ROSALIO DELA ROSA VS A JUSTICES SABIO

On August 14, 2002, a letter-complaint 1 addressed to the Chief Justice was received by the
Office of the Court Administrator, charging respondents with deliberately causing the delay of
the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 59354 for Estafa entitled, "People of the Philippines,
Plaintiff versus Ferdinand Santos, Robert John Sobrepeña, Federico Campos, Polo Pantaleon,
and Rafael Perez De Tagle, Jr., Accused" pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 72. Complainant is the private prosecutor in the said criminal case.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

During the preliminary investigation of the case, the City Prosecutor of Pasig City dismissed the
complaint for estafa on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. On appeal to the Secretary of
Justice, the said Resolution was set aside and the City Prosecutor of Pasig City was directed to
file the necessary Information for Estafa under Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code against the five accused. 2 The case was raffled to the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 72, presided by respondent Judge Eugenio C. Mendinueto.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary

Accused Polo S. Pantaleon and Federico O. Campos filed a "Motion for Judicial Determination
of Probable Cause." 3 On the other hand, Accused Ferdinand Santos, Robert John Sobrepeña,
and Rafael Perez De Tagle, Jr. filed a "Petition for Review with Urgent Prayer for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction" before the Court of Appeals, which was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 67388.

Meanwhile, a hearing was conducted by the trial court to determine the existence of probable
cause. It appeared from the evidence presented therein that accused Pantaleon and Campos
were not connected with the Fil-Estate Properties Properties, Inc. when the transaction
complained of occurred. Consequently, the criminal case against them was dismissed. 4 As to
the other three accused, respondent Judge suspended the proceedings pending the outcome of
CA-G.R. SP No. 67388.

On November 8, 2001, the Court of Appeals, through the Special Sixteenth Division, composed
of respondent Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Perlita J. Tirona and Mariano C. Del Castillo,
issued a Temporary Restraining Order directing the trial court and the City Prosecutor of Pasig
City to refrain from conducting any further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 59354 until further
orders. 5 The Court of Appeals further directed complainant to file his comment to the petition
for review. Instead of filing the required comment, complainant filed a motion to quash the
Temporary Restraining Order. 6 The three accused (petitioners therein), through their
respective counsel, respondent Attys. Gilbert Reyes, Deogracias Fellone and Antonio
Hernandez, filed written oppositions to the motion. 7

Meanwhile, the Temporary Restraining Order expired after the period of sixty days without a writ
of preliminary injunction being issued. Hence, complainant filed with the trial court a "Motion to
Commence Proceedings", which was denied on the ground that it would be practical as well as
procedurally appropriate to await the final resolution of CA-G.R. SP No. 67388 in order to avoid
the possibility of conflicting resolutions. The motion for reconsideration filed by complainant was
likewise denied. 8

On September 2, 2002, the Court of Appeals, through its Fourteenth Division, denied due
course and dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 67388. 9

Thus, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint against respondent Justices Jose L.
Sabio, Jr., Oswaldo Agcaoili, Perlita Tria-Tirona and Mariano Del Castillo for ignorance of the
law and inexcusable negligence when they issued the Temporary Restraining Order without
basis. Complainant alleged that respondent Justices deliberately delayed the prosecution of
Criminal Case No. 59354 by issuing the Temporary Restraining Order despite the fact that
respondent Judge Mendinueto was mandated by the Constitution and Rule 112 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure to act within ten days from receipt of the Information; and that respondent
Justices failed to resolve the Motion to Quash despite the lapse of more than ten months.
Complainant further charged that respondent Judge was likewise guilty of deliberately delaying
Criminal Case No. 59354, when he refused to commence proceedings despite the lapse of the
Temporary Restraining Order.

Complainant also charged respondent lawyers, Attys. Gilbert Reyes, Deogracias Fellone and
Antonio Hernandez, for having masterminded the scheme to frustrate the prosecution of the
case against their three clients through the petition for review filed before the Court of Appeals.

In their joint comment 10 filed on October 1, 2002, respondent Justices Sabio, Tria-Tirona, Del
Castillo and Agcaoili denied that there was delay in the disposition of CA-G.R. SP No. 67388.
They alleged that the petition was resolved relatively early considering the pendency of other
cases of equal importance and the heavy caseload of the Justices concerned. Specifically, the
petition, which was filed on October 26, 2001, was resolved on September 2, 2002. In addition,
respondent Justice Sabio, to whom CA-G.R. SP No. 67388 was raffled, was designated by the
Presiding Justice, together with other Court of Appeals Justices, to help expedite the disposition
of cases of "1997 and below" vintage under the Zero Backlog Project of the Court of Appeals.

In his comment 11 filed on October 7, 2002, respondent Judge Mendinueto explained that he
refused to proceed with Criminal Case No. 59354 notwithstanding the lapse of the sixty-day
effectivity of the Temporary Restraining Order in deference to the final outcome of CA-G.R. SP
No. 67388 and in order to avoid the absurd possibility of two conflicting resolutions by the trial
court and the Court of Appeals.

In their joint comment, 12 respondent lawyers averred that their filing of the petition before the
appellate court was a legitimate move to protect the interests of their clients. They contended
that while the Secretary of Justice is not among the quasi-judicial agencies whose orders or
judgments may be the subject of a petition for review, the enumeration in Rule 43, Section 2 of
the Rules of Court is not exclusive, as held in the case of Carpio v. Sulu Resources
Development Corporation. 13 They further alleged that any error in the remedy they chose did
not render them administratively liable considering that they did not act in bad faith.

After several exchanges of various pleadings between complainant and the three-lawyer
respondents, 14 the Court referred the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator for
investigation, report and recommendation. 15 However, considering that some of the
respondents are incumbent Justices of the Court of Appeals, the case was subsequently
referred to Retired Justice Romulo S. Quimbo, Consultant of the Office of the Court
Administrator, 16 pursuant to Section 3, Rule 140 17 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 01-8-10-SC, dated September 11, 2001.

On June 5, 2003, Justice Quimbo submitted his report with the recommendation that the
administrative case against all the respondents be dismissed for lack of merit.

The Investigating Justice found that respondent Justices of the Court of Appeals did not commit
error in requiring complainant (respondent therein) to comment and in granting the prayer for a
Temporary Restraining Order so as not to frustrate or prejudice whatever action the said court
may take relative to the petition. While the petition was eventually dismissed on the ground that
Rule 43 was inapplicable, respondent Justices cannot be held administratively liable for not
dismissing the petition outright since such omission did not amount to a flagrant disregard of the
facts, jurisprudence and applicable law. Likewise, there is no showing that respondent Justices
knowingly issued an unjust and baseless Temporary Restraining Order. Moreover, the length of
time the petition remained pending before the Court of Appeals was justified by the heavy
caseload of the Justices concerned.

Similarly, there were no grounds to impose administrative sanctions on respondent Judge

Eugenio C. Mendinueto. His decision to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case even after
the expiration of the Temporary Restraining Order showed a becoming modesty and deference
to a higher court. There was also no showing that respondent Judge connived and confederated
to frustrate justice in said criminal case.

In the same way, the complaint against respondent lawyers was found to be unsubstantiated.
There was no evidence that they misused the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice; or
that they deliberately delayed the case, impeded the execution of a judgment, or misused court
processes. Rather, the action of the three respondent lawyers was well within the bounds of the
fair and honorable conduct referred to in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Investigating Justice, however, took note of the allusion by complainant in his pleadings to
the three respondent lawyers as "brilliant lawyers", "legal supermen" or "sages," which he said
amounted to sarcasm.

We agree with the recommendation of the Investigating Justice Romulo S. Quimbo.

No evidence was presented to show that all the respondents, either individually or collectively,
adopted a schematic plan to delay the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 59354. Apparently, the
conspiracy theory advanced by complainant was formulated after the respondent Justices
granted the Temporary Restraining Order and required complainant to comment on the petition
filed by the three respondent lawyers, instead of dismissing the petition outright.

As held in the recent case of Sacmar v. Judge Reyes-Carpio, 18 a charge of knowingly

rendering an unjust and baseless order will prosper, only if it is shown that the issuance of the
order was indeed unjust and the respondents did not merely commit an error of judgment or
took the unpopular side of a controversial point of law. Their failure to correctly interpret the law
or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily render them
administratively liable. 19 Magistrates are not expected to be infallible in their judgments.

In the case at bar, the records fail to show that the respondent Justices and respondent Judge
were guilty of fraud, dishonesty, corruption or, at the very least, bad faith. To merit disciplinary
action from this Court, there should be a showing that the complained judicial acts of
respondent Judge, more so of respondent Justices of the Court of Appeals, were attended by
fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith. 20 There being none, there is no cogent ground to
hold them administratively liable.

Furthermore, the legal remedy taken by respondent lawyers, which was later found to be
erroneous, does not constitute proof that they deliberately and knowingly intended to forestall
the hearing of Criminal Case No. 59354. There was no evidence that they have overstepped the
norms of their Lawyer’s Oath in advocating the interest of their clients. To be sure, Canon 19 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility requires them to represent their clients with zeal within
the bounds of law. Accordingly, in the judicial forum, their clients were entitled to the benefit of
any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and the three
respondent lawyers were expected to avail of such remedy or defense. Indeed, complainant
failed to show adequate proof that the three respondent lawyers deliberately and knowingly
"hatched a scheme and toyed with the law" 21 when they filed the said petition before the Court
of Appeals.

It bears stressing that it is the duty of a lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and
candor toward his professional colleagues. 22 As officers of the court, lawyers are mandated to
conduct themselves honorably, fairly and candidly toward each other. Though a lawyer’s
language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting
the dignity of the legal profession. Obviously, complainant’s use of sarcasm in calling the three
respondent lawyers "brilliant lawyers", "legal supermen" and "sages" fell short of this mandate. It
served no useful purpose. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions have no
place in the dignity of judicial forum. Civility among members of the legal profession is a
treasured tradition that must at no time be lost to it. 23chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the complaint against all the respondents is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant

vs.
ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989, respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a

member of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law
imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 October 1988 in C.A.-G.R. CR
No. 05093.

On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of
jewelry, with a total stated value of P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis, with the
condition that the respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and return the unsold items to
Ms. Marquez on or before 14 February 1984. Sometime in February 1984, respondent, instead
of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry which then amounted to approximately P26,250.00,
issued three checks: (a) a check dated 16 February 1984 for the amount of P5,400.00; (b) a
check dated 23 February 1984 also for the amount of P5,400.00; and (c) a check dated 25
February 1984 for the amount of P15,450.00. Upon presentment for payment within ninety (90)
days after their issuance, all three (3) checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders
Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor,
respondent made no arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring of checks which had
bounced and made no effort to settle her obligations to Ms. Marquez.

Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against respondent with the Regional Trial Court
of Manila: (a) one for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85-38358; and (b) three (3) for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed respectively as Criminal Cases Nos. 85-38359, 85-38360 and
85-38361. In due time, after trial, the trial court rendered a decision dated 25 August 1987
which:

(a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and

(b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all three (3) cases, and sentenced
respondent to pay a fine of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and
to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00 in Criminal Case No. 8538359;
to pay a fine of P 6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify
the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38360; and
to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
indemnify the complainant in the amount of P15,450.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38361, and to
pay the costs in all three (3) cases.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093 affirmed in toto the decision of the
trial court but, in addition, suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice of law. The pertinent
portion of the decision read as follows:

For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction, the
judgment is hereby AFFIRMED subject to this modification.
It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a member of the Bar, and the
offense for (sic) which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude, she is hereby ordered
suspended from the practice of law and shall not practice her profession until further action from
the Supreme Court, in accordance with Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. A
copy of this decision must be forwarded to the Supreme Court as required by Section 29 of the
same Rule.

SO ORDERED. 1

ANTERO J. POBRE, Complainant, v. Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites
the Court's attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago's speech
delivered on the Senate floor:

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am

humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my
middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice
Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the
position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another
environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.

To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker
towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and
constituted direct contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or
other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator.
In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does
not deny making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those statements
were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech
she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee. The
purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in
governance with a view to future remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose
what she believed "to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC]," which, after sending
out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice, would
eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for
nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that non-
sitting members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.

The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section
11 of the Constitution, which provides: "A Senator or Member of the House of Representative
shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from
arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in
any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof."
Explaining the import of the underscored portion of the provision, the Court, in Osmeña, Jr. v.
Pendatun, said:

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished

in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its
purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust
with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest
liberty of speech and that he should be protected from resentment of every one, however,
powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense."1

As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and
arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative
department. Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate
into a polite and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the
uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public
good. The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and
inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a
judgment against them based upon a judge's speculation as to the motives.2

This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution
of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the
importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this
representative body to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce
anomalies, and talk about how the country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not
interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the
legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and
mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the
privilege.3 The disciplinary authority of the assembly4 and the voters, not the courts, can
properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity.5

For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for
disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable
criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this
could not be the last word on the matter.

The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member
of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the
lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is
at once apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in
substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as stating that she wanted "to spit on the face of Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court," and calling the Court a
"Supreme Court of idiots."

The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.6 We draw her attention to the ensuing
passage in Sotto that she should have taken to heart in the first place:

x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of this Court and believe
that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own
hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos would be the result.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be allowed to
erode the people's faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8,
Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide:

Canon 8, Rule 8.01. A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Canon 11. A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her achievements speak for
themselves. She was a former Regional Trial Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited authority
on constitutional and international law, an author of numerous law textbooks, and an elected
senator of the land. Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of
the court, like any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to
maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in public service are keepers of public faith and
are burdened with the higher degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren
in private practice.7 Senator Santiago should have known, as any perceptive individual, the
impact her statements would make on the people's faith in the integrity of the courts.
As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege speech as a prelude to crafting
remedial legislation on the JBC. This allegation strikes the Court as an afterthought in light of
the insulting tenor of what she said. We quote the passage once more:

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am

humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my
middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice
Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the
position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another
environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x. (Emphasis ours.)

A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements were expressions
of personal anger and frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a
sense, therefore, her remarks were outside the pale of her official parliamentary functions. Even
parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and
destroy the reputation of the Court and its magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and
disgust. Authorities are agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege
accorded the individual members of the Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but
rather a privilege for the benefit of the people and the institution that represents them.

To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger without indulging in insulting
rhetoric and offensive personalities.

Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiago's outburst was directly traceable to what she
considered as an "unjust act" the JBC had taken in connection with her application for the
position of Chief Justice. But while the JBC functions under the Court's supervision, its individual
members, save perhaps for the Chief Justice who sits as the JBC's ex-officio chairperson,8
have no official duty to nominate candidates for appointment to the position of Chief Justice.
The Court is, thus, at a loss to understand Senator Santiago's wholesale and indiscriminate
assault on the members of the Court and her choice of critical and defamatory words against all
of them.

At any event, equally important as the speech and debate clause of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the
Constitution is Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the Constitution that provides:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of the law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. (Emphasis ours.)
The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, exercises specific authority to promulgate rules governing the Integrated
Bar with the end in view that the integration of the Bar will, among other things:

(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from
the assaults that politics and self interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity,
impartiality and independence;

xxx

(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x.9

In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda,10 we reiterated our
pronouncement in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer11 that the duty of attorneys to the courts
can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office
which they are bound to uphold. The Court wrote in Rheem of the Philippines:

x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that "[i]t is the duty of a
lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." That same
canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against
"unjust criticism and clamor." And more. The attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a conduct
that should be "with all good fidelity x x x to the courts."

Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v.
Cloribel12 that:

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to
advance the ends of justice." His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to
which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice." Faith in the
courts, a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to
the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people." Thus has it
been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build
and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to
the proper administration of justice."13

The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting injunction of a strict
Code. Society has entrusted that profession with the administration of the law and dispensation
of justice. Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a
member of the Bar for misconduct committed while in the discharge of official duties, unless
said misconduct also constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.14

Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long as
their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor,15 a good character being an
essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such
privilege. When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of
"conduct" or "misconduct," the reference is not confined to one's behavior exhibited in
connection with the performance of lawyers' professional duties, but also covers any
misconduct, which albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their profession would show them to
be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license and the law invest in
them.16

This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the people's faith in courts and trust in the rule of
law, has consistently exercised its disciplinary authority on lawyers who, for malevolent purpose
or personal malice, attempt to obstruct the orderly administration of justice, trifle with the
integrity of courts, and embarrass or, worse, malign the men and women who compose them.
We have done it in the case of former Senator Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty. Noel
Sorreda in Sorreda, and in the case of Atty. Francisco B. Cruz in Tacordan v. Ang17 who
repeatedly insulted and threatened the Court in a most insolent manner.

The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty.
Santiago for what otherwise would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part
towards the Court and its members. The factual and legal circumstances of this case, however,
deter the Court from doing so, even without any sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional
consideration dictates this kind of disposition.

We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senator's offensive and disrespectful
language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to
re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal,
and remind her anew that the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of
Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them,
as the people's representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of being
made responsible before the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall.18 It is
intended to protect members of Congress against government pressure and intimidation aimed
at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its members.

The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that
enjoins a Senator from using, under any circumstance, "offensive or improper language against
another Senator or against any public institution."19 But as to Senator Santiago's
unparliamentary remarks, the Senate President had not apparently called her to order, let alone
referred the matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the
Rules dictates under such circumstance.20 The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her
own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own
rules on her.

Finally, the lady senator questions Pobre's motives in filing his complaint, stating that
disciplinary proceedings must be undertaken solely for the public welfare. We cannot agree with
her more. We cannot overstress that the senator's use of intemperate language to demean and
denigrate the highest court of the land is a clear violation of the duty of respect lawyers owe to
the courts.21

Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has failed to prove that she in fact made the
statements in question. Suffice it to say in this regard that, although she has not categorically
denied making such statements, she has unequivocally said making them as part of her
privilege speech. Her implied admission is good enough for the Court.

WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-

Santiago is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

JOSELANO GUEVARRA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA,

RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for Disbarment[1] before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty.
Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct and
unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath."

In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:

He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee Irene Moje
(Irene) introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes
spelled "Mary Ann") Tantoco with whom he had three children.

After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from January to March
2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of
which read "I love you," "I miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall."

Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the
morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about
her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents' house in Binangonan, Rizal or she
was busy with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two occasions.
On the second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal
house.

On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday celebration at which he saw
her and respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and
humiliation, he left the venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal
house and hauled off all her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the
household appliances.

Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words "I
Love You" on its face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October
7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene, reading:
My everdearest Irene,

By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I will say a
prayer for you that you may find meaning in what you're about to do.

Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness but experience
eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it because there's a
bigger plan for the two of us?

I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything humanly
possible to love you. And today, as you make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!

I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on you, to the time
we spent together, up to the final moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will love
you until the life in me is gone and until we are together again.

Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to last me a
lifetime. Always remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL
ALWAYS

. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!

BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!

I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I'M LIVING MY TWEETIE
YOU'LL BE!"[2]

Eternally yours,

NOLI
Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B 11th
Street, New Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already
residing. He also learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002
together with respondent during a concert, she was pregnant.

In his ANSWER,[3] respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the above-
quoted letter was handwritten.

On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:

Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they
attended social functions together. For instance, in or about the third week of September 2001,
the couple attended the launch of the "Wine All You Can" promotion of French wines, held at
the Mega Strip of SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported in
Section B of the Manila Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page 21. Respondent and
Irene were photographed together; their picture was captioned: "Irene with Sportscaster Noli
Eala." A photocopy of the report is attached as Annex C.[4] (Italics and emphasis in the original;
CAPITALIZATION of the phrase "flaunting their adulterous relationship" supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as
alleged in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being that their relationship was
low profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families, and that
Respondent, as far as the general public was concerned, was still known to be legally married
to Mary Anne Tantoco.[5] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:
Respondent's adulterous conduct with the complainant's wife and his apparent abandoning or
neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit to
keep his membership in the bar. He flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it
a "piece of paper." Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter to complainant's bride on
the very day of her wedding, vowing to continue his love for her "until we are together again," as
now they are.[6] (Underscoring supplied),
respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:
Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint regarding his
adulterous relationship and that his acts demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making him
unfit to keep his membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondent's relationship with
Irene was not under scandalous circumstances and that as far as his relationship with his own
family:
5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with [his wife] Mary
Anne as in fact they still occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware of
Respondent's special friendship with Irene.

xxxx

5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage by
calling the institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his reference [in his above-
quoted handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage between Complainant and Irene as a piece of
paper was merely with respect to the formality of the marriage contract.[7] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Respondent admitted[8] paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:
The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. The
Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the foundation of the
family (Article XV, Sec. 2).[9]
And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:
Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he, as a
lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the complainant's
wife, he mocked the institution of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the complainant's
marriage, commits adultery with his wife, and degrades the legal profession.[10] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the reason
being that under the circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect to his purely personal
and low profile special relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor
tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule
138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.[11] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To respondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,[12] alleging that Irene gave birth to a
girl and Irene named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father. Complainant
attached to the Reply, as Annex "A," a copy of a Certificate of Live Birth[13] bearing Irene's
signature and naming respondent as the father of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje
who was born on February 14, 2002 at St. Luke's Hospital.

Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS[14] dated January

10, 2003 from respondent in which he denied having "personal knowledge of the Certificate of
Live Birth attached to the complainant's Reply."[15] Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint
due to the pendency of a civil case filed by complainant for the annulment of his marriage to
Irene, and a criminal complaint for adultery against respondent and Irene which was pending
before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.

During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainant's Complaint-Affidavit and Reply to
Answer were adopted as his testimony on direct examination.[16] Respondent's counsel did not
cross-examine complainant.[17]

After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION[18] dated October 26, 2004, found the charge against
respondent sufficiently proven.

The Commissioner thus recommended[19] that respondent be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01
of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reading:
Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct
(Underscoring supplied),
and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:
Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession. (Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution
dated January 28, 2006 briefly reading:
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06
CBD Case No. 02-936
Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala

RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the
above-entitled case for lack of merit.[20] (Italics and emphasis in the original)
Hence, the present petition[21] of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant to Section 12 (c),
Rule 139[22] of the Rules of Court.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner and dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor
as its above-quoted 33-word Resolution shows.

Respondent contends, in his Comment[23] on the present petition of complainant, that there is
no evidence against him.[24] The contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner
observed:
While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. "C") and the news item
published in the Manila Standard (Exh. "D"), even taken together do not sufficiently prove that
respondent is carrying on an adulterous relationship with complainant's wife, there are other
pieces of evidence on record which support the accusation of complainant against respondent.

It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent through counsel made
the following statements to wit: "Respondent specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an
adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the
matter being [that] their relationship was low profile and known only to immediate members of
their respective families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph
19 of the complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the acts of the respondents
with respect to his purely personal and low profile relationship with Irene is neither under
scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct . . ."

These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that there is indeed a "special"
relationship between him and complainant's wife, Irene, [which] taken together with the
Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex "H-1") sufficiently prove that
there was indeed an illicit relationship between respondent and Irene which resulted in the birth
of the child "Samantha". In the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it should be noted that
complainant's wife Irene supplied the information that respondent was the father of the child.
Given the fact that the respondent admitted his special relationship with Irene there is no reason
to believe that Irene would lie or make any misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the
child. It should be underscored that respondent has not categorically denied that he is the father
of Samantha Louise Irene Moje.[25] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous relationship with
Irene, "adultery" being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that "committed by
any married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the
man who has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be
subsequently declared void."[26] (Italics supplied) What respondent denies is having flaunted
such relationship, he maintaining that it was "low profile and known only to the immediate
members of their respective families."

In other words, respondent's denial is a negative pregnant,

a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which
are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated
otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it in
affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial
pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is
alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or
modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied
while the fact itself is admitted.[27] (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal knowledge" of Irene's
daughter Samantha Louise Irene Moje's Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named
respondent - a "lawyer," 38 years old - as the child's father. And the phrase "NOT MARRIED" is
entered on the desired information on "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE." A comparison of
the signature attributed to Irene in the certificate[28] with her signature on the Marriage
Certificate[29] shows that they were affixed by one and the same person. Notatu dignum is that,
as the Investigating Commissioner noted, respondent never denied being the father of the child.

Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's Medical Center, in his January 29, 2003
Affidavit[30] which he identified at the witness stand, declared that Irene gave the information in
the Certificate of Live Birth that the child's father is "Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala," who was
38 years old and a lawyer.[31]

Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been sufficiently
proven by more than clearly preponderant evidence - that evidence adduced by one party which
is more conclusive and credible than that of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight
than the other[32] - which is the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case against
a lawyer.
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and
they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, "clearly preponderant
evidence" is all that is required.[33] (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship with Irene
was not, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, reading:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. - A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is
a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts
hereinabove enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie
evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
under scandalous circumstances.[34]

The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension uses
the phrase "grossly immoral conduct," not "under scandalous circumstances." Sexual
intercourse under scandalous circumstances is, following Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code
reading:
ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or,
shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his
wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods.

x x x x,
an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse with a
woman elsewhere.

"Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of
marriage should be characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding
circumstances."[35] The case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a
married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly.
Apropos is the following pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:[36]
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with
complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute
a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree" in order to merit
disciplinary sanction. We disagree.

xxxx

While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two
unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is
not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital
relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered
disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the
marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.[37] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:[38]
The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent did contract a
bigamous marriage . . . It is enough that the records of this administrative case substantiate the
findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that
indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral
conduct and indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession.
This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor
and privileges which his license confers upon him.[39] (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law
which goes:
I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do
solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will
support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor
consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to
the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution
reading:
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall
be protected by the State.
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional
provision, obligates the husband and the wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support."[40]

Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from
engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law."

Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of the case before the
IBP Commissioner, filed a Manifestation[41] on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that
complainant's petition for nullity of his (complainant's) marriage to Irene had been granted by
Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery
complainant filed against respondent and Irene "based on the same set of facts alleged in the
instant case," which was pending review before the Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of
complainant, had been, on motion of complainant, withdrawn.

The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainant's Motion to
Withdraw Petition for Review reads:
Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the petition for review,
we are inclined to grant the same pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70 dated
July 3, 2000, which provides that "notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the petitioner
may withdraw the same at any time before it is finally resolved, in which case the appealed
resolution shall stand as though no appeal has been taken."[42] (Emphasis supplied by
complainant)
That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is
immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the marriage was declared null and void.
[43] As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.[44] In carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial
declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and void, and despite respondent
himself being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law. And he
betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.

As for complainant's withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ, respondent glaringly
omitted to state that before complainant filed his December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his
Petition for Review, the DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003
reversing the dismissal by the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office of complainant's complaint for
adultery. In reversing the City Prosecutor's Resolution, DOJ Secretary Simeon Datumanong
held:
Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the fair estimation of
the Department, sufficiently establish all the elements of the offense of adultery on the part of
both respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje conceded to complainant that she was
going out on dates with respondent Eala, and this she did when complainant confronted her
about Eala's frequent phone calls and text messages to her. Complainant also personally
witnessed Moje and Eala having a rendezvous on two occasions. Respondent Eala never
denied the fact that he knew Moje to be married to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was
married to another woman. Moreover, Moje's eventual abandonment of their conjugal home,
after complainant had once more confronted her about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit
relationship involving both respondents. This becomes all the more apparent by Moje's
subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, which was a few
blocks away from the church where she had exchange marital vows with complainant.

It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially since Eala's vehicle and
that of Moje's were always seen there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in the said
address whereas Eala asserts that that was where he held office. The happenstance that it was
in that said address that Eala and Moje had decided to hold office for the firm that both had
formed smacks too much of a coincidence. For one, the said address appears to be a
residential house, for that was where Moje stayed all throughout after her separation from
complainant. It was both respondent's love nest, to put short; their illicit affair that was carried
out there bore fruit a few months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby hospital of St.
Luke's Medical Center. What finally militates against the respondents is the indubitable fact that
in the certificate of birth of the girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala was the father. This
speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful and damning nature of the adulterous acts of the
respondents. Complainant's supposed illegal procurement of the birth certificate is most
certainly beside the point for both respondents Eala and Moje have not denied, in any
categorical manner, that Eala is the father of the child Samantha Irene Louise Moje.[45]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and
thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant complainant's motion to withdraw his petition for
review. But even if respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the
Information for adultery were filed in court, the same would not have been a bar to the present
administrative complaint.

Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,[46] viz:

x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these
[administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct
which merely enables one to escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in
disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts assume
in trying criminal case[47] (Italics in the original),
this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,[48] held:
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and
they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on January 28,
2006 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE.

Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct,
violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of
respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies
of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6396 October 25, 2005

ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. VIRGIL R. CASTRO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
Tinga, J.:

This administrative case concerns a lawyer who hurled invectives at a Clerk of Court. Members
of the bar decorum must at all times comfort themselves in a manner befitting their noble
profession.
Complainant Atty. Rosalie Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya. On 8 May 2003, she filed with the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a Complaint-Affidavit1 with
supporting documents2 against respondent Atty. Virgil R. Castro for Unprofessional Conduct,
specifically violation of Canon 7, Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.3 The charge in the complaint is summed up as follows:
Respondent Atty. Castro was a private practitioner and Vice-President of IBP-Nueva Vizcaya
Chapter. On 5 May 2003, respondent went to complainant’s office to inquire whether the
complete records of Civil Case No. 784, entitled Sps. Crispino Castillano v. Sps. Federico S.
Castillano and Felicidad Aberin, had already been remanded to the court of origin, MCTC
Dupax del Norte, Alfonso Castaned, Nueva Vizcaya. It must be noted that respondent was not
the counsel of record of either party in Civil Case No. 784.
Complainant informed respondent that the record had not yet been transmitted since a certified
true copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals should first be presented to serve as basis for
the transmittal of the records to the court of origin. To this respondent retorted scornfully, "Who
will certify the Court of Appeals’ Decision, the Court of Appeals? You mean to say, I would still
have to go to Manila to get a certified true copy?" Surprised at this outburst, complainant
replied, "Sir, it’s in the Rules but you could show us the copy sent to the party you claim to be
representing." Respondent then replied, "Then you should have notified me of the said
requirement. That was two weeks ago and I have been frequenting your office since then, but
you never bothered to notify me." Complainant replied, "It is not our duty, Sir, to notify you of the
said requirement."
Respondent then answered, "You mean to say it is not your duty to remand the record of the
case?" Complainant responded, "No, Sir, I mean, it’s not our duty to notify you that you have to
submit a copy of the Court of Appeals’ decision." Respondent angrily declared in Ilocano, "Kayat
mo nga saw-en, awan pakialam yon? Kasdiay?" ("You mean to say you don’t care anymore? Is
that the way it is?") He then turned and left the office, banging the door on his way out to show
his anger. The banging of the door was so loud it was heard by the people at the adjacent RTC,
Branch 30 where a hearing was taking place.4
After a few minutes, respondent returned to the office, still enraged, and pointed his finger at
complainant and shouted, "Ukinnan, no adda ti unget mo iti kilientek haan mo nga ibales kaniak
ah!" ("Vulva of your mother! If you are harboring ill feelings against my client, don’t turn your ire
on me!") Complainant was shocked at respondent’s words but still managed to reply, "I don’t
even know your client, Sir." Respondent left the office and as he passed by complainant’s
window, he again shouted, "Ukinnam nga babai!" ("Vulva of your mother, you woman!")5
Complainant suffered acute embarrassment at the incident, as it happened in her office of which
she was, and still is, the head and in front of her staff. She felt that her credibility had been
tarnished and diminished, eliciting doubt on her ability to command full respect from her staff.6
The Complaint-Affidavit, filed three days after the incident, was supported by an Affidavit7
signed by employees of RTC-Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya who witnessed the incident. The
Affidavit narrated the same incident as witnessed by the said employees. A Motion to File
Additional Affidavit/Documentary Evidence was filed by complainant on 25 September 2003.8
On 26 May 2003, the CBD-IBP issued an Order9 requiring respondent to submit his answer to
the complaint. Respondent submitted his Compliance10 dated 18 June 2003. Respondent
explained that he was counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 847, entitled Sps. Federico
Castillano, et al. v. Sps. Crispin Castillano, et al., filed with the RTC of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch
30. He learned of the finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 64962 with
respect to Civil Case No. 847 before the lower court. Prior to the incident, he went to the office
of the complainant to request for the transmittal of the records of the case to the MCTC and the
complainant reassured him of the same.
Respondent admits having inquired about the status of the transmittal of the records on 5 May
2003. However, he has no explanation as to what transpired on that day. Instead, he narrates
that on 25 May 2003, twelve days after the incident, the records had not yet been transmitted,
and he subsequently learned that these records were returned to the court of origin.
The hearing for the administrative complaint before the CBD was set on 25 September 2003 by
the Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan. However, on said date, only complainant
appeared. The latter also moved that the case be submitted for resolution.11 Respondent later
on filed a Manifestation stating that the reason for his non-appearance was because he was still
recuperating from physical injuries and that he was not mentally fit to prepare the required
pleadings as his vehicle was rained with bullets on 19 August 2003. He also expressed his
public apology to the complainant in the same Manifestation.12
Complainant filed a Manifestation expressing her desire not to appear on the next hearing date
in view of respondent’s public apology, adding that respondent personally and humbly asked for
forgiveness which she accepted.13
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be reprimanded and warned
that any other complaint for breach of his professional duties shall be dealt with more
severely.14 The IBP submitted to this Court a Notice of Resolution adopting and approving the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.15
At the onset, it should be noted that respondent was not the counsel of record of Civil Case No.
784. Had he been counsel of record, it would have been easy for him to present the required
certified true copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals. He need not have gone to Manila to
procure a certified true copy of the decision since the Court of Appeals furnishes the parties and
their counsel of record a duplicate original or certified true copy of its decision.
His explanation that he will enter his appearance in the case when its records were already
transmitted to the MCTC is unacceptable. Not being the counsel of record and there being no
authorization from either the parties to represent them, respondent had no right to impose his
will on the clerk of court.
Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Rule 8.02—A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment
of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper
advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
Through his acts of constantly checking the transmittal of the records of Civil Case No. 784,
respondent deliberately encroached upon the legal functions of the counsel of record of that
case. It does not matter whether he did so in good faith.
Moreover, in the course of his questionable activities relating to Civil Case No. 784, respondent
acted rudely towards an officer of the court. He raised his voice at the clerk of court and uttered
at her the most vulgar of invectives. Not only was it ill-mannered but also unbecoming
considering that he did all these to a woman and in front of her subordinates.
As held in Alcantara v. Atty. Pefianco,16 respondent ought to have realized that this sort of
public behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the public estimation and erode
public respect for it.17 These acts violate Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and Rule 8.01, to wit:
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on his fitness to
practice law, now shall he, whether in public or private life behave in scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
Canon 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 — A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
Moreover, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that lawyers conduct
themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty
bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must act honorably, fairly and candidly
towards each other and otherwise conduct themselves without reproach at all times.18
As correctly evaluated by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent did not categorically deny
the charges in the complaint. Instead, he gave a lengthy narration of the prefatory facts of the
case as well as of the incident on 5 May 2003.
Complainant also alleged in her Complaint-Affidavit that respondent’s uncharacteristic behavior
was not an isolated incident. He has supposedly done the same to Attys. Abraham Johnny G.
Asuncion and Temmy Lambino, the latter having filed a case against respondent pending before
this Court.19 We, however, cannot acknowledge such allegation absent any evidence showing
the veracity of such claim. No affidavits to that effect were submitted by either Atty. Asuncion or
Atty. Lambino.
Nonetheless, the penalty to be imposed should be tempered owing to the fact that respondent
had apologized to the complainant and the latter had accepted it. This is not to say, however,
that respondent should be absolved from his actuations. People are accountable for the
consequences of the things they say and do even if they repent afterwards. The fact remains
that things done cannot be undone and words uttered cannot be taken back. Hence, he should
bear the consequences of his actions.
The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers is the esteem of their brethren. This
esteem cannot be purchased, perfunctorily created, or gained by artifice or contrivance. It is
born of sharp contexts and thrives despite conflicting interest. It emanates solely from integrity,
character, brains and skills in the honorable performance of professional duty.20
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby FINED in the amount of TEN
THOUSAND (₱10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that any similar infraction with be dealt with
more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant for appropriate
annotation in the record of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6116 August 1, 2012

ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Engr. Gilbert
Tumbokon against respondent Atty. Mariano R. Pefianco for grave dishonesty, gross
misconduct constituting deceit and grossly immoral conduct.

In his Complaint,1 complainant narrated that respondent undertook to give him 20%
commission, later reduced to 10%, of the attorney's fees the latter would receive in representing
Spouses Amable and Rosalinda Yap (Sps. Yap), whom he referred, in an action for partition of
the estate of the late Benjamin Yap (Civil Case No. 4986 before the Regional Trial Court of
Aklan). Their agreement was reflected in a letter2 dated August 11, 1995. However, respondent
failed to pay him the agreed commission notwithstanding receipt of attorney's fees amounting to
17% of the total estate or about ₱ 40 million. Instead, he was informed through a letter3 dated
July 16, 1997 that Sps. Yap assumed to pay the same after respondent had agreed to reduce
his attorney's fees from 25% to 17%. He then demanded the payment of his commission4 which
respondent ignored.

Complainant further alleged that respondent has not lived up to the high moral standards
required of his profession for having abandoned his legal wife, Milagros Hilado, with whom he
has two children, and cohabited with Mae FlorGalido, with whom he has four children. He also
accused respondent of engaging in money-lending business5 without the required authorization
from the BangkoSentralngPilipinas.
In his defense, respondent explained that he accepted Sps. Yap's case on a 25% contingent fee
basis, and advanced all the expenses. He disputed the August 11, 1995 letter for being a
forgery and claimed that Sps. Yap assumed to pay complainant's commission which he clarified
in his July 16, 1997 letter. He, thus, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for the
corresponding sanction against complainant's counsel, Atty. Florencio B. Gonzales, for filing a
baseless complaint.6

In the Resolution7 dated February 16, 2004, the Court resolved to refer this administrative case
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In
his Report and Recommendation8 dated October 10, 2008, the Investigating IBP Commissioner
recommended that respondent be suspended for one (1) year from the active practice of law, for
violation of the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1; Rule 7.03, Canon 7 and Rule 9.02, Canon 9
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code). The IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the same in its Resolution No. XIX-2010-4539 dated August

28, 2010. Respondent moved for reconsideration10 which was denied in Resolution No. XIX-
2011-141 dated October 28, 2011.

After due consideration, We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors.

The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers
are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession,
the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms embodied in the Code.11
Lawyers may, thus, be disciplined for any conduct that is wanting of the above standards
whether in their professional or in their private capacity.

In the present case, respondent's defense that forgery had attended the execution of the August
11, 1995 letter was belied by his July 16, 1997 letter admitting to have undertaken the payment
of complainant's commission but passing on the responsibility to Sps. Yap. Clearly, respondent
has violated Rule 9.02,12 Canon 9 of the Code which prohibits a lawyer from dividing or
stipulating to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in
certain cases which do not obtain in the case at bar.

Furthermore, respondent did not deny the accusation that he abandoned his legal family to
cohabit with his mistress with whom he begot four children notwithstanding that his moral
character as well as his moral fitness to be retained in the Roll of Attorneys has been assailed.
The settled rule is that betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual relations outside marriage
is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.13
Consequently, We find no reason to disturb the IBP's finding that respondent violated the
Lawyer's Oath14 and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging
in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

However, We find the charge of engaging in illegal money lending not to have been sufficiently
established.1âwphi1 A "business" requires some form of investment and a sufficient number of
customers to whom its output can be sold at profit on a consistent basis.15 The lending of
money to a single person without showing that such service is made available to other persons
on a consistent basis cannot be construed asindicia that respondent is engaged in the business
of lending.

Nonetheless, while We rule that respondent should be sanctioned for his actions, We are
minded that the power to disbar should be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases
of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court and as member of the bar,16 or the misconduct borders on the criminal, or committed
under scandalous circumstance,17 which do not obtain here. Considering the circumstances of
the case, We deem it appropriate that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year as recommended.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO is found GUILTY of violation of the

Lawyer’s Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 9.02,
Canon 9 of the same Code and SUSPENDED from the active practice of law ONE (1) YEAR
effective upon notice hereof.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of
the Philippine Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5624 January 20, 2004

NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT C. FLORIDO, Respondent.
DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is an administrative complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. James Benedict C.
Florido and his eventual removal from the Roll of Attorneys for allegedly violating his oath as a
lawyer "by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious and bogus Court of Appeals
Resolution/Order."1
In her Complaint-Affidavit, Natasha V. Heysuwan-Florido averred that she is the legitimate
spouse of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido, but that they are estranged and living
separately from each other. They have two children – namely, Kamille Nicole H. Florido, five
years old, and James Benedict H. Florido, Jr., three years old – both of whom are in
complainant’s custody. Complainant filed a case for the annulment of her marriage with
respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 23122, before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 24. Meanwhile, there is another case related to the complaint for annulment of marriage
which is pending before the Court of Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54235 entitled,
"James Benedict C. Florido v. Hon. Pampio Abarientos, et al."

Sometime in the middle of December 2001, respondent went to complainant’s residence in

Tanjay City, Negros Oriental and demanded that the custody of their two minor children be
surrendered to him. He showed complainant a photocopy of an alleged Resolution issued by the
Court of Appeals which supposedly granted his motion for temporary child custody.2
Complainant called up her lawyer but the latter informed her that he had not received any
motion for temporary child custody filed by respondent.

Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the alleged resolution of the Court of
Appeals, but respondent failed to give it to her. Complainant then examined the resolution
closely and noted that it bore two dates: November 12, 2001 and November 29, 2001. Sensing
something amiss, she refused to give custody of their children to respondent.

In the mid-morning of January 15, 2002, while complainant was with her children in the ABC
Learning Center in Tanjay City, respondent, accompanied by armed men, suddenly arrived and
demanded that she surrender to him the custody of their children. He threatened to forcefully
take them away with the help of his companions, whom he claimed to be agents of the National
Bureau of Investigation.

Alarmed, complainant immediately sought the assistance of the Tanjay City Police. The
responding policemen subsequently escorted her to the police station where the matter could be
clarified and settled peacefully. At the police station, respondent caused to be entered in the
Police Blotter a statement that he, assisted by agents of the NBI, formally served on
complainant the appellate court’s resolution/order.3 In order to diffuse the tension, complainant
agreed to allow the children to sleep with respondent for one night on condition that he would
not take them away from Tanjay City. This agreement was entered into in the presence of
Tanjay City Chief of Police Juanito Condes and NBI Investigator Roger Sususco, among others.

In the early morning of January 16, 2002, complainant received information that a van arrived at
the hotel where respondent and the children were staying to take them to Bacolod City.
Complainant rushed to the hotel and took the children to another room, where they stayed until
later in the morning.

On the same day, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 31,
a verified petition4 for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus asserting his right to custody of
the children on the basis of the alleged Court of Appeals’ resolution. In the meantime,
complainant verified the authenticity of the Resolution and obtained a certification dated January
18, 20025 from the Court of Appeals stating that no such resolution ordering complainant to
surrender custody of their children to respondent had been issued.

At the hearing of the petition for habeas corpus on January 23, 2002, respondent did not
appear. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint alleging that respondent violated his attorney’s
oath by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious Court of Appeals’ Resolution in and
outside a court of law. Furthermore, respondent abused and misused the privileged granted to
him by the Supreme Court to practice law in the country.

After respondent answered the complaint, the matter was referred to the IBP-Commission on
Bar Discipline for investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP-CBD recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years with a warning that
another offense of this nature will result in his disbarment.6 On June 23, 2003, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the Report and recommendation of the Commission with the
modification that the penalty of suspension be increased to six years.

The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent can be held administratively liable for
his reliance on and attempt to enforce a spurious Resolution of the Court of Appeals.

In his answer to the complaint, respondent claims that he acted in good faith in invoking the
Court of Appeals Resolution which he honestly believed to be authentic. This, however, is belied
by the fact that he used and presented the spurious resolution several times. As pointed out by
the Investigating Commissioner, the assailed Resolution was presented by respondent on at
least two occasions: first, in his Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus docketed as
Special Proc. Case No. 3898,7 which he filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City;
and second, when he sought the assistance of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Tanjay
City to recover custody of his minor children from complainant. Since it was respondent who
used the spurious Resolution, he is presumed to have participated in its fabrication.

Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer.1âwphi1 The burden cast on the judiciary
would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. The time that
will have to be devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted could easily be
imagined. Even with due recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in
the defense of a client’s cause, it must never be at the expense of the truth.8 Thus, the Code of
professional Responsibility states:

CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the
language or the argument of an opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or
knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or
assert as a fact that which has not been proved.

Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive language in his pleadings in
describing complainant and her relatives. A lawyer’s language should be forceful but dignified,
emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession.9 The lawyer’s arguments whether written or oral should be gracious to both court
and opposing counsel and should be of such words as may be properly addressed by one
gentlemen to another.10 By calling complainant, a "sly manipulator of truth" as well as a
"vindictive congenital prevaricator", hardly measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of a
lawyer.

Respondent’s actions erode the public perception of the legal profession. They constitute gross
misconduct and the sanctions for such malfeasance is prescribed by Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court which states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.- A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.

Considering the attendant circumstances, we agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board
of Governors that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law. However, we find
that the period of six years is too harsh a penalty. Instead, suspension for the lesser p8eriod of
two years, which we deem commensurate to the offense committed, is hereby imposed on
respondent.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Atty. James Benedict C. Florido is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.

Let copies of this resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of the
Bar and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6198 September 15, 2006

RENATO M. MALIGAYA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ANTONIO G. DORONILLA, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. of the Judge Advocate General's Service is before us on a charge
of unethical conduct for having uttered a falsehood in open court during a hearing of Civil Case
No. Q-99-38778.1
Civil Case No. Q-99-38778 was an action for damages filed by complainant Renato M.
Maligaya, a doctor and retired colonel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, against several
military officers for whom Atty. Doronilla stood as counsel. At one point during the February 19,
2002 hearing of the case, Atty. Doronilla said:
And another matter, Your Honor. I was appearing in other cases he [complainant Maligaya] filed
before against the same defendants. We had an agreement that if we withdraw the case against
him, he will also withdraw all the cases. So, with that understanding, he even retired and he is
now receiving pension.2 (emphasis supplied)

Considering this to be of some consequence, presiding Judge Reynaldo B. Daway asked a

number of clarificatory questions and thereafter ordered Atty. Doronilla to put his statements in
writing and "file the appropriate pleading."3 Weeks passed but Atty. Doronilla submitted no such
pleading or anything else to substantiate his averments.
On April 29, 2002, Maligaya filed a complaint against Atty. Doronilla in the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline.4 The complaint, which charged Atty. Doronilla
with "misleading the court through misrepresentation of facts resulting [in] obstruction of
justice,"5 was referred to a commissioner6 for investigation. Complainant swore before the
investigating commissioner that he had never entered into any agreement to withdraw his
lawsuits.7 Atty. Doronilla, who took up the larger part of two hearings to present evidence and
explain his side, admitted several times that there was, in fact, no such agreement.8 Later he
explained in his memorandum that his main concern was "to settle the case amicably among
comrades in arms without going to trial"9 and insisted that there was no proof of his having
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyer's oath.10 He pointed out, in
addition, that his false statement (or, as he put it, his "alleged acts of falsity") had no effect on
the continuance of the case and therefore caused no actual prejudice to complainant.11
In due time, investigating commissioner Lydia A. Navarro submitted a report and
recommendation finding Atty. Doronilla guilty of purposely stating a falsehood in violation of
Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility12 and recommending that he
be "suspended from the government military service as legal officer for a period of three
months."13 This was adopted and approved in toto by the IBP Board of Governors on August
30, 2003.14
There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers who, as officers of the court,
participate in the dispensation of justice, to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth
and honor.15 The common caricature that lawyers by and large do not feel compelled to speak
the truth and to act honestly should not become a common reality.16 To this end, Canon 10 and
Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility state:
CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS, AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

By stating untruthfully in open court that complainant had agreed to withdraw his lawsuits, Atty.
Doronilla breached these peremptory tenets of ethical conduct. Not only that, he violated the
lawyer's oath to "do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court," of which Canon 10
and Rule 10.01 are but restatements. His act infringed on every lawyer's duty to "never seek to
mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law."17
Atty. Doronilla's unethical conduct was compounded, moreover, by his obstinate refusal to
acknowledge the impropriety of what he had done. From the very beginning of this
administrative case, Atty. Doronilla maintained the untenable position that he had done nothing
wrong in the hearing of Civil Case No. Q-99-38778. He persisted in doing so even after having
admitted that he had, in that hearing, spoken of an agreement that did not in truth exist. Rather
than express remorse for that regrettable incident, Atty. Doronilla resorted to an ill-conceived
attempt to evade responsibility, professing that the falsehood had not been meant for the
information of Judge Daway but only as "a sort of question" to complainant regarding a "pending
proposal" to settle the case.18
The explanation submitted by Atty. Doronilla, remarkable only for its speciousness,19 cannot
absolve him. If anything, it leads us to suspect an unseemly readiness on his part to obfuscate
plain facts for the unworthy purpose of escaping his just deserts. There is in his favor, though, a
presumption of good faith20 which keeps us from treating the incongruity of his proffered
excuse as an indication of mendacity. Besides, in the light of his avowal that his only aim was
"to settle the case amicably among comrades in arms without going to trial,"21 perhaps it is not
unreasonable to assume that what he really meant to say was that he had intended the
misrepresentation as a gambit to get the proposed agreement on the table, as it were. But even
if that had been so, it would have been no justification for speaking falsely in court. There is
nothing in the duty of a lawyer to foster peace among disputants that, in any way, makes it
necessary under any circumstances for counsel to state as a fact that which is not true. A
lawyer's duty to the court to employ only such means as are consistent with truth and honor22
forbids recourse to such a tactic. Thus, even as we give Atty. Doronilla the benefit of the doubt
and accept as true his avowed objective of getting the parties to settle the case amicably, we
must call him to account for resorting to falsehood as a means to that end.
Atty. Doronilla's offense is within the ambit of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which
in part declares:
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit x x x or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice x x x.

The suspension referred to in the foregoing provision means only suspension from the practice
of law. For this reason, we disagree with the IBP's recommendation for Atty. Doronilla's
suspension from the government military service. After all, the only purpose of this
administrative case is to determine Atty. Doronilla's liability as a member of the legal profession,
not his liability as a legal officer in the military service. Thus, it would be improper for us to order,
as a penalty for his breach of legal ethics and the lawyer's oath, his suspension from
employment in the Judge Advocate General's Service. Of course, suspension from employment
as a military legal officer may well follow as a consequence of his suspension from the practice
of law but that should not be reason for us to impose it as a penalty for his professional
misconduct. We would be going beyond the purpose of this proceeding were we to do so.
Therefore, we shall treat the IBP's recommendation as one for suspension from the practice of
law.
At any rate, we are not inclined to adopt the IBP's recommendation on the duration of Atty.
Doronilla's suspension. We need to consider a few circumstances that mitigate his liability
somewhat. First, we give him credit for exhibiting enough candor to admit, during the
investigation, the falsity of the statement he had made in Judge Daway's courtroom. Second,
the absence of material damage to complainant may also be considered as a mitigating
circumstance.23 And finally, since this is Atty. Doronilla's first offense, he is entitled to some
measure of forbearance.24
Nonetheless, his unrepentant attitude throughout the conduct of this administrative case tells us
that a mere slap on the wrist is definitely not enough. Atty. Doronilla, it seems, needs time away
from the practice of law to recognize his error and to purge himself of the misbegotten notion
that an effort to compromise justifies the sacrifice of truthfulness in court.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for TWO MONTHS. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar misconduct shall be
dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to his personal record and copies furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Court Administrator, the Chief-of-Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Commanding General of the AFP Judge Advocate
General's Service.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No.7054 November 11, 2014

CONRADO N. QUE, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

For the Court's consideration is the Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency1 filed by Atty.
Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. (respondent), who seeks to be reinstated as a member of the Philippine
Bar.
Factual Background

In a Decision2 dated December 4, 2009, this Court disbarred the respondent from the practice
of law on the following grounds: abuse of court procedures and processes; filing of multiple
actions and forum-shopping; willful, intentional and deliberate resort to falsehood and deception
before the courts; maligning the name of his fellow lawyer; and fraudulent and unauthorized
appearances in court.

The material portions of the subject Decision provide:

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent committed various acts of
professional misconduct and thereby failed to live up to the exacting ethical standards imposed
on members of the Bar. We cannot, agree, however, that only a penalty of one-year suspension
from the practice of law should be imposed. Neither should we limit ourselves to the originally
recommendedpenalty of suspension for two (2) years.

Given the respondent’s multiple violations, his past record as previously discussed, and the
nature of these violations which shows the readiness to disregard court rules and to gloss over
concerns for the orderly administration of justice,we believe and so hold that the appropriate
action of this Court is to disbar the respondent to keep him away from the law profession and
from any significant role in the administration of justice which he has disgraced. He is a
continuing risk, too, to the public that the legal profession serves. Not even his ardor and
overzealousness in defending the interests of his client can save him. Such traits at the expense
of everything else, particularly the integrity of the profession and the orderly administration of
justice, this Court cannot accept nor tolerate.

Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the respondent’s first ethical infraction of
the same nature. We penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia versus Atty.
Anastacio E. Revilla for his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse of court
procedures and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for collaborating with non-
lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We showed leniency then by reducing his penalty to
suspension for six (6) months. We cannot similarly treat the respondent this time; it is clear that
he did not learn any lesson from his past experience and since then has exhibited traits of
incorrigibility. It is time to put a finis to the respondent’s professional legal career for the sake of
the public, the profession and the interest of justice.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM Resolution No. XVII-2005-164 dated

December 17, 2005 and Resolution No. XVII-2008-657 dated December 11, 2008 of the Board
of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline insofar as respondent Atty. Anastacio
Revilla, Jr. is found liable for professional misconduct for violations of the Lawyer’s Oath; Canon
8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; and Rule 19.01, Canon
19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court. However, we modify the penalty the IBP imposed, and hold that the respondent
should be DISBARREDfrom the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.

On July 8, 2010, the respondent filed a Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion3 praying
that his license to practice law be restored based on humanitarian considerations, but the Court
En Bancresolved to deny the petition for lack of merit.

The respondent subsequently filed on January 11, 2011, an Appeal for Grace, Succor, and
Mercy4 asking the Court to take a second look at the penalty imposed upon him. He maintained
that Conrado N. Que (complainant) failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he
committed grossly immoral conduct meriting the severe penalty of disbarment. He also
attempted to pass the blame on another individual (a certain Gerolin Piedad, General Manager
of Kalayaan Development Corporation) to free himself from liability by claiming that one of the
charges leading to his disbarment was not of his own doing.

In a Resolution5 dated February 8, 2011, the Court denied the appeal.

The respondent again wrote the Court on July 13, 2011, reiterating his pleas for the Court’s
compassion and mercy.6 He sought the Court’s forgiveness stating that he has learned his
lesson; but at the same time, questioning the Court’s finding for lackof factual support. He
appended to his appeal proofs of his updated payment of IBP membership dues,7 MCLE
compliance,8 and a letter from the Bishop of Marinduque.9 His appeal, however, was denied by
a Resolution10 dated August 2, 2011.

On May 17, 2012, the respondent sent a letter11 addressed to the Members of the Court En
Banc once again reiterating his prayer to lift the order of disbarment. He alleged among others
that for more than three years that he has been disbarred in the practice of law, he has never
been involved in any immoral or illegal activities, has devoted himself in the services of St. Peter
Parish and Shrine, CommonwealthAvenue as Eucharistic Minister leader, has conducted
regular monthly lectures on the subject of marriage at the Diocese of Novaliches, and has
participated as monthly financial contributor to Mr. Carmel Church, Lucena City. He also begged
the Court to no longer prolong his penalty since it had already served its purpose. The plea was
also denied on July 3, 2012.12

On August 30, 2012, the respondent once more prayed for his reinstatement professing
repentance and remorse for what he did.13 He pleaded for the Court’s consideration, and
vowed that he will no longer misuse the rules of procedure but instead, devote his time and
energy for its proper observance and implementation. He also stated that for almost three years
of being disbarred from the practice of law, he has never been involved in any unlawful,
dishonest, and immoral activities. He promised to maintain at all times a high degree of legal
proficiency, morality, integrity, and fair dealings to the courts, clients, and the legal profession in
accordance with the values and morals embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In a Resolution14 dated October 9, 2012, the Court denied his petition for lack of merit.
Aggrieved, the respondent filed on March 27, 2013 a letter15 pleading the Court to revisit his
previousrequests for reinstatement.

Treating his letter as a motion for the reconsideration of the resolutions dated August 2, 2011,
July3, 2012, and October 9, 2012, the Court, on June 4, 2013 deniedthe motion with finality.16
On July 18, 2014, the respondent filed a Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency17 reiterating
his apologies to the Court. He stressed that the penalty of disbarment has already taken its toll
on his health; he has now become most frail and weak; and he had been diagnosed with
chronic kidney disease at stage five (5) and undergoing dialysis thrice weekly. He also stressed
that in the years that he had been excluded from the practice of law, he devoted his time to
Christian and charity pursuits serving with all humility as a Lay Minister and a regular lecturer on
Legal Aspect of Marriage at St. Peter Church, Quezon City.

The respondent also pleads for clemency, not because he intends to practice law again, but to
be made whole, to recover from being shattered, and to finally have peace of mind.
Heexpressed his sincere repentance and deep remorse by taking full responsibility for his
misdemeanor. He also prayed that his disbarment be lifted and that he be reinstated as a
member of the Philippine bar. As part of his petition, he submitted a Medical Abstract18
evidencing his diagnosis for chronic kidney disease, and a certification19 from St. Peter Parish,
Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, proving that he and his family are dedicated
parishioners.

The Court's Ruling

We deny the present appeal.

Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.20 It is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right granted to everyone who demands it, but rather, a special privilege granted
and continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness inintellectual attainment and in
moral character.21 The same reasoning applies to reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer. When
exercising its inherent power to grant reinstatement, the Court should see to it that only those
who establish their present moral fitness and knowledge of the law will be readmitted to the Bar.
Thus, though the doors to the practice of law are never permanently closed on a disbarred
attorney, the Court owes a duty to the legal profession as well as to the general public to ensure
that if the doors are opened,it is done so only as a matter of justice.22

The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatementto the practice of law is whether the lawyer has
sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and character.23 Whether the applicant
shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of the
Court.24 The lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or
she is again worthy of membership in the Bar. The Court will take into consideration his or her
character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for
which he or she was disbarred, his or her conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time
that has elapsed in between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement.25

In the present case, we note that before his admission to the Bar, the respondent had
demonstrated an active involvement and participation in community and church activities by
joining Youth For Christ, Catechism, and Bible Study and Sharing. Likewise, upon admission to
the Bar, the respondent worked as Municipal Attorney in Sta. Cruz, Marinduque rendering free
legal assistance to his townmates who were inneed of legal service. Thereafter, the
respondentwas appointed as a Municipal Administrator and had continued extending assistance
to the indigent residents.

The respondent also actively engaged and participated in various community projects, through
the Marinduque Jaycees, where he served as President from 1980 to 1981, and the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Marinduque Chapter, where he served as a member, Director, and
President from 1982 to 1987.

In his present appeal for judicial clemency, the respondent acknowledged his indiscretions and
claimed to have taken full responsibility for his misdemeanor. Unlike in his previous
petitions/appeal for judicial clemency, the respondent no longerquestioned the Court’s decision.
According to him, he has long expressed deep remorse and genuine repentance.

The respondent also claimed that the long period of his disbarment gave him sufficient time to
reflect on his professional conduct, to show remorse and repentance, and to realize the gravity
of his mistakes. After his disbarment, the respondent continued lending assistance, and
deviated his time and effort in pursuing civic and religious work that significantly contributed to
his character reformation.He professed that during his almost five (5) years of disbarment, he
has been an active member of the Couples for Christ, Marriage Encounter, and Knights of
Columbus; and through his affiliations with these groups, he had served in the ecclesial affairs
in his parish as an Extraordinary Minister for Holy Communion and a lecturer on Legal Aspect of
Marriage Pre-Cana and Marriage Preparation Seminar at the Parish Church of St. Peter in
Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.

Although the Court believes that the respondent is not inherently lacking in moral fiber as shown
by his conduct prior to his disbarment, we are not convinced that he had sufficiently achieved
moral reformation.

In Rodolfo M. Bernardo v. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia,26 the Court, in deciding whether or not to
reinstate Atty. Mejia, considered that 15 years had already elapsed from the time hewas
disbarred, which gave him sufficient time to acknowledge his infractions and to repent. The
Court also took into account the fact that Atty. Mejiais already of advanced years, has long
repented, and suffered enough. The Court also notedthat he had made a significant contribution
by putting up the Mejia Law Journal containing his religious and social writings; and the religious
organization named "El Cristo Movement and Crusade on Miracle of the Heart and Mind."
Furthermore, the Court considered that Atty. Mejia committed no other transgressions since he
was disbarred.

Similarly in Adez Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,27 the Court granted the reinstatement of the
disbarred lawyer (found to be guilty of intercalating a material fact in a CA decision) and
considered the period of three (3) years as sufficient time to do soul-searching and to prove that
he is worthy to practice law. In that case, the Court took into consideration the disbarred
lawyer’s sincere admission of guilt and repeated pleas for compassion.

Also in Valencia v. Antiniw,28 the Court reinstated Atty. Antiniw (who was found guilty of
malpractice in falsifying a notarized deed of sale and subsequently introducing the document in
court) after considering the long period of his disbarment (almost 15 years). The Court
considered that during Atty. Antiniw’s disbarment, he has been persistent in reiterating his
apologies to the Court, has engaged inhumanitarian and civic services, and retained an
unblemished record as an elected public servant, as shown by the testimonials of the numerous
civic and professional organizations, government institutions, and members of the judiciary.

In all these cases, the Court considered the conduct of the disbarred attorney before and after
his disbarment, the time that had elapsed from the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement, and more importantly, the disbarred attorneys’ sincere realization and
acknowledgement of guilt.

In the present case, we are not fully convinced that the passage of more than four (4) years is
sufficient to enable the respondent to reflect and to realize his professional transgressions.

We emphasize that this is the second timethat the respondent was accused and was found
guilty of gross misconduct.1âwphi1 The respondent, in an earlier case of Plus Builders, Inc. v.
Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla,Jr.,29 was likewise found guilty of gross misconduct for committing
willful and intentional falsehood before the court; misusing court procedure and processes to
delay the execution of a judgment; and collaborating with nonlawyers in the illegal practice of
law – mostly the same grounds on which the Decision dated December 4, 2009 (2nd
disbarment) was based. In Plus Builders, we granted the respondent’s motion for
reconsideration and reduced the penalty of suspension from the practice of law from two (2)
years to six (6) months out of compassion to the respondent.

Considering the respondent’s earlier disbarment case(and subsequent reduction of the penalty
imposed as an act of clemency), and another disbarment case against him still pending review
by the Court, we are not fully and convincingly satisfied that the respondent has already
reformed. The period of five (5) years is likewise not considerably long considering the nature
and perversityof the respondent’s misdeeds. We believe that it is still early for the Court to
consider the respondent’s reinstatement.

Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the respondent's sincerity in acknowledging his

guilt.1âwphi1 While he expressly stated in his appeal that he had taken full responsibility of his
misdemeanor, his previous inclination to pass the blame to other individuals, to invoke self-
denial, and to make alibis for his wrongdoings, contradicted his assertion. The respondent also
failed to submit proof satisfactorily showing his contrition. He failed to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that he is again worthy of membership in the legal profession. We thus
entertain serious doubts that the respondent had completely reformed.

As a final word, while the Court sympathizes with the respondent's unfortunate physical
condition, we stress that in considering his application for reinstatement to the practice of law,
the duty of the Court is to determine whether he has established moral reformation and
rehabilitation, disregarding its feeling of sympathy or pity. Surely at this point, this requirement
was not met. Until such time when the respondent can demonstrate to the Court that he has
completely rehabilitated himself and deserves to resume his membership in the Bar, Our
decision to disbar him from the practice of law stands.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency filed by Atty.
Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5653 February 27, 2006

JOHN SIY LIM, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CARMELITO A. MONTANO, Respondent.
DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Atty. Carmelito A. Montano stands charged with gross misconduct relative to his filing of Civil
Case No. C-19928 entitled Spouses Tomas See Tuazon and Natividad See Deecho v. John Siy
Lim and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City.1

It appears that complainant John Siy Lim was the defendant in Civil Case No. C-14542 for
reformation of contract, quieting of title, with damages, then pending before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 131.2 The subject of the dispute was a 650-square meter
conjugal lot along A. del Mundo Street, 7th Avenue, Caloocan City covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 860. After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of defendant (complainant
herein), and declared that the deed of sale the parties executed on July 15, 1987 was an
absolute and unconditional conveyance of subject property by the plaintiff in favor of such
defendant. On motion for reconsideration, however, the trial court reversed itself and declared
that the sale was in fact an equitable mortgage. It thus ordered the cancellation of TCT No.
152621 and the reinstatement of the previous title on the subject property.
The complainant appealed the case to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
40167. In its Decision dated March 31, 1995, the appellate court reversed the ruling of the RTC,
to wit:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Order dated November 16, 1992, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and the original Decision of the trial court, dated December 2, 1991, hereby
REINSTATED, with the modification that plaintiff-appellee is ordered to pay defendant-appellant
the sum of Five Thousand (₱5,000.00) Pesos a month as reasonable rental for the use and
occupation of Apartment No. 161 from July 15, 1988 until the premises shall have been vacated
and possession thereof peacefully turned over to defendant-appellant.

The counterclaim for attorney’s fees of defendant-appellant is DENIED. There is no clear

showing that the action taken by plaintiff-appellee was done in bad faith. There should be no
penalty on the right to litigate.3

The aggrieved party elevated the matter to this Court, and the petition was docketed as G.R.
No. 119794. On October 3, 2000, the Court affirmed the ruling of the CA and denied the
petition.4 Entry of judgment was made of record on October 3, 2000.5

On January 4, 2002, respondent filed a Notice of Appearance6 as counsel of Tomas See

Tuazon (the losing party) in the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 131 in Civil Case No. C-14542.
On January 7, 2002, he filed, in behalf of his client, a "Motion to Comply to [sic] Decision without
Writ,"7 worded as follows:

1. Plaintiff is aware that pursuant to the decision of the court, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court, the decision on the present case had already become final
and executory.

2. In order to avoid undue inconvenience on the part of herein defendant, plaintiff shall
voluntarily settle the money judgment as stated in the decision sought to be enforced.

3. The plaintiff will be filing Eight Hundred Ten Thousand (₱810,000.00) Pesos, equivalent to
162 months of rent as per decision and the same to be covered by supersedeas bond issued by
a reliable insurance company to answer for said obligation.

4. Every month starting February 15, 2002, plaintiff shall deposit to the court the amount of
₱5,000.00 as monthly rent.8

On the same date, respondent, in behalf of his clients (the spouses Tomas See Tuazon) filed
the Complaint9 for nullity of TCT and other documents, reconveyance, maintenance of physical
possession before the RTC of Caloocan City, eventually raffled to Branch 121 thereof (Civil
Case No. C-19928).
Meantime, on February 19, 2002, Judge Luisito C. Sardillo of Branch 12610 issued an Order11
in Civil Case No. C-14542 granting the Motion for Execution with Manifestation earlier filed by
the prevailing party (complainant herein), and denying for lack of merit, the "Motion to Comply to
[sic] Decision without Writ" filed by respondent counsel.

This prompted the complainant to file the instant complaint for disbarment against respondent.
In his Complaint-Affidavit12 dated March 20, 2002, complainant alleged that respondent filed
the complaint in Civil Case No. C-19928 out of malice, pointing out that it involves "the same
parties, the same causes of action and relief prayed for as that of Civil Case No. C-14542."
Thus, the complainant prayed that the respondent be "disbarred and/or suspended from the
practice of law for his gross misconduct," on the following allegation:

6. Evidently, I have been subjected to harassment by the antics of the respondent in filing a
recycled case docketed as Civil Case No. C-19928 on January 07, 2002. Respondent is guilty in
abetting the conduct of his clients, Sps. Tuazon. He has clearly violated his lawyer’s oath not to
promote or sue groundless, false or unlawful suits among others. Instead of counseling his
clients to abide and obey the decision of our Supreme Court, the final arbiter of all controversies
and disputes, he is showing disrespect to a final and executory decision of our court.13

In his Comment,14 respondent denied the allegations against him. While he admitted that he
filed Civil Case No. C-19928 as counsel for the plaintiff therein, he claimed that it was not filed
with malicious intent. Moreover, while the new case involved the same party, it was for a
different cause of action and relief, and, as such, the principle of res judicata did not apply. He
further explained that the complaint in Civil Case No. C-14542 was for declaratory relief or
reformation of instrument, while Civil Case No. 19928 was for annulment of title. He accepted
the case based on "his professional appreciation that his client had a good case."

In his Reply,15 the complainant stressed that the respondent was guilty of forum shopping; Civil
Case No. C-19928 was nothing but a revival of the old complaint; and "the lame excuse of the
respondent that the present case is an action in rem while the other case is an action in
personam" did not merit consideration.

On November 25, 2002, the Court resolved to refer the matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.16

On September 1, 2003, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline assigned the case to
Commissioner Salvador L. Peña. Only the counsel for the respondent appeared at the
mandatory conference held on September 30, 2003. Finding that there were no factual issues in
the case, Commissioner Peña terminated the mandatory conference and ordered the parties to
submit their respective verified Position Papers, and, thereafter, considered the case submitted
for resolution.
The case was re-assigned to Commissioner Doroteo B. Aguila who submitted his Report and
Recommendation dated May 9, 2005, finding the respondent guilty of misconduct. It was
recommended that respondent be meted a two months’ suspension from the practice of law.

According to the Investigating Commissioner, the elements of res judicata are present in this
case as to bar the filing of Civil Case No. C-19928 since (a) the judgment in Civil Case No. C-
14542, upholding the validity of the absolute deed of sale, had attained finality; (b) the court
which rendered the decision had the required jurisdiction; and (c) the disposition of the case
was a judgment on the merits.

On October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued
Resolution No. XVII-2005-108, adopting said Report and Recommendation with the modification
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.

We agree that respondent is administratively liable.lavvph!1.net

In this case, it is clear that respondent is guilty of forum shopping. By his own admission, he
was aware that Civil Case No. C-14542 was already final and executory when he filed the
second case (Civil Case No. C-19928). His allegation that he "was not the original counsel of his
clients" and that "when he filed the subsequent case for nullity of TCT, his motive was to protect
the rights of his clients whom he believed were not properly addressed in the prior case for
reformation and quieting of title," deserves scant consideration. As a responsible member of the
bar, he should have explained the effect of such final and executory decision on his clients’
rights, instead of encouraging them to file another case involving the same property and
asserting the same rights.

The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a
favorable judgment. It exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks
a favorable opinion in another, or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable decision. An
important factor in determining its existence is the vexation caused to the courts and the parties-
litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs.17 Forum shopping
exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case
will amount to res judicata in another.18 Thus, the following requisites should concur:

(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, (b)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and
(c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration. x x x19

The fact that the parties in the first and second cases are not identical will not prevent the
application of the principle of res judicata. Mere substantial identity of parties, or a community of
interests between a party in the first case and a party in the subsequent case, even if the latter
was not impleaded in the first case, is sufficient.20 Moreover, a party cannot, by varying the
form of action or adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the
principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated between the same
parties or their privies.21 This was what respondent resorted to in order to give some
semblance of merit to the complaint for annulment of title. He should have realized that the
ruling of the Court in Tuazon v. Court of Appeals22 effectively determined with finality the rights
and obligations of the parties under the questioned deed of sale.

A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice.23 The filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the Court’s
processes and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration
of justice and will be punished as contempt of court. Needless to state, the lawyer who files
such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a final and
executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for incompetence (for not knowing
any better) or for willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the
courts, and to maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just and are consistent with
truth and honor. 24

The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in violation of the doctrine of
res judicata, runs contrary to Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
requires a lawyer to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice. By his actuations, respondent also violated Rule 12.0225 and
Rule 12.0426 of the Code, as well as a lawyer’s mandate "to delay no man for money or
malice."27

Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration
of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice
contravenes such lawyer’s duty. Indeed, the Court has time and again warned not to resort to
forum shopping for this practice clogs the court dockets.28

While we rule that the respondent should be sanctioned for his actions, we also note that the
power to disbar should be exercised with great caution, to be imposed only in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
Court and as a member of the bar. Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser
penalty could accomplish the end desired.29

WHEREFORE, for violating Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent

Atty. Carmelito A. Montano is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months. He is STERNLY WARNED that any future violation of his duties as a lawyer will be
dealt with more severely. This Decision is immediately executory. Atty. Montano is DIRECTED
to inform the Court of the date of receipt of this decision.

SO ORDERED.
VICENTE SOTTO January 21, 1949

In re VICENTE SOTTO, for contempt of court.

Vicente Sotto in his own behalf.

FERIA, J.:

This is a proceeding for contempt of our court against the respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto, who
was required by their Court on December 7, 1948, to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt to court for having issued a written statement in connection with the
decision of this Court in In re Angel Parazo for contempt of court, which statement, as published
in the Manila Times and other daily newspapers of the locality, reads as follows:
As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53.) interpreted by the Supreme Court in
the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now has to suffer 30 days imprisonment,
for his refusal to divulge the source of a news published in his paper, I regret to say that our
High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once more putting in
evidence the incompetency of narrow mindedness o the majority of its members, In the wake of
so many mindedness of the majority deliberately committed during these last years, I believe
that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme
Court. To his effect, I announce that one of the first measures, which as its objects the complete
reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, a constant peril to liberty and
democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf may hear: the Supreme
Court very of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable
times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were
the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary.

Upon his request, the respondent was granted ten days more besides the five originally given
him to file his answer, and although his answer was filed after the expiration of the period of
time given him the said answer was admitted. This Court could have rendered a judgment for
contempt after considering his answer, because he does not deny the authenticity of the
statement as it has been published. But, in order to give the respondent ample opportunity to
defend himself or justify the publication of such libelous statement, the case was set for hearing
or oral argument on January 4, the hearing being later postponed to January 10, 1949. As the
respondent did not appear at the date set for hearing, the case was submitted for decision.
In his answer, the respondent does not deny having published the above quoted threat, and
intimidation as well as false and calumnious charges against this Supreme Court. But he therein
contends that under section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, which confers upon this Supreme
Court the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, "this Court
has no power to impose correctional penalties upon the citizens, and that the Supreme Court
can only impose fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and has to be promulgated by
Congress with the approval of the Chief Executive." And he also alleges in his answer that "in
the exercise of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution, the respondent made his
statement in the press with the utmost good faith and with no intention of offending any of the
majority of the honorable members of this high Tribunal, who, in his opinion, erroneously
decided the Parazo case; but he has not attacked, or intended to attack the honesty or integrity
of any one.' The other arguments set forth by the respondent in his defenses observe no
consideration.
Rules 64 of the rules promulgated by this court does not punish as for contempt of court an act
which was not punishable as such under the law and the inherent powers of the court to punish
for contempt. The provisions of section 1 and 3 of said Rule 64 are a mere reproduction of
section 231 and 232 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, amended, in connection
with the doctrine laid down by this Court on the inherent power if the superior courts to punish
for contempt is several cases, among them In re Kelly, 35 Phil., 944. That the power to punish
for contempt is inherent in all courts of superior statue, is a doctrine or principle uniformly
accepted and applied by the courts of last resort in the United States, which is applicable in this
jurisdiction since our Constitution and courts of justice are patterned as expounded in American
Jurisprudence is as follows:
The power of inflicting punishment upon persons guilty of contempt of court may be regarded as
an essential element of judicial authority, IT is possessed as a part of the judicial authority
granted to courts created by the Constitution of the United States or by the Constitutions of the
several states. It is a power said to be inherent in all courts general jurisdiction, whether they
are State or Federal; such power exists in courts of general jurisdiction independently of any
special express grant of statute. In many instances the right of certain courts of tribunals to
punish for contempt is expressly bestowed by statue, but such statutory authorization is
unnecessary, so far as the courts of general jurisdiction are concerned, and in general adds
nothing statutory authority may be necessary as concerns the inferior courts statutory authority
may be necessary to empower them to act. (Contempt, 12 Jur., pp. 418, 419.)

In conformity with the principle enunciated in the above quotation from American Jurisprudence,
this Court, in In re Kelly, held the following:
The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending cause, respecting the same,
has always been considered as misbehavior, tending to obstruct the administration of justice,
and subjects such persons to contempt proceedings. Parties have a constitutional right to have
their fairly in court, by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publications or public clamor. Every
citizen has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have
justice administered by the courts, under the protection and forms of law, free from outside
coercion or interference. Any publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the upon court, the
parties, the officers of the court, the counsel, etc., with reference to the suit, or tending to
influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable. The power to
punish for contempt is inherent in all court. The summary power to commit and punish for
contempt tending to obstructed or degrade the administration of justice, as inherent in courts as
essential to the execution of their powers and to the maintenance of their authority is a part of
the law of the land. (In re Kelly, 35 Phil., 944, 945.)
Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the
decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if well
founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if
it is not well taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in reversing
or modifying its decision. Had the respondent in the present case limited himself to as statement
that our decision is wrong or that our construction of the intention of the law is not correct,
because it is different from what he, as proponent of the original bill which became a law had
intended, his criticism might in that case be tolerated, for it could not in any way influence the
final disposition of the Parazo case by the court; inasmuch as it is of judicial notice that the bill
presented by the respondent was amended by both Houses of Congress, and the clause
"unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the interest of the State" was added
or inserted; and that, as the Act was passed by Congress and not by any particular member
thereof, the intention of Congress and not that of the respondent must be the one to be
determined by this Court in applying said act.
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the press, the
respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was
then and still is pending reconsideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only
intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next
Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing
the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the members of Justices from
eleven to seven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case,
who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the
final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of
justice. But the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent
purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the administration of
justice, for in his above-quoted statement he says:
In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, I
believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the members of the
Supreme Court. To this effect, I announce that one of the first measures, which I will introduce
in the coming congressional sessions, will have as its object the complete reorganization of the
Supreme Court. As it is now the Supreme Court of today constitutes a constant peril to liberty
and democracy.

To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately "so
many blunders and injustices," that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of one party
knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose
favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend
necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court, and consequently to lower or degrade the administration of justice by
this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to
which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their
rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and
integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they
might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be
the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other,
is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity
according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions,
which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
Respondent's assertion in his answer that "he made his statement in the press with the utmost
good faith and without intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable members of
this high Tribunal," if true may mitigate but not exempt him from liability for contempt of court;
but it is belied by his acts and statements during the pendency of this proceeding. The
respondent in his petition of December 11, alleges that Justice Gregorio Perfecto is the principal
promoter of this proceeding for contempt, conveying thereby the idea that this Court acted in the
case through the instigation of Mr. Justice Perfecto.
It is true that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and the press must be protected
to its fullest extent, but license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen should not be
confused with liberty in its true sense. As important as the maintenance of an unmuzzled press
and the free exercise of the right of the citizen, is the maintenance of the independence of the
judiciary. As Judge Holmes very appropriately said U. S vs Sullens (1929), 36 Fed. (2nd), 230,
238, 239: "The administration of justice and the freedom of the press, though separate and
distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The press and the
courts have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to uphold the principles of the
Constitution and laws, from which the former receives its prerogatives and the latter its
jurisdiction. The right of legitimate publicity must be scrupulously recognized and care taken at
all times to avoid impinging upon it. In a clear case where it is necessary, in order to dispose of
judicial business unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to impair the impartiality of
verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice, this court will not hesitate to exercise
its undoubted power to punish for contempt. This Court must be permitted to proceed with the
disposition if its business in an orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive of its
constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a
last resort, as a individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence
as an unprejudiced tribunal. . . ."
It is also well settled that an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be
respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts, he may be removed from office or
stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L. R. A. [N.S.], 586,
594).
In view of all the foregoing, we find the respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto guilty of contempt of this
Court by virtue of the above-quoted publication, and he is hereby sentenced to pay, within the
period of fifteen days from the promulgation of this judgment, a fine of P1,000, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The respondent is also hereby required to appear, within the same period, and show cause to
this Court why he should not be disbarred form practicing as an attorney-at-law in any of the
courts of this Republic, for said publication and the following statements made by him during the
pendency of the case against Angel Parazo for contempt of Court.
In his statement to the press as published in the Manila Times in its issue of December 9, 1948,
the respondent said "The Supreme Court can send me to jail, but it cannot close my mouth; "
and in his other statement published on December 10, 1948, in the same paper, he stated
among others: "It is not the imprisonment that is degrading, but the cause of the imprisonment."
In his Rizal day speech at the Abellana High School in Cebu, published on January 3, 1949, in
the Manila Daily Bulletin, the respondent said that "there was more freedom of speech when
American Justices sat in the Tribunal than now when it is composed of our countrymen;"
reiterated that "even if it succeeds in placing him behind bars, the court can not close his
mouth," and added: "I would consider imprisonment a precious heritage to leave for those who
would follow me because the cause is noble and lofty." And the Manila Chronicle of January 5
published the statement of the respondent in Cebu to the effect that this Court "acted with
malice" in citing him to appear before this Court on January 4 when "the members of this Court
know that I came here on vacation." In all said statements the respondent misrepresents to the
public the cause of the charge against him for contempt of court. He says that the cause is for
criticizing the decision of this Court in said Parazo case in defense of the freedom of the press,
when in truth and in fact he is charged with intending to interfere and influence the final
disposition of said case through intimidation and false accusations against this Supreme Court.
So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ.,
concur.

Separate Opinions

PERFECTO, J., concurring:

Respondent published in the Manila newspapers of Sunday, December 5, 1948, a written

statement in relation with the decision rendered by this Court sentencing Angel Parazo to 30
days imprisonment for contempt.

On December 7, 1948, considering the statement as "intended not only to intimidate the
members of this Court or influence the final disposition of said (Parazo) case, but also to
degrade and vilify the administration of justice," this Court adopted a resolution ordering
respondent to show cause within five days why he should not be punished for contempt,
"without prejudice to taking further action against him as attorney."

Alleging to be suffering from myologenous leukemia, with moderately severe anemia, and that
his physician had advised him to have "absolute rest and to avoid any form of mental and
physical strain for a few weeks," respondent prayed for a 15-day extension to file his answer. He
was granted a 10-day extension.

In the resolution of December 13, 1948, granting said extension, this Court branded as false
respondent's allegations the effect that he had formal charges pending in this Court against Mr.
Justice Perfecto and that the latter is the "moving spirit" of these contempt proceedings.

Two days after the expiration of the 10-day extension granted to him, respondent filed his
answer. The belated filing of said answer was overlooked by this Court in order not to deprive
respondent of the benefits of his answer. Filed out of time, due to his unexplained fault, it could
legally have been rejected.

In said answer, dated December 24, 1948, respondent repeated one of his allegations which, in
the resolution of December 13, 1948, this Court had already declared to be false.

Respondent has not denied that he is the author of the statement for which he has been
summoned to our bar for contempt and he has not denied the correctness of the text published
in the Manila Chronicle and other daily newspapers and which is reproduced in the resolution of
this Court of December 7, 1948.

In his statement, respondent does not limit himself to saying that this Tribunal has erroneously
interpreted Republic Act No. 53, but alleges that said erroneous interpretation "is once more
putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow-mindedness of the majority of its members,"
coupled with this sweeping and calumnious accusation:

In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, I
believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the members of the
Supreme Court.

To fittingly crown this dastard imputation of deliberately committing blunders and injustice,
respondent would bully the members of this Court, by making the following intimidating
announcement:

To this effect, I announce that one of the first measures, which I will introduce in the coming
congressional sessions, will have as its objects the complete reorganization of the Supreme
Court.

There are other rhetorical passages in respondent's statement, aimed to emphasize the nuclear
ideas of the statement, to the effect that the majority of the members of the Supreme Court are
incompetent and narrow-minded and guilty of "so many blunders and injustices deliberately
committed" and that the author will introduce in the coming congressional sessions a measure
"to change the members of the Supreme Court" and to effect a "complete reorganization of the
Supreme Court.

Among such maximizing expressions intended to stress the main ideas and purposes of the
statement are the following:

1. As it is now constituted, the Supreme Court of today constitutes a constant peril to liberty and
democracy.

2. It need be said loudly, very loudly so that even the deaf may hear: The Supreme Court if
today is far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano
Arellano, Victoriano Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the glory of the
Philippine judiciary.

3. The reporter, who is erroneously convicted of contempt and unjustly sentenced to 30 days
imprisonment by the Supreme Court, should be immediately and spontaneously pardoned by
the Executive Power, to serve as lesson in law to the majority of the members of that High
Tribunal.

4. That sentence is intolerable, and should be protested by all newspapers throughout the
country, under the cry of "The press demands better qualified justices for the Supreme Court."

There can be no question that respondent knowingly published false imputations against the
members of this Court. He accused them of such depravity as to have committed "blunders and
injustices deliberately." He has maliciously branded them to be incompetent, narrow-minded,
perpetrators of evil, "a constant peril to liberty and democracy," to be the opposite of those who
were the honor and glory of the Philippines judiciary, to be needing a lesson in law, to be
rendering an intolerable sentence, to be needing replacement by better qualified justices.

Respondent has not presented any evidence or offered any to support his slanderous
imputations, and no single word can be found in his answer showing that he ever believed that
the imputations are based on fact.

Respondent appears to belong to the class of individuals who have no compunction to resort to
falsehood of falsehoods. The record of this case indicates that the practice of falsehoods seems
to be habitual in respondent, and this is proved when he reiterated in his answer one of his
allegations in a previous petition which were pronounced by this Court to be false in its
resolution in its resolution of December 3, 1948.

More than thirty years ago, using the words of respondent himself, in "those memorable times of
Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, and Manual Araullo and other learned jurists who were the
glory of the Philippines judiciary" and when it was the "impregnable bulwark of Justice," the
Supreme Court pronounced respondent guilty of falsehoods three times: first, in case in which
he was sentenced to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional for criminally abducting
Aquilina Vasquez, a girl less then 18 years of age, and to pay her a dowry of P500 and to
support the offspring of his relations with her (U. S. vs. Sotto, 9 Phil., 231); second, in a
sentence of disbarment as a blackmailer (In re Sotto, 38 Phil., 532); and third, in prison
sentence for false libel (U. S. vs. Sotto, 38 Phil., 666). The first and the last sentences bear the
signature of Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano himself.

In the first case the Supreme Court found that only on July 29, 1906, Vicente Sotto wrote a letter
to Aquilina Vasquez, protesting his love for her and urging her to leave her house and go with
him; on the afternoon of August 1, 1906, Sotto made an arrangement with Luis Crisologo for the
renting of his house since that night when Sotto went with Aquilina into the room of the house,
where she passed the night; Sotto had told Crisologo that he wanted the house for a forestry
ranger who was just arriving from Bohol; Sotto did not leave the room until the middle of the
night; Aquilina transferred to a house in Sambag where Sotto brought various housekeeping
utensils; during the following days and nights Aquilina was visited by respondent.

On August 10, 1906, a complaint was filed against Vicente Sotto and Pio Datan, charging them
with the crime of rapto. As a defense, respondent offered evidence to show that on August 5,
1906, a legal marriage was celebrated between Aquilina and the accused Pio Datan, Sotto's
washerman and accomplice in crime. Upon the evidence, the Supreme Court pronounced the
celebration of the alleged marriage to be false. The certificate of marriage offered as evidence in
support of the claim that the marriage took place had been declared a forgery.

It is not necessary to give the details of the whole disgusting affair, wherein the revolting and
sinister nature of an individual is pictured in bold relief with some of its ugliest features. The
more that 4 years of imprisonment imposed upon the accused did not reform him. It only served
to emphasize the beginning of along career of falsehoods and slanders already spanning more
than 40 years, soon nearing half of a century.

Respondent also chose not to deny his intimidating announcement to introduce in the coming
sessions of Congress, among the first measures, one for the change of the members of the
Supreme Court and for the latter's complete reorganization.

He has not explained or justified why he has to intimidate the members of the Supreme Court
with change and reorganization, and why, to make the intimidation more dreadful, he had to
announce the horrible course of subverting and trampling down the Constitution, as all who can
read and understand the fundamental law know that it is beyond the powers of Congress to
reorganize and change the membership of the Supreme Court.

Because the announcement is highly subversive, being aimed at shaking the very foundations
of this Republic, it could have been no less terrible than for the respondent to have announced
an intention to attain his purposes by resorting to open rebellion. The fact that respondent is a
lawyer and a senator aggravates his flaunted purpose to assault the very Constitution he has
sworn to obey and defend.

We have devoted considerable time to respondent's answer.

As first defense, respondent alleges that he made the written press statement, not as a lawyer
or as a private citizen, but as a senator. He avers a senator should have ample liberty to discuss
public affairs and should not be annoyed with contempt proceedings.

Now law or valid authority has been invoked in support of the theory, unless we could
countenance a fictitious maxim that respondent is the sovereign. The theory lacks even the
merit of novelty. Long before the claim of respondent that, because he is a senator, he is above
the law, Mussolini, Hitler and all the tyrants and dictators who preceded them since the dawn of
history had always claimed that they were above they law and acted as if they were really so.
Unfortunately for respondent, senators are creatures of the Constitution and the Constitution
makes them amenable to law.

As a second defense, respondent alleges that, not having appeared either as attorney or a
witness in the Parazo case, he cannot be held either for direct or for indirect contempt.

The defense is based on stark ignorance of the law on the subject.

Respondent alleges, as third defense, that he made his statement with "utmost good faith," with
"no intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable members of the High Tribunal,"
and that he has not attacked nor intended to attack the honesty or integrity of any one.

This allegation lacks sincerity in view of his imputation, among several others equally false and
calumnious, that the majority members of the Supreme Court have committed many blunders
and injustices deliberately." The slanderous imputation can only be attributed to bad faith.

As another defense, respondent questions the validity of the penal provisions of Rule 64,
implying that said penalties are not procedural in nature, and invoking the provisions of section
13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, limiting the rule-making power of the Supreme Court to
matters of pleading, practice, and procedure in courts, and to the admission to the practice of
law.

Respondent's contention can be easily disposed of by quoting the following provisions of Act
No. 190:

SEC. 231. What Contempts of Court may be Punished Summarily. — A court of First Instance
or a judge of such court at chambers, may punish summarily, by fine not exceeding two hundred
pesos, or by imprisonment not exceeding ten days, or both, a person guilty of misbehavior in the
presence of or so near the court or judge as to obstruct administration of justice, including the
refusal of a person present in court to be sworn as a witness or to answer as a witness when
lawfully required.

SEC. 232. What Other Acts are Contempts of Court. — A person guilty of any of the following
act any be punished as for contempt:

1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment of command of a

court, or injunction granted by a court or judge;

2. Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties, or in his official
transactions;

3. A failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

4. The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue
of an order or process of the court held by him.

5. The persons defeated in a civil action concerning the ownership or possession of real estate
who, after being evicted by the sheriff from the realty under litigation in compliance with
judgment rendered, shall enter or attempt to enter upon the same for the purpose of executing
acts of ownership or possession or who shall in any manner disturb possession by the person
who the sheriff placed in possession of said reality.

SEC. 235. Trial of the Charge. — Upon the day fixed for the trial, the court shall proceed to
investigate the charge and shall hear any answer or testimony which the accused may make or
offer.

SEC. 236. Punishment if Found Guilty. — The court shall then determine whether the accused
is guilty off the contempt charged; and, if it be adjudged that he is guilty, he may be fined not
exceeding one thousand pesos, or imprisoned not more than six months, or both. If the
contempt consist in the violation of an injunction, the person guilty of such contempt may also
be ordered to make complete restitution to the party injured by such violation.

Therefore, even on the false hypothesis that penalties for contempt are not procedural in nature,
courts of justice may impose said penalties, if not under Rule 64, under the provisions of Act No.
190.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in courts of justice. It springs from the very nature
of their functions. Without such power, courts of justice would be unable to perform effectively
their functions. They function by orders. Every decision is a command. The power to punish
disobedience to command is essential to make the commands effective.

Respondent is in error in maintaining that the Supreme Court has no power to enact Rule 64,
He is correct in calling it judicial legislation although he fails to remember that judicial legislation
in matters of judicial practice and procedure is expressly authorized by section 13 of Article VIII
of the Constitution.

As a last defense, respondent invokes the constitutional freedom of the press, which includes
the right to criticize judges in court proceedings.

Respondent, undoubtedly, misses the point, and his citations about said freedom, with which we
fully agree, have absolutely no bearing on the question involved in these proceedings.

No one, and the members of the Supreme Court would be the last to do so, has ever denied
respondent the freedom of the press and his freedom to criticize our proceedings, this Court and
its members. Respondent's statement goes much further than mere criticism of our decision and
the majority members of this Court. The statement is an attempt to interfere with the
administration of justice, to miscarry and defeat justice, by trammelling the freedom of action of
the members of the Supreme Court, by bullying them with the menace of change,
reorganization, and removal, upon the false accusation that they have been committing
"blunders and injustices deliberately," and the menacing action constitutes a flagrant violation of
the Constitution. Such a thing is not covered by the freedom of the press or by the freedom to
criticize judges and court proceedings, as no one in his senses has ever conceived that such
freedom include any form of expressed gangterism, whether oral or written.

The freedom of the press is not involved in these proceedings. To assert otherwise is to
mislead. What is at stake in these proceedings is the integrity of our system of administration of
justice and the independence of the Supreme Court and its freedom from any outside
interference intended to obstruct it or to unduly sway it one way or another.

The freedom of the press is one of the causes which we have always endeared. The repeated
prosecution and persecutions we have endured in the past for its sake — we have been hailed
to court eight times, — are conclusive evidence of the firm stand we have taken as defender of
such freedom. It can be seen from official records that every acquittal handed down to us by the
Supreme Court had been a new step forward and new triumph for the freedom of the press. (U.
S. vs. Perfecto, 42 Phil., 113 Sept. 9, 1921; U.S. vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil., 58, March 4, 1922; U. S.
vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil., 887, March 4, 1922.) That stand has remained the same, as can be
shown in our written opinion in another contempt proceedings in the Ben Brillantes case, which
failed to attract public attention at the time.

Among the facts which we cannot ignore in deciding this case, are the following:

1. That this is not the first time respondent has been brought to a court of justice, for a grave
misbehavior and for perpetrating stark falsehoods. In a decision by the Supreme Court of
September 6, 1918, respondent was removed from the office of attorney-at-law and
incapacitated from exercising the legal profession. He was found guilty of:

(a) Lack of fidelity to clients;

(b) Blackmailing, by abusing his position as director of a newspaper whose columns he used to
blacken the reputation of those who refused to yield to demands made by him in his business as
lawyer;

(c) Publication of malicious and unjustifiable insinuations against the integrity of a judge who
had fined him for the crime of libel;

(d) Giving false testimony or perjury. (38 Phil., 532.)

2. On September 24, 1918, the Supreme Court sentenced respondent to imprisonment for libel,
for besmirching the honesty of three private individuals, Lope K. Santos, Jose Turiano Santiago
and Hermenegildo Cruz with false charges. (38 Phil., 666.)
3. After having been cited for contempt in these proceedings, respondent, in order to pose as a
martyr for the freedom of the press, waged a campaign of viturperation against the Supreme
Court. He made repeated press statements and delivered speeches in his home province to
show that he cannot expect justice from the Supreme Court, that the Supreme Court will
imprison him, that he will be imprisoned for the sake of the freedom of the press, thereby posing
as a false martyr for it.

4. In his persecutory obsession, respondent would make all believe that, contrary to fact, the
writer of this opinion is the moving spirit behind these contempt proceedings and that the
Supreme Court is acting merely as a tool. Apparently, respondent was irked by his failure to sit
even for a single moment in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, because of our objection. The
publicity given to our objection has exposed the illegality of respondent's designation made by
the Senate President as, under section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, the power to choose
Senators for the Electoral Tribunal belongs to the Senate, and not to its presiding officer. At the
bar of public opinion, the Senate President and respondent appeared either to be ignorant of the
Constitution or to be bent on flagrantly violating it.

5. Respondent is the number of the bill which was enacted into Republic Act No. 53, but the
purposes of his bill were thwarted by an amendment introduced by the Senate, denying the
privilege granted therein when in conflict with the interest of the Senate. Respondent's bill was
for an absolute privilege. Because the majority decision of the Supreme Court had made his
failure patent, respondent took occasion to give vent to his grudge against the Supreme Court,
wherein, of the 15 cases he had since liberation, he lost all except three, as can be seen in the
records of the following cases:

L-23, Filomena Domiit Cabiling vs. The Prison Officer of the Military Prison of Quezon City

LOST

L-212, Narcisa de la Fuente vs Fernando Jugo, etc. et al.

WON

L-247, Monsig. Canilo Diel vs. Felix Martinez, etc. et al.

WON

L-301, In the matter of the petition of Carlos Palanca to be admitted a Citizen of the Philippines

LOST
(As amicus curiae

L-307, Eufemia Evangelista et al. vs. Rafael Maninang

LOST

L-599, Amalia Rodriguez vs. Pio E. Valencia et al.

LOST

L-1201, Vicente Sotto vs. Tribunal del Pueblo et al.

LOST

L-1287, Ong Sit vs. Edmundo Piccio et al.

LOST

L-1365, Vitaliano Jurado vs. Marcelo Flores

LOST

L- 1509, Tagakotta Sotto vs. Francisco Enage

LOST

L-1510, Bernarda Ybañez de Sabido et al. vs. Juan V. Borromeo et al.

LOST

L-1938, Vicente Sotto vs. Crisanto Aragon et al.

WON

L-1961, The People of the Philippines vs. Antonio de los Reyes

LOST

L-2041, Quirico Abeto vs. Sotero Rodas

LOST

L-2370, Voltaire Sotto vs. Rafael Dinglasan et al.

LOST

Upon the records of his previous cases in 1918 and of these proceedings, it is inevitable to
conclude that we have before us the case of an individual who has lowered himself to
unfathomable depths of moral depravity, — a despicable habitual liar, unscrupulous vilifier and
slanderer, unrepented blackguard and blackmailer, shameful and shameless libeler, unmindful
of the principles of decency as all hardened criminals. He is a disgrace to the human species.
He is a shame to the Senate.

Aghast at the baseness of his character, we felt, at first blush, the impulse of acquitting him, as
his contemptible conduct, culminating in the press statement in question, seemed compatible
only with the complete irresponsibility of schizophrenics, idiots, or those suffering from doddery.

His repeated press releases in which he tried to focus public attention to the most harmless part
of his statement, wherein he accuses the majority of the Supreme Court of incompetency or
narrow-mindedness, have shown, however, that respondent is not completely devoid of
personal responsibility, as he is aware that he has no possible defense for alleging that the
members of the Supreme Court have committed "blunders and injustices deliberately," for which
reason he has widely publicized his expectation that he will be sentenced in this case to
imprisonment, a penalty that, by his repeated public utterances, he himself gives the impression
that he is convinced he deserves.

Verily he deserves to be sentenced to six months imprisonment, the maximum allowed by Rule
64, and such penalty would not be heavy enough because of the attendance of several
aggravating circumstances, namely, the falsehoods he resorted to in this case, his insolence
after he was cited for contempt, the fact that he is a lawyer and a Senator, the fact that he has
already been sentenced to imprisonment for falsely libeling three private individuals, the fact
that more than 30 years ago he had been disbarred as a blackmailer, the fact that more than 40
years ago he was sentenced to be jailed for more than 4 years as an abductor. The majority of
this Court has sentenced a young and humble newspaperman to 30 days imprisonment only for
refusing to answer a question. The offense committed by respondent is much graver than a
mere refusal to answer a question.

We concur, however, in the decision imposing upon respondent a fine of P1,000 with subsidiary
imprisonment and ordering him to show cause why he should not be completely deprived of the
privilege of practicing the profession of a lawyer. High reasons of humanity restrained us from
sending respondent to prison, unless he should voluntarily choose to enter therein, instead of
paying the fine. He is old and, according to his physician, suffering from myologenous leukemia
with moderately severe anemia, requiring absolute and avoidance of any from of mental and
physical strain, and we do not wish to endanger respondent's life by sending him to prison, and
thus causing him the mental and physical strains which his physician advised him to avoid.
Although the continued existence of respondents is more harmful than beneficial to our Republic
and to human society, we have to be consistent with our abidance by the injunction of the
Sermon on the Mount: "Thou shalt not kill." (Matth., Chapter 5, paragraph 21.) Although their
segregation from the society of decent men is advisable because of the dangers of corruptive
contamination, even the lives of moral lepers have to be spared. After all, the heaviest
punishment for an evildoer is the inherent stigma of shame of his evildoings.
Let it be clear that we are not punishing respondent because we want to curtail his freedom of
the press, but because of his wanton interference in the independence of the Supreme Court his
overt attempt to deprive us of our freedom of judgment in a pending case, his swashbuckling
bravado to intimidate the members of this Court to sway their decision in favor of a litigant.

The freedom of the press is not in the least involved in these proceedings. The offensive
statements has not been published by respondent as a newspaperman, editor or journalist. He
does not appear to be a member of the staff of any one of the newspapers which published his
statement. We did not even molest said newspapers. Their editors have not been cited for
contempt. We did not interfere with their freedom to publish the scurrilous statement.

If respondent has not attempted by his browbeating to undermine and overthrow the very
foundations of our judicial system and actually sought to defeat and miscarry the administration
of justification in a pending litigation, we would certainly have abstained from summoning him
merely for criticizing, insulting and slandering the members of the Court. After all his reputation
for lack of veracity, malice and unscrupulosity is well-known in official records branding him with
the indelible stigma of infamy.

His blatant posing, therefore, in this case as a martyr for the freedom of the press, as part of his
systematic campaign of falsehoods and slanders directed against the Supreme Court, is an
imposture that only ignorants, blockheads and other mental pachyderms can swallow.

It takes too much effrontery for such a character as respondent to pose as a martyr and no less
than for the sake of a sacred cause, the freedom of the press, which no one has no much
dishonored with his blackmailing practices and by his long list of cases in the courts of justice,
starting as far back as 1901. (Julia vs. Sotto, 2 Phil., 247; U. S. vs. Sotto, 9 Phil., 231; In re
Sotto, 38 Phil., 532; U. S. vs. Sotto, 38 Phil., 666; R.G. No. 201; U. S. vs. Sotto, R.G. No.
11067; U. S. vs. Sotto, R.G. No. 14284; U. S. vs. Vicente Sotto, R.G. No. 16004; People vs.
Vicente Sotto, R.G. No. 23643.)

Respondent belongs to that gang of unprincipled politicians headed by a Senate President who
trampled down the popular will by the arbitrary and unconstitutional suspension of Senators
Vera, Diokno and Romero (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192), who issued the false certification as
to the voting of the congressional resolution regarding the infamous Parity Amendment, thus
perpetrating falsification of public document (Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1), who muzzled
the people by ordering, in usurpation of executive powers mayors all over the country not to
allow the holding of public meetings which the opposition had organized to denounce the frauds
in the elections of November 11, 1947 (Cipriano C. Primicias, as General Campaign Manager of
the Coalesced Minority Parties vs. Valeriano E. Fugoso, as Mayor of the City of Manila, 80 Phil.,
71) who wantonly violated the Constitution by interfering with the management of the funds of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal (Suanes vs. The Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil., 819),
who, again in violation of the fundamental law, usurped the exclusive powers of the Senate
when he designated respondent to sit in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and who crowned his
misdeeds by enunciating on Saturday, January 15, 1949, the most immoral political philosophy
— that of open toleration of rackets, graft and corruption in public office.

According to Rizal, the victims immolated in the altar of great ideals, to be acceptable, have to
be noble, spotless and pure. They should, therefore, be as noble and pure as Socrates, Christ,
Joan of Arc, Lincoln, Bonifacio, Mabini, Gandhi and Rizal himself. Then and only then will
martyrdom be hallowed and glorified because it is will worthy of the effulgent grandeur of sacred
ideals. "Hate never produces anything but monsters and crime criminals!" Love alone realizes
wonderful works, virtue alone can save! Redemption presupposes virtue, virtue sacrifice, and
sacrifice love! Pure and spotless must the victim be that the sacrifice may be acceptable!" (El
Filibusterismo.)

Respondent complains in his answer that he is not accorded fair dealing because the writer of
this opinion has not abstained from taking part in this case. The complaint is absolutely
groundless. It is based on two false premises, concocted by respondent to make it appear that
he is a victim of persecution, and on a conclusion, also false, because based on the two false
premises.

Respondent alleges that there are pending in the Supreme Court certain charges he filed
against the writer and that the undersigned is the "moving spirit" behind these proceedings.
Both trump-up allegations are false, and the Supreme Court has declared it to be so in its
resolution of December 13, 1948.

The records of the Supreme Court show that no such charges have been filed. Respondent
ought to know, if he can read and understand the Constitution, that if he has any charge to file
against a justice of the Supreme Court to seek his ouster, he has to file it with the House of
Representatives, the only agency authorized by the fundamental law to institute impeachment
proceedings.

If the House of Representatives should institute it, the respondent will have the opportunity to sit
in judgment as a senator as, under the Constitution, the Senate is the sole tribunal on cases of
impeachment.

No justice with full sense of responsibility should commit a dereliction of official duty by inhibiting
himself in a case upon imaginary or fabricated grounds. The members of the Supreme Court
are not such moral weaklings as to easily yield to dishonest appeals to a false sense of
delicacy. A cowardly surrender to groundless challenges of unscrupulous parties is unbecoming
to a judge, and much more to a Justice of the Highest Tribunal of the Republic.

It is true that, after respondent had failed to sit in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, because we
objected to the designation issued to him by Senate President Avelino on constitutional
grounds, he requested the Chief Justice to relieve us one of the members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, and respondent would make it appear that for his move we are prejudiced
against him.
He is absolutely wrong. His request to the Chief Justice did not disturb us the least. The
Constitution does not grant anyone the power to oust, replace, or dismiss any member of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, judicial or senatorial, during his term of office in the Tribunal.
Although an illegal substitution has been made once in the case of Senators Sebastian and
Cuenco, such precedent did not make constitutional what is unconstitutional, and the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court has made clear his stand to uphold the Constitution by stating it in
black and white in the decision he penned in the Suanes case L-2460. Respondent's failure was
so obvious for us to mind his move.

After all, should we waste time and energy by entertaining any kind of prejudice against
respondent, when there are so many great minds, beautiful characters, and wonderful
personalities that are demanding our attention and whose spiritual companionship makes life
enjoyable?

If we had entertained any prejudice against respondent, we would have meted out to him the
penalty of imprisonment which he well deserves ,without minding the ill consequences it may
entail to his health and life and without heeding the promptings of our pity and sense of
humanity. Fortunately, very many years have already elapsed since we acquired the state of
mind with which we can judge things and persons with an open and free conscience, truly
emancipated from the shackles of any prejudice. The hateful events during the Japanese
occupation were the best mycelium for spawning and the choicest fertilizers for growing
prejudices against Generals Yamashita and Homma, to the extent of justifying any measure or
action that would spell their doom. Immediate members of our family and ourselves endured
agonizing sufferings and some of our near relatives were liquidated under their regime. But
when Yamashita and Homma came to this Supreme Court, seeking remedy against the
absurdly iniquitous procedure followed by the military commissions which tried them, so
iniquitous that it closed to the Japanese generals all chances of fair trial, no scintilla of prejudice
precluded us from casting the lone vote intended to give them the remedy and justice they
sought for, notwithstanding the fact that Yamashita and Homma, appeared, in the general
consent of our people, to be veritable monsters of cruelty and murder. Certainly, respondent
would not pretend having given us, if ever, stronger grounds for prejudice than Yamashita and
Homma, or that he is worse than both of them.

We are not to end this opinion without expressing our steadfast addiction to the following
propositions:

1. The independence of the judiciary from outside interference or obstruction is essential to the
effectively of its functions so that it can afford protection to fundamental rights including the
freedom of the press, against encroachments and illegal assaults.

2. The freedom of the press includes the right to comment on pending judicial cases and the
right to criticize the public and private life of all public officers, without any exception.
3. The freedom of the press does not, however, safeguard any publication intended to bully
courts and judges in order to sway their judgment on pending cases, and such interference and
obstruction should be promptly and drastically checked for the sake of an effective
administration of justice.

4. Tribunal should be prompt in stopping the threatening and browbeating tactics of swaggering
political ruffians and cutthroats bend on thwarting the scale of justice, as the opposing
alternative to such a stern judicial attitude is surrendered to judicial anarchy.

5. Courts of justice annealed to face and ever ready to deal vigorously with attempts to turn
them into puppets of domineering would-be dictators are essential in maintaining the reign of
law and guaranteeing the existence of an orderly society.

This opinion has been written to modify and clarify our stand in concurring in the decision.