Elmer Canoy, complainant vs. Atty.

Jose Max Ortiz, respondent 

A.C. No. 5485 March 16,2005

Facts:

 This is a case wherein complainant Elmer Canoy accused his former counsel, Atty.
Jose Max Ortiz of misconduct and malpractice. In 1998, Canoy filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal against his former employer, Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines, and was
represented in said case by Atty. Ortiz. Canoy, explained Ortiz, was one of his indigent
clients, in that it was the latter’s practice since commencing his practice of law to cater
to indigent and law-income clients. In the labor case against CCBP filed with the
National Labor Relations Commission, the labor arbiter ordered the parties to submit
their respective petition papers. Canoy submitted all the necessary documents and
records to Atty. Ortiz for the preparation of the position paper. Canoy made several
follow-ups with the office of his attorney, said visits were unfruitful until it came to
his knowledge on2000, upon inquiring with the NLRC itself, that his complaint was
already dismissed way back in 1998 for failure to prosecute because the parties did
not submit their position papers. Atty. Canoy further claimed that Atty.Ortiz never
informed him about the status of his case nor of the fact that he failed to submit the
position paper.In his Comment, Atty. Ortiz admitted to not being able to submit
the position paper because the period within which to file it lapsed already, with arbiter
already dismissing the case, but reasoned out that his election as a Councilor of
Bacolod City made him very preoccupied with his functions. His duties as a public
servant and a lawyer are “beyond physical limitation”, said Atty. Ortiz, so he had to
withdraw from his other cases. He also claimed of not being able to remember whether
he immediately informed Canoy of the dismissal of the case, but recalled of Canoy
conveying that he already has a lawyer to handle the case. Hence, his office did not
insist on refiling the case. Atty Ortiz also pointed out that the dismissal of Canoy’s
complaint was without prejudice.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Ortiz is guilty of misconduct and malpractice

Ruling:

Upon investigation of the case, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines concluded that
clearly “Atty. Ortiz failed to exercise the degree of competence and diligence required
of him in prosecuting his client” and recommended that Atty. Ortiz be reprimanded. The
Supreme Court, however, finds the recommended penalty of the IBP too lenient and
instead suspended Atty. Ortiz from the practice of law for one month, in lieu of the
admonition or reprimand. According to the Court, Atty. Ortiz several canons and rules
in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Specifically, Atty. Ortiz was guilty of violating
Rule 18.03 of the Code, which states, “A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable,” on account of his failure to file the position paper on time, tantamount
to neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him. That the case was dismissed without
prejudice does not mitigate his liability. Further, Ortiz also violated Rule 22.02, which
states, “A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice
appropriate in the circumstances.” Therefore, even if Atty. Ortiz was justified
in terminating his services due to his elective position, he should have coordinated with
the new council of Canoy and turned over to the latter all papers and property which the
Client is entitled and should have cooperated with his successor in the orderly transfer
of the matter, as per Rule 22.02.
Laput vs. Remotigue , 6 SCRA 45(A.M. No. 219, 29 September 1962)LABRADOR,J.
(En Banc)
FACTS:
Petitioner
ATTY. CASIANO U. LAPUT charge respondents ATTY. FRANCISCO E.F.REMOTIGUE
and ATTY. FORTUNATO P. PATALINGHUG with unprofessional and unethical conduct
in soliciting cases and intriguing against a brother lawyer. In May 1952, Nieves Rillas
Vda. de Barrera retained petitioner Atty. Laput to handle her "Testate Estate of Macario
Barrera" case in CFI-Cebu. By Jan. 1955, petitioner had prepared two pleadings:
(1) closing of administration proceedings, and (2) rendering of final accounting and
partition of said estate. Mrs. Barrera did not countersign both pleadings. Petitioner found
out later that respondent Atty. Patalinghug had filed on 11 Jan. 1955 a written
appearance as the new counsel for Mrs. Barrera. On 5 Feb. 1955, petitioner voluntarily
asked the court to be relieved as Mrs. Barrera’s counsel. Petitioner alleged that
respondents’ appearances were unethical and improper;
(2)they made Mrs. Barrera sign documents revoking the petitioner’s “Power of Attorney"
purportedly to disauthorize him from further collecting and receiving dividends of the
estate from Mr. Macario Barrera’s corporations, and make him appear as a dishonest
lawyer and no longer trusted by his client; and (3)Atty. Patalinghug entered his
appearance without notice to petitioner. Respondent Atty. Patalinghug answered that
when he entered his appearance on 11 Jan.1955Mrs. Barrera had already lost
confidence in her lawyer, and had already filed a pleading discharging his
services. The other respondent Atty. Remotigue answered that when he filed
his appearance on 7Feb. 1955, the petitioner had already withdrawn as counsel.
The SC referred the case to the Sol Gen for investigation, report and recommendation.
The latter recommended the complete exoneration of respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Remotigue and Atty Patalinghug are guilty of unprofessional and
unethical conduct in soliciting cases.
RULING: No. The SC found no irregularity in the appearance of Atty. Patalinghug as
counsel for Mrs. Barrera; and there was no actual grabbing of a case from petitioner
because Atty. Patalinghug's professional services were contracted by the
widow. Besides, the petitioner's voluntary withdrawal on 5 Feb. 1955, and his filing
almost simultaneously of a motion for the payment of his attorney's fees, amounted to
consent to the appearance of Atty. Patalinghug as counsel for the widow. The SC also
held that respondent Atty. Remotigue was also not guilty of unprofessional conduct in
as much as he entered his appearance, dated 5 Feb. 1955, only on 7 February 1955,
after Mrs. Barrerahad dispensed with petitioner's professional services, and after 
petitioner had voluntarily withdrawn his appearance. As to Atty. Patalinghug’s
preparation of documents revoking the petitioner’s power of attorney, the Sol Gen found
that the same does not appear to be prompted by malice or intended to hurt petitioner's
feelings, but purely to safeguard the interest of the administratrix. Case dismissed and
closed for no sufficient evidence submitted to sustain the charges.
Borja Sr, vs. Sulyap Inc. 399 SCRA 601 (2003)

FACTS:

Basilio Borja, Sr. as lessor, and Sulyap, Inc., as lessee, entered into a contract of lease
involving a one-storey office building owned by Borja located at New Manila, Quezon
City. Pursuant to the lease, Sulyap, Inc. paid, among others, advance rentals,
association dues and deposit for electrical and telephone expenses. Upon the expiration
of their lease contract, Sulyap demanded the return of the said advance rentals, dues
and deposit but Borja refused to do so. Thus, Sulyap filed with the RTC of QC a
complaint for sum of money against Borja. Subsequently, the parties entered into
and submitted to the trial court a “Compromise Agreement” stating that Borja is bound
to pay the amounts P30,575 and P50,000 and in case any amount due is not paid within
the period stated in this agreement shall earn 2% interest per month until fully paid plus
25% attorney’s fees of the amount collectible and that writ of execution shall be issued
as a matter of right. Petitioner, however, failed to pay the amounts stated in the judicial
compromise. Sulyap filed a writ of execution against Borja. The Trial Court granted the
writ. Borja motioned to quash the writ by stating that his failure to pay the amounts
within the agreed period was due to Sulyap’s fault; therefore, the penalty clause should
not be imposed. Borja filed another motion praying for the quashal of the writ of
execution and modification of the decision. This time, he contended that there was fraud
in the execution of the compromise agreement. He claimed that 3 sets of compromise
agreement were submitted for his approval. Among them, he allegedly chose
and signed the compromise agreement which contained no stipulation as to the
payment of 2% monthly interest and 25%attorney’s fees in case of default in payment.
He alleged that his former counsel, Atty. Leonardo Cruz, who assisted him in entering
into the said agreement, removed the page of the genuine compromise agreement
where he affixed his signature and fraudulently attached the same to the compromise
agreement submitted to the court in order to make it appear that he agreed to the
penalty clause embodied there in, Sulyap presented Atty. Cruz as witness, who
declared that the petitioner gave his consent to the inclusion of the penalty clause of 2%
monthly interest and 25% attorney’s fees in the compromise agreement. He added that
the compromise agreement approved by the court was in fact signed by the petitioner
inside the courtroom before the same was submitted for approval. Atty. Cruz stressed
that the penalty clause of 2%interest per month until full payment of the amount due,
plus 25% thereof as attorney’s fees, in case of default in payment, was actually chosen
by the petitioner. The trial court ruled in favour of Sulyap because it gave credence to
the testimony of Atty. Cruz and even noted that it was more than one year from receipt
of the judgment on compromise on October 25, 1995, when he questioned the inclusion
of the penalty clause in the approved compromise agreement despite several
opportunities to raise said objection.

ISSUE:

Whether Borja is bound by the penalty clause in the compromise agreement.

HELD:

YES. While a judicial compromise may be annulled or modified on the ground of vitiated
consent or forgery, we find that the testimony of the petitioner failed to establish the
attendance of fraud in the instant case. No evidence was presented by petitioner other
than his bare allegation that his former counsel fraudulently attached the page of
the genuine compromise agreement where he affixed his signature to the compromise
agreement submitted to the court. Petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the existence of
the penalty clause in the compromise agreement approved by the court. When he
received the judgment reproducing the full text of the compromise agreement, to
February 19, 1997, he never raised the issue of the fraudulent inclusion of the penalty
clause in their agreement. We note that petitioner is a doctor of medicine. He must have
read and understood the contents of the judgment on compromise. In fact,
on November 13, 1995, he filed, without the assistance of counsel, a motion praying
that the amounts of P50,000.00 and 37,575.00 be withheld from his total obligation and
instead be applied to the expenses for the repair of the leased premises which was
allegedly vandalized by the private respondent Even assuming that Atty. Leonardo Cruz
exceeded his authority in inserting the penalty clause, the status of the said clause is
not void but merely voidable, i.e., capable of being ratified.17 Indeed, petitioner’s failure
to question the inclusion of the 2% monthly interest and 25% attorney’s fees in the
judicial compromise despite several opportunities to do so was tantamount
to ratification. Hence, he is estopped from assailing the validity there of Finally, we find
no merit in petitioner's contention that the compromise agreement should be annulled
because Atty. Cruz, who assisted him in entering into such agreement, was then
an employee of the Quezon City government, and is thus prohibited from engaging in
the private practice of his profession. Suffice it to state that the isolated assistance
provided by Atty. Cruz to the petitioner in entering into a compromise agreement does
not constitute a prohibited "private practice" of law by a public official. "Private practice"
of a profession, specifically the law profession does not pertain to an isolated court
appearance; rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually
or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer. Such was never established
in the instant case.
In re Santiago (1940)

In Re Atty. Roque Santiago

June 21, 1940

Original Action in the Supreme Court. Malpractice.

Facts:

In this administrative case, the Solicitor General charged the respondent Atty. Roque

Santiago with malpractice and prayed that disciplinary action be taken against him.
The respondent gave legal advice to one Ernesto Baniquit who was living separately
from his wife for some nine consecutive years and seeking to contract a second
marriage. The respondent assured Baniquit that he could secure a separation from his
wife and marry again. The lawyer prepared a document (Exhibit A) stating that the
contracting parties, husband and wife, were authorized to marry again and at the same
time giving the authorization to renounce or waive each member’s right against the
party marrying.
 The notary let the husband and wife execute and acknowledge
the document and declared that they were again single and as such could contract
another marriage. Relying on this document, Baniquit contracted a second marriage.
The respondent, upon realizing his mistake, sent for the parties and let them sign the
deed of cancellation (Exhibit C) a month later but after the second marriage of Baniquit.

Issue:

1. Did the lawyer commit malpractice in his acts regarding the dispensation of
such advice and preparation of document?
2. Is the document regarding separation (Exhibit A) valid?

Held:

1. Yes. The advice given by the respondent and his preparation and acknowledgment

by of the contract constitute malpractice which justifies disbarment from the practice of
law.
2. No. Marriage separation should have should be sanctioned in the proper court and
before the separation (see Selanova). Apart from this, the document subverts the vital
foundation of the family, marriage, and is contrary to law, morals and public policy.
IN RE: ATTY. FELIZARDO M. DE GUZMAN January 21, 1974
FACTS:
Vicente Floro filed his Answer to the above-mentioned Petition for relief and he alleged
that the decision of the City Court was based on an admission made in open court by
petitioner Lagrimas Lapatha on the basis of which the words "Confession of judgment"
were written on the "expedient" of the case and underneath were affixed the signature
of said petitioner and that of Atty. Felizardo de Guzman; that the alleged payments of
Lagrimas Lapatha were made after the rendition of the decision to forestall immediate
execution of the judgment; that when petitioner filed with the City Court a motion for
reconsideration of the decision alleging fraud, the true circumstances attending the
hearing of November 2, 1967, were brought out to the satisfaction of petitioner's
counsel, for which reason the City Court denied the motion for reconsideration; that
during the hearing on petitioner's motion for reconsideration Atty. de Guzman agreed
not to press for the execution of the judgment on the assurance of petitioner that she
would vacate the premises by January 15, 1968, however, petitioner did not comply with
her promise and instead filed the Petition for Relief.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition for relief against the respondent who committed any deceit or
misconduct in Civil Case No. 165187 of the City Court of Manila be approved.
RULING:
We agree with the Solicitor General that in the instant case "the evidence is wanting" to
sustain a finding that respondent committed any deceit or misconduct in Civil Case No.
165187 of the City Court of Manila. In Go vs. Candoy, 19 this Court said: "It is quite
elementary that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant. To be made the basis for suspension or disbarment of a lawyer, the
charge against him must be established by convincing proof. The record must disclose
as free from doubt a case which compels the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary
powers. The dubious character of the act done as well as of the motivation thereof must
be clearly demonstrated." WHEREFORE, this administrative complaint is dismissed and
respondent, Atty. Felizardo M. de Guzman, is exonerated of the charge.