EN BANC  

August 8, 2017

G.R. No. 225442

SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN (SPARK),* JOANNE ROSE SACE LIM, JOHN ARVIN
NAVARRO BUENAAGUA, RONEL BACCUTAN, MARK LEO DELOS REYES, and CLARISSA JOYCE
VILLEGAS, minor, for herself and as represented by her father, JULIAN VILLEGAS, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
QUEZON CITY, as represented by MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY OF MANILA, as represented by
MAYOR JOSEPH ESTRADA, and NAVOTAS CITY, as represented by MAYOR JOHN REY TIANGCO,,
Respondents,

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This petition for certiorari and prohibition  assails the constitutionality of the curfew ordinances issued by the
1

local governments of Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas. The petition prays that a temporary restraining order
(TRO) be issued ordering respondents Herbert Bautista, Joseph Estrada, and John Rey Tiangco, as Mayors of
their respective local governments, to prohibit, refrain, and desist from implementing and enforcing these
issuances, pending resolution of this case, and eventually, declare the City of Manila's ordinance as ultra
vires for being contrary to Republic Act No. (RA) 9344,  or the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act," as amended,
2

and all curfew ordinances as unconstitutional for violating the constitutional right of minors to travel, as well as
the right of parents to rear their children.

The Facts

Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew for minors, several
local governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their curfew ordinances on minors through
police operations which were publicly known as part of "Oplan Rody." 3

Among those local governments that implemented curfew ordinances were respondents: (a) Navotas City,
through Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99- 02,  dated August 26, 1999, entitled "Nagtatakdang 'Curfew' ng mga
4

Kabataan na Wala Pang Labing Walong (18) Taong Gulang sa Bayan ng Navotas, Kalakhang Maynila," as
amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13,  dated June 6, 2002 (Navotas Ordinance); (b) City of Manila,
5

through Ordinance No. 8046  entitled "An Ordinance Declaring the Hours from 10:00 P.M. to 4:00 A.M. of the
6

Following Day as 'Barangay Curfew Hours' for Children and Youths Below Eighteen (18) Years of Age;
Prescribing Penalties Therefor; and for Other Purposes" dated October 14, 2002 (Manila Ordinance); and (c)
Quezon City, through Ordinance No. SP- 2301,  Series of 2014, entitled "An Ordinance Setting for a [sic]
7

Disciplinary Hours in Quezon City for Minors from 10:00 P.M. to 5:00 A.M., Providing Penalties for
Parent/Guardian, for Violation Thereof and for Other Purposes" dated July 31, 2014 (Quezon City Ordinance;
collectively, Curfew Ordinances). 8
Petitioners,  spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) - an association of young
9

adults and minors that aims to forward a free and just society, in particular the protection of the rights and
welfare of the youth and minors  - filed this present petition, arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are
10

unconstitutional because they: (a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall under the
void for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of
minors during curfew hours; (c) deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive
due process; and (d) deprive parents of their natural and primary right in rearing the youth without substantive
due process.  In addition, petitioners assert that the Manila Ordinance contravenes RA 9344, as amended by
11

RA 10630. 12

More specifically, petitioners posit that the Curfew Ordinances encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement as there are no clear provisions or detailed standards on how law enforcers should apprehend
and properly determine the age of the alleged curfew violators.  They further argue that the law enforcer's
13

apprehension depends only on his physical assessment, and, thus, subjective and based only on the law
enforcer's visual assessment of the alleged curfew violator. 14

While petitioners recognize that the Curfew Ordinances contain provisions indicating the activities exempted
from the operation of the imposed curfews, i.e., exemption of working students or students with evening class,
they contend that the lists of exemptions do not cover the range and breadth of legitimate activities or reasons
as to why minors would be out at night, and, hence, proscribe or impair the legitimate activities of minors during
curfew hours. 15

Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a) are unconstitutional as they deprive minors of the
right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process;  and (b) fail to pass the strict scrutiny
16

test, for not being narrowly tailored and for employing means that bear no reasonable relation to their
purpose.  They argue that the prohibition of minors on streets during curfew hours will not per se protect and
17

promote the social and moral welfare of children of the community. 18

Furthermore, petitioners claim that the Manila Ordinance, particularly Section 4  thereof, contravenes Section
19

57-A  of RA 9344, as amended, given that the cited curfew provision imposes on minors the penalties of
20

imprisonment, reprimand, and admonition. They contend that the imposition of penalties contravenes RA
9344's express command that no penalty shall be imposed on minors for curfew violations. 21

Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State interest to impose curfews contrary to the parents'
prerogative to impose them in the exercise of their natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth, and that
even if a compelling interest exists, less restrictive means are available to achieve the same. In this regard,
they suggest massive street lighting programs, installation of CCTV s (closed-circuit televisions) in public
streets, and regular visible patrols by law enforcers as other viable means of protecting children and preventing
crimes at night. They further opine that the government can impose more reasonable sanctions, i.e., mandatory
parental counseling and education seminars informing the parents of the reasons behind the curfew, and that
imprisonment is too harsh a penalty for parents who allowed their children to be out during curfew hours. 22

The Issue Before the Court

The primordial issue for the Court's resolution in this case is whether or not the Curfew Ordinances are
unconstitutional.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly granted.

I.

At the onset, the Court addresses the procedural issues raised in this case. Respondents seek the dismissal of
the petition, questioning: (a) the propriety of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances; (b) petitioners' direct resort to the Court, contrary to the
hierarchy of courts doctrine; and (c) the lack of actual controversy and standing to warrant judicial review. 23

A. Propriety of the Petition for

Certiorari and Prohibition.

Under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice not only "to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but also "to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government."  Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
24

ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Case law explains that the present Constitution has "expanded the concept of judicial power, which up to then
was confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual controversies involving rights that were legally
demandable and enforceable." 25

In Araullo v. Aquino III,  it was held that petitions for certiorari and prohibition filed before the Court "are the
26

remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government may be determined under the Constitution."  It was explained that
27

"[w]ith respect to the Court, x x x the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and
reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only
by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but also to
set right, undo[,] and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the
second paragraph of Section 1, [Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cited above]." 28

In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Centers Association,
Inc.,  it was expounded that "[ m ]eanwhile that no specific procedural rule has been promulgated to enforce
29

[the] 'expanded' constitutional definition of judicial power and because of the commonality of 'grave abuse of
discretion' as a ground for review under Rule 65 and the courts' expanded jurisdiction, the Supreme Court -
based on its power to relax its rules - allowed Rule 65 to be used as the medium for petitions invoking the
courts' expanded jurisdiction[. ]" 30

In this case, petitioners question the issuance of the Curfew Ordinances by the legislative councils of Quezon
City, Manila, and Navotas in the exercise of their delegated legislative powers on the ground that these
ordinances violate the Constitution, specifically, the provisions pertaining to the right to travel of minors, and the
right of parents to rear their children. They also claim that the Manila Ordinance, by imposing penalties against
minors, conflicts with RA 9344, as amended, which prohibits the imposition of penalties on minors for status
offenses. It has been held that "[t]here is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will
or personal bias. "  In light of the foregoing, petitioners correctly availed of the remedies of certiorari and
31

prohibition, although these governmental actions were not made pursuant to any judicial or quasi-judicial
function.

B. Direct Resort to the Court.

Since petitions for certiorari and prohibition are allowed as remedies to assail the constitutionality of legislative
and executive enactments, the next question to be resolved is whether or not petitioners' direct resort to this
Court is justified.

The doctrine of hierarchy of courts "[r]equires that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court
exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. While this jurisdiction is shared with
the Court of Appeals [(CA)] and the [Regional Trial Courts], a direct invocation of this Court's jurisdiction is
allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and especially set out in the
petition[.]"  This Court is tasked to resolve "the issue of constitutionality of a law or regulation at the first
32

instance [if it] is of paramount importance and immediately affects the social, economic, and moral
well-being of the people,"  as in this case. Hence, petitioners' direct resort to the Court is justified.
33

C. Requisites of Judicial Review.

"The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a
law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal
requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise
of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity;
and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case."  In this case, respondents assail the
34

existence of the first two (2) requisites.

1. Actual Case or Controversy.

"Basic in the exercise of judicial power - whether under the traditional or in the expanded setting - is the
presence of an actual case or controversy."  "[A]n actual case or controversy is one which 'involves a conflict of
35

legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.' In other words, 'there must be a contrariety of legal rights
that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence."  According to
36

recent jurisprudence, in the Court's exercise of its expanded jurisdiction under the 1987 Constitution, this
requirement is simplified "by merely requiring a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion in the
assailed governmental act." 37

"Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe
for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging
it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the
challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of the act complained of."38

Applying these precepts, this Court finds that there exists an actual justiciable controversy in this case given
the evident clash of the parties' legal claims, particularly on whether the Curfew Ordinances impair the minors'
and parents' constitutional rights, and whether the Manila Ordinance goes against the provisions of RA 9344.
Based on their asseverations, petitioners have - as will be gleaned from the substantive discussions below -
conveyed a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion, which perforce impels this Court to exercise its
expanded jurisdiction. The case is likewise ripe for adjudication, considering that the Curfew Ordinances were
being implemented until the Court issued the TRO  enjoining their enforcement. The purported threat or
39

incidence of injury is, therefore, not merely speculative or hypothetical but rather, real and apparent.

2. Legal Standing.

"The question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on the determination of whether those assailing the
governmental act have the right of appearance to bring the matter to the court for adjudication. [Petitioners]
must show that they have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that they have sustained
or are in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a consequence of the enforcement of
the challenged governmental act."  "' [I]nterest' in the question involved must be material - an interest that is
40

in issue and will be affected by the official act- as distinguished from being merely incidental or general." 41

"The gist of the question of [legal] standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is
injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no
standing."42

As abovementioned, the petition is anchored on the alleged breach of two (2) constitutional rights, namely: (1)
the right of minors to freely travel within their respective localities; and (2) the primary right of parents to rear
their children. Related to the first is the purported conflict between RA 9344, as amended, and the penal
provisions of the Manila Ordinance.

Among the five (5) individual petitioners, only Clarissa Joyce Villegas (Clarissa) has legal standing to raise the
issue affecting the minor's right to travel,  because: (a) she was still a minor at the time the petition was filed
43

before this Court,  and, hence, a proper subject of the Curfew Ordinances; and (b) as alleged, she travels from
44

Manila to Quezon City at night after school and is, thus, in imminent danger of apprehension by virtue of the
Curfew Ordinances. On the other hand, petitioners Joanne Rose Sace Lim, John Arvin Navarro Buenaagua,
Ronel Baccutan (Ronel), and Mark Leo Delos Reyes (Mark Leo) admitted in the petition that they are all of
legal age, and therefore, beyond the ordinances' coverage. Thus, they are not proper subjects of the Curfew
Ordinances, for which they could base any direct injury as a consequence thereof.

None of them, however, has standing to raise the issue of whether the Curfew Ordinances violate the parents'
right to rear their children as they have not shown that they stand before this Court as parent/s and/or
guardian/s whose constitutional parental right has been infringed. It should be noted that Clarissa is
represented by her father, Julian Villegas, Jr. (Mr. Villegas), who could have properly filed the petition for
himself for the alleged violation of his parental right. But Mr. Villegas did not question the Curfew Ordinances
based on his primary right as a parent as he only stands as the representative of his minor child, Clarissa,
whose right to travel was supposedly infringed.

As for SPARK, it is an unincorporated association and, consequently, has no legal personality to bring an
action in court.  Even assuming that it has the capacity to sue, SPARK still has no standing as it failed to allege
45

that it was authorized by its members who were affected by the Curfew Ordinances, i.e., the minors, to file this
case on their behalf.

Hence, save for Clarissa, petitioners do not have the required personal interest in the controversy. More
particularly, Clarissa has standing only on the issue of the alleged violation of the minors' right to travel, but not
on the alleged violation of the parents' right.

These notwithstanding, this Court finds it proper to relax the standing requirement insofar as all the petitioners
are concerned, in view of the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case. "In a number of
cases, this Court has taken a liberal stance towards the requirement of legal standing, especially when
paramount interest is involved. Indeed, when those who challenge the official act are able to craft an
issue of transcendental significance to the people, the Court may exercise its sound discretion and
take cognizance of the suit. It may do so in spite of the inability of the petitioners to show that they have been
personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act." 46

This is a case of first impression in which the constitutionality of juvenile curfew ordinances is placed under
judicial review. Not only is this Court asked to determine the impact of these issuances on the right of parents
to rear their children and the right of minors to travel, it is also requested to determine the extent of the State's
authority to regulate these rights in the interest of general welfare. Accordingly, this case is of overarching
significance to the public, which, therefore, impels a relaxation of procedural rules, including, among others, the
standing requirement.
That being said, this Court now proceeds to the substantive aspect of this case.

II.

A. Void for Vagueness.

Before resolving the issues pertaining to the rights of minors to travel and of parents to rear their children, this
Court must first tackle petitioners' contention that the Curfew Ordinances are void for vagueness.

In particular, petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are void for not containing sufficient enforcement
parameters, which leaves the enforcing authorities with unbridled discretion to carry out their provisions. They
claim that the lack of procedural guidelines in these issuances led to the questioning of petitioners Ronel and
Mark Leo, even though they were already of legal age. They maintain that the enforcing authorities
apprehended the suspected curfew offenders based only on their physical appearances and, thus, acted
arbitrarily. Meanwhile, although they conceded that the Quezon City Ordinance requires enforcers to
determine the age of the child, they submit that nowhere does the said ordinance require the law enforcers to
ask for proof or identification of the child to show his age. 47

The arguments are untenable.

"A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the
Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the
parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle." 48

In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is improper, considering that they do not
properly identify any provision in any of the Curfew Ordinances, which, because of its vague terminology, fails
to provide fair warning and notice to the public of what is prohibited or required so that one may act
accordingly.  The void for vagueness doctrine is premised on due process considerations,  which are
49

absent from this particular claim. In one case, it was opined that:

[T]he vagueness doctrine is a specie of "unconstitutional uncertainty," which may involve "procedural due
process uncertainty cases" and "substantive due process uncertainty cases." "Procedural due process
uncertainty" involves cases where the statutory language was so obscure that it failed to give adequate
warning to those subject to its prohibitions as well as to provide proper standards for adjudication. Such a
definition encompasses the vagueness doctrine. This perspective rightly integrates the vagueness doctrine with
the due process clause, a necessary interrelation since there is no constitutional provision that explicitly bars
statutes that are "void-for-vagueness." 50

Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement parameters to guide the local authorities in the
proper apprehension of suspected curfew offenders. They do not assert any confusion as to what conduct
the subject ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only point to the ordinances' lack of enforcement
guidelines. The mechanisms related to the implementation of the Curfew Ordinances are, however, matters of
policy that are best left for the political branches of government to resolve. Verily, the objective of curbing
unbridled enforcement is not the sole consideration in a void for vagueness analysis; rather, petitioners must
show that this perceived danger of unbridled enforcement stems from an ambiguous provision in the law that
allows enforcement authorities to second-guess if a particular conduct is prohibited or not prohibited. In this
regard, that ambiguous provision of law contravenes due process because agents of the government cannot
reasonably decipher what conduct the law permits and/or forbids. In Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown,   it 51

was ratiocinated that:

A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on ad
hoc and subjective basis, and vague standards result in erratic and arbitrary application based on individual
impressions and personal predilections. 52
As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any ambiguous standard in any of the provisions of the Curfew
Ordinances, but rather, lament the lack of detail on how the age of a suspected minor would be determined.
Thus, without any correlation to any vague legal provision, the Curfew Ordinances cannot be stricken down
under the void for vagueness doctrine.

Besides, petitioners are mistaken in claiming that there are no sufficient standards to identify suspected curfew
violators. While it is true that the Curfew Ordinances do not explicitly state these parameters, law enforcement
agents are still bound to follow the prescribed measures found in statutory law when implementing ordinances.
Specifically, RA 9344, as amended, provides:

Section 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child may be determined from the child's birth
certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents,
age may be based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the
physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. (Emphases supplied)

This provision should be read in conjunction with · the Curfew Ordinances because RA 10630 (the law that
amended RA 9344) repeals all ordinances inconsistent with statutory law.  Pursuant to Section 57-A of RA
53

9344, as amended by RA 10630,  minors caught in violation of curfew ordinances are children at
54

risk and, therefore, covered by its provisions.  It is a long-standing principle that "[c]onformity with law is one
55

of the essential requisites for the validity of a municipal ordinance."  Hence, by necessary implication,
56

ordinances should be read and implemented in conjunction with related statutory law.

Applying the foregoing, any person, such as petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, who was perceived to be a minor
violating the curfew, may therefore prove that he is beyond the application of the Curfew Ordinances by simply
presenting any competent proof of identification establishing their majority age. In the absence of such proof,
the law authorizes enforcement authorities to conduct a visual assessment of the suspect, which - needless to
state - should be done ethically and judiciously under the circumstances. Should law enforcers disregard these
rules, the remedy is to pursue the appropriate action against the erring enforcing authority, and not to have the
ordinances invalidated.

All told, petitioners' prayer to declare the Curfew Ordinances as void for vagueness is denied.

B. Right of Parents to Rear their

Children.

Petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they deprive parents of their
natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth without substantive due process. In this regard, they assert
that this right includes the right to determine whether minors will be required to go home at a certain time or will
be allowed to stay late outdoors. Given that the right to impose curfews is primarily with parents and not with
the State, the latter's interest in imposing curfews cannot logically be compelling. 57

Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained.

Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's policy relative to the rights of parents in the
rearing of their children:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

As may be gleaned from this provision, the rearing of children (i.e., referred to as the "youth") for civic efficiency
and the development of their moral character are characterized not only as parental rights, but also as parental
duties. This means that parents are not only given the privilege of exercising their authority over their children;
they are equally obliged to exercise this authority conscientiously. The duty aspect of this provision is a
reflection of the State's independent interest to ensure that the youth would eventually grow into free,
independent, and well-developed citizens of this nation. For indeed, it is during childhood that minors are
prepared for additional obligations to society. "[T]he duty to prepare the child for these [obligations] must
be read to include the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good
citizenship."  "This affirmative process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and example is essential
58

to the growth of young people into mature, socially responsible citizens." 59

By history and tradition, "the parental role implies a substantial measure of authority over one's
children."  In Ginsberg v. New York,  the Supreme Court of the United States (US) remarked that
60 61

"constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their own
household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society."  As in our
62

Constitution, the right and duty of parents to rear their children is not only described as "natural," but also as
"primary." The qualifier "primary" connotes the parents' superior right over the State in the upbringing
of their children.  The rationale for the State's deference to parental control over their children was explained
63

by the US Supreme Court in Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti),  as follows:

64

[T]he guiding role of parents in their upbringing of their children justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors.
The State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental action and from their own immaturity by
requiring parental consent to or involvement in important decisions by minors. But an additional and more
important justification for state deference to parental control over children is that "the child is not [a)
mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with
the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."  (Emphasis and underscoring
65

supplied)

While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be stressed that "when actions concerning the
child have a relation to the public welfare or the well-being of the child, the [Sltate may act to promote
these legitimate interests."  Thus, "[i]n cases in which harm to the physical or mental health of the child
66

or to public safety, peace, order, or welfare is demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may
override the parents' qualified right to control the upbringing of their children." 67

As our Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated to support parents in the exercise of these rights and
duties. State authority is therefore, not exclusive of, but rather, complementary to parental
supervision. In Nery v. Lorenzo,  this Court acknowledged the State's role as parens patriae in protecting
68

minors, viz. :

[Where minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it is cast the duty of protecting the
rights of persons or individual who because of age or incapacity are in an unfavorable position,  vis-a-
vis other parties. Unable as they are to take due care of what concerns them, they have the political
community to look after their welfare. This obligation the state must live up to. It cannot be recreant to such a
trust. As was set forth in an opinion of the United States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens
patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, x x x."  (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
69

As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid parents in the moral development of
their children,  and, thus, assumes a supporting role for parents to fulfill their parental obligations. In Bellotti, it
70

was held that "[I]egal restriction on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to
the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society meaningful
and rewarding. Under the Constitution, the State can properly conclude that parents and others,
teachers for example, who have the primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the
support of the laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility." 71

The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions designed to aid parents in their role of promoting
their children's well-being. As will be later discussed at greater length, these ordinances further compelling
State interests (particularly, the promotion of juvenile safety and the prevention of juvenile crime), which
necessarily entail limitations on the primary right of parents to rear their children. Minors, because of their
peculiar vulnerability and lack of experience, are not only more exposed to potential physical harm by criminal
elements that operate during the night; their moral well-being is likewise imperiled as minor children are prone
to making detrimental decisions during this time. 72
At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances apply only when the minors are not -
whether actually or constructively (as will be later discussed) - accompanied by their parents. This serves as an
explicit recognition of the State's deference to the primary nature of parental authority and the importance of
parents' role in child-rearing. Parents are effectively given unfettered authority over their children's conduct
during curfew hours when they are able to supervise them. Thus, in all actuality, the only aspect of parenting
that the Curfew Ordinances affects is the parents' prerogative to allow minors to remain in public
places without parental accompaniment during the curfew hours.   In this respect, the ordinances
73

neither dictate an over-all plan of discipline for the parents to apply to their minors nor force parents to
abdicate their authority to influence or control their minors' activities.  As such, the Curfew Ordinances
74

only amount to a minimal - albeit reasonable - infringement upon a parent's right to bring up his or her child.

Finally, it may be well to point out that the Curfew Ordinances positively influence children to spend more time
at home. Consequently, this situation provides parents with better opportunities to take a more active role in
their children's upbringing. In Schleifer v. City of Charlottesvillle (Schleifer),  the US court observed that the city
75

government "was entitled to believe x x x that a nocturnal curfew would promote parental involvement in a
child's upbringing. A curfew aids the efforts of parents who desire to protect their children from the perils of the
street but are unable to control the nocturnal behavior of those children."  Curfews may also aid the "efforts of
76

parents who prefer their children to spend time on their studies than on the streets."  Reason dictates that
77

these realities observed in Schleifer are no less applicable to our local context. Hence, these are additional
reasons which justify the impact of the nocturnal curfews on parental rights.

In fine, the Curfew Ordinances should not be declared unconstitutional for violating the parents' right to rear
their children.

C. Right to Travel.

Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances based on the minors' right to travel.
They claim that the liberty to travel is a fundamental right, which, therefore, necessitates the application of the
strict scrutiny test. Further, they submit that even if there exists a compelling State interest, such as the
prevention of juvenile crime and the protection of minors from crime, there are other less restrictive means for
achieving the government's interest.  In addition, they posit that the Curfew Ordinances suffer from overbreadth
78

by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours. 79

Petitioner's submissions are partly meritorious.

At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners' invocation of the overbreadth doctrine, considering that petitioners
have not claimed any transgression of their rights to free speech or any inhibition of speech-related conduct.
In Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. AntiTerrorism Council(Southern Hemisphere),  this 80

Court explained that "the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and,
owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases,"  viz.: 81

By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in order to
plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the court, that are
impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly
analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigants.

The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual
rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied
to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by
invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted
to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules
give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute
"on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly
authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal
adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third
parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad law's "very existence
may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An
overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third
parties.  (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
82

In the same case, it was further pointed out that "[i]n restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims,
the Court, in at least two [(2)] cases, observed that the US Supreme Court has not recognized an overbreadth
doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment,  and that claims of facial overbreadth have been
83

entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words. In Virginia v.
Hicks,  it was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is
84

not specifically addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified
by the 'transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression. "' 85

In the more recent case of SpousesImbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,  it was opined that "[f]acial challenges can only be
86

raised on the basis of overbreadth and not on vagueness. Southern Hemisphere demonstrated how

vagueness relates to violations of due process rights, whereas facial challenges are raised on the basis of
overbreadth and limited to the realm of freedom of expression." 87

That being said, this Court finds it improper to undertake an overbreadth analysis in this case, there being no
claimed curtailment of free speech. On the contrary, however, this Court finds proper to examine the assailed
regulations under the strict scrutiny test.

The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a fundamental right88 under Section 6, Article III of the
1987 Constitution, to wit:

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the
interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to move freely from the Philippines to other countries or
within the Philippines.  It is a right embraced within the general concept of liberty.  Liberty - a birthright of every
89 90

person - includes the power of locomotion  and the right of citizens to be free to use their faculties in lawful
91

ways and to live and work where they desire or where they can best pursue the ends of life. 92

The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access and exercise their other rights, such as the
rights to education, free expression, assembly, association, and religion.  The inter-relation of the right to travel
93

with other fundamental rights was briefly rationalized in City of Maquoketa v. Russell,  as follows:
94

Whenever the First Amendment rights of freedom of religion, speech, assembly, and association require one to
move about, such movement must necessarily be protected under the First Amendment.

Restricting movement in those circumstances to the extent that First Amendment Rights cannot be
exercised without violating the law is equivalent to a denial of those rights. One court has eloquently
pointed this out:

We would not deny the relatedness of the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to freedom of
travel and movement. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or drive to their church, their freedom to worship
is impaired. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or drive to the meeting hall, freedom of assembly is
effectively blocked. If, for any reason, people cannot safely walk the sidewalks or drive the streets of a
community, opportunities for freedom of speech are sharply limited. Freedom of movement is inextricably
involved with freedoms set forth in the First Amendment. (Emphases supplied)

Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify restrictions even if made against
fundamental rights. Specifically on the freedom to move from one place to another, jurisprudence provides that
this right is not absolute.  As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State  may impose limitations on the
95 96

exercise of this right, provided that they: (1) serve the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health; and (2) are provided by law. 97
The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the promotion of juvenile safety and prevention of
juvenile crime, inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The restriction on the minor's movement and
activities within the confines of their residences and their immediate vicinity during the curfew period is
perceived to reduce the probability of the minor becoming victims of or getting involved in crimes and criminal
activities. As to the second requirement, i.e., that the limitation "be provided by law," our legal system is replete
with laws emphasizing the State's duty to afford special protection to children, i.e., RA 7610,  as amended, RA
98

9775  RA 9262  RA 9851 RA 9344  RA 10364  RA 9211  RA8980,  RA9288,  and Presidential Decree
99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106

(PD) 603,  as amended.

107

Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603, which explicitly authorizes local government units,
through their city or municipal councils, to set curfew hours for children. It reads:

Article 139. Curfew Hours for Children. - City or municipal councils may prescribe such curfew hours for
children as may be warranted by local conditions. The duty to enforce curfew ordinances shall
devolve upon the parents or guardians and the local authorities.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As explicitly worded, city councils are authorized to enact curfew ordinances (as what respondents have done
in this case) and enforce the same through their local officials. In other words, PD 603 provides sufficient
statutory basis - as required by the Constitution - to restrict the minors' exercise of the right to travel.

The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to minors are likewise constitutionally
permissible. In this relation, this Court recognizes that minors do possess and enjoy constitutional rights,  but
108

the exercise of these rights is not co-extensive as those of adults.  They are always subject to the
109

authority or custody of another, such as their parent/s and/or guardian/s, and the State.  As parens patriae, the
110

State regulates and, to a certain extent, restricts the minors' exercise of their rights, such as in their affairs
concerning the right to vote,  the right to execute contracts,  and the right to engage in gainful
111 112

employment.  With respect to the right to travel, minors are required by law to obtain a clearance from the
113

Department of Social Welfare and Development before they can travel to a foreign country by themselves or
with a person other than their parents.  These limitations demonstrate that the State has broader authority over
114

the minors' activities than over similar actions of adults,  and overall, reflect the State's general interest in the
115

well-being of minors.  Thus, the State may impose limitations on the minors' exercise of rights even though
116

these limitations do not generally apply to adults.

In Bellotti, the US Supreme Court identified three (3) justifications for the differential treatment of the minors'
117

constitutional rights. These are: first, the peculiar vulnerability of children; second, their inability to make
critical decisions in an informed and mature manner; and third, the importance of the parental role in
child rearing: 118

[On the first reason,] our cases show that although children generally are protected by the same constitutional
guarantees against governmental deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system
to account for children's vulnerability and their needs for 'concern, ... sympathy, and ... paternal attention.x
x x.

[On the second reason, this Court's rulings are] grounded [on] the recognition that, during the formative years
of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize
and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them. x x x.

xxxx

[On the third reason,] the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their children justifies limitations on the
freedoms of minors. The State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental action and from their
own immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in important decisions by minors. x x x.

xxxx
 x x x Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to
the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society
meaningful and rewarding.  (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
119

Moreover, in Prince v. Massachusetts,  the US Supreme Court acknowledged the heightened dangers on the
120

streets to minors, as compared to adults:

A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full
maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It may secure this against impeding restraints and dangers within a
broad range of selection. Among evils most appropriate for such action are the crippling effects of child
employment, more especially in public places, and the possible harms arising from other activities subject
to all the diverse influences of the [streets]. It is too late now to doubt that legislation appropriately designed
to reach such evils is within the state's police power, whether against the parent's claim to control of the child or
one that religious scruples dictate contrary action.

It is true children have rights, in common with older people, in the primary use of highways. But even in such
use streets afford dangers for them not affecting adults. And in other uses, whether in work or in other
things, this difference may be magnified.  (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
121

For these reasons, the State is justified in setting restrictions on the minors' exercise of their travel rights,
provided, they are singled out on reasonable grounds.

Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny to determine the reasonableness of
classifications.  The strict scrutiny test applies when a classification either (i) interferes with the exercise of
122

fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect
classes.  The intermediate scrutiny test applies when a classification does not involve suspect classes or
123

fundamental rights, but requires heightened scrutiny, such as in classifications based on gender and
legitimacy.  Lastly, the rational basis test applies to all other subjects not covered by the first two tests.
124 125

Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in our legal system guaranteed no less by our
Constitution, the strict scrutiny test  is the applicable test.  At this juncture, it should be emphasized that
126 127

minors enjoy the same constitutional rights as adults; the fact that the State has broader authority over minors
than over adults does not trigger the application of a lower level of scrutiny.  In Nunez v. City of San Diego
128

(Nunez),  the US court illumined that:

129

Although many federal courts have recognized that juvenile curfews implicate the fundamental rights of minors,
the parties dispute whether strict scrutiny review is necessary. The Supreme Court teaches that rights are
no less "fundamental" for minors than adults, but that the analysis of those rights may differ:

Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-
defined age of majority.  Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess
1âwphi1

constitutional rights. The Court[,] indeed, however, [has long] recognized that the State has somewhat
broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults. xxx. Thus, minors' rights are not
coextensive with the rights of adults because the state has a greater range of interests that justify the
infringement of minors' rights.

The Supreme Court has articulated three specific factors that, when applicable, warrant differential analysis of
the constitutional rights of minors and adults: x x x. The Bellotti test [however] does not establish a lower
level of scrutiny for the constitutional rights of minors in the context of a juvenile curfew. Rather,
the Bellotti framework enables courts to determine whether the state has a compelling state interest justifying
greater restrictions on minors than on adults. x x x.

x x x Although the state may have a compelling interest in regulating minors differently than adults, we
do not believe that [a] lesser degree of scrutiny is appropriate to review burdens on minors'
fundamental rights. x x x.
According, we apply strict scrutiny to our review of the ordinance. x x x.  (Emphases supplied)
130

The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a consideration of the peculiar circumstances of minors
as enumerated in Bellotti vis-a-vis the State's duty as parenspatriae to protect and preserve their well-being
with the compelling State interests justifying the assailed government act. Under the strict scrutiny test, a
legislative classification that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the disadvantage
of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional.  Thus, the government has the burden of proving that the
131

classification (1) is necessary to achieve a compelling State interest, and (i1) is the least restrictive
means to protect such interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest. 132

a. Compelling State Interest.

Jurisprudence holds that compelling State interests include constitutionally declared policies.  This Court has
133

ruled that children's welfare and the State's mandate to protect and care for them
as parenspatriae constitute compelling interests to justify regulations by the State.  It is akin to the
134

paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way.  As explained in Nunez,
135

the Bellotti framework shows that the State has a compelling interest in imposing greater restrictions on minors
than on adults. The limitations on minors under Philippine laws also highlight this compelling interest of the
State to protect and care for their welfare.

In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate objective of the Curfew Ordinances is to
keep unsupervised minors during the late hours of night time off of public areas, so as to reduce - if not totally
eliminate - their exposure to potential harm, and to insulate them against criminal pressure and influences
which may even include themselves. As denoted in the "whereas clauses" of the Quezon City Ordinance, the
State, in imposing nocturnal curfews on minors, recognizes that:

[b] x x x children, particularly the minors, appear to be neglected of their proper care and guidance, education,
and moral development, which [lead] them into exploitation, drug addiction, and become vulnerable to and at
the risk of committing criminal offenses;

xxxx

[d] as a consequence, most of minor children become out-of-school youth, unproductive by-standers, street
children, and member of notorious gangs who stay, roam around or meander in public or private roads, streets
or other public places, whether singly or in groups without lawful purpose or justification;

xxxx

[f] reports of barangay officials and law enforcement agencies reveal that minor children roaming around,
loitering or wandering in the evening are the frequent personalities involved in various infractions of city
ordinances and national laws;

[g] it is necessary in the interest of public order and safety to regulate the movement of minor children during
night time by setting disciplinary hours, protect them from neglect, abuse or cruelty and exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial or detrimental to their development;

[h] to strengthen and support parental control on these minor children, there is a need to put a restraint on the
tendency of growing number of youth spending their nocturnal activities wastefully, especially in the face of the
unabated rise of criminality and to ensure that the dissident elements of society are not provided with potent
avenues for furthering their nefarious activities[.] 136

The US court's judicial demeanor in Schleifer,  as regards the information gathered by the City Council to
137

support its passage of the curfew ordinance subject of that case, may serve as a guidepost to our own eatment
of the present case. Significantly, in Schleifer, the US court recognized the entitlement of elected bodies to
implement policies for a safer community, in relation to the proclivity of children to make dangerous and
potentially life-shaping decisions when left unsupervised during the late hours of night:
Charlottesville was constitutionally justified in believing that its curfew would materially assist its first stated
interest-that of reducing juvenile violence and crime. The City Council acted on the basis of information from
many sources, including records from Charlottesville's police department, a survey of public opinion, news
reports, data from the United States Department of Justice, national crime reports, and police reports from
other localities. On the basis of such evidence, elected bodies are entitled to conclude that keeping
unsupervised juveniles off the streets late at night will make for a safer community. The same streets
may have a more volatile and less wholesome character at night than during the day. Alone on the
streets at night children face a series of dangerous and potentially life-shaping decisions. Drug dealers
may lure them to use narcotics or aid in their sale. Gangs may pressure them into membership or participation
in violence. "[D]uring the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience,
perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them." Those who
succumb to these criminal influences at an early age may persist in their criminal conduct as
adults. Whether we as judges subscribe to these theories is beside the point. Those elected officials with their
finger on the pulse of their home community clearly did. In attempting to reduce through its curfew the
opportunities for children to come into contact with criminal influences, the City was directly advancing its
first objective of reducing juvenile violence and crime.  (Emphases and underscoring supplied; citations
138

omitted)

Similar to the City of Charlottesville in Schleifer, the local governments of Quezon City and Manila presented
statistical data in their respective pleadings showing the alarming prevalence of crimes involving juveniles,
either as victims or perpetrators, in their respective localities. 139

Based on these findings, their city councils found it necessary to enact curfew ordinances pursuant to their
police power under the general welfare clause.  In this light, the Court thus finds that the local governments
140

have not only conveyed but, in fact, attempted to substantiate legitimate concerns on public welfare,
especially with respect to minors. As such, a compelling State interest exists for the enactment and
enforcement of the Curfew Ordinances.

With the first requirement of the strict scrutiny test satisfied, the Court now proceeds to determine if the
restrictions set forth in· the Curfew Ordinances are narrowly tailored or provide the least restrictive means to
address the cited compelling State interest - the second requirement of the strict scrutiny test.

b. Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn.

The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from the fundamental premise that citizens should not
be hampered from pursuing legitimate activities in the exercise of their constitutional rights. While rights may be
restricted, the restrictions must be minimal or only to the extent necessary to achieve the purpose or to address
the State's compelling interest. When it is possible for governmental regulations to be more narrowly
drawn to avoid conflicts with constitutional rights, then they must be so narrowly drawn.   141

Although treated differently from adults, the foregoing standard applies to regulations on minors as they are still
accorded the freedom to participate in any legitimate activity, whether it be social, religious, or civic.  Thus, in
142

the present case, each of the ordinances must be narrowly tailored as to ensure minimal constraint not only on
the minors' right to travel but also on their other constitutional rights.
143

In In Re Mosier,  a US court declared a curfew ordinance unconstitutional impliedly for not being narrowly
144

drawn, resulting in unnecessary curtailment of minors' rights to freely exercise their religion and to free
speech.  It observed that:
145

The ordinance prohibits the older minor from attending alone Christmas Eve Midnight Mass at the local
Roman Catholic Church or Christmas Eve services at the various local Protestant Churches. It would
likewise prohibit them from attending the New [Year's] Eve watch services at the various churches. Likewise it
would prohibit grandparents, uncles, aunts or adult brothers and sisters from taking their minor relatives of any
age to the above mentioned services. x x x.

xxxx
Under the ordinance, during nine months of the year a minor could not even attend the city council
meetings if they ran past 10:30 (which they frequently do) to express his views on the necessity to repeal the
curfew ordinance, clearly a deprivation of his First Amendment right to freedom of speech.

xxxx

[In contrast, the ordinance in Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown (supra note 52)] was [a] very narrowly drawn
ordinance of many pages with eleven exceptions and was very carefully drafted in an attempt to pass
constitutional muster. It specifically excepted [the] exercise of First Amendment rights, travel in a motor
vehicle and returning home by a direct route from religious, school, or voluntary association
activities. (Emphases supplied)

After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective provisions, this Court finds that only the Quezon City
Ordinance meets the above-discussed requirement, while the Manila and Navotas Ordinances do not.

The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the coverage of the curfew, namely: (a) minors
accompanied by their parents, family members of legal age, or guardian; (b) those running lawful errands such
as buying of medicines, using of telecommunication facilities for emergency purposes and the like; (c) night
school students and those who, by virtue of their employment, are required in the streets or outside their
residence after 10:00 p.m.; and (d) those working at night. 146

For its part, the Navotas Ordinance provides more exceptions, to wit: (a) minors with night classes; (b) those
working at night; (c) those who attended a school or church activity, in coordination with a specific barangay
office; (d) those traveling towards home during the curfew hours; (e) those running errands under the
supervision of their parents, guardians, or persons of legal age having authority over them; (j) those involved in
accidents, calamities, and the like. It also exempts minors from the curfew during these specific occasions:
Christmas eve, Christmas day, New Year's eve, New Year's day, the night before the barangay fiesta, the day
of the fiesta, All Saints' and All Souls' Day, Holy Thursday, Good Friday, Black Saturday, and Easter Sunday. 147

This Court observes that these two ordinances are not narrowly drawn in that their exceptions are inadequate
and therefore, run the risk of overly restricting the minors' fundamental freedoms. To be fair, both ordinances
protect the rights to education, to gainful employment, and to travel at night from school or work.  However,
148

even with those safeguards, the Navotas Ordinance and, to a greater extent, the Manila Ordinance still do not
account for the reasonable exercise of the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, rights to
peaceably assemble, and of free expression, among others.

The exceptions under the Manila Ordinance are too limited, and thus, unduly trample upon protected liberties.
The Navotas Ordinance is apparently more protective of constitutional rights than the Manila Ordinance;
nonetheless, it still provides insufficient safeguards as discussed in detail below:

First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church activities, it hinders them from engaging in
legitimate non-school or nonchurch activities in the streets or going to and from such activities; thus, their
freedom of association is effectively curtailed. It bears stressing that participation in legitimate activities of
organizations, other than school or church, also contributes to the minors' social, emotional, and intellectual
development, yet, such participation is not exempted under the Navotas Ordinance.

Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the curfew during Christmas Eve and Christmas
day, it effectively prohibits minors from attending traditional religious activities (such as simbang gabi) at night
without accompanying adults, similar to the scenario depicted in Mosier.  This legitimate activity done pursuant
149

to the minors' right to freely exercise their religion is therefore effectively curtailed.

Third, the Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate avenues for minors to engage in political rallies or attend
city council meetings to voice out their concerns in line with their right to peaceably assemble and to free
expression.
Certainly, minors are allowed under the Navotas Ordinance to engage in these activities outside curfew hours,
but the Court finds no reason to prohibit them from participating in these legitimate activities during curfew
hours. Such proscription does not advance the State's compelling interest to protect minors from the dangers of
the streets at night, such as becoming prey or instruments of criminal activity. These legitimate activities are
merely hindered without any reasonable relation to the State's interest; hence, the Navotas Ordinance is not
narrowly drawn. More so, the Manila Ordinance, with its limited exceptions, is also not narrowly drawn.

In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely stricken down since their exceptions, which
are essentially determinative of the scope and breadth of the curfew regulations, are inadequate to ensure
protection of the above-mentioned fundamental rights. While some provisions may be valid, the same are
merely ancillary thereto; as such, they cannot subsist independently despite the presence  of any separability
150

clause.151

The Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to the first two (2) ordinances as it sufficiently safeguards
the minors' constitutional rights. It provides the following exceptions:

Section 4. EXEMPTIONS - Minor children under the following circumstances shall not be covered by the
provisions of this ordinance;

(a) Those accompanied by their parents or guardian;

(b) Those on their way to or from a party, graduation ceremony, religious mass, and/or
other extra-curricular activities of their school or organization wherein their attendance
are required or otherwise indispensable, or when such minors are out and unable to go
home early due to circumstances beyond their control as verified by the proper
authorities concerned; and

(c) Those attending to, or in experience of, an emergency situation such as conflagration,
earthquake, hospitalization, road accident, law enforcers encounter, and similar incidents[;]

(d) When the minor is engaged in an authorized employment activity, or going to or returning
home from the same place of employment activity without any detour or stop;

(e) When the minor is in [a] motor vehicle or other travel accompanied by an adult in no
violation of this Ordinance;

(f) When the minor is involved in an emergency;

(g) When the minor is out of his/her residence attending an official school, religious,
recreational, educational, social, community or other similar private activity sponsored
by the city, barangay, school, or other similar private civic/religious organization/group
(recognized by the community) that supervises the activity or when the minor is going
to or returning home from such activity, without any detour or stop; and

(h) When the minor can present papers certifying that he/she is a student and was dismissed
from his/her class/es in the evening or that he/she is a working student.  (Emphases and
152

underscoring supplied)

As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, .

Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of exceptions guarantees the protection of these
aforementioned rights. These items uphold the right of association by enabling minors to attend both
official and extra-curricular activities not only of their school or church but also of other legitimate
organizations. The rights to peaceably assemble and of free expression are also covered by these
items given that the minors' attendance in the official activities of civic or religious organizations are
allowed during the curfew hours. Unlike in the Navotas Ordinance, the right to the free exercise of religion is
sufficiently safeguarded in the Quezon City Ordinance by exempting attendance at religious masses even
during curfew hours. In relation to their right to ravel, the ordinance allows the minor-participants to move to
and from the places where these activities are held. Thus, with these numerous exceptions, the Quezon
City Ordinance, in truth, only prohibits unsupervised activities that hardly contribute to the well-being
of minors who publicly loaf and loiter within the locality at a time where danger is perceivably more
prominent.

To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly authorizes his/her minor child to run lawful errands
or engage in legitimate activities during the night, notwithstanding curfew hours. As astutely observed by Senior
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen during the deliberations on
this case, parental permission is implicitly considered as an exception found in Section 4, item (a) of the
Quezon City Ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian", as accompaniment should be
understood not only in its actual but also in its constructive sense. As the Court sees it, this should be the
reasonable construction of this exception so as to reconcile the juvenile curfew measure with the basic premise
that State interference is not superior but only complementary to parental supervision. After all, as the
Constitution itself prescribes, the parents' right to rear their children is not only natural but primary.

Ultimately, it is important to highlight that this Court, in passing judgment on these ordinances, is dealing with
the welfare of minors who are presumed by law to be incapable of giving proper consent due to their
incapability to fully understand the import and consequences of their actions. In one case it was observed that:

A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale that she can easily be the
victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The
State, as parenspatriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their
minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its protection. 153

Under our legal system's own recognition of a minor's inherent lack of full rational capacity, and balancing the
same against the State's compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime, this Court
finds that the curfew imposed under the Quezon City Ordinance is reasonably justified with its narrowly drawn
exceptions and hence, constitutional. Needless to say, these exceptions are in no way limited or restricted, as
the State, in accordance with the lawful exercise of its police power, is not precluded from crafting, adding, or
modifying exceptions in similar laws/ordinances for as long as the regulation, overall, passes the parameters of
scrutiny as applied in this case.

D. Penal Provisions of the Manila Ordinance.

Going back to the Manila Ordinance, this Court deems it proper - as it was raised - to further discuss the
validity of its penal provisions in relation to RA 9344, as amended.

To recount, the Quezon City Ordinance, while penalizing the parent/s or guardian under Section 8
thereof,  does not impose any penalty on the minors. For its part, the Navotas Ordinance requires the minor,
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along with his or her parent/s or guardian/s, to render social civic duty and community service either in lieu of -
should the parent/s or guardian/s of the minor be unable to pay the fine imposed - or in addition to the fine
imposed therein.  Meanwhile, the Manila Ordinance imposed various sanctions to the minor based on
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the age and frequency of violations, to wit:

SEC. 4. Sanctions and Penalties for Violation. Any child or youth violating this ordinance shall be
sanctioned/punished as follows:

(a) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and below, the sanction shall consist of a
REPRIMAND for the youth offender and ADMONITION to the offender's parent, guardian or
person exercising parental authority.

(b) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and under Eighteen (18) years of age, the
sanction/penalty shall be:
 1. For the FIRST OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition;

2. For the SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition, and a warning about

the legal impostitions in case of a third and subsequent violation; and

3. For the THIRD AND SUBSEQUENT OFFENSES, Imprisonment of one (1) day

to ten (10) days, or a Fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (Php2,000.00), or both at
the discretion of the Court, PROVIDED, That the complaint shall be filed by
the PunongBarangay with the office of the City Prosecutor.  (Emphases and
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underscoring supplied).

Thus springs the question of whether local governments could validly impose on minors these sanctions - i.e.,
(a) community . service; (b) reprimand and admonition; (c) fine; and (d) imprisonment. Pertinently, Sections
57 and 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, prohibit the imposition of penalties on minors for status offenses
such as curfew violations, viz.:

SEC. 57. Status Offenses. - Any conduct not considered an offense or not penalized if committed by an
adult shall not be considered an offense and shall not be punished if committed by a child.

SEC. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. - Ordinances enacted by local governments concerning

juvenile status offenses such as but not limited to, curfew violations, truancy, parental disobedience, anti-
smoking and anti-drinking laws, as well as light offenses and misdemeanors against public order or safety such
as, but not limited to, disorderly conduct, public scandal, harassment, drunkenness, public intoxication, criminal
nuisance, vandalism, gambling, mendicancy, littering, public urination, and trespassing, shall be for the
protection of children. No penalty shall be imposed on children for said violations, and they shall instead
be brought to their residence or to any barangay official at the barangay hall to be released to the custody of
their parents. Appropriate intervention programs shall be provided for in such ordinances. The child shall
also be recorded as a "child at risk" and not as a "child in conflict with the law." The ordinance shall also
provide for intervention programs, such as counseling, attendance in group activities for children, and for the
parents, attendance in parenting education seminars. (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

To clarify, these provisions do not prohibit the enactment of regulations that curtail the conduct of minors, when
the similar conduct of adults are not considered as an offense or penalized (i.e., status offenses). Instead, what
they prohibit is the imposition of  penalties on minors for violations of these regulations. Consequently, the
enactment of curfew ordinances on minors, without penalizing them for violations thereof, is not violative of
Section 57-A.

"Penalty"  is defined as "[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer usually in the form of imprisonment or
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fine";  "[p ]unishment imposed by lawful authority upon a person who commits a deliberate or negligent
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act."  Punishment, in tum, is defined as "[a] sanction - such as fine, penalty, confinement, or loss of property,
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right, or privilege - assessed against a person who has violated the law." 160

The provisions of RA 9344, as amended, should not be read to mean that all the actions of the minor in
violation of the regulations are without legal consequences. Section 57-A thereof empowers local governments
to adopt appropriate intervention programs, such as community-based programs  recognized under Section
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54  of the same law.

162

In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community service is a valid form of intervention program that a
local government (such as Navotas City in this case) could appropriately adopt in an ordinance to promote the
welfare of minors. For one, the community service programs provide minors an alternative mode of
rehabilitation as they promote accountability for their delinquent acts without the moral and social stigma
caused by jail detention.

In the same light, these programs help inculcate discipline and compliance with the law and legal orders. More
importantly, they give them the opportunity to become productive members of society and thereby promote
their integration to and solidarity with their community.
The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is likewise consistent with Sections 57 and 57-A of
RA 9344 as it is merely a formal way of giving warnings and expressing disapproval to the minor's
misdemeanor. Admonition is generally defined as a "gentle or friendly reproof' or "counsel or warning against
fault or oversight."  The Black's Law Dictionary defines admonition as "[a]n authoritatively issued warning or
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censure";  while the Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "gentle or friendly reproof, a mild rebuke, warning
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or reminder, [counseling], on a fault, error or oversight, an expression of authoritative advice or

warning."  Notably, the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) and our
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jurisprudence in administrative cases explicitly declare that "a warning or admonition shall not be considered a
penalty."166

In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-based programs and admonition are clearly not
penalties - as they are not punitive in nature - and are generally less intrusive on the rights and conduct of the
minor. To be clear, their objectives are to formally inform and educate the minor, and for the latter to
understand, what actions must be avoided so as to aid him in his future conduct.

A different conclusion, however, is reached with regard to reprimand and fines and/or imprisonment imposed
by the City of Manila on the minor. Reprimand is generally defined as "a severe or formal reproof."  The
167

Black's Law Dictionary defines it as "a mild form of lawyer discipline that does not restrict the lawyer's ability to
practice law";  while the Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "public and formal censure or severe reproof,
168

administered to a person in fault by his superior officer or body to which he belongs. It is more than just a
warning or admonition."  In other words, reprimand is a formal and public pronouncement made to denounce
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the error or violation committed, to sharply criticize and rebuke the erring individual, and to sternly warn the
erring individual including the public against repeating or committing the same, and thus, may unwittingly
subject the erring individual or violator to unwarranted censure or sharp disapproval from others. In fact, the
RRACCS and our jurisprudence explicitly indicate that reprimand is a penalty,  hence, prohibited by Section
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57-A of RA 9344, as amended.

Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably constitute penalties - as provided in our various
criminal and administrative laws and jurisprudence - that Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, evidently
prohibits.

As worded, the prohibition in Section 57-A is clear, categorical, and unambiguous. It states that "[n]o penalty
shall be imposed on children for x x x violations [of] juvenile status offenses]." Thus, for imposing the
sanctions of reprimand, fine, and/or imprisonment on minors for curfew violations, portions of Section 4 of the
Manila Ordinance directly and irreconcilably conflict with the clear language of Section 57-A of RA 9344, as
amended, and hence, invalid. On the other hand, the impositions of community service programs and
admonition on the minors are allowed as they do not constitute penalties.

CONCLUSION

In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances have passed the first prong of the strict scrutiny
test - that is, that the State has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent
juvenile crime in the concerned localities, only the Quezon City Ordinance has passed the second prong of the
strict scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance out of the three which provides for the least restrictive means to
achieve this interest. In particular, the Quezon City Ordinance provides for adequate exceptions that enable
minors to freely exercise their fundamental rights during the prescribed curfew hours, and therefore, narrowly
drawn to achieve the State's purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their
parents or guardian", has also been construed to include parental permission as a constructive form of
accompaniment and hence, an allowable exception to the curfew measure; the manner of enforcement,
however, is left to the discretion of the local government unit.

In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared unconstitutional and thus, null and void, while the
Quezon City Ordinance is declared as constitutional and thus, valid in accordance with this Decision.

For another, the Court has determined that the Manila Ordinance's penal provisions imposing reprimand and
fines/imprisonment on minors conflict with Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended. Hence, following the rule
that ordinances should always conform with the law, these provisions must be struck down as invalid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLYGRANTED. The Court hereby declares Ordinance No. 8046, issued by
the local government of the City of Manila, and Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. No. 99-02, as amended
by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13 issued by the local government of Navotas
City, UNCONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, NULL and VOID; while Ordinance No. SP-2301, Series of 2014, issued
by the local government of the Quezon City is declared CONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, VALID in accordance
with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.