Central London Property Trust LTD V High Trees House LTD

Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd [1947] KB 130
A promise which was intended to create legal

Held:
relations and which was acted on was binding in law,
despite the absence of consideration.
They are cases in which a promise was made which was intended to create legal relations and
which, to the knowledge of the person making the promise, was going to be acted on by the
person to whom it was made and which was in fact so acted on. In such cases the courts have said
that the promise must be honoured.
Held (1.) that where parties enter into an arrangement which is intended to create legal relations
between them and in pursuance of such arrangement one party makes a promise to the other which
he knows will be acted on and which is in fact acted on by the promisee, the court will treat the
promise as binding on the promisor to the extent that it will not allow him to act inconsistently with it
even although the promise may not be supported by consideration in the strict sense and the effect of
the arrangement made is to vary the terms of a contract under seal by one of less value
The principle stated in Central London. Property Trust Ld. v. High Trees House Ld. [1947] K. B.
130 and Robertson v. Minister of Pensions [1949] 1 K. B. 227, is that, where one party has, by his
words or conduct, made to the other a promise or assurance which was intended to affect the legal
relations between them and to be acted on accordingly, then, once the other party has taken him at
his word and acted on it, the party who gave the promise or assurance cannot afterwards be allowed
to revert to the previous legal relationship as if no such promise or assurance had been made by him,
but he must accept their legal relations subject to the qualification which he himself has so introduced,
even though it is not supported in point of law by any consideration, but only by his word.
Where a promise is given which (a) is intended to create legal relations, and (b) is intended to be
acted on by the promisee, and (c) is, in fact, acted on, the promisor cannot bring an action against the
promisee which involves the repudiation of his promise or is inconsistent with it: see the High Trees
case(6) and Robertson v. Minister of Pensions (7). Such a promise acts as an estoppel or quasi-
estoppel. It is just and equitable that if such a promise with those conditions can be used as a shield
by the promisee, he can also use it as a sword and sue upon it, and in such case the promisor should
not be allowed to plead that his promise is not binding on him: the promisor is estopped from denying
his promise. The reasoning which it has been established affords the promisee in such a case a
defence, is good to afford him also the weapon of a cause of action. Consideration is not necessary in
such a case, where such a promise has been acted on to the detriment of the promisee.
The principle, as I understand it, is that, where one party has, by his words or conduct, made to the
other a promise or assurance which was intended to affect the legal relations between them and to be
acted on accordingly, then, once the other party has taken him at his word and acted on it, the one
who gave the promise or assurance cannot afterwards be allowed to revert to the previous legal
relations as if no such promise or assurance had been made by him, but he must accept their legal
relations subject to the qualification which he himself has so introduced, even though it is not
supported in point of law by any consideration but only by his word.
“but allowed Maher to remain under the impression that the deal would be
completed.”
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Waltons_Stores_(Interstate)_Ltd_v_Maher
Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (LAWS2381)
http://constructionblog.practicallaw.com/estoppel-by-convention-a-shield-or-a-sword/
use combe in your favor
https://www.uts.edu.au/sites/default/files/Estoppel%20Law%20%28Sample%20Annotated%20Essay
%29.pdf
https://www.studocu.com/row/document/city-university-of-hong-kong/law-of-contract/coursework/3-
promissory-estoppel/3757212/view
Evenden v Guildford City FC [1975] QB 917 he expressed the view that

it could apply to parties without an existing legal relationship.
However, this was doubted in

Re Wyven Developments
[1974] 1 WLR 1097 by
Templeman J, who appeared
to think that this
was no longer the case and
that it could create rights.
Lord Denning in Evenden v
Guildford City AFC [1975] QB
917 also
adopted this approach
However, this was doubted in Re Wyven Developments [1974] 1 WLR 1097 by Templeman J, who
appeared to think that thiswas no longer the case and that it could create rights. Lord Denning in
Evenden v Guildford City AFC [1975] QB 917 alsoadopted this approach
Evenden v Guildford City AFC [1975] QB 917, here the courts held "that
promissory estoppel can be a cause of action."
However, this
requirement seemed
changed in light of the
decisions in Re Wyven
Developments
(1974) 1 WLR 1097 and
Evenden V. Guildford City
AFC (1975) QB 917, here
the courts held
“that promissory
estoppel can be a cause
of action”.
However, this requirement seemed changed in light of the decisions in Re Wyven Developments (1974)
1 WLR 1097 and Evenden V. Guildford City AFC (1975) QB 917, here the courts held “that promissory
estoppel can be a cause of action”.
Promissory estoppel occurs when there is a contractual relationship between parties. Like when there is
a legal relationship between the promisee and the promisor. It remains unsettled whether promissory
estoppel may arise in pre-contractual relationships. However, Lord Denning in Brinkom Investments Ltd
V. Carr (1979)CA was of the view that promissory estoppel may arise from promise made by parties
negotiating contracts. Similar views was expressed in Durham Fancy Goods V. Michael Jackson (1969) 2
QB 839 where Donaldson J. held that contractual relationship is irrelevant provided that there is “a pre-
existing legal relationship which could, in certain circumstances, give rise to liabilities and penalties”
Durham Fancy Goods Ltd. v. Michael Jackson (Fancy Goods)
Ltd. [1968] 2 Q.B. 839
Combe v Combe
Peter Rawlinson for the wife. Where a promise is given which

(a) is intended to create legal relations, and (b) is intended to
be acted on by the promisee, and (c) is, in fact, acted on, the
promisor cannot bring an action against the promisee which
involves the repudiation of his promise or is inconsistent with
it: see the High Trees case 10 and Robertson v. Minister of
Pensions 11 . Such a promise acts as an estoppel or quasi-
estoppel. It is just and equitable that if such a promise with
those conditions can be used as a shield by the promisee, he
can also use it as a sword and sue upon it, and in such case
the promisor should not be allowed to plead that his promise
is not binding on him: the promisor is estopped from denying
his promise. The reasoning which it has been established
affords the promisee in such a case a defence, is good to
afford him also the weapon of a cause of action.
Consideration is not necessary in such a case, where such a
promise has been acted on to the detriment of the promisee.
no its still a shield. the promisee can only claim for what he had loss or other injunctions.
In none of these cases was the defendant sued on the promise, assurance, or assertion as a cause
of action in itself: he was sued for some other cause, for example, a pension or a breach of
contract, and the promise, assurance or assertion only played a supplementary r“le - an important
r“le, no doubt, but still a supplementary role. That is, I think, its true function. It may be part of a
cause of action, but not a cause of action in itself.
so long as the act or forbearance is done on the faith of the promise and at the request of the
promisor, express or implied. The act done is then in itself sufficient consideration for the
promise.
Football case
The principle of promissory estoppel, which ( per Lord

Denning M.R.) is not limited to where the parties are already
contractually bound to one another,
As to promissory estoppel, see Spencer Bower and
Turner, 2nd ed., p. 6. The doctrine is not confined to
contract. It can be used as a minesweeper or
minelayer. Robertson v. Ministry of Pensions [1949] 1 K.B.
227 , 230 shows that it is not limited to pre-existing
contracts.
it is not necessary for the employee to rely on estoppel
because he can rely on the contract.
that promissory estoppel is limited to cases where parties are already bound contractually one to the
other. I do not think it is so limited: see Durham Fancy Goods Ltd. v. Michael Jackson (Fancy Goods) Ltd.
[1968] 2 Q.B. 839 , 847. It applies whenever a representation is made, whether of fact or law, present or
future, which is intended to be binding, intended to induce a person to act upon it and he does act upon
it.

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Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd [1947] KB 130

A promise which was intended to create legal

use combe in your favor

Evenden v Guildford City FC [1975] QB 917 he expressed the view that

However, this was doubted in

Peter Rawlinson for the wife. Where a promise is given which

The principle of promissory estoppel, which ( per Lord

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