CITIZENSHIP Notes
CITIZENSHIP Notes
CITIZENSHIP Notes
Citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the 1973 Constitution
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippine islands at the time of the adoption of the 1935
Constitution
2. Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine islands
3. Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines
4. Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority,
elect the Philippine citizenship—governs those who are born before the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution
5. Those who are naturalized in accordance with the law
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, if a Filipina married an alien, she lost her Filipino citizenship. Hence, her
child would have to elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Under the 1973
Constitution, however, children born of Filipino mothers were already considered Filipinos. Therefore, the
provision on election of citizenship under the 1987 Constitution only applies to those persons who were
born under the 1935 Constitution. In order for the children to elect Filipino citizenship, the mothers must
have been Filipinos at the time of their marriage. So, if your mother was a Filipina who married an alien
under the 1935 constitution and you were born before January 17, 1973, you can elect Filipino citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority.
Effects of Naturalization
Illustration:
Cases/Doctrines
Basic Philippine law follows the rule of jus sanguinis and provides for naturalization.
Philippine citizens at the time of the adoption of this Constitution were those who were citizens under the
1973 Constitution.
By virtue of being a son of a Filipino father or mother, the presumption is that he is Filipino and remains
Filipino until proof is shown that he has renounced or lost Philippine citizenship. Possession of an alien
registration certificate accompanied by proof of performance of acts whereby Philippine citizenship is lost
is not adequate proof of loss of citizenship accompanied by proof of performance of acts whereby
Philippine citizenship is lost is not adequate proof of loss of citizenship.
Facts: Petitioner questions the qualification of private respondent RosalindYbasco Lopez to run for
governor of Davao Oriental on citizenship grounds. Respondent was born in 1934 in Australia to a Filipino
father and an Australian mother. In 1998, she applied for an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and
Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) and was issued an Australian passport.
Issue: WON respondent is a Filipino; and if she is, WON she renounced her citizenship by applying for
ACR and ICR and being issued an Australian passport.
Ruling: Respondent is a Filipino. In 1934, the controlling laws of the Philippines were the Philippine Bill of
July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916 (Jones Law). Under both organic acts,
all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein,
including their children, are considered Philippine citizens. Respondent’s father was therefore a
Filipino, and consequently, her.
Respondent did not lose her citizenship. Renunciation of citizenship must be express. Applying for ACR,
ICR, and Australian passport are not enough to renounce citizenship. They are merely acts of assertion of
her Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the same.
Facts: Victorino X. Fornier filed a petition praying that the Comelec disqualify FPJ from running for
president on the grounds that he misrepresented himself in his certificate of candidacy when he claimed
that he was a natural-born Filipino citizen. Fornier argued that Poe’s mother was
an American citizen and that his father was a Spanish national, and even if his father was a Filipino
citizen, he could not have transmitted his citizenship to FPJ because FPJ was illegitimate.
Ruling: (taken from Bernas) As long as paternity is proved, an illegitimate child of a Filipino father is a
natural born Filipino citizen. Fornier failed to substantiate his case.
A Filipino citizen by election, even those made prior to the effectivity of this Constituion, is a natural-born
citizen.The law cannot treat natural-born citizens and naturalized citizens differently except in instances
where the Constitution itself makes a distinction.
The Commissioner of Immigration referred the matter to the Secretary of Justice who, rendered an
opinion (No. 129) holding that the alleged Philippine citizenship of petitioner's mother had not been
sufficiently established, that said election of Philippine citizenship by petitioner herein was legally
ineffectual and that he did not thereby become a Filipino citizen. Petitioner sought a rehearing and a
reconsideration of said opinion. Secretary of Justice, who denied the petition for reconsideration. About a
year later, petitioner instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila the present action for mandamus
against the Secretary of Justice and the Commissioner of Immigration, to compel them to recognize as
valid said election of Philippine citizenship by petitioner and to cancel his alien's certificate of
registration. Said court rendered judgment for the petitioner. Hence, this appeal by respondents.
HELD: No. Election must be made within a reasonable period after reaching the age of majority. 3 years
is a reasonable period, however, may be extended under certain circumstances as when the person
concerned has always considered himself a Filipino citizen. In the case at bar the petitioner reached the
aged of majority 1944, he made his election of citizenship 1951 when he was 28 years old, 7 years after
he reached the age of majority. Petitioner cited his reasons for the delayed election but the court stated
that it was insufficient excuse for the delay of the said election.
The Republic avers that respondent did not comply with the constitutional requirement of electing Filipino
citizenship when she reached the age of majority. It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution,
which provides that the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father
followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected
Philippine citizenship.
Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only
to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of respondent who was concededly an illegitimate
child, considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married. As such, she was not
required to comply with said constitutional and statutory requirements to become a Filipino citizen. By
being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth.
Stated differently, she is a Filipino since birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached
the age of majority.
The Republic’s submission is misleading. The Court of Appeals did not allow respondent to use her
father’s surname. What it did allow was the correction of her father’s misspelled surname which she has
been using ever since she can remember. In this regard, respondent does not need a court
pronouncement for her to use her father’s surname.
While judicial authority is required for a change of name or surname, there is no such requirement for the
continued use of a surname which a person has already been using since childhood.
The doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the false impression of family relationship
remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed change of name would in great probability cause
prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community in
general. In this case, the Republic has not shown that the Yu family in China would probably be
prejudiced or be the object of future mischief. In respondent’s case, the change in the surname that she
has been using for 40 years would even avoid confusion to her community in general.
Facts: Juan G. Frivaldo was elected Governor of Sorsogon, but he was declared an alien and disqualified
from serving as governor. He was originally a natural-born Filipino citizen, but he became a US Citizen
when he fled the Marcos regime. He later returned to the Philippines and sought Filipino citizenship again,
first through petition for naturalization, and then by direct act of congress, but to no avail. He also
attempted repatriation but prevailing repatriation laws at the time were only open to army deserters and
Filipino women who lost their citizenship by marriage to foreigners. Raul Lee wanted annulment of
Frivaldo’s proclamation as Governor-elect and cancellation of Frivaldo’s certificate of candidacy, because
he was not a Filipino citizen.
Ruling: Frivaldo’s naturalization proceedings were full of procedural flaws and he could not be considered
a Filipino citizen. Frivaldo was disqualified. He had to vacate his office and turn it over to the Vice
Governor.
Facts: Lau Yuen Yeung, a Chinese citizen, married Moy Ya Lim Yao a.k.a. Edilberto Aguinaldo, an
alleged Filipino citizen. She overstayed her nonimmigrant visa and was about to be reported, but Moy Ya
Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed her arrest and deportation.
Ruling: Under Sec. 15 of CA 473, by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao, Lau Yuen Yeung has
become a naturalized Filipino citizen; provided that she did not suffer from any of the disqualifications
under Sec. 4 of CA 473. As a Filipino citizen, she cannot be deported.
We next go to the mechanics of implementation of the constitutional and legal provisions, as applied to an
alien woman married to a Filipino. We part from the premise that such an alien woman does not, by the
fact of marriage, acquire Philippine citizenship. The statute heretofore quoted (Sec. 15, Revised
Naturalization Law), we repeat, recites that she "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" if she
"might herself be lawfully naturalized".
How then shall she be "deemed" a citizen of the Philippines? An examination of the Revised
Naturalization Law is quite revealing. For instance, minor children of persons naturalized under the law
who were born in the Philippines "shall be considered citizens thereof". Similarly, a foreign-born minor
child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the parents, "shall automatically
become a Filipino citizen".7 No conditions are exacted; citizenship of said minor children is conferred by
the law itself, without further proceedings and as a matter of course. An alien wife of a Filipino does not fit
into either of the categories just mentioned. Legal action has to be taken to make her a citizen.
There is no law or rule which authorizes a declaration of Filipino citizenship. 8 Citizenship is not an
appropriate subject for declaratory judgment proceedings. 9 And in one case, we held that citizenship of an
alien woman married to a Filipino must be determined in an "appropriate proceeding". 10
Speculations arise as to the import of the term "appropriate proceeding". The record of this case disclose
that, in some quarters, opinion is advanced that the determination of whether an alien woman married to
a Filipino shall be deemed a Filipino citizen, may be made by the Commissioner of
Immigration. 11 Conceivably, absence of clear legal direction on the matter could have given rise to
divergence of views. We should aim at drying up sources of doubt. Parties interested should not be
enmeshed in jurisdictional entanglements. Public policy and sound practice, therefore, suggest that a
clear-cut ruling be made on this subject.
If an alien woman married to a Filipino does not become ipso facto a citizen, then she must have to file
a "petition for citizenship" in order that she may acquire the status of a Filipino citizen. Authority for this
view is Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law in which the plain language is: "Any person
desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship, shall file with the competent court" a petition for the purpose.
And this, because such alien woman is not a citizen, and she desires to acquire it. The proper forum,
Section 8 of the same law points out, is the Court of First Instance of the province where the petitioner
has resided "at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition".
It is quite plain that the determination of whether said alien wife should be given the status of a citizen
should fall within the area allocated to competent courts. That this is so, is exemplified by the fact that this
Court has taken jurisdiction in one such case originating from the court of first instance, where an alien
woman had directly sought naturalization in her favor. 12
And, as nothing in the Revised Naturalization Law empowers any other office, agency, board or official, to
determine such question, we are persuaded to say that resolution thereof rests exclusively with the
competent courts.
We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to be a citizen of this
country must apply therefor by filing a petition for citizenship reciting that she possesses all the
qualifications set forth in Section 2, and none of the disqualifications under Section 4, both of the Revised
Naturalization Law; (2) Said petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance where petitioner has
resided at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition; and (3) Any action by any other
office, agency, board or official, administrative or otherwise — other than the judgment of a competent
court of justice — certifying or declaring that an alien wife of the Filipino citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is
hereby declared null and void.
3. We treat the present petition as one for naturalization. Or, in the words of law, a "petition for
citizenship". This is as it should be. Because a reading of the petition will reveal at once that efforts were
made to set forth therein, and to prove afterwards, compliance with Sections 2 and 4 of the Revised
Naturalization Law. The trial court itself apparently considered the petition as one for naturalization, and,
in fact, declared petition "a citizen of the Philippines".
Res judicata
General rule: it does not apply in cases hinging on the issue of citizenship
Exceptions: (the following must be present)
Application of Res Judicata in citizenship issues [c. naturalized citizens] Petitioner is correct insofar as the
general rule is concerned,
However, in the case of Burca v. Republic (51SCRA 248 [1973]), an exception to this general rule was
recognized. The Court ruled in that case that in order that the doctrine of res judicata
may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present:
1. A person’s citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party
2. The Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof; and
3. The finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court
Dual citizenship
1. Those Filipino citizens, without performing any act and as an involuntary consequence of the
conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another state
2. Those citizens with dual allegiance—disqualification for running for any elective local position
applies, however, electing Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy amounts to
termination or renunciation of their foreign citizenship
Cases/Doctrines
1. A certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if it is shown to have been obtained fraudulently or
illegally or if the person is shown to have violated the prohibitions imposed on him by CA 473. But
to justify the cancellation, the evidence must be “clear, unequivocal and convincing: and not
merely preponderant. Republic v. Cokeng
2. A decision in a naturalization proceeding is not res judicata as to any of the matters which could
support a judgment canceling the certificate for illegal or fraudulent procurement. In fact, the
certificate may be canceled for acts committed after naturalization.
3. Perjury, committed during the pendency of his petition, is evidence of lack of good moral
character. Hence, having able to obtain citizenship despite this misconduct rendered his
acquisition thereof fraudulent or illegal. Republic v. Cesar Guy
4. While, normally, the question of w/n a person has renounced his Philippine citizenship should be
heard before a trial court of law in adversary proceedings, this has become unnecessary as this
Court, no less, upon insistence of petitioner in using his Portuguese citizenship despite having
been naturalized as Filipino citizen, had to look into the facts and satisfy itself on w/n petitioner’s
claim to continued Philippine citizenship is meritorious. Willie Yu v. Defensor-Santiago
5. In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express. The
mere fact that a person was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of
registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate
against her claim of Filipino citizenship. Valles v. Comelec
6. There is no law authorizing “judicial repatriation.” Philippine citizenship may not be declared in a
non-adversary suit where affected persons are not made parties. Dugcoy Jao v. Republic
7. The repatriation of a mother entitles her minor children to a declaration that he is entitled to
Philippine citizenship. Republic v. Hon. Judge Tandayag
Labo v .COMELEC
FACTS: Herein petitioner, claiming for recognition as a Philippine citizen is a mayor-elect who, through
his marriage with an Australian national, was naturalized and took an oath of allegiance as an Australian
citizen. Said marriage was found to be bigamous and therefore was annulled. Petitioner claims that his
naturalization made him only a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship.
HELD: Yes, because Commonwealth Act No. 63 clearly stated that Philippine citizenship may be lost
through naturalization in a foreign country; express renunciation of citizenship; and by oath of allegiance
to a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner. The petitioner’s contention that his
marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is
irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that
marriage. He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal and
positive process, simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for
such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance,
renouncing all other allegiance. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has
reacquired Philippine citizenship.
Facts: Juan G. Frivaldo ran for Governor of Sorsogon and won. Again. Raul R. Lee questioned his
citizenship. Again. He petitioned for repatriation under PD 725 and was able to take his oath of allegiance
as a Philippine citizen, but on the day that he got his citizenship, the Court had already ruled based on his
previous attempts to run as governor and acquire citizenship, and had proclaimed Lee -2nd placer- as
Sorsogon Governor-elect.
Ruling: Frivaldo’s repatriation was valid and legal and because of PD 725’s curative nature, his
repatriation retroacted to the date of the filing of his application to run for governor. He is therefore
qualified to be proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
Facts: Teodoro Cruz was a Philippine citizen, but he enlisted in the US Marine Corps and subsequently
became a naturalized US citizen. He reacquired Filipino citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630
(Title: “An Act Providing For Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship By Persons Who Lost Such
Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission in, the Armed Forces of the United
States”). Cruz ran and was elected for the position of Representative of Pangasinan, and the HRET
declared Cruz a duly elected Representative. Petitioner Bengson III contends that Cruz was not qualified
to be Representative of Pangasinan because he was no longer a natural born citizen.
Ruling: Cruz is a natural-born Filipino Citizen. Under the 1987 Constitution, only naturalized Filipinos are
not considered natural-born citizens. Cruz has all the qualifications to be elected as a member of the
House of Representatives. The HRET did not commit any grave abuse of discretion.
Facts: Eduardo Manzano won the 1998 vice mayoral elections for the City of Makati. Ernesto Mamari
alleged that Manzano should be disqualified because he was not a Filipino citizen. His parents were
Filipino (Filipino according to the 1935 Constitution), but he was born in San Francisco, California
(American under US law). He has dual citizenship.
On the other hand, dual allegiance is when one shows, by some positive act, that one owes
loyalty to 2 states. It is voluntary. Manzano manifested in his certificate of candidacy that he will defend
the Constitution and bear true faith and allegiance to it. As far as Philippine law is concern, he has
repudiated his American citizenship. Manzano grew up and had a career in the Philippines. Therefore,
Manzano is a Philippine citizen and is not disqualified from running for office.
Facts: Petitioner questions the qualification of private respondent RosalindYbasco Lopez to run for
governor of Davao Oriental on citizenship grounds. Respondent was born in 1934 in Australia to a Filipino
father and an Australian mother. In 1998, she applied for an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and
Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) and was issued an Australian passport.
Issue: WON respondent is a Filipino; and if she is, WON she renounced her citizenship by applying for
ACR and ICR and being issued an Australian passport.
Ruling: Respondent is a Filipino. In 1934, the controlling laws of the Philippines were the Philippine Bill of
July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916 (Jones Law). Under both organic acts,
all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein,
including their children, are considered Philippine citizens. Respondent’s father was therefore a
Filipino, and consequently, her.
Respondent did not lose her citizenship. Renunciation of citizenship must be express. Applying for ACR,
ICR, and Australian passport are not enough to renounce citizenship. They are merely acts of assertion of
her Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the same.
Petitioner Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez was a candidate for the position of Chairman of Barangay Bagacay,
San Dionisio, Iloilo City in the synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections held on
October 29, 2007.
On October 25, 2007, respondent Tessie P. Villanueva filed a petition before the Provincial Election
Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for the disqualification of petitioner on the ground that he is an
American citizen, hence, ineligible from running for any public office. In his Answer, petitioner argued that
he is a dual citizen, a Filipino and at the same time an American, by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re- acquisition Act of 2003. He returned to the
Philippines and resided in Barangay Bagacay. Thus, he said, he possessed all the qualifications to run for
Barangay Chairman.
After the votes for Barangay Chairman were canvassed, petitioner emerged as the winner.
On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution granting the petition for disqualification.
HELD: R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino
citizenship may run for a public office in the Philippines. Section 5 of the said law states:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities
and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate
of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath. (Emphasis added)
Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law. This new law explicitly provides that
should one seek elective public office, he should first "make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath."
Petitioner failed to comply with this requirement. We quote with approval the COMELEC observation on
this point:
While respondent was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of the Dual Citizenship Law when
he took his oath of allegiance before the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General's Office in Los
Angeles, California, the same is not enough to allow him to run for a public office. The above-quoted
provision of law mandates that a candidate with dual citizenship must make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath. There is no evidence presented that will show that respondent complied with the provision
of R.A. No. 9225. Absent such proof we cannot allow respondent to run for Barangay Chairman of
Barangay Bagacay.
For the renunciation to be valid, it must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of law
who is authorized to administer an oath. The affiant must state in clear and unequivocal terms that he
is renouncing all foreign citizenship for it to be effective. In the instant case, respondent Lopez's
failure to renounce his American citizenship as proven by the absence of an affidavit that will
prove the contrary leads this Commission to believe that he failed to comply with the positive
mandate of law. For failure of respondent to prove that he abandoned his allegiance to the United
States, this Commission holds him disqualified from running for an elective position in the Philippines.
While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to discharge the functions of
Barangay Chairman, his victory cannot cure the defect of his candidacy. Garnering the most number of
votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the
constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity
Petitioner Nestor Jacot assails the Resolution of COMELEC disqualifying him from running for the
position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections, on the
ground that he failed to make a personal renouncement of US citizenship. He was a natural born citizen
of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. He sought to
reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225.
ISSUE: Did Nestor Jacot effectively renounce his US citizenship so as to qualify him to run as a vice-
mayor?
HELD: No. It bears to emphasize that the oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all those who
wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an
additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic
Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts, considering their special circumstance of having more
than one citizenship.