Martha McGhee - Glisson, J.

D'%

Flying Blind: The Medical Certificate Warranty and

General Aviation lnsurance Exclusions
The typical general aviation policy exclusion limits or suspends the coverage of a
policy in certain situations, usually those that the underwriter feels will materially
increase the risk of loss, such as aerobatic flight1,a pilot without experience in the
particular aircraft2, or hauling d ~ n a m i t e Ballard
.~ and Chero - writing from the
vantage point of AVEMCO, a major aviation underwriter explain that exclusions-
prevent those who take greater risks from passing the actuarial costs of their
activities on to the entire policy-holding group in the form of higher premiums, but
rather force them to pay an additional premium to cover these 'extra-hazardous
a ~ t i v i t i e s .The
' ~ insurers maintain that these exclusions are a matter of contract
between the company and the insured, and that those insureds who wish may
negotiate the desired ~ o v e r a g e . ~
It is true that insurance coverage is founded in contract, and if all exclusions were
uniformly and precisely worded the insurers' claims might be accurate. However,
in point of fact the language varies widely from policy to policy, and is often so
ambiguous or complicated that the insured - and even the courts cannot -
determine exactly what is excluded. Thus a frequent result of an applicable policy
exclusion is not a negotiated additional premium, but a letter denying coverage
after the loss. Judge Goldberg in Ranger lnsurance Company v. Culberson6
The clumps of words in an insurance policy might seem like so much insignifi-
cant jabberwocky to those who follow insurance law, perhaps worse to those
who only stumble into the field. Jabberwocky it might be, Insignificant it is
not.On those clumps of words rests the intent of the insurance coverage. Some
insurance policies, their riders, exclusions, folds-in and folds-out, and appen-
dages, are festooned in such ways that mechanical knowledge is a help in
unfolding and laying them out so that the policies are in physically readable
form . . . It is all too clear that contract language, while at times a great explai-
ner, is at times a great obscurer . . .'
The search for precision in exclusionary language has not been successful, if
success is measured in terms of uniform application. A survey of cases involving
one common type of exclusion - the 'statutory violation' clause shows that -
exept for one clarification in the sixties - accomplished mainly by statute -
little had been resolved.
Earlier forms of this clause often provided that coverage would be suspended
for any loss occurring while in violation of any civil air r e g u l a t i ~ nCourts
.~ upheld
this exclusion in the forties, reasoning that the field of aviation was so hazardous
that strict adherence to all regulations was a reasonable requirementg

'Atlanta, Georgia. Paper written for the aviat~onlaw seminar of R. D . Margo

1 . Bruce v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. C o . , 222 F.2d 642 (4th Gir. 1955).
2. lnsurance Co. of N. America v. Butte Aero Sales & Service, 243 F. Supp. 276 ( D . Mont. 1965).
3 . Lineas ABreas Colombianas Expresas V. Traveler's Fire Ins Co. 257 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1958).
4 . Ballard & Chero, 'Analysis of Aviation Liability Coverage Exclusions', 45 JALC 11 7 , 118 (1979).
5 . Id. See also Grigsby v. Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 11 3 Ga. App. 572, 148 S. E.2d 925 (1966).
6 . 454 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1971). This case involved a student pilot illegally carrying passengers; s e e n . 69,
in fra
7 . Id. at 867.
8. E. g. Kilburn v. Union Marine & Gen. Ins. Co., 326 Mich. 11 5 , 40 N.W.2d 90 (1 949).
9 . West Memphis Flying Service, Inc. v. Am. Aviation & Gen. Ins. Co., 215 Ark. 6 , 219 S.W.2d 215 (1949).

Air Law, volume V . number 4 , 1980 21 1

 However, with the tremendous postwar growth of aviation - and the corres-
ponding proliferation of federal regulation - this strict position has become
untenable for many courts. The Federal Aviation Regulations have become ex-
plicit and complex, giving detailed statutory prohibitions against every potentially
harmful acivity on board from using portable electronic devicesi0 to 'operat(ing)
an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property
of another . . .'Ii In such a closely regulated situation, 'the insuring agreements
become illusory in effect since few accidents occur without the aircraft's owner or
pilot violating one or more of the very detailed regulations promulgated by the
Federal Aviation Administration.'12 With this reasoning the court in Roach v.
Churchman rejected the insurer's contention that any violation of the FARs would
avoid coverage.
This case was actually a late attempt to read a general 'statutory violation'
exclusion into the definition of proper certificationi3, and the earlier cases such as
Kilburn14 and West Memphis1=have never been overruled in their own jurisdic-
tions. However, courts that have considered the question in recent years have
rejected the arguments for a general exclusion made in the older cases.16
Independently of the courts' decisions, though perhaps influenced by the same
public policy considerations, many state legislatures have passed statutes for-
bidding general statutory violation exclusions in aviation insurance policies. The
Georgia enactment is typical:
No policy of insurance issued or delivered in this State covering any loss,
expense or liability arising out of the ownerschip, maintenance or use of an
aircraft shall excuse or deny coverage because the aircraft is operated in
violation of civil air regulations pursuant to Federal, State or local laws or
ordinances.
This section does not prohibit the use of specific exclusions or conditions in
any such policy which relates to any of the following:
a. Certification of an aircraft in a stated category by the Federal Aviation
Administration.
b. Certification of a pilot in a stated category by the Federal Aviation Admini-
stration.
c. Establishing requirements for pilot experience.
d. Establishing limitations on the use of the aircraft."
Looking to the changing law, insurers developed policy exclusions to coqform
to the dictates of the courts and legislatures. The exclusion permitted underGa.
Code Ann. $54-2439 (b) is a frequently used -
and frequently litigated - provi-
sion. The language varies from policy to policy, but tends to break down into
several recognisable groups:
1. Clauses which simply require a specific certificate or certificates (pilot or
medical);
2. Clauses which require that the pilot be 'properly certificated and qualified
under current regulations'; and
3. Clauses which require that the pilot be 'holding a valid pilots certificate with

10. 14 C.F.R. $ 91.19 (1973).

11. 14 C.F.R.$ 91.9, 91.10(1973).
12. Roach v. Churchman, 43 F.2d 849, 853 (8th Cir. 1970).
13. See discussion at text accompanying n. 1 6 et seq., infra.
14. See n. 8, supra.
15. See n. 9, supra.
16. E.g. Ranger Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 25 Ariz. App. 426, 544 P.2d 250 (1970); Ranger Ins. Co. v. Culberson,
454 F.2d 857 (5 th Cir. 1971).) Contra, Ohio Cas. ins. Co. v. Heaney, 229 F. Supp 30 (N.D. 111. 1964).
17. Ga. Code Ann. $ 56-2439 (Harrison 1977). Other similar statutes include Gal. Ins. Code Ann. $ 11584
(West 1972); Minn. Stat. Ann. $ 6 0 A . 081 (West Supp. 1979); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. $412.21 (Equity Supp.
1979); Va. Code Ann. $ 38.1-389.2 (Michie 1976).

21 2 Air Law, volume V number 4 1980

ratings and certificates appropriate for the flight and the aircraft as required by the
Federal Aviation Administration.'18
The cases which have interpreted these 'pilot warranty exclusions' fall into
several distinct fact situations as well. Typical, and most common, are those
involving the pilot who allows his medical certificate to expire. Called upon to
determine coverage in these cases, the state and federal courts have been unable
to reach a consensus of opinion.
Under Part 61 of the Federal Aviation Regulations, a pilot is forbidden to operate
an aircraft 'unless he has in his personal possession an appropriate current
medical certificate issued under Part 67.'19 This certificate is issued after a phy-
sical administered by a designated FAA medical examiner, and expires after
twenty-four months in the case of the third class medical certificate required for
private and student pilots.z" pilot who flies after the expiration of his medical
certificate is clearly in violation of FAA regulations; the question must be whether
this violation will avoid his insurance coverage under the particular provisions of
his policy.
A Federal District Court in Ohio Casualty lnsurance Co. v. Heaney2' simply
assumed that a valid medical certificate could be required as part of a pilot
warranty clause that did not specifically include it, and went so far as to assert that
a policy in Illinois might 'condition liability coverage on compliance with a gov-
ernment r e g u l a t i ~ n .However,
'~~ as the case was a declaratory judgment decid-
ing the disputed expiration date of a medical certificate, and the certificate was
determined to be valid on the date of the accidentz3,these statements are only
dicta. Furthermore, a recent Illinois federal case had, at least sub silentio, over-
ruled this decision.24
The relatively simple wording of the policy in Royal Indemnity Co. v. John F.
Cawrse Lumber C O . was ~ ~ easily determined to provide coverage. The exclusion
required that the insured pilot be 'holding a valid and current private or commer-
cial pilot certificate.Iz6 The insurer maintained that the language included, by
implication, the requirement of Part 61.3(c) that no pilot may fly without a current
medical certificate. The court rejected this contention, observing that' . . .It is
crystal clear that the agency promulgating these regulations intended the phrase
'current pilot's certificate' to have a meaning entirely separate and distinct from
the phrase 'current medical certificate' . . . ' 2 7 Under the 'accepted meaning' ma-
xim of policy construction, the court refused to expand the words in the policy to
'give them a new ~ i g n i f i c a n c e . ' ~ ~
Another, apparently straightforward provision is that found in Glades Flying
: ~ ~ policy does not apply . . .
Club v. Americas Aviation and Marine I r ~ s u r a n c e'This
While the aircraft is in flight. . . if piloted by a pilot not properly certificated and
qualified under the current applicable Civil Air regulation^.'^^ The Florida court

18. E.g. (1) Royal Indem. Co, v . John F. Cawrse Lumber Co., 245 F. Supp. 707 (D. Ore. 1965); (2) Glades
Flying Club v. Americas Aviation & Marine Ins. Co., 235 So.2d 18 (Fla. 1970): (3) lnsurance Co, of N.
America v. Maurer, 505 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. App. 1974).
19. 14 C.F.R. $ 61.3 (c) (1973).
20. 14 C.F.R. $ 61.23 (1973). Second-class medical certificates are required for commercial pilots:
first-class for holders of an Air Transport Rating.
21. 229 F. Supp. 30(N.D. 111. 1964).
22. 229 F. Supp. at 33.
23. 229 F. Supp. at 30.
24. See discussion of causation, text accompanying n. 63, infra.
25.245 F. Supp. 707 (D. Ore. 1965).
26. 245 F. Supp. at 709.
27. Id.
28. 245 F. Supp. at 710.
29. 235 So.2d 18 (Fla. 1970).
30. 235 So.2d at 19.

Air Law, volume V. number 4,1980

held that proper certification required 'both a valid pilot's license and . . . a cur-
rent, valid medical certificate' to fulfill the current government regulation^.^'
Similarly, in Grigsby v. Houston Fire & Casualty lnsurance C O . ~a~ pilot , who
allowed his medical certificate to expire (and also failed to fulfill current expe-
rience requirements) fell under exclusions requiring 'a valid and effective pilot
certificate with proper rating as required by the Federal Aviation Agency for the
flight involved' and forbidding 'operation . . . in violation of any regulations per-
taining to Airman's certificate^.'^^
However, other jurisdictions have had more difficulty in interpreting a similar
clause. In fact, in four recent cases involving expired medical certificates and
virtually identical exclusions written on the same company, coverage was
granted in two cases but denied in the others.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals saw no ambiguity in a clause requiring the
pilot to be 'properly certificated and rated for the flight and the aircraft.' In Baker v.
lnsurance Co. o f North America34the court found that the pilot was not 'properly
certificated' without a valid medical certificate, as 'by the clear and express
prohibition of [§ 61.3(c) of the FARs] he could not lawfully act as pilot in command
under that [pilot] certificate, since at the time of the crash he did not have the
appropriate current medical ~ e r t i f i c a t e . Predictably,
'~~ the court distinguished
Cawrse, supra, on the basis of its specific mention of a 'pilot's ~ e r t i f i c a t e . ' ~ ~
Yet, in lnsurance Co. of North America v. MaureP7,the Texas court construed
'ratings and certificates appropriate for the flight and the aircraft' not to include a
medical certificate. Applying the rule that 'exeptions and words of limitation will be
strictly construed against the insurer', the court observed:
. . . it is not unreasonable to conclude that the requirement of a 'valid pilot's
certificate with ratings and certificates appropriate for the flight and the aircraft
as required by the Federal Aviation Administration' does not also require a valid
medical certificate.
We note also that the phrase 'valid pilot's certificate' is singular. It refers only to
one certificate and that is a pilot's certificate and not a medical certificate. It is
undisputed that appellee had a current pilot's certificate . . . The phrase 'as
required by the Federal Aviation Administration' in the policy simply requires
that the pilot have a valid pilot's certificate as required by the F.A.A. . . . 3 8
Similarly, the Court of Appeals of California in Woods v, lnsurance Co. of North
America39 found that the identical language did not suspend coverage after
expiration of a medical certificate. Citing Roach v. Churchmann40 for the propo-
sition that 'limitations and exclusions to insuring agreements require a narrow
construction on the theory that the insurer, having affirmatively expressed cove-
rage through broad promises, assumes a duty to define any limitations upon that
coverage in clear and explicit terms,I4l the court found that INA had failed to so
define this exclusion:
. . . we note while two separate documents are required by the F A A . . . the
insurer chose to use in both Endorsements 1 and 2 the ambiguous term 'pro-

31. 235 So2d at 20.

32. 113 Ga App. 572, 148 S.E.2d 925 (1966).
33.113 Ga. App, at 573. The court in a short opinion did not expound on its holding, but cited a number of
older cases, among them the West Memphis case, see text accompanying n. 9, supra.
34.10N.C. App. 605, 179S.E. 2-892(1971).
35. 179 S.E.2d at 894.
36. 179 S.E. 2d at 895.
37.505 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. App. 1974).
38. 505 S.W.2d at 933. The court seems to be ignoring the second use of 'certificates' in the plural.
39. 38 Cal. App. 36 144, 113 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1974).
40. 431 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1970). See text accompanying n. 13, supra.
41. 113 Cal. Rptr. at 86.

Air Law, volume V. numbe; 4 , 1980

 perly certificated.' If that term included the meaning that the pilot must hold in
addition to the license a current medical certificate, the insurer schould have so
specified (cf. Berlanti v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London,, N.Y.S.Ct. November
30, 1964; 9 Avi. Cas. 17, 420), wherein the court so stated, after holding that the
phrase 'flown by a licensed pilot' did not also include the current medical
certificate required by the FAA regulations . . . 4 2
Therefore, the court reasoned, in the context of this policy the phrase 'pro-
perly certificated' can only mean the pilot's proficiency certificate and license, not
the medical certificate, and failure to have a current medical would not exclude
the insured from coverage.43
Though these cases, citing widespread authority, seem to indicate a trend
towards strict construction of this exclusionary language, the fourth and most
recent case returns to the broad interpretation of Baker44,and denies coverage to
the insured. The Tennessee court in lnsurance Co. of North America v. Lynpal,
l n ~observed:
. ~ ~
We agree . . . that the time honored rule of insurance contract construction is
that in case of ambiguity, the contract will be construed more strictly against the
insurer. 48 A.L.R.2d 706. However, we do not find that the language of the
contract which is questioned here is ambiguous.
The language of the policy states perfectly clearly that the coverage provided
thereby shall not apply while the aircraft is in flight unless the pilot maintains a
valid pilot's certificate 'with ratings and certificates appropriate for the flight
and the aircraft as required by the Federal Aviation Administration.'
When we look to the regulations it is clearly stated that: 'No person may act as a
pilot in command under a certificate issued to him . . . unless he has in his
personal possession an appropriate current medical certificate issued under
Part 67 . . . ' 4 6
Faced with this distinct difference of opinion, the prudent insurer who 'wants to
exclude coverage because the pilot's medical certificate is out of date . . . can and
should clearly so state. Those who know how to spell 'medical certificate' have
had a better success than those who don't . . . ' 4 7
The insurance policy in Omaha Sky Divers Parachute Club, Inc. v. Ranger
Insurance C O .contained
~ ~ a straightforward exclusion: 'Only the following pilot or
pilots holding valid and effective pilot and medical certificates with ratings as
required by the Federal Aviation Administration for the flight involved will operate
the aircraft. . . ' 4 9 The court handled this language in a correspondingly straight-
forward way: 'Here the terms of the policy specifically exclude coverage while the
aircraft is operated . . . by any pilot not 'holding valid and effective pilot and
medical certificates.' A medical certificate which had lapsed 5 months before the
accident occurred . . . was not a 'valid and effective' medical ~ e r t i f i c a t e , and
'~~
denied coverage. One year later the Georgia Court of Appeals upheld the same

42. 113 Cal. Rptr. at 84. The court observed: 'The insurer urges that Berlanti as a decision of a lower court
is not of suffic~entdignity to be of precedential value to this court. Neither this court (nor any other) can
afford to ignore a well-reasoned decision of any other court o n a similar matter.' N. 5.
43. 113 Cal. Rptr, at 88. It IS interesting that this court quotes extensively from the Cawrse decision, which
was distinguished by the North Carolina court in Baker in reaching the opposite result. See text
accompanying nos. 25 & 36, supra.
44. See text accompanying n. 36, supra.
45. 14 Av. 18.067 (Tenn. App. 1977).
46. 14 Av. at 18.070.
47. Davis, Proposed Standardized General Aviation lnsurance Policy - Pilot Clause & Exclusions, 43
JALC 371, 372-3 (1977).
48. 189 Neb. 61 0, 204 N.W.2d 162 (1 973).
49.204 N.W.2d at 163.
50.204 N.W.2d at 164.

Air Law, volume V, number 4 , 1980

exclusion in similar circumstances, finding it to be 'clear and unambiguous', in
Ranger lnsurance Co. v. Columbus-Muscogee Aviation, I ~ c .More ~ ' recently, the
Oregon Court of Appeals refused to estop an insurer from asserting a specific
medical certificate exclusion, although the insurer had renewed the policy over
notification from the pilot that his medical certificate had expired.52
Yet even this explicit language has been no guarantee of certainty. In AVEMCO
lnsurance Co. v. C h ~ n the g ~policy
~ failed to incorporate the standard 'Item 7' or
pilot warranty clause under the heading 'Exclusions', but instead listed it under
'Declarations'. The court held that the clause therefore could not be construed as
an ' e x c l ~ s i o n ' that
, ~ ~ a combination of AVEMCO's unconcern with the medical
certificate prior to the accident and 'Item 7"s applicaton only 'in flight' rendered
'Item 7' a condition subsequent rather than an exclusion,55and that Hawaii law
requires 'that insurance coverage be upheld unless the insured's breach of con-
dition subsequent can be shown to have contributed to the loss or in fact made
the insurer's risk more h a ~ a r d o u s .The ' ~ ~ case was remanded to give plaintiff
insurer the opportunity to 'probe into defendant's contention of Dr. Chung's good
health.'57
While the Hawaii court reached a desired result without an overt assault on
well-established insurance law, the California Court of Appeal took a more direct
approach in National Indemnity Co. v. D e m a n e ~Although .~~ the exclusion clause
of the policy incorporated the 'Item 7' or pilot warranty clause by reference, the
court found this to be insufficient because the exclusion referred only to the
identities of the pilots and not directly to the qualifications of those pilots as
already set out in 'Item 7'. Nor, the court hastened to add, was this the only reason
. . . for holding the purported exclusion by indirection to be ineffective. When
application for the policy was made by telephone, the agent required and
received from one of the owners (and pilots) of the aircraft the names of the two,
their ratings, their total logged hours, their hours with this model, their hours
with retractable gear aircraft . . . The application was considered, then a binder
was issued. In it, there was no mention of a medical certificate. The two pur-
chasers, if they read the binder, would know nothing of the attempted exclusion
which was to follow . . . And even if they looked at the Pilot Clause, they would
see in bold capitals of typewritten words, their names. Only if their eyes fell upon
the small print, in gross contrast with the typewriting, would they see reference
to the holding of a medical ~ e r t i f i c a t e . ~ ~
The combination of insufficiently referenced exclusion, fine print and 'contract
of adhesion' proved fatal to this exclusion. The 'equitable', broad approach to
policy terms in favor of the insured, mentioned peripherally in Chung, was applied
in full force in Demanes.
However, it is not only in the West that apparently clear exclusions come to
grief. The same pilot clause used in Omaha Skydivers failed to deny coverage in
South Carolina. In South Carolina lnsurance Co. v. Collins,60the state Supreme

51. 130 Ga. App. 742. 204 S.E.2d 474 (1 974). For a related case, see Boon8 v. Ranger Ins. Co., 152 Ga.
-
App. 891, - S.E.2d (1980).
52. Goddard v. AVEMCO Ins. Co., 15 Av. 17,946 (Ore. Ct. App. 1979).
53.388 F. Supp. 142 (D. Hawaii 1975).
54. 388 F. Supp, at 148.
55. 388 F. Supp. at 149.
56. 388 F. Supp. at 151.
57. Id.
58. 86 Cal. App. 3d 155, 150 Cal. Rptr. 117 (1 978).
59. 150 Cal. Rptr, at 119. Or as a lesser legal light, Lawyer Calhoun, once observed: 'They gives it to you
in the big print, and in the fine print they takes it away.' NBC radio broadcast, 10 May 1936.
60. 269 S.C. 282, 237 S.E.2d 358 (1 977).

21 6 Air Law, volume V , number 4 , 1980

Court, applying a long line of automobile and life insurance cases,61held that in
order for a policy exclusion to apply, the insurer must demonstrate that the
injuries are 'the necessary or natural consequence of the act' forbidden by the
exclusion.62 'When the parties made the contract of insurance, they were not
inserting a mere arbitrary provision, b u t . . . it was the purpose of the insurance
company to relieve itself of liability from accidents caused by the excluded con-
diti~n.'~~
Of course, where causation is required the question of interpretation of the pilot
warranty - at least with respect to medical certificates - becomes peripheral. For
example, in American States Insurance Co. v. Byerly Aviation, lnc.", a 'named
pilot' case, it is stated that 'the insurer must plead and prove a causal connection
between [the] exclusion and the loss claimed.'65Except for a case of fraudulent
application for a medical ~ e r t i f i c a t e most
~ ~ , attempts at exclusions based on
expired medical certificates would not succeed in such a jurisdiction on account
of problems of proof. However, in those where the pilot warranty question is
squarely addressed, the result is by no means certain.
The divergent holdings of these courts are indicative of the unsettled problems
of the policy exclusion. Of thirteen cases involving medical certificates, six
granted coverage and seven denied it.67Some of this conflict can be attributed to
differences in state law, some to the 'public policy' orientation of the particular
court, and some to variations in insurers' language. How ought these problems to
be resolved?
There is considerable doubt as to the value of the medical certficate as a pilot
warranty exclusion, even if clearly provided for in the policy. The violation of FAA
regulations involved is at most a passive one, and usually inadvertent. The pur-
pose of an exclusion is to avoid an increased risk to the insureP8, but the sus-
pension of coverage upon expiration of a medical certificate does not obviously
accomplish this end. In most cases the certificate in question is a third-class
medical, with a two year duration; such infrequent examination cannot provide
any guarantee of a pilot's health at the time of loss. This situation can be
contrasted with a more serious violation such as the carrying of passengers by a
student pilot, which demonstrably increases the risk of the insurer.6g
In fact, the insurance companies themselves have shown little interest in con-
firming the existence of a valid medical certificate - before an accident. Deposi-
tions of AVEMCO officials in the Chung case revealed that
. . . AVEMCO assumed that when Dr. Chung on his application indicated that he
had a private license that he also had a current Medical Certificate. It was not
AVEMCO's policy to make any check regarding a valid Medical Certificate at
the time it issued or renewed a policy. When any loss was reported, however,

61. Beginning with Reynolds v. Life & Cas. Co. of Tenn., 166 S.C. 214, 164 S.E. 602 (1932).
62. 164 S.E. at 603.
63. 237 S.E.2d at 361-62.
64. 456 F. Supp. 967 (S.D. 111. 1978).
65. 456 F. Supp. at 968-9.
66. E.g., Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bowie, 563 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. App. 1978), rev'd 574 S.W.2d 540 (Tex. 1978)
where insured concealed history of heart disease in order to o b t a ~ na medical certificate. This would
seem more analogous to the general insurance law on fraudulent applications.
67. This does not ~ n c l u d ethe older West Memphis B Kilburn cases.
68. See text accompanying n. 1 et seq, supra.
69. The court in American Mercury Ins. Co. v. Bifulco, 74 N.J. Sup. 191, 181 A.2d 20 (1962), agreed with
this proposition and cited for support a CAB safety circular entitled: 'Students * * * Don't Carry Passen-
gers': ' . . . Hour for hour flown, students with passengers are far more apt to get into serious trouble . . .
this can be shown readily by crash records on file . . . There's little doubt that it is caused by the resulting
lack of attention to the job at hand . . ." 181 A.2d 22. However, many courts will still grant coverage
despite this violation of the pilot warranty; see Rangerlns. Co. v. Culberson, 454 F.2d 857 (5 th Cir. 1971);
Ranger Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 25 Ariz. App. 426, 544 P.2d 250 (1976). This is another area of controversy.

Alr Law, volume V, number 4 1980 21 7

 one of the first steps taken by AVEMCO was to determine the existence of a
valid Medical Certificate . . . 7 0
According to Davis7' some major underwriters have already removed the me-
dical certificate requirement from their standard policies. This is a trend that,
absent fraud or misrepresentation in obtaining the certificate, should be follow-
ed.72
Whether or not such provisions are eliminated, is it possible to achieve the goal
of clarity in policy exclusions? Total uniformity will never be feasible because of
variations in general insurance law from state to state - as in South Carolina and
- or variations in public policy - as a comparison between North Caro-
lina and California amply demonstrates.
However, all difficulties in interpretation cannot be laid at the doors of the
courts, when aviation policies show such wild variations in exclusion wording.
Despite insurers' claims of a need to write 'individual' policies for 'individual'
risks,74,national industry guidelines on all policy exclusions are long overdue. If
these clauses are given clear, standard, unambiguous wording, it will be easier -
even within the strictures of local law - to assess risks and coverage. It is surely
preferable for insurer and insured alike to know the extent of coverage before
claims are entered, rather than 'flying blind' through extensive, expensive, unne-
cessary litigation over ambiguous language.

70. 388 F. Supp. at 146. See text accompanying n. 53 et seq., supra.

71. Davis, 43 JALC at 373.
72.See n. 66, supra.
73. See text accompanying n. 60, supra; n. 64, supra.
74. Whitehead, 'Insuring B Claim Servicing Risks in General Aviation,' 37 JALC 323 (1971)

21 8 Air Law, volume V, number 4 , 1980