Culpable Homicide
Culpable Homicide
Introduction
Chapter XVI of the Indian Penal Code begins with the ‘Offences Affecting Life’ and deals
with homicide offences. It incorporates in it four homicide offences. They are: (1) culpable
homicide not amounting to murder, (2) culpable homicide amounting to murder, (3) death by a
rash or negligent act, and (4) dowry death. It also deals with suicide and thugs1.
Section 299. Culpable homicide.— Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of
causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or
with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable
homicide.
Illustrations
(a) A lays sticks and turf over a pit, with the intention of thereby causing death, or with the
knowledge that death is likely to be thereby caused. Z believing the ground to be firm,
treads on it, falls in and is killed. A has committed the offence of culpable homicide.
(b) A knows Z to be behind a bush. B does not know it A, intending to cause, or knowing it
to be likely to cause Z’s death, induces B to fire at the bush. B fires and kills Z. Here B
may be guilty of no offence; but A has committed the offence of culpable homicide.
(c) A, by shooting at a fowl with intent to kill and steal it, kills B who is behind a bush; A
not knowing that he was there. Here, although A was doing an unlawful act, he was not
guilty of culpable homicide, as he did not intend to kill B, or to cause death by doing an
act that he knew was likely to cause death.
Explanation 1.—A person who causes bodily injury to another who is laboring under a disorder,
disease or bodily infirmity, and thereby accelerates the death of that other, shall be deemed to
have caused his death.
Explanation 2.—Where death is caused by bodily injury, the person who causes such bodily
injury shall be deemed to have caused the death, although by resorting to proper remedies and
skilful treatment the death might have been prevented.
Explanation 3.—The causing of the death of a child in the mother’s womb is not homicide. But it
may amount to culpable homicide to cause the death of a living child, if any part of that child has
been brought forth, though the child may not have breathed or been completely born.
Essential Ingredients
1
P.S.A. Pillai, Criminal Law. (Gurgaon: Lexis Nexis, 2017).
Page |2
The definition itself provides for three circumstances, wherein the presence or absence of certain
factors in causing death is nevertheless treated as causing culpable homicide. These
circumstances are dealt with in explanations 1-3.
Explanation 1 provides for a situation where the injured person is suffering from some disorder,
disease or bodily infirmity, which quickened his death. The fact that his death was quickened or
hastened by the disorder or disease he was already suffering from, will not reduce the guilt or
culpability of the person causing the injury. In other words, the person who caused the injury
cannot escape criminal liability of culpable homicide by stating that if the person injured did not
suffer from the said disease or disorder, he would not have died.
Explanation 2 provides for a situation wherein a person who has been injured could have
recovered and escaped death, if, he had been given prompt and proper medical treatment. In such
situations too, the fact that the injured person died because he could not avail of good medical
treatment, cannot be a ground for negating guilt or culpability of the person who inflicted the
injury in the first place.
In Rewa Ram Versus State of Madhya Pradesh2, the accused had caused multiple injuries with
a knife to his wife, Gyanvatibai. She was admitted into the hospital and an operation was
performed on her. Thereafter, she developed hyperpyrexia, i.e., high temperature, as a result of
which she died. This hyperpyrexia was a result of atmospheric temperature on weak, debilitated
individuals, who already had some temperature. The doctor who performed the postmortem
opined that the death was not as a result of multiple injuries, but because of hyperpyrexia. The
Honourable Madhya Pradesh High Court placed reliance on Explanation 2 to Section 299,
Indian Penal Code. It observed that if the supervening causes are attributed to the injuries
caused, then the person inflicting the injuries is liable for causing death, even if death was
not the direct result of the injuries. In the instant case, there was medical evidence to show that
the hyperpyrexia was a result of her debilitated condition. Gyanvatibai fell into debilitated
condition because of multiple injuries, which she had sustained, due to which she had to undergo
operation, and the post-operative starvation, which was necessary for her recovery, resulted in
her death. Thus, her death was a direct consequence of the injuries inflicted on her. Intervening
or supervening cause of hyperpyrexia was a direct result of the multiple injuries and was not
independent or unconnected with the serious injuries mixed by her. As a result, it was held, the
accused ‘had caused’ her death and therefore his conviction for murder was upheld.
The term ‘whoever causes death’ may be simple enough to understand, but has shown itself to be
words of great import in deciding whether a particular act would amount to culpable homicide or
not. The very first test to decide whether particular act or omission would be covered by the
definition of culpable homicide is to verify whether the act done by the accused has ‘caused’ the
death of another person. The relevant consideration for such verification is to see whether the
death is caused as a direct result of the act committed by the accused4.
In Moti Singh Versus State of Uttar Pradesh 5, the deceased Gayacharan, had received two
gunshot wounds in the abdomen, which were dangerous to life (i.e., which were life threatening).
The injury was received on 9 February 1960. There was no evidence as to whether he had fully
recovered or not when he was discharged from the hospital. He, however, died on 1 March 1960.
His body was cremated without any postmortem being done. The Honourable Supreme Court
held that the mere fact that the two gunshot injuries were dangerous to life were not sufficient for
holding that Gayacharan’s death, which took place about three weeks after the incident, was on
account of the injuries received by him. The court observed that in order to prove the charge of
Gayacharan’s murder, it was necessary to establish that he had died on account of the injuries
received by him. Since there was no evidence to establish the cause of death, the accused could
not be said to have caused the death of Gayacharan. A crucial aspect highlighted by the court in
this case was that the connection between the primary cause and the death should not be too
remote.
In Joginder Singh Versus State of Punjab 6, the deceased Rupinder Singh had teased the sister of
the accused. In retaliation, the two accused went to Rupinder’s house and shouted that they had
come to take away the sister of Rupinder Singh. In the meantime, the cousins of Rupinder Singh
intervened. One of them was given a blow on the neck by the accused. Meanwhile, Rupinder
Singh started running towards the field. The accused started chasing him and Rupinder Singh
jumped into a well. As a result of this, he sustained head injuries, which made him loose
consciousness and thereafter he died due drowning. The Honourable Supreme Court held that
the accused were about 15 to 20 feet from Rupinder Singh, when he jumped into the well. There
was no evidence to show that the accused drove Rupinder Singh into the well or that they left
him no option but to jump into the well. Under these circumstances, it was held, that the accused
could not have caused the death of Rupinder Singh, and hence they were entitled to be acquitted
of the charge of murder.
Intention or Knowledge
Both the terms ‘intention’ and ‘knowledge’ appear in Sections 299 and 300, however, having
different consequences. Intention and knowledge are used as alternate ingredients to constitute
the offence of culpable homicide. However, intention and knowledge are two different things.
The difference between the two came to be considered by the Honourable Supreme Court in
Basdev Versus State of Pepsu7. In this case, the accused was alleged to have shot a 16-year old
4
P.S.A. Pillai, Criminal Law. (Gurgaon: Lexis Nexis, 2017).
5
AIR 1964 SC 900, (1964) Cr LJ 727 (SC).
6
AIR 1979 SC 1876, (1979) Cr LJ 1406 (SC).
7
AIR 1956 SC 488.
Page |4
boy in a marriage feast after having got drunk. It was his defense that he was so drunk that he did
not have the knowledge or intention to kill the boy for what was a trifling incident. The court
differentiated between motive, intention and knowledge:
Knowledge denotes a bare state of conscious awareness of certain facts in which the human
mind might itself remain supine or inactive whereas intention connotes a conscious state in
which mental facilities are roused into activity and summed up into action for the deliberate
purpose of being directed towards a particular and specific end which the human mind
conceives and perceives before itself. Intention need not necessarily involve premeditation8.
Intention or the mental element in committing the crime is an essential ingredient of culpable
homicide. While ‘intention’ is a very important element in all crimes, it becomes crucial in the
offence of culpable homicide, because it is the degree of intention of the accused, which
determines the degree of crime. In other words, it is the mental element of the accused alone,
which is material to decide whether a particular act is culpable homicide amounting to murder, or
culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
As far as the offence of culpable homicide is concerned, there are three species or degrees of
mens rea present:
(i) an intention to cause death;
(ii) an intention to cause dangerous bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and
(iii) knowledge that the act is likely to cause death.
Intention, in the context of the definition of culpable homicide, does not always necessarily
mean pre-meditation or pre-planning to kill a person. The expectation that the act of a person is
likely to result in death is sufficient to constitute intention. A man expects the natural
consequences of his acts and therefore, in law, he is presumed to intend the consequences of his
acts. So, if a person in performing some act either:
(i) expects death to be the consequence thereof; or
(ii) expects a dangerous injury to be the consequence of his act; or
(iii) knows that death is a likely consequence of his act, and in each case death ensues, his
intention in the first two cases, and his knowledge in the third, renders the act a
homicide.
However, no hard and fast rule can be laid down for determining the existence of intention.
Whether there is intention or not is a question of fact. A guilty intention or knowledge is thus
essential to the offence under this section. ‘Intent’ and ‘knowledge’ in Section 299 postulate the
existence of positive mental attitude which is of different degrees.
8
Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code. (Gurgaon: Lexis Nexis, 2017).
Page |5
As has been stated earlier, the third degree of intention contemplated under the definition of
culpable homicide is knowledge. The third part of Section 299 States whoever causes death by
doing an act… with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the
offence of culpable homicide. In the scheme of the section, the least or minimum degree of
mental element contemplated to make an act of homicide culpable is the knowledge that the act
is likely to cause death.
Proof of Intention
Direct proof of intention is always very difficult to obtain. However, intention is something
which can be gathered and inferred from the action of the person and the surrounding
circumstances, such as motive of the accused, the nature of the attack, the time and place of
attack, the nature of weapons used, the nature of injuries caused to the deceased and so on. These
and other factors may be taken into consideration to determine whether a person had the requisite
intention.
It has been held in the case of Chahat Khan Versus State of Haryana10, that, when injuries are
inflicted on vital parts of the body like the abdomen by a lethal or sharp edged weapon, the
irresistible inference is that the accused intended to kill the deceased.
Punishment
or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with
fine, or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but
without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
This section prescribes the punishment for the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to
murder. The sentence under this section is divided into two parts, popularly referred to as Section
304, Part I and Section 304, Part II, though the section itself does not separate the Parts in this
manner. The punishment prescribed under this section varies with a wide range from
9
P.S.A. Pillai, Criminal Law. (Gurgaon: Lexis Nexis, 2017).
10
AIR 1972 SC 2574, (1973) Cr LJ 36 (SC).
Page |6
imprisonment for life to the imposition of a mere fine, though it is a comprehensive section
dealing with the single offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The varying
sentences depend on the degree of intention and knowledge of causing death that is imputed to
the accused.
Section 304, Part I, prescribes a sentence of imprisonment for life or imprisonment of either
description for a term up to ten years and fine, if, the act is done with the intention of causing
death or causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. This clause corresponds to clauses
(a) and (b) of Section 299. This Part also covers cases wherein an offence of culpable homicide
does not amount to murder, on account of the fact that the act falls within one of the exceptions
to Section 300. Section 304, Part I, thus applies to culpable homicide, wherein the accused has
the intention either to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. If the offender
has the intention to cause bodily injury accompanied with the knowledge that such injury is
likely to cause the death of the person injured as defined in Section 300, clause (2), then the
offence will come under Section 302 and not under s 304, Part I, unless it falls under any of the
five exceptions under s 300, IPC.
A reference to Section 304, Part I, clearly shows that this part covers offences where intention to
commit the offence is present. Section 304, Part II, applies to offences where the act is done with
the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death or such
bodily injury as is likely to cause death. This clause corresponds to clause (c) of Section 299.
However, if an offence is committed with the knowledge that it is so imminently dangerous that
it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and such
act is done without any excuse, then the offence will be taken out of the purview of Section 304,
Part II, and would be covered under Section 302, as the offence would amount to murder under
Section 300, clause (4). Thus, the knowledge referred to in Part II of Section 304 is of a lesser
degree than the special knowledge referred to in clause (4) of Section 30011.
The question whether the accused had the knowledge that his act was likely to cause the death, is
a question of fact that has to be decided depending on the facts and circumstances of each case.
Distinction between the provisions of Section 304 Part I and Part II. Linguistic distinction
between the two Parts of Section 304 is evident from the very language of this section. There are
apparent distinctions, one in relation to the punishment while the other is founded on the
intention of causing the act, without any intention but with the knowledge that the act is likely to
cause death. It is neither advisable nor possible to state any strait-jacket formula that would be
universally applicable to all cases for such determination. Every case essentially must be decided
on its own merits. The court has to perform he very delicate function of applying the provisions
of the Code to the facts of the case with a clear demarcation as to under what category of cases,
the case at hand falls and accordingly punish the accused12.
In Hardev Singh Versus State of Punjab 13, the accused aimed a blow at the deceased’s son,
when the deceased lay herself upon her son in order to save him. The accused inflicted kirpan
11
P.S.A. Pillai, Criminal Law. (Gurgaon: Lexis Nexis, 2017)
12
Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code. (Gurgaon: Lexis Nexis, 2017).
13
AIR 1975 SC 179.
Page |7
blow on the head of the deceased. The deceased died as a result of the head injury. The injury in
the opinion of the doctor was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. However,
the intention of the accused was to assault the son of the deceased who had received only simple
injuries. It indicated that the accused did not intend to kill the deceased’s son or cause any
grievous hurt to him. So, therefore from facts and circumstances of the case, it was held that the
accused did not intend to cause injury which was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death, but had knowledge that the injury is likely to cause death. The accused was
convicted under Section 304, Part II.
Kedar Prasad Versus State of Madhya Pradesh14, decided by the Supreme Court illustrates the
operation of Section 304, Indian Penal Code. One of the three accused persons who assaulted the
deceased, struck on the head, the second caused simple injuries on the knee and arm of the
deceased, while the third accused inflicted simple blows on him. The Honourable Supreme
Court held the first guilty under Section 304, Part I, on the ground of his intentional fatal blow,
while the second and third accused were held responsible under Sections 324 and 323,
respectively. The Court also refused to invoke Section 34, Indian Penal Code, against them. But
in Kunhimodeen Kuty Versus State of Kerala15, wherein it held both the accused, who were
armed with weapons attacked the deceased, guilty under Section 304, Part 1/34, Indian Penal
Code.
The distinction between these two offences is very ably set by Sarkaria, J., in State of Andhra
Pradesh Versus R. Punnaya16. Since the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court is now the
law of the land by virtue of Art. 141 of the Constitution relevant passages from Punnayya’s case
are reproduced below for the guidance of all concerned.
“In the scheme of the Penal Code, ‘culpable homicide’ is genus and ‘murder’ its specie. All
‘murder’ is ‘culpable homicide’ but not vice versa. Speaking generally ‘culpable homicide sans
‘special characteristics of murder’ is culpable homicide not amounting to murder’. For the
purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of this generic offence, the Code
practically recognizes three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is what may be called,
culpable homicide of the first degree. This is the gravest form of culpable homicide which is
defined in Section 300 as ‘murder’. The second may be termed as ‘culpable homicide of the
second degree’. This is punishable under the Part I of Section 304. Then, there is ‘culpable
homicide of the third degree’. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment
provided for it is also the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable
homicide of this degree is punishable under the Part II of Section 304.”
(a) With the intention of causing death; (1) With the intention of causing death;
(2) With the intention of causing such
bodily injury, as the offender knows to
be likely to cause death of the person to
whom the harm is caused;
(b) With the intention of causing such (3) With the intention of causing bodily
bodily injury as is likely to cause death; injury to any person, and the bodily
injury intended to be inflicted is
sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death;
(c) With the knowledge that the act is (4) With the knowledge that the act is so
likely to cause death; imminently dangerous that it must in
all probability cause death, or such
bodily injury as is likely to cause death
and committed without any excuse for
incurring the risk or causing death or
such injury as aforesaid.
Intention to Kill
Clause (a) of Section 299 and clause (1) of Section 300 are identical. If death is caused by an act,
which is done with the intention of causing death, then it is culpable homicide under Section 299
(a). It also amounts to murder under clause (1) of Section 300, unless it falls under any of the
exceptions17.
Clause (b) of Section 299 and clause 2 and 3 of Section 300, both deal with intention to cause
bodily injury as is likely to cause death. As far as s 299(b) is concerned, it merely stipulates that
if death is caused by an act, with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause
death it amounts to culpable homicide. Clause (2) of Section 300 while stating that if an act is
done with the intention of causing such bodily injury which is likely to cause death, also further
stipulates that the intentional causing of bodily injury should be accompanied with the
knowledge that the bodily injury is likely to cause death. The word ‘likely’ used in Section
299(b) means a mere probability or possibility that the injury could result in death. But, the usage
of the word ‘likely’ in clause (2) of Section 300 denotes, to an extent, certainty of death.
Illustration (b) to Section 300 explains this aspect. It imputes a certain special knowledge which
the accused has about the condition of the deceased, such as any disease that he might be
labouring under, which brings in certainty to the fact that the bodily injury will result in death.
The distinction in the meaning attributed to the word ‘likely’ in Sections 299(b) and 300 (2) is
only in the degree of probability.
As far as clause (3) of Section 300 is concerned, the intention of causing bodily injury is
accompanied by a further objective of certainty that such bodily injury is sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death. The word ‘sufficient’ in the ordinary course of nature to
17
P.S.A. Pillai, Criminal Law. (Gurgaon: Lexis Nexis, 2017).
Page |9
cause death, again imputes the certainty of death to a greater extent than the words ‘likely’ in
Section 299(b).
Thus, the essential distinction between death under Sections 299(b) and 300 (2) and (3) is that
there is a lesser degree of likelihood that the bodily injury caused will result in death under
Section 299(b) and there is a greater degree of likelihood that the bodily injury caused will result
in death under Sections 300 (2) and (3).
Knowledge of Death
Clause (c) of Sections 299 and clause 4 of Section 300 deal with instances where the accused has
knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. Similar to the earlier clauses, here again, the
requirement of knowledge under Section 300(4) is a very high degree of probability of death.
This high degree of probability of death is indicated in the latter part of the clause, wherein it is
provided that the act should be so imminently dangerous that in all probability it will cause death
or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and such act is done without any excuse for
incurring the risk. Both clause (c) of Section 299 and clause (4) of Section 300 apply to cases
where the accused has no intention to cause death or bodily injury, but there is knowledge that
the act is essentially a risky one. Whether the act amounts to murder or culpable homicide
depends upon the degree of risk to human life. If death is a likely result, it is culpable homicide;
if it is the most probable result, it is murder18.
The case involved the death of an individual named Ram Kumar Singh who was killed as a
consequence of an altercation between him and the appellant Rampal Singh over some land
dispute. The appellant was charged with murder and was also convicted by the trial court and the
High Court attracting life imprisonment. The appellant contended that his act of killing the
deceased by a rifle’s shot was a result of sudden and grave provocation. The Honourable
Supreme Court found that just before the incident the deceased and the appellant grappled each
other and had to be separated by people. The deceased even said that if the appellant had
courage, he would shoot him. As the case not being of any previous animosity, the court found
that the appellant had no pre-mediation or previous intention to kill the accused and the intention
which can be concluded from the circumstances is that of bodily injury which could cause death.
On the basis of the above facts and circumstances, the Court altered the conviction from that
under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code to one under Section 304 Part I of the Code and
awarded a sentence of ten years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 10,000, in default to
undergo simple imprisonment for one month.
The appellant and two others in this case were walking past a field where the deceased was
guarding his jaggery crop with his wife and pet dog on the day of occurrence and the dog of the
deceased starting barking at the appellant and his companions. As a reaction to the barking, the
appellant started beating the dog with an iron rod to which the deceased objected and was beaten
by the appellant and his companions. The deceased was hit by the appellant with the iron rod
aimed at his head while the other two were giving him fist blows. Due to the blow with the iron
rod, the deceased got unconscious and succumbed to his injuries afterwards.
The appellant argued that the act does not amount to murder as it was committed without
premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without them
having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner which is fourth exception to
Section 300. The Honourable Supreme Court here observed that the appellant and his
companions did not act under any pre-meditation and the incident was due to the sudden quarrel.
The assailants did not act in a cruel manner as they gave just one blow with the rod and fled
immediately after realizing that the deceased fell unconscious which shows that they lacked any
intention to kill. The mens rea which can be inferred is the presence of knowledge that the injury
is likely to cause death of the person. The case was therefore found to be falling more
appropriately under Section 304 Part II and the appellant was awarded a rigorous imprisonment
for five years.
Statistics
The above Table shows the data related to the cases reported, crime rate and the percentage share
of Culpable Homicide not amounting to Murder in India in the years 2014, 2015 and 2016.
The data shows that the incidents of culpable homicide have remained in the range of 3100 cases
and shows a bit more stagnant position which is surely not a good sign as it is considered to be a
one of the most serious offences under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 because it is an offence
against the body of an individual. The crime rate has also remained the same for these three
consecutive years and the percentage share of culpable homicide not amounting to murder to IPC
crimes being 0.1 shows the relative importance of it in relation to other IPC crimes.
Year Uttar Pradesh Haryana Chandigarh
2014 1412 65 06
2015 1338 61 07
2016 1272 42 06
The above table shows the data collected by National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) related
to the offence of Culpable Homicide not amounting to Murder.
21
Crime Rate is measured as crime per one lakh of population.
P a g e | 11
a. Uttar Pradesh being the most populous state of India remains the state with the most
number of incidents of culpable homicide not amounting to murder being reported for in
the years of study i.e. 2014, 2015 and 2016. The data shows a decline of approximately
6% in the number of incidents of culpable homicide in each succeeding year which is
surely a good sign apparently but the data is not sufficient to come to a conclusion.
b. Haryana being a much smaller state has a lesser number of cases of culpable homicide
not amounting to murder being reported than Uttar Pradesh. Just like Uttar Pradesh, there
is a decline in the number of incidents contrary to national statistics which show a more
stagnant position in this context. The rate of decrease was lesser from 2014 to 2015 but it
got significantly reduced from 2015 to 2016.
c. Chandigarh shows a stagnant number of incidents of culpable homicide with the number
being 6 in 2014 & 2016 and 7 in 2015.
Chandigarh
7.2
7
6.8
6.6 Chandigarh
6.4
6.2
6
5.8
5.6
5.4
2014 2015 2016
Conclusion
An offence cannot amount to murder unless it falls within the definition of culpable homicide;
but it may amount to culpable homicide without amounting to murder. All acts of killing done
with the intention to kill, or to inflict bodily injury sufficient to cause death, or with the
knowledge that death will be the likely result are prima facie murder; while those committed
with the knowledge that death will be a likely result are culpable homicide not amounting to
P a g e | 12
murder. Where the act is done “with the intention of causing death” the difference between
culpable homicide and murder is merely a question of different degrees of probability that death
will ensue. It is culpable homicide where death must have been known to be a probable result. If
an injury is deliberately inflicted, in the sense that it is not accidental or unintentional, and the
injury, objectively speaking, is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and
death results, the offence is murder.