STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Chapter 1

Nomenclature and Definitions

The application of psychology in warfare for military gains is as old as the

war itself Here the target is enemy mind—his thought process—rather than his
body. Different forms of communications are used with a view to influencing the
thinking, attitudes and perceptions of the enemy or any other party concerned.
The approach is not new. Twentieth Century, however, saw its growth into a
systematic science and the practice taking its rightful place in schemes of different
militaries and commanders—ranging from a spot tactical move to overall strategy
of war and from a concept to a complete doctrine. It came out from the realm of
covert warfare to that of overt military action. Though its success is seldom
mentioned in citations of victory, every war since then has brought in its OWTI
lessons in this area and contributed to its growth.
The development of the subject has been so active that it not only got
defined and redefined over the period but even its name has vaiied from time to
time and country to country. These names and definitions provide an insight into
the evolution of this warfare and its growing significance in strategic thinking.
They also point at nature of the activity, its method, and means of conducting it.
Noted British military thinker. Gen. J.F.C. Fuller was first to use the term
"Psychological Warfare" for this kind of activities. The father of striking theory
of armour warfare even went to the extent of believing that the PvSychological
Warfare would replace the traditional warfare. This quickly replaced other loose
terins like propaganda war or leaflet war and became a generic term. Different
militaries have coined different names for the Psychological Warfare, for not so
well explained but obvious politico-military reasons.
The Americans call it 'Psychological Operations' or just psyop for short.
Capt. E.M. Zacharias of the US Navy was first to mention it in his operations plan
of 1945 to hasten Japan's surrender.^ The nascent American intelligence had
called it Mora! Warj'are; particularly the covert propaganda, before the US turned
belligerent in the World War II. The Americans, however, continued to call it

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Psychological Warfare by and large throughout the war. This is evident not only
from the title of the dedicated staff component of the Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Force, viz.. Psychological "Warfare Division. The same
name was used by lower formations. Paul Linebarger's book that belongs to the
World War 11 period is also titled. Psychological Warfare!^
In the Korean War, the Americans replaced the term Psychological
Warfare with Zacharias' 'Psychological Operations.' The argument for the change
was that such operations did not need a 'state of war' and they coiild be directed
towards civilians.'' But the old name appears to have persisted throughout the
conflict, maybe out of sheer habit.*' The term. Psychological Operations,
however, gained currency in the Vietnam War.^
The British who called it Propaganda in the W World War 1 were eager to
get rid off it since it had become a hated word because of their own deeds in
America in that war. They renamed it, Political Waffare in the World War II,
calling the organisation created for the purpose. Political Warfare Executive. It
never occurred to the Germans that 'propaganda' was not a politically correct
word. Hitler formed 'Ministry of Propaganda and National Enlightenment' (and
conceded a point to the Allies in the arena of the psywar). The tendency to
change the name continued after the Victory in Europe (V-E). The British and
French have opted for Information Support and the Germans so determined to
reminiscence of Goebbels now call it Operation Information.
But the South Africans have been quite imaginative and prolific in
coining new names for their psychological warfare. They started with
Kontunikasie Operasies. an Afrikaans term, or KOMPS for short, meaning
coinmunication operations. It was also called Command Information, Command
Operations, and Community Operations and Civic Actions. Then after calling it
'Command Communication', now they have settled for a rather euphemistic.
Corporate Communication.
The latest addition to the unofficial list is Information Warfare, which is
also used to suggest attacks and defence of computers databanks and networks.
Some try to distinguish it from the psychological warfare by calling it Information
Technology Warfare while others think that the psychological warfare and
information technology warfare belong to the same spectrum, the Information
Warfare or still a broader one. War By Other Means (WBOM) that includes
several other 'soft-kill' strategies.
Reasons for such changes are more political than strategic. Most of the
governments used to have 'War Ministry' or 'Department of War' but after the
World War 11 it became imperative for governments not to appear to be a
warmonger for domestic and international political reasons. So they renamed
them as 'Ministry of Defence' or 'Department of Defence.' Stigma of covert
propaganda, which meant clandestinely spreading falsehood or erasing popular
beliefs for militajy purposes, was being looked down upon and hardly any
country wanted to be seen to be a Goebellian. Besides, the practice is not confined
to the period of hostilities not it limited to the enemy and this has also posed a
problem. Murray Dyer argues, "we are not at liberty to wage warfare against our
friends or against neutrals, we may wage warfare only against our enemies "
while underscoring 'the inadequacy' of the name, Psychological War/are.'^ But he
does accept the psychological warfare as a generic term despite it having different
names at 'other times and among other peoples.'
This attitude is very much reflected in the comments made by Col. Fred Walker
who said the news media by referring to the Psychological Operations as
Psychological Warfare were implying that there was some "nefarious objective or
purpose" in such an action.'° Referring to the then ofBcial definition (Joint Pub
1-02), he even suggests that the term 'Persuasive Communications' be considered
to mean the same thing as psychological operations." "Using the term warfare to
describe US psychological-political strategy in its broadest sense is itself
problematic. Psychological-political operations need not be directed only to
adversaries; neutral, allied and semi-allied nations potentially constitute highly
important targets because our enemies will target them in efForts to break those
alUances," argues Dr. Carnes Lord.''^ No Government would like to say that it is
indulging in 'warfare' against its own people (The attitude influenced even the
official definition of the psychological warfare.).
Over the period, the Pentagon has learnt that terminology can be a major
factor in various audiences' acceptance or rejection of any policy. Walker gives
several examples. The term neutron bomb was a key element in the Soviets'
eminently successfiil campaign against President Jimmy Carter's plan to deploy
enhanced radiation weapons in Europe. The same American leadership was
'duped' into calling Iranian terrorists as students at the outset of the American
Embassy hostage debacle in Teheran in 1979, His successor, Ronald Reagan,
suffered similar problem of name. His Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) that
could have been described as 'peacefiil military uses of space' became infamous
as Star Wars (after a Hollywood blockbuster) and that aided the Soviet
Psychological Warfare efforts. The name evoked subconscious perception that it
was a sci-fi imagination and the word Wars connoted an offence and not
defence.''^ Now the Americans have learnt to call SDI 'National Missile Defence
(NMD).'
Maybe, psychological warfare experts were fu'st to realise the importance
of the diction and hence these changes. One explanation is that the Psychological
Operations is a fai" more comprehensive term than the Psychological Warfare
because the former deals with all types of audiences—friendly, neutral and
hostile.''* Another is that the Psychological Warfare is a part of the Psychological
Operations, for the latter not only includes all types of audiences in all types of
situations unlike the former, which has a target audience only of the enemy and
that too in actual war.'^ But this explanation is undermined by the same source's
aigument that the psychological Operations can be both, strategic as well as
tactical.'^
Thus the word 'propaganda' being not in such a good taste and 'warfare'
being what could not be deployed against 'non-enemies,' it is imperative to caU it
by other name. Ironically, another deceptive or euphemistic name was needed for
the reasons of operational security. The British gave it even code-names in the
World War 11. Besides, no government or military would like to admit that even a
part of its victory was due to its 'non-combat' and not so honourable activities.
No matter what moral or military justification these colonels and the Pentagon
might offer in support of the term, 'Psychological Operations,' the old school
would not have it. Gen. Richard G. Stilwell, a former chairman of the Security
Review Committee of the Department of Defence (US) says,'" The term
psychological warfare, for all its shortcomings, succeeds in combining two
meaningful subjects, both as old as man. Certainly it is better than psychological
operations, which, as my mentor Paul Linebarger'^ once said, leaves the issue
entirely neutral. Psychological warfare seeks to achieve the objective where
military force is unavailable or inappropriate..."'* Other countries could have
faced similar predicament and the military debate there may have remained
confined to higher command circles and not become public knowledge in all
cases, for obvious reasons.

DEFINITIONS

Hardly any other instrument of power has been facing such an intense
identity crisis. It persists as one tries to define the p.sychological warfare. Besides
the wide range of nomenclature, the debate has generated many a defmition. Its
positive aspect is that these definitions have laid down parameters of theory and
practice of psychological warfare, while indicating the line of its evolution. But
like one common name, one common definition that can provide its terms of
reference and determine its boundaries has remained elusive. '"^ As the name
Psychological Warfare has found acceptance by lexicographers, military writers
and editors of encyclopaedia, attempts to work out a comprehensive definition
have continued and the process has remained open-ended. The American Military
has changed its own oflRcial definition several times. Different defmitions have
been found either too incomplete, and limiting the practice in scope or tending to
be so general that they can cover most of the iniUtary actions.^"^
The New Encyclopaedia Britannica calls it Psychological Warfare, also
psywar. and defines it as: "the use of propaganda against an enemy, supported by
such military, economic, or political measures as may be required. Such
propaganda is generally intended to demoralize the enemy, to break his will to
fight or resist and sometimes to render him favourably disposed to one's
position.'^' The New Millennium Encyclopaedia, an American work concurs with
the name and says, "P.sychological warfare aims at destroying an enemy's will to
resist, it includes the use of propaganda (printed, broadcast, or in the form of
films) and aerial bombardment employed for its demoralizing effect on the enemy
civilian population as well as on combatant force s.^^
Both these definitions are of the World War 11 vintage. Wliile the former
includes hosts of military and non-military action in support of the psywar, the
latter confines it to only aerial bombardment. Both aim at using only the
propaganda but only against the single target—enemy, implying that during a
shooting war. Not that the propaganda, was not being directed against other
audiences at home and elsewhere even at that time. Elaborate tasks involved in
identifying different targets and tailoring effective propaganda for them find no
place in these definitions for they were not carried out as a matter of rule. These
activities' exclusion makes these definitions incomplete. The propaganda alone
does not make the modem psychological warfare, a complete mission-specific
military activity. What makes these definitions relevant even today is their stress
on the propaganda, which, continues to be the warhead of the Psychological
Warfare. Tlie propaganda is so important that many prefer to call the activity
Propaganda Warfare or just Propaganda. It is a weapon to either boost morale,
one of the most important aspects of war, or to weaken the enemy morale. It can
be deployed on and off the battlefield.
This makes it imperative to have a look at the accepted meaning of the
propaganda. The American encyclopaedia perceives propaganda as dissemination
of ideas and information for the purpose of inducing or intensifying specific
attitudes and actions. The propaganda may have distorted facts and may appeal to
passion and prejudice, it is thought to be patently false and deceiving. But this is
not necessarily true. One can present the truth and the whole truth and still be a
propagandist.''•'
Linebarger gives perhaps the first comprehensive definition:
"Psychological warfare, in the broad sense, consists of the application of parts of
the science called psychology to the conduct of war; in the narrow sense,
psychological warfare, comprises the use of propaganda against an enemy,
together with such military operational measures as may suppleinent the
propaganda."^" Given soon after the World War 11, this definition is valid even
today.
Interestingly, he describes propaganda as organized persuasion by non-
violent means and argues that the war itself may be considered to be, among other
things, a violent form of persuasion.'"' The rider makes it explicit that the military
measures taken in support of the Psychological Warfare should be non-violent.
This line separates the Psychological Warfare from other forms of war. This
surely excludes aerial bombardment carried out for its demoralising effect but
includes the same measure if taken to prove a propaganda-point, the collateral
damages notwithstanding. Similarly, this includes a misleading military
manoeuvre or procurement of equipment to signal a move to be confirmed by the
propaganda, to complete the deception.
Linebarger finds that the definition is an open game and the Psychological
Warfare needed to be defined more for the purpose of making it convenient and
operable rather than for knowing what it is since the world knows that by
demonstration during the two world wars. He also argues that the problem is not
whether to apply the Psychological Warfare but is that ofhoM' better to apply it
and suggests that a staff officer needs a different definitionfi^omthe one used by
the combat officer. While a political leader would use a broader definition than
the one requiied by soldiers, the fanatic would have his or her own definition.^"^
Yet, he prefers a simple definition, application of propaganda to the purposes of
war, and elaborates a bit to say, "Psychological Warfare comprises the use of
propaganda against an enemy, together with such other operational measiu^es of a
military, economic or political nature as may be required to supplement the
propaganda."^^ But nobody could be more aware about the deficiency of this
definition, than Linebarger himself He distinguishes the propaganda fi^om
military propaganda and maintains that it can be directed against all: enemy,
neutral orfi-iendlyforeign group for a specific strategic or tactical purpose. It is
significant that the home audiences are excluded.
Another interesting definition comes Irom the Psychological Warfare
Division of the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
(PWD/SHAEf), World War II. The definition apparently approved by the
Supreme Commander, Gen. Dwight Eisenhower, defines the Psychological
Warfare as "the dissemination of propaganda designed to undermine the enemy's
will to resist, demoralize his forces and sustain the morale of our supporters." ^'
This is obviously coined in the thick of war, during run up to the D-Day. About
10 years later, as President of the United States, Eisenhower, provided one of the
broadest definitions in a memo to his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles dated
October 24, 1953, "the psyops are anything from the singing of a beautifiil
anthem upto the most extraordinary kind of physical sabotage.""^°
 The Vietnam era and the Cold War gave a fresh impetus to the
Psychological Warfere and generated fresh definition. "Psyop (psychological
operations, the official American name) is the planned or programmed use of
human actions to influence the attitudes and actions of friendly, neutral, and
enemy populations that are important to national objectives."'" Attempt here is to
make it more comprehensive by replacing propaganda and suppleinentary military
measures with 'programmed human actions.' The emphasis is on the planning and
national objectives and that implies that the activity can be carried out both in war
and peace.
But even this official definition has not remained static. The subsequent
revision of the publication says, "Planned psychological activities in peace and
war which normally pursue objectives to gain the support and cooperation of
friendly and neutral countries and to reduce the will and the capacity of hostile or
potentially hostile countries to wage war."^^ While retaining almost all points of
the earlier definition, this one includes potential threats and to that extent it is
innovative. But both these definitions are not clear about immediate objectives
and also do not explicitly except the home audience. Walker finds that the US
became focussed on 'strategic psychological activities' because it found that the
global propaganda and disinformation eflbrts of the then Soviet Union were
directed against the US foreign policy objectives. This is the influence of the Cold
War. In his view, this definition supports a long-term effort to achieve national or
regional foreign policy objectives through persuasion.
That American establishment and public are touchy about such a matter is
evident from the adoption of the name, psychological operation, and the defmition
given by Linebarger. The common perception about the propaganda, its perceived
ovei"use by the Soviet Union (from behind the ijon curtain) and anti-war agitations
seen during the Vietnam caused a combine impression on the American psyche
and even today pacifist pressure groups have often been alleging that the
American government is subjecting its own citizens to the psychological warfare.
So the latest dictionary of the Pentagon defines the psyop thus: "Psychological
operations (psyop) are operations planned to convey selected information and
indicators to foreign audiences to mfluence their emotions, motives, objective
reasoning and ultimately the behaviour of foreign governments, organizations,
groups and individuals. The purpose is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and
behaviour favourable to the originator's objectives."^''
This is the post-Operation Desert Storm/Shield definition. The experience
of the Gulf War, which saw yet another use of full-scale Psychological Warfare,
is incorporated in this definition. Significantly, the definition not only has the
word 'foreign' explicitly leaving out the home audiences, it elaborates on the
objectives of the Psychological Warfare and like earlier doctrinal definitions, is
not propaganda-centric. The propaganda is not the only ammunition and the
military activities are not bound by the time (war or peace) or place (anywhere
outside the US territory). But the hair-splitting is avoided in the Army's Field
Manual which goes into nuts and bolts of the Psychological Warfare: "Psyops are
products and actions designed to channel behaviour in support of the
commander's intent at the tactical, operational and strategic level.""^'' This straight
forward definition is not only user-lriendly but also integrates the Psychological
Warfare with the commander's plan and all other military actions to execute it.
One finds the NATO definition as quoted in the official dictionary of the
Pentagon, absolutely without any inhibition: "Planned psychological activities in
peace and war directed to enemy, fiiendly and neutral audiences in order to
influence attitudes and behaviour affecting achievement of political and military
objectives. They include strategic psychological activities, psychological
consolidation activities and battlefield psychological activities."^^ The same
dictionary even defines the Psychological Warfare (as against the official name:
Psychological Operations): "The planned use of propaganda and other
psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions,
emotions, attitudes and behaviour of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to
support the achievement of national objectives." Its close resemblance to the
official definition certainly suggests the name Psychological Warfare is as good
as Psychological Operations.
Though its significance was seldom disputed, like spying, its practice was
also seldom acknowledged. Often, the use of Psychological Warfare was
considered unsportsmanlike.''' No military commander would like to give the due
credit to a humble leaflet for his victory. Some commanders so over-awed by the
military prowess of their men and weapons that they look down upon the
Psychological Warfare as a 'civilian' activity primarily because it is non-lethal.
Books of military history, which, describe so vividly battles, outflanking
manoeuvres and strategic planning, war, usually omit a mention of the
Psychological Warfare. The science of Psychological Warfare that aims at
changing attitudes often fails to influence the attitudes of the military and political
leadership towards itself The offjcial tendency of being politically correct in
different countries in varying degrees and more so in the United States, general
image of the activity of propaganda that it amounted to be lying and attitude of
military and political leadership towards the Psychological Warfare have ftielled
this inconclusive debate that has not retarded the evolution of this military
science.
The spin-off is greater understanding of the science of Psychological
Warfare.

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' u s Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Psychological Operations
Field Manual (FM) 33-1, Headquarters, Deparlmeni of the Army, Washington DC, 18 February
1993. p 1-1. This document also serves as Fleet Marine Field Manual 3-53 of the US Marine
Corps.
^Ibld
' Prosser, Frank and Friedman, Herb, Organisation of US Propaganda Efforts During WORLD
WAR U, www.psvwar.ore
* Linebarger, Col. Paul Myron Anthony, who codified tlie Psychological Warfare mostly on the
basis of liis empirical knowledge gained during the World War U. He was involved in creation of
American psywar organisation of the war. Office of War Information and raised the US Army's
first psywar unit; was the wartime head of the American psywar in China. He wiote science
fictions under pseudonym. Cordwainer Smith. His book. Psychological Warfare is considered a
standard one in the defence studies and is relied upon considerably in this work.
' Wolfgeher, Paul A., Psychological Warfare: The 7" Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company in the
Korean War, Korean War Educator, www.koreanwar-educator.org
' Sandler. Stanely. The Korean War: An Encyclopedia, Garland Publishing Inc.
htip://korea.SO.;irmv.m]i''historv and Korean War: Golden Jubilee Fact Sheet
http.//korea50.armv.miL''history/factsheets/psvchowar.html
' Goldstein, Col. Fiank, USAF and Col. Daniel W. Jacobowtz, USAF, Rtd,"Psychological
Operations: An Introduction," Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies, ed.
Colonels Frank Goldsiein and Benjamin Findley, USAF, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force
Base, Alabama, September 1996, p 14
* Chaney, Andrew, a South African psychological warfare specialist who being of the English
origin, later, also served as an officer in a British military intelligence, in Psychological
Operations and Strategies in Pre- Democratic South Africa, unpublished, and also in personal
communication with this researcher. He was actively involved in tlie psychological warfare in
South Africa.
' Dyer, .Murray, The Weapon on the Wall. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979, p 8
'" Walker, Col. Fred, USAF, "Strategic Concepts for Militai^ Operations," Psychological
Operations: Principles and Case Studies, ed. Colonels Frank Goldstein and Benjamin Findley,
USAF, Air University Press. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, September 1996, p 17. But tliis
study finds that the term "psychological warfare' Vk'as certainly not a media-made one as Col.
Walker observes.
»Ibid
" Lord, Dr., Carnes. "The Psychological Dimension in National Strategy." Psychological
Operations: Principles and Case Studies, ed. Colonels Frank Goldstein and Benjamin Findley,
USAF, Air University Press. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, September 1996, p 75. Dr. Lord,
a fellow ofthe National Defence University and an assistant professor in the Department of
Government and Foreign Affairs ofthe University of Virginia, prefers to call it Psvcholugical-
political Operations but does not elaborate. He also holds that a "cultural revolution' that took
place in the US in 1960s, shattered the foreign policy consensus ofthe post-war decades (a result
ofthe Vietnam war), a questioning of American values and the legitimacy of a leading world role
for the US. "Such attitudes could only spell trouble for any strategy thai depended on the confident
projection abroad of America's pohtical identity and values." p 74
" Walker, Col. Fred W., U.SAF, "Strategic Concepts for Milit?iTy Operations," P.iychological
Operations: Principles and Case Studies, ed. Colonels Frank Goldstein and Benjamin Findley,
USAF, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, September 1996, p 19
" Katz, Lt. Col. Philip, US Army, et al, "A critical Analysis of US Psyop", Psychological
Operations: Principles and Case Studies, ed. Colonels Frank Goldstein and Benjamin Findley,
USAF, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, September 1996, p 144
" .Meissner, Col., Joseph, US Army (Rtd), President of a tiade body of experts. Psyop
Association, Canton, Ohio and editor of its journal. Perspectives, in personal communication with
this researcher.
'^ Ibid
'^ See the Endnote No 4 of this chapter.
" Sfilwell, Cen., Richard G., US Army "Political-Psychological Dimensions of
Coimterinsurgency," Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies, ed. Colonels Frank

11
Goldstein and Benjamin Findley, USAF, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama,
September 1996, p 319
" Dyer, Murray, The Weapon on the Wall, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979, p 8

" The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 9, Is"" Edition, 1994 p 764
^^New Millennium EncycJopedia, Simon & Schuster, New York, CD-ROM edition, 1999
^' Ibid
"•' Linebarger, Paul M. A., Psychological Warfare, Combat Foj-ces Pi-ess, Wasliington, '54, p 25
" Ibid
" Ibid, 37
" Ibid, 40
" Ibid, 39
' ' Paddock, Jr, Col., Alfred H. US Army Special Waifare: Its Origins, National Defence
University Press, Washington, 1982 p 143
^^ Rouse, Maj. Edward, US Army, Psychological Operations/Warfare,
www pipeline.coin/'|)S\'\vainor''psvlisi.hl.Tn]. Maj. Rouse, a Vietnam veteran runs this website, so
well appreciated by the US psyop community. It has a slogan that liberates further even
Eisenhowever's "beautiftil antliem.' It goes: "Capture Their Minds and Their Hearts and Souls
Wilt Follow," The slogan originated in the Vietnam War.
^' US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defence Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
(Joint Pub 1-02), Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1974
'^ US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defence Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
(Joint Pub i -02). Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1989 as cited by Col. Fred
Walker USAF (Rtd), "^Strategic Concepts for Military Operations, "Psychological Operations:
Principles and Case Studies, edited by CoJ. Frank L. Goldstein, USAF, Air University Press,
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, September 1996 p 17. In Walker's view, this definition
supports a long-term effort to achieve a national or regional foreign policy objective through
persuasion.
" US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations (Joint Pub 3-53), Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Pentagon, Washington, 10 July 1996. p I-l. All doctrines ofthe Pentagon and
different armed forces use same definition, drawing from the latest Joint Pub 1-02.
" US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Psychological Operations
Field Manual (FM) 33-1. Headquarters, Department ofthe Army, Wasliington DC, 18 February
1993. p 1-1.
•^" US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defence Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
(Joint Pub 1-02), Government Printing Office. Washington DC, 1994
""' Libebarger, Paul M. A.. Psychological Warfare, Combat Farces Press, Washington. '54, p 37

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