FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 155749. February 8, 2007.]

ERLINDA F. SANTOS , petitioner, vs . MA. CAREST A. RASALAN ,

respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ , J : p

For our Resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assailing the
Decision 2 dated June 29, 2001 and Resolution dated October 17, 2002 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59241 a rming the Decision dated March 24, 2000 of the
Ombudsman in OMB-ADM-0-99-0679.
Erlinda F. Santos, petitioner, and Ma. Carest A. Rasalan, respondent, are both
employed as government nurses at the Tondo Medical Center, Balut, Tondo, Manila. On
August 18, 1999, respondent led with the O ce of the Ombudsman an administrative
complaint for grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a public o cial against
petitioner, docketed as ADM-0-99-0679. Respondent alleged that when she reported for
work after her maternity leave, she came to know that petitioner had been spreading
untruthful and malicious statements against her, thus:
On June 03, 1999, respondent (Erlinda F. Santos) was talking to Ma.
Rosalinda Ilasin, a Nursing Attendant of Tondo Medical Center, and respondent
said, "Nanganak na pala si Carest," to which Ilasin responded, " Oo, sa Gat Andres
siya nanganak." Further, respondent said, " Akala ko ba mayaman, bakit diyan
siya nanganak?" wherein Ilasin answered, "Ang service naman ni Dr. Angtuaco
and habol nila, at puede ba Lyn, tigilan mo na yan, kinausap ka na nuong tao
bago siya manganak, kaya tumigil ka na."
Despite those words of caution of Ilasin, respondent continued telling
stories about me and then continued by maliciously saying, "Di ba Baby, only
the mother can tell who is the father of her child?"
That because of these malicious remarks, Ilasin asked the respondent to
stop saying innuendoes against me, and she said, "Please lang, Lyn, tumigil ka
na."
On November 25, 1999, petitioner led a motion to dismiss 3 the administrative
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. In an Order dated December 2, 1999, the O ce of the
Ombudsman denied the motion.
On March 24, 2000, the O ce of the Ombudsman rendered its Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that the
respondent be held GUILTY as charged, with a mitigating penalty of SUSPENSION
FROM THE SERVICE for SEVEN (7) MONTHS WITHOUT PAY. aICHEc

It is hereby ordered that the Chief of Tondo Medical Center should carry out
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 the implementation of the suspension from the service of respondent Erlinda F.
Santos, Staff Nurse of the said hospital, informing this O ce of the action taken
thereon within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. 4

Petitioner led a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in an Order 5 dated
May 10, 2000.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision a rming the Decision of the
O ce of the Ombudsman. On October 17, 2002, petitioner's motion for reconsideration
was denied. 6
Forthwith, petitioner led the instant petition alleging that: (1) the O ce of the
Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over respondent's administrative complaint considering
that the acts complained of are not work-related and are purely personal between the
parties; and (2) the facts do not establish the charge against her.
For her part, respondent prays that the petition be denied for lack of merit.
The petition is bereft of merit.
The authority of the Ombudsman to act on respondent's administrative complaint is
anchored on Section 13(1), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Section 13. The O ce of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions, and duties:

(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act

or omission of any public o cial, employee , o ce or agency,
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient . . . .

(Underscoring supplied)

Section 19 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman
Act of 1989, 7 likewise provides:
SEC. 19. Administrative Complaints. — The Ombudsman shall act on
all complaints relating, but not limited to acts or omissions which:

(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;

(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;

(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency's functions,

though in accordance with law;

(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of

facts;

(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper

purpose; or

(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justi cation .

(Underscoring supplied)

The O ce of the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals found that the acts
committed by petitioner as a public employee are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive,
irregular, immoral and devoid of justi cation, thus falling within the purview of the above-
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 quoted constitutional and statutory provisions. We nd no cogent reason to deviate from
their findings.
Pursuant to Section 16 of R.A. No. 6770, the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
encompasses all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance committed by any
public officer or employee during his/her tenure of office, thus:
SEC. 16. Applicability. — The provisions of this Act shall apply to all
kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance that have been committed
by any officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of
office.

Moreover, in Vasquez v. Hobilla-Alinio , 8 we held that even if the act or omission

complained of is not service-connected, still it falls within the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman, thus:
The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the
public o cial or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not
require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or
arise from the performance of o cial duty . Since the law does not
distinguish, neither should we.

Having settled the issue of jurisdiction, we shall now determine whether the Court of
Appeals erred when it sustained the ndings of the Ombudsman and concluded that
petitioner is liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. SHaATC

The Ombudsman also found that: —

Rightly so, when the complainant got back to work at the hospital after her
maternity leave, she was ashamed and offended to know that the malicious and
slanderous words alluded to her by the respondent were like wild re that
reverberated through the walls of the hospital and seeped through and lingered in
every ear of the employee.

For who could not feel the shame of these slanderous remarks?

"Erlinda F. Santos: Di ba Baby, only the mother can tell who is the father of
her child."
The foregoing words imply that the father of the newborn baby is other
than complainant's husband. But, of course, the respondent very well knew the
husband of the complainant, who is the brother of her boyfriend. To ask who the
father of the child of the complainant is to impute that the father of the child is
other than Ramon Rasalan, the husband of the complainant. No other meaning
could be inferred from the foregoing words.
The defamatory imputation of unchastity to the complainant is slanderous
as it was maliciously intended to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt. . . . . 9

We shall not disturb the above ndings. Under Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770, ndings
of fact by the Ombudsman are conclusive as long as these are supported by substantial
evidence, 1 0 as in this case.
However, under the same set of facts, we do not agree that petitioner's offense can
be categorized as "grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
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 service." Her offense merely constitutes simple misconduct .
I n Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma , 1 1 we held that misconduct is a
transgression of some established and de nite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by a public o cer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any
of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard
established rules, which must be proved by substantial evidence. 1 2 Otherwise, the
misconduct is only simple . A person charged with grave misconduct may be held liable
for simple misconduct if the misconduct does not involve any of the additional elements
to qualify the misconduct as grave. Grave misconduct necessarily includes the lesser
offense of simple misconduct. 1 3
In the present case, there is no substantial evidence to show that any of those
additional elements exist to qualify petitioner's misconduct as grave. Thus, to our mind, the
penalty of suspension for seven (7) months without pay is too harsh.
Section 52, B-2, Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules On Administrative Cases In the
Civil Service 1 4 provides that the offense of simple misconduct is classi ed as less grave,
punishable as follows:
2. Simple Misconduct

1st Offense — Suspension

1 mo. 1 day to 6 mos.
2nd Offense — Dismissal

Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we hold that the penalty of suspension
of two (2) months without pay is in order.
One nal word. The law does not tolerate misconduct by a civil servant. Petitioner's
acts in question undoubtedly violate the norm of decency and diminish or tend to diminish
the people's respect for those in the government service. When an o cer or employee is
disciplined, the object is the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the
public's faith and confidence in the government. 1 5
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59241 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in the sense
that petitioner is found guilty of simple misconduct and is suspended from the service for
two (2) months without pay. DSAEIT

SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Azcuna and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1. Filed under Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

2. Penned by Associate Ramon Mabutas, Jr. (retired) and concurred in by Associate Justice
Roberto A. Barrios and Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz.

3. Annex "H" of the petition, Rollo, pp. 107-109.

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 4. See Decision of the Court of Appeals, id., pp. 61-82.
5. Annex "L" of the petition, id., pp. 119-121.
6. See Resolution of the Court of Appeals, id., pp. 83-84.

7. Its full title reads, "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL
ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES."

8. G.R. Nos. 118813-14, April 8, 1997, 271, SCRA 67, citing Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA
545 (1990). caCTHI

9. Annex "K" of the petition, Rollo, pp. 112-121.

10. Almanzor v. Felix, G.R. No. 144935, January 15, 2004, 419 SCRA 641.
11. G.R. No. 154521, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 589, citing Bureau of Internal Revenue
v. Organo, 424 SCRA 9 (2004); Castelo v. Florendo, 413 SCRA 219 (2003).
12. Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, id., citing Civil Service Commission v. Lucas, 361
Phil. 486; 301 SCRA 560 (1999); Landrito v. Civil Service Commission, 223 SCRA 564
(1993).

13. Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, id.

14. Memorandum Circular No. 19, s. 1999 of the Civil Service Commission.
15. Civil Service Commission v. Cortez, G.R. No. 155732, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 593,
citing Bautista v. Negado, 108 Phil. 283, 289 (1960).

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