POSSESSION

Rizal Cement vs Villareal

Facts
Herein respondent file an application for the registration under Torrens Title, two parcel of lands
located in Rizal. Petitioner filed an opposition to said application having bought the same from
Maria Certeza – the original owner, and have been in continuous and adverse possession of the
property. Respondent counter the defense of petitioner stating that they and their predecessors-in-
interest have been in continuous, adverse and open possession of said portion since time
immemorial; and that they have been religiously paying the real estate taxes thereon.
Issue
WON Rizal Cement is the one who have better position over possession of the said land.
Held
No. Very significantly petitioner did not present any witness in actual possession of the land in
question. As aptly found by the appellate court, respondents possess the property in the concept of
an owner. Petitioner's evidence, consisting of tax receipts, tax declaration and survey plan are not
conclusive and indisputable basis of one's ownership of the property in question. Assessment alone
is of little value as proof of title. Mere tax declaration does not vest ownership of the property upon
the declarant. Settled is the rule that neither tax receipts nor declaration of ownership for taxation
purposes alone constitutes sufficient evidence of ownership or of the right to possess realty. They
must be supported by other effective proofs.

Ignacio Wong vs Carpio and Mercado

Facts
Private respondent Manuel Mercado and William Giger executed a deed of sale with a
right to repurchase a parcel of land. Mercado began harvesting only the coconut fruits and he
paid the taxes on the land for Mr. Giger. He went periodically to the land to make copra
but he never placed any person on the land in litigation to watch it. Neither did he reside on
the land. Ignacio Wong subsequently bought the same land to Ginger after having found out that the
said property is abandoned. On September 27, 1976, Mercado again went to the land in suit
to make copras. Wong ordered the hooking of the coconut which pre-empt Mercado to file a case
for forcible entry.
Issue
WON it was Mercado who has a better right of possession over the property.
Held
Yes. It should be stressed that possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the
exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and
legal formalities for acquiring such right. In the instant case, it is clear that possession passed
from vendor William Giger to private respondent Manuel Mercado by virtue of the first sale
a retro. Accordingly, the later sale a retro in favor of petitioner failed to pass the possession of
the property because there is an impediment —the possession exercised by private
respondent. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different
personalities except in the cases of co-possession.

Somodio vs CA
Facts
A piece of land in General Santos City was sold to Wilfredo Mabugat. Nicanor Somodio
contributed one-half of the purchase price, Mabugat executed an Affidavit of Trust, recognizing the
right of Somodio over one-half portion of the lot. After they partitioned the property, Somodio
immediately took possession of his portion and planted ipil-ipil trees, coconut trees and
other fruit bearing trees. IN 1976, he allowed Ayco to enter the premises and construct a
nipa hut thereon. When the time came that he wanted to remove Ayco, the latter refused, and
Somodio filed suit for unlawful detainer. On June 1983, Ebeneco Purisima entered the property and
started constructing a structure. A forcible entry case was filed against Purisima. During suit, the
MTC and RTC ruled in favor of Somodio, but the Court of Appeals set Aside the judgment,
stating that Somodio did not clearly and conclusively establish physical, prior possession
over the lot.
Issue
WON Somodio had exercise prior right of possession over the subject property.

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 Held
Yes. Petitioner took possession of the property sometime in 1974 when he planted the
property to coconut trees, ipil-ipil trees and fruit trees. In 1976, he started the construction of a
building on the property. It is immaterial that the building was unfinished and that he left
for Kidapawan for employment reasons and visited the property only intermittently.
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every
square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession. It is sufficient that petitioner
was able to subject the property to the action of his will.

Maglucot vs Maglucot
Facts
Petitioner here filed a complaint for recovery of possession of Lot 1639-D, which was co-owned
before partition was made. Petitioner averred that there was a valid partition made between Tomas
Maglucot and his co-owners in 1946. Respondents herein however, averred that the said partition is
without effect since petitioners were unable to show any court approval of any partition.
Furthermore, they emphasize that petitioners failed to show that the interested parties were apprised
or notified of the tentative subdivision contained in the sketch and that the CFI subsequently
confirmed the same.
Issue
WON respondents are estopped from questioning the partition.
Held
Yes. Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and who took
possession of the portion allotted to them, are estopped from questioning the title to partition
allotted to another party. Here, respondents already occupied the lots in accordance with the sketch
plan. This occupation continued until this action was filed. They cannot now be heard to question
the possession and ownership of the other co-owners who took exclusive possession of lot 1639-D
also in accordance with the sketch plan. Also, the payment of rentals reveals that respondents
possession of the land is that of a holder and not as owner thereof. One who possess as a mere
holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership. Hence,
petitioners were in possession of the subject lot in the concept of an owner from 1952 up to the
time the present action was commenced.

Cequena vs Bolante
Facts
The subject lot was originally owned by Sinfroso Mendoza. After he died, by virtue of affidavit,
tax declaration was subsequently place under the name of Margarito Mendoza, brother of Sinfroso.
Respondent, who is a child of Sinfroso is the present occupant of the subject lot. During the
cadastral survey of the land, daughters of Margarito and son of Sinfroso had a dispute over the
ownership of the property. The trial court said that petitioners are the lawful owner of the property.
However, in a turn of events, the appellate court held that the probative value of petitioners' tax
receipts and declarations paled in comparison with the respondent's proof of ownership of
the disputed parcel. Actual, physical, exclusive and continuous possession by respondent since
1985.
Issue
WON respondent Honorata has a better right of possession over the property.
Held
No. Ownership of immovable property is acquired by ordinary prescription through possession
for ten years. Being the sole heir of her father, respondent showed through his tax receipt that she
had been in possession of the land for more than ten years since 1932. Respondent's possession was
not disturbed until 1953 when the petitioners' father claimed the land. But by then, her possession,
which was in the concept of owner had already ripened into ownership. Petitioner contention that
they had paid tax declaration of the said property are not conclusive evidence of ownership. At
most, they constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership or possession. It must be coupled with
proof of actual possession of the property to ripen into ownership.

EDCA Publishing vs Santos

Facts
The case stemmed on the malicious acts of Professor Jose Cruz, who, by deceit and fraud, was
able to convince EDCA to sell to him those books ordered by appearing to be a dean in De La Salle
College. After verifying seller’s ownership, entrapment operation was initiated which lead to the
arrest of Jose Cruz. However, Cruz revealed that he has sold 120 books obtain from petitioner to

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 respondent spouses. By reason of this, petitioner, along with some policemen, and without a
warrant, entered the house of respondent and thereafter confiscated the books, threatening them of
violation of anti-fencing. A writ of preliminary attachment was issued and the petitioner, after
initial refusal, finally surrendered the books to the private respondents. CA affirmed in favor of
respondents, hence, this petition.
Issue
WON petitioner can still recover the books.
Held
Santos was a good faith buyer after taking steps to verify the identity of the seller. When she was
showed the invoice, she reasonably believed that he was a legitimate seller. With regard to unlawful
deprivation, EDCA was not unlawfully deprived of the property by mere failure of consideration.
There was already a perfected contract of sale. Proof was even substantiated when EDCA gave the
invoice as proof of payment upon delivery of the books. This did not amount to unlawful taking,
because by the delivery of EDCA to Cruz, ownership of the books already transferred to him.

De Garcia vs CA
Facts
Guevarra was the owner of a lady’s diamond ring with white gold mounting, solitaire 2-karat
diamond as well as 4 brills. It was stolen from her house. On a relevant date, while she was talking
to Garcia, an owner of a restaurant, she recognized the ring on the latter’s finger and asked how she
acquired the same. Garcia averred that she bought it from her comadre. Guevarra made Garcia
know that the ring was stolen from her place days before. It was ascertained the ring was
indeed Guevarra’s but despite written demands, Garcia refused to return the ring.
Issue
WON Guevarra can still claim the diamond ring.
Held
Respondent Angelina D. Guevara, having been unlawfully deprived of the diamond ring in
question, was entitled to recover it from petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia who was found in
possession of the same. The only exception the law allows is when there is acquisition in good faith
of the possessor at a public sale, in which case the owner cannot obtain its return without
reimbursing the price.

Dizon vs Suntay
Facts
Suntay is the owner of a 3-carat diamond ring which was delivered to Clarita Sison for sale on
commission. After the lapse of a considerable time without Sison having returned to Suntay
the latter’s ring, Suntay made demands on Sison. Turns out that the ring was pledged by Clarita’s
niece, evidently in connivance with her, with the defendant Dizon’s pawnshop. Suntay made
demands to Dizon to surrender the said property. The CFI granted the action.
Issue
WON Suntay can still claim the said property.
Held
YES. The controlling provision is Article 559 of the Civil Code which provides in part that one
who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person
in possession of the same. Suntay having been unlawfully deprived of the ring in question, is
entitled to recover it from Dizon who was found in possession of the same.

Azarcon vs Eusebio
Facts
Respondent Victor Eusebio and petitioners herein had a dispute over the possession of a certain
parcel of public land. Victor Eusebio (respondent) has filed a lease application while Leonardo
Azarcon and his companions had a homestead application. Eusebio contested that Azarcon
occupied the said lot through forcible entry. Azarcon, in his answered, stated that they have been in
continuous possession of the subject lot since 1941. Eusebio won, thereby, Azarcon file an appeal
before CA. While the appeal is still on pending, a writ of execution was issued in favor of Eusebio.
Azarcon was able to get the notice. Nevertheless, he still culminate the play that is still pending for
harvest.
Issue
WON Azarcon can validly claim ownership over the said palay.
Held
Yes. Under the law a person who is in possession and who is being ordered to leave a parcel of

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 land while products thereon are pending harvest, has the right to a part of the net harvest in
proportion to the time of possession. As the order of execution did not expressly prohibit the
defendants-appellants from gathering the pending fruits, which fruits were the result of their
possession and cultivation of the land, it cannot be said that the defendants-appellants
committed an act which is clear violation of the courts' order. Besides, the defendants-
appellants had presented, after receipt of the order of execution, a motion to set aside the said order
of execution, and this motion to stay execution was granted.

MWSS vs CA
Facts
The City of Dagupan filed a complain against MWSS for recovery of possession of Dagupan
Waterworks System. MWSS interposed a defense that under RA 1383, MWSS is vested upon
ownership, and control of all waterworks systems throughout the Philippines and as one of its
counterclaims, had a right or reimbursement for all the necessary and useful expenses introduced.
The trial court found MWSS to be possessor in bad faith, which was subsequently affirmed by CA.
Due to this, they cannot claim reimbursement. MWSS question the ruling stating that the Civil
Code is silent as to whether a possessor in bad faith has the right to remove useful improvements.
Issue
WON MWSS has the right to remove useful expenses made to Dagupan Waterworks Systems
given that they are possessor in bad faith.
Held
NO. It is provided under Article 449 of the Civil Code of the Philippines that "he who
builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or
sown without right to indemnity." As a builder in bad faith, NAWASA lost whatever useful
improvements it had made without right to indemnity. Under Article 546 of same law, only a
possessor in good faith shall be refunded for useful expenses with the right of retention until
reimbursed. Article 547 provides that only a possessor in good faith may remove useful
improvements if the can be done without damage to the principal thing and if the person who
recovers the possession does not exercise the option of reimbursing the useful expenses.

USUFRUCT
Bachrach vs Seifert
Facts
E. M. Bachrach died leaving a will in which, he bestowed upon his wife, Mary McDonald
Bachrach, for life, all the fruits and usufruct of the remainder of his property and upon her death,
the ½ thereof will be divided between his legal heirs. The other heirs, however, filed a petition to
have their share until the death of Mary. Payment is made to the heirs but was postponed during the
war with Japanese. Payment continues after war but in 1947, Mary declined to give further
payments. Mary alleged that the allowances paid to the heirs come from the fruits of usufruct which
belongs to her due to testate succession and if she continues to render payment, She be authorized
to sell the ½ shares of the heirs.
Issue
WON Mary be relieved of his obligation to pay.
Held
Yes. The courts first impression was that the appellants had no valid reason for objecting to the
sale of the 1/2 of the estate adjudicated to them because in that way they would receive their shares
earlier; furthermore, that the administration was warranted in asking for the sale of said 1/2 of the
property adjudicated to the heirs or as much thereof as was sufficient to reimburse for the
allowances being paid by her to the heirs from her personal funds or from the fruits of the said 1/2
which, as a usufructuary, belonged to her.

Hemedes vs CA
Facts
The disputed property was originally owned by Jose Hemedes. He executed a “Donation Inter
Vivos” in favor of Justa Kausapin under resolutory conditions that upon her death or remarriage,
the property will be given to the heirs of donor, Maxima. Justa and Maxima then executed
reconveyance and thereafter, Maxima applied for the registration of the land in which, she
annotated that Justa exercise usufruct. The property was later on acquired by R&B Insurance after

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 foreclosure of mortgage after failure of Maxima to pay the loan. However, R&B found out the
property is being lease to Asia Brewery. They were later informed that Justa, the usufruct
transferred the rights to his step-son who subsequently sold it to Dominoin, and in which, the said
company lease it to Asia Brewery. Respondent defense was that R&B is not a mortgage in good
faith for not checking the annotation therefrom.
Issue
WON R&B Insurance is mortgage in bad faith.
Held
No. The annotation of usufructuary rights in favor of Justa Kausapin upon Maxima Hemedes
title does not impose upon R & B Insurance the obligation to investigate the validity of its
mortgagor's title. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of
preserving its form and substance. The usufructuary is entitled to all the natural, industrial and civil
fruits of the property and may personally enjoy the thing in usufruct, lease it to another, or alienate
his right of usufruct, even by a gratuitous title, but all the contracts he may enter into as such
usufructuary shall terminate upon the expiration of the usufruct.

Fabie vs Jose Guitierrez and Ngo So

Facts
The petitioner Josefa Fabie is the usufructuary of the income of certain houses located in
Binondo, Manila. The owner is respondent Jun Grey. Jose Fabie instituted an action of unlawful
detainer against Ngo So for not leaving the premesis after termination of right of lease. Ngo So
contends that he was a tenant in the said place since 1908 and that he is paying rental to the owner.
He contends that Fabie cannot eject him since he is only having the right of usufruct. It is only the
owner that can evict him. The owner intervened siding with respondent, asserting his superior right
of ownership against petitioner.
Issue
WON Josefa has the right of administration over the property
Held
Yes. The usufruct gives authority to Josefa to collect rents, derive incomes, make improvements
and administer the property. The pretension of the respondent Juan Grey that he is the administrator
of the property with the right to choose the tenants and to dictate the conditions of the lease is
contrary to both the letter and the spirit of the said clause of the will, the stipulation of the parties,
and the judgment of the court. He cannot manage or administer the property after all the acts of
management or administration have been vested by the court, with his consent, in the usufructuary.

EASEMENT & SERVITUDE

Ronquillo vs Jose Roco
Facts
Petitioners’ parcel of land was connected to the Naga Market Place and Igualdad St. by an
easement of a right of way through the land of the respondents, which they have been using for
more than 20 years. On May 1953, however, respondents built a chapel right in the middle of the
road, blocking their usual path to the marketplace. One year after, by means of force, intimidation,
and threats, the owners (respondents) of the land where the easement was situated, planted wooden
posts and fenced with barbed wires the road, closing their right of way from their house to Igualdad
St. and Naga public market.
Issue
WON easement of right of way can be acquired by prescription.
Held
No. Only continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by title or prescription.
Easement of right of way is a discontinuous one. Although some believes that it can be acquired
through prescription, however, the opinion of the majority must prevail, unless and until the same is
changed or clarified, the easement of right of way may not be acquired through prescription.

Tañedo vs Bernard
Facts
Antonio Cardenas (resp) is the original owner of 2 parcels of land (7501-A and 7501-B). He
constructed an apartment bldg in Lot A and in Lot B he constructed an apartment, house, bodega
and a septic tank for common use of the occupants of the two lots. He sold Lot A to herein
petitioner and then mortgaged Lot B. However, Bernard sold it to Spouses Sim. Tanedo then
wanted to redeem it but the spouses denied his request and moreover, block the sewage pipe. In
defense of respondent, they averred that the subsequent sale to different owner will extinguish

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 easement.
Issue
WON the subsequent sale to different owners will distinguish right of easement.
Held
The alienation of the dominant and servient estates to different persons is not one of the grounds
for the extinguishment of an easement. On the contrary, use of the easement is continued by
operation of law under Art 624. In the instant case, no statement abolishing or extinguishing the
easement of drainage was mentioned in the deed of sale of Lot 7501-A to Eduardo Tañedo. Nor did
Antonio Cardenas stop the use of the drain pipe and septic tank by the occupants of Lot 7501-A
before he sold said lot to Eduardo Tafiedo.

Costabella vs CA
Facts
Petitioners owned a lot wherein they started constructing their beach hotel. Before such
construction, the private respondent, in going to and from their respective properties and the
provincial road, passed through a passageway which traversed the petitioner’s property. As a result
of the construction, this passageway, including the alternative route, was obstructed. Private
respondent filed for injunction plus damages. In one of their contention, they averred that they now
acquired the easement of right of way through prescription.
Issue
WON right of way can be acquired through prescription.
Held
No. NO. one may validly claim an easement of right of way when he has proven the: (1) the
dominant estate is surrounded by other immovable and has no adequate outlet to a public highway;
(2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the
dominant estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at point least prejudicial to the servient estate. The
private respondent failed to prove that there is no adequate outlet from their respective properties to
a public highway. There must be a real necessity and not mere convenience for the dominant estate
to acquire such easement.

Encarnacion vs CA
Facts
Tomas Encarnacion, owner of a dominant estate, has been given by respondent the right of way.
However, in 1960, the owner of the servient estate enclosed their lands with a fence but provided a
road path of 25 meters long and about 1 meter in width. During this time, the plant nursery business
of Encarnacion started to grow. Subsuquenlty, he brought a jeepney. However, the vehicle is way
too big to fit on the said passage. He then requested the spouses to allocate to him 1 ½ meters of
right of way but spouses refuse.
Issue
WON Encarnacion is entitled to expansion of the said right of way.
Held
Yes. In the case at bar, although there is a dried river bed, t it traversed by a semi-concrete bridge
and there is no egress or ingress from the highway. For the jeep to reach the level of the highway, it
must literally jump 4-5 meters up. And during rainy season, it is impassable due to the floods.
When a private property has no access to a public road, it has the right of easement over adjacent
servient estates as a matter of law. With the non-availability of the dried river bed as an alternative
route, the servient estates should accommodate the needs of the dominant estate.

Case vs Heirs of Tuason

Facts
Petitioner filed an application of registration of his property. However, the heirs of Tuason
question the measuring made on the property of Case as it already infringe in their boundary line;
that the true dividing line between the property of the petitioner and that of the said heirs is the
walls indicated in black ink on the accompanying plan.
Issue
WON the wall is a party wall.
Held
No. It should, however, be noted that that portion of the wall between the numbers 3, 4, 5, and 6
on the plan of the opponents, which corresponds to numbers 33, 32, 31, and 30 of that of the
petitioner, and which constitutes the cesspool on the property of the latter, belongs to him, and it
has so been admitted by counsel for the opponents, for the reason that the petitioner had acquired it

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 by prescription, the opponents having lost control over the area of land covered by the said
cesspool together with the walls that inclose it. Under article 572 of the Civil Code the easement of
party walls is presumed, unless there is a title or exterior sign, or proof to the contrary, among
others, in dividing walls of adjoining buildings up to the common point of elevation.

Choco vs Santa Maria

Facts
The defendant, in building his house, has made several openings and windows in the walls of his
house on both sides overlooking the property of the plaintiff. Plaintiff protested and subsequently,
made some letters of demands to defendant. An agreement has been agreed by both parties wherein
it was affirmed that the plaintiff will just adjust it but it was not made. The trial court ruled in favor
of plaintiff prohibiting the opening of the window in question.
Issue
WON the court erred in ordering the closing of such window.
Held
No. The window in question is in front of the plaintiffs’ property since between it and the
plaintiff’s property there does not intervene the distance required by law – therefore, its opening is
a manifest violation of the provision of Art 582 of the Civil Code which provides for a 2 meter
distance between the walls to which they are built and to the property of servient estate.

Solid Manila Corporation vs Bio Hong

Facts
Solid Manila Corp has been using the private alley in the property of Bio Hong as its right of
way long before. Bio Hong acquired the said property to its original owner in which, there is a
stipulation that the said alley shall be freed from any obstruction and the public to use the same.
Bio Hong however, the private respondent constructed steel gates that precluded unhampered use.
The trial court rule in favor of petitioner but Bio Hong argue, upon appeal to CA that the easement
has been extinguish because of merger of rights. The CA reverse the trial court ruling.
Issue
WON the easement of right of way has been extinguish due to merger.
Held
No. genuine merger took place as a consequence of the sale in favor of the private respondent
corporation. According to the Civil Code, a merger exists when ownership of the dominant and
servient estates is consolidated in the same person. Merger requires full ownership of both estates.
The servitude in question is a personal servitude (established for the benefit of a community, or of
one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong). In a personal servitude,
there is therefore no "owner of a dominant tenement" to speak of, and the easement pertains to
persons without a dominant estate, in this case, the public at large. Thus, merger could not have
been possible.

Floro vs Llenado
Facts
Mr. Floro, who owns a Park Subdivision has its own access roads from the MacArthur Highway
through road lot 4. Llenado, owned the Llenado Homes Subdivision which he obtained from its
previous owner. The controversy brewed since Llenado Homes did not have any passage to the
MacArthur Highway. However, a proposed access road has been given but the said access road did
not exist yet. Mr. Flor gave provisional authority to Mr. Llenado to have temporary use of its access
road. Later, Floro discovered grave damage to its access roads due to passage of heavy machinery.
He then barricaded Road Lot 5 with a pile of rocks, wooden posts and adobe stones. He essentially
implied Llenado to keep out of property.
Issue
WON there is a legal easement to allow Llenado to use the access road of Mr. Floro.
Held
No. The court held that to be entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way, the
preconditions provided under Arts. 649 and 650 of the Civil Code must be established. For this
case, it is apparent that the elements have not been met. The original subdivision development plan
presented by Llenado indicates an existing and prior agreement with Ms. Ipapo to create a right of
way through the abandoned Ipapo ricefield. Ipapo had long agreed to these terms but Llenado
apparently thought it too much work and cost to develop such road. It was easier for him to create

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 an easement via the Floro property.

Quimen vs CA
Facts
Anastacia together with her siblings inherited a property in Bulacan in which, they subdivided
the said property amongst themselves. A portion of the lot of his brother, which was located at the
back of her property was sold to Yolanda. The property of Anastacia is near municipal road thereby,
Yolanda requesting for a right of way to Anastacia which the latter agreed but later on refused to
acknowledge such agreement. Yolonda constructed a house on the lot she bought using as her
passageway to the public highway a portion of Anastacia’s property. But when Yolanda finally
offered to pay for the use of the pathway Anastacia refused to accept the payment. In fact she was
thereafter barred by Anastacia from passing through her property. She strongly maintains that the
proposed right of way is not the shortest access to the public road because of the detour
Issue
WON Anastacia is entitled for the said easement
Held
Yes. Article 650 of the NCC explicitly states that “the easement of right of way shall be
established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate. The criterion of least prejudice to the
servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance although this is a matter of
judicial appreciation. When the easement may be established on any of several tenements
surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage
should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a
single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be
the shortest.

La Vista Inc. vs CA
Facts
Mangyan Road serve as a boundary between Ateneo and Maryknoll (Mirriam College). The
area, comprising of the said road, was originally belong to vast tract of land owned by Tuasons.
Tuasons sold a portion of the land to Philippine Building Corporation which was later on
transferred to Ateneo. The remaining part, adjoining that of Ateneo, was created into La Vista
Subdivision by the Tuasons themselves. In 1976, La Vista offers to buy some erected properties of
Ateneo. However, they lost on I bidding with Solid Homes. Subsequently, they developed a
subdivision now known as Loyola Grand Villas. Solid Homes requested that they be allowed to use
the Mangyan Road which was denied by the Tuason hence, this action.
Issue
WON La Vista may barred the use of Mangyan Road to Solid Homes.
Held
No. A legal or compulsory easement is that which is constituted by law for public use or for
private interest. The owner of an estate may claim a legal or compulsory right-of-way only after
he has established the existence of four (4) requisites, namely, (a) the estate is surrounded by other
immovable and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (b) after payment of the proper
indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due to the proprietor's own acts; and, (d) the right-of-way
claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule,
where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. A voluntary
easement on the other hand is constituted simply by will or agreement of the parties. These
certainly are indubitable proofs that the parties concerned had indeed constituted a voluntary
easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road and, like any other contract, the same could be
extinguished only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate.

Prosperity Credit Resources vs CA

Facts
Petitioner gave a loan to private respondent Metropolitan Fabrics Inc. and mortgage his property.
The lots comprise a commercial compound with Tandang Sora Avenue as the nearest public road.
Respondent then was able to redeem the property but to do so, will leave the other lots, without
access to Tandang Sora thereby, the two parties agreed to an easement. Petitioner then filed an
injuction since respondent was not allowing him to use the access road for excavation of water pipe
and entry of its trucks. Respondent answered that the said action is not covered by the agreement.
Issue

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 WON Petitioner can be given access for the installation of water pipe and passage of trucks even
if not included in the agreement.
Held
No. There is no question as to the meaning of the terms "ingress" and "egress." They give
petitioner the right to use the private road as a means of entry into and exit from its property on the
northwestern side of the compound. The question concerns the meaning of the phrase "for whatever
kind of passage." The trial court read this phrase to mean that petitioner had the right to make
excavations on the side of the access road in order to install a network of water pipes. The word
"passage" does not, however, "clearly and unmistakably" convey a meaning that includes a right to
install water pipes on the access road.

Villanueva vs Velasco
Facts
Petitioner Bryan Villanueva bought a parcel of land in QC from Pacific Banking Corporation.
When he bought it, there was a small house on its southeastern portion owned by Espinolas, There
was a previous agreement between the previous owner (dominant estate) and Spouses Espinolas
(servient estate) for right of way. Espinolas filed a writ of demolition for obstruction the said
easement, but Bryan interfere stating that the said easement is not annotated in the title, therefore,
no such easement exist.
Issue
WON easement of right of way exist even if not annotated in the title.
Held
Yes. A legal easement is mandated by law, and continues to exist unless its removal is provided
for in a title of conveyance or the sign of the easement is removed before the execution of the
conveyance conformably with Art 647 in accordance with Article 617 of the Civil Code.

National Irrigation Administration vs CA

Facts
A free patent over three (3) hectares of land, situated in the province of Cagayan was issued in
the name of Vicente Manglapus. Such grant however, is subject to the conditions that it shall be
free of encumbrance except with consent and approval of Secretary of Agriculture. Sometime in
1982, NIA was to construct canals in Amulung, Cagayan and Alcala, Cagayan. NIA then entered a
portion of Manglapus land and made diggings and fillings thereon. Manglapus filed a complaint for
damages against NIA.
Issue
WON Manglapus be awarded of just compensation on the damaged or easement of right of way.
Held
No. Article 619 of the Civil Code provides that, "Easements are established either by law or by
the will of the owners. The former are called legal and the latter voluntary easements." In the
present case, the court find and declare that a legal easement of a right-of-way exists in favor of the
government. The land was originally public land, and awarded to respondent Manglapus by free
patent. The ruling would be otherwise if the land were originally private property, in which case,
just compensation must be paid for the taking of a part thereof for public use as an easement of a
right of way.
NUISSANCE
Hidalgo vs Balandan
Facts
Guillermo Balandan and his wife is claiming for the death of their son, Mario. Petitioner was the
owner of an Ice plant, who had in their premises 2 tanks filled of water, 9 feet deep. The factory
was fenced but Ingress and egress was easily made because the gates were always open and there
was no guard assigned in the said gate. Also the tanks didn’t have any barricade or fence. One day
when Mario was playing with his friend, they saw the tank and began playing and swimming inside
it. While bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished out later, already as a
cadaver. The lower court decided in the favor of the parents due to the doctrine of attractive
nuisance.
Issue
WON the doctrine of attractive nuisance can be applied.
Held
No. The doctrine of attractive nuisance states that “One who maintains on his premises
dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who
fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is
liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in

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 the premises. American Jurisprudence shows us that the attractive nuisance doctrine generally is
not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual
condition or artificial feature. In the case at bar, the tanks cannot fall under such doctrine thus the
petitioners cannot be held liable for Mario’s death.

MODES OF ACQUIRRING OWNERSHIP

Acap vs CA
Facts
When Spouses Vasquez died, their son, Felixberto, inherited the said lot. He then executed a
deed of sale in favor of Pido. Teodoro Acap, a tenant, was allowed by Pido to stay by paying
corresponding rentals. The said property now belongs to Edy after Pido died by reason of the
execution of Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights by the heirs of Pido. Edy informed Ted
that the rental shall now be render to him but Ted refuse, claiming that he only recognize Pido as
the true owner and will only pay rentals to the wife of Pido.
Issue
WON the Declaration of heirship and Waiver of Rights is a mode of Acquiring Ownership
Held
No. An asserted right or claim to ownership or a real right over a thing arising from a juridical
act, however justified, is not per se sufficient to give rise to ownership. While title is the juridical
justification, mode is the actual process of acquisition or transfer of ownership over a thing in
question. There is a difference between a sale of hereditary rights and a waiver of hereditary rights.
The first presumes the existence of a contract or deed of sale between the parties. The second is, a
mode of extinction of ownership where there is an abdication or intentional relinquishment of a
known right, in favor of other persons who are co-heirs in the succession. Respondent, being then a
stranger to the succession, cannot conclusively claim ownership over the subject lot on the sole
basis of the waiver document which neither recites the elements of either a sale, or a donation, or
any other derivative mode of acquiring ownership.

DONATIONS
De Luna vs Abrigo
Facts
De Luna donated a portion of his lot to the Luzonian University Foundation. The donation was
embodied in a Deed of Donation Intervivos and was subject to certain terms and conditions. In case
of violation or non-compliance, the property would automatically revert to the donor. When the
Foundation failed to comply with the conditions, de Luna executed a Revival of Donation
instituting again another terms and condition in which the Foundation accepted. After De Luna
died, the heirs now seek for the said donation to be revoked on the ground that the terms were
violated. RTC dismissed petition on the ground of prescription of action of 4 years.
Issue
WON the action prescribed.
Held
No. The donation subject of this case is one with an onerous cause. Under the old Civil Code, it
is a settled rule that donations with an onerous cause are governed not by the law on donations but
by the rules on contract. On the matter of prescription of actions for the revocation of onerous
donation, it was held that the general rules on prescription apply, which is 10 years.

Reyes vs Mosqueda
Facts
Dr. Emilio Pascual died leaving some property. He was survived by his sister Ursula, and the
children of their late sister. The heirs of Pascual then filed a Special Proceedings for the
administration of their decedent’s property. Ursula intervened in the said action stating that some
property be excluded since it was donated to them by donation mortis causa of his late brother.
Issue
WON the donation is mortis cause or intervivos given the fact that the title of said donation is
mortis causa.
Held
The donation is intervivos. Although the donation was entitled ―donations mortis causa it has
been held that dispositions in a deed of donation do not depend on the title or term used in the deed
of donation. It is the body of the document which should be considered in ascertaining the intention
of the donor. For a donation to be a donation mortis causa, the following characteristics should be
present: (1) It conveys no title before the death of the transferor or the transferor retains ownership

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 over the property
(2) Before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will. (3) The transfer is
void should the transferor survive the transferee.

Liguez vs CA
Facts
Conchita Liguez filed a complaint against the widow and heirs of Salvador Lopez to recover a
parcel of 51.84 hectares of land in Davao. She averred to be its legal owner, pursuant to a deed of
donation executed in her favor by Salvador. The donation was made in view of Salvador’s desire to
have sexual relations with Conchita. Furthermore, Conchita’s parents would not allow Conchita to
live with him unless he first donated the subject land. The defense of the widow and heirs was that
st nd
1 , the donation is void because it forms part of conjugal property and 2 , because of illegal
consideration.
Issue
WON the donation is not valid by reason of illegal consideration.
Held
Yes. In this case, Salvador was not moved exclusively by the desire to benefit Conchita, but also
to secure her cohabiting with him, and so that he could gratify his sexual impulses. Actually,
therefore, the donation was but one part of an onerous transaction that must be viewed in its
totality. Thus considered, the conveyance was clearly predicated upon an illicit causa. Lopez would
not have conveyed the property in question had he known that Conchita would refuse to cohabit
with him. The cohabitation was an implied condition to the donation and being unlawful,
necessarily tainted the donation.

Pajarillo vs IAC
Facts
Perfecta Cordero died leaving a 28 hectares of land in Quezon province. Perfecta’s siblings, Juana
and Felipe executed a public instrument for extra-judicial settlement of the estate of Perfecta in
favor of Salud Matias. According to them, Perfecta donated the said property to Matias, her niece,
in consideration of love and affection. The instrument has no annotation of the donee’s acceptance.
Subsequently, Matias transferred possession to his mother and Uncle Claudio who now pays the
real property tax of the land. Juana then, later on, executed Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
Claudio. Claudio died, Matias then filed for reconveyance of property on the ground that the deed
of sale in favor of Claudio was fictitious.
Issue
WON the extra-judicial settlement was valid given that no annotation of acceptance in it.
Held
Yes. Felipe and Juana had declared themselves the heirs of Perfecta and the owners of the
property in question. As such, they were free to give the land to whomever they pleased and for
whatever reason they saw fit. The extra-judicial settlement also reflects their own affection for
Salud which constituted the valid consideration for their own act of liberality. The purpose of the
formal requirement is to insure that the acceptance of the donation is duly communicated to the
donor. In the case at bar, it is not even suggested that Juana was unaware of the acceptance for she
in fact confirmed it later and requested that the donated land be not registered during her lifetime
by Salud. Given this significant evidence, the Court cannot in conscience declare the donation
ineffective because there is no notation in the extrajudicial settlement of the donee's acceptance.
That would be placing too much stress on mere form over substance. It would also disregard the
clear intent of the donation.

Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs CA

Facts
Spouses De Castro and Martina Rieta executed a deed of donation in favor of petitioner subject
to resolutory condition that petitioner shall not sell the property for a period of 100 years from the
execution of the deed of donation otherwise, it will be return to spouses. However, prior to
exhaustion of the condition, the Bishop of Imus executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of
Spouses Ignao. Rieta then filed for nullification of deed of donation and reconveyance. Ignao
contends however, that the action now prescribes.
Issue
WON the action now prescribes.
Held
No. General rule, action for reconveyance will prescribed 4 years after NON-COMPLIANCE of

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 the condition. However, if it is subject to resolutory conditions, prescription shall not applied since
there is automatic reversion expressly provided in the terms. The proper application now will rules
on contract and general provision on prescription. The court however, find the condition contrary to
public policy as it restrict the right of donee to exercise right of ownership.

Eduarte vs CA
Facts
Pedro Calapine was the registered owner of a parcel of land. He executed a deed of donation
inter vivos of ½ of the land to his niece, and subsequently, ceding the other ½ of the property. Helen
Doria donated a portion of the lot to the Calauan Christian Reformed Church. Helen Doria sold
and conveyed the remaining portion and save some 700 meters for his residence. Pedro Calapine
sought to annul the sale and donation to Eduarte and CCRC on the ground that the deed of donation
was a forgery and that Doria was unworthy of his liberality claiming ingratitude (commission of
offense against the person, honor or property of donor).
Issue
WON the donation may be revoked by reason of ingratitude.
Held
Yes. As noted in Tolentinos Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code on paragraph (1)
of Article 765 all crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and are causes for revocation.
Petitioners attempt to categorize the offenses according to their classification under the Revised
Penal Code is therefore unwarranted considering that illegal detention, threats and coercion are
considered as crimes against the person of the donor despite the fact that they are classified as
crimes against personal liberty and security under the Revised Penal Code.

Quilala vs Alcantara
Facts
On 1981, Catalina Quilala executed a “Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" in favor of Violeta
Quilala over a parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila. It was registered before Register of
Deeds in which, subsequently, the title had been transferred to Violeta. When Catalina died, a heir
suddenly came, alleging that he is a surviving son of Catalina. The trial court found that the deed of
donation, although signed by both Catalina and Violeta, was acknowledged before a notary public
only by the donor, Catalina.
Issue
WON the signing on the wrong side invalidate the donation.
Held
No. No. The lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the notary public does not also
render the donation null and void. The instrument should be treated in its entirety. It cannot be
considered a private document in part and a public document in another part. The fact that it was
acknowledged before a notary public converts the deed of donation in its entirety a public
instrument. The fact that the donee was not mentioned by the notary public in the acknowledgment
is of no moment. To be sure, it is the conveyance that should be acknowledged as a free and
voluntary act.

Gestopa vs CA and Danlag

Facts
Spouses Danlag own six parcels of land. To four parcels of land, they executed a donation mortis
causa in favor of respondent Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil. Years later, they executed another donation,
this time inter vivos, to six parcels of land in favor of respondents, reserving their rights to the fruits
of the land during their lifetime and for prohibiting the donee to sell or dispose the properties
donated. Subsequently, the spouses sold 2 parcels to herein petitioners, spouses Gestopa, and
eventually revoking the donation. Respondent filed a petition to quiet title, stating that she had
already become the owner of the parcels of land. Trial Court ruled in favor of petitioners, but CA
reversed.
Issue
WON the second donation is donation inter vivos.
Held
Yes. The spouses were aware of the difference between the two donations, and that they needed
to execute another deed of donation inter vivos, since it has a different application to a donation
mortis causa. Also, the court stated four reasons to the matter: (1) that the spouses donated the
parcels of land out of love and affection, a clear indication of a donation inter vivos; (2) the
reservation of a lifetime usufruct; (3) reservation of sufficient properties for maintenance that

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 shows the intention to part with their six lot; and (4) respondent's acceptance, contained in the deed
of donation. Once a deed of donation has been accepted, it cannot be revoked, except for
officiousness or ingratitude, which the spouses failed to invoke.

Siguan vs Lim
Facts
Respondent Lim was being charged with violation of BP 22 after she issued a check which does
not have sufficient funds. Lim was thereafter convicted in which he appeal the decision before
higher court. Petitioner herein found out that the said respondent had previously execute a deed of
donation in favor of her children. Petitioner then filed accion pauliana to acquire possession of the
said property and the titled be transfer to him.
Issue
WON petitioner herein can acquire the donated property although it has already been registered
in Registry of Deeds.
Held
No. The rescission required the existence of creditors at the time of alleged fraudulent alienation,
and this must be proved as one of the bases of the judicial pronouncement setting aside the contract.
Without prior existing debt, there can neither be injury nor fraud. While it is necessary that the
credit of the plaintiff in the accion pauliana must exist prior to the fraudulent alienation, the date of
the judgment enforcing it is immaterial.

Gonzales et al vs CA
Facts
Spouses Ignacio and Marina Gonzales owned a two parcels of agricultural land. When Marina
died, she appointed Lilia as administrator of her share. Ignacio, on the other hand, execute a deed of
donation in favor of his 14 grandchildren. However it was not registered which resulted for the
property being place under Operation Land Transfer. Lilian averred that the property be excluded
but was denied. However, a re-investigation occur in which, the property owner was declared by
DAR Secretary to have already acquired it because of the deed of donation. However, the RTC and
later on, CA reject such contention of DAR Secretary hence, this appeal.
Issue
WON the deed of donation is valid since it was instituted prior to enactment of PD 27 or the
Operation Land Transfer.
Held
It is undisputed in this case that the donation executed by Ignacio Gonzales in favor of his
grandchildren, although in writing and duly notarized, has not been registered in accordance with
law. For this reason, it shall not be binding upon private respondents who did not participate in said
deed or had no actual knowledge thereof. Hence, while the deed of donation is valid between the
donor and the donees, such deed, however, did not bind the tenants-farmers who were not parties to
the donation. From the foregoing, the ineluctable conclusion drawn is that the unregistered deed of
donation cannot operate to exclude the subject land from the coverage of the Operation Land
Transfer. To rule otherwise would render ineffectual the rights and interests that the tenants-farmers
immediately acquired upon the promulgation of P.D. No. 27.

Eloy Imperial vs CA
Facts
Leoncio sold his parcel of land to his acknowledged natural son, (it is actually a donation, in
appearance of an absolute sale) Eloy Imperial. However, Leoncio filed a complaint for annulment
of donation alleging that he was deceived by his son. Leoncio died and Victor, his adopted son
replace him in the execution of the compromise agreement. When Victor died after 4 years, Cesar
and Teresa, siblings of Victor, filed a complaint for annulment of the donation as it impairs the
legitime of Victor, since he is also a child of Leoncio. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent
since the donation is innofficious as it left no other legitime to Victor. The CA affirmed the ruling
of RTC.
Issue
WON action for inofficious donation had prescribed.
Held
Yes. It took private respondents 24 years since the death of Leoncio to initiate this case. The
action, therefore, has long prescribed. Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an
obligation created by law must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action
accrues. Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious

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 donations, required under Article 771 of the Civil Code, to the extent that they impair the legitime
of compulsory heirs.

Republic of the Philippines vs Silim

Facts
Silim Mangubat donated a parcel of land in favor of Bureau of Public Schools in Zambonga Del
Sur, Municipality of Malangas on the condition that it shall be used exclusively for educational
purposes. However, as the said parcel of land was too small for the construction of the planned
school building, the Province of Zamboanga, executed a deed of exchange in favor of a new and
suitable location.
Issue
WON the donation may still be invalidate.
Held
YES. The Court upheld the validity of the donation. Firstly, it ruled that there was a valid
acceptance in accordance with Arts. 745 and 749 of the Civil Code: it was made personally or
through an agent, and it was made in a public document. Anent the second contention concerning
the non-fulfillment of the consideration, the Court ruled that contrary to Silim and Mangubat’s
argument, the parcel of land was used precisely for school purposes. The condition is primarily for
exclusive use of the land for educational purpose and the act is merely in furtherance or
enhancement of such conditions.

Secretary of Education vs Heirs of Dulay

Facts
In 1981, spouses Dulay execute a deed of donation in favor of petitioner in which the title was
subsequently transferred to the school. However, the property was not used for school purposes and
remained idle. Spouses Dulay then filed an action for revocation of the Deed of Donation as it was
not used for its intended purpose which is the very consideration of the donation. The Secretary of
Education through Solicitors General posed a defense that he DECS complied with said condition
because the land was being used by the school as its technology and home economics laboratory.
Issue
WON the DECS was able to comply with the conditions.
Held
No. Petitioners failed to prove that the donated property was used for school purposes. The
planting of palay on the land donated can hardly be considered and could not have been the "school
purposes" referred to and intended by the donors when they had donated the land in question. Also,
the posture of the defendant-appellants that the land donated is being used as technology and home
economics laboratory of the Rizal National High School is far from being the truth considering that
not only is the said school located two kilometers away from the land donated but also there was
not even a single classroom built on the land donated that would reasonably indicate that, indeed,
classes have been conducted therein

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