H.

Civil and Criminal Liabilities

1. Civil Liability

Requisites for recovery of damages arising from acts of public officers

The mere fact that the individual has sustained injury by reason of the act
of the public officer is not enough to create a right of action. In order to create a
right of action, two things must concur— damage to himself and a wrong violation
of the right of a party committed by the other. Without a wrong, it is damnum
absque injuria.

The government can only act through individual persons. But their liability,
if any, is only in their official capacity, such that no judgment can be rendered to
make them personally liable in their private capacity, unless there is an allegation
in the complaint that such officials have maliciously and in bad faith acted outside
the scope of their official authority or jurisdiction.

Any pecuniary liability a public officer may be held accountable for on the
occasion of civil suit for damages arising from a delict or quasi-delict allegedly
committed by him is for his own account. The extant rule is that a public officer
shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary damages for acts done in
performance of official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice
or gross negligence. [ CITATION DeL14 \l 1033 ]

Effect of contributory negligence of injured party

As a rule, public officers should be held to a faithful performance of their
official duties, and made to answer in damages to all persons who may have
been injured through their malfeasance, omission or negligence.

However, it is equally true that if the result complained of would have

followed, notwithstanding their misconduct, or if the injured party himself
contributed to the result in any degree by his own fault or neglect, they cannot be
held responsible. If the position of the injured party would have been just the
same had not the alleged misconduct occurred, he has no legal ground of
complaint; and if his conduct or the conduct of his attorney contributed to the
result, he is in pari delicto, and the law leaves him where it finds him. [ CITATION
DeL14 \l 1033 ]

Liability of the President for official acts

1. Civil responsibility- The execution of the law is a matter fully as important
as the creation or determination of the law. One branch is as necessary
and important as the other.

Whatever impedes or prevents the free and unconstrained activity of a

governmental department within its proper limits tends to evil results. The civil
responsibility of the Chief Executive would produce in him an inevitable tendency
to protect himself by following lines of least resistance and to temper the force of
his executive arm in places and upon occasions where there is strong opposition,
either by powerful and influential persons or by great vested interests. [ CITATION
DeL14 \l 1033 ]
 2. Criminal liability- Although the three departments of government are
coordinate and of equal importance in the administration of governmental
affairs, nevertheless, the Chief Executive is the first man of the State. An
assault upon him is an assault upon the people. An offense against him is
an offense against the State. [ CITATION DeL14 \l 1033 ]

3. Liability for damages- To put him on trial, is to put on trial the government
itself. As the State may not be held liable, and by such process its
sovereignty weakened, without express provision of law, so the person
most perfectly its incarnation should not be subjected curtly to personal
liability for damages resulting from the performance of official acts except
by law equally express. [ CITATION DeL14 \l 1033 ]

Liability of other executive official for official acts

1. Functions involve exercise of discretion- Government officials

performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly the
established statutory or constitutional rights which any reasonable person
would have known.

a. If the law at that time was not clearly established, an official could not
reasonably expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor
could he fairly be said to know that the law forbade conduct not
previously identified as unlawful.
b. However, if the law was clearly established, the immunity defense
ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official
should know the law governing his conduct. [ CITATION DeL14 \l 1033 ]

2. Reason for immunity- The courts have recognized the limited immunity
from personal liability for unconstitutional conduct, applicable to many
classes of public officials who were required to exercise discretion in the
course of their responsibilities.

a. Such immunity is necessary because the imposition of monetary costs

for mistakes which were not unreasonable in the light of all
circumstances would undoubtedly deter the most conscientious
governmental decision maker from exercising his judgment
independently, forcefully, and in a manner best serving the long-term
interest of the public.

b. In the case of higher officers of the executive branch, the analysis as to

immunity is complex, since the range of decisions and choices, whether
the formulation of policy, of legislation, of budgets, or of day-to-day
decisions is virtually infinite. [ CITATION DeL14 \l 1033 ]

3. Acts of the heads of executive departments- Under our presidential

type of government, all heads of executive departments are mere
 assistants and agents of the Chief Executive. Except in cases where the
President is required by the Constitution or law to act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of his office are
performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the
secretaries, performed and rendered in the regular course of business,
are, unless disapproved by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of
the President. [ CITATION DeL14 \l 1033 ]

Liability of legislative officials for official acts

1. Privileges accorded to the members of Congress- Members of the
Congress are not only exempt from general liability, but certain special
privileges are accorded to them by the Constitution. Thus, the Constitution
declares that “a Senator or Member of the House shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years of imprisonment, be privileged from
arrest while Congress is in session.” Furthermore, “no Member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate
in the Congress or in any committee thereof.”

These privileges are designed not to protect the members against the
prosecutions for their own benefit, but to support the rights of the people, by
enabling the representatives to execute the functions of their office without fear of
prosecution, civil or criminal.

2. Reasons for immunity- Members of public legislative bodies are chosen

by their constituents to enact such laws, regulations or rules of conduct as
in their judgment are best suited to the welfare and prosperity of the people
within their jurisdiction. They are called upon to exercise their judgment
and discretion as to what the people need and what will best serve that
need. They would certainly perform their duties in a timid and time-serving
manner, if, indeed, they would undertake the performance at all — if every
dissatisfied person would compel them to vindicate the wisdom of their
enactments in action for damages.

The immunity extends to all grades of legislative action. This immunity is not
confined to members of Congress but extends to the protection of the members
of local legislative bodies. [ CITATION DeL14 \l 1033 ]

Liability of members of the judiciary for official acts

1. Reasons for immunity- It is a general principle that no civil action or
administrative sanction can be sustained against a judicial officer for the
recovery of damages by one claiming to have been injured by the officer’s
judicial action within his jurisdiction.

A number of reasons, anyone of them sufficient, have been advanced in

support of this rule. Thus it is said:
a. The necessary result of the liability would be to occupy the judge’s time
and mind with the defense of his own interests, when he should be
giving them up wholly to public duties, thereby defeating to some extent
the very purpose for which his office was created.
 b. The effect of putting the judge on his defense as wrongdoer necessarily
is to lower the estimation in which his office his held by the public, and
any adjudication against him lessens the weight of his subsequent
decisions.

c. The civil responsibility of the judge would often be an incentive to

dishonest instead of honest judgments, and would invite him to consult
public opinion and public prejudices when he ought to wholly above and
uninfluenced by them.

d. Such civil responsibility would constitute a serious obstruction to justice,

in that it would render essential a large increase in the judicial force, not
only as it would multiply litigation, but as it would open each case to
endless controversy. If one judge can be tried for his judgment, the one
who presides on the trial may also be tried for his, and thus the process
may go on until it becomes intolerable.

e. Where the judge is really deserving of condemnation, a prosecution at

the instance of the State is a much more effectual method of bringing
him to account than the private suit.

f. Judicial offices would never be accepted by any man of standing,

reputation or financial worth, if at the peril of his fortune, he must justify
his judgments to the satisfaction of another judge at the instance of a
dissatisfies litigant.

Generally speaking, a judge is not liable for acts done in the exercise of the
judicial function. The immunity does not apply to acts which are purely ministerial
in nature, although insofar as they are acting within their judicial authority, their
immunity from civil liability is held not affected by bad faith, malice, or corrupt
motives. If the judge be in fact corrupt, the public has its remedy, but the
defeated suitor cannot be permitted to obtain redress against the judge by
alleging that the judgment against him was the result of corrupt or malicious
motives. [ CITATION DeL14 \l 1033 ]

2. Liability for rendering an unjust judgment- As a matter of public policy,

in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, the acts of a judge in his
judicial capacity do not always constitute misconduct and are not subject to
disciplinary action, even though such acts may be erroneous. Good faith
and absence of malice are sufficient defenses. But a judge may be held
criminally liable for dereliction of duty for knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment or interlocutory order or for rendering a manifestly unjust
judgment or interlocutory order by reason of inexcusable negligence or
ignorance.

a. In order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly rendering an

unjust judgment, it must be shown that the judgment is unjust as it is
contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, and the same was
made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.
 b. To hold a judge liable for rendition of a manifestly unjust judgment by
reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance, it must be shown that
although he has acted without malice, he failed to observe in the
performance of his duty that diligence, prudence and care which the law
requires.

c. A judicial officer when required to exercise his judgment or discretion is

not held criminally, civilly, or administratively for any error of judgment
that he may commit, absent any showing of bad faith, corruption,
malice, deliberate intent to violate the law or a persistent disregard of
well-known legal rules and principles. [ CITATION DeL14 \l 1033 ]

3. Liability for gross ignorance of law and incompetence- Gross

ignorance of law and incompetence are characteristics and quirks
impermissible of judge. Where there is a gross misjudgment or gross
ignorance of the law, he may be meted the penalty of suspension. Judges
must keep themselves posted in the latest law and jurisprudence. A judge
is called upon to exhibit more than a cursory acquaintance with the
statutes and procedural rules.

To warrant a finding of gross ignorance of the law, the assailed order or

decision must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, the decision
must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, the error must be so
gross and patent as to produce an inference of ignorance or bad faith or that the
judge knowingly rendered an unjust decision. [ CITATION DeL14 \l 1033 ]

4. Quantum of proof necessary to support administrative charges- In

several cases, the Supreme Court has ruled that of what is imputed to a
respondent judge connotes a misconduct that, if proven, would result in
dismissal from the bench, than the quantum of proof necessary to support
the administrative. Charges or to establish grounds for removal of a judicial
officer should be more substantial.

In Alcuzar v. Casipit, the reason is explained thus: “Administrative

proceedings against judges, are by nature, highly penal in character and are to
be governed by the rule applicable in criminal cases.” In subsequent rulings
which may be said to have superseded its earlier pronouncements, the Supreme
Court applied substantial evidence as the normative quantum of proof necessary
in resolving administrative complaints against judges. There appears no
compelling reason to require a higher degree of proof in cases filed against
judges when the complainant is merely requires to prove substantial evidence for
administrative cases filed against other public officers or employees. [ CITATION
DeL14 \l 1033 ]

Liability of quasi-judicial officers for official acts

1. Nature of functions- There are officials in the executive branch or
members of the bodies who do not belong strictly to any of the traditional
branches of government and are vested with discretion and empowered to
 exercise their judgment in matters brought before them. Their functions are
said to be quasi-judicial and they are called quasi-judicial officers.

2. Reasons for immunity- The same reasons of private interest and public
policy which operate to render the judicial officer exempt from civil liability
for his judicial acts within his jurisdiction apply to the quasi-judicial officer
as well, and it is well-settle that the quasi-judicial officer cannot be called
upon to respond in damages to the private individual for the honest
exercise of his judgment within his jurisdiction however erroneous or
misguided his judgment may be.

3. Liability for ministerial acts- The question depends in each case upon
the character of the act. If it be judicial or quasi-judicial in its nature, the
officer acts judicially and is exempt.

But the quasi-judicial officer, like the judicial, may and often does act
ministerially, and, when so acting, he is liable for carelessness or negligence like
any other ministerial officer.[ CITATION DeL14 \l 1033 ]

Liability of ministerial officers for official acts

1. General rule- Where the law imposes a public officer the performance of
ministerial duties in which a private individual has a special and direct
interest, the officer will be liable to such individual for any injury which he
may proximately sustain in consequence of the failure or neglect of the
officer to perform the duty at all, or to perform it properly.

A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a

given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to mandate of the legal
authority, without regard to the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety
or impropriety of the act done. [ CITATION DeL14 \l 1033 ]

2. Requisites for liability- The individual suing must show that he has
suffered an injury from the breach of a duty owing to himself. It is not
enough that he has sustained an injury, or that the officer has violated a
duty owing to someone. The plaintiff must show that these two things
concur: that he has sustained a special and peculiar injury, and that it
results from a breach of duty which the officer owed to him.

It is well-settled that the ministerial officer who performs in the prescribed

manner and with due care and diligence an act imposed upon him by law incurs
no liability to any individual however much the latter may be injured. [ CITATION
DeL14 \l 1033 ]

3. Liability where officer also acts extra-judicially- That the officer in

question is one who usually acts judicially or extra-judicially is not
conclusive, for such officers may be and are frequently called upon to
perform ministerial acts.

Kinds of liability of ministerial officers

 There are three classes of defaults in the performance of ministerial duties,
namely:
1. Nonfeasance or neglect or refusal, without sufficient excuse, to perform
an act which it was the officer’s legal duty to the individual to perform;
2. Misfeasance or the failure to use, in the performance of a duty owing to
an individual, that degree of care, skill and diligence which the
circumstances of the case reasonably demand; and
3. Malfeasance or the doing, either through ignorance, inattention or
malice, of that which the officer has no legal right to do it all, as where
he acts without any authority whatever, or exceeds, ignores or abuses
his powers.

Thus, it is the general rule that good faith and absence of malice constitute
no defense in an action to hold a ministerial officer liable for damages caused by
his nonfeasances or misfeasances, for an officer is under a constant obligation to
discharge the duties, and it is not necessary to show that his failure to act was
willful or malicious. However, good faith or honest mistake may, in some cases,
be shown in mitigation of damages. [ CITATION DeL14 \l 1033 ]

Liability of superior officer for acts of subordinates

1. General rule- Public officers in the government, in the performance of their
public functions, are not civilly liable to third persons, either for the
misfeasance or positive wrongs, or for the nonfeasance, negligence, or
omissions of duty of their official subordinates. Indeed, the negligence of
subordinates cannot always be ascribed to their superior in the absence of
the latter’s own negligence.

Consistent with the interest in unimpaired decision-making, it is appropriate to

protect from the possibility of suit a public servant who has not himself engaged
in actionable conduct; thus, those in the chain of command should not be subjevt
to suit on any theory of vicarious responsibility. [ CITATION DeL14 \l 1033 ]

2. Exceptions- The rule exempts from liability a public officer in a

supervisory position for acts or defaults of his subordinates is qualified in
the following cases:
a. Where, being charged with the duty of employing or retaining his
subordinates, he negligently or willfully employs or retains unfit or
improper persons; or
b. Where, being charged with duty to see that they are appointed or
qualified in a proper name, he negligently or willfully fails to require
them the due conformity to the prescribed regulations; or
c. Where, he so carelessly or negligently oversees, conducts or carries on
the business of his office as to furnish the opportunity for the default; or
d. A fortiori, where he has directed, authorized or cooperated in the wrong;
or
e. Where liability is expressly provided in the statute.

3. Other exceptions- A superior is also liable for the misconduct or

negligence within scope of the employment of those employed by or under
 him voluntarily or privately, and paid by or responsible to him. [ CITATION
DeL14 \l 1033 ]

Liability of subordinates
1. Same rules as those applicable to officers of higher rank- No
distinction is made between public officials and employees for the purpose
of determining immunity. In general, rules applicable to officers of higher
rank for official misconduct are the same as those governing subordinate
officers.

In every case, a court must make a delicate balance: the need to free the
particular officer to perform his functions without the vexation of defending
lawsuits arising from their performance, against the right of an aggrieved party to
seek to redress. [ CITATION DeL14 \l 1033 ]

2. Where acts done pursuant to orders or instructions of a superior- A

subordinate official who acts in good faith under orders or instructions of a
superior officer acting in pursuance to law, is not personally liable in an
action for damages. This principle holds true even though the superior
officer acts under an unconstitutional law before the same is adjudged to
be void.

But an order of a superior is, in general, no justification for an unlawful act on

the part of a subordinate officer, although, in a proper case, the fact that the
defendant was acting under the orders of his superior may be shown in mitigation
of damages. [ CITATION DeL14 \l 1033 ]

Liability for tortious acts

1. Acts done within scope of official authority- A public officer, whether
judicial, quasi-judicial, or executive, is generally not personally liable to one
injured in consequence of an act performed within the scope of official
authority, and in line of official duty.

2. Acts done without or in excess of official authority- On the other hand,

officers and employees of a state are not immune from suit for their own
tortious conduct, even where such conduct is committed in the course of
their employment. If a public officer exceeds the power conferred on him
by law, he cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent
acting under the color of his office, or that the damage was caused by an
act done or omitted under the color of office, and not personally.

Liability under the Civil Code

1. For failure or neglect to perform official duty- Action for damages and
other relief against the public servant or employee without prejudice to any
disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.

2. For violating the rights and liberties of private individuals- liable for
damages. Whether or not the defendant’s act or omission constitutes a
criminal offence, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely
separate and distinct civil action for damages and other relief. Such civil
 action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution, and may
be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

3. For failure to render aid or protection to a person- Peace officer shall

be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be
subsidiarily responsible.

Liability on contracts executed in behalf of the government

The general rule is that the public officer acting within the scope of his
authority and in his official capacity is not personally liable on contracts executed
in behalf of the government. In the absence a showing to the contrary, it is
presumed that the officer does not intend to render himself liable as to contracts
and engagements fairly within the scope of his authority. But one who executed
an unambiguous personal undertaking which makes no mention of the public
agency he serves, or does not indicate that it is executed in an official capacity,
may not escape liability by claiming that the public agency was the real principal.
[ CITATION DeL14 \l 1033 ]

Liability for unexplained wealth

1. RA No. 1379 (Forfeiture of Unexplained Wealth Act)- Forfeiture
proceedings are actions in rem and, therefore, civil in nature. A full-blown
trial is not required Even if the proceedings do not reach trial, the court is
not precluded from determining the nature of the acquisition of the property
in question even in a summary proceeding.

2. RA No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)- If proven, it shall

be a ground for dismissal or removal.

Liability of accountable officers in the government

1. Bond Requirement
a. Every officer of any government agency whose duties permit or require
the possession or custody of government funds or property shall be
accountable therefor and for the safekeeping thereof in conformity with
the law.

b. Every accountable officer shall be properly bonded in accordance with

law.

2. Primary and secondary responsibility

a. The head of any agency of the government is immediately and primarily
responsible for all government funds and property pertaining to his
agency.

b. Persons entrusted with the possession or custody of the funds or

property under the agency head shall be immediately responsible to
him, without prejudice to the liability of either party to the government.

3. General liability for unlawful expenditures- Personal liability of the

official or employee found to be directly responsible therefor.
4. Measure of liability of accountable officers
a. Liable for all losses, damages or deterioration occasioned by
negligence in the keeping or use of the property whether or not it be at
the time in his actual custody.

b. Every officer accountable for the government funds shall be liable for all
losses resulting from unlawful deposit, use, or application thereof and
for all losses attributable to negligence in the keeping of the funds.

1. Liability for acts done by direction of superior officer- No

accountable officer shall be relieved from liability by reason of his
having acted under the direction of a superior officer in paying
out, applying, or disposing of funds or property with which he is
chargeable, unless prior to that act, he notified the superior in
writing of the illegality of the payment, application, or disposition.
The officer directing any illegal payment or disposition of the
funds or property shall be primarily liable for the loss, while the
accountable officer who fails to serve the required notice shall be
secondarily liable. [ CITATION DeL14 \l 1033 ]

2. Liability of a public officer who signs or initials documents-

Every person who signs or initials documents in the course of
transit through standard operating procedures does not
automatically become a conspirator in a crime which transpired at
a stage where he had no participation. His knowledge of
conspiracy and his active and knowing participation must be
proved by positive evidence. [ CITATION DeL14 \l 1033 ]