Ramos Case-Digest
Ramos Case-Digest
Ramos Case-Digest
GATCHALIAN, petitioner
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. Nos. L-32560-61 October 22, 1970
Background
Petitioner Esmeraldo Gatchalian is an alleged candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention for the first
district of Rizal questioned the validity of COMELEC Resolutions Nos. RR-707 and 731 as violative of Sec. 56 of
the Revised Election Code.
Facts
Pursuant to the request of the advertising firms and associations of the Philippines, the COMELEC promulgated
on August 13, 1970 Comelec Resolution No. RR-707 holding that "donations of billboards to the
Commission by foreigners or companies or corporations owned and controlled partially or wholly by
foreigners are not covered by the provision of Sec. 56 of the Revised Election Code."
No foreigner shall aid any candidate, directly or indirectly, or to take part in or to influence in any manner
any elections.
The prohibited active intervention of foreigners thereunder may consist of:
(1) aiding any candidate, directly or indirectly, in any election;
(2) taking part in any election; and
(3) influencing in any manner any election.
Subsequently, on September 17, 1970, upon to the request of the Advertising Council of the Philippines, the
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. RR-731 to the effect that the ban in Sec. 46 of the Revised Election
Code, as amended, does not cover the projected campaign for funds and other contributions by the
Advertising Council of the Philippines and others similarly situated, during the 120 days immediately
preceding a regular or special election; and "that in line with the ruling in its resolution numbered RR-707,
donations and contributions for the above campaign may be received from foreigners, companies or
corporation owned and/or controlled wholly or partially by foreigners.
Under the circumstances above indicated, on September 21, 1970, the petitioner filed a petition to the COMELEC
impugning the validity of the two resolutions.
The respondent however denied the petition on the ground "that contributions by foreigners to the Comelec
Billboards Committee for the purpose of financing costs of Comelec billboards are not made in aid or
support of any particular candidate in a particular district and that the allocation of space for its candidate
is allowed by lottery, nor would it in any way influence the result of the election.
Petitioner then filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court and for a review for the COMELEC ruling contending
that the said order is null and void as contrary to law or having been issued in excess of the powers of the
Commission on Elections or in grave abuse of its discretion.
Petitioner also prayed for a writ of preliminary as well as permanent injunction but none were issued by reason of
the fact that the COMELEC itself refrained from enforcing the questioned Resolutions Nos. RR-707 and 731 and
had given the corresponding advice to the advertising firms and associations concerned, including the Advertising
Council of the Philippines.
Issue
[For purposes of discussion, the issue relevant here is] whether the term "foreigner as employed in the law includes
both natural and juridical persons or associations or organized groups, with or without legal personality.
Ruling
There is nothing in the Revised Election Code, much less in Sec. 56 itself, indicating that the term "foreigner" is
limited only to natural persons. Neither is there any provision in the same Revised Election Code expressly or
impliedly suggesting that the circumstances of an artificial person in law are not identical to those of natural
persons covered by the prohibition in the Revised Election Code. On the contrary, there is greater reason to
believe that the law-maker feared more the assistance and influence of artificial persons in the elections than the
aid of natural persons. Hence, the law utilizes the more generic term "foreigner."
It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that a law is understood to contain, by implication, if not by its
expressed terms, all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose. And that the
whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of its part.
ESMERALDO M. GATCHALIAN, petitioner
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. Nos. L-32560-61 October 22, 1970
The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term
of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such
elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of office.
Thus, subscribing to petitioner's interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include the SK election
will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of
public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A
No. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase
"regular local election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be conducted
rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code.