engineer Qinetiq - Si Program

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Dta of Pc-9/A Wing Main Spar With Miss-Drill Damage: Stuart Cogan Senior Engineer Qinetiq - Si Program

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puhumight
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DTA of PC-9/A Wing Main Spar

with Miss-drill Damage

Stuart Cogan
Senior Engineer
QinetiQ – SI Program

ASIP Conference 2018,


Phoenix, USA

28 November 2018
PC-9/A Design and RAAF History
• RAAF in-service 1984 | 67 aircraft
• Role
– Training role (ab-initio, advanced, continuation, instructor)
– Aerobatic display
– Forward Air Control

• Basic (wing) structural layout


– Low wing
– Wing Box
– Critical structural wing location: lower spar cap @ rib 5

• Structural Certification & Management


– Originally Far 23 | Safe Life 10,000 AFHRs
– RAAF FSFT | RAAF usage spectrum | DEF-STAN 00-970
– SI Management: ASIP based on MIL-STD-1530C

2
Wing Main Spar Miss-drills – Background
• In 2003, during replacement of a MLG support bracket,
miss-drill damage was found in the lower cap of the main
wing spar on a RAAF P/C-9 aircraft
• Introduced at manufacture as a result of pilot hole miss-
alignment
• Fleet wide X-ray inspection performed to detect presence of
manufacturing defects in lower caps of main spar
• A total of 142 miss-drill defects detected in 42 wings
• Based on location and sizing from X-ray images, worst case
miss-drills repaired across fleet

3 Presentation title | Month Year | ©


Background (cont.)
• Fatigue Management of RAAF PC-9 wing based
on results from PC-9 FSFT conducted at DST
– Tested to 67,150 SFH
– Failure occurred at Rib 5 lower spar cap fastener hole

• Wing Spar Safe-Life calculated based on DEF


STAN 00-970 requirements
– 1.2 DLL at 54,718 SFH
– 3.33 Scatter Factor
– Safe-Life of 16431 SFH

• FSFT Wing Spar lower cap did not contain miss-


drill defects

4
Task Objectives
• Verify miss-drill damage size that can be reliably detected by the earlier fleet-wide X-ray
inspections
• Determine a wing spar lower cap safe life (inspection threshold) in the presence of
undetected miss-drill defects

5
Topics

1 NDT Evaluation

2 Baseline Crack Growth Analysis

3 Miss-drill Stress Analysis

4 Miss-drill Crack Growth Analysis

5 Task Outcomes

6 Follow On Work

6
NDT Evaluation
• Procedure (X-Ray) used by RAAF to inspect all spars for
miss-drill damage evaluated by QinetiQ NDT
• Test pieces developed for various spar cap thicknesses
• Various miss-drill damage introduced at spar holes
– Based on pilot hole diameter (2.5 mm)
– Various depths and distances from main hole edge
– Range of drill angles with respect to main hole centreline

• Trials by NDT gave a detectable miss-drill size of 1.2 mm


in the spar cap for RAAF radiography
• NB – This size is for miss-drills (Voids) not cracks
• This size was used as the limit miss-drill size in crack
growth analysis

7
Baseline Main Spar Crack Growth Modelling
• Crack growth model developed based on cracking observed
during FSFT
• AFGROW used to perform crack growth analysis:
– Material data (2024-T351 Al Alloy) from NASGRO database

– Geometry Factors developed for fore / aft cracking from spar


fastener holes based on library beta solutions and compounding
based on local spar geometry.
– Main spar lower cap stress spectra developed from FSFT strain
gauge readings

8
Baseline Main Spar Crack Growth Modelling (cont.)
• Crack growth model correlated based on fractography
results for the main spar cracks published by DST
• Correlation of AFGROW model carried out by developing
SMF to tune the AFGROW crack growth curve to match the
FSFT crack growth behaviour for crack sizes greater than
1.27 mm in size
• For small cracks (< 1.27 mm), a trend line was determined
directly from fractography data
• Allowable unrepaired inspection threshold of 13900
hours, or a Fatigue Index (FI) of 139.
– FI target = 100
– IFS = 1.27mm
– Secondary damage = 0.127mm

9
Miss-drill Stress Analysis
• Based on detectable miss-drill size of 1.2 mm, FEA conducted to establish likely worst
case miss-drilled spar hole configurations for further consideration
• Peak stress (Kt) used as primary guide for selection along with stress distribution
• Based on FEA, two configurations selected to represent undetected miss-drill damage:
– Through thickness miss-drill (1.2 mm in size) next to main hole (i.e. ‘Figure 8’ hole)

– Blind miss-drilled pilot hole that penetrates to 80 percent of the spar thickness

10
Miss-drill Damage Crack Growth Modelling
• StressCheck FEMs built to represent main spar cap Miss-
drilled holes
• Used to determine stress intensity factors for cracks at
Miss-drilled holes.
• Results used to develop geometry factors for a range of
crack sizes / aspect ratios
• StressCheck results input into AFGROW as user defined
geometry factor tables for crack growth analysis

11
Miss-drill Crack Growth Modelling (cont.)
• Baseline AFGROW crack growth model updated with Geometry factors for cracks at miss-
drilled holes
• For small cracks (< 1.27 mm), the baseline crack growth rate (from fractography) was
increased for miss-drills using a power law relationship based on the ratio of miss-drill to
baseline Kt calculated from FEA:

12
Miss-drill Crack Growth Modelling (cont.)
• Several Scenarios considered to develop an appropriate inspection threshold (safe life) for
the main spar with miss drill damage:
– Case 1 - JSSG-2006: Damage Tolerance approach with blueprint geometry (no explicit modelling of
miss-drill) coupled with a 0.050 inch rogue flaw (primary damage) and 0.010 inch secondary flaws
at the spar cap  compared to baseline DTA case.
– Cases 2&3 - JSSG-2006 Modified: Miss-drill geometry modelled with 0.010 inch primary and
secondary flaws
– Case 4 - DEF STAN 00 970: Consistent with fatigue management of other RAAF PC-9 wing
locations, an inspection threshold derived from FSFT results with main spar cracking adjusted to
account for presence of miss-drill damage based on crack growth modelling.

• Residual Strength based on 1.2 DLL for all cases considered


• N.B. DTA scenario where 0.050 inch rogue flaw used in addition to modelling effects
of Miss-drill on crack growth considered overly conservative and not used to
establish threshold.

13
Miss-drill Crack Growth Modelling (cont.)

14
Miss-drill Crack Growth Results
Case / Scenario JSSG-2006 DEF STAN
Case 4:
Case 1: Case 2a: Case 2b: Case 3:
100% MD
Baseline 100% MD 100% MD 80% MD
Miss-drill Modelled No Yes Yes Yes Yes

Primary IFS 0.050 in 0.050 in 0.010 in 0.012 in N/A (FSFT)

Secondary IFS 0.010 in 0.010 in 0.010 in 0.010 in N/A (FSFT)

Residual Strength 1.2 DLL 1.2 DLL 1.2 DLL 1.2 DLL 1.2 DLL

Crack Growth 26874 SFH 18698 SFH 26596 SFH 21345 SFH 33902 SFH
Interval
Safety Factor 2 2 2 2 3.3

Threshold (FI) 134 93 132 106 102

15
Task Outcomes
• X-ray inspection technique evaluated and minimum detectable Miss-drill size (1.2 mm)
established
• StressCheck and AFGROW used to quantify effects of Miss-drills on spar crack growth
• Crack growth analyses performed to establish inspection thresholds using both JSSG-
2006 (Damage Tolerance) and DEF STAN 00-970 fatigue criteria
• Results support an inspection threshold for wing main spar lower cap in-excess of 100 FI
(Structural Life of Type of PC-9 wing) for wings with undetected or unrepaired miss-drills

16
Follow-On Work
• Selection of a retired PC-9 wing with evidence of miss-drill defects
• Accelerated / simplified fatigue test of wing main spar to grow any cracks that are present
• Teardown / quantitative fractography to identify and investigate any main spar cracking
• Assess results against crack growth behaviour predicted as part of current work

17
Design Team
Jason Wittkopp – QinetiQ NDT L2
Colin Hockings – QinetiQ NDT L3
Ben Clarkl – QinetiQ NDT Principal Engineer
Jack Atkinson – QinetiQ SI Engineer
Mark Spiteri – QinetiQ SI Engineer
David Tata – QinetiQ SI Senior Engineer
Callum McGregor – QinetiQ SI Principal Engineer
Stuart Trezise – QinetiQ SI Principal Engineer
Matthew Richmond – QinetiQ SI Principal Engineer
Kevin Watters – QinetiQ SI Senior Principal Engineer
Kevin Jackson – QinetiQ SI Senior Principal Engineer

DST Group

DAVENG-ASI4

18
Questions?

19
20

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